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The Resurgence of the Extreme-Right in France: Political Protest and the Party System in the 1980'S

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The Resurgence of the Extreme-Right in France: Political Protest and the Party System in the 1980'S THE RESURGENCE OF THE EXTREME-RIGHT IN FRANCE: POLITICAL PROTEST AND THE PARTY SYSTEM IN THE 1980'S SUBMITTED BY DAVID BLATT DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE MCGILL UNIVERSITY, MONTREAL A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS JULY, 1989 @ DAVID BLATT 1989 T 1/<:: f~': .:' 1 1 1: 'J '_' 1 Il /- Il 1 t I,I F. t 1 . JII' G',' j 1,1 ); 1 ;-' J ., J. ABSTRACT until 1983, the extreme-Right had ceased to be a significant force in French politics. However, over a six-year period, the Front National has established itself as a major politicaJ. party Wl th the consistent support of at least ten per cent of the French electorate. The resurgence of the extreme-Right is rooted in the persistence of an extreme-Right tradition which the Front National has managed ta capture. The previous fail ure of this tradition to translate into support for parties of the extrerne­ Right was primarily a resul t of the nature of electoral competi tion cturing the f irst quarter-century of the Firth Republic and of the ability of the major parties ta integrate the concerns of potential extreme-Right supporters. Changes in the party system, along with France' s economic and social crisis, have allowed for the resurgence of the extreme-Right in France. ii RESUME Jusqu 1 en 1983, 11 extrême droi te était considerée une forcc politique insignifiante en France. Cependant, depuis plus de six ans, le Front National s'est impose comme parti politique qUI reçoit regul ièrement l'appui dl au moins dix pour cent de l'électorat française. Cette renaissance de l' extrême droite a pour orig ine la persistance dl une tradition d'extrême droite que le Front National a réussi à saisir. Jusqu 1 à present, l'echec de cette tradition de s'exprimer a travers des partis d'extrême droite était le résultat de la nature de l'enjeu electorale pendant le premier quart de siècle de la Vième Republique, ainsi que le talent des principaux partis d' integrer les preoccupations des partisans potentiels de l'extrême droite. La renaissance de l'extrême droite en France a été le resultat des changements dans le système des partis ainsi que de la crise economique et sociale. iii i •J .. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS l am deeply thankful to Professor Hudson Meadwell, who has served as advisor and friend throughout this project weIl beyond the call of dut Y • His comments and suggestions have hE' l ped me out of and away from rnany blind alleys, and his availability at any and aIl times has helped enormously in getting me through. l am grateful also to Ruth Abbey, whose careful reading of a rough draft of this thesis generously alerted me to numerous crrors and improvements, and to Eric Darier, who translated the abstract into French and also provided helpful comments. A number of friends have contributed to the creation of this thesis, either through their ideas and suggestions or by helping me stay at least close to sanity through this past year. l would especially like to thank Guy Dunkerley, Mike Lusztig, Ruth Abbey, Bruce Morrison, Brett Naisby and Suzanne Inhaber at McGill, and my incomparable array of housemates, Tim, Sue, Peter, Stuart and Hank. Adrian Dix perhaps unwittingly instilled in me a keen interest in French politics that has led in a roundabout way to the present efforts, for which thanks rnay or may not be owed! l gratefully acknowledge the financial assistance provided during rny Masters 1 program by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada and McGill University. iv ~ ESpas. TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT/RESUME ........................................•.. i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......•.................................. i V LIST OF TABLES .•......•................................... V 1 INTRODUCTION............................................... 1 Chapter ONE: THE EXTREME-RIGHT UNDER THE FIFTH REPUBLIC ....... la The Extreme-Right ~radition and the Front National. la Evolution of the Extreme-Right, 1945-1981 ..... 16 TWO: THE EMERGENCE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL .............. 31 Triumphs of the Front National ................ 32 An Expression of Crisis ....................... 46 The Political Environment.................. .. 59 THREE: THE PARTY SYSTEM AND THE RISE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL. 68 The Legitimation Thesis.................... .. 70 Persistence of the Extreme-Right Tradition .... 77 Evolution of the Party System: Changes in Electoral Competltjon...................... 84 Evolution of the Party System: Dealing with Protest. 94 CONCLUSION .•............................................... 105 APPENDIX ONE: Electoral Results, AlI Parties, 1981-89 ............ 116 TWO: Electoral Results, Front National, By Department, 1984-89. • • . .. 117 BI BLI OGRAPHY . • . .. 12 a v LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. The Front National Vote in 1986 by Department, According to the Rate of Urbanization, the Level of Immigration and the Degree of Insecurity...... 