Centre of Attention: Liberalism and the Politics of Cold War Strategy
Benjamin Martill, University of Oxford
Abstract Common to existing work on ideology and foreign policy is the use of the left-right model to structure underlying partisan differences. An exclusive reliance on this model is problematic, however, because it precludes the possibility of operationalizing the distinct values of the political centre ground. Understanding the centre is important because on many foreign policy issues the most salient partisan divides are between the centre and competitors on the left and the right, rather than between the left and right themselves. In this article I offer an alternative conceptualisation of ideology based around the ‘horseshoe model’ commonly used in European studies and Comparative Politics. This allows us to distinguish the values of the political centre from those shared by both left and right. The five distinguishing elements of the centre’s approach to foreign policy, I argue, are: (1) interdependence, (2) supranationalism, (3) particularism, (4) deterrence, and (5) free trade. I test the argument by examining the changing Cold War strategies of Euratlantic states vis-à-vis both superpowers.
Paper presented at the PSA annual conference, Sheffield, April 2015
Draft version – please do not cite
1 Introduction
Existing works on ideology and International Relations (IR) have highlighted a number of linkages between the partisan orientation of governments and their foreign policy behaviour, in issue-areas as diverse as security, human rights, economics and international organization. These works share a common reliance on the standard model of political ideology that posits variation along a single dimension from left to right. In this article I argue that the reliance on the left- right model serves to obscure the distinctiveness of the foreign policy approach of the political centre, to the detriment of our understanding of the partisan bases of foreign policy contestation.
Not only are the values that characterise the political centre associated with a distinct tradition of liberal political thought, they are also set apart from both the left and the right by their individualism, in marked contrast to the collectivism of socialist and conservative ideological traditions. As a result, in a large number of international issues, partisan contestation falls not along traditional left-right lines, but along a liberalism-collectivism dimension that separates those at the political centre from both left and right.
To help conceptualise these differences I borrow the ‘horseshoe model’ of ideology commonly used in European studies and Comparative Politics. This model helps us conceptualise the key differences between liberalism and its competitors in the conduct of foreign policy. Here I identify five underlying differences between the liberal and collectivist conceptions of the international:
(1) interdependence versus dependence, (2) supranationalism versus domesticism, (3) particularism versus pluralism, (4) deterrence versus
2 diplomacy, and (5) free trade versus protectionism. Together these five dimensions help explain the significant divisions between liberalism and both socialism and conservatism in their approaches to foreign policy.
I test the validity of the argument using the case of Euratlantic Cold War strategy. I argue that the liberal emphasis on Western integration, free trade, and collective (Western) security makes centrist parties the most pro-American and anti-Soviet political actors in the Euratlantic countries. In contrast, I argue that the independence and statism of socialist and conservative parties, coupled with their respective diplomatic strategies of mediation and balancing, makes these the most likely actors to pursue disengagement from the Western alliance and cooperation with the USSR.
I offer two sources of evidence for these claims. First, I offer an historical summary of the politics of French Cold War strategy, which highlights the increased tendency for parties of the left and the right to seek disengagement from the US-led Western alliance and increasing proximity towards the Soviet
Union. The case demonstrates the extent to which the rise and fall of the political centre in French domestic politics contributes to changes in France’s external relations during the period. Second, I conduct a quantitative analysis of
Euratlantic relations with the US and USSR from 1948 to 1978, using data on cooperation and ideology to examine the theory’s broader applicability. The quantitative element also allows us to test the theory against the predictions of competing approaches to international cooperation.
The results from both the case study and the quantitative analysis support the theoretical conjecture that the most salient division in Cold War politics was
3 between liberalism and the collectivist ideologies of both left and right, and not between the left and the right themselves. Moreover, the results of the statistical analysis highlight the extent to which established theories of cooperation based on international-structural variables and alternative sources of domestic influence on foreign policy are unable to explain the pattern of variation in the relations between Euratlantic states and the superpowers.
The findings have important implications for our understanding of international politics more generally. They suggest that the prevailing left-right model of ideology may struggle to adequately explain the pattern of partisan contestation of many foreign policy issues. The findings suggest that an analysis of the politics of the political centre may be able to tell us considerably more in this regard. This has implications for many pressing areas of foreign policy concern, with debates over such diverse issues as the international economy, European integration, international law, transatlantic relations, humanitarian intervention, democracy promotion and grand strategy all exhibiting a discernible pattern of liberalism versus the rest.
Ideology and Foreign Policy: The Left-Right Model
Much has been written in recent decades on the relationship between political ideology and international relations. Taken together, these works have uncovered important differences between governments on the left and the right in their conduct of foreign policy. Various arguments have been put forward as to the effects of ideology. These may be grouped into three broad, and somewhat overlapping, issue-areas: (1) security, (2) authority, and (3) ethics.
4 With regards questions of security and grand strategy it has been argued that those on the left of the ideological spectrum are more trusting of the intentions of other states and therefore more likely to pursue ‘pacific’ strategies towards them
(Rathbun 2011:3). The left is, as a result, predisposed to a more cooperative stance in international affairs than the right; they favour reduced defence expenditures (Nincic 2008), favour diplomatic solutions over those involving force (Gries 2014:105), and are less likely to initiate conflict in the first place
(Arena & Palmer 2009). When leftist oriented governments did become embroiled in conflict, they were likely to attempt to end the conflict sooner
(Calin 2010; Koch 2009) and less likely to view unilateral action as the most appropriate option (Rathbun 2012).
In relation to authority, it has been suggested that those on the right are markedly more sceptical about the legitimacy and efficacy of forms of international governance than those on the left. They are also less concerned with the need to act in concert with allies and to pursue multilateral action when needed (Gries
2014:104; Rathbun 2012). It has also been argued that those on the right are more sceptical of the need to comply with international law (Spiro 2000).
Although they are more opposed to these forms of international authority than the left, however, the right are in favour of greater free trade and economic openness than the left (Milner & Judkins 2004).
