Perek IV Daf 46 Amud a

HALAKHA The Gemara raises a difficulty: If the water was previously not in its current ָ ּכל שׁ ֶ ֵ ןּכ דְּהָ ווּלְ הוּנֹולָ ד דַּאֲסִ ירִ י! Flowing water, even state, all the more so should it be considered as something that came : י מָ ם ִ ז ֹורְ מִ י ם – Flowing water if it is privately owned, has the legal status of the person who draws it. The wording of the Gemara into being [nolad] on the Festival, and consequently it is prohibited to indicates that if the water is moving, as in the case carry it. Something that came into being or assumed its present form on . of flowing spring water, it has the legal status of Shabbat or Festivals is considered set-aside [muktze] and may not be .the person who draws it even if it does not leave its handled on Shabbat or Festivals מו place (Shulĥan Arukh, Oraĥ Ĥayyim 397:15). Rather, we should say: The water in clouds is in constant motion and אֶ ָאּל מַּיָא בְּעָבִ ים מֵ ינַד נָיְידִ י. הָשְׁ ָּ תא The halakha is in accordance with the lenient therefore does not acquire residence there. The Gemara comments:Now דְּאָתֵית לְהָכִי – אֹוקְיָינֹוס נַמִי לָא הֲ לָ כָ ה ְ ּכדִ בְ רֵ י – opinion with regard to an eiruv : Even a sleeping person establishes that you have arrived at this answer, the ocean should also not be dif- לִ י ְשׁ קוּ לָךְ,מַּיָא בָּ אֹוקְיָינֹוס נַמִ י מֵ ינַד ּהַמֵיקֵל בְּעֵירוּב residence for the purpose of walking two thou- ficult for you,as the water in the ocean is also in constant motion. And it was taught in a baraita: Flowing rivers and streaming springs are like נַיְידִ י. וְתַ נְיָא: נְהָ רֹות הַ ּמֹושׁ ְכִ ין וּמַעְ יָינֹות sand cubits in each direction, since the halakha is the feet of all people, as their waters do not acquire residence in any הַ ּנֹובְעִ ין – הֲרֵ י הֵ ן ּכְרַ גְלֵ י כָ ל אָדָ ם. in accordance with the opinion of Yoĥanan ben Nuri. However, ownerless objects have the H halakhic status of the person who finds them and particular place. The same law also applies to clouds and seas. do not establish residence on their own, because -Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The ha אָמַר רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידִ י, אָמַר רַבִּי the halakha is in accordance with the leniency of N ,lakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoĥanan ben Nuri יְהֹושׁ ֻעַ בֶּ ן לֵוִ י: הֲ לָכָ ה ּכְרַ יבִּ יֹוחָ נָן בֶּ ן נוּרִ י. .(both opinions (Shulĥan Arukh, Oraĥ Ĥayyim 401:1 that one who was asleep at the beginning of Shabbat may travel two thou- אֲמַ ר לֵ ּיה רַ בִּ י זֵ ירָ א לְרַ בִּ י יַעֲ קֹב בַּ ר אִ ידִ י: sand cubits in every direction. Rabbi said to Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi: בְּ פ ֵירוּשׁשְׁמִ יעַלָךְ, אֹו מִ ּכְלָלָ א שְׁמִ יעַ NOTES The halakha is in accordance with the opinion Did you hear this halakha explicitly from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, or לָךְ ? אֲמַ ר לֵ ּיה: בְּ ֵ פירוּשׁ שׁ ְמִ יעַ לִ י. ?did you understand it by inference from some other ruling that he issued הֲלָכָ ה ּכ יְרַבִּ יֹוחָנָן בֶּ ן – of Rabbi Yoĥanan ben Nuri .If the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi said to him: I heard it explicitly from him : נ ּ ו רִ י Yoĥanan ben Nuri only when he is lenient, and ?The Gemara asks: Fromwhat other teaching could this ruling be inferred מַ אי ּכְלָלָ א? רדְּאָמַ ירַבִּ יְהֹושׁ ֻעַ בֶּ ן לֵוִ י: the halakha is in accordance with the only where a leniency is involved, such as with regard :The Gemara explains: From that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said הֲלָכָ ה ּכְדִבְרֵ י הַ ֵּ מי ֵ קל בְּעֵ ירוּב. to ownerless utensils, the result is two contradic- The halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to tory leniencies. Some commentaries answer that an eiruv.HN perhaps we rule in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoĥanan ben Nuri, but not for his rea- The Gemara asks:Why do I need both? Why was it necessary for Rabbi ְ ו תַ רְ ּ ֵ תי לָ ּ ָ מה לִ י ? son. Rather, since a sleeping person can establish residence when awake, he can also do so when Yehoshua ben Levi to state both the general ruling that the halakha is in asleep; a sleeping person establishes residence accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to an eiruv, and also the where he is. Ownerless objects, however, never specific ruling that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of establish residence (Rashba; Ritva). Rabbi Yoĥanan ben Nuri on this issue? The halakha is in accordance with the lenient Rabbi Zeira said: Both rulings were necessary, as had he informed us אָמַ ר רַבִּי זֵירָ א: צְרִ יכִי, דְּאִ י אַשְׁמַעִינַן הֲ לָ כָ ה ְ ּכדִ בְ רֵ י – opinion with regard to an eiruv only that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi הֲ לָכָ ה ּכְרַ יבִּ יֹוחָ נָן בֶּ ן נוּרִ י – הֲ וָ ה אָמִ ינָא The earlier and later commentaries : ּהַמֵיקֵל בְּעֵירוּב discuss this principle, limiting it in several ways: Yoĥanan ben Nuri, I would have said that the halakha is in accordance בֵּ ין לְ ק ָ ּוּלא וּבֵ ין לְ חוּמְרָ א, ָ קא מַשׁ ְמַ ע לָ ן: They maintain that it applies only to an eiruv, but with him whether this is a leniency, i.e., that a sleeping person acquires -residence and may walk two thousand cubits in every direction, or wheth הֲלָכָ ה ּכְדִבְרֵ י הַ ֵּ מי ֵ קל בְּעֵ ירוּב. not to partitions, because the laws of partitions have a source in the Torah (Rivash). They further er it is a stringency, i.e., that ownerless utensils acquire residence and can state that this principle does not apply to cases of unresolved dilemmas. Since the Sages did not be carried only two thousand cubits from that place. Consequently, he resolve these dilemmas by applying this principle, teaches us that the halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion leniency cannot be presumed (Baĥ, based on the with regard to an eiruv, so that we rule in accordance with Rabbi