PPSXXX10.1177/1745691618803640SchacterMemory and Imagining the Future research-article8036402018

ASSOCIATION FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE

Perspectives on Psychological Science 2019, Vol. 14(2) 256 –272 Implicit Memory, Constructive Memory, © The Author(s) 2018 Article reuse guidelines: and Imagining the Future: A Career sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI:https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691618803640 10.1177/1745691618803640 Perspective www.psychologicalscience.org/PPS

Daniel L. Schacter Department of Psychology, Harvard University

Abstract In this article I discuss some of the major questions, findings, and ideas that have driven my research program, which has examined various aspects of human memory using a combination of cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging approaches. I do so from a career perspective that describes important scientific influences that have shaped my approach to the study of memory and discusses considerations that led to choosing specific research paths. After acknowledging key early influences, I briefly summarize a few of the main takeaways from research on implicit memory during the 1980s and 1990s and then move on to consider more recent ideas and findings concerning constructive memory, future imagining, and mental simulation that have motivated my approach for the past 2 decades. A main unifying theme of this research is that memory can affect psychological functions in ways that go beyond the simple everyday understanding of memory as a means of revisiting past experiences.

Keywords priming, memory errors, episodic memory, episodic simulation, prospection

For more than 40 years my work has focused on the connections have developed between the study of analysis of human memory. During this time, memory memory and investigations of such cognitive functions has increasingly become a multidisciplinary pursuit as as decision making (e.g., Redish & Mizumori, 2015; well as a central focus in numerous areas of psychology. Shohamy & Daw, 2015), theory of mind (e.g., Buckner When I entered the field in the 1970s, cognitive psy- & Carroll, 2007; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009), and future chologists tested models of memory based on experi- thinking or prospection (e.g., Atance & O’Neill, 2001; mental studies of healthy individuals, neuropsychologists Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, studied brain-damaged patients with memory problems, 2007, 2008; Seligman, Railton, Baumeister, & Sripada, and neuroscientists studied nonhuman animals in an 2013; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). attempt to specify the neural mechanisms that make I begin this article by stressing the broad relevance memory possible, but there was little interaction among of memory research across numerous areas of psychol- these researchers. During the 1980s, cognitive psychol- ogy because I believe that much of my work has been ogists, neuropsychologists, and neuroscientists inter- linked by an interest in the reach of memory across ested in memory began to interact (see, e.g., Cermak, multiple domains of mental life and, more specifically, 1982; LeDoux & Hirst, 1986; Weinberger, McGaugh, & how manifestations of memory affect psychological Lynch, 1985), ultimately providing the foundations for functions in ways that go beyond the everyday com- a cognitive neuroscience approach to memory that has monsense understanding of memory as a means of developed explosively over the past 2 decades (for an revisiting past experiences. I first pursued this interest overview, see Slotnick, 2017). At the same time, analy- in early work on what Graf and Schacter (1985) termed ses of memory started to occupy an increasingly promi- nent role in areas ranging from social cognition (e.g., Srull Corresponding Author: & Wyer, 1989) to developmental psychology (e.g., Daniel L. Schacter, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, 33 Brainerd & Pressley, 1985) and psychopathology (e.g., Kirkland St., Cambridge, MA 02138 Williams & Scott, 1988). More recently, promising new E-mail: [email protected] Memory and Imagining the Future 257

“implicit memory,” where recent experiences affect per- Herb Crovitz was also instrumental in the next step formance on subsequent tasks that do not require con- of my scientific journey: deciding to pursue graduate scious recollection of those experiences (Schacter, studies at the University of Toronto in 1976. Crovitz 1987a). More recently, I have focused on very different greatly admired Endel Tulving, the eminent memory ways in which memory affects performance on tasks researcher who had just returned to Toronto after sev- that are not typically thought of as “memory tasks” in eral years at Yale University. I was fortunate that Tulving the traditional sense of the term, but instead tap aspects took me on as a graduate student at a time when the of prospection, imagination, problem solving, and cre- environment at Toronto for studying human memory ativity (Schacter, Benoit, & Szpunar, 2017; Schacter & was unsurpassed and included numerous established Madore, 2016). I have approached these latter studies luminaries as well as up-and-coming young researchers in the context of a conceptual framework that charac- who provided broad exposure to a variety of method- terizes memory as a fundamentally constructive act (fol- ological and theoretical approaches. lowing Bartlett, 1932, and many others since) prone to These early experiences shaped my approach to the various kinds of errors and distortions that reveal the study of memory in many ways, but perhaps most operation of adaptive processes (Schacter, 1996, 2001b, important was the orientation toward memory research 2012; Schacter, Guerin, & St. Jacques, 2011). Linking in particular, and scientific research in general, that these two perspectives—the reach of memory into Crovitz and Tulving shared. Both stressed the value of “nonmnemonic” domains on the one hand and con- finding a question that could lead one to previously structive aspects of memory on the other—has occu- uncharted territory, where one could discover some- pied much of my theoretical and empirical attention for thing new, theoretically revealing, and hopefully sur- the past 2 decades. prising. Both had little time for experiments that This article considers some of the key findings, ideas, followed up incrementally on existing findings or used and questions produced by this approach from a career workmanlike procedures to make a small point that perspective, that is, placing my research program in the was unlikely to make much of a difference in the grand context of some important influences that led me down scheme of things. As anyone who has spent much time the main research paths I have chosen and reflecting with Endel Tulving knows, the first question one could on some of the scientific choices I have made. I first expect from him upon proposing a new project was consider formative experiences that were crucial in simple, predictable, and critically important: What will instilling a particular scientific mindset that has guided we know after you complete this project that we did my subsequent research and theorizing. Next, I briefly not know before and that is worth knowing? Tulving summarize some early work on implicit memory. I then set a high bar for what is “worth knowing,” so thinking turn to the empirical and theoretical issues concerning about this simple question with that high bar in mind constructive memory, imagination, and prospection that could help one to rule out paths that might be easy to have been central to my more recent work. pursue but were ultimately not worth pursuing. Note that this emphasis on novelty should not be at odds Early Career Influences with the equally important need to replicate one’s find- ings and take small steps to systematically characterize My path to a career in memory research began in 1974 a phenomenon; ideally one strives to combine novelty after completing an undergraduate psychology degree and rigor. Indeed, decades before the existence of the