Presented to the Graduate Council of the North Texas State University In

Home , Daily Sketch, Daily Times (Nigeria), Joseph Gomwalk, National Observer (UK), News Agency of Nigeria, Nigerian Observer

79I /f

NIGERIAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND PRESS FREEDOM, 1966-79

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of the

North Texas State University in Partial

Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Ehikioya Agboaye, B.A.

Denton, Texas

May, 1984 Agboaye, Ehikioya, Nigerian Military Government and

Press Freedom, 1966-79. Master of Arts (Journalism), May,

1984, 3 tables, 111 pp., bibliography, 148 titles.

The problem of this thesis is to examine the military-

press relationship inNigeria from 1966 to 1979 and to

determine whether activities of the military government

contributed to violation of press freedom by prior restraint,

postpublication censorship and penalization.

Newspaper and magazine articles related to this study

were analyzed. Interviews with some journalists and mili-

tary personnel were also conducted.

Materials collected show that the military violated

some aspects of press freedom, but in most cases, however,

journalists were free to criticize government activities.

The judiciary prevented the military from arbitrarily using

its power against the press.

The findings show that although the military occasionally attempted suppressing the press, there are few instances that prove that journalists were denied press freedom. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page LIST OF TABLES...... P

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Statement of the Problem Purpose of the Study Significant Questions Definition of Terms Review of the Literature Significance of the Study Limitations Methodology Organization

II. PREMILITARY ERA,.... 1865-1966...18 . . . . .

From Colonial to Indigenous Press The Press in the First Republic

III. PRESS ACTIONS IN THE MILITARY'S EARLY YEARS 29

Before the Civil War The Nigeria-Biaf ran War and After

IV. PRESS CRITICISM AND GOVERNMENT REACTION . . . . 40

Arrests and Detentions Press Censorship and the Military

V. GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT WITH THE NATIONAL AND FOREIGN PRESS ...... 58

Press Freedom Government Acquisition of Media Foreign Press Dilemma The Military Regime's Achievements for Nigerian Press

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS--Continued

Page VI. CONCLUSION.-...... 84

Summary Conclusions Suggestions for Further Study

APPENDIX...... 92

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... -.-...... 102

iv LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

I. Major Nigerian Newspapers and Their Political Owners/Sponsors During the Civilian Government--As Of December, .1975...... 92 ......

II. Prominent Government Newspapers During the Military Regime ...... 94

III. Some Military Decress and Edicts on the Media ...... 97

V CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One of the continuing problems journalists may face is

the suppression of press freedom. Confrontations between

media and governments are common (17, p. 10), notably in

modern African states where the developmental theory concept

of journalism (7, p. 73) is still developing. The concern

for press freedom in Africa is a difficult problem to mass media teachers and practitioners in many parts of the world where the fundamental principle of a free press is regarded as a barometer by which political freedom is measured (11, p. 40). Commenting on the general deterioration of press freedom, John Merrill observed that a common denominator of press freedom reports released each year is that "the world's press is getting less and less free" (12, p. 73).

The intrusion of the military into politics of Third

World countries has complicated press freedom issues. Where the army seizes power from a legitimately constituted government, the press is given a new role that produces a tense relationship between the soldier-rulers and the press. It is against this general background that one should view the press freedom conflict between the military and the press in

1 2

Nigeria during the thirteen-year military government from

1966 to 1979.

Nigeria, a former British colony located in West Africa

with a population estimated from 80 to 100 million people, is

the largest, strongest, and richest nation in Black Africa

(13, p. 42). This population has a divergent and pluralistic

composition whose characteristic a Nigerian newspaper editor

aptly described as a society that contains an estimated 250

different ethnic groups with religious, cultural, political,

and economic differences (4, p. 39).

The Nigerian press during the colonial era was nurtured

in the British fashion of a free and unfettered press. Though

not given total freedom to criticize the colonial masters'

policies, Nigerian journalists fully utilized the freedom at

their disposal in criticizing the British. By this approach

indigenous journalists encouraged nationalists to spread the

feeling of political consciousness among the members of the

few elite who, as opinion leaders, informed the masses of

happenings in the country. During the colonial period, Fred

Omu, a Nigerian historian, confirmed that Nigerian journalists

encouraged a sense of political and nationalist awareness

(15, p. viii).