Yoĥanan Rif). The principle also cannot be applied if the ben Nuri only when it entails a leniency. doubt arises from two different explanations of The Gemara asks: Let him state only that the halakha is in accordance וְלֵ ימָ א: “הֲ לָכָ ה ּכְדִבְרֵ י הַ ֵּ מי ֵ קל בְּעֵ ירוּב״, -the same statement (Baĥ). Some early commen taries claim that this principle refers only to dis- with the lenient opinion with regard to an eiruv. Why do I need the “הֲלָכָ ה ּכ יְרַבִּ יֹוחָ נָן בֶּ ן נוּרִ י״ לָ ָּ מה לִ י? putes among the tanna’im, since their statements statement that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi were known to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi and he could decide among them, but not to the words Yoĥanan ben Nuri? of amora’im (Ra’avad; see Hagahot HaRosh; Me’iri). -The Gemara answers: This ruling was necessary as well, for had he in אִ יצְטְרִ יךְ, סָלְ ָ קא דַּעֲתָךְ אָמִ ינָא: הָנֵי formed us only that the halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion ּמִילֵי – יָחִיד בִּמְקֹום יָחִיד, וְרַבִּים with regard to an eiruv, it might have entered your mind to say that this בִּמְ קֹום רַ בִּ ים. אֲבָ ל יָחִ יד בִּמְ קֹום רַ בִּ ים – statement applies only to disputes in which a single authority disagrees -with another single authority, or several authorities disagree with sev אֵ י מָ א לָ א . eral other authorities. But when a single authority maintains a lenient opinion against several authorities who maintain a more stringent posi- tion, you might have said that we do not rule in his favor. Hence, it was necessary to state that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoĥanan ben Nuri although he disputes the Rabbis.

, said to : Now, since the laws of eiruvin are rabbinic in origin אֲמַ ר ּלֵיה רָבָ א לְאַבַּיֵי: מִ ּכְדִ י, עֵירוּבִין what reason is there for me to differentiate between a disagreement of a דְּרַבָּנַן, מַ ה ּלִי יָחִ יד בִּמְ קֹום יָחִ יד וּמַ ה single authority with a single authority and a disagreement of a single ִ ּלי יָחִ יד בִּמְ קֹום רַבִּ ים? authority with several authorities? ׳ד קרפ .ומ ףד . Perek IV . 46a 238 HALAKHA - said to Rava: Is there no difference with regard to rab אֲמַ ר לֵ ּיה רַ ב ַּפ ָּ פא לְרָבָ א: וּבִדְרַבָּנַן לָ א binic laws between a disagreement of a single authority with a A woman for whom it is enough that she be impure from the time she saw – : A woman שָׁנֵי לָן בֵּ ין יָחִ יד בִּמְ קֹום יָחִ יד לְיָחִ יד ָּׁהאִש ּשֶׁדַּיָיה ּשְׁעָתָה single authority, and a disagreement of a single authority with approaching menopause who passes three expected ִ בּ מְ ק ֹו ם רַ ִבּ י ם ? several authorities? menstrual cycles without experiencing bleeding and then sees blood is regarded as ritually impure only from Didn’t we learn in a mishna that Rabbi Elazar says: Any woman the time that she examines herself and experiences וְהָתְנַן, רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אֹומֵר: ּכָל אִ ּשָׁה who passed three expected menstrual cycles without experiencing menstrual flow. However, the law concerning a young שׁ ֶעָבְ רוּ עָלֶ יהָ שׁ ָ לֹשׁ עֹונֹות – דַּ ּיָ ּיה bleeding is presumed not to be menstruating. If afterward she sees woman is different. She is retroactively ritually impure for שׁ ְ ָ ע ָ ת ּה . blood, it is enough that she be regarded as ritually impure due to up to twenty-four hours, in accordance with the opinion menstruation from the time that she examined herself H and saw that of the Rabbis (Rambam Sefer Tahara, Hilkhot Metamei she had a discharge, rather than retroactively for up to twenty-four Mishkav UMoshav 4:1). : שׁ ְ מ ּ ו עָ ה ֹו קְר בָ ה ו ּ רְ ח ֹו ָ קה – hours. The Rabbis, however, maintain that thishalakha applies only A proximate and a distant report to an older woman or to a woman after childbirth, for whom it is One who receives a proximate report of the death of a natural to stop menstruating, but not to a normal young woman for close relative practices both the mourning customs ob- served for seven days and those observed for thirty days. whom three periods have passed without bleeding. One who receives a distant report practices mourning And it was taught in a baraita: It once happened that Rabbi Yehuda customs for only one day, with part of a day considered to be an entire day. Some authorities rule that although וְתַ נְיָא: מַעֲשֶׂ ה וְעָשָׂ ה רַבִּ י ּכְרַבִּ י אֶ לְעָ זָ ר. HaNasi ruled that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the laws governing the seven-day mourning period are לְאַ חַ ר שׁ ֶ ּנִזְ ַ ּכר אָמַ ר: ּכְדַ י הוּא רַ בִּ י אֶ לְעָ זָ ר Rabbi Elazar. After he remembered that Rabbi Elazar’s colleagues not practiced in the case of a distant report concerning לִסְ מֹוךְ עָלָ יו בִּשׁ ְעַ ת הַדְּחָ ק. disagree with him on this matter and that he had apparently ruled a father or mother, the other laws of mourning are ob- incorrectly, he nonetheless said: Rabbi Elazar is worthy to rely served (Ramban; Shulĥan Arukh, Yoreh De’a 402:1). upon in exigent circumstances.N NOTES The Gemara comments: What is the meaning of: After he remem- The nature of : ִ ּ ב שׁ ְ ַ ע ת ַ ה ְ ּ ד ָח ק – In exigent circumstances מַ אי “לְאַחַ ר שֶׁ ּנ ַ ִּזְכר״? אִ ילֵ ימָ א לְאַחַ ר bered? If you say that it means after he remembered that the ha- the exigent circumstance referred to here is discussed שׁ ֶ ּנ ַ ִּזְכר דְּאֵ ין הֲלָכָ ה ּכְרַבִּ י אֶלְעָזָר, אֶ ָ ּלא lakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar but by the commentaries (see and Tosafot). Tosafot ּכְרַבָּנַן – בִּשְׁעַת הַדְּחָק הֵיכִי עָבֵיד rather in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, then how explain that it refers to a case where the questioner de- could he rule in accordance with him even in exigent circum- parted, and it would be nearly impossible to find him ּכְוָותֵ ּיה? stances, given that the halakha had been decided against him? and inform him that there had been a mistaken ruling.