at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill that recent replication crisis, Tulving often emphasized to was focused mainly on clinical psychology. I had the his students that replication is a necessary and critical good fortune to be hired as a research assistant by the part of science, and I have frequently taken the late Herbert Crovitz, an experimental psychologist at approach of attempting to replicate and explore the Duke University and the nearby Veterans Affairs Medi- characteristics of a new phenomenon. cal Center in Durham. I knew next to nothing about Crovitz and Tulving shared another interest that had memory, but Crovitz had just begun to study memory an impact on me: curiosity about, and respect for, the disorders that result from brain damage. In my capacity history of our field. Crovitz wrote a delightful (and in as a research assistant, I tested some intriguing cases my view underappreciated) book, Galton’s Walk (Crovitz, of amnesia—patients whose severe memory deficits 1970), that paid homage to the contributions of the contrasted with their relatively intact abilities in the great 19th-century psychologist Sir Francis Galton and domains of perception, language, and other nonmne- used them as a starting point for developing novel monic cognitive functions. Exposure to those patients, approaches to memory, thought, and creativity. Tulving and stimulating discussions about them with Crovitz, was an avid reader of history and philosophy of science sparked my interest in human memory. and highly knowledgeable about the history of memory 258 Schacter research. He changed my intellectual life by including answer was, and still is, no. If intellectual passion and a brief reference to the work of a little-known German curiosity drive one’s engagement with a project—book, biologist named Richard Semon in a book chapter titled experiment, or otherwise—then strategic career consid- “Ecphoric processes in recall and recognition” (Tulving, erations will likely work themselves out. Developing a 1976). Semon had coined the term ecphory—roughly successful career requires both passion or curiosity and equivalent to “memory retrieval”—in two early 20th- strategic planning, but in my case at least, the former century books on memory that few researchers other has always driven the latter. than Tulving had noticed. Curious about Tulving’s use Thankfully, I also managed to complete an experi- of the term ecphory, in early 1977 I read the English mental dissertation project in 1981 (eventually pub- translations of Semon’s two books on memory (Semon, lished in Schacter, 1983), and along with Endel Tulving 1921, 1923) and discovered to my surprise that he had and Morris Moscovitch, received funding during that put forth a systematic theory of memory that anticipated same year to establish the Unit for Memory Disorders at many modern views (and had also coined the better- the University of Toronto. I was responsible for directing known term “engram” for memory trace). Discussions the Unit for Memory Disorders and was able to focus of these books with Tulving and fellow graduate stu- almost entirely on research (along with occasional teach- dent Eric Eich resulted in an article in which we dis- ing in the Department of Psychology at Toronto). I thus cussed Semon’s ideas in the context of then-current managed to avoid some of the nonresearch responsibili- thinking in memory research (Schacter, Eich, & Tulving, ties that come with a more standard tenure-track faculty 1978). Intrigued by the fascinating and sometimes tragic position, such as a full teaching load and committee story of Semon’s life and the historical issues raised by work. Even though I was in a virtually ideal situation for the long neglect of his prescient theory, I went on to maximizing research productivity, remaining at the same write a book about Semon that told his story and used institution at which I had received my PhD degree and it as a springboard for addressing a variety of related continuing to collaborate on some studies with my advi- issues in memory research, as well as in the history and sor, inevitably raised issues about scientific indepen- psychology of science (Schacter, 1982; reissued with a dence. Thus, after six highly productive years at Toronto, foreword by Tulving in Schacter, 2001a). I decided that the time had come to venture out more I wrote that book while I was a graduate student—an fully on my own. In 1987, I began a tenured associate admittedly risky pursuit for someone whose day job professor position in the Department of Psychology at the centered on doing memory experiments. But, spurred University of Arizona, which was rapidly building an excit- on by Tulving’s encouragement and respect for the ing new program in cognitive science. Leaving the sup- history of science, I completed a task about which I portive and productive environment at Toronto entailed had become quite passionate that cemented my interest some risk, but I felt that it was worth taking for the poten- in the history of our field and broadened my perspec- tial benefits of a novel scientific and collegial environ- tive in a way that has remained with me. (I also take ment. I spent nearly 4 years at Arizona before accepting some pleasure in a recent minirevival of interest in a position as professor of psychology at Harvard Univer- Semon’s ideas by neuroscientists who have developed sity, where I have remained since 1991. sophisticated new tools for analyzing the engram; see, e.g., Josselyn, Köhler, & Frankland, 2017.) Implicit Memory One general lesson that stuck with me from this early experience of book writing is that intellectual passions The major line of work that my colleagues and I pur- and curiosity take priority over just about all other sued at the University of Toronto focused on what came considerations (setting aside personal/family issues) to be known as implicit memory (Graf & Schacter, 1985; when developing a career as a psychological scientist. Schacter, 1987a). My interest in this topic had been Was it a wise move from a career development perspec- sparked in Crovitz’s lab by reading early literature indi- tive to spend so much time writing a historical book cating that the behavior and performance of patients that did not directly contribute to the list of experimental with amnesia reflected influences of recent experiences publications I would need to establish myself as a mem- that they could not recall consciously (e.g., Claparède, ory researcher? Probably not. It was a perilous undertak- 1911/1951). I became even more interested in these ing that could easily have interfered with developing phenomena when I was a visiting graduate student at the kind of track record expected of a young experi- Oxford University in 1978 (made possible by Endel mental psychologist. But should I have set aside my Tulving’s sabbatical there). Tulving and I met regularly deep interest in the subject matter or the galvanizing with the late Lawrence Weiskrantz, whose pioneering energy I felt when pursuing the project because of stra- studies with Elizabeth Warrington had produced some tegic concerns about career advancement? For me, the fascinating observations suggestive of preserved implicit Memory and Imagining the Future 259 memory in patients with amnesia (e.g., Warrington & in some cases entirely lacking explicit memory for hav- Weiskrantz, 1968). Our conversations frequently focused ing performed the task previously (e.g., Glisky & on how to think about their intriguing findings. Schacter, 1987; Glisky, Schacter, & Tulving, 1986). After returning to Toronto, Tulving and I continued This work was exciting because of the sheer novelty to discuss the issues that had arisen in our meetings of the implicit memory phenomena we were studying with Weiskrantz. These discussions led to a study with and the importance of the theoretical issues that those healthy young adults that showed that priming effects phenomena raised concerning the nature and basis of on a word fragment completion test could be dissoci- different forms of memory (cf. Cohen & Eichenbaum, ated experimentally from performance on a standard 