Finally, differences between left and right have also been observed in the area of international ethics and the values underpinning foreign policy. Those on the left have been found to exhibit a greater scope of moral concern than those on the right (Gries 2014:110). They are also associated with a more moralistic foreign policy in general, opposing international hierarchy and colonialism (Gibbs 1995;
5 Rathbun 2004:21) and emphasising the importance of human rights and foreign aid (Therien & Noel 2008:132-134). It has also been suggested that the right is much less tolerant of cultural differences than the left (Gries 2014:84-85).
What unites these arguments is their reliance on the left-right model of ideology as a means of structuring partisan differences. Whilst not all of these works posit the existence of single and coherent ‘leftist’ and ‘rightist’ bodies of thought, all of them rely on the assumption of an underlying left-right dimension to which more specific positions ultimately reduce. Of course, the reliance on the left-right model is not surprising given its routine and intuitive deployment in our everyday understandings of politics, and the disciplinary drivers pointing towards analytical parsimony. Yet there also problems that accompany the use of the left- right model to understand foreign policy, chief among which is the lack of conceptual specificity afforded to the foreign policy preferences associated with the political centre.
There are several reasons why liberalism has been paid little specific attention.
First, the reliance on the traditional left-right model offers little scope for acknowledging the specificity of liberalism, and the political centre becomes associated merely with “the geometrical spot at which the moderates of opposed tendencies meet” (Duverger 1964). A second view equates the centre with pragmatism, distinguishing those at the centre not by their values but by their rejection of value-based (or ‘ideological’) policymaking (Sartori 1976:134-135).
A third problem is the associated of liberalism with the meta-values of democracy, the rule of law and representation in themselves, to which political actors, whether socialist or conservative, must implicitly subscribe.
6 There are also more practical reasons why the specificity of liberal ideology has frequently been missed. The overwhelming focus of studies on the US is one notable issue. Not only is the US the quintessential liberal state, domestic politics within the US is also associated with low levels of ideological variation (Hartz
1955; Ikenberry 2009:76-77). As a result, works on political ideology that take
US party politics as their point of departure either downplay the extent of liberal/illiberal variation, or equate US liberalism with ‘the left’. Moreover, the decline of many liberal parties after the Second World War also contributed to the lack of theorisation of centrist party positions. In Britain and Germany, for example, the respective liberal parties often polled less than 10% of the popular vote, and received an even smaller proportion of seats. In other countries, such as
France, liberals were able to govern only in coalition with non-liberal parties, and their influence was restricted accordingly.
The Case for the Political Centre
Despite its neglect in the ideology literature, the distinct conception of the international associated with liberal ideology and the political centre is of significant importance for our understanding of international relations, and its incorporation into our analyses of ideology long overdue. In this section I make two claims: First, I argue that liberal ideology is distinct – both conceptually and empirically – from its competitors, and second, I suggest that in many cases the centre is more distinct from its competitors than they are from each other.
Neglecting the centrist position is problematic because the foreign policy dispositions of actors at the political centre are distinct in many respects from
7 those on both the left and the right. The distinct foreign policy approach of the political centre is associated with the core liberal values of interdependence, liberty, rationality, individualism, supranationalism and moral particularism. As such, those at the centre offer a distinct interpretation of the international, rather than simply a ‘moderate’ variant of leftist or rightist viewpoints. Most important, liberalism is not an all-pervasive ideology as many accounts have it; critics from the left and right have, from within democratic systems, challenged each of these core liberal claims and sought to supplant liberal policies with their own ideologically imbued preferences. There is, then, much value in distinguishing the specific ideology of the political centre from the broad and all-pervasive liberalism of the Enlightenment that pervades every aspect of contemporary politics.
Nor does it make sense to equate liberal policies with a moderate or ‘pragmatic’ approach. Underneath ostensibly pragmatic policies, such as the liberal reliance on the market mechanism, linger distinctly liberal interpretations of the nature of the individual, society, and the state. One of the main reasons the liberalism and pragmatism have been equated is the broader tendency for proponents of ideologies to represent their particular ontological and normative claims as
‘truths’ that describe the nature of the social world as it is. Just as socialists contend the tenets of Marxism are ‘science’ not ideology (Cox 1993:57), and conservatives claim to reject ideological ‘blue-prints’ for society (Viereck 2009), liberals similarly cloak their ideological claims in the guise of ‘truths’. That they do so does not make them ‘true’ in a useful, analytical sense, however; it simply offers one more set of competing ‘truths’ to analyse.
8 It is also worth noting the extent to which liberal ideology and centrist positions maintain influence within contemporary democratic politics. Liberal ideology is a strong position in all Western democratic states, even when a single centrist party does not represent it. In majoritarian democracies the pressures of the electoral system help maintain a two-party system that obscures the existence of a discernible political centre. In these systems, the centre is usually located within intra-party factions at the fringes of both parties (as in the United
Kingdom, and in Canadian politics in the 1960s and 1970s), or within a single
‘centre party’ operating in opposition to a non-centrist ‘other’ (as is observed in
US and Canadian politics from the 1980s onwards). In proportional systems, in contrast, centrist values tend to be espoused by a single (or even multiple) ‘centre party’, the existence of which is the by-product of the high degree of proportionality in the electoral system, which results in a tighter mapping between parties and viable ideological positions (this is the case in both France and, until recently, Germany (Kaarbo 1996:505)).
Perhaps most importantly, in many cases the centre is more distinct from the alternatives on both the left and right than they are from one another. On issues of significant concern to policymakers and publics the most salient partisan divide lies not between the left and the right, but between the political centre and those on the fringes of the political spectrum, on both the left and the right. This pattern of ‘liberalism versus the rest’ is evident in contemporary policy debates over free trade, humanitarian intervention, European integration, international legal compliance, democracy promotion and transatlantic relations. In each of these domains the most salient partisan differences divide those at the centre from those at the wings. Nor is this trend new; the liberal view of foreign affairs
9 has battled against its critics on the left and the right since its earliest articulations in the 18th century.
Before we continue, it is worth making one final point in relation to the discipline. It may seem strange to some to suggest IR has not taken liberal ideology seriously. Indeed, as of 2009, 19% of introductory IR courses were dedicated to the study of liberalism, and 17% of IR scholars defined their work as falling within the ‘liberal’ paradigm (Jordan et al. 2009:18,31). My claim here is not that there is no liberal approach to international affairs. The argument is that the effects of liberal ideology on foreign policy have never been seriously studied.