-Rather, it must be that the halakha had not been stated on this mat אֶ ָ ּלא: דְּלָ א אִ ּיתְמַ ר הִלְכְתָ א לֹא ּכְרַבִּ י ter, neither in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, nor in אֶ לְעָ זָ ר וְ לֹא ּכְרַ בָּ נַן, לְאַחַ ר שׁ ֶ ּנִזְ ַ ּכר דְּ לָ או accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And after he remem- יָחִ יד ּפָלֵ יג עֲלֵ ּיה אֶ ָ ּלא רַ בִּ ים ּפְלִ יגִ י עֲלֵ ּיה, bered that it was not a single authority who disagreed with Rabbi Elazar, but rather several authorities who disagreed with him, he אָמַ ר: ּכ יְדַ הוּא רַ יבִּ אֶ לְעָ רזָ לִסְ מֹוךְ עָלָ יו nonetheless said: Rabbi Elazar is worthy to rely upon in exigent ִ ּ ב שׁ ְ ַ ע ת ַ ה ְ ּ ד ָח ד circumstances. This demonstrates that even with a dispute that in- volves a rabbinic decree, such as whether a woman is declared ritu- ally impure retroactively, there is room to distinguish between a disagreement of a single authority and a single authority, and a dis- agreement of a single authority and several authorities.

Rav Mesharshiya said to Rava, and some say it was Rav Naĥman ראֲמַ ברַ מְשַׁרְשִּׁיָא לְרָבָ א, וְאָמְרִ י לָ ּה bar Yitzĥak who said to Rava: Is there no difference with regard רַ ב נַחְמָ ן בַּ ר יִצְחָ ק לְרָבָ א: וּבִדְרַבָּנַן לָ א to rabbinic laws between a disagreement of a single authority with שָׁנֵי בֵּ ין יָחִ יד בִּמְ קֹום יָחִ יד, בֵּ ין יָחִ יד a single authority, and a disagreement of a single authority with ?several authorities ִ בּ מְ ק ֹו ם רַ ִבּ י ם ?

Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: If a person receives a proximate report וְהָתַ נְיָא: שׁ ְ מוּעָ ה ְ ק הרֹובָ נֹוהֶ גֶ ת שׁ ִבְעָ ה that one of his close relatives has died, he practices all the customs ְ וּשׁ ִ לֹשׁ ים, רְ חֹו ָ קה – אֵ ּ ינָהנֹוהֶגֶת אֶ ָ ּלא of the intense seven day mourning period as well as the customs of יֹום אֶחָ ד. the thirty day mourning period. But if he receives a distant report, he practices only one day of mourning.

What is considered a proximate report, and what is considered a יוְאֵ זֹו הִ יא ְ קרֹובָ הוְאֵ יזֹו הִ יא רְ חֹו ָ קה? distant report? If the report arrives within thirty days of the close בְּתֹוךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים – קְרֹובָה, לְאַחַר relative’s passing, it is regarded as proximate, and if it arrives after שְׁ לֹשִׁ ים – רְ חֹוָ קה, דִּבְרֵ י רַבִּי עֲקִיבָ א. thirty days it is considered distant; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. But the Rabbis say: Both in the case of a proximate report וַחֲכָמִ ים אֹומְרִ ים: אַחַ ת שׁ ְ מוּעָ ה ְ קרֹובָ ה and in the case of a distant report,H the grieving relative practices תוְאַחַ שְׁ מוּעָה רְ חֹוָ הק נֹוהֶגֶת שִׁבְעָה .the seven-day mourning period and the thirty-day mourning period ּ ו שׁ ְ לֹ שׁ ִ י ם .

And Rabba bar bar Ĥana said that Rabbi Yoĥanan said: Wherever וְאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה, אָמַר רַבִּי you find that a single authority is lenient with regard to a certain יֹוחָנָן: ּכָל מָ קֹום שֶׁאַ ָ ּהת מֹוצֵא יָחִיד halakha and several other authorities are stringent, the halakha is מֵ יֵ קל וְרַבִּ ים מַחְמִ ירִ ין – הֲלָכָ ה ּכְדִבְרֵ י in accordance with the words of the stringent authorities, who constitute the majority, except for here, where despite the fact that הַמַחְמִירִ ין, הַמְ רוּבִּ ים. חוּץמִ ּזֹו, שׁ ֶאַ ף the opinion of Rabbi Akiva is lenient and the opinion of the Rabbis עַל ּפִי שֶׁרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא מֵיקֵל וַחֲכָמִים is more stringent, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of מַחְמִ ירִ ין – הֲלָכָ ה ּכְדִבְרֵ י רַבִּ י עֲ ִ קיבָ א. Rabbi Akiva. Perek IV . 46a 239 . ׳ד קרפ .ומ ףד NOTES -And Rabbi Yoĥanan holds like Shmuel, as Shmuel said: The ha וְסָבַ ר לָ ּה ּכִשׁ ְ מוּאֵ ל, דְּאָמַ ר שׁ ְ מוּאֵ ל: The halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion Even a sleeping person estab- lakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to :הֲלָכָ ה ּכְדִבְרֵ י הַ ֵּ מי ֵ קל בְּעֵ ירוּב – The nature of the exigent to an eiruv : ִ ּ ב שׁ ְ ַ ע ת ַ ה ְ ּ ד ָח ק – In exigent circumstances N הֲלָכָ ה ּכְדִבְרֵ י הַ ֵּ מי ֵ קל בְּאֵבֶ ל. -The ra :הֲ לָכָ ה ּכְדִ בְרֵ י הַ ֵּ מי ֵ קל בְּאֵ בֶ ל – with regard to mourning NOTES circumstance referred to here is discussed by the commentaries (see lishes residence for the purpose of walking two thousand cubits in tionale for this principle is that according to most commen- mourning practices, i.e., wherever there is a dispute with regard to Rashi and Tosafot). Tosafot explain that it refers to a case where the each direction, since the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoĥanan taries and halakhic authorities, the mandate for mourning mourning customs, the halakha is in accordance with the lenient questioner departed, and it would be nearly impossible to find him Rabbi Yoĥanan ben Nuri. However, ownerless objects have the halakhic ben Nuri – : If the halakha is in accordance with practices is not from Torah law. In addition, all the particulars opinion. and inform him that there had been a mistaken ruling. status of the person who finds them and do not establish residence הֲלָכָ ה ּכ יְרַבִּ יֹוחָ נָן בֶּ ן נוּרִ י Rabbi Yoĥanan ben Nuri only when he is lenient, and the halakha is of the laws of mourning are certainly instituted by rabbinic on their own, because the halakha is in accordance with the leniency in accordance with the Rabbis only where a leniency is involved, such The halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion in regard to law, and consequently, the halakha is lenient about them. From here the Gemara infers: It is only with regard to mourning בַּאֲבֵילוּת הוּא דְּאַ ק ִּילוּ ּבָּה רַבָּנַן, .