1993; Schacter & Tulving, 1994; Sherry & Schacter, 1987; old–new recognition memory test and even appeared Squire, 1992). However, the focus of my research pro- to occur independently of conscious recognition gram soon changed as a result of unanticipated devel- (Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 1982). That study, along with opments that pointed toward another domain in which related work from others that dissociated priming from novel phenomena could be discovered and important conscious memory in both healthy individuals (e.g., theoretical issues were at stake. Graf, Mandler, & Haden, 1982; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) and patients with amnesia (e.g., Cohen & Squire, 1980), The Cognitive Neuroscience of pointed toward the existence of a largely unexplored Constructive Memory but potentially rich domain of memory in which impor- tant discoveries could be made. In 1994, the neuropsychologist Bill Milberg referred a During the decade that followed, my colleagues and patient to me, BG, who had sustained a focal right I (at Toronto, Arizona, and Harvard) intensively explored frontal lobe infarction. The patient was of particular implicit memory in behavioral and neuroimaging studies interest at the time because recently published neuro- of normal individuals and behavioral studies of patients imaging studies had revealed a surprising link between with amnesia and other neuropsychological patients. right frontal lobe activation and episodic memory We focused mainly on priming effects in tasks ranging retrieval (e.g., Tulving, Kapur, Craik, Moscovitch, & from completing visual word stems with the first word Houle, 1994). Collaborating with Milberg, postdoc Tim that pops to mind (e.g., Graf & Schacter, 1985; Schacter, Curran, and several others, we quickly discovered an Alpert, Savage, Rauch, & Albert, 1996; Schacter, Rapcsak, unexpected but striking finding: BG exhibited patho- Rubens, Tharan, & Laguna, 1990) to identifying auditory logically high levels of false recognition. In a variety of words masked in noise (e.g., Church & Schacter, 1994; paradigms in which he was initially shown a series of Schacter, Church, & Treadwell, 1994) and making deci- words or pictures, BG made many more false alarms to sions about whether novel visual shapes constitute pos- items that he had not been shown previously than any sible or impossible objects (e.g., Schacter, Cooper, & of the control participants, claiming to have detailed Delaney, 1990; Schacter et al., 1995). Building on previ- recollections of these nonstudied items (Curran, ous findings, we found that (a) various experimental Schacter, Norman, & Galluccio, 1997; Schacter, Curran, manipulations (e.g., type of encoding task, study-to-test Galluccio, Milberg, & Bates, 1996). Follow-up experi- changes in sensory modality) had different effects on ments revealed that BG inappropriately based his rec- priming versus standard explicit memory tasks; (b) vari- ognition decisions on the general similarity between ous kinds of brain damage often spared priming while the kinds of items he had studied and the characteristics impairing explicit memory; and (c) neuroimaging tech- of a particular test item. For example, if BG saw a list of niques revealed distinct neural signatures of priming common words, then simply presenting a common word and explicit memory. as a test item was often sufficient for him to endorse These dissociations led my colleagues and I to pro- either an old or a new word as previously studied, but pose that distinct systems support performance in the he would not endorse a nonsense word as previously two classes of tasks (e.g., Schacter, 1990; Tulving & studied. These and related findings from similar patients Schacter, 1990; for an alternative view, see Roediger, (e.g., Parkin, Bindschaedler, Harsent, & Metzler, 1996) 1990, and for an attempted resolution of the two raised intriguing theoretical questions about the neural approaches, see Schacter, 1992). We also delineated basis of false recognition that had not received much related, striking phenomena in which the effects of a attention in the literature, suggesting a role for prefrontal prior experience could be demonstrated despite regions in setting decision criteria when people make reduced or absent recollection of that experience, such old/new and related kinds of memory judgments. as source amnesia (Schacter, Harbluk, & McLachlan, At around the same time, questions concerning false 1984) and the ability of patients with amnesia to learn memories took on broader significance as a conse- such complex tasks as computer programming despite quence of the exploding controversy concerning the 260 Schacter accuracy of recovered memories of childhood sexual control subjects, they showed not only poorer true rec- abuse (e.g., Loftus, 1993). The emerging societal impor- ognition of studied items but also lower levels of false tance of understanding issues related to memory accu- recognition of the critical lure word (e.g., Schacter, racy and distortion called for a broad approach that Verfaellie, & Pradere, 1996). These findings contrasted combined insights from different disciplines. As part of sharply with our and others’ findings concerning ele- Harvard’s new interdisciplinary Mind, Brain, and Behav- vated false recognition levels after damage to regions ior program, several colleagues and I organized a con- within the prefrontal cortex and further suggested that ference in 1994 devoted to exploring the nature of medial temporal lobe structures play a role in encoding memory distortion at multiple levels of analysis; the pro- and/or retrieving the kind of information that supports gram included contributions from neurobiologists, psy- false recognition of related lure words, which we sug- chologists, sociologists, and historians. The conference gested involved retaining the semantic gist of the list provided the basis for the publication of an edited vol- (see Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). ume that appeared the following year (Schacter, 1995). To obtain converging evidence on the neural basis In light of the fascinating and relatively unexplored of false recognition, we initiated neuroimaging studies questions concerning the neural basis of false recogni- to examine DRM false recognition in people without tion that were raised by our studies of patient BG and amnesia. Relying on both positron emission tomogra- the rich psychological and social implications of the phy and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), broad issue of memory distortion, it became clear to we reported evidence of activation within the medial me that there was much that we did not know, and that temporal lobe during both true and false recognition would be worth knowing, about the cognitive neurosci- that was broadly consistent with evidence of reduced ence of constructive memory. Thus, I changed the focus DRM true and false recognition in patients with amnesia of my research program to put more emphasis on this (Cabeza, Rao, Wagner, Mayer, & Schacter, 2001; Schacter, relatively unexplored scientific territory. While at the Reiman, et al., 1996). Further, these studies also impli- time I had misgivings about de-emphasizing the study cated regions within the prefrontal cortex in retrieval- of implicit memory, the scientific excitement associated monitoring processes, consistent with observations with pursuing a new and likely productive direction for concerning elevated false recognition in BG and similar my lab outweighed any risks associated with a reduced patients. At the same time, we initiated similar studies emphasis on a familiar and rewarding pursuit, such as of false recognition with healthy older adults and found concerns about jeopardizing my grant funding, which strong evidence for age-related increases in false rec- at the time was heavily oriented toward implicit mem- ognition in the DRM paradigm (Norman & Schacter, ory research (and I did continue with some work on 1997) and in a categorized pictures paradigm that was implicit memory; e.g., Dobbins, Schnyer, Verfaellie, & developed in my laboratory (Koutstaal & Schacter, Schacter, 2004; Schacter, Wig, & Stevens, 2007). A lesson 1997). In light of related evidence pointing toward fron- here worth noting explicitly is that not all aspects of a tal lobe dysfunction as an important contributor to age- research career are carefully planned in advance—in related memory declines in source-monitoring paradigms this instance, an unexpected case referral from a col- (e.g., Glisky, Polster, & Routhieaux, 1995; Schacter, league ultimately led to a decision to fundamentally 1987b), our findings on age-related increases in false change the direction of my research program. recognition converged nicely with our neuropsychologi- One immediate consequence of this decision was to cal and neuroimaging findings. focus on developing different kinds of cognitive neu- The general picture painted by these studies was one roscience evidence to complement the work we had in which false recognition thrives when people retain initiated with patient BG. To get started, we used the mainly memory for the general features of studied items Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, a proce- and rely on this information at the time of retrieval. It dure for reliably producing false memories that was thus follows that conditions that promote the encoding initially reported by Deese (1959) and revived and of specific or distinctive features of target information expanded by Roediger and McDermott (1995). In this should help to reduce such gist-based false recognition. paradigm, participants study semantic associates of a Consistent with this perspective, we showed that when nonstudied critical lure word (e.g., candy, sour, sugar, DRM lists are encoded in the form of pictures that bitter, good, taste, for the lure word sweet) and subse- heighten reliance on distinctive information when mak- quently exhibit high levels of false recall and recogni- ing old/new recognition decisions, false recognition of tion of the critical lure. Experiments that examined DRM critical lure items is significantly reduced (Israel & false recognition in patients with amnesia who had Schacter, 1997), reflecting the use of what we subse- damage to the medial temporal lobe and related struc- quently referred to as a distinctiveness heuristic tures consistently found that, compared with matched (Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999; see also Dodson & Memory and Imagining the Future 261

Schacter, 2002): a retrieval orientation in which people 1995). This focus on adaptive aspects of memory errors expect to remember vivid details of a past experience was an important part of the seven-sins framework, and make recognition judgments based on this meta- although my original arguments (Schacter, 1999, 2001b) cognitive expectation. were based more on broad conceptual analyses than In an attempt to pull together these emerging find- on direct experimental evidence. Nonetheless, that con- ings and conceptualize them in the context of related ceptual focus helped me to crystallize two key ques- earlier observations of confabulations in brain-damaged tions that played a critical role in the next stage of my patients (e.g., Moscovitch, 1995), as well as ideas about research program: (a) What are the functions of a con- the role of medial temporal and frontal regions in structive memory? and (b) How can we address such a memory-encoding and memory-retrieval processes (see question experimentally? Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995; Schacter, 1987b; Squire, Remembering the Past and Imagining 1992), we formulated a constructive memory framework the Future (Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998). Key ideas in this framework included the role of pattern separation at My laboratory’s focus on the cognitive neuroscience of the time of encoding and the importance of formulating constructive memory continued into the first decade of a focused or specific description of a target event at the this century and beyond. We relied increasingly on the time of retrieval; failures at either stage could produce use of neuroimaging techniques to address key ques- the kind of gist-based or similarity-based false recogni- tions, resulting in studies that used novel paradigms to tion delineated in the foregoing studies. examine the neural systems underlying true versus false This integrative effort also led me to think broadly recognition (e.g., Aminoff, Schacter, & Bar, 2008; Guerin, about different kinds of memory errors and failures. Robbins, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2012; Gutchess & Schacter, Psychologists had studied forgetting since the ground- 2012; Slotnick & Schacter, 2004), delineate the neural cor- breaking studies of Ebbinghaus (1885) and memory relates of the distinctiveness heuristic that we had previ- distortions since Bartlett’s (1932) pioneering efforts; the ously characterized only behaviorally (Gallo, Kensinger, literature was full of articles that described different & Schacter, 2006), and dissociate different kinds of ways in which memory can fail or lead us astray. But prefrontal-based retrieval-monitoring mechanisms it was equally clear that there had been few attempts (Dobbins, Foley, Schacter, & Wagner, 2002). to organize or classify the different ways in which mem- At the same time, I began to think about constructive ory can go wrong. I proposed such a scheme in an memory with respect to a striking phenomenon that I article and subsequent book concerning what I termed had observed 2 decades earlier at the University of the seven “sins” of memory (Schacter, 1999, 2001b): Toronto. There we intensively studied a patient with three sins of omission that refer to different kinds of profound amnesia, KC, who had sustained a head injury forgetting (transience, absent-mindedness, and block- in a motorcycle accident (for an overview, see Rosenbaum ing) and four sins of commission that refer to forms of et al., 2005). Although he showed robust priming effects memory distortion (misattribution, suggestibility, and and other manifestations of implicit memory, KC could bias) and intrusive memories (persistence). not explicitly recollect any particular event that had hap- Considering all of these sins together, and the havoc pened in his past—in other words, he had a complete that they can wreak in everyday life, could easily lead lack of episodic memory (Tulving, 1985). During a test- one to conclude that human memory is hopelessly and ing session in the early 1980s at which I was present, fundamentally flawed. But it makes little sense that Endel Tulving asked KC a seemingly simple yet impor- evolution would have yielded such a deeply flawed tant question: What will you be doing tomorrow? KC system. Thus, taking a lead from earlier analyses of drew a blank, just as when he was asked to remember adaptive aspects of forgetting (Anderson & Milson, what he did yesterday, thus suggesting that an inability 1989; Bjork & Bjork, 1988), I proposed that each of the to remember past episodes has a devastating impact seven sins could be viewed as by-products of otherwise on the ability to imagine future episodes (Tulving, adaptive features of memory. For example, I argued 1985). that the memory sin that most closely corresponds to That observation stuck with me, and from time to false recognition—misattribution—often arises because time over the ensuing years I thought about how to we do not need to record every detail of every experi- investigate the role of memory in imagining future ence and instead extract the central features, meaning, experiences. However, my lab was fully occupied with or gist of past experiences, which is fundamental to studies of implicit memory and memory distortion, as such critical functions as our ability to categorize and well as various other related pursuits, including research generalize (see McClelland, 1995; Reyna & Brainerd, on the neural underpinnings of memory encoding (e.g., 262 Schacter

