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Trans. JSASS Space Tech. Vol. 7, No. ists26, pp. Tg_11-Tg_20, 2009

Non-U.S. Human Space Transportation Failures

By I-Shih CHANG and E. Joe TOMEI

The Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, California, U.S.A. (Received April 17th, 2008) Non-U.S. human space transportation history from 1961 through 2007 is reviewed. Past and present non-U.S. human space programs and human vehicles and are briefly discussed. Category and chronological list of non-U.S. human space missions are presented. The emphasis of the study is on the investigation of mission failures and major anomalies encountered in non-U.S. human space transportation history. Failures and major anomalies by part, root cause, element, function, domain, and component are analyzed. Failure outcome, failure mode, time of failure, and mission reliability relevant to flight safety analysis are examined. Findings and failure mitigation strategy are summarized.

Key Words: Space Launch, Human Space Flight, Failure and Anomaly

1. Introduction human space flights have ever been conducted outside the U.S. Therefore, only orbital human space launch systems To expand human presence, activity, and habitation (, , and in /USSR, and beyond , new launch vehicles and crew CZ-2F in ) and their associated space flight systems exploration vehicles are being developed by several (Vostok, Voskhod, and Soyuz in Russia/USSR, and space-fairing nations for human space transportation. The in China) are considered in the study. new vehicles will incorporate modern space technologies Human space flight requires an expansion of space to meet stringent requirements for crew safety in space transportation systems. For purposes of this study human launch operation and space flight environment. space flight can be categorized into several transportation Anticipated expansion in to phases. They are the launch phase, earth and lunar would also contribute to increased demand for reliable on-orbit phases, lunar transfer and return phases, surface human space transportation systems. Human space launch exploration phase, entry and landing phases, and lunar and flight are dangerous, expensive, and technically ascent phase. Human space flight also includes static, challenging. The success of this new endeavor relies upon in-situ habitation phases both on the lunar surface and on the application of knowledge and experience gained from board space stations. There are also a variety of related prior human space programs. topics worthy of investigation, including uncrewed flights The study is concerned with all non-U.S. human space in support of human space flights (developmental, missions and is a portion of a continuing effort 1)-14) to logistics, etc.), animal space flights, and human investigate the failure causes and corrective actions of the deployment. All of these are to be addressed by the larger world space launch and flight systems and to provide project being undertaken. This paper will limit its lessons learned from the past in order to mitigate space discussion to the primary transportation phases. Several mission failures in the future. The prior work has been additional papers would be needed to contain all of the concentrated on failures. The current collected material. project is intended to examine the failure history of all The paper starts with a brief description of non-U.S. human space flights focusing on transportation and is a human space transportation history, followed by category subset of overall space missions. and chronological list of non-U.S. human space missions The focus of the study is on human space mission and identification of space mission failures and major failures and major anomalies in order to better understand anomalies. Analysis of mission failures and anomalies by the ramifications of the human space transportation record part, root cause, element, function, domain, and on the new human space programs. The objective of the component are presented. Failure outcome, failure mode, study is to apply knowledge and experience gained from time of failure, and mission reliability relevant to flight prior non-U.S. human space programs to the development safety analysis are examined. Findings and failure of reliable human space launch vehicles and spacecraft in mitigation strategy are summarized at end of the paper. the future. 3. Non-U.S. Human Space Transportation History 2. Overview Human space flight started when the USSR launched a This paper summarizes the history of non-U.S. human Vostok vehicle carrying to a low-earth orbit space transportation failures since the inception of the on 1961-04-12. Shortly afterwards, the U.S. launched a first human space flight in 1961. Past and present non-U.S. vehicle carrying in a Mercury human space launch systems and their associated for a suborbital flight on 1961-05-05 and an flight systems are considered. No suborbital or lunar LV-3B carrying John Glenn for an orbital flight on

Copyright© 2009 by the Japan Society for Aeronautical and Space Sciences and ISTS. All rights reserved. Tg_11 Trans. JSASS Space Tech. Japan Vol. 7, No. ists26 (2009)