Early works within the liberal tradition sought to offer an account of international anarchy that took into account the core liberal concepts of interdependence rationality, linking these to cooperation under anarchy (Axelrod & Keohane
1985; Keohane 1984; Keohane & Nye 1971; Snidal 1985; Stein 1982). Later, in the 1990s, works on sub-state and transnational actors (Milner 1997; Moravcsik
1997) and the ‘democratic peace thesis’ (Maoz & Russett 1993; Owen 1994) helped expand the liberal paradigm beyond its state-centric foundations.
Yet none of these works take seriously the ideological status of these liberal claims (Jahn 2009). Rather, they incorporate key insights of liberal ideology into their analytical frameworks. The argument offered here, however, begins from the premise that the tenets of liberal thought are contingent normative and ontological claims about the nature of the social world (from which a particular concept of ‘the international’ emerges), and not natural facets of state behaviour.
It is interested in how these liberal ideas have influenced the conduct of foreign
10 policy, not how liberal ideas can provide a framework for analysing these policies.
The Horseshoe Model and Traditions of Political Thought
In order to distinguish the political centre from its competitors, it is first necessary to elaborate upon extent of contemporary ideological variation, and the relationship between the existing traditions of political thought. Here I discuss three traditions that have animated political contestation throughout the past several centuries of democratic rule: socialism, liberalism, and conservatism. I begin by describing the basic underlying commitments of each, before offering a conceptual framework for understanding the relationship between the three.
Socialists are egalitarians; they endorse a benevolent conception of human nature that emphasises the natural trustworthiness of individuals and their capacity for other-regardingness. They argue that the individuals owe to one another the proceeds of social cooperation, such that each individual has sufficient social goods to lead a meaningful life. They are also collectivists, placing the interests of society above those of the individual. They view the state as an important tool in this regard, as it expresses the interests of the collective and facilitates the redistribution of social resources (Heywood 2007:44). Internationally socialists emphasise the importance of the community of states and of the collective values
– such as non-aggression and national equality – upon which it is based, and their
11 belief in the inherent trustworthiness of other states leads them to endorse a form of pacificism.1
Liberals view individuals as neither inherently benevolent nor fickle, but as rational and reasonable decision-makers. Liberals also reject both extremes of substantive equality and naturalised hierarchy; instead they endorse the formal equality of individuals and support the redistribution of social goods only to the extent that this is necessary to guarantee the formal equality of individuals. The liberal emphasis on human self-reliance underpins a profound individualism.
They reject collectivism as an infringement of individual liberty, endorsing a minimal conception of legitimate state authority. Liberals view the international as an asocial realm characterised by the interdependence of the policies of individual states. From the liberal perspective, international ‘society’ is best understood as a functional association of individual states than an expression of underlying cultural commonality (Rawls 1971).
Conservatives view humans as fickle creatures that are inherently untrustworthy.
They err towards a Hobbesian reading of society, where strife is the natural condition of human interaction and the state is the key to maintaining order. They view hierarchy as a natural feature of human interaction in a world where talent is distributed unevenly, suggest inequality is both just and productive.
Conservatives are also collectivists. They view individuals as part of an ‘organic’ social whole – the nation – that has value in and of itself. They view a strong state as the best means of protecting the nation from internal and external threats and of providing for the needs of individuals at every level of social
1 As Ceadal (1987), has argued, pacificism, as distinct from pacifism, does not reject the use of force in all circumstances.
12 stratification. Conservatives view the international as a dangerous anarchic realm where threats from other states are ever-present and national power is the single most important currency. They emphasise only the moral duties held by the state towards its citizens, but deny the existence of duties to individuals or countries beyond borders.
To help conceptualise the differences between the three ideologies I adopt the two-dimensional ‘horseshoe model’ of ideological space. This conceives of ideologies as structured along two dimensions: a left-right egalitarianism-elitism dimension and a top-to-bottom individualism-collectivism dimension.
Ideological positions are arranged in a curvilinear fashion across the two dimensions, with socialism and conservatism, bracketing liberalism, on opposite ends of the horizontal dimension and liberalism opposite both socialism and conservatism on the vertical dimension (Weisberg 1974:749). This model is commonly used in studies of European integration (e.g. Gabel & Anderson
2002:910; Hooghe et al. 2002:970; Marks & Steenbergen 2002:890; Massetti
2009: 525) and totalitarian politics (Davies & Lynch 2002:5-6) to represent underlying similarities between left and right that are not captured in one- dimensional models. For our purposes it is a helpful means of conceptualising the differences between the political centre and both the left and the right.
13
Figure 1: The ‘horseshoe’ model of ideology.
Liberalism versus Collectivism: Five Implications for Foreign Policy
The brief sketches of each ideology above indicate that the basic philosophical commitments of each position have implications for the manner in which these ideologies conceptualise the nature of the international realm. The argument of this paper is that the principal differences concern those between liberalism and its socialist and conservative competitors, and not between socialism and conservatism per se. I argue that there are five key differences between the political centre and both the left and right when it comes to the conduct of the state’s external relations. Centrist foreign policy is defined by a commitment to
(1) interdependence, (2) supranationalism, (3) particularism, (4) deterrence, and
(5) free trade. Both the left and the right, in contrast, have – for sometimes different reasons – pursued foreign policy strategies based on the principles of
(1) dependence, (2) domesticism, (3) pluralism, (4) diplomacy, and (5) protectionism.
14 Interdependence versus Dependence
The first difference concerns the value that each ideology places on the concept of international interdependence. Although each of the three positions would acknowledge the interdependent nature of the post-World War II international system, it is only liberals that regard this phenomenon as a natural and desirable facet of statecraft. For the centre interdependence is the natural condition of states; analyses of the international economy from the nineteenth century frequently stressed the extent to which nations were linked together through their manifest interactions. The centre, moreover, view interdependence as a beneficial conditions that helps ameliorate the worst elements of international anarchy and offers increasing incentives for states to withhold aggression.