Wagner et al., 1998), metamemory (e.g., Chua, Schacter, scenarios by allowing us to recombine bits and pieces Rand-Giovanetti, & Sperling, 2006; Maril, Simons, Mitchell, of past experiences into simulations of novel situations Schwartz, & Schacter, 2003), and emotional influences on that might occur in the future. The ability to flexibly memory (e.g., Kensinger & Schacter, 2006). use past experiences to construct mental simulations is Consequently, my interest in initiating studies of future potentially highly adaptive because it allows us to men- imagining remained on the back burner until 2005–2006, tally “try out” different approaches to a future situation when two things happened. First, Donna Rose Addis, without having to engage in actual behaviors (see who had done functional MRI (fMRI) research focused Ingvar, 1979; Jing, Madore, & Schacter, 2017). We fur- on neural correlates of autobiographical memory for her ther hypothesized that the flexibility of episodic mem- graduate work (e.g., Addis, Moscovitch, Crawley, & ory that makes it adaptive for simulating future McAndrews, 2004), arrived in my lab as a postdoctoral experiences comes at the cost of being vulnerable to fellow. We discussed ways in which the approaches she errors and distortions that result from mistakenly com- had taken to studying autobiographical memory could bining elements of imagination and memory. We called be extended to studying how people imagine future this set of ideas the constructive episodic simulation episodes, soon resulting in the development of a new hypothesis (Schacter & Addis, 2007a, 2007b; for related fMRI paradigm that allowed us to directly compare the views, see Dudai & Carruthers, 2005; Suddendorf & two. During scanning, participants received word cues Corballis, 2007). and were asked to remember a past personal experi- Once again, there was an opportunity to pursue a ence, imagine a future personal experience, or perform new research direction offering the potential for making control tasks involving nonpersonal visuospatial or novel empirical discoveries and addressing significant semantic processing. The study revealed similarly theoretical questions. This new line of work felt par- increased activation for the past and future event tasks ticularly promising because I viewed it as closely related compared with the control tasks in a set of brain regions conceptually to our research on the cognitive neurosci- that overlap substantially with the well-known default ence of constructive memory during the previous mode network (for reviews, see Buckner, Andrews- decade. Therefore, it was an easy decision to focus Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Raichle, 2015), including much of my laboratory’s efforts on attempting to under- medial temporal and frontal lobes, posterior cingulate stand the processes that support our ability to imagine and retrosplenial cortices, and lateral parietal and tem- or simulate future and other hypothetical experiences poral areas (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; see also and how this ability is related to remembering past Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, experiences. 2007). Schacter, Addis, and Buckner (2007) suggested Of course, the general topic of future thinking, more that the aforementioned regions make up a core neural recently referred to as prospection (Buckner & Carroll, network that underpins remembering past experiences, 2007; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Seligman et al., 2013), imagining future experiences, and related kinds of men- comprises a vast psychological terrain that has been of tal simulations (for a recent meta-analysis that confirms interest to psychologists for decades (see Oettingen, this idea in a larger sample of studies, see Benoit & Sevincer, & Gollwitzer, 2018). Szpunar, Spreng, and Schacter, 2015). Schacter (2014) offered a preliminary taxonomy that Second, although initially this new work on future distinguishes among four basic forms of prospection: imagining felt theoretically disconnected from my ear- simulation (constructing a detailed mental representa- lier work, as we moved forward with it I began to see tion of the future), prediction (estimating the likelihood that this work might be related in an important way to of, or one’s reaction to, a specific future outcome), a key question raised by my earlier theorizing about intention (setting a future goal), and planning (identify- adaptive aspects of the seven sins of memory: What are ing and organizing steps to achieve a goal). Szpunar, the functions of a constructive memory? There were Spreng, et al. (2014) further suggested that the repre- several kinds of evidence suggesting a tight linkage sentational contents underlying each of the four forms between episodic memory and future imagining, includ- of future thinking could vary on a gradient from epi- ing the above-noted neuroimaging evidence, Tulving’s sodic (simulations, predictions, intentions, or plans that (1985) observations concerning patient KC, and other relate to specific autobiographical events that might related observations (for reviews, see Klein, 2013; Mullally occur in the future) to semantic (simulations, predic- & Maguire, 2014; Schacter et al., 2008, 2012; Schacter, tions, intentions, and plans that relate to more general Benoit, & Szpunar, 2017; Szpunar, 2010). Adopting a func- or abstract states of the world that might occur in the tional perspective, Schacter and Addis (2007a, 2007b) future). From this perspective, the term episodic future hypothesized that episodic memory enables past expe- thinking (Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Szpunar, 2010) encom- riences to be used flexibly to imagine novel future passes episodic simulation, prediction, intention, or Memory and Imagining the Future 263 planning. As a practical matter, however, our studies of physically present in the picture) and more external episodic future thinking have nearly always focused on details (semantic information, commentary) than did episodic simulation, so here I use the terms episodic younger adults. Describing a picture does not require future thinking and episodic simulation interchangeably. retrieving episodic details from past experiences. Con- sequently, these critical findings suggested that nonepi- Mechanisms of Episodic Simulation sodic factors that change with age and could plausibly and Future Thinking influence performance on the memory, imagination, and description tasks we used, such as narrative style Much of our recent research has attempted to test a or communicative goals (e.g., Trunk & Abrams, 2009), central tenet of the constructive episodic simulation might account for the observed age effects on all three hypothesis, namely that episodic memory processes are tasks rather than changes in episodic retrieval. key drivers of the observed cognitive and neural simi- These findings constituted a clear challenge to the larities between remembering past experiences and constructive episodic simulation hypothesis not only imagining future experiences. In addition to the afore- with respect to findings from older adults but also more mentioned neuropsychological and neuroimaging evi- broadly: Perhaps many or all of the documented simi- dence favoring this idea, another line of evidence from larities between remembering past experiences and my lab that initially supported this view came from imagining future experiences could be attributed to cognitive research examining young and older adults. nonepisodic rather than episodic influences. Although In a study by Addis, Wong, and Schacter (2008), young it is jarring when an experimental result calls into ques- and older adults remembered past experiences and tion fundamental aspects of one’s theoretical thinking, imagined future experiences in response to word cues. it is also exciting: Such a result demands new experi- The details of their remembered and imagined experi- ments that one would not have otherwise thought about ences were coded using the well-established Autobio- doing. To address the issue, we needed a way to dis- graphical Interview (Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & tinguish episodic from nonepisodic influences on tasks Moscovitch, 2002), which distinguishes between inter- such as future imagination or picture