1962-02-20. Some 42 years after the first human space (1971-1982), (1976-2001), and International Space flight, China launched a CZ-2F vehicle carrying Yang Station (1993-present) are part of the overall project, but Liwei for an orbital flight on 2003-10-15. Currently, will not be considered in this paper. Russia/USSR, the U.S., and China are the only three Fig. 1 shows non-U.S. human space launch vehicles and human space-faring countries in the world. spacecraft. The Russia/USSR launch vehicles usually bore Non-U.S. human orbital space programs include Vostok, the same names as their first spacecraft. The Vostok is the Voskhod, and Soyuz in Russia/USSR and Shenzhou in world first spacecraft carrying humankind to space. The China. In Russia/USSR, the Vostok program started in Voskhod spacecraft completed the missions with the first late 1956. The first human orbital mission with a Vostok human spacewalk and the first multi-person crew in space. was carried out in 1961, and the last occurred in 1963. The Soyuz spacecraft is the workhorse for carrying The Voskhod program started in the early 1960s, humans to space stations including OPS, Salyut, following the cancellation of the Vostok program. The Mir, and International . The Chinese first Voskhod human orbital mission was carried out in Shenzhou spacecraft resembles a larger version of the 1964; and the last occurred in 1965. The Soyuz program Soyuz, but contains a powered for started in 1963 and was originally a part of the continuous flight in space for earth observations after unsuccessful USSR landing project. The first crewed-capsule reentry. human orbital mission with a Soyuz was carried out in 1967. The Soyuz spacecraft has gone through several 4. Non-U.S. Human Space Missions revisions and enhancements in the last four decades and is still in use today. In China, the human space program As of 2007-12-31, Russia/USSR human space started in 1992 and the first human orbital mission was exploration mission count is 105, which includes 6 Vostok, carried out with the Shenzhou-5 spacecraft in 2003. 2 Voskhod, and 97 Soyuz orbital missions; China human Other than the successful programs mentioned in the mission count is 2, both performed by previous paragraph, there were also cancelled human CZ-2F/Shenzhou missions. Table 1 lists all non-U.S. space programs: L1 circumlunar (1960-1970), L3 lunar human space missions. The human-cost of access to space (1964-1974), TKS ferry (1965-1978), Spiral for Russia/USSR includes one Soyuz crewmember during (1965-1976), LKS spaceplane (1975-1983), reentry in 1967 and two Soyuz crewmembers during and spaceplane (1976-1993) in USSR; Shuquang reentry in 1971. One (1968-1872) and Piloted FSW (1978-1980) in China. A comprehensive database has been developed at The Other cancelled human space flight programs include Aerospace Corporation to log the entire space launch and Japan’s HOPE (1980s-2003), Europe’s /Phoenix flight history. Data is collected from multiple sources and (1987-1993). Currently, there are new human including journal papers, public access sites, publications space transportation systems being developed: Crew and an assortment of other historical data references Space Transportation System (CSTS) started in 2006 published by The Aerospace Corporation and other jointly by Russia, Europe, and Japan; Space Jet (started in organizations 15)-24). A significant part of the database 2007) by Europe; Human System (started in compilation process consists of reviewing and comparing 2006) by India; and Virgin Galactic (U.K.) sponsored the various sources, identifying conflicts and resolving SpaceShipTwo project. The space habitation programs inconsistencies. The data entries have been populated for involving Almaz orbital piloted stations (OPS), Salyut the small launch vehicles 9)-10), heavy launch vehicles 13),

Fig. 1. Russia/U SSR human space launch vehicles, spacecraft, lunar module, and rover (drawings reprinted courtesy of NASA)