The left, in contrast, has been markedly more sceptical of interdependence, whilst acknowledging that it is a defining characteristic of the modern states system. The left have tended to see dependence where the centre sees interdependence, arguing that it is international capitalism that produces these linkages and that the system itself relies on the exploitation of weaker countries by the dominant capitalist powers (usually, the US). As a result, the left have tended to resist further deepening of the ‘interdependence’ between nations, viewing the relation as an inherently unequal and exploitative one.
The right have also challenged the normative value of interdependence on similar grounds, although their analysis has focused not on the capitalist system but on the nature of international anarchy. They have understood the deepening ties between states as the result of power asymmetries, arguing that interdependence is nothing more than the interference of the stronger powers in the affairs of
15 weaker states. As a result they have also sought to limit the deepening ties between states, fearing the loss of autonomy and the influence ceded to the more powerful that is the natural consequence.
Supranationalism versus Domesticism
A second difference concerns the effectiveness and legitimacy of forms of governance ‘above’ the state, namely international governmental and legal institutions. Here again there is a distinct divide between the centre and its competitors. Liberals at the political centre have generally welcomed forms of international authority. They have argued that these institutions are able to shape the behaviour of states and that they contribute to the regulation of the global order in a beneficial way. They have also sought to downplay the problems associated with the legitimacy of international authority, viewing delegation as morally justified and democratically valid, and in many cases welcoming the limitations on the authority of the state itself.
The leftist position on supranational authority is somewhat more complex.
Technically the left embrace ideal of a future ‘world government’ and view states as arbitrary containers of humankind. As a result, they have strongly endorsed the UN, which they view as early example of this ideal. Yet they have also been markedly sceptical of other forms of international authority. Supranationalism outside of the security realm is held to be anti-democratic and to risk undermining the policy autonomy of the state; that it, the ability of the government to pursue a redistributive agenda at home. This concern for maintaining domestic autonomy is also reinforced by the left’s assessment of
16 international governance as a vehicle for capitalist expansion, with leftist critiques of the EU, IMF, and WTO essentially taking this line.
The right have also evidenced a marked scepticism towards forms of international authority, though in their case this critique is rooted in their pessimistic conception of the international domain. The right’s emphasis on the importance of national sovereignty and the inescapable condition of insecurity that characterises the international realm has led them to view attempts at abridging anarchy as both inefficacious and illegitimate. International governance is likely to achieve little of value, given the overwhelming incentives for states to defect, and also risks undermining the authority of the state (which, for the right, derives exclusively from the nation itself). Those on the right, then, have sought to maintain their independence in the face of moves towards increasing international governance.
Particularism versus Pluralism
A third dimension concerns the extent to which the internal environment of other states is viewed as a legitimate area of concern. Here the position of the centre tends towards particularism. There is a lengthy tradition in liberal thought of what is contemporaneously termed ‘democratic conditionality’, the key tenets of which have changed little over the years. The liberal emphasis on the individual, coupled with its civic concept of nationalism, where the state emerges contractually from the consent of individuals, makes the internal organisation of states a key liberal concern. States may be considered legitimate actors only to the extent they have in place a functioning ‘consultation hierarchy’ (Rawls
17 1999). For liberals there is also a security element at play here; undemocratic states are not only illegitimate, they are also potentially dangerous, as the citizens’ desire to avoid conflict is not channelled into the state’s conduct.
The left share the centre’s broad scope of moral concern and desire to spread justice across the globe, but they tend to be more pluralist than liberals; that is, they have been far more open to considering non-democratic states as legitimate members of the international community. This is for three reasons. First, there is a discernible leftist preference for outcomes over procedures; anti-democratic regimes have been tolerated to the extent that they champion redistributive policies, and are seen to provide for the worse off. Second, the socialist emphasis on pacificism – that is, the desire to mediate conflict between nations – is itself predicated on an endorsement of the rights of states over the rights of individuals, and contains within it a latent pluralism or sorts. Third, and finally, the left has come to be associated with a cultural egalitarianism that promotes tolerance of otherness and difference.
The right, in contrast, arrive at a similarly pluralist position through a different logic. The pluralism of the right is the product of their conception of the international, and the dominance of Realpolitik therein. The international system, they contend, is not a suitable environment for the realisation of ethical goals; the only duties that do pertain are the duties of leaders to their country and the mutual respect between sovereigns at the international level (Chapnick 2005).
Both of these factors help reinforce a pluralist account of global order: The right do not view the internal constitution of other states as being of any relevance, and their conception of international actor-hood is unrelated to the constitution of
18 the polity. Moreover, unlike liberals, conservatives associated threat with power, not regime type.
Deterrence versus Diplomacy
The fourth dimension concerns the extent to which strategy is pursued through deterrent or diplomatic means. When it comes to international security, the centre has prioritised the former over the latter. The liberal approach to security is based fundamentally on its rationalist assumptions; actors are not necessarily benevolent or fickle, but rather act strategically in response to the incentives they are faced with. When it comes to dealing with threats, therefore, the optimal means of defence is the credibility of a potential response to any aggression. As a result, liberals seek to develop such capabilities that an attack may be deterred, and focus in particular on potential threats to the credibility of this deterrence
(such as, for example, alliance cohesion).
The left oppose the liberal emphasis on strategic deterrence and credibility. They have instead embraced a pacificistic emphasis on the mutual reduction of tension through cooperative actions, and stress the importance of making the ‘first move’ in order to signal benign motivations. As Rathbun has illustrated, the left reject the premises of the ‘deterrence’ model on which the liberal strategy is based, viewing any increase in capabilities as resulting in a dangerous spiral (Rathbun
2004:xx). Rather than build up capabilities, the leftist approach has been to promote diplomatic engagement in order to diffuse conflict and prevent the development of weapons spiralling out of control.
19 The right, too, have embraced more diplomatic approaches to achieving security.
This might sound strange initially, given the association of the political right with hawkish security policies and significant weapons spending. But they fundamental premises of the policies that these elements of rightist thought are put in service of feature a far greater diplomatic element that is often acknowledged. The conservative approach to security has emphasised the potential threat from any source and the need to balance power accordingly.
