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Nonprobative Photos Rapidly Lead People to Believe Claims About Their Own (And Other People’S) Pasts Fairfield University DigitalCommons@Fairfield Psychology Faculty Publications Psychology Department 3-2016 Nonprobative photos rapidly lead people to believe claims about their own (and other people’s) pasts Brittany A. Cardwell Linda A. Henkel Fairfield University, [email protected] Maryann Garry Eryn J. Newman Jeffrey L. Foster Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/psychology-facultypubs Copyright 2016 Springer. A post-print has been archived with permission from the publisher. The final publication is va ailable at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-016-0603-1. Peer Reviewed Repository Citation Cardwell, Brittany A.; Henkel, Linda A.; Garry, Maryann; Newman, Eryn J.; and Foster, Jeffrey L., "Nonprobative photos rapidly lead people to believe claims about their own (and other people’s) pasts" (2016). Psychology Faculty Publications. 14. https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/psychology-facultypubs/14 Published Citation Cardwell, Brittany A., Linda A. Henkel, Maryanne Garry, Eryn J. Newman, and Jeffrey L. Foster. "Nonprobative photos rapidly lead people to believe claims about their own (and other people’s) pasts." Memory & Cognition (March 2016): 1-14. DOI:10.3758/s13421-016-0603-1 This item has been accepted for inclusion in DigitalCommons@Fairfield by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Fairfield. It is brought to you by DigitalCommons@Fairfield with permission from the rights- holder(s) and is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses, you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the work itself. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Nonprobative photos rapidly lead people to believe claims about their own (and other people’s) pasts Journal: Memory & Cognition Manuscript ID MC-ORIG-15-117.R2 Manuscript Type: Resubmitted Manuscript Date Submitted by the Author: n/a Complete List of Authors: Cardwell, Brittany; University of Otago, Psychology Henkel, Linda; Fairfield University, Psychology Garry, Maryanne; Victoria University of Wellington, Psychology; Newman, Eryn; University of Southern California, Psychology Foster, Jeffrey; University of Western Sydney, School of Social Sciences and Psychology Keywords: decision making, false memory, memory, judgment Page 1 of 36 Running head: NONPROBATIVE PHOTOS CHANGE THE PAST 1! 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Nonprobative photos rapidly lead people to believe claims about their own (and other people’s) pasts 16 17 Brittany A. Cardwell¹, Linda A. Henkel², Maryanne Garry¹, Eryn J. Newman¹, & Jeffrey L. Foster¹ 18 19 Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand¹ 20 21 22 Fairfield University, Connecticut² 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Author note 30 31 Brittany Cardwell, Maryanne Garry, Eryn Newman, and Jeffrey Foster, School of 32 33 34 Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington. Linda Henkel, Psychology Department, Fairfield 35 36 University. Eryn Newman is now located in the Dana and David Dornsife College of Letters, Arts, 37 38 39 and Sciences of the University of Southern California. Jeffrey Foster is now located in the 40 41 Psychology Department of the University of Western Sydney. Correspondence should be sent to 42 43 Maryanne Garry, School of Psychology Box 600, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, 44 45 46 New Zealand. Email: [email protected] Phone: +64 (4) 463 5769 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Page 2 of 36 NONPROBATIVE PHOTOS CHANGE THE PAST 2$ 1 2 Abstract 3 4 5 Photos lead people to believe true and false events happened to them, even when those photos 6 7 provide no evidence the events occurred. Research shows that these nonprobative photos increase 8 9 false beliefs when combined with misleading suggestions and repeated exposure to the photo or 10 11 12 target event. We propose that photos exert similar effects without those factors, and test that 13 14 proposition in five experiments. In Experiment 1, people saw the names of several animals and 15 16 17 pretended to give food to or take food from each. Then people saw the animal names again, half 18 19 with a photo of the animal and half alone, and decided whether they had an experience with each. 20 21 Photos led people to believe they had experiences with the animals. Moreover, Experiments 2-5 22 23 24 provide evidence that photos exerted these effects by making it easier to bring related thoughts and 25 26 images to mind—a feeling people mistook as evidence of genuine experience. In each experiment, 27 28 29 photos led people to believe positive claims about the past (but not negative claims), consistent with 30 31 evidence that feelings of ease selectively increase positive judgments. Experiment 4 also showed that 32 33 photos (like other manipulations of ease) bias people’s judgments broadly, producing false beliefs 34 35 36 about other people’s pasts. Finally, in Experiment 5, photos exerted more powerful effects when they 37 38 depicted unfamiliar animals, and could most help bring information to mind. These findings suggest 39 40 41 nonprobative photos can distort the past without other factors that encourage false beliefs, and 42 43 operate by helping related thoughts and images come to mind. 