description. The nal or episodic details (e.g., details about actions, set- approach we adopted was to manipulate the involve- tings, and people in an event) and external details, ment of episodic memory on these tasks by attempting including semantic details, commentary, and the like. to “prime” episodic retrieval processes and test for the Older adults produced fewer internal and more external influence of such priming on subsequent tasks. details than young adults both when they remembered To accomplish this objective, we adapted a well- past experiences and imagined future experiences. The known procedure, the Cognitive Interview (CI; Fisher prior evidence that episodic memory is impaired in & Geiselman, 1992), which has been used successfully older compared with younger adults led us to interpret in forensic contexts to elicit detailed episodic retrieval these results as support for the idea that age-related of crime events in eyewitnesses (for a meta-analysis, deficits in episodic retrieval are responsible for reduced see Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010). We referred to internal details during both remembering and imagin- our adapted version of the CI as an episodic specificity ing, consistent with the constructive episodic simulation induction (ESI; for review, see Schacter & Madore, hypothesis. That interpretation fit well with other evi- 2016). In our procedure, participants first view a video dence that a variety of psychiatric and neurological of an everyday scene and then receive either an ESI or patient populations show similar reductions in episodic control induction. During ESI, participants are given a detail when they remember past experiences and imag- variety of CI probes to elicit detailed episodic retrieval ine possible future experiences (for review, see Schacter of events in the video, such as generating mental images et al., 2008, 2012). of what they had seen and recalling in as much detail However, it was not long before a new series of as possible people, actions, the arrangement of objects, experiments cast doubt on this seemingly straightfor- and so on. In the control induction, participants provide ward state of theoretical affairs. Gaesser, Sachetti, Addis, their general impressions of the video but do not and Schacter (2011) replicated age-related reductions engage in detailed episodic retrieval (in some experi- in internal details for remembering past experiences ments, the control induction involves completing math and imagining future experiences in experiments using problems). After these inductions, participants com- pictures (i.e., photos of everyday scenes) as cues for plete unrelated tasks, such as imagining a future experi- remembering and imagining. However, we also found ence or describing a picture. We reasoned that if a task similar age-related reductions when young and older draws on episodic memory, performance should be adults simply described what they saw in the pictures: increased by a prior ESI (relative to the control induc- Older adults provided fewer internal details (i.e., details tion), whereas if a task does not draw on episodic 264 Schacter memory, it should be uninfluenced by a prior ESI. Con- regions in episodic future simulation, including the hip- sistent with this prediction, ESI boosted the number of pocampus (e.g., Campbell, Madore, Benoit, Thakral, & internal or episodic details that both young and old Schacter, 2018; Gaesser, Spreng, McLelland, Addis, & participants provided when asked to remember past Schacter, 2013; Martin, Schacter, Corballis, & Addis, experiences or imagine future experiences in response 2011; Thakral, Benoit, & Schacter, 2017; for review, see to picture cues, whereas it had no impact on either type Schacter, Addis, & Szpunar, 2017) and subregions within of detail when participants described the picture cue the medial prefrontal cortex (Benoit, Szpunar, & (Madore, Gaesser, & Schacter, 2014). Schacter, 2014; St. Jacques, Carpenter, Szpunar, & These results provide strong evidence for the selec- Schacter, 2018; Szpunar, St. Jacques, Robbins, Wig, & tive involvement of episodic retrieval in remembering Schacter, 2014). We have also established that the core/ past experiences and imagining future experiences, in default network that underpins episodic future simula- line with the constructive episodic simulation hypoth- tion is involved when people generate counterfactual esis, and further suggest that performance on the pic- simulations regarding how past events could have ture description task is driven by nonepisodic processes turned out differently (e.g., De Brigard, Spreng, Mitchell, such as communicative goals or narrative style— & Schacter, 2015) and that it can support more complex processes that change with age and therefore affect the forms of autobiographical planning by coupling with performance of older adults (for detailed discussion, executive networks involved in cognitive control (e.g., see Schacter, Devitt, & Addis, in press). The general Gerlach, Spreng, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2011; Spreng & lesson here has broad implications: When using narra- Schacter, 2012; Spreng, Stevens, Chamberlain, Gilmore, tive tasks to assess remembering, imagining, and related & Schacter, 2010). process, it is theoretically crucial to assess and distin- From a career perspective, this work has been par- guish between episodic and nonepisodic processes. ticularly rewarding because it has led to investigations In addition to the behavioral effects of ESI, we have of novel issues that have broadened my thinking about also documented neural effects in core network regions how memory and simulation contribute to a variety of previously linked to episodic retrieval. Administering psychological functions. For example, in a collaboration ESI just before participants imagine future experiences with Demis Hassabis in London, we examined brain during fMRI scanning both replicated previous behav- activity during an episodic simulation task in which ioral results and produced significant increases in the people tried to predict the behavior of four individuals hippocampus and inferior parietal lobule compared with distinct personality traits (Hassabis et al., 2014). with control conditions and also produced subsequent Results showed extensive core network activity during changes in resting-state functional connectivity between these predictive episodic simulations and distinguished these regions and other core network regions (Madore, between core regions involved in social and nonsocial Szpunar, Addis, & Schacter, 2016). To obtain even stron- aspects of episodic simulations (see also Szpunar, ger causal evidence for a role of episodic retrieval in St. Jacques, et al., 2014). Moreover, multivariate pattern future imagining, we have also manipulated episodic classification analyses identified which of the four indi- retrieval by using transcranial magnetic stimulation viduals was being imagined based solely on activity (TMS) to temporarily disrupt the activity of a region patterns in the medial prefrontal cortex. thought to be critical for both episodic memory and Another nice example comes from a recent collabo- simulation: the left angular gyrus, a part of the inferior ration with the laboratory of Dahua Wang and Xiancai parietal lobule in the core network linked previously Cao in Beijing, where we tested the constructive epi- with aspects of episodic retrieval (e.g., Yazar, Bergstrom, sodic simulation hypothesis by asking whether episodic & Simons, 2014). After TMS to this region, participants memory and simulation play a role in attachment pro- provided fewer internal details and more external cesses that distinguish individuals characterized by details when remembering a past experience or imagin- secure and insecure attachments in close relationships ing a future experience in response to word cues com- (Cao, Madore, Wang, & Schacter, 2018). In an experi- pared with TMS to a control site (the vertex; Thakral, ment using Autobiographical Interview procedures, Madore, & Schacter, 2017). Moreover, TMS to the angu- secure individuals generated more internal and fewer lar gyrus had no effect on a control task that required external details both when remembering past and imag- generating semantic associates to word cues. ining future attachment-relevant experiences (i.e., expe- Collectively, these findings establish a critical role riences involving a significant other) compared with for episodic retrieval processes in constructing mental attachment-irrelevant experiences (i.e., experiences simulations of the future. In related lines of work, we involving strangers or more distant acquaintances). In have provided additional fMRI evidence that helps to contrast, these parallel attachment-driven effects on past characterize the role of several key core network and future events were not seen in insecure individuals. Memory and Imagining the Future 265