(of both opinions (Shulĥan Arukh, Oraĥ Ĥayyim 401:1 The rationale for this principle Nevertheless, certain limitations apply. For example, the practices that the Sages were lenient, but in general, with regard :הֲלָכָ ה ּכְדִבְרֵ י הַ ֵּ מי ֵ קל בְּאֵבֶ ל – as with regard to ownerless utensils, the result is two contradictory mourning אֲ בָ ל בְּ עָ לְ מָ א – אֲ ִ פי ּל ּ ו ִ בּ דְ רַ ָ בּ נַ ן שׁ ָ נִ י principle applies to the laws of mourning but not to the leniencies. Some commentaries answer that perhaps we rule in ac- is that according to most commentaries and halakhic authorities, the A woman for whom it is enough that she be impure from the time to other areas of halakha, even in the case of rabbinic laws there is בֵּין יָחִיד בִּמְקֹום יָחִיד, בֵּין יָחִיד laws of rending one’s garments over the death of a relative A woman approaching menopause a difference between a disagreement of a single authority with a : ָּׁהאִש ּשֶׁדַּיָיה ּשְׁעָתָה – cordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoĥanan ben Nuri, but not for his mandate for mourning practices is not from Torah law. In addition, she saw ִ בּ מְ ק ֹו ם רַ ִבּ י ם . reason. Rather, since a sleeping person can establish residence when all the particulars of the laws of mourning are certainly instituted by who passes three expected menstrual cycles without experiencing (Ramban; Baĥ). In addition, this principle applies to only awake, he can also do so when asleep; a sleeping person establishes rabbinic law, and consequently, the halakha is lenient about them. bleeding and then sees blood is regarded as ritually impure only from certain laws of mourning (Ramban; Rashba), and it is not single authority and a disagreement of a single authority with residence where he is. Ownerless objects, however, never establish Nevertheless, certain limitations apply. For example, the principle the time that she examines herself and experiences menstrual flow. operative with respect to an opinion that has been rejected several authorities. This being the case, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi residence (Rashba; Ritva). applies to the laws of mourning but not to the laws of rending one’s However, the law concerning a young woman is different. She is ret- by all authorities (Baĥ). did well to rule explicitly that the halakha is in accordance with the garments over the death of a relative (Ramban; Baĥ). In addition, this roactively ritually impure for up to twenty-four hours, in accordance The halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard opinion of Rabbi Yoĥanan ben Nuri, even though he is a single principle only applies to certain laws of mourning (Ramban; Rashba), with the opinion of the Rabbis (Rambam Sefer Tahara, Hilkhot Metamei to an eiruv – : The earlier and later commen- authority who ruled leniently in dispute with the Rabbis. .(and it is not operative with respect to an opinion that has been rejected Mishkav UMoshav 4:1 הֲלָכָ ה ּכְדִבְרֵ י הַ ֵּ מי ֵ קל בְּעֵ ירוּב taries discuss this principle, limiting it in several ways: They maintain by all authorities (Baĥ). -One who re : שׁ ְ מ ּ ו עָ ה ֹו קְר בָ ה ו ּ רְ ח ֹו ָ קה – that it applies only to an eiruv, but not to partitions, because the laws A proximate and a distant report of partitions have a source in the Torah (Rivash). They further state that ceives a proximate report of the death of a close relative practices both this principle does not apply to cases of unresolved dilemmas. Since the mourning customs observed for seven days and those observed the Sages did not resolve these dilemmas by applying this principle, HALAKHA for thirty days. One who receives a distant report practices mourning Flowing water, even if it is privately owned, customs for only one day, and part of a day is considered to be an Perek IV : י מָ ם ִ ז ֹורְ מִ י ם – leniency cannot be presumed (Baĥ, based on the Rif). The principle Flowing water also cannot be applied if the doubt arises from two different explana- has the legal status of the person who draws it. The wording of the entire day. Some authorities rule that although the laws governing the tions of the same statement (Baĥ). Some early commentaries claim Gemara indicates that if the water is moving, as in the case of flowing seven-day mourning period are not practiced in the case of a distant Daf 46 Amud b that this principle refers only to disputes among the tanna’im, since spring water, it has the legal status of the person who draws it even if report concerning a father or mother, the other laws of mourning are their statements were known to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi and he could it does not leave its place (Shulĥan Arukh, Oraĥ Ĥayyim 397:15). observed (Ramban; Shulĥan Arukh, Yoreh De’a 402:1). Rav Pappa said a different explanation for the fact that Rabbi וְרַב ַּפּפָא אָמַר: אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא decide among them, but not with regard to the words of amora’im The halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard Yehoshua ben Levi made both statements: It was necessary for דַּעֲתָךְ אָמִ ינָא: הָנֵי מִ ּילֵי – בְּעֵירוּבֵי .(Ra’avad; see Hagahot HaRosh; Me’iri) Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi to inform us that the halakha is in accor- חֲצֵ ירֹות, אֲבָ ל בְּעֵ ירוּבֵ י תְ חוּמִ ין – dance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoĥanan ben Nuri, because had he said only that the halakha follows the lenient opinion with regard אֵ ימָ א לָ א, צְרִ יכָ א. : -to an eiruv, it could have entered your mind to say that this state מו ment applies only with regard to the laws governing the eiruv of courtyards, which are entirely rabbinic in origin. But with regard to the more stringent laws governing the eiruv of Shabbat limits, you would have said that we should not rule leniently, and therefore it was necessary to make both statements.