Tg_12 I-S. CHANG and E. J. TOMEIT: Non-U.S. Human Space Transportation Failures

Table 1. Non-U.S. human space launch log No. Launch Date LV SC No. Launch Date LV SC No. Launch Date LV SC Russia/USSR (Orbital Flights) 39 1979-02-25 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 78 1994-01-08 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-18 1 1961-04-12 SL-3 (Vostok) 40 1979-04-10 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 79 1994-07-01 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-19 2 1961-08-06 SL-3 (Vostok) Vostok 2 41 1980-04-09 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 80 1994-10-04 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-20 3 1962-08-11 SL-3 (Vostok) Vostok 3 42 1980-05-26 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 81 1995-03-14 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-21 4 1962-08-12 SL-3 (Vostok) Vostok 4 43 1980-06-05 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz T-2 82 1995-09-03 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-22 5 1963-06-14 SL-3 (Vostok) Vostok 5 44 1980-07-23 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 83 1996-02-21 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz TM-23 6 1963-06-16 SL-3 (Vostok) Vostok 6 45 1980-09-18 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 84 1996-08-17 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz TM-24 7 1964-10-12 SL-4 (Voskhod) 46 1980-11-27 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz T-3 85 1997-02-10 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz TM-25 8 1965-03-18 SL-4 (Voskhod) 47 1981-03-12 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz T-4 86 1997-08-05 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz TM-26 9 1967-04-23 SL-4 (Soyuz) 48 1981-03-22 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 87 1998-01-29 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz TM-27 10 1968-10-26 SL-4 (Soyuz) 49 1981-05-14 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 88 1998-08-13 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz TM-28 11 1969-01-14 SL-4 (Soyuz) Soyuz 4 50 1982-05-13 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz T-5 89 1999-02-20 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz TM-29 12 1969-01-15 SL-4 (Soyuz) Soyuz 5 51 1982-06-24 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz T-6 90 2000-04-04 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz TM-30 13 1969-10-11 SL-4 (Soyuz) 52 1982-08-19 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz T-7 91 2000-10-31 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz TM-31 14 1969-10-12 SL-4 (Soyuz) 53 1983-04-20 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz T-8 92 2001-04-28 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz TM-32 15 1969-10-13 SL-4 (Soyuz) 54 1983-06-27 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz T-9 93 2001-10-21 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz TM-33 16 1970-06-01 SL-4 (Soyuz) 55 1983-09-26 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz T-10A 94 2002-04-25 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz TM-34 17 1971-04-23 SL-4 (Soyuz) Soyuz 10 56 1984-02-08 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz T-10B 95 2002-10-30 SL-4 (Soyuz-FG) Soyuz TMA-1 18 1971-06-06 SL-4 (Soyuz) 57 1984-04-03 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz T-11 96 2003-04-26 SL-4 (Soyuz-FG) Soyuz TMA-2 19 1973-09-27 SL-4 (Soyuz) 58 1984-07-17 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz T-12 97 2003-10-18 SL-4 (Soyuz-FG) Soyuz TMA-3 20 1973-12-18 SL-4 (Soyuz) 59 1985-06-06 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz T-13 98 2004-04-19 SL-4 (Soyuz-FG) Soyuz TMA-4 21 1974-07-03 SL-4 (Soyuz) 60 1985-09-17 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz T-14 99 2004-10-14 SL-4 (Soyuz-FG) Soyuz TMA-5 22 1974-08-26 SL-4 (Soyuz) 61 1986-03-13 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz T-15 100 2005-04-15 SL-4 (Soyuz-FG) Soyuz TMA-6 23 1974-12-02 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 62 1987-02-05 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-2 101 2005-10-01 SL-4 (Soyuz-FG) Soyuz TMA-7 24 1975-01-10 SL-4 (Soyuz) 63 1987-07-22 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-3 102 2006-03-30 SL-4 (Soyuz-FG) Soyuz TMA-8 25 1975-04-05 SL-4 (Soyuz) Soyuz 18A 64 1987-12-21 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-4 103 2006-09-18 SL-4 (Soyuz-FG) Soyuz TMA-9 26 1975-05-24 SL-4 (Soyuz) Soyuz 18B 65 1988-06-07 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-5 104 2007-04-07 SL-4 (Soyuz-FG) Soyuz TMA-10 27 1975-07-15 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) Soyuz 19 66 1988-08-29 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-6 105 2007-10-10 SL-4 (Soyuz-FG) Soyuz TMA-11 28 1976-07-06 SL-4 (Soyuz) 67 1988-11-26 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-7 29 1976-09-15 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 68 1989-09-05 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-8 30 1976-10-14 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 69 1990-02-11 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-9 31 1977-02-07 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 70 1990-08-01 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-10 32 1977-10-09 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 71 1990-12-02 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-11 CHINA (Orbital Flights) 33 1977-12-10 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 72 1991-05-18 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-12 C1 2003-10-15 CZ-2F 34 1978-01-10 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 73 1991-10-02 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-13 C2 2005-10-12 CZ-2F 35 1978-03-02 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 74 1992-03-17 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-14 36 1978-06-15 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 75 1992-07-27 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-15 37 1978-06-27 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 76 1993-01-24 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-16 38 1978-08-26 SL-4 (Soyuz-U) 77 1993-07-01 SL-4 (Soyuz-U2) Soyuz TM-17

launch failure in-flight failure on-pad failure The date is Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). and human space transportation vehicles 11). The database systematic look at mission successes as well as failures, for human space transportation has been expanded to including scrutiny of various launch vehicle and comprise crew module, , re-entry module, spacecraft subsystems, can shed light on precise areas that lunar module, and lunar rover of space transportation might be at the root of many problems. This type of study systems, in addition to solid motor stages, liquid engine can also help suggest what actions to take to address those stages, hybrid motor stages, , and ground problems. Where data is available, failures and anomalies equipment of space launch systems. For each system, are further identified by the defective part. Table 3 shows mission failures and major anomalies are identified and failures and anomalies by part for Russia/USSR human examined. As mentioned previously, the database also space missions. Rendezvous system, docking system, and includes entries for space station, docking module, fueling separation system defects appear to be major sources of module, extravehicular unit, and uncrewed support failure and anomaly. The unknown failure is associated missions. These data will be incorporated into future with the Soyuz mission on 1983-09-26. The unknown papers and in the overall project report. anomalies are associated with 2 Vostok and 5 Soyuz The following sections will analyze Russia/USSR missions. The database is developed to assess launch human space mission failures and anomalies. vehicle failure and anomaly data and to understand causes and trends of flight failures and anomalies. Table 4 5. Russia/USSR Mission Failures & Major Anomalies defines the legends used in the database and in the figures contained in this paper. A space mission failure is an unsuccessful attempt to For this study, human space transportation failure and place a payload in the intended orbit or to perform a anomaly data are combined into a single analysis. Due to planned space activity or mission. A major anomaly is a the large quantity, the anomaly data dominates the results. near miss in launch or flight even when the mission was The anomalies addressed in this paper are those considered successful. Out of 105 Russia/USSR human determined to be significant enough to be considered space missions since 1961, there were 1 on-pad, 1 launch, major. In the database each major anomaly is weighted as and 11 in-flight mission failures. Failures are categorized an estimate of severity but for the purposes of this paper as catastrophic (3), mission abort (9), launch mishap (1). all anomalies are treated equally. In addition, those The causes of Russia/USSR human space mission failures considered minor or out-of-family anomalies are not are listed in Table 2, which includes the Soyuz on-pad addressed. Judgment and historical evidence are used in failure. Research has identified 31 Russia/USSR human assigning anomaly weight. space flight major anomalies (not including space Failures and anomalies can have their roots in any habitation events). These are distributed: Vostok (6), phase of launch vehicle and spacecraft development. The Voskhod (4), and Soyuz (21). Analysis of space mission root causes (design, analysis, process, random, or failures is critical to a space program’s future success. A workmanship) of mission failure and anomaly are shown