The findings provide novel support for the constructive Pan, Musicaro, & Schacter, 2016; for review, see Beaty, episodic simulation hypothesis and have interesting Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, 2016). This linkage was implications for the longstanding construct of internal unexpected given the focus on semantic memory in the working models of attachment (e.g., Bowlby, 1969) by creativity literature but nonetheless raised the intriguing providing evidence for the idea that such models can possibility that episodic retrieval might extend into a bridge past and future experiences of close relation- novel domain that had been largely overlooked by ships (Cassidy, 2000). memory researchers. Our previous work with ESI sug- gested that it could be a useful tool for providing a Extensions to Problem Solving and strong test of the possible contribution of episodic retrieval to divergent creative thinking. Creativity We thus tested this idea by administering ESI or a Having established that episodic retrieval contributes control induction before having participants complete to future simulation, we have also examined the pos- the Alternate Uses Test (AUT), a standard tool for sibility that episodic memory retrieval might play a role assessing divergent thinking that requires people to in other tasks that we do not ordinarily think of as generate novel but appropriate uses for common “episodic memory tasks” (for a related perspective, see objects (e.g., brick, paperclip). ESI boosted the number Moscovitch, Cabeza, Winocur, & Nadel, 2016). For of such uses that participants provide on the AUT but example, the means-end problem-solving task devel- had no impact on an object association task that oped by Platt and Spivack (1975) provides hypothetical requires participants to generate familiar associates of scenarios that begin with a person experiencing a social the target objects (Madore, Addis, & Schacter, 2015). problem (e.g., friends are avoiding her) and end with Similar to future imagining, we also provided fMRI evi- the individual solving that problem (friends like her dence that administering an ESI increases subsequent again). The participants’ task is to generate steps that hippocampal activity during performance of the AUT are relevant to solving the problem (e.g., asking a friend (Madore, Thakral, Beaty, Addis, & Schacter, 2017). This what is wrong). Research by Sheldon, McAndrews, and study also revealed that ESI produced activation Moscovitch (2011) suggested a role for episodic retrieval increases during AUT performance in prefrontal regions in generating relevant steps, leading us to predict that associated with cognitive control, as well as increases ESI would increase the number of relevant steps that in functional connectivity (both task-based and resting- participants provide. That is exactly what we found for state) between the core or default network and an exec- both young and old adults (Madore & Schacter, 2014). utive control network. These results converge nicely Extending this finding to the domain of personally wor- with other neuroimaging studies that have shown that risome experiences, Jing, Madore, and Schacter (2016) connectivity increases between default and control net- documented that ESI not only boosted the number of works are consistently observed during tasks that tap relevant steps that participants generate to solve prob- creative cognition (for review, see Beaty et al., 2016). lems that worry them but also produced increases in More recently, we have provided direct evidence for well-being toward the worrisome experience (for neural commonalties among divergent thinking, imagin- related findings on the ability to generate alternative ing future experiences, and remembering past experi- future scenarios, see Jing et al., 2017). ences by showing that, within a single experiment, all We have also extended this approach to the domain three processes engage some of the same core network of divergent creative thinking: the ability to generate regions, including the hippocampus and parahippocam- creative ideas by combining diverse kinds of informa- pal gyrus (Beaty, Thakral, Madore, Benedek, & Schacter, tion in novel ways. Although creativity research has 2018). typically focused on the contributions of semantic From a career perspective, these new lines of work memory, just as with means-end problem solving there have helped to broaden my empirical and theoretical was some evidence suggesting that episodic memory horizons, raised novel questions about how memory might play a role in divergent creative thinking. Gil- fits in the larger landscape of cognition, and more gen- hooly, Fioratou, Anthony, and Wynn (2007) reported erally contributed to the scientific vitality of my research that people occasionally draw on episodic memories program. when performing a divergent thinking task; Duff, Kur- czek, Rubin, Cohen, and Tranel (2013) reported that Adaptive Constructive Processes and patients with amnesia who have episodic memory defi- Memory Errors cits also exhibit divergent thinking deficits; and work in my lab revealed a positive correlation between diver- As mentioned earlier, a question that was central to the gent thinking and episodic future simulation (Addis, conceptualization of the seven sins of memory has 266 Schacter continued to remain at the forefront of my theoretical two background settings after they correctly inferred approach: What are the functions of a constructive that the two individuals were associated than after they memory? On the one hand, several lines of evidence incorrectly inferred that there was no association from my lab and others support the functional utility between the individuals (Carpenter & Schacter, 2017; of the mental simulation processes that we have linked see Carpenter & Schacter, 2018, for a similar pattern of with episodic retrieval, including the aforementioned inference-related memory errors concerning high-value work on social problem solving (Jing et al., 2016; and low-value individuals). Madore & Schacter, 2014; Sheldon et al., 2011) as well Although we have focused on exploring the func- as studies showing that episodic simulation boosts pro- tions and consequences of adaptive constructive pro- social intentions (e.g., Gaesser & Schacter, 2014), emo- cesses in the context of work on episodic simulation, tion regulation (e.g., Jing et al., 2016, 2017), farsighted we have also examined similar issues in related domains decision making (e.g., Benoit, Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011), of memory. For example, we have used both behavioral and prospective memory performance (e.g., Spreng, and fMRI methods to show that reactivating memories Madore, & Schacter, 2018; for detailed review, see of a recent experience can produce memory errors Schacter, 2012; Schacter Benoit, & Szpunar, 2017). On when novel information presented during reactivation the other hand, my lab and others have also shown that becomes confused with a prior experience; we have episodic simulations and related forms of imagination argued that this memory error reflects the operation of can contribute to various kinds of memory distortions a functionally useful updating process (St. Jacques, (e.g., Devitt, Monk-Fromont, Schacter, & Addis, 2016; Olm, & Schacter, 2013; St. Jacques & Schacter, 2013). Devitt & Schacter, 