Ironically, according to Omu, after independence was achieved in 1960, the indigenous press became a dangerous tool in the hands of politicians (15, p. 248). 3

Eventually, the military seized power from the civilians

on January 15, 1966. The soldier-rulers stressed that their

major concern was to purge the nation of the ills inherent

in the society (14, p. 2). During the civil war (1967-1970),

the press, by having opinions similar to the federal govern-

ment's stand on the rebellion, assisted in countering the

secessionists' propaganda. After the war, the press also

helped to reintegrate the Ibos into the country by encouraging

other Nigerians to forgive and to forget the past. Jour-

nalists also supported the government's efforts at rehabili-

tating all war victims.

Unfortunately, there were accusations of corruption

against military-civilian government officials which led to

attacks by journalists, and this gave rise to several mis-

understandings between the press and military. Typical of

this period was General Yakubu Gowon's administration, 1966-

1975. Frank Barton, African media writer, said that "the

soldiers who had come to power in 1966 to eliminate corruption were now as crooked as the civilians they had ousted-- more crooked, for Nigeria's oil wealth was beginning to flow . . ." (3, p. 53). Hachten stated that the relationship between the press and Gowon's regime at this time was tense

(8, p. 164).

During the Murtala Muhammed's regime in 1975, the government started the Nigerian News Agency, a National Press

Council, and reorganized radio and television broadcasting. 4

The rulers also took over some prominent newspapers both at

the federal and state levels.

There were military-police arrests and detentions of

journalists during the military administration in Nigeria.

As a result media practitioners exercised careful restraint

in whatever they published.

Censorship of the press during the military administra-

tion in Nigeria took various forms. Wilcox noted that the harassment of journalists by the military compelled editors

to adopt self-imposed censorship in which publication of newspaper articles critical of government actions were curtailed (19, p. 69). He also stated that a form of censorship of foreign journalists was the "special visa requirement" which empowered Nigerian embassies to thoroughly screen foreign correspondents who wanted to visit the country (19, p. 95).

Barton suggested that there was post-publication censorship by the Nigerian military government between 1966 and 1979, because journalists were detained, arrested, and mis- treated after newspaper articles criticizing government policies were published (3, p. 52).

However, Michael Singleton argued that a war situation necessitates some form of censorship (16, p. 727).

The Mineri Amakiri court case in which this journalist was brutually treated by officials of the Rivers State Government--Amakiri sued, won the case, and collected damages 5

(3, p. 55)--and other similar incidents tend to determine the

stand of the judiciary in the relationship between the press and military.

For the stability of a country to be assured, the press

and government should understand their cooperation is vital

in the attainment of national goals. However, the appearance of the military in Nigeria's politics seems to have complicated the relationship between journalists and the government. This is, according to Jakande's observation, because

when we talk of a military regime, the picture it conjures in the mind of the average citizen is that of a government of soldiers. . . .There are those whose executive council include civilians holding offices at the pleasure of the soldiers as in Nigeria (5, p. 82). The duty of the press, no matter the government in power, is

"to seek out the truth about all things, and to present to his readers not such things as statecraft would wish them to know but the truth as near as he can attain" (5, p. 84).

As Dele Cole, former general manager of the Daily Times group of companies observed,

The military have for the most part been willing to recognize the indispensable role of the press in our national life. . . . The press has willingly conceded the unique achievements of the military regime in much the same way as a censored press can exist in a civilian and freely elected regimes (5, p. 101).

Statement of the Problem

The problem of this study was to examine the military- press relationship in Nigeria from 1966 to 1979 and to 6

determine whether activities of the military government contributed to censorship of the press.

Purpose of the Study The purpose of this study is to analyze the status of freedom of the press in Nigeria during the military regime from 1966 to 1979.

As a result, this thesis will therefore 1. Analyze newspaper articles and determine if these writings constituted the reasons for military and police detentions, arrests, and harassment of journalists; 2. Determine how harassment of journalists by the military and police prevented publications that were critical of the military government;

3. Examine the military regime's decrees and edicts against journalists and discuss the ways in which these laws affected the usual duties of media workers in Nigeria;

4. Determine whether police or military intimidations of journalists prevented newspaper writers from criticizing government policies;

5. Examine publications by foreign journalists and determine the reasons for the military's ban, expulsion, and arrest of these correspondents.

Significant Questions Significant questions covered during this study were as follows. 7

1. Why were there confrontations between journalists

and military-police personnel?

2. What military actions had an effect on press freedom?

3. Did the military censor the press before, during, or after publication; and what effects did this have?

4. What court decisions affected the relationship between the press and military?

Definition of Terms

For the purposes of this study, the following definitions were established.

