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Lyndon Johnson: a Psychological Character Study Stephanie L Union College Union | Digital Works Honors Theses Student Work 6-2011 Lyndon Johnson: A Psychological Character Study Stephanie L. Vacchio Union College - Schenectady, NY Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalworks.union.edu/theses Part of the American Politics Commons, Political History Commons, and the President/ Executive Department Commons Recommended Citation Vacchio, Stephanie L., "Lyndon Johnson: A Psychological Character Study" (2011). Honors Theses. 1083. https://digitalworks.union.edu/theses/1083 This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Union | Digital Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Union | Digital Works. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Lyndon Johnson: A Psychological Character Study By Stephanie L. Vacchio * * * * * * * * * Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Honors in the Departme nt of Political Science UNION COLLE GE June, 2011 1 ABSTRACT VACCHIO, STEPHANIE Lyndon Johnson: A Psychological Character Study. Department of Political Science, March 2011. ADVISOR: Clifford Brown Thesis: Lyndon Johnson’s childhood had a direct and significant impact on his leadership style while President. This thesis centers on Lyndon Johnson and his character traits and how they are translated into his leadership abilities. The ways in which he handled issues as president, his personal relationships with others, and his own personality traits all define who Johnson was as a man. These aspects combined can be viewed as “character”, or the result of the environment someone has been exposed to for a prolonged period of time. In the case of Johnson, it is his childhood that has played the largest role in shaping his character and in turn his personality. My thesis explores the psychological study of childhood and how it can affect the way in which an individual acts as an adult. Johnson’s political career is analyzed through a lens that takes into account the environment in which he was raised as a child and the way in which the character he developed influenced his leadership capabilities. I discuss each stage of Johnson’s life and how his character became both his biggest springboard and his largest obstacle. 2 Table of Contents Introduction: Understanding Lyndon Johnson, iii Chapter One: Model and Theories, 1 Chapter Two: Understanding Leadership Qualities, 27 Chapter Three: The Childhood of Lyndon Johnson, 43 Chapter Four: The Wonder Kid Arrives in Washington, D.C., 63 Chapter Five: The Senate Years, 84 Chapter Six: The Presidency Years, 131 Chapter Seven: Conclusions, 161 Introduction: Understanding Lyndon Johnson 3 In choosing to conduct a study of presidential character there were a number of ways to explore the topic. Though there are a number of past presidents to choose from, it was not difficult to narrow down my selection to just one president. Lyndon Johnson is perhaps of the most misunderstood and complex presidential personalities that the United States has seen to date. Johnson is a paradoxical figure; he could be kind and gentle one minuet and mean and uncouth the next. He was an intelligent, capable President in one sense and yet could be quite insecurity and unconcerned at times. Though Johnson is most infamously remembered for the U.S.’s involvement in Vietnam there is an underlying story that not many are aware of that explains the reasoning behind Johnson’s actions. The story of his childhood and the psychological issues that resulted from the environment he was subject to as a young boy help to provide answers for Johnson’s behavior. This story also explains the reasons for Johnson’s giant success as well as the basis for Johnson’s failures. Johnson is an incredibly polarizing figure in contemporary American politics. The ways in which he handled issues as president, his personal relationships with others, and his own personality traits all define who Johnson was as a man. These aspects combined can be viewed as “character”, or the result of the environment someone has been exposed to for a prolonged period of time. In the case of Johnson, it is his childhood that has played the largest role in shaping his character and in turn his personality (which can be defined as an outward projection of character). 