The Gemara asks:And from where do you say that we distinguish וּמְנָא ּתֵימְרָא דְּשָׁנֵי לָן בֵּין עֵירוּבֵי between an eiruv of courtyards and an eiruv of Shabbat limits? As חֲצֵ ירֹות לְעֵ ירוּבֵ י תְ חוּמִ ין – דִּתְ נַן, we learned in a mishna that Rabbi Yehuda said: In what case is אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: ּבַּמֶה דְּבָרִים this statement said, that an eiruv may be established for another person only with his knowledge? It was said with regard to an eiruv אֲ מוּרִ ים – בְּעֵ ירוּבֵ י תְ חוּמִ ין, אֲבָ ל of Shabbat limits, but with regard to an eiruv of courtyards, an בְּעֵ יירוּבֵ חֲ צֵ ירֹות – מְעָרְבִ ין בֵּ ין לָדַ עַ ת eiruv may be established for another person whether with his וּבֵ ין שׁ ֶ ּלֹא לָדַ עַ ת, ֶ שׁ ּזָכִ ין לָאָדָ ם שׁ ֶ ּלֹא knowledge or without his knowledge, as one may act in a person’s בְּ ָ פנָיו, וְאֵ ין חָבִ ין לָאָדָ ם אֶ ָ ּלא בְּ ָ פנָיו. interest in his absence; however, one may not act to a person’s disadvantage in his absence. One may act unilaterally on someone else’s behalf when the action is to that other person’s benefit; how- ever, when it is to the other person’s detriment, or when there are both advantages and disadvantages to him, one may act on the other person’s behalf only if one has been explicitly appointed as an agent. Since an eiruv of courtyards is always to a person’s benefit, it can be established even without his knowledge. However, with re- gard to an eiruv of Shabbat limits, while it enables one to walk in one direction, it disallows him from walking in the opposite direction. Therefore, it can be established only with his knowledge.

Rav Ashi said that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s need to issue two רַב אַשִׁי אָמַר: אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא rulings can be explained in another manner: It is necessary for דַּעֲתָךְ אָמִ ינָא: הָנֵי מִ ֵיּיל – בְּשִׁ ּיוּרֵ י Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi to inform us that the halakha is in accor- עֵ ירוּב, אֲבָ ל בִּתְ חִ ַ ּילת עֵ ירוּב – אֵ ימָ א dance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoĥanan ben Nuri, as if he had said only that the halakha is in accordance with the lenient opinion with לָ א . regard to an eiruv, it could have entered your mind to say that this statement applies only with regard to the remnants of an eiruv, i.e., an eiruv that had been properly established, where the concern is that it might subsequently have become invalid. But with regard to an initial eiruv, i.e., an eiruv that is just being established and has not yet taken effect, you might have said that we should not rule leniently, and therefore it was necessary to issue both rulings. ׳ד קרפ :ומ ףד . Perek IV . 46b 240 NOTES The Gemara asks: And from where do you say that we distinguish וּמְ נָא ּת אֵימְרָ ָ דְּשׁ נֵי ןלָ בֵּ ין ִ שׁ ּיוּרֵ י עֵ ירוּב between the remnants of an eiruv and an initial eiruv? As we learned The remnants of an eiruv and an initial eiruv – The distinction between an : לִתְחִ ַ תּיל עֵ ירוּב – דִּתְ נַן: ראָמַ ירַבִּ יֹוסֵ י: ִ שׁ ּיוּרֵ י עֵ ירוּב וּתְ חִ ַ ּילת עֵ ירוּב in a mishna: Rabbi Yosei said: In what case is this statement said, that initial eiruv and the remnants of an eiruv refers to ּבַּמֶה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – ּבִּתְחִילַת the Sages stipulated that a fixed quantity of food is necessary for estab- two clearly distinct stages. Namely, that there are עֵירוּב, אֲבָל בְּשִׁ ּיוּרֵ י עֵירוּב – אֲ פ ִּילוּ lishing an eiruv? It is said with regard to an initial eiruv, i.e., when set- different standards for the initial phase of acquir- ting up an eiruv for the first time;however, with regard to the remnants ing residence in a given location, or establishing an ָ ּכל שׁ ֶ הוּא. of an eiruv, i.e., on a subsequent Shabbat when the measure may have eiruv in a given alleyway, than for the remainder of become diminished, even a minimal amount suffices.N an eiruv, where the question is whether an eiruv that has been established remains valid. As stated here, it And they said to establish an eiruv for courtyards only after all the is more reasonable to be lenient with regard to the וְלֹא אָמְרוּלְעָרֵב חֲצֵירֹות ּאֶלָא remainder of an eiruv. -inhabitants of the city merge their alleyways and become like the inhab ּכְדֵי ּשֶׁלֹא ּלְשַׁכַח ּתֹורַת עֵירוּב מִן itants of a single courtyard, so that the law of eiruv should not be The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of הַ ִּ תינֹוקֹות. forgotten by the children, who may not be aware of the arrangement Rabbi Yosei even in disputes with other Sages – The different versions of this : הֲ לָ כָ ה … רַ ּכְ י ִ בּ י ֹו סֵ י מֵ חֲ בֵ רָ י ו .that has been made with regard to the alleyways statement raise the question of whether the halakha -Since the Gemara discussed the principles cited with regard to halakhic accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei only in dis רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב וְרַבִּי זְרִ יָ קא אָמְרוּ: הֲלָכָה decision-making, it cites additional principles. Rabbi Ya’akov and putes with an individual Sage, or even in a dispute ּכְרַבִּי עֲק ִיבָאמֵחֲבֵירֹו, וּכְרַבִּי יֹוסֵי Rabbi said: Thehalakha is in accordance with the opinion of with two or more Sages. Many authorities (Halakhot מֵחֲבֵרָ יו, יוּכְרַבִּ מֵחֲבֵ ירֹו. Rabbi Akiva in disputes with any individual Sage, and the halakha is Gedolot, Rav Sherira Gaon, Rif, Ri Migash, Rabbeinu in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei even in disputes with Manoaĥ, and apparently the Rambam and Rabbi other Sages,N and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Yosef Karo as well) maintain that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion only in disputes with an Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in disputes with any individual Sage. individual Sage, but not in disputes with other Sages .