Press Freedom--Colin Legum argued that for the existence of press freedom to be meaningful, the press should be

". . . free from compulsions from whatever source, governmental or social, external or internal; from compulsions-- not, of course, from pressures, since no press can be free from pressures except in a moribund society empty of con- tending forces and beliefs" (10, p. 30).

Press Censorship--According to Robert F. Ladenson, press censorship applies "to any restriction upon expression of which the listener happens to disapprove." He further stated that censorship of the press is the process of "making illegal certain precisely identified acts of expression" (9,, p. 53).

Ladenson (9, pp. 55-60) categorized some forms of press censorship as: 8

(a) Prior Restraints--He argued that prior restraint

may be identified with direct governmental action that

makes it literally impossible for one to communicate with

others effectively" (9, p. 55).

Examples of censorship in this group may therefore

include licensing, taxation, injunction, contempt citations, forced disclosure, forcible printing and government ownership. Government might also restrain people from right of assembly, right of travel, right of access to specific per-

sons, and freedom from incrimination.

(b) Penalization--Ladenson noted that government penalizes individuals who adhere to acts of expression . ."

(9, p.. 56). This method, in other words, may include

seditious laws, criminal libel, obscenity, privacy and defamation laws.

Postpublication Censorship--Wilcox stated that a form of direct government censorship is postpublication censorship when officials ". . . ban, suspend, seize, or confiscate any newspaper or magazine when officials feel the content threatens public order and safety" (19, p. 54).

Threats and Intimidations--This type of press restriction, Wilcox stated, is when ". . . journalists can be punished on any number of broad grounds generally outside the usual grounds of libel, pornography, or even sedition" (19, p. 70). 9

It therefore means that arrests, detentions, and physical abuse of persons that publish what the government deems as bad can be included in this category. This study will determine the ways in which these four forms of press cen-

sorship were practiced by the Nigerian military government.

Review of Literature

A search in the Journalism Abstract published between 1966 and 1981 shows that although some theses and disser- tations have been written generally on issues of the press during the Nigerian military administration, none has been written specifically on the military and press freedom during these years.

However, textbooks on African media include sections on the relationship between the Nigerian military government and the press from 1966 to 1979.

Rosalynde Ainslie, in her book, The Press in Africa, published in 1967, argued that the country was "relatively free of press control under the first six months of military government" (1, p. 247). William Hachten's Muffled Drums (1971), although it does not mention the Nigerian media, discussed the relationship between the military government and the press from 1966 to 1979. He said that there was no overt government control of newspapers during the military government's stay in power (7, p. 165). 10

In his contribution to Reporting Africa (1971), edited

by Olav Stokke, Mamman Daura, a former editor of the New

Nigerian, reported that although the paper "was owned and

subsidized by government . . . we frequently criticize

their actions . . . but the New Nigerian has not been sub-

jected to sustained government interference" (4, p. 43).

Dennis Wilcox, in his 1975 book, Mass Media in Black

Africa, supports the thesis that Nigeria is an example of a nation under military rule with little press control. He argued that his research "also contradicts the general assumption that military regimes automatically mean a highly restricted press system" (19, p. 130).

Fred Omu, a Nigerian historian, commenting on the press- military relations in the postscript of his book, Press and

Politics in Nigeria 1880-1937, published in 1978, argued that although there were series of confrontations between press and military, the former was relatively free because of the "liberal disposition of the federal military leadership" (15, p. 250).

Sylvanus Ekwelie, analyzing the relationship between the press and military in Nigeria, published in Gazette Inter- national, stated that the press was free to "criticize even military decisions" (6, p. 225).

In a 1979 thesis, Olusegun Akinrinade analyzed the news and editorial content of three government-owned newspapers, 11

New Nigerian, Daily Times, and Daily Sketch, and of one independent paper, the Nigerian Tribune. His findings show that ". . . the federal government has kept its policy of non-interference in newspaper affairs . . ." (2, p. 55). Frank Barton, in The Press of Africa (1979), said that

"even with a military junta, Nigeria, where the national press is now virtually government-owned, has developed a breed of very independent newspaper" (3, p. 7). In his 1980 UNESCO-published Communication Policies in Nigeria, Frank Ugboajah stated that during the military era, although there were several clashes between the press and military personnel, the army regime was "very reluctant to restrict the freedom of the press" (18, p. 30).

Significance of the Study How much control a country's governing body exacts on its press determines the nature of freedom that government grants its people. The takeover of the democratic government by the military in Nigeria in 1966 might indicate that the relationship between the government and press was jeopardized.

