Martill, University of Oxford
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Centre of Attention: Liberalism and the Politics of Cold War Strategy Benjamin Martill, University of Oxford Abstract Common to existing work on ideology and foreign policy is the use of the left-right model to structure underlying partisan differences. An exclusive reliance on this model is problematic, however, because it precludes the possibility of operationalizing the distinct values of the political centre ground. Understanding the centre is important because on many foreign policy issues the most salient partisan divides are between the centre and competitors on the left and the right, rather than between the left and right themselves. In this article I offer an alternative conceptualisation of ideology based around the ‘horseshoe model’ commonly used in European studies and Comparative Politics. This allows us to distinguish the values of the political centre from those shared by both left and right. The five distinguishing elements of the centre’s approach to foreign policy, I argue, are: (1) interdependence, (2) supranationalism, (3) particularism, (4) deterrence, and (5) free trade. I test the argument by examining the changing Cold War strategies of Euratlantic states vis-à-vis both superpowers. Paper presented at the PSA annual conference, Sheffield, April 2015 Draft version – please do not cite 1 Introduction Existing works on ideology and International Relations (IR) have highlighted a number of linkages between the partisan orientation of governments and their foreign policy behaviour, in issue-areas as diverse as security, human rights, economics and international organization. These works share a common reliance on the standard model of political ideology that posits variation along a single dimension from left to right. In this article I argue that the reliance on the left- right model serves to obscure the distinctiveness of the foreign policy approach of the political centre, to the detriment of our understanding of the partisan bases of foreign policy contestation. Not only are the values that characterise the political centre associated with a distinct tradition of liberal political thought, they are also set apart from both the left and the right by their individualism, in marked contrast to the collectivism of socialist and conservative ideological traditions. As a result, in a large number of international issues, partisan contestation falls not along traditional left-right lines, but along a liberalism-collectivism dimension that separates those at the political centre from both left and right. To help conceptualise these differences I borrow the ‘horseshoe model’ of ideology commonly used in European studies and Comparative Politics. This model helps us conceptualise the key differences between liberalism and its competitors in the conduct of foreign policy. Here I identify five underlying differences between the liberal and collectivist conceptions of the international: (1) interdependence versus dependence, (2) supranationalism versus domesticism, (3) particularism versus pluralism, (4) deterrence versus 2 diplomacy, and (5) free trade versus protectionism. Together these five dimensions help explain the significant divisions between liberalism and both socialism and conservatism in their approaches to foreign policy. I test the validity of the argument using the case of Euratlantic Cold War strategy. I argue that the liberal emphasis on Western integration, free trade, and collective (Western) security makes centrist parties the most pro-American and anti-Soviet political actors in the Euratlantic countries. In contrast, I argue that the independence and statism of socialist and conservative parties, coupled with their respective diplomatic strategies of mediation and balancing, makes these the most likely actors to pursue disengagement from the Western alliance and cooperation with the USSR. I offer two sources of evidence for these claims. First, I offer an historical summary of the politics of French Cold War strategy, which highlights the increased tendency for parties of the left and the right to seek disengagement from the US-led Western alliance and increasing proximity towards the Soviet Union. The case demonstrates the extent to which the rise and fall of the political centre in French domestic politics contributes to changes in France’s external relations during the period. Second, I conduct a quantitative analysis of Euratlantic relations with the US and USSR from 1948 to 1978, using data on cooperation and ideology to examine the theory’s broader applicability. The quantitative element also allows us to test the theory against the predictions of competing approaches to international cooperation. The results from both the case study and the quantitative analysis support the theoretical conjecture that the most salient division in Cold War politics was 3 between liberalism and the collectivist ideologies of both left and right, and not between the left and the right themselves. Moreover, the results of the statistical analysis highlight the extent to which established theories of cooperation based on international-structural variables and alternative sources of domestic influence on foreign policy are unable to explain the pattern of variation in the relations between Euratlantic states and the superpowers. The findings have important implications for our understanding of international politics more generally. They suggest that the prevailing left-right model of ideology may struggle to adequately explain the pattern of partisan contestation of many foreign policy issues. The findings suggest that an analysis of the politics of the political centre may be able to tell us considerably more in this regard. This has implications for many pressing areas of foreign policy concern, with debates over such diverse issues as the international economy, European integration, international law, transatlantic relations, humanitarian intervention, democracy promotion and grand strategy all exhibiting a discernible pattern of liberalism versus the rest. Ideology and Foreign Policy: The Left-Right Model Much has been written in recent decades on the relationship between political ideology and international relations. Taken together, these works have uncovered important differences between governments on the left and the right in their conduct of foreign policy. Various arguments have been put forward as to the effects of ideology. These may be grouped into three broad, and somewhat overlapping, issue-areas: (1) security, (2) authority, and (3) ethics. 4 With regards questions of security and grand strategy it has been argued that those on the left of the ideological spectrum are more trusting of the intentions of other states and therefore more likely to pursue ‘pacific’ strategies towards them (Rathbun 2011:3). The left is, as a result, predisposed to a more cooperative stance in international affairs than the right; they favour reduced defence expenditures (Nincic 2008), favour diplomatic solutions over those involving force (Gries 2014:105), and are less likely to initiate conflict in the first place (Arena & Palmer 2009). When leftist oriented governments did become embroiled in conflict, they were likely to attempt to end the conflict sooner (Calin 2010; Koch 2009) and less likely to view unilateral action as the most appropriate option (Rathbun 2012). In relation to authority, it has been suggested that those on the right are markedly more sceptical about the legitimacy and efficacy of forms of international governance than those on the left. They are also less concerned with the need to act in concert with allies and to pursue multilateral action when needed (Gries 2014:104; Rathbun 2012). It has also been argued that those on the right are more sceptical of the need to comply with international law (Spiro 2000). Although they are more opposed to these forms of international authority than the left, however, the right are in favour of greater free trade and economic openness than the left (Milner & Judkins 2004). Finally, differences between left and right have also been observed in the area of international ethics and the values underpinning foreign policy. Those on the left have been found to exhibit a greater scope of moral concern than those on the right (Gries 2014:110). They are also associated with a more moralistic foreign policy in general, opposing international hierarchy and colonialism (Gibbs 1995; 5 Rathbun 2004:21) and emphasising the importance of human rights and foreign aid (Therien & Noel 2008:132-134). It has also been suggested that the right is much less tolerant of cultural differences than the left (Gries 2014:84-85). What unites these arguments is their reliance on the left-right model of ideology as a means of structuring partisan differences. Whilst not all of these works posit the existence of single and coherent ‘leftist’ and ‘rightist’ bodies of thought, all of them rely on the assumption of an underlying left-right dimension to which more specific positions ultimately reduce. Of course, the reliance on the left-right model is not surprising given its routine and intuitive deployment in our everyday understandings of politics, and the disciplinary drivers pointing towards analytical parsimony. Yet there also problems that accompany the use of the left- right model to understand foreign policy, chief among which is the lack of conceptual specificity afforded to the foreign policy preferences associated with the political centre. There are several reasons why