How the Weak Win Wars: a Theory of Asymmetric Conflict
How the Weak Ivan Arreguín-T oft Win Wars ATheoryof Asymmetric Con ict How the WeakWin Wars Noone hadgiven MuhammadAli achanceagainst George Foremanin the WorldHeavyweight Championship ght of October30, 1974. Foreman, none of whoseopponents hadlasted more than three roundsin the ring, wasthe strongest,hardest hit- ting boxerof his generation. Ali, though notas powerful asForeman, had a slightly fasterpunch andwas lighter onhisfeet. In the weeks leading up tothe ght,however ,Foremanhad practiced against nimble sparringpartners. He wasready .Butwhen the bell rangjust after 4:00 a.m. in Kinshasa,something completely unexpected happened. In roundtwo, instead of movinginto the ring tomeet Foreman,Ali appeared tocoweragainst the ropes.Foreman, now condent of victory,pounded him againand again, while Ali whispered hoarsetaunts: “ George,you’ re not hittin’,”“George,you disappoint me.” Fore- manlost his temper, andhis punches became afurious blur.Tospectators,un- awarethat the elasticring ropeswere absorbingmuch of the forceof Foreman’s blows,it looked as if Ali wouldsurely fall.By the fth round,how- ever, Foremanwas worn out. And in roundeight, asstunned commentators anda deliriouscrowd looked on, Muhammad Ali knocked George Foremanto the canvas,and the ght wasover. The outcomeof thatnow-famous “ rumble in the jungle”was completely un- expected. The two ghterswere equally motivatedto win: Both had boasted of victory,andboth had enormous egos. Y et in the end, aght thatshould have been overin three roundswent eight, andForeman’ s prodigiouspunches proveduseless against Ali’ s rope-a-dope strategy. This ghtillustrates an importantyet relativelyunexplored feature ofinter- statecon ict: how a weakactor ’sstrategycan make a strongactor ’spower ir- IvanArreguí n-T oft is apostdoctoral fellow inthe International SecurityProgram at theBelfer Center for Scienceand International Affairs at Harvard University’s JohnF .KennedySchool of Government.
[Show full text]