The public media, according to Merrill, are persuasive instruments in the social aspect of man's struggle for self liberation and ". . . it inevitably follows that what information is transmitted and the nature of that transmission 12

will dictate the directions and intensity of change in all

other institutions within the society" (12, p. xvii).

If a government is essential in the growth of societies, the press complements this role by its critical analyses of

government activities. But when a government restricts journalists from exercising their professional rights, such an administration lends support to unnecessary suspicions by its critics and the masses. This situation thereby leads to constant confrontations between the press and rulers.

This study will attempt to contribute to the existing body of knowledge in journalism by trying to analyze the nature of freedom the press had during the period in review, and if actions demonstrated by the military were exercised primarily to suppress press freedom in Nigeria. Not only will this study serve as a reference point for judging the military government's role in Nigeria regarding its attitude toward preserving or disrupting institutions needed for development, but it will also assist in other studies that seek to analyze the history of the military and the press in Nigeria.

Limitations This study will focus attention primarily on the relationship between the military government in Nigeria and the press, with specific regard to press freedom from 1966 to 1979. 13

Efforts will be concentrated on the print media because,

unlike radio and television that have always been under gov-

ernment control, a majority of newspapers and magazines

circulated during the span of this study were not controlled

by the government. The print media, therefore, are seen as

more critical, sensitive, vocal, and antagonistic toward

government than electronic media.

Attempts to secure complete and necessary material

required for this study were handicapped by inability to

travel to Nigeria. Much of the needed information was obtained through the mail from the author's brother, who teaches at the University of Ilorian, Kwara State, Nigeria.

Methodology

This study will describe and analyze major military- press confrontations that occurred from 1966 to 1979.

Between these years, Ugboajah stated that there were fifteen national dailies and thirty-one weekly newspapers

(18, pp. 18, 19). However, Wilcox noted there were fourteen national newspapers. Out of these numbers he lists seven of the dailies as under government ownership and seven as privately owned (19, p. 38).

This study will discuss three federal government- controlled dailies (Daily Times, Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo, New

Nigerian) and one weekly, Sunday Times; five state-owned newspapers (Nigerian Chronicle, Nigerian Observer, Sunday 14

Observer, Daily Sketch, and the Renaissance); and three

private interest national dailies (The Guardian, Nigerian Tribune, and Sunday Concord).

The foreign-owned newspapers to be analyzed in this thesis are the New York Times, the Times of London, and the

Wall Street Journal. Some foreign-owned international magazines also to be discussed include Newsweek, Time, and the U.S. News and World Report.

Apart from using secondary material and sources, interviews were conducted with some Nigerians involved in the relationship between the military and the press during the period discussed in this study.

Organization This thesis covers the time from when the Nigerian army first seized political power in 1966 until it handed the reins of government over to democratically elected rulers in 1979.

This study has, therefore, been systematically divided into four phases, which are discussed in Chapters II to V. Chapter I introduces the study by stating the problem statement, purpose of the study, and significant questions. In Chapter II, an attempt is made to give a brief historical background of the Nigerian press from the British colonial government days in 1865 until the end of the First Republic of Nigeria in 1966. In Chapter III, the relationship between the military regime and the press before, during, and after 15

the civil war is discussed. Press criticism and the military

government reaction and the issue of censorship constitute

the discussion in Chapter IV. The government involvement with the national and foreign press is discussed in Chapter V.

Chapter VI summarizes and concludes this study. CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Ainslie, Rosalynde, The Press in Africa, New York, Walker and Company, 1967. 2. Akinrinade, Olusoji Olusegun, "Ownership Control V. Editorial Content: A Study of Nigerian Daily Newspapers," unpublished master's thesis, Depart- ment of Journalism, Northwestern State University, Natchitoches, Louisiana, 1979. 3. Barton, Frank, The Press of Africa, New York, Africana Publishing Corporation, 1979.

4. Daura, Mamman, "Editing a Government Newspaper in Nigeria," Reporting Africa, edited by Olav Stokke, New York, Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971.

5. Duyile, Dayo, Media and Mass Communication in Nigeria, Ibadan, Sketch Publishing Co. Ltd., 1979.

6. Ekwelie, Sylvanus A., "The Nigerian Press Under Military Rule," Gazette: International Journal for Mass Communication Studies, 25, No. 4 (1979), 219-232.

7. Hachten, William A., World Press Prism, Ames, Iowa State University Press, 1981. 8. , Muffled Drums, Ames, Iowa State University Press, 1971.