2018; Garry, Manning, Loftus, & We have also shown that false memories in the DRM Sherman, 1996; Gerlach, Dornblaser, & Schacter, 2014; paradigm can be predicted from characteristics of a Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Loftus, 2003). Taken together, semantic neural code in the anterior temporal lobe, a these two kinds of findings support a characterization region that underpins functionally critical semantic- of episodic simulation as an adaptive constructive pro- processing and memory functions (Chadwick et al., cess, that is, a cognitive process that plays a functional 2016). These findings, together with our work on flex- role in cognition but produces distortions or illusions ible recombination and episodic simulation, suggest as a consequence of doing so (Schacter, 2012). The that there is no single answer to the question I posed constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter earlier regarding the function of a constructive memory. & Addis, 2007a, 2007b) embodies this idea because it A number of adaptive processes, including episodic proposes that flexible episodic retrieval processes that simulation, memory updating, and semantic coding, support the adaptive function of simulating future expe- produce memory errors that are consequences of the riences by recombining elements of past experiences functions they perform (see also Howe, 2011; Newman to construct novel event representations can also con- & Lindsay, 2009; Schacter et al., 2011). tribute to memory errors. We have recently provided what we believe to be Concluding Comments some of the strongest evidence to date in support of this view by showing that within a single experimental If someone had asked me 40 years ago what I would paradigm the same flexible retrieval/recombination be studying in 2018, I am not sure what I would have processes that support an adaptive cognitive function said. But I am reasonably certain that I would have also increase memory errors (Carpenter & Schacter, mentioned very few, if any, of the questions, paradigms, 2017, 2018). The adaptive cognitive function in these or approaches described in this article (or other recent experiments is associative inference (Zeithamova & projects in my lab, such as studies of mind wandering Preston, 2010), that is, the ability to link separate expe- that fit well with our work on prospection and episodic riences that share a common element. In Carpenter and simulation; e.g., Maillet, Seli, & Schacter, 2017; Seli, Schacter’s (2017) paradigm, to make associative infer- Smilek, Ralph, & Schacter, 2018). And that underscores ences participants need to combine information across one of the main satisfactions of a long career as a psy- distinct scenes that comprise people, objects, and set- chological scientist: the enjoyment of being surprised tings; individuals are linked to one another because by where one goes next and the ensuing satisfaction each is paired with the same object in a different back- when a new direction turns up something that we did ground setting (e.g., a man and a toy in one living not know before and that is worth knowing. For me, room; a boy and the same toy in a different living the surprising moments and new directions have almost room). When asked about details of the setting in which invariably been the product of collaborations with each person appeared, participants made more source graduate students, postdocs, and other colleagues memory errors in which they mixed up elements of the whose insights and efforts have helped to take the work Memory and Imagining the Future 267 to places that it would not have gone otherwise. Those Funding collaborative efforts themselves have constituted some This work was supported by National Institute of Mental of the most satisfying experiences of my career as a Health Grant R01-MH060941 and National Institute on Aging psychological scientist and continue to be an ongoing Grant R01-AG008441. source of satisfaction as my colleagues and I move forward with ongoing projects that will hopefully lead References to future surprises and insights. Addis, D. R., Moscovitch, M., Crawley, A. P., & McAndrews, Of course, in a long career one inevitably faces chal- M. P. (2004). Recollective qualities modulate hippocam- lenges and disappointments, and I am no exception: pal activation during autobiographical memory retrieval. Experiments do not work, articles are rejected, and Hippocampus, 14, 752–762. grants are not funded. Those experiences are rarely Addis, D. R., Pan, L., Musicaro, R., & Schacter, D. L. (2016). pleasant and can be demoralizing, but over the long Divergent thinking and constructing episodic simulations. term I think it is important to try to view them as Memory, 24, 89–97. sources of instructive feedback. A failed experiment Addis, D. R., Wong, A. T., & Schacter, D. L. (2007). may reveal an important but correctable flaw in our Remembering the past and imagining the future: Common thinking; a rejected article or nonfunded grant may and distinct neural substrates during event construction and elaboration. Neuropsychologia, 45, 1363–1377. expose technical or interpretative problems with meth- Addis, D. R., Wong, A. T., & Schacter, D. L. (2008). Age-related ods and/or data, a conceptual limitation in our framing changes in the episodic simulation of future events. Psy- of an issue, or a communicative limitation in how we chological Science, 18, 33–41. portray it to others. Trying to take away useful lessons Aminoff, E., Schacter, D. L., & Bar, M. (2008). The corti- from a disappointment can help to minimize future dis- cal underpinnings of context-based memory distortion. appointments. Ultimately, however, disappointments and Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20, 2226–2237. challenges are more bearable if we can experience sat- Anderson, J. R., & Milson, R. (1989). Human memory: An isfaction and excitement from a surprising finding or adaptive perspective. Psychological Review, 96, 703–719. promising new idea and knit together an accumulating Atance, C. M., & O’Neill, D. (2001). 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Advance for this article. online publication. doi:10.1162/jocn_a_01327 Benoit, R. G., Gilbert, S. J., & Burgess, P. W. (2011). A neural mechanism mediating the impact of episodic prospec- Acknowledgments tion on farsighted decisions. Journal of Neuroscience, 31, This article was written in response to an invitation to con- 6771–6779. tribute to a series of career perspective articles in Perspectives Benoit, R. G., & Schacter, D. L. (2015). Specifying the core net- on Psychological Science. The research described in this arti- work supporting episodic simulation and episodic mem- cle reflects the combined efforts of numerous graduate and ory by activation likelihood estimation. Neuropsychologia, undergraduate students, postdoctoral fellows, research assis- 75, 450–457. tants, and colleagues without whom the work would not have Benoit, R. G., Szpunar, K. K., & Schacter, D. L. (2014). been done. I express my deepest appreciation to all of them. Ventromedial prefrontal cortex supports affective future I thank Roger Beaty, Nadia Brashier, Aleea Devitt, Ethan simulation by integrating distributed knowledge. Harris, Kevin Madore, Susan McGlynn, Hannah Schacter, and Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 111, Preston Thakral for helpful comments and suggestions regard- 16550–16555. ing earlier drafts of the manuscript and Roddy Roediger and Bjork, R. A., & Bjork, E. L. (1988). On the adaptive aspects Marcia Johnson for useful reviews of the article. of retrieval failure in autobiographical memory. In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris, & R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects of memory: Current research and issues (pp. 283– Declaration of Conflicting Interests 288). Chichester, England: John Wiley. The author(s) declared that there were no conflicts of interest Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and loss: Vol. 1. Attachment. with respect to the authorship or the publication of this article. 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