4 The character traits that Johnson acquired as a result of his childhood upbringing had a direct and substantial impact on his presidential leadership style. Johnson was brought up in a home where constant love, affection, and praise were not prevalent. That is, Johnson’s mother did not consistently provide him with positive reinforcement. She simply applauded him when he did something she liked and ignored him when he went against her wishes. This type of parenting left an incredible mark on Johnson, both as a child and as an adult. In short, the way in which Johnson was raised led him to develop a large insecurity complex. This complex led him to both outstanding achievements and immense failures. Within Johnson himself we find a polarizing conflict that became magnified during his presidency. This conflict is perhaps the corner stone of Johnson’s personality and the biggest obstacle in his way throughout his administration. Literatur e and Research: In order to better understand Johnson’s childhood in relation to his presidential leadership style, it was necessary to research in three different parts. Firstly, a basic understanding of Johnson both as a child and as an adult was key. In order to comprehend Johnson to the best of my ability, I read almost every prominent biography written about Johnson. These include Robert Dallek’s Portrait of a President, Doris Kearns’ Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, Robert Caro’s The Years of Lyndon Johnson; Means of Ascent, Master of the Senate, Path to Power, and Johnson’s own Autobiography. 5 After a firm understanding of who Johnson’s was as a child, a man, a politician, a husband, and a father was established, it was necessary to contextualize Johnson’s leadership style by reading the existing literature of this subject. Among the texts read are; James David Barber’s The Presidential Character, Fred Greenstein’s The Presidential Difference, Aaron Wildavsky’s collections, The Presidency and Perspectives on the Presidency, Benjamin Page and Mark Petracca’s The American Presidency. These texts allowed me to better understand the qualities of presidents (both good and bad, successful and very unsuccessful). Based upon Johnson’s qualities, which were gathered from the biographies, I then was able to categorize Johnson and judge what kind of president he was. I came to the conclusion that though Johnson was a highly motivated man, his presidency was littered with times of poor judgment, paranoia, insecurity, and indecisiveness. In order to fully understand the decisions Johnson made and to understand why he acted the way he did during certain periods, it was necessary to understand what these personality characteristics were born from. That is why the third part of my research focuses on developmental psychology and an analysis of parenting during childhood years. In order to understand childhood development, extensive research on childhood development was conduction. The major source for this research was a text on the subject matter written by Smith, Cowie and Blades. This text provided basic information on parenting and how it may affect a child. It also provided the scientific backing for my research model, which is entitled “The Cycle of Parental Oppression”. This cycle illustrates that the way in which a child is raise can force 6 them to develop a negative self image, which can lead to a slew of other negative traits. Research Model: The model used in this thesis (illustrated in Chapter One) depicts Lyndon Johnson’s journey from childhood to adulthood and the qualities he developed along the way. The way in which his mother raised him has a clear and direct affect; Johnson developed a severe lack of self‐esteem. A lack of confidence in one’s self can lead to a child’s need for self‐acceptance. In order to find ways to give himself praise, Johnson looked for other outlets aside from his mother. As a result, Johnson continually looked for ways to increase his power. Power became the outlet of choice for Johnson, but the cycle of oppression continues because no matter how much power Johnson was able to obtain throughout his entire life, he was never able to build up his self‐esteem. In fact, one could argue that the more power he had, the more insecure Johnson became. His incredible insecurities were truly the basis for so many of Johnson’s fatal flaws. But in many ways, his insecurity was both his biggest asset and his worst enemy. The model above serves as a means of understanding how childhood development, personal qualities, and presidential leadership are all connected. Their connection is clear and direct, and allows us to better understand why Johnson made certain decisions while in office. The model and presidential leadership literature will serve as the first two theoretical chapters of this thesis. These will be completed by the end of this term. Following those two theory 7 chapters, I expect to include at least three other chapters; one focusing on childhood and insecurity, another on the qualities that were born out of insecurity, and a third on how Johnson’s relationships with others shaped decision making during the early days of the Vietnam War. The “Cycle of Parental Oppression” is applied to different stages in Johnson’s life throughout this thesis. A basic understanding of which qualities are important to the Presidency is established in Chapter Two. Establishing the importance of different leadership qualities is vital, as this thesis looks at leadership qualities and how they are affected by childhood development.
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