(The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha do these principles (see Yad Malakhi לְמַ אי הִלְכְתָ א? רַבִּ י אַסִ י אָמַ ר: הֲלָכָ ה, apply, meaning, to what degree are they binding? Rabbi Asi said: This הֲ לָ כָ ה … – Halakha…one is inclined…it appears וְרַבִּי חִּיָיא בַּ ר אַבָּ א אָמַ ר: מַ ּטִין, וְרַבִּי is considered binding halakha. And Rabbi Ĥiyya bar Abba said: One These expressions have been explained :מַ ִּ טין…נִרְאִ ין יֹוסֵ י בְּרַבִּ י חֲ נִינָא אָמַ ר: נִרְאִ ין. is inclined toward such a ruling in cases where an individual asks, but in several ways (see Rashi and Tosafot). The ge’onim does not issue it as a public ruling in all cases. And Rabbi Yosei, son of explain that the word halakha means that this Rabbi Ĥanina, said: It appears that one should rule this way, but it is matter has been established as law and must be not an established halakha that is considered binding with regard to accepted. The phrase it appears indicates that the issuing rulings.N Sages discussed this issue and the words of one Sage appear more acceptable than the statements of his Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi said that Rabbi Yoĥanan said: In the case of a colleague. The phrase one is inclined means that ּכָשׁ ַּלֹון הַּזֶה אָמַ ר רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּ ר אִ ידִ י, dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, the halakha is in without examining in detail all sides of the argument, .the judgment tends towards a particular opinion ראָמַ רַ יבִּ יֹוחָ נָן: רַ בִּ י מֵאִ יר וְרַ בִּ י יְהוּדָ ה – accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda; in the case of a dispute הֲלָכָה ּכְרַבִּי יְהוּדָ ה, רַבִּי יְהוּדָ ה וְרַבִּי between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei, the halakha is in accordance Halakhic decision-making – : These קְבִ תיעַ הֲלָ כֹות יֹוסֵ י – הֲ לָכָ ה ְרַ ּכ יבִּ יֹוסֵ י, וְאֵ ין צָרִ יךְ לֹומַ ר with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei; and, needless to say, in the case of a rules of halakhic decision-making, namely, that dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei, the halakha is in ac- the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of a רַ יבִּ מֵאִ יר וְרַ יבִּ יֹוסֵ י – הֲ לָכָ ה ּכְרַ יבִּ יֹוסֵ י. ,cordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. As now, if in disputes with particular Sage in disputes with a given colleague הָשְׁ ָּ תא בִּמְ קֹום רַבִּי יְהוּדָ ה – לֵיתָ א, Rabbi Yehuda, the opinion of Rabbi Meir is not accepted as law, need whether with regard to one issue or all issues, were -established by the Sages, who examined these dis ִ בּ מְ ק ֹום רַ בּ י ִ י ֹו סֵ י מִ י ָבּ עֲ יָ א ? ! it be stated that in disputes with Rabbi Yosei, Rabbi Meir’s opinion putes and usually found a principle in the statements is rejected? Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is not accepted in disputes with of each Sage that led them to accept or reject his N Rabbi Yosei. approach. Nevertheless, these fixed rules are limited in several ways. The Gemara itself explicitly states that Rav Asi said: I also learn based on the same principle that in a dispute where a contradictory halakha is stated by amora’im אָמַ ר רַ ב אַסִ י: אַ ף אֲנִי דלֹומֵ רַבִּי יֹוסֵי between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon, the halakha is in accordance the principle does not apply, and it was only stated יוְרַבִּ שׁ ִמְ עֹון – הֲלָכָ ה ּכ יְרַבִּ יֹוסֵ י. דְּאָמַ ר with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei. As Rabbi Abba said that Rabbi with regard to cases where no explicit ruling exists. רַבִּי אַבָּ א, ראָמַ רַבִּי יֹוחָנָן: רַבִּי יְהוּדָ ה Yoĥanan said: In cases of dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Most authorities agree that even when there is no Shimon, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ye- halakhic ruling in accordance with one opinion, but וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעֹון – הֲלָכָה ּכְרַבִּי יְהוּדָ ה. huda. Now, if where it is opposed by Rabbi Yehuda the opinion of the Gemara’s discussion favors a particular approach ּהָשְׁתָא בִּמְקֹום רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לֵיתָא, -and accepts it as the basis of its discussion, the ha ִ בּ מְ ק ֹום רַ בּ י ִ י ֹו סֵ י מִ י ָבּ עֲ יָ א ? ! Rabbi Shimon is not accepted as law, where it is opposed by the opinion lakha follows suit. Some commentaries state that of Rabbi Yosei, with whom the halakha is in accordance against Rabbi these principles do not apply to any issue that is Yehuda, is it necessary to say that the halakha is in accordance with the not practical halakha nowadays, such as the laws opinion of Rabbi Yosei? related to the Temple. In addition, other principles occasionally override these fixed rules of halakhic The Gemara raises a dilemma: In a dispute between Rabbi Meir and decision-making. Examples include the principle of אִ יבָּעֲיָא לְהוּ: ירַבִּ מֵאִ יר יוְרַבִּ שִׁמְ עֹון N ,Rabbi Shimon, what is the halakha? No sources were found to resolve accepting the lenient opinion with regard to an eiruv מַ אי? ֵּ תיקוּ. this