Bell, David S. "Gaullism: a Personal Conservatism." Conservative Moments: Reading Conservative Texts
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Perceived Sentiments Towards Foreigners: a Longitudinal and Cross-National Approach to Immigrant Group Size and Populist Radical Right Voting
Perceived sentiments towards foreigners: A longitudinal and cross-national approach to immigrant group size and populist radical right voting Miranda Trippenzee S2484188 [email protected] Master thesis Master Population Studies Population Research Centre Faculty of Spatial Sciences University of Groningen Supervisor: dr. R. Rutigliano Groningen, 2nd of July 2020 Abstract This research aims at disentangling the contradictory evidence about the relationship between immigrant group size and populist radical right (PRR) voting. This is one of the first studies to adopt (1) a longitudinal approach to the two phenomena instead of a cross-sectional approach, (2) a cross- national approach while controlling for economic circumstances in a country, (3) a direct comparison of the three theories about the relationship between immigrant group size, and PRR voting and (4) the role of perceived sentiments towards foreigners as key variable. The latter is conducted by constructing an index based on six questions in the European Social Survey about immigration. The results indicate that the hypothesis of fear of small numbers describes the relationship between immigrant group size and PRR voting best over all countries between 2002 and 2018. The relationship is moderated by perceived sentiments towards foreigners, as the relationship between immigrant group size and PRR voting depends on the level of perceived sentiments towards foreigners. Moreover, dynamics within the studied countries illustrate that perceived sentiments towards foreigners predict a part of the PRR voting dynamics and the level of this perception affects the relationship between immigrant group size and PRR voting. This study leaves the question open how different types of immigrant groups vary in their dynamic relationship between PRR voting and immigrant group size. -
Voting Cohesion Among Eurosceptics in the European Parliament
Bachelor project (2016): International Parliamentary assemblies Voting cohesion among Eurosceptics in the European Parliament Name: Joni Wolfert Studentnr.: 1376543 Instructor: Dr. Tom Louwerse Date: 9 June 2016 Number of Words: 6091 Abstract This dissertation studies the similarity in voting behaviour of eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament. The study researches if the voting behaviour of eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament is more similar on eurosceptic issues than on other issues. In general euroscepticism refers to the opposition to European integration and the EU. This study looks at the voting cohesion of all eurosceptic parties, hard and soft, and right- and left-wing eurosceptic parties on the issues that form the core of euroscepticism compared to non- eurosceptic issues. It turns out that the voting cohesion of all eurosceptic parties on issues that form the core of euroscepticism is not higher than the voting cohesion on other issues. However when group of eurosceptics is split into different groups the voting cohesion goes up. It is found that hard eurosceptics have a higher voting cohesion on issues related to euroscepticism than on other issues. The left and right eurosceptic parties have the highest increase of voting cohesion which shows the different motivations for their euroscepticism. Introduction Eurosceptic parties have been present in the European Parliament (EP) since the first term in 1979 (Gabel & Hix, 2002, p. 951). The 2014 European Parliamentary elections have especially been good for the Eurosceptic parties. The presence of left and right eurosceptic parties in the EP has grown at these elections (Brack, 2015, p. 337). Several studies have been conducted on why these parties get elected and their party positions (Hobolt, Spoon & Tilly, 2009; Treib, 2014; Kopecky & Muddle, 2002). -
Martill, University of Oxford
Centre of Attention: Liberalism and the Politics of Cold War Strategy Benjamin Martill, University of Oxford Abstract Common to existing work on ideology and foreign policy is the use of the left-right model to structure underlying partisan differences. An exclusive reliance on this model is problematic, however, because it precludes the possibility of operationalizing the distinct values of the political centre ground. Understanding the centre is important because on many foreign policy issues the most salient partisan divides are between the centre and competitors on the left and the right, rather than between the left and right themselves. In this article I offer an alternative conceptualisation of ideology based around the ‘horseshoe model’ commonly used in European studies and Comparative Politics. This allows us to distinguish the values of the political centre from those shared by both left and right. The five distinguishing elements of the centre’s approach to foreign policy, I argue, are: (1) interdependence, (2) supranationalism, (3) particularism, (4) deterrence, and (5) free trade. I test the argument by examining the changing Cold War strategies of Euratlantic states vis-à-vis both superpowers. Paper presented at the PSA annual conference, Sheffield, April 2015 Draft version – please do not cite 1 Introduction Existing works on ideology and International Relations (IR) have highlighted a number of linkages between the partisan orientation of governments and their foreign policy behaviour, in issue-areas as diverse as security, human rights, economics and international organization. These works share a common reliance on the standard model of political ideology that posits variation along a single dimension from left to right. -