Balancing strategies are based not upon deep alliances but on temporary and fluid arrangements with other states designed specifically to increase the leverage of the state vis-à-vis potential threats. Importantly, successful balancing depends less on aggregate capabilities than on diplomatic manoeuvring, and the ability to pursue flexible strategies.
Free Trade versus Protectionism
The final dimension concerns the degree of economic openness thought desirable by the state. The centre is associated with support for the market mechanism as a means of allocating resources and the pursuit of a global economic order based on free trade and enterprise. For liberals the market is the most efficient and just means of aggregating preferences and enduring that an individual’s effort is rewarded fairly. Between nations, free trade is thought to result in Pareto- superior outcomes across the broad, to the advantage of both states and consumers. Moreover, those at the centre also hold that liberalisation is likely to result in a more pacific international environment, as the intensification of
20 commercial relations results in ever-increasing levels of interdependence, tying the fate of countries to one another.
Those on the left have challenged the liberal claim that global free trade is both desirable and pacific. They have argued that the spread of free trade is the product of an inherently expansionist and unjust capitalist system that perpetuates social inequalities and works in favour of a small and unrepresentative elite. The association of free trade with Pareto-superior consequences, they argue, misses the extent to which average gains are differentiated along class lines. Nor is this order pacific; the expansion of capitalism is, for the left, usually the product of force and violence, and the contemporary liberal order constitutes a self-serving hierarchy build around
Western interests, to the detriment of poorer states.2
The right, in contrast, have also opposed the liberalisation of trade, but for very different reasons. For the right it has been the concern to maintain the autonomy of the nation that had underlain their sometime attempts to restrict free trade. In particular, the presence of foreign capital has been thought to damage the autonomy of the state. Liberalisation has also been linked by those on the right to the undermining of traditional forms of domestic order, and the right have traditionally feared the destabilising effects of unfettered capitalism (Heywood
2007). As a result, for reasons of national independence and domestic social order – both core tenets of their underlying ideology – the right have often sought to restrict free trade and marketization.3
2 In addition, the left have often pursued protectionist and anti-free trade policies for more prosaic reasons, notably the perceived need to prop up uncompetitive industries or safeguard jobs. 3 As with the left there is also a more instrumental reason for this, namely the dominance of domestic industries fearing international competition within many right-wing parties.
21 In each of these five areas of international politics it is the centre that is conceptually divided from both the left and the right. When taken together it is clear that these distinct elements combine to produce distinct strategies for the conduct of foreign policy. Whilst those at the centre promoted policies based on interdependence, supranationalism, particularism, deterrence and free trade, those on both the left and right challenged almost all of these elements, pursuing foreign policy strategies that evidenced independence, domesticism, pluralism, diplomacy, and protectionism. These five key differences, I argue, separate liberals from their competitors in a number of important domains of international politics.
Testing the Argument: Ideology and Cold War Strategy
To test the relevance of the ‘horseshoe model’ for international politics more broadly I explore the case of Euratlantic security strategy during the Cold War.
There are three reasons why this case is particularly appropriate. First,
Euratlantic Cold War strategy is a hard test of ideology; at times of intense global insecurity, it is thought, strategic necessity will trump domestic political beliefs.
Moreover, this effect should be confounded in weaker states, such as those under study, which do not possess the same degrees of freedom as the superpowers.
Second, studying Euratlantic states during the Cold War offers substantial variance on the independent variable; not only was this the age of ‘ideological extremes’, but these states evidenced consistently greater levels of partisan variation than the US during the period. Third, the long-term stability of this period, coupled with the absence of exogenous shocks of such a magnitude to
22 alter the structure of the system itself, helps establish a broad period across which we may make meaningful comparisons.
The Cold War was defined by an overwhelming concentration of military power in two centres and an intense ideological divide. The Euratlantic states 4 ultimately felt far more sympathy for the US than the USSR, and depended upon the US ‘security umbrella’ for protection. Yet within these confines of a broadly
‘Atlanticist’ grand strategy there was significant variation in the strategies pursued by the Euratlantic states vis-à-vis both of the superpowers. As governments came and went, they left in their wake an undulating pattern of shifting relations towards the East and West. I argue that this variation is explained by the strength of the political centre in each state relative to the opposition from left or right. This is because centrist governments were most likely to pursue strong relations with the US and least likely to engage in cooperation with the Soviet Union.
Liberal parties sought to promote increasing interdependence within the West through increasing institutionalisation of the liberal Western order and the removal of barriers to economic integration. Moreover, they also viewed the
USSR as an illegitimate and threatening international actor, the solution for which they sought through a collective policy of containment. The left sought to maintain the state’s independence in the face of the expansion of the US-led capitalist order, whilst seeking to maintain a neutral position from which to mediate between the two superpowers. The right emphasised the importance of maintaining autonomy from either superpower or international constraints, and
4 In my thesis I focus on four country cases: Canada, France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom
23 sought to maintain their independence by playing off each of the superpowers through a balancing strategy.
I offer two sources of evidence to support the validity of these theoretical claims.
(1) The first consists of an historical examination of French Cold War politics from 1945 to 1990, with a focus on the shifting relations between France and both of the superpowers. The French case illustrates the extent to which party positions approximate the ideal-typical accounts discussed in the theory section and the salience of the politics between the centre and its competitors in accounting for the changing pattern of France’s Cold War foreign relations. (2)
The second element of the research is a quantitative study of the relations between Euratlantic states and each of the superpowers from 1948 to 1978 that tests the relative causal weight of the strength of liberal ideology relative to other potentially confounding domestic and international sources of variation.
French Cold War Politics, 1945-1990
Relations between France, the US, and the USSR have been determined to a large degree by shifts in the balance of forces in the government and the changing ideological bases of foreign policy that have resulted. Though the complexities of the party system and the government’s position vis-à-vis the legislature make broad generalisations somewhat inappropriate, it is generally the case that Franco-American relations have been prioritised when the balance of political forces tends towards the centre, and deemphasised when it tends to the left or the right. The Gaullists have challenged the threat of US domination and embraced a policy of national independence that sought increased engagement
24 with the USSR, while the PCF and leftist elements of the PS have opposed the influence of US capital and sought to downplay the threat from the Soviet Union.