49 2. Most Important Issues, Front National Voters, Total Electorate, 1984-89.... ..... ..... ..............•. 51 3. The Electorate of the Front National, 1984-88....... 54 4. Ideological Self-Placement of Front National Voters, 1984-86 .......................................... 56 5. Motivation behind Vote, April 1988.................. 65 vi L ,,4 INTRODUCTION Perhaps no development in French politics since the unrest of May 1968 has been as surprising as the resurgence of the extreme-Right over the past five years. In 1981, Jean-Marie Le Pen, President of the Front National (FN), was unable even to collect the five hundred norninating signatures necessary to rUIl as a Presidential candidate, while in the legislativc elections of that year, his party was unable to capture even two-tenths of one per cent of the vote. Yet in 1984, the Front National won over 11% in elections to the European Parliarnent and has since polled around 10% in every subsequent national and local election, including a st-unning 14.4% of the vote for Le Pen in the first round of the 1988 Presidential election. With i ts recent solid showings in the Municipal and European parliament elections of 1989, the Front National has firrnly establ ished i ts capaci ty to attract the support of a sizeable portion of the French electorate tirne after time. The ernergence of the Front National forces a reexarnination of a nurnber of widely held assumptions about the evol ution and nature of French politics under the Fifth Republic. First of a11, until virtually the moment of the FN' s initial electoral breakthrough in 1983, the extreme-right was believed to have been eliminated for good as a significant poli tical force in France. 1 2 In 1983, Jean-Christian Peti tfils wrote that "(t) he extreme-right has ceased to play a role in eiectorai politics ... broken into a myriad of li ttle pieces, this impotent coterie of phantoms ll survives only as a historical residue • 1 Although some observers interpreted incidents of right-wing terrorism and anti-semi tism as evidence of enduring extreme-right actjvism,2 twenty-fi ve years of electoral frustration, political isolation and organizational disuni ty marked the extreme-right as a most unlikely, even unthinkable, candidate for political resurrection. Secondly and more generally f the emergence of the Front National as a significant poli tical party runs counter to dominant interpretations of the main features and trends of the French party system. From a fragmented, diffuse, multi-polar system throughout French republican history, the first quarter century of the Fifth Republic had witnessed the emergence of a stable, bipolar system monopolized by four dominant political parties - the Socialists (PS), Communists (PCF) f Gaullists (RPR) and Giscardians (UDF). While in the last election of the Fourth Republic the four largest parties received only 70% of the vote, in 1981, the 'Big Four' together polled an overwhelming 96.6%.3 Similarly f whi1e the Fourth Republic saw significant parties 1Jean-Chr i stian Peti tfils, L'extrême droite en France (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983), 123. 2see Paul Hainsworth, "Anti-semitism and Neo-Fascism on the ll Contemporary Right , in Social Movements and Protest in France, ed. Phil Cerny (London: Frances Pinter, 1982), 142-71- 3Klaus Von Beyme, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: st. Martin's Press, 1985),386. 3 occupying aIl the positions along the political spectrum, by 1981 competition had been simplified to a straight L.,ft-Right conflict. By 1983, Frank Wilson, an expen. on French parties, could bl i thely, if prematurely, predict that "the reduction in the number of significant French parties to o'tly four seems permanent".4 One major source of optimism about the stability of the French party system stemmed from its apparent ability to resist the challenge of protest movements and alternative organizations to the hegemony of the maj or parties. Beginning in the late 1960's - for many, ironically, with the events of May 1968 in France - increasing evidence and examples of major party decline were identified in virtually all the advanced Western dernocracies. Faced with growing demands by such groups as environmentalists, ethnie nationalists, pacifists, frustrated taxpayers and civil rights activists, previously stable party systems were showing undeniable signs of dealignment, realignment and deeomposition: "All over the world, single-issue movements are forming, special interest groups are assuming party-like status f and minor parties are winning striking overnight victories as hitherto dominant parties lose the confidence of their electorates. 5 4Frank Wilson, "The French Party System Sinee 1981", contemporary French civilization 8 (Fall/Winter 1983-84): 117. 5Kay Lawson and Peter Merkl, ed. When Parties Fail: Emerging ALternative Organizations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 3. This volume presents a wide range of case studies to support this thesis, as does Electoral Change in Advanccd 4 As Frank Wilson notes, gi'/en the historical weakness of the French party system, together wi th the distrust and hostility wi th which pOlitical parties have traditionally been viewed, France would seem among the likeliest of candidates to suffer a similar decline.
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