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Page 3 of 36 NONPROBATIVE PHOTOS CHANGE THE PAST 3$ 1 2 Nonprobative photos rapidly lead people to believe claims about their own (and other people’s) pasts 3 4 5 Photos can distort beliefs about the past. When photos are doctored to depict people 6 7 involved in an event that never really happened, people can claim to remember the false event 8 9 (Strange, Gerrie, & Garry, 2005; Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002). Perhaps more surprising is 10 11 12 that photos can wield these effects even when they do not provide “proof ” the event occurred—that 13 14 is, when the photos are related to the event, but provide no evidence that event actually happened. 15 16 17 In one study, for example, people were more likely to remember a suggested, but false, childhood 18 19 prank (putting a slimy toy in their teacher’s desk) if they saw a photo that related to but did not 20 21 depict the prank (a photo of classmates from that grade; Lindsay, Hagen, Read, Wade, & Garry, 22 23 24 2004). 25 26 One way these nonprobative photos should promote false beliefs is by making it easier for 27 28 29 people to bring to mind related thoughts and images (e.g., about their long ago friends, teacher, and 30 31 classroom), which people mistake as evidence they were remembering a real experience. Such a 32 33 process fits with the source monitoring framework, which proposes that when people think about 34 35 36 personal experiences, they use the characteristics of the thoughts and images that come to mind to 37 38 determine whether they are remembering an actual experience or one they merely imagined. 39 40 41 Indeed, people conclude they are remembering a genuine experience when the thoughts and images 42 43 they retrieve are similar to those derived from perceptual experience—that is, when they are 44 45 reasonably detailed given the age of the event, contain few records of effortful cognitive operations 46 47 48 typical of imagining events, and come to mind relatively easily (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 49 50 1993; Lindsay, 2008, 2014). 51 52 53 It is clear that viewing photos can increase source monitoring errors (see Henkel & Carbuto, 54 55 2008). But much less clear is the extent to which photos promote those errors by themselves—that is, 56 57 in isolation of other factors often paired with photos that also cultivate false beliefs. One such factor 58 59 60 is the suggestion the event really occurred. Claiming that a description of the target event, such as the slime prank, was provided by a trusted family member would make people especially likely to Page 4 of 36 NONPROBATIVE PHOTOS CHANGE THE PAST 4$ 1 2 accept the thoughts and images that came to mind as evidence the event happened (Gilbert, 1991; 3 4 5 Nickerson, 1998). Another factor is repeated exposure to the photo or event. In most of these 6 7 studies, people see the photo repeatedly, over the course of a week or more, and are often 8 9 encouraged to elaborate on details of the event (Blandon-Gitlin & Gerkens, 2010; Brown & Marsh, 10 11 12 2008; Lindsay et al., 2004). Repetition and elaboration increase the ease and detail with which 13 14 thoughts and images later come to mind (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Suengas & Johnson, 1988; 15 16 17 Thomas, Bulevich, & Loftus, 2003), and the passage of time causes the true source of those 18 19 thoughts and images to fade. As a result, people are more likely to make a source monitoring error, 20 21 confusing imagination with reality (see Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2008; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978). 22 23 24 Although these factors would bolster the influence of photos, there are reasons to believe 25 26 they are not necessary. That is, photos should distort people’s beliefs about the past in the absence of 27 28 29 suggestion, repetition, or the passage of time. Indeed, the source monitoring framework predicts 30 31 that nonprobative photos will encourage false beliefs if those photos can help people produce 32 33 thoughts and images with phenomenal characteristics that feel like the result of genuine experience 34 35 36 (Johnson et al., 1993; Lindsay, 2008, 2014).
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