9. Ladenson, Robert F., A Philosophy of Free Expression and Its Constitutional Applications, Totowa, New Jersey, Rowman and Littlefield, 1983.

10. Legum, Colin, "The Mass Media--Institutions of the African Political Systems," Reporting Africa, edited by Olav Stokke, New York, Africana Pub- lishing Corporation, 1971. 11. McPhail, Thomas L., Electronic Journalism, London, Sage Publications Ltd., 1981. 12. Merrill, John Calhoun, The Imperative of Freedom, New York, Hastings House Publications7,1974.

16 17

13. "Nigeria: Second Chance for Democracy," Newsweek (March 30, 1981), pp. 42-44. 14. Ojiako, James 0., 13 Years of Military Rule, Lagos, Nigeria, Daily Times Publications Ltd., 1979. 15. Omu, Fred I. A., Press and Politics in Nigeria 1880- 1937, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, Humanities Press, Inc., 1978.

16. Singleton, Michael, "Attitude of Military Censors and Other Officers on Mass Media Issues," Journalism Quarterly, 54 (Winter, 1977), 727-32. 17. Small, William J., Political Power and the Press, New York, N. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1972. 18. Ugboajah, Frank Okwu, Communication Policies in Nigeria Paris, UNESCO, 1980. ia

19. Wilcox, Dennis L, Mass Media in Black Africa, New York, Praeger Publications, 1975. CHAPTER II

PREMILITARY ERA, 1865-1966

The beginning of press activities in Nigeria was dominated by foreigners. This has given the country a firm foundation and basis on which to judge the failures and

successes of the indigenous press. However, Nigerian journalists found the press useful in criticizing the British government actions which they thought were calculated at pre- venting the independence of the country. Journalists, there-

fore, were among those who assisted the country in gaining its independence. These same journalists exploited the

press for political gains after the attainment of independence. This trend led to the process whereby tribalism is

closely associated with the Nigerian press.

From Colonial to Indigenous Press The introduction of the press to Nigeria was by foreigners whose British or American backgrounds afforded them the oppor- tunity and knowledge to establish printing presses and eventually, newspapers. Gradually, different types of newspapers with multifarious tones proliferated in Lagos. Missionaries were the first to print newspapers in

Nigeria. This was in 1859, when a vernacular paper,

18 19

Iwe Irohin, edited by the Reverend Henry Townsend of the

Christian Missionary Society was started (6, p. 145).

After religious-inclined newspapers, literary and education dailies followed. In 1863, Robert Campbell came out with Anglo African, which he said was mainly to exploit the growing interest in Western education in Lagos by pro-

viding cheap and accessible material that would educate,

inform, and entertain its readers (8, p. 19).

Owen Macaulay in 1883 started editing The Eagle and

Lagos Critic. He said its purpose was to bring into the

minds of the community a fondness for reading (2, p. 13).

Alongside these religious and literary publications

were political newspapers. Their authors used them to

organize vigorous campaigns in favor of greater cultural

identity and to fight for their country's independence and

sovereignty (8, p. 100). The Lagos Times and Gold Coast

Colony Advertiser, founded in 1880, was a political newspaper that set examples for others to emulate. And two years later, a forthnightly, the Lagos Observer, edited by J. Blackall Benjamin, appeared on the scene. More than the Lagos Times, which made efforts to balance radicalism with decorum, the

Observer emerged as one of the symbols of intellectual aggression that characterized political developments in

colonial Nigeria (8, p. 30).

In 1914, the British amalgamated Northern and Southern protectorates, and the name Nigeria came into being. Before 20

this date, many political newspapers had gained prominence, and one of them, the Nigerian Times, edited by James Bright Davies from 1910, is remarkable. This paper, the author said, was determined to express opinion and pass judgment on

government measures freely and with candor (8, p. 42).

Although most of these newspapers were anti-British

government, some supported the colonialists' views. A

typical example was Kitoye Ajasa's The Nigerian Pioneer,

founded in 1917. Ajasa was criticized by fellow journalists as being financed by Lord Lugard, the governor. As a result,

the content of his newspaper, they alleged, favored British

views that were against Africa's interests (4, p. 180).

When in 1925 Herbert Macaulay's Lagos Daily News

appeared, Nigerian journalists had mastered the tricks of

political propaganda. Macaulay, like other editors, utilized

his newspaper in stirring up readers against the British

colonial government (2, p. 15).