Tg_13 Trans. JSASS Space Tech. Japan Vol. 7, No. ists26 (2009)

Table 2. Russia/USSR human space mission failures

No. Launch Date Failure Date Orbit LV SC Mission 1 1967-04-23 1967-04-24 LEO SL-4 (Soyuz) Soyuz 1 Soyuz 7K-OK s/n 4 2 1968-10-26 1968-10-26 LEO SL-4 (Soyuz) Soyuz 3 Soyuz 7K-OK s/n 10 3 1969-10-12 1969-10-12 LEO SL-4 (Soyuz) Soyuz 7 Soyuz 7K-OK s/n 15 4 1969-10-13 1969-10-13 LEO SL-4 (Soyuz) Soyuz 8 Soyuz 7K-OK s/n 16 5 1971-04-23 1971-04-23 LEO SL-4 (Soyuz) Soyuz 10 Soyuz 7K-OKS s/n 31 6 1971-06-06 1971-06-29 LEO SL-4 (Soyuz) Soyuz 11 Soyuz 7K-OKS s/n 32 7 1974-08-26 1974-08-26 LEO SL-4 (Soyuz) Soyuz 15 Soyuz 7K-TA9 s/n 63 8 1975-04-05 1975-04-05 LEO SL-4 (Soyuz) Soyuz 18A Soyuz 7K-T s/n 39 9 1976-10-14 1976-10-14 LEO SL-4 (Soyuz U) Soyuz 23 Soyuz 7K-TA9 s/n 65 10 1977-10-09 1977-10-09 LEO SL-4 (Soyuz U) Soyuz 25 Soyuz 7K-T s/n 42 11 1979-04-10 1979-04-10 LEO SL-4 (Soyuz U) Soyuz 33 Soyuz 7K-T s/n 49 12 1983-04-20 1983-04-20 LEO SL-4 (Soyuz U) Soyuz T-8 Soyuz T-8 13 1983-09-26 1983-09-26 LEO SL-4 (Soyuz U) Soyuz T-10A Soyuz T s/n 16L

No. Failure Cause 1 Parachute failure due to a drag force design flaw led to the crash of Soyuz 1 and the death of the cosmonaut. 2 The failed docking was blamed on manual spacecraft orientation control error performed by the cosmonaut. 3 Automated rendezvous and docking system failed due to new helium pressurization integrity test prior to mission. 4 Automated rendezvous & docking system failed due to poor new pre-flight helium pressurization integrity test. 5 Automatic docking system failed and the cosmonauts had no instrument to provide data for a manual docking. 6 During reentry, air vent valves opened depressurizing the decent module; the crew lost consciousness and died. 7 Igla automated rendezvous and docking system failed 8 1st/2nd stage separation failed, vehicle veered off course, crew capsule ejected at 180 km and landed safely. 9 The crew returned after automatic docking system failed and no thruster fuel remained for a manual docking. 10 The crew returned to earth after repeated tries with the automated rendezvous and docking system failed. 11 The Soyuz spacecraft failed to dock with the Salyut space station due to the failure of main propulsion system. 12 The crew returned to earth after the automated docking system was damaged during shroud separation. 13 Vehicle exploded on at 90 sec before launch; two cosmonaute saved by the .

Table 3. Russia/USSR human space mission failures and anomalies by part

Part Failure Anomaly Part Failure Anomaly Part Failure Anomaly Rendezvous system 3 2 Separation bolts 1 1 Gyroscope 1 Antenna 1 Unknown 1 7 Hatch 1 Combustion chamber 1 Vent valve 1 Horizon sensor 1 Docking probe 1 Cable separation 4 Solar panel 1 Docking system 1 2 Retro 3 Spacesuit 1 Instrumentation 1 Guidance computer 2 Thermal control 1 Parachutes 1 Cabin layout 1 TPS 1 Propellant utilization 1 Environmental cartridge 1 Weather 1