dilemma, and it stands unresolved. the rules listed in tractate Eduyot, and the acceptance of Rabbi Meir’s decrees. said: These principles of halakhic decision-making ראָמַ ברַ מְשׁ ִ ַרְשׁ ּיָא: לֵ יתְ נְהוּ לְהָ נֵי ּכְלָלֵ י. :רַ יבִּ מֵאִ יר וְרַ יבִּ שׁ ִמְ עֹון – are not to be relied upon. The Gemara asks: From where does Rav Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon מְ נָא לֵ ּ יה בלְרַ מְשׁ ִ ַרְשׁ ּיָא הָ א? Mesharshiya derive this statement? This dilemma is left unresolved in the Babylonian . Several authorities write that in these dis- If you say that he derived it from that which we learned in the mishna putes, the stringent opinion is accepted with regard אִ ילֵ ימָ א אמֵהָ דִּתְ נַן,רַ בִּ ישׁ ִמְ עֹון אֹומֵ ר: that Rabbi Shimon said: To what is this comparable? It is like three to Torah law, and the lenient opinion is accepted לְמָ ההַדָּבָ ר הדֹּומֶ – לְשָׁ לֹשׁחֲצֵירֹות with regard to rabbinic law. However, in the Jerusa- courtyards that open into one another, and also open into a public הַ ּתוּ ְ פחֹות זֹו לָ זֹו וּ ְ פתוּ חֹות לִ רְשׁ וּ ת domain. If the two outer courtyards established an eiruv with the lem Talmud it is stated that the halakha is in accor- dance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in disputes middle one, the residents of the middle one are permitted to carry to הָרַבִּים, עֵירְבוּ שְׁ ּת ַיִםהַחִיצֹונֹות עִם with Rabbi Meir. Apparently, Rav Sherira Gaon and הָאֶמְצָעִית – הִיא ּמוּתֶרֶת ּעִמָהֶן, the two outer ones, and they are permitted to carry to it, but the resi- the Ra’avad rule in accordance with the Jerusalem dents of the two outer courtyards are prohibited to carry from one to Talmud, as does Rambam, according to the Leĥem וְהֵ ן ָּ מוּתרֹות עִ ָּ מ ּה, וּשׁ ְ ַּ ת יִםהַחִ יצֹונֹות .(the other, as they did not establish an eiruv with one another. Mishne (see Yad Malakhi אֲ סוּרֹות זֹו םעִ זֹו. Perek IV . 46b 241 . ׳ד קרפ :ומ ףד And Rav Ĥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: The halakha is in וְאָמַ ר רַ ב חָמָ א בַּ ר ּגוּרְ יָא, אָמַ ר רַ ב: הֲלָכָ ה accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon; and who disagrees ּכְרַ יבִּ שׁ ִמְ עֹון. וּמַ אן ּפָלֵ יג עֲלֵ ּיה – רַ בִּ י יְהוּדָ ה. in disputes with an individual Sage, but not in disputes with other with regard to cases where no explicit ruling exists. Most authorities Sages (see Yad Malakhi). agree that even when there is no halakhic ruling in accordance with with Rabbi Shimon on this matter? It isRabbi Yehuda. Didn’t you וְהָ א אָמְרַ ְ ּ:ת ירַבִּ היְהוּדָ יוְרַבִּ שׁ ִמְ עֹון הֲלָכָ ה NOTES one opinion, but the Gemara’s discussion favors a particular approach Halakha…one is inclined…it appears – : These ex- say: In disputes between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, the ּכְרַ בִּ י יְהוּדָ ה, אֶ ָ ּלא לָ או שׁ ְמַ ע מִ ָ ּינ ּה: לֵ יתְ נְ הוּ. .and accepts it as the basis of its discussion, the halakha follows suit הֲלָכָה…מַ ִּ טין…נִרְאִ ין ִ שׁ ּיוּרֵ י עֵ ירוּב וּתְ חִ ַ ּילת – The remnants of an eiruv and an initial eiruv pressions have been explained in several ways (see Rashi and Tosafot). halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? The distinction between an initial eiruv and the remnants of Some commentaries state that these principles do not apply to any : עֵ י ר ּו ב The ge’onim explain that the word halakha means that this matter has an eiruv refers to two clearly distinct stages. Namely, that there are issue that is not practical halakha nowadays, such as the laws related Rather, can we not conclude from this mishna that these principles been established as law and must be accepted. The phrase it appears different standards for the initial phase of acquiring residence in a to the Temple. In addition, other principles occasionally override these should not be relied upon? indicates that the Sages discussed this issue and the words of one Sage given location, or establishing an eiruv in a given alleyway, than for the fixed rules of halakhic decision-making. Examples include the principle appear more acceptable than the statements of his colleague. The The Gemara rejects this argument:What is the difficultyposed by וּמַ אי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּ ילְמָ א: הֵ יכָא דְּאִ יתְמַ ר – remainder of an eiruv, where the question is whether an eiruv that has of accepting the lenient opinion with regard to an eiruv, the rules listed ּ phrase one is inclined means that without examining in detail all sides been established remains valid. As stated here, it is more reasonable to in tractate Eduyot, and the acceptance of Rabbi Meir’s decrees. this ruling? Perhaps where it is stated explicitly to the contrary, it אִ ּיתְמַ ר, הֵ יכָ א דְּ לָ א אִ ּיתְמַ ר – לָ א אִ ּיתְמַ ר. .be lenient with regard to the remainder of an eiruv. of the argument, the judgment tends towards a particular opinion Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon – : This dilemma is stated, but where it is not stated explicitly to the contrary, it is ירַבִּ מֵאִ יר יוְרַבִּ שׁ ִמְ עֹון Halakhic decision-making – : These rules of halakhic .is left unresolved in the Babylonian Talmud. Several authorities write not stated, and these principles apply קְבִ תיעַ הֲלָ כֹות The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei even decision-making, namely, that the halakha is in accordance with The different that in these disputes, the stringent opinion is accepted with regard to : הֲ לָ כָ ה … רַ ּכְ י ִ בּ י ֹו סֵ י מֵ חֲ בֵ רָ י ו – in disputes with other