HISTORIA CONTEMPORÁNEA - Programa 2015
1 HISTORIA CONTEMPORÁNEA - Programa 2015 Profesor Adjunto a cargo de la cátedra: Dr. Daniel F. Gaido Profesores Asistentes: Dr. Carlos Mignon y Lic. Jorge Santarrosa PRESENTACIÓN: En el marco del curso se estudiará la historia de Europa en los siglos XIX y XX tomando como eje el desarrollo del capitalismo, centrándose en las luchas de clases que el capitalismo genera y que constituyen la base de su historia política. Por tal motivo se pondrá énfasis en el análisis de los procesos revolucionarios, donde tales luchas, usualmente soterradas, se manifiestan con claridad. El curso abordará temas tales como el ciclo de las revoluciones burguesas, la formación de los estados nacionales, el ascenso de la democracia parlamentaria, el desarrollo del movimiento obrero, las ideologías de izquierda (anarquismo, socialismo y comunismo), el surgimiento del imperialismo moderno, la revolución rusa y el estalinismo, fascismo y nazismo, las dos guerras mundiales, el Holocausto judío, la descolonización de posguerra, el colapso de la Unión Soviética y la formación y crisis de la Unión Europea. OBJETIVOS: Desarrollar una aproximación teórica al proceso de desarrollo capitalista, analizando las transformaciones políticas ocurridas en Europa como resultado de dicho proceso. Investigar los orígenes del imperialismo moderno y sus transformaciones como resultado de los procesos de descolonización después de la segunda guerra mundial. Analizar el origen histórico de las principales corrientes políticas alternativas al capitalismo, como anarquismo, socialismo y comunismo. METODOLOGÍA Y FORMA DE EVALUACIÓN: Clases teóricas: Clases frontales con una exposición sintética de temas centrales mediante el análisis de casos representativos. La asistencia a las clases teóricas no es obligatoria. -
Prezentace Aplikace Powerpoint
Current French Politics A brief quiz to warm ourselves up: Who is this person? Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy 2007- 2012 • Sarkozy – minister of interior 2002- 2004 and 2005-2007 (civil unrests 2005) • Anti-immigration and securitization rhetoric in the campaign and in office • Crisis of the Eurozone and French- German Leadership (‘Merkozy’) • Economics of state interventionism (dirigisme) • British and French operation in Libya 2011 turning down Kaddafi’ s regime • Prime minister François Fillon Presidential elections 2012 • Main candidates: • François Hollande (28.6 per cent in the 1st round; 51/6 in the 2nd round) • Nicolas Sarkozy (27.2 / 48.4) • Marine Le Pen (17.9) • Jean-Luc Mélenchon (11.1) • François Bayrou (9.1) Parliamentary elections 2012 Presidency of François Hollande • First secretary of PS 1997-2008 • Law on marriage of same-sex couples (2013) • Unpopular labour reform 2013 (Kurzarbeit) • January and November 2015 Paris and 2016 Nice terrorist acts • Economical and social difficulties • The least popular President of the 5th Republic • Prime ministers: • Jean-Marc Ayrault (2012-2014) • Manuel Valls (2014-2016) • Bernard Cazeneuve (2016-2017) The European Parliament elections 2014 Presidential elections 2017 • Main candidates: • Emmanuel Macron (24.0 / 66.1) • Marine Le Pen (21.3 / 33.9) • François Fillon (20.0) • Jean-Luc Mélenchon (19.6) • Benoît Hamon (6.4) Parliamentary elections 2017 • Effects of the electoral system: • http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/france.html Presidency of Emmanuel Macron • Graduated from ENA -
Third Division World War II Vol One.Pdf
THIRD INFANTRY DIVISION THE VICTORY PATH THROUGH FRANCE AND GERMANY VOLUME ONE 'IVG. WILLIAM MOHR THE VICTORY PATH THROUGH FRANCE AND GERMANY THIRD INFANTRY DIVISION - WORLD WAR II VOLUME ONE A PICTORIAL ACCOUNT BY G. WILLIAM MOHR ABOUT THE COVER There is nothing in front of the Infantry in battle except the enemy. The Infantry leads the way to attack and bears the brunt of the enemy's attack. The primary purpose of the Infan try is to close with the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting. On the side of a house, tommy gunners of this Infantry patrol, 1st Special Service Froce Patrol, one of the many patrols that made possible the present offensive in Italy by feeling out the enemy and discovering his defensive strength, fire from the window of an adjoining building to blast Nazis out. The scene is 400 yards from the enemy lines in the Anzio area, Italy. Fifth Army, 14 April, 1944. The 3rd Infantry Division suffered 27,450 casualties and 4,922 were killed in action. 2 - Yellow Beach, Southern France, August, 1944 3 - Marseilles, France, August, 1944 4 - Montelimar, France, August, 1944 5 - Cavailair, France, August, 1944 6 - Avignon, France, August, 1944 7 - Lacroix, France, August, 1944 8 - Brignolles, France, August, 1944 9 -Aix-En-Provence, France, August, 1944 12 - St. Loup, France, August, 1944 13 - La Coucounde, France, August, 1944 14 - Les Loges Neut, France, August, 1944 15 - Besancon, France, September, 1944 18 - Loue River, Ornans, France, September, 1944 19 - Avonne, France, Septem&er, 1944 20 - Lons Le Sounier, France, September, 1944 21 - Les Belles-Baroques, France, September, 1944 22 - St. -