Table 4. Human space transportation database legends

Element Component Failure Outcome 0-H Strap-on - Hybrid motor A/E Avionics/Electronic B Breakup 0-L Strap-on - Liquid engine C Crew De Death 0-S Strap-on - Solid motor E Electrical DP Damaged Payload 1-H First stage - Hybrid motor EC Environmental control E Explosion 1-L First stage - Liquid engine EN Engine EL Emergency Landing 1-S First stage - Solid motor FP Fluid/Pneumatic F Fire 2-H Second stage - Hybrid motor H Hydraulic I Impact 2-L Second stage - Liquid engine M Mechanical In Injury or Illness 2-S Second stage - Solid motor O Ordnance MF Mission Failure 3-H Third stage - Hybrid motor P Propellant N No Launch 3-L Third stage - Liquid engine S Structural NR No Recovery 3-S Third stage - Solid motor SM Solid motor O Wrong Orbit or Trajectory 4-H Fourth stage - Hybrid motor SWA Software computational algorithm R Reentry 4-L Fourth stage - Liquid engine SWD Software data input RD Range Safety Destruct 4-S Fourth stage - Solid motor SWL Software timing/memory control logic SD Self Destruct 5-H Fifth stage - Hybrid motor T Thermal protection U Unknown 5-L Fifth stage - Liquid engine U Unknown 5-S Fifth stage - Solid motor CM Crew Module DM Docking Module ER Escape Domain Failure Mode EV Extravehicular Unit ENV Environment CO Checkout test FM Fueling Module H/W Hardware F Fallback G Ground system S/W Software L Landing LM Lunar Module U Unknown MFT Malfunction turn O Operations OO On orbit failure PAF Payload Attach Fitting OT On trajectory failure PLF Payload Fairing P On pad failure RM Re-entry Module PF Failed to program (flies straight up) RoV Rover Vehicle SO Surface operation SM Service Module U Unknown SP SpacePlane SS Space Station SV Space Vehicle U Unknown

Tg_14 I-S. CHANG and E. J. TOMEIT: Non-U.S. Human Space Transportation Failures

Fig. 4. Russia/USSR human space mission failures and anomalies by function (continued) Root Cause A Analysis: An engineering error or flaw in the definition of the system design characteristics (hardware and/or software), or incorrect/insufficient analysis of system behavior that becomes the primary cause of a failure/anomaly. D Design: An engineering error or flaw in the definition of the system design characteristics (hardware and/or software), other than incorrect/insufficient analysis of system behavior that becomes the primary cause of a failure/anomaly. P Process: An engineering error or serious omission in the definition of manufacturing, installation, test, or operating procedures or criteria, or inaccurate communication of engineering intent that becomes the primary cause of a failure/anomaly. Or: A manufacturing/assembly error or misapplication of the system of checks and balances designed to screen out errors. R Random: An undectable fault that occurs randomly due to the inherent reliability characteristics of the hardware. W Workmanship: Hardware or software technicians missapply or ignore proper procedures by commission or omission resulting in error or defect that is the primary cause of a failure/anomaly. Can occur in manufacture, assembly, installation, inspection and test. Includes software data entry and pilot errors. U Unknown

Function C&C Ground command and control system: elements designed to command and control the launch vehicle operations prior to and during flight. ECLSS Environmental control: crew cabin, life support systems and equipment, flight suits, space suits, manned maneuvering units. ENV Environmental protection: elements designed to control or protect from launch or reentry induced environments; includes vibration, shock,acoustic, aerodynamic and thermal environments protection. EPDC Electrical: elements designed to provide electrical power generation, conditioning and distribution; includes power supplies, batteries, converters, inverters, sequencers, switches, relays, diodes, cabling and harnesses for carrying electrical power. GN&C Guidance, navigation and control: elements designed to measure position, velocity and attitude, determine motion necessary to reach desired positon or attitude, and issue steering and attitude commands; includes gyros, inertial measurement and navigation units, computers and associated software. GSE Ground support equipment: elements designed to support, interface, service, supply, restrain and release the vehicle prior to flight. LAND Landing systems: parachutes, drag brakes, impact bags, floats, tires. MECH Mechanism: docking adapters, holddown and release arms, remote manipulator system, landing gear. PROP Propulsion: elements designed to produce thrust and manage propellant supply; includes liquid engines, solid motors, propellant conditioning, feed and pressurization, propellant utilization, engine conditioning, controllers and igniters. SEP Separation: elements designed to perform vehicle staging and jettison; includes separation ordnance, springs, thrusters, motors, clamp bands, tiedowns, connecting devices and controllers. STRU Structures: elements design to carry or react vehicle loads or environments, provide mounting interfaces and environmental protection; includes skirts, thrust structures, bulkheads, interstages, adapters, shrouds, shields, covers, tanks and pressure vessels. T&FS Tracking and flight safety: elements designed to track, safe and destroy vehicle for public safety; includes transponders, receivers, ordnance, antennas and destruct and thrust termination devices. TLM Telemetry: elements designed to measure vehicle activity, condition data and transmit to ground stations; includes sensors, transducers, signal conditioners, instrumentation converters, multiplexers, combiners, transmitters and antennas. TV&AC Controls: elements designed to control direction, position and attitude; includes thrust vector control, engine gimbals, position actuators, position controllers, attitude control systems and devices, spin, despin and nutation damping elements. U Unknown in Fig. 2. The figure shows that 38.6% of all human space determine the distribution of failures and anomalies due to mission failures and anomalies are attributable to various sources. Fig. 4 shows failures and anomalies by engineering design defects with engineering process function. In the figure C&C stands for command and errors next highest at 15.9%. The 38.6% unknown root control, ECLSS for environmental control and life support, causes are associated with three Soyuz mission failures on ENV for environmental protection, EPDC for electrical 1975-04-05, 1977-10-09, and 1979-04-10 and 3 Vostok power, GN&C for guidance, navigation and control, and 11 Soyuz mission anomalies. Failures and LAND for landing system, MECH for mechanical, PAF anomalies can occur at any stage of launch and flight. Fig. for payload attach fitting, PROP for propulsion, SEP for 3 shows failures and anomalies by element. The number separation, STRU for structures, TLM for telemetry, on the abscissa stands for the stage number, S for solid TV&AC for thrust vector and attitude control, and Unk motor stage, H for hybrid stage, L for liquid engine stage, for unknown. Overall, GN&C (34.1%) caused the greatest CM for crew module, EV for extravehicular unit, G for number of Russia/USSR human space mission failures and ground system, LM for lunar module, O for operations, anomalies, followed by ECLSS (13.6%), separation PAF for payload attach fitting, RoV for rover vehicle, SM (13.6%), propulsion (11.4%) and TV&AC (11.4%). for service module, SP for spaceplane, SS for space Fig. 5 shows failures and anomalies by domain station (docking system in this case), and SV for space (hardware, software, or environment). Problems in vehicle. Because of Soyuz’s frequent flights, failures and hardware caused the majority of the failures and anomalies in the crew module (47.7%) stand out among anomalies for Russia/USSR human space missions. all the others, followed by payload attach fitting (22.7%) Overall, at least 61.4% of all failures and anomalies have and service module (20.5%). been caused by hardware. The 34.1% unknowns are Failures and anomalies are usually attributable to associated with five Soyuz mission failures on 1969-10-12, problems associated with a functional subsystem. The 1069-10-13, 1974-08-26, 1975-04-05, and 1976-10-14, sources of launch vehicle failures are defined into a and 2 Vostok and 8 Soyuz mission anomalies. comprehensive set of functional areas in order to