The liberals, in contrast, have endorsed Atlanticist conceptions of collective security, promoted closer regional integration, and sought to transform the
French economy along lines similar to the US.
Communist participation in government until mid-1947 prevented France from committing to either side in the emerging Cold War. From 1945 to 1947 the government was comprised a three-way split between the PCF, the SFIO and the
MRP, led by socialist and centrist premiers (so-called tripartisme). Any option of allying with the West or participating in the collective management of West
Germany was off the table, both because the communists would immediately veto any policy that directly aligned France with the West, and because other countries – particularly Britain – were sceptical of cooperating with a government that featured communist representation (Creswell 2006:6, 9). The political situation ensured France would seek to distance itself from the emerging geopolitical alignments, the years 1945-47 being a ‘neutral era’ for French foreign policy (Duroselle 1976:174). This neutrality was to come to an abrupt end in May 1947, when socialist premier Paul Ramadier dismissed the communists from government following their refusal to support the government’s efforts to maintain French control in Indochina (Williams
1958:20).
In place of tripartisme, a series of ‘third force’ governments composed of the socialists (SFIO) and the centrists (MRP and Radicals) held sway from 1947 to
1951. It was during the years of the ‘third force’ that France would align itself with the Atlantic community and establish the necessary institutional architecture
25 to embed this relationship. Ideologically the ‘third force’ sought to promote moderately interventionist economic policies at home and liberal internationalism abroad. Within a year of the communists exiting government,
France had accepted the terms of the Marshall Plan, agreed to West German unification, requested military alliance from President Truman (March 1948), and openly accepted the principal elements of the West’s strategy of containment
(Creswell 2006:9). Most important, however, was the signing of the North
Atlantic Treaty (under the Queille government) in 1949 and the beginning of diplomatic manoeuvring in the direction of European integration. Opposition during the period came from the communists, who were opposed to France’s alignment with the US, and the Gaullist RPF (created in 1947), which derided
France’s ‘debility’ and ‘satellization’ under the US (Duroselle 1976:177).
The threat from the PCF and the RPF was amplified by the 1951 legislative elections. The shift in political power away from the centre heralded the emergence of significant challenges to France’s Atlantic orientation constructed in the late 1940s, much of which still required implementation. Franco-American relations soured during the period primarily because of French recalcitrance over the European Defence Community (EDC), the supranational European army, plans for which emerged from French concerns about a rearmed West Germany.
The French government signed the EDC treaty in May 1952, but the constitution of the Fourth Republic demanded ratification in the National Assembly; whilst a majority of the centrists supported EDC (Irving 1973), around a third of the chamber objected to the treaty.5 The government delayed ratification as a result, and worked to elicit Gaullist support by offering concessions to the RPF over the
5 The communists opposed the EDC because it entailed France being further subsumed into the capitalist Western bloc, while the Gaullists opposed EDC because of its supranational elements.
26 course of 1953 (Creswell 2006:103-104, 112).6 Both the delays and the changes angered the Americans, and despite Dulles threatening an ‘agonizing reappraisal’ of US commitment (Kuisel 1993:22-23), the treaty was rejected on 30 August
1954 by combined communist and Gaullist opposition.
The brief successive governments of the Fourth Republic’s final years were preoccupied with France’s disastrous colonial wars in Algeria. Most consequential for Franco-American relations was the onset of the Algiers crisis in 1958, which not only precipitated the demise of the Fourth Republic and the return of De Gaulle to the political frontline, but also set the stage for a decade and a half of Gaullist dominance of France’s foreign relations. The initial governing arrangements of the Fifth Republic, involving a Gaullist (UDR) coalition with centrists and the moderate non-Gaullist conservatives, prevented any immediate moves to curtail Franco-American ties, at least beyond rhetoric.
The departure of the MRP from the governing coalition in May 1962 (over disagreements with De Gaulle’s designs for Europe) (Einaudi & Goguel
1952:196), however, and the UNR’s success in the legislative elections of
November 1962, placed the Gaullists in an unrivalled position domestically, controlling both the presidency and a majority of the seats in the governing coalition.
French Cold War grand strategy, as a result, underwent a significant reorientation after 1962. The backlash against the US that resulted was extraordinarily comprehensive. Gaullist ideology sought to balance American influence and free
France from restrictive Atlantic ties. Independence, in every respect, was the
6 The concessions included the right to withdraw French troops, an increase in France’s voting allocation within the organization, a proviso that the integrity of French forces be maintained even within EDC, and a demand that a guarantee US financial assistance accompany ratification.
27 watchword of Gaullist strategy. At a press conference on 14 January 1963, De
Gaulle outlined the strategic doctrine accompanying the construction of France’s nuclear deterrent, emphasising the independent nature of the force and the strategy of defence tous azimuts (against all). From 1963 onwards the government also began to restrict purchases of French businesses from companies based in the US (Kuisel 1993:159). Contacts with the USSR increased markedly during de Gaulle’s tenure, as the General pursued a policy of détente vis-à-vis Moscow (De Gaulle 1971:202) and scuppered the US vision of a united
Europe by vetoing British entry to the Common Market in January 1963. De
Gaulle also began gradually to withdraw French forces from NATO command before breaking completely with the alliance’s organisational command structure in March 1966.
De Gaulle’s anointed successor as president, Georges Pompidou, took office in
June 1969. Pompidou’s foreign policy continued to adhere to the Gaullist blend of Realpolitik and national independence internationally, and support for state intervention in the domestic arena, and Pompidou did not differ from the earlier approach of de Gaulle in his interpretation of France’s relations to the superpowers. In foreign affairs, Pompidou is often credited with restoring calm to Franco-American relations. Whilst it is true that a moderate relaxation of tensions occurred during the period, the sources of these overtures owed more to
Gaullist ideology than is conventionally acknowledged. Internationally, the structural conditions of the early 1960s had shifted, and the relative rise in Soviet power encouraged a counterbalancing strategy to improve relations with the US.