Sages the opinion of a particular Sage in disputes with a given colleague, versions of this statement raise the question of whether the halakha Torah law, and the lenient opinion is accepted with regard to rabbinic Rather, the proof is from that which we learned elsewhere in a אֶ ָ ּלא מֵהָ א, דִּתְ נַן: עִ יר שׁ ֶ ל יָחִ יד וְ נַעֲשֵׂ ית שׁ ֶ ל whether with regard to one issue or all issues, were established by the accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei only in disputes with an in- law. However, in the Jerusalem Talmud it is stated that the halakha is in mishna: If a city that belongs to a single individual subsequently רַ בִּ ים – מְעָרְבִ ין אֶ ת ּכ ָ ּוּל ּה. שׁ ֶ ל רַ בִּ ים וְ נַעֲשֵׂ ית Sages, who examined these disputes and usually found a principle dividual Sage, or even in a dispute with two or more Sages. Many accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in disputes with Rabbi in the statements of each Sage that led them to accept or reject his becomes one that belongs to many people, one may establish an שׁ ֶ ל יָחִ יד – אֵ ין מְעָרְבִ ין אֶ ת ּכ ָ ּוּל ּה, אֶ ָ ּלא אִ ם authorities (Halakhot Gedolot, Rav Sherira Gaon, Rif, Ri Migash, Rab- Meir. Apparently, Rav Sherira Gaon and the Ra’avad rule in accordance approach. Nevertheless, these fixed rules are limited in several ways. eiruv of courtyards for all of it. But if the city belongs to many beinu Manoaĥ, and apparently the Rambam and Rabbi Yosef Karo as with the Jerusalem Talmud, as does Rambam, according to the Leĥem ןֵּ כ עֹושֶׂ ה חוּצָ ה לָ ּה ּכְעִ יר חֲדָשׁ ָ ה שׁ ֶבִּ יהוּדָ ה, The Gemara itself explicitly states that where a contradictory halakha is well) maintain that the halakha is in accordance with his opinion only Mishne (see Yad Malakhi). people, and it falls into the possession of a single individual, one may not establish an eiruv for all of it, unless he excludes from ֶ שׁ ּיֵשׁ בָּ ּה חֲמִ ִׁ ּיםש דִּ ּיֹורִ ין, דִּבְרֵ י רַבִּ י יְהוּדָ ה. stated by amora’im the principle does not apply, and it was only stated the eiruv an area the size of the town of Ĥadasha in Judea, which contains fifty residents; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.

:Rabbi Shimon says ירַבִּ שׁ ִמְ עֹון אֹומֵ ר:

Perek IV Daf 47 Amud a

The excluded area need not be so large; rather, three courtyards ָ שׁ לֹשׁ חֲ צֵ ירֹות שׁ ֶ ל שׁ ְ נֵי בָ ִּ תים. וְאָמַ ר רַ ב חָמָ א each containing two houses are sufficient for this purpose. And בַּ ר ּגוּרְיָא, אָמַ ר רַ ב: הֲלָכָה ּכ יְרַבִּ שִׁמְ עֹון. Rav Ĥama bar Gurya said that Rav said: The halakha is in accor- וּמַ אן ּפָלֵ יג עֲלֵ ּיה – רַבִּ י יְהוּדָ ה. וְהָ א אָמְרַ ְּ ת: dance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon; and who disagrees with :Rabbi Shimon on this matter? It isRabbi Yehuda. Didn’t you say רַ יבִּ היְהוּדָ וְרַ יבִּ שׁ ִמְ עֹון הֲ לָכָ ה ּכְרַ בִּ י יְהוּדָ ה! . In a case where Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree, the מז halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? This teaches that one should not rely on these principles.

The Gemara rejects this argument as well: What is the difficulty וּמַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּילְמָא הָכָא נַמִי, הֵיכָא -here? Perhaps here, too, where it is stated explicitly that the ha דְּאִ ּיתְמַ ר – אִ ּיתְמַ ר, הֵ יכָא דְּלָא אִ ּיתְמַ ר – lakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, it is stated, but where לָ א אִ י ּ ְ תמַ ר . it is not stated explicitly, it is not stated, and the principle that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda applies.

Rather, the proof is from that which we learned elsewhere in a אֶ ּלָא מֵהָ א, דִּתְנַן: הַ ַּ מּנ ִיחַ תאֶ בֵּיתֹו וְהָלַךְ mishna: With regard to one who left his housewithout making an לִשְׁבֹּות בְּעִיר אַחֶרֶת, אֶחָד נָכְרִי וְאֶחָד eiruv of courtyards, and established residence for Shabbat in a יִשְׂרָאֵ ל– אֹוסֵר לִבְנֵי חֲצֵירֹות, דִּבְרֵ י רַבִּי different town, whether he was a gentile or a Jew, his lack of par- ticipation prohibits the other residents of the courtyards in which מֵאִ יר. he has a share to carry objects from their houses to the courtyard, because he did not establish an eiruv with them, and failure to in- clude a house in the eiruv imposes restrictions upon all the residents of the courtyard. This isthe statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says: His lack of participation does not prohibit the רַבִּ ייְהוּדָ האֹומֵ ר: אֵ ינֹו אֹוסֵ ר. ירַבִּ ייֹוסֵ אֹומֵ ר: others to carry, since he is not present there. Rabbi Yosei says: Lack נָכְרִ י –אֹוסֵ ר, ליִשְׂרָאֵ – אֵ ינֹו אֹוסֵ ר, מִ ּפְנֵי of participation in an eiruv by a gentile who is away prohibits the שׁ ֶאֵ ין דֶּרֶ ךְ יִשְׂרָאֵ ל לָ בֹא בַּ ׁ ּשַבָּ ת. רַ יבִּ שׁ ִמְ עֹון others to carry, because he might return on Shabbat; but lack of participation by a Jew who is not present does not prohibit the אֹומֵ ר: אֲ ִ פ ּילוּ הִ ִיחַ ּנ אֶ תבֵּ יתֹו וְהָלַךְלִשׁ ְבּ ֹות others to carry, as it is not the way of a Jew to return on Shabbat אֵ צֶ ל בִּ ּתֹו בְּ אֹותָ ּה הָעִ יר – אֵ ינֹו אֹוסֵ ר, שׁ ֶ ּכְבָ ר once he has already established his residence elsewhere. Rabbi ִ ה ִּ ס יחַ ַ ּ ד ְ ע ּת ֹו . Shimon says: Even if he left his houseand established residence for Shabbat with his daughter in the same town, his lack of par- ticipation does not prohibit the residents of his courtyard to carry, even though he is permitted to return home,because he has already removed it, i.e., returning, from his mind. ׳ד קרפ .זמ ףד . Perek IV . 47a 242