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Anomaly Failure

20 Design Process 38.6% 38.6% Random Wmanship 10 Unknown Number of Failures/Anomalies 15.9%

0 2.27% Analysis Design Process Random Wmanship Unknown 4.55% Root Cause percent

Fig. 2. Russia/USSR human space mission failures and anomalies by root cause

30

Anomaly Failure 4.55%

20 20.45%20.5% 1-L CM EV O 10 47.73% PAF 22.73% SM Number of Failures/Anomalies

0 2.27% G O EV SP SS SV 1-L 2-L 3-L LM SM 0-S 1-H 3-S CM

PAF RoV 2.27% Element

Fig. 3. Russia/USSR human space mission failures and anomalies by element

30

Anomaly 2.27% Failure 11.4% 13.6% 2.27% C&C 20 ECLSS 2.27% ENV 13.6% GN&C LAND MECH 10 PROP SEP 34.1%

Number of Failures/Anomalies TLM 11.4% TV&AC

0 6.82% Unk PAF SEP TLM ENV C&C LAND

STRU 2.27% EPDC PROP GN&C MECH ECLSS Function TV&AC percent

Fig. 4. Russia/USSR human space mission failures and anomalies by function

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Anomaly 2.28% Failure

20

34.1% Environment Hardware 10 Software 59.1% Unknown Number of Failures/Anomalies