Ike's Rebuff' of De Gaulle in '58 Bared
statement that he could no longer justify delegating Free World defense decisions to the United States, adding: "It would be more realistic at this time to create a tripartite or- ganization to take joint de- cisions on global problems." Ike's Rebuff ' State's memorandum does not mention Germany, but Schoenbrun states what was well known: the Dulles view Of de Gaulle that France was a continental power like Germany and not a world power like the United In '58 Bared States and Britain. This con- k i lL/101 cept de Gaulle then rejected By Chklmers M. Roberts and today still rejects, as indi- Washington Post Mail Writer cated by the current NATO, problem he has created in Wel A bit of history was put on search for a world-wide French the public record yesterday great power role independent but It will probably serve less of the United States. the cause of enlightenment The Eisenhower reply on Oct. 20 reflected the Dulles than further to exacerbate view. The President replied French-American relations. close cooperation at line sum- mit between France, the Unit- that "our present procedures The State Department re- ed Kingdom and the United for organizing the defense of leased to a Senate subcom- States." the Free World clearly require mittee the text of a 1958 De Gaulle on Sept. 17 wrote the willing cooperation of letter from President- Eisen- President Eisenhower "to indi- many other nations, both with- hower that in effect rejected cate that NATO in its present in and outside NATO. We can- President de Gaulle's call for form no longer met the needs not afford to adopt any system an American-French British of French security" and noted which would give to our other directorate to take joint de- that France had world-wide re- allies, or other Free World cisions on global problems. -
France and the German Question, 1945–1955
CreswellFrance and and the Trachtenberg German Question France and the German Question, 1945–1955 ✣ What role did France play in the Cold War, and how is French policy in that conºict to be understood? For many years the prevailing as- sumption among scholars was that French policy was not very important. France, as the historian John Young points out, was “usually mentioned in Cold War histories only as an aside.” When the country was discussed at all, he notes, it was “often treated as a weak and vacillating power, obsessed with outdated ideas of a German ‘menace.’”1 And indeed scholars often explicitly argued (to quote one typical passage) that during the early Cold War period “the major obsession of French policy was defense against the German threat.” “French awareness of the Russian threat,” on the other hand, was sup- posedly “belated and reluctant.”2 The French government, it was said, was not eager in the immediate postwar period to see a Western bloc come into being to balance Soviet power in Europe; the hope instead was that France could serve as a kind of bridge between East and West.3 The basic French aim, according to this interpretation, was to keep Germany down by preserving the wartime alliance intact. Germany itself would no longer be a centralized state; the territory on the left bank of the Rhine would not even be part of Germany; the Ruhr basin, Germany’s industrial heartland, would be subject to allied control. Those goals, it was commonly assumed, were taken seriously, not just by General Charles de Gaulle, who headed the French provisional government until Jan- uary 1946, but by Georges Bidault, who served as foreign minister almost without in- terruption from 1944 through mid-1948 and was the most important ªgure in French foreign policy in the immediate post–de Gaulle period. -
WHO's WHO in the WAR in EUROPE the War in Europe 7 CHARLES DE GAULLE
who’s Who in the War in Europe (National Archives and Records Administration, 342-FH-3A-20068.) POLITICAL LEADERS Allies FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT When World War II began, many Americans strongly opposed involvement in foreign conflicts. President Roosevelt maintained official USneutrality but supported measures like the Lend-Lease Act, which provided invaluable aid to countries battling Axis aggression. After Pearl Harbor and Germany’s declaration of war on the United States, Roosevelt rallied the country to fight the Axis powers as part of the Grand Alliance with Great Britain and the Soviet Union. (Image: Library of Congress, LC-USZ62-128765.) WINSTON CHURCHILL In the 1930s, Churchill fiercely opposed Westernappeasement of Nazi Germany. He became prime minister in May 1940 following a German blitzkrieg (lightning war) against Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. He then played a pivotal role in building a global alliance to stop the German juggernaut. One of the greatest orators of the century, Churchill raised the spirits of his countrymen through the war’s darkest days as Germany threatened to invade Great Britain and unleashed a devastating nighttime bombing program on London and other major cities. (Image: Library of Congress, LC-USW33-019093-C.) JOSEPH STALIN Stalin rose through the ranks of the Communist Party to emerge as the absolute ruler of the Soviet Union. In the 1930s, he conducted a reign of terror against his political opponents, including much of the country’s top military leadership. His purge of Red Army generals suspected of being disloyal to him left his country desperately unprepared when Germany invaded in June 1941. -