Although Pompidou presided over a moderate relaxation, there were no changes
28 to the overall French Cold War strategy, and by 1973 relations with the US had soured once again (Soutou 2005:103).
In April 1974, Giscard d’Estaing, the leader of the Republicains independants, was elected to the presidency, and in 1976 Giscard appointed as prime minister the liberal Raymond Barre.7 The return to power of the centrist elements of the
French political scene was accompanied by the pursuit of a more accommodating line with the US and a strategic shift away from reliance on the nuclear deterrent and towards greater collaboration with NATO in the arena of conventional defence (Palmer 1987:474). This was matched by a distinct coolness towards the
USSR in the years of the Giscard presidency (Frears 1981:98). Giscard’s tenure was also marked by a greater reliance on the free market, manifest in the removal of price controls and subsidies, increased emphasis on restrained fiscal policy, a move away from economic planning, and the pursuit of budgetary discipline and monetary stability (Frears 1981:135). Collectively these foreign policy shifts underwrote a rapprochement between France and the US during the 1970s
(Soutou 2005:103).
Giscard was defeated in the presidential election of May 1981 by socialist candidate Francois Mitterrand. The implications of a socialist government for
Franco-American relations were not clear, however, given the diversity of opinions within the left as a whole. Whilst the PCF were ardently pro-Soviet and anti-American, the PS exhibited a diversity of opinions. The left-wing CERES
7 The RI remained in a minority position in the ‘presidential majority’ during the period. As a result, although liberal policies set the agenda from 1974-81, Gaullist obstruction in the National Assembly also worked as a partial constraint on implementation, particularly in the economic sphere, where Gaullist opposition led to the defeat of several bills.
29 faction, favouring domestic intervention8 and Cold War neutrality, competed for influence with the Rocardists, the Atlanticist and free-trade wing of the party
(Cerny 1983:5). The Mitterandists, for their part, were somewhere in between. In the first two years of the Mitterrand presidency it was the left of the party that held the most influence. The PS, in coalition with the PCF, enacted a strongly interventionist economic agenda based on the left’s Common Program. The government acted to increase benefits and the minimum wage, to reduce the working week, and to nationalise prominent banks and industries (Wilson
1982:204-205). In the field of foreign policy the government continued the
‘Gaullist’ tradition of distancing France from the US and the Atlantic alliance, adding to the existing tension over France’s leftist turn on the economy.
By 1983, however, the perceived failure of the government’s leftist agenda prompted a decisive turn away from the interventionist strategy towards the rapid embrace of neoliberal economic orthodoxy (Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb
2002:566). Having started out by implementing wage increases, committing to full employment and expanding the role of the state in the economy, the PS-PCF coalition ended up freezing wages, accepting unemployment, and emphasising private enterprise (Lauber 1987:24), prompting the PCF to leave the coalition in
July 1984. Mitterrand’s foreign policy from the mid-1980s onwards was also characterised by an embrace of the Atlantic alliance (Costigliola 1992:202) and strong criticism of the Soviet Union (Harrison 1987:486), making the late 1980s one of the high points in Franco-American relations.
8 Alongside their distrust of capitalism, many members of CERES disapproved of the ties between France and the US because they believed they eroded the government’s ability to intervene in the domestic economy (Cerny 1983:5).
30 Quantitative Analysis of Euratlantic Strategy, 1948-1978
I complement the French case study with an OLS regression analysis of the intensity of the foreign policy actions of Euratlantic states towards the US and
USSR during the period. I use longitudinal panel data drawn from a sample of twenty-two Western states from the period 1948 to 1978. The curtailment of the time-period results from the absence of data on the dependent variable for the entire time period. As it stands the quantitative analysis covers 70% of the Cold
War’s, according to the standard account of its duration. The data are arranged by country for each year, giving a total of 565 separate observations.
The dependent variable is the quality of bilateral relations between the country and the superpowers. To measure this I use the scale of intensity derived from the COPDAB events dataset, which details every major event that occurred between two countries on a given date from 1948 to 1979 (Azar 1993). The intensity of each ‘event’ is measured by scaling each type of interaction in accordance with a schema from most to least cooperative, where outright federation is most cooperative and military conflict is least cooperative. The scale is then weighted in accordance with values derived from a consultative study of IR scholars and the consensus they reached on the relative intensity of each action. Low values are cooperative, high values are conflictual. Eight is the midpoint above which events are classed as conflictual and below which they are deemed cooperative.
31 Scale Classification
1 Voluntary unification into one nation
2 Major strategic alliance
3 Military, economic, or strategic support
4 Non-military economic, technical, or industrial agreement
5 Cultural or scientific agreement or support
6 Official verbal support of goals, values, or regime
7 Minor official exchanges, talks or policy expressions
8 Neutral or non-significant acts
9 Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction
10 Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in interaction
11 Diplomatic-economic hostile actions
12 Political-military hostile actions
13 Small-scale military acts
14 Limited war acts
15 Extensive war acts causing deaths or high strategic costs
Figure 2: The classification of events according to the COPDAB intensity scale (Azar 1993).
The key independent variable is ideology. To measure this I utilise data on ideology from the Comparative Manifesto Group Project (CMG), which provides estimates of party positions from manifestos at each election year (Budge et al.
2001). The manifesto measure relies on a coding-strategy whereby each quasi- sentence in a party’s manifesto is classified according to fifty-six separate dimensions. In the original data these are compiled into a composite left-right measure. I create two separate measures of ideology; one which mirrors the traditional horizontal dimension (egalitarianism-elitism) and another that is arranged according to the vertical dimension (individualism-collectivism). I derive the two separate dimensions by allocating each of the different issue-areas in the original data to one of four possible designations: egalitarianism, elitism,
32 individualism, and collectivism. The horizontal measure is composed of the elitist scores minus egalitarian scores, while the vertical dimension is derived from the individualist scores minus the statist scores. For most issue-areas the choices are uncontroversial. I have excluded those few areas that did not lend themselves to easy classification.
33
Figure 3: Allocation of CMG dimensions to Horizontal and Vertical dimensions of ideology.