4.54% 0 Environment Hardware Software Unknown Domain percent

Fig. 5. Russia/USSR human space mission failures and anomalies by domain

Tg_16 I-S. CHANG and E. J. TOMEIT: Non-U.S. Human Space Transportation Failures

Failures and anomalies caused by hardware and programs 25). Fig. 11 compares the U.S., Russia/USSR, software malfunctions have also been categorized by and China human space mission reliabilities. component type. Fig. 6 shows failures and anomalies by component. In the figure, A/E stands for 7. Summary and Conclusions Avionics/Electronic, C for crew, E for electrical, EC for environmental control, EN for engine, FP for The results of investigation of human space fluid/pneumatic, H for hydraulic, M for mechanical, O for transportation history shown in this paper helps to reveal ordnance, P for propellant, S for structures, SM for solid the most common causes of non-U.S. human space motor, SWD for software data input, SWL for software mission failures and anomalies and should be useful to timing/memory control logic, T for thermal protection, implement strategies to avoid similar failures in the future WE for weather, and Unk for unknown. While both for new and existing programs. Engineering design avionics/electronic (A/E) defects (34.1%) have the and process errors remain the greatest threat to non-U.S. greatest single impact on human space mission failures human space mission success. Many past mission failures and anomalies, mechanical (18.2%) and environmental could have been prevented if rigorous mission assurance control (13.6%) malfunctions are also major contributors measures had been taken. to mission failures and anomalies. The 3 unknowns are The study on non-U.S. human space transportation associated with 1 Vostok and 2 Soyuz mission anomalies. failures is mainly concerned with the Russia/USSR missions. The disastrous failure of the lunar vehicle 6. Flight Safety Data program and early cancellation of the crewed /Buran mission in Russia/USSR were remarkable Flight safety analysis uses failure outcome, failure contrast to the enormous success of the V vehicle mode, time of failure, and mission reliability to assess program and repeatable operations of the crewed Space future potential risk of like systems. In addition to data for Transportation System (STS)/Shuttle mission in the U.S. mission failure and anomaly analysis shown in the Considering the fact that the (120 missions previous section, data relevant to flight safety analysis is as of 2007-12-31) can carry up to 7 crew members and the included in the study. Fig. 7 shows the outcomes of Soyuz (97 missions as of 2007-12-31) can carry only 3, Russia/USSR human space mission failure. All the the number of transported by the U.S. vehicles failures are associated with the Soyuz missions. In the to LEO is far more than the number of cosmonauts figure, failure outcomes are categorized as breakup (B), transported by the Russia/USSR vehicles. The STS is explosion (E), fire (F), impact (I), mission technologically much more advanced (albeit more unaccomplished (MF), no launch (N), wrong orbit (O), expensive) than the Soyuz vehicle which has used reentry (R), range safety destruct (RD), self destruct (SD), essentially the same primitive design since 1967. The damaged payload (DP), and unknown (Unk). Overall, study shows that the U.S. leads in both number of mission unaccomplished (69.2%) and reentry failures missions and mission reliability. The Russia/USSR human (15.4%) constitute most of the observed outcomes. Fig. 8 space transportation capability is limited, but there has not shows the modes of failure. In the figure, failure modes been any mission failure since 1984. are defined as fallback (F), landing (L), malfunction turn A large number of mission failures (7 out of 13) and (MFT), on-orbit (OO), on-trajectory (OT), on-pad (P), and anomalies (14 out of 31) in Russia/USSR missions have unknown (Unk) failure. On-orbit failures (69.2%) are been associated with the crew module involving observed to be the most commonly occurring failure mode, rendezvous and docking systems. This may be due to followed by landing failures (15.4%). Fig. 9 shows the Russia/USSR vehicles relying on automatic systems rather times of failure. At least 3 out of 13 failures are known to than human flight controls. In addition, Russia/USSR occur at the end of mission. One failure (Soyuz T-10A) human space flight missions concentrated to a greater occurred on-pad. Times of failure are not known for 9 out extent on and space station of 13 Soyuz mission failures. missions than those of the U.S.; hence the number of The yearly mission success and failure data and the rendezvous and docking anomalies is a product of the type demonstrated mission reliability of all Russia/USSR of missions flown. The type of human space human space missions are shown in Fig. 10. It can be seen transportation vehicle has not changed over the past 47 from the figure that after initial successes in early 1960s, years as the Russia/USSR space program has never flown USSR human space missions suffered significant setback an operational, human-crewed spaceplane or human space in middle and late 1960s and in early . The huge flight beyond low Earth orbit. success of the U.S. Saturn/ program The benefit of escape rocket was demonstrated in completely overshadowed the USSR human space projects saving the Soyuz T-10A crew during a on-pad failure. throughout 1970s and early 1980s. The Russia/USSR Two catastrophic failures involving 3 casualties occurred human space programs attained a 87.15% mission during reentry in Russia/USSR missions. In addition to reliability with 92 successes out of 105 attempts, the human cost during these two flight failures, two comparing to a 93.70% mission reliability with 158 pre-launch catastrophic failures of uncrewed missions successes out of 168 attempts for the U.S. human space resulted in the death of at least 4 technicians.

Tg_17 Trans. JSASS Space Tech. Japan Vol. 7, No. ists26 (2009)

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Anomaly 6.82% A/E Failure 2.27% 2.27% E 4.55% EC 20 EN 4.55% FP 34.1% 2.27% M 2.27% O P 10 SM 18.2% SWL Number of Failures/Anomalies T 2.27% WE 0 Unk T P S E H C O M FP EC EN 13.6% SM WE A/E

Unk 2.27% SWL

SWD 4.55% Component

Fig. 6. Russia/USSR human space mission failures and anomalies by component

20

18 Failure 7.69% 16 7.69% 14 15.4% 12

10 E I 8 MF

Number of Failures 6 R

4

2 69.2%

0 B E F I MF N O R RD SD Unk Outcome percent

Fig. 7. Russia/USSR human space mission failure outcome

20

18 Failure 7.69% 16 7.69% 14 15.4% 12 L 10 OO 8 OT

Number of Failures 6 P

4

2 69.2%

0 F L MFT OO OT P Unk Mode percent

Fig. 8. Russia/USSR human space mission failure mode

20

18 Failure 7.69% 16 7.69% 14

12

10 P above 300 8 15.4% End/Mission

Number of Failures 6 Unknown 69.2% 4

2

0 P 0-100 100-200 200-300 above 300 End/Mission Unknown Failure Time (sec) percent

Fig. 9. Russia/USSR human space mission time of failure

Tg_18 I-S. CHANG and E. J. TOMEIT: Non-U.S. Human Space Transportation Failures

100 40

90 35

Russia/USSR 80 30

70 25

60 20 Country Reliability Success Rate Russia/USSR failure Russia/USSR 87.15% 92 / 105 = 87.62% Russia/USSR success 50 15 Number of Launches Mission Reliability (%) 40 10

30 5

20 0 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Calendar Year

Fig. 10. Russia/USSR human space mission reliabilities

100 40

U.S. 90 35

Russia/USSR 80 30 China

70 25

60 China success 20 Country Reliability Success Rate Russia/USSR failure U.S. 93.70% 158 / 168 = 94.05% Russia/USSR success Russia/USSR 87.15% 92 / 105 = 87.62% 50 U.S. failure 15 China 79.37% 2 / 2 = 100.00% U.S. success Number of Launches Mission Reliability (%) 40 10