The Re-Elaboration of Fascism and Its Impact on Right-Wing Populism In
National Past and Populism: The Re-Elaboration of Fascism and Its Impact on Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe Daniele Caramani and Luca Manucci Department of Political Science University of Zurich Affolternstrasse 56 8050 Zurich Switzerland Email: [email protected] / [email protected] Phone: 0041 44 630 4010 Web: www.ipz.uzh.ch Abstract: The electoral performance of right-wing populism also depends on the type of re-elaboration of countries’ national past and their collective memories. Complementing socio-economic and political-institutional factors, the paper analyses cultural opportunity structures. Given the link between fascist and populist visions of power, it shows that different collective memories of the fascist past and World War II may open up or close down the space for right-wing populist parties. Theoretically, the typology includes four types of re-elaboration: culpabilization, victimization, heroization and cancellation. Results of a comparative analysis of eight West European countries based on a novel measurement method point to (1) culpabilization and heroization as types of re-elaboration limiting right-wing populist parties’ electoral performance, (2) cancellation as a type having an undetermined effect, and (3) victimization as a type triggering the success of right-wing populist parties. Keywords: populism, fascist past, re-elaboration, collective memory, cultural opportunity structures, comparative. 2 Introduction The success of Alternative for Germany in the 2017 federal elections came to many as a shock. Germany is a country that dealt critically with its past and developed a political culture making it unthinkable that right-wing populist discourses and parties would establish themselves. -
France Background
The World Factbook Europe :: France Introduction :: France Background: France today is one of the most modern countries in the world and is a leader among European nations. It plays an influential global role as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, NATO, the G-8, the G-20, the EU and other multilateral organizations. France rejoined NATO's integrated military command structure in 2009, reversing de Gaulle's 1966 decision to take French forces out of NATO. Since 1958, it has constructed a hybrid presidential-parliamentary governing system resistant to the instabilities experienced in earlier, more purely parliamentary administrations. In recent decades, its reconciliation and cooperation with Germany have proved central to the economic integration of Europe, including the introduction of a common currency, the euro, in January 1999. In the early 21st century, five French overseas entities - French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mayotte, and Reunion - became French regions and were made part of France proper. Geography :: France Location: metropolitan France: Western Europe, bordering the Bay of Biscay and English Channel, between Belgium and Spain, southeast of the UK; bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Italy and Spain French Guiana: Northern South America, bordering the North Atlantic Ocean, between Brazil and Suriname Guadeloupe: Caribbean, islands between the Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean, southeast of Puerto Rico Martinique: Caribbean, island between the Caribbean Sea and North Atlantic Ocean, -
Challenger Party List
Appendix List of Challenger Parties Operationalization of Challenger Parties A party is considered a challenger party if in any given year it has not been a member of a central government after 1930. A party is considered a dominant party if in any given year it has been part of a central government after 1930. Only parties with ministers in cabinet are considered to be members of a central government. A party ceases to be a challenger party once it enters central government (in the election immediately preceding entry into office, it is classified as a challenger party). Participation in a national war/crisis cabinets and national unity governments (e.g., Communists in France’s provisional government) does not in itself qualify a party as a dominant party. A dominant party will continue to be considered a dominant party after merging with a challenger party, but a party will be considered a challenger party if it splits from a dominant party. Using this definition, the following parties were challenger parties in Western Europe in the period under investigation (1950–2017). The parties that became dominant parties during the period are indicated with an asterisk. Last election in dataset Country Party Party name (as abbreviation challenger party) Austria ALÖ Alternative List Austria 1983 DU The Independents—Lugner’s List 1999 FPÖ Freedom Party of Austria 1983 * Fritz The Citizens’ Forum Austria 2008 Grüne The Greens—The Green Alternative 2017 LiF Liberal Forum 2008 Martin Hans-Peter Martin’s List 2006 Nein No—Citizens’ Initiative against