34 As the data are organised by government and year, the scores from the manifesto data are imputed from the most recent election and carried forward each subsequent year until a new manifesto appears or a change of government occurs. Where governments are composed from multiple parties, a collective ideology is estimated according to the formula below, where IG is the governing
n coalition ideology, IP indicates the ideology of each individual party in the
n government and SP refers to the proportion of seats held by each party in the legislature. This means that each party’s relative ability to inform the governmental agenda is a function of its legislative seat-share.9
I include several variables to control for key domestic and international factors that are likely to affect the level of cooperation. Internationally I control for the power of each country, thereby capturing those differences in the level of cooperation that are determined by the importance of the state or by its relative power position vis-à-vis the US. For this I rely on the Correlates of War Project’s
Combined Index of National Capabilities (CINC) measure, which offers a composite measure of national power based on its material, economic and geographical resources (Singer et al. 1972). To control for the impact of US hegemony on the allied states I include in the model a measure of the relative power differential between the US and each country by year, using the Correlates of War data (Singer et al. 1972).
9 The data on government composition are from Woldendorp et al. (2000).
35 I also create a dummy variable for Cold War intensity to measure the cumulative effect of the move from the First Cold War to Détente and I include a year-on- year measure of Cold War intensity calculated from the average COPDAB scores of the US and USSR towards one another. I also control for the number of yearly interactions and the proportion of seats the governing party holds in the legislature. I include regional dummies to control for European, North American and Rest of World differences. I include the total number of international organizations each state belongs to in any given year in order to control for the density of the institutional architecture using data from Pevehouse et al. on the membership of each institution (Pevehouse et al. 2004). Finally, I also include the year-on-year difference in GDP growth as a proxy for economic performance, using historical data from Maddison (2003).
I first test the relationship between liberal ideology and the actions of the allied states towards the US. This constitutes the primary test of the framework elaborated in the thesis. The theory predicts that, as the strength of liberal ideology increases, the actions of the allies towards the US will become less intense (that is, more cooperative). Here I run a series of OLS regression models with the intensity of allied actions towards the US as the dependent variable. I report unstandardized coefficients and standard errors for each model, along with the R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared scores to capture the fit of the model. I use standard symbols to denote the levels of statistical significance.
Overall the models seem to support the validity of the theory’s hypothesis that the strength of liberal ideology is an important determinant of lowered intensity in allied actions towards the US. The models point to a varied level of success for competing theories. The most successful alternative approach is the liberal thesis
36 that the strength of institutional ties between nations acts to ameliorate the level of enmity between these countries. The validity of this claim is repeatedly borne out in the data. The competing approaches meet with lower levels of success.
Existing domestic political explanations are also unsupported by the results; interestingly, there is no significant relationship between the horizontal (left- right) dimension of ideology and the intensity of actions towards the US.
37
38
Figure 4: The association between the liberalism variable (X-axis) and the intensity of allied actions towards the US (Y-axis).
39
Next I run a series of models with the intensity of allied actions towards the
USSR as the dependent variable. The results suggest that liberal ideology makes a difference to the intensity of allied actions towards the Soviet Union. The liberalism variable is significant at the 5% level across all but one of the models, and the causal association is a positive one, in line with the predictions of the theory that the greater the strength of liberal ideology, the greater the intensity of actions towards the USSR will be. The measure of left-right ideology is not significant at any level.
40
41
42
Figure 5: The association between the liberalism variable (X-axis) and the intensity of allied actions towards the USSR (Y-axis).
Conclusions
This article has argued that existing work on ideology and foreign policy has not adequately distinguished the foreign policy position of the political centre from its competitors on both the left and the right of the political spectrum. I argued that this was important because, in many areas of foreign policy, the pattern of partisan contestation is not between the left and the right, but between liberalism and its competitors. To help understand the ways in which the liberal position of the centre differs from elements of both socialism and conservatism, I argued for the use of the horseshoe model of ideology, which views ideological positions as structured in a curvilinear fashion across two dimension; an egalitarianism- elitism dimension, and an individualism-collectivism one.
I tested the validity of this argument against the empirical record through an examination of Euratlantic Cold War strategy. I argued that, if the theory were
43 correct, one should expect centrist governments to pursue the strongest relations with the US and the weakest relations with the USSR, relative to their competitors on the left and right. The results from both the historical study of the
French case and the quantitative analysis suggest that the predictions of the theory are borne out in the data. The centrist parties were the most ardently pro-
US actors in the French case, and also the least likely to consider either increasing French engagement with the USSR or disengaging from the Cold
War. Moreover, unlike their opponents on both ends of the political spectrum, they seldom challenged the institutionalisation or interdependence of the Western order. Statistically, the liberalism-collectivism variable is a significant predictor of the strength of a state’s relations with both of the superpowers, whilst the left- right variable was not statistically significant, and not were several other variables measuring competing explanations.
These findings have important implications for our understanding of partisanship and foreign policy more generally. They suggest that the left-right model may not always be the best tool for analysing ideology and international relations, and that it will often help to supplement this with a model that can also take into account variation on the liberalism-collectivism dimension. Considering those areas of international relations where there is an observable similarity between the positions of the left and the right, it is likely that the horseshoe model will increase our understanding of international law, grand strategy, international organization, European integration, transatlantic relations, humanitarian intervention, democracy promotion and international economic relations.
The argument also has implications for our understanding of IR theory more generally. Here four brief points may be made. (1) First, the horseshoe model
44 improves on our existing understanding of ideology and foreign policy, offering substantial additional leverage for little additional complexity. (2) Second, it helps us provide a systematic explanation for a complex empirical phenomenon –
Euratlantic Cold War strategy – that had previously been explained primarily by reference to invariant structuralist approaches or ad hoc categories such as
‘personality politics’. (3) Third, the theory helps uncover the micro-foundations of the liberal peace, refocusing the debate on the ideological content of its main proponents within democratic systems, and not on the properties of these systems themselves. (4) Fourth, the findings challenge the analytical status of contemporary IR theories by demonstrating the extent to which the core concerns of Marxist, realist and liberal IR scholarship are bounded by domestic political actors (and therefore a part of the very phenomenon they purport to explain).
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