30 5

20 0 2006 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Calendar Year

Fig. 11. Comparison of U.S. and non-U.S. human space mission reliabilities

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The China human space program is still in its infancy, 6) Chang, I-Shih: Overview of World Space Launches, AIAA J. of but seems to be well-constructed. No Chinese human Propulsion and Power, 16 (2000), pp.853-866. 7) Chang, I-Shih: Space Launch Vehicle Reliability (update), space mission anomalies have been reported in open Crosslink, The Aerospace Corporation magazine of advances in literature, albeit only two missions have been conducted aerospace technology, Spring 2005. as of 2007-12-31. Like other space and military programs 8) Chang, I-Shih, E. Joe Tomei: Solid Rocket Failures in World Space in China, the human space program in China is not Launches, AIAA 2005-3793, Tucson, AZ, 11 July 2005. transparent and is heavily shrouded in secrecy. However, 9) Tomei, E. Joe, I-Shih Chang: Survey of U.S. Small Launch Vehicle Failures, ISTS-2006-a-22, Kanazawa, Japan, 7 June 2006. the determination of the Chinese government to further 10) Chang, I-Shih, E. Joe Tomei: Survey of Non-U.S. Small Launch develop the human space transportation capability to Vehicle Failures, ISTS-2006-a-23, Kanazawa, Japan, 7 June 2006. enhance her national pride is well documented. 11) Tomei, E. Joe, I-Shih Chang, A. W. Joslin, M. Adams, A. B. As mentioned in the Introduction section, human space Cozart: Assessment of U.S. Human Space Launch and Flight launch and flight are still dangerous, expensive, and Programs, IAC-06-D2.4.10, Valencia, Spain, 3 Oct. 2006. 12) Joslin, A. W., I-Shih Chang, E. Joe Tomei, M. Adams, S. A. technically challenging for both U.S. and non-U.S. Frolik: Considerations for Testing Programs for U.S. Future missions since the first human space flight carried out in Crewed Exploration Flight Vehicles, IAC-07-D1.5.5, Hyderabad, 1961. The meager human space transportation experience India, 27 Sep. 2007. gained during these 47 years is the only precious data that 13) Tomei, E. Joe, I-Shih Chang: Heavy Launch Vehicle Failure humankind has for the past thousands of years of History, IAC-08-D1.5.3, Glasgow, Scotland, U.K., 2 Oct. 2008. 14) Joslin, A. W., I-Shih Chang: Environmental Testing Program dreaming to go above the Earth to reach the sky. Considerations for Future Crewed Exploration Flight Vehicles, Application of knowledge and experience gained from IAC-08-D1.5.5, Glasgow, Scotland, U.K., 2 Oct. 2008. these human space programs shown in this paper, its 15) Baalke, R.: http://www2.jpl.nasa.gov/calendar/calendar.html, accompanying paper 25), and other related documents is Space Calendar. crucial for mitigating risks in future travel to immense 16) McDowell, J. J.: http://www.planet4589.org/space/jsr/jsr.html, Jonathan's Space Report (1989-2007). space above the Earth’s atmosphere and to the Moon, 17) Wade, M.: http://www.astronautix.com/, Encyclopedia planets, and beyond. Astronautica (1997-2007). 18) Kyle, E.: http://geocities.com/launchreport/slr.html, Space Launch References Report (1998-2007). 19) Thompson, T. D.: Space Log 1957-1996, TRW Inc., Redondo Beach, CA, July 1997. 1) Chang, I-Shih: Investigation of Space Launch Vehicle Catastrophic 20) Isakowitz, S. J., J. P. Hopkins, J. B. Hopkins, Jr.: International Failures, AIAA J. of Spacecraft and Rockets, 33 (1996), pp. Reference Guide to Space Launch Systems, 1st-4th editions, AIAA 198-205. Publications, Washington, D.C., 2004. 2) Chang, I-Shih: SRM Failures in World Space Launches, 21) http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/home/index.html Proceedings of the Solid Rocket Motor Failure Investigation 22) http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/main/index.html Workshop, AIAA JPC, Cleveland, Ohio, 13 July 1998. 23) http://www.scaled.com/projects/tierone/ 3) Chang, I-Shih, S. Toda, S. Kibe: Chinese Space Launch Failures, 24) Portree, D.: Mir Hardware Heritage, NASA RP 1357, March 1995. ISTS-2000-g-08, Morioka, Japan, 31 May 2000. 25) Tomei, E. Joe, I-Shih Chang: U.S. Human Space Transportation 4) Chang, I-Shih, S. Toda, S. Kibe: European Space Launch Failures, Failures, ISTS-2008-g-11, Hamamatsu, Japan, 3 June 2008. AIAA 2000-3574, Huntsville, AL, 18 July 2000. 5) Patel, N., I-Shih Chang: U.S. Solid Rocket Nozzle Anomalies, AIAA 2000-3575, Huntsville, AL, 18 July 2000.

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