The 1922 Richards Constitution further expanded Nigerians' political strength by making it more feasible for indigenous politicians to compete for seats in the Legisla- tive Council. These politicians, therefore, started con- testing for various positions in the council. This change in politics affected the tone of the press, which by then had become a tool for influencing political interests. At the same time, attacks against the colonial government policies were not minimized. For instance, the Daily Service came into 21

being in 1934 as the mouthpiece of the Nigerian Youth Move- ment. Its aims were the development of a united nation and a sense of common understandings among the conglomeration of peoples and cultures of Nigeria (4, p. 180). In 1937, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe started publishing the West African Pilot. This prominent nationalist and American- trained journalist brought into the country a new idealism of nationalism as well as exotic techniques of political and journalistic propaganda (8, p. 69).

Within a few years, Zik introduced the first newspaper chain in Africa and established papers in many important

towns (3, p. 26).

It is interesting to note that throughout these years there was little success at official censorship, although various ploys were adopted to muffle journalists. In 1946, for example, Zik's license for operating a wireless station to obtain foreign news from Reuters was refused (3, p. 28). Before that time, Lord Lugard in 1917 had introduced a censorship law that empowered him to appoint a censor during emergencies (3, p. 20). The refusal of the home office in Britain and criticisms by African journalists weakened Lugard's plans.

Earlier in 1903, Governor William MacGregor fought hard to legitimize the Newspaper Ordinance, which imposed heavy fines on erring journalists. However, prosecutions under this law were few. Perhaps the significance of the law was 22

not in the number of newspapers prosecuted, but in its subtle effect in limiting the proliferation of newspapers

(8, p. 182).

Another successful press legislation was Governor Egerton's Seditious Of fences Bill of 1909, which sought to punish publications and speeches designed to inflame people against the government. Although Nigerian journalists endeavored to repudiate this bill, it was made into law. The governor did not direct any prosecution against any journalist during his term of office, which ended in 1912. Omu suggested that Egerton did not really intend to use the law except as a sort of scarecrow to reduce press criticisms

(8, p. 188).

Hachten, supporting this statement, said the colonial governors exercised considerable restraint towards Nigerian journalists (6, p. 148). Wilcox noted that the British government neither guaranteed press freedom nor strictly controlled officials' judgments in such matters (10, p. 6). Another reason for the ruluctance of the British government to institute repressive censorship or other stringent press laws is offered by Omu. He argued that because the governors were accustomed to free political institutions in Britain, they felt it would be unjustified should they refuse to give the same rights to their subjects in Africa (9, p. 280). 23

Although not having total press freedom, the Nigerian colonial journalists made remarkable contributions, not only to the profession but also to the attainment of independence for their country. Ainslie remarked that the colonial press gave a voice to a subject people through its literate elite and established a tradition of political criticism and debate that served to keep the colonial administration aware of public opinion Cl, p. 30).

The Press in the First Republic The Zik group of companies, with its newspaper chain, introduced new elements into the press and the political scenes of Nigeria. These newspapers, unlike similar ones in the past, became authoritative organs of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), a political

party established by Zik.

In 1951, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a prominent nationalist, founded the Action Group (AG) party. The Daily Service became this political party's main medium for projecting the party's objectives (2, p. 24). Both the Nigerian Tribune and the Service merged in 1958 to form the Allied Newspapers Limited, another newspaper chain favorable to the Action Group party. With these two chains of newspapers in the country, factional and tribal politics, closely associated with press activities, were intensified. Their primary function was to 24

outdo each other and seize political power (2, p. 28). Individuals who felt dissatisfied with the political parties controlling the two large conglomerates started their own papers. K. O. Mbadiwe, for instance, founded the Daily Telegraph for political reasons. The government in power after independence also established its own newspaper to bolster its power (4, p. 186). And so in 1961 the federal government newspapers, the Morning Post and the Sunday Post, came into existence. Tafawa Balewa, the prime minister, thought he was not getting the support he merited in any of

the other Lagos papers (3, p. 40). Following these examples, the Western Region Government also came out with the Daily Sketch. In the north, the

Nigerian Citizen, a biweekly subsidized by the northern

government, became the spokesman for the Moslem leadership of the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC)--a political party (6, p. 158). The publishers, Gaskiya Corporation, also put out the Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo, a Hausa language newspaper. Of the twenty-one Nigerian daily and weekly papers listed by Eleazu (4, p. 183) as of December 1965, four were independent publications, although not necessarily free from any political affiliations; three were sponsored by the Action Group (AG); seven by the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC); the federal government and the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) founded two each; the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), in control of the Western 25

Regional Government, had one; the COR State Movement, and the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) each owned one newspaper.

