THE WAY A DRUNK USES A LAMP POST: INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND POLICY DURING THE VIETNAM WAR, 1962 - 1968 A Dissertation Submitted to the Temple University Graduate Board In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY by Thomas A. Reinstein December 2018 Examining Committee Members: Richard H. Immerman, Advisory Chair, Department of History Nguyen Thi Dieu, Department of History Petra Goedde, Department of History David Farber, Kansas University Department of History Mark Atwood Lawrence, External Reviewer, University of Texas at Austin Department of History © Copyright 2018 by Thomas A. Reinstein All Rights Reserved ii ABSTRACT This dissertation examines the relationship between intelligence analysis and policy formation during the Vietnam War from 1962 to 1968. Rooted in a multidisciplinary approach that draws from history and international relations theory, it argues that Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, along with most of their top advisors, used intelligence analysis to confirm their preconceived notions about the U.S. war effort in Vietnam. Both presidents and the majority of their advisors all agreed that while victory in Vietnam would be difficult, allowing the Republic of (South) Vietnam (RVN) to fall to Communism was unthinkable. They filtered out intelligence analyses that suggested the U.S. could not win or that its geopolitical position could withstand the RVN’s loss. JFK and LBJ’s national security decision-making system enabled this dysfunctional use of intelligence. Both presidents relied on an ad hoc system of policy formation in which major policy decisions took place in informal meetings staffed only by their most trusted advisors. Doing so allowed either president or their advisors latitude to expel intelligence officers from critical meetings for any reason. Analysts who became bearers of bad news on the war effort or developed negative personal relationships with any influential member of the administration risked banishment to the policy wilderness. On the other hand, analysts who reinforced their customers’ preconceptions received more access to policy circles. Top Kennedy and Johnson administration officials abused intelligence in several different ways. Ignoring or disregarding analyses that cast doubt on the war effort’s iii prospects was most common. In such cases, officials favored more optimistic reporting or used their own reasoning. In doing the latter, most policymakers and military officials based decisions on personal insecurity, rigid anti-Communism, previous personal experiences during World War II, and interpretations of history that justified American involvement in Vietnam. They also “cherry-picked” or pulled language from analyses that justified their positions while ignoring language elsewhere in the same reports that did not. And when the war became more controversial within the Johnson administration in 1967, some pro-war officials began openly politicizing intelligence, or pressuring analysts to advance a particular conclusion regardless of evidence. Finally, gaps in intelligence collection and analytic tradecraft worsened the intelligence community’s standing during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Throughout the war, American intelligence collectors were unable to break the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam’s high-level communication codes or recruit any defectors or spies within the Hanoi government. Analysts thus used less reliable evidence, which weakened the reliability of their conclusions. Many analysts did not even cite sources at all. Analysts also used vague language that made their findings appear untrustworthy. All of these factors made Vietnam-era intelligence analyses easier for their readers to ignore. The result was flawed policy and strategy in Vietnam. iv For Beth and Michael ! v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation would not exist without the strong institutional support that I received throughout my time in graduate school. Temple University’s Graduate School provided me with a University Fellowship and a Dissertation Completion Grant, while Temple’s Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy (CENFAD) provided several travel grants. CENFAD also provided me with a Sgt. Maj. William F. Berger Endowed Fellowship and, through the generosity of Marvin Wachman and Jeffrey Bower, two research grants. The John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Libraries both awarded me grants that covered all of my costs for a combined month in Boston, MA and Austin, TX, respectively. Covering the costs of trips to barbeque and Mexican restaurants on the weekends was especially critical during the latter trip. Like every historian, I relied on archivists and librarians at every step of my research. The archivists at the Kennedy and Johnson libraries were tremendously helpful, both in terms of locating important documents and processing my many declassification review requests. In particular, I must thank Stephen Plotkin and John Wilson. I also