During the First Republic of Nigeria, most of the newspapers were owned by political parties, as has been shown. As a result, these papers became forums for settling political scores. For example, in one of its editorials in 1964, the Nigerian Outlook, a pro-NCNC newspaper stated that other rival political parties' papers, for instance, ". . . the MDF [Midwest Democratic Front--political party] was characterized as the 'prodigal son . . . with unyielding contempt by reason of their treachery, double dealings and deliberate hypocrisy. . . ,' the NPC as 'political impostors,' the Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo as 'vernacular rag'" (4, p. 209), The Nigerian Citizen of February 23, 1964, described delegates of a rival political party's convention as " . . intellectuals who are good in political jingoism .. . but useless in council . . . strange characters, wolfs isic] under the cloak of gentility . . . a conclave of disunited people . . . a pack of rebels, carpet crossers and crooks" (4, p. 209).

In his content analysis study of Nigerian newspapers of the First Republic, Eleazu (4, pp. 212-229) observed that the regional papers brought to the attention of their readers favorable news about their regions and little, if anything, from other areas; accusations against and abuses of political 26

foes constituted a considerable portion of news items at this time (4, p. 217).

Hachten stated that Zik's West African Pilot was often wildly irresponsible and reckless in its name-calling, and that bribes were taken by editors to influence their views (6, p. 155). Lamenting the situation of the Nigerian press, Omu said that at a time when maturity and responsibility were expected of the press, newspapers were completely immersed in the vortex of partisan politics and in no way prepared the people for the challenges of independence and national unity (8, p. 247).

The relationship between government officials and the press at this time was often abrasive and tense (6, p. 163). Laws instituted by the British governments were not expunged from statute books; police arrests, detentions, newspaper bans, and harassment of journalists by political foes characterized the attitude of the government. By 1964, the federal and regional governments instituted press laws that obstructed the freedom of journalists (5, p. 7). One typical example is the Newspapers (Amendment) Act of 1964, introduced by the central government as a reaction to combat the growing power of the politicized press. This law, like similar ones by the various regional governments, tried to prevent false publications.

Although section six of the 1964 press law concerned editors and newspapers published in Lagos only, it was 27

indirectly applicable to other areas (5, p. 7). Nigerian journalists were threatened by this act, which simply cautioned against publication and circulation of rumor or false reports. Chief T.O.S. Benson, federal Minister of Informa- tion, introduced the bill. He and other NCNC leaders pointed out that similar laws existed in the Eastern and Northern Regions (7, p. 49).

The outcry by journalists against this law could mean that the Nigerian media professionals before and during this time were careless about the accuracy of news they published. This law, therefore, forced members of the press not to publish rumors unless editors were sure of the authenticity of such news items (7, p. 49).

By 1965, the violence that engulfed western Nigeria following the disputed 1964 general elections illustrated the vulnerability of Nigeria's highly politicized press and political passions (6, p. 158). In the disturbances, which ultimately spread to other areas from the Western Region, the press was seriously affected. Some of the state's newspapers were banned in the east and west. The federal government's Morning and Sunday Post were also prevented from circulating in some parts of the country (6, p. 159), CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Ainslie, Rosalynde, The Press in Africa, New York, Walker and Company, 1967.

2. Anamaleze, John, Jr., The Nigerian Press: The People's Conscience, New York, Vantage Press, 1978. 3. Barton, Frank, The Press of Africa, New York, Africana PublishingCorporation, 1979. 4. Eleazu, Uma 0., Federalism and Nation-Building, Devon, Arthur H. Stockwell Ltd., 1977. 5. Elias, T. 0., "Legal Requirements for Publishing a Newspaper," Nigerian Press Law, edited by T. 0. Elias, Lagos, Evans Brothers Ltd., 1969. 6. Hachten, William A., Muffled Drums, Ames, Iowa State University Press, 1981. 7. Mackintosh, John P., Nigerian Government and Politics, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1966. 8. Omu, Fred I. A., Press and Politics in Nigeria 1880- 1937, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, Humanities Press, Inc., 1978.

9. , "The Dilemma of Press Freedom in Colonial Africa: The West African Example," Journal of African History, 9 (1968), 279-98. 10. Wilcox, Dennis L., Mass Media in Black Africa, New York, Praeger Publications, 1975.