wish to thank the archival staff at the National Archives and Records Administration’s Archives II facility in College Park, MD, the Army War College Archives in Carlisle, PA (especially Jeff Hawks), the RAND Corporation Archive in Santa Monica, CA, the Naval History and Heritage Command in Washington, DC, and Princeton University’s Seeley J. Mudd Library. And I must recognize the archivists and administrators who run United States Declassified Documents Online, the Texas Tech University Virtual Vietnam vi Archive, the Digital National Security Archive, and the Central Intelligence Agency’s Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room. It was while attending Cornell University as an undergraduate that I decided I liked U.S. History enough to earn a PhD in it. So I must express my gratitude to Holly Case, Durba Ghosh, and Fredrik Logevall for inculcating that interest by shepherding me through writing an undergraduate honors thesis during my junior and senior years. All three taught me research and writing skills that I have relied on ever since. In addition, Fred brought me into the ranks of Vietnam War scholars starting with a class he co- taught with another esteemed scholar of the war, Keith Taylor, and continuing through his time as my thesis advisor. I am proud to count him as a colleague. Writing a dissertation is a mostly solitary endeavor, but it helps when graduate students have a community of scholars and friends to lean on. Richard Immerman is a model graduate advisor whose dedication to his students is unparalleled. I shall miss our conversations in Good Karma Café on 10th and Pine Streets. Nguyen Thi Dieu, who I have long regarded as a second advisor, made me a better historian through many hours of rigorous one-on-one training. Petra Goedde taught two of my favorite graduate seminars and also ably served on my dissertation committee despite my asking her to do so at the absolute last minute. David Farber, Beth Bailey, Ben Talton, Gregory J.W. Urwin, Howard Spodek, Eileen Ryan, Jay Lockenour, and Heather Thompson provided irreplaceable guidance throughout my graduate career. So did Mark Atwood Lawrence, who also graciously agreed to serve as my external reader. Thanks to my fellow graduate students for their feedback and support, particularly John Worsencroft, Jessica Bird, Minju Bae, Carly Goodman, Seth Tannenbaum, Kaete O’Connell, Silke Zoller, Manna vii Duah, David Thomas, and Tommy Richards. Thanks also to Rob Thompson, Martin Clemis, Kaeten Mistry, David Milne, John Prados, Edwin Moïse, Tami Biddle, Bob Kodosky, Mark Clodfelter, Nancy Gore, Nick Martin, and Will Wester. And I am grateful to Marc Selverstone, Nicole Hemmer, Sheila Blackford, Bryan Craig, Julie Gronlund, and Keri Matthews at the Miller Center of Public Affairs for giving me a welcoming scholarly community, a place to write, and access to all Johnson White House tape recordings after I moved to Charlottesville in 2015. I am indebted to Thomas L. Hughes for granting me several hours of his time in September 2015 for a comprehensive and revealing interview about his time in State Department intelligence under Kennedy and Johnson. Mr. Hughes’ recollections changed my perspective and argument. This dissertation is an improved work because of our discussion. In writing this dissertation, I regret that there are two people who did not live to see it. Marilyn Young was a peerless historian and a wonderful person. She passed away in 2017. Both the academy and the world are lesser places without her. I also remember my friend Matt Kahn, who died in 2009 after a long struggle with a terrible disease. I miss you, Matt. Watch out for snakes. Lastly, I must thank my family. My parents, Robert Reinstein and Taylor Aspinwall, have supported my dream of becoming a historian for as long as I have held it in every possible way. If nothing else, having a couple of lawyers as parents improves your ability to formulate an argument. Additionally, it was my father who got me interested in history in the first place with long discussions about the American Civil War at the dinner table, which my mother called listening to “Battles with Tom and Bob.” viii Discussions of his time in the anti-war and civil rights movements as well as my mother’s contemporaneous experiences as a feminist soon followed. Given that, perhaps it was only natural that I would study the Vietnam era. My sister, Ellen Cookman, has likewise remained steadfastly supportive. El, if one of us had to become a lawyer, I’m glad it was you, because you’re really good at it. My parents-in-law, Judith Dexter and Robert Rice, made me part of their family well before their daughter and I made it official. In doing so I also got two more fabulous siblings, Andrea and Tom. And my grandmother, Mary S. Ashmead, has changed my life with her support. Yet nothing can compare to the gratitude I feel towards my wife, Elizabeth Dexter-Rice. Beth has been there for me since we first started dating in December 2007 and continuing through my time at Temple and her time as a medical student and pediatric resident.