28 CHAPTER III

PRESS ACTIONS IN THE MILITARY'S EARLY YEARS

The relationship between the press and military in the first few years of the military's government was cautious. Because of political tensions in the country, journalists from different areas of the country disagreed on substantial issues. Due to the mudslinging and tribal accusations resulting from this action, the government stepped in with some decrees. The press, however, constantly criticized various government actions, and their contributions during the civil war are commendable.

Before the Civil War By the end of 1965, at the height of the political wranglings in the Western Region, law and order had broken down. On January 15, 1966, the army seized power from the civilian government. The coup leader, Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, said that his aim was to eradicate tribalism, nepotism, and regionalism from the country (27, p. 2). The Nigerian press, some suggest, cannot avoid blame for the intrusion of the army into the body politic of the nation, because it frequently demonstrated an irrespon- sibility which a country can ill afford (30, p. 93). Journalists of the First Republic were mostly preoccupied

29 30

with trivialities and enmeshed in tribal-political loyalties (1, p. 65; 26, p. 27; 32).

Ogunde (26, p. 28) suggested that the relationship between the military and the press during the early stages of military rule was cautious. This, he said, was because the military rulers, having realized that the press was at the forefront of ethnic rivalry that culminated in army rule, wanted to avoid such repetition.

However, the military's first act to allay the fears generally held about its type of unelected government was the lifting of all bans imposed on newspapers by the civilian governments (17, p. 159). It, therefore, became an offense against the military government for any form of ban to be placed on newspaper circulation in the country. (Note, however, that the military governor of the Western State, General Adeyinka Adebayo, in 1967 banned the federal government's Morning Post and Sunday Post for two months without this decree being invoked on him.) Although the army, in 1963, suspended the Republican Constitution, section twenty-five, relating to free speech and press freedom, was left intact (33, p. 25; 24, p. 69) because of the military's regard for the press. These initial actions signalled a bright future in the relationship between the press and Nigeria's new rulers. Some few months later, the press vigorously criticized the appointment made by a military governor, Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, who 31

appointed his father to membership of two public corporations (14, p. 225). Because no military reprisal was taken against journalists in this action, the press increased the attack against the army.

Journalists from the north and south soon alienated themselves on account of the first military coup being master- minded solely against northern Hausa-Moslem leaders by the Ibos (14, p. 225). Anti-tribal comments, pictures, and cartoons were carelessly used by the press (12, p. 348). Not only was the army displeased, but also northerners, who were most affected by the coup. For instance, the New Nigerian, a newspaper owned by the Northern governments, in a series of articles criticized actions of General Aguiyi Ironsi, the head of state, an Ibo. Articles with headings "Federalism is Good for Nigeria," "Unitary System Not For Us," "Leave the North As It Is," and "Smouldering Fires" appeared in this newspaper on April 5, 7, and 19 of 1966.

The Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo, a Hausa language newspaper also published by the proprietors of the New Nigerian, had an editorial on March 28, 1966, titled "Discipline these insolent Ibos living in the North." This article appeared before the 1966 pogrom in which thousands of eastern Ibos resident in

the northern part of the country were massacred. The soldiers, due to this type of inciting newspaper articles, reacted without delay for fear that too gentle an attitude might make their regime seem like any civilian 32

government (29, p. 250). And so in 1966, the Defamation and Offensive Publications Decree was imposed on any offending publications that tended to incite the public against the government or other Nigerians (14, p. 225). Omu stated that because the press had realized its destructive role in the downfall of the civilian government (29, p. 248), it was expected that Nigerian journalists could have been more mature after the army seized power. The effect of the military trying to prevent the continued publication of unsavory articles by the press was a series of clashes between the press and the military. As has been discussed, the military governor of the western state placed a ban on two federal papers for allegedly misrepresenting facts about his area of authority.

After disturbances recurred in 1967 in many areas of the country, the government imposed the Newspapers Prohibition of Circulation Decree. This law authorized the head of state to proscribe the circulation of any newsprint when he believed that such unrestrained distribution was dangerous to the unity and stability of the country (16, p. 133). This decree, which came at a time when many Ibos were killed in the north, may have kept the press from encouraging such actions in other parts of the nation.

Some analysts and media observers said that although the military had the right to regulate the press, it made no serious attempts to do so and that the press enjoyed an almost 33

unrestrained freedom (1, p. 247; 4, p. 51; 7, p. 91; 30, p. 96). This attitude of the military is explained by some African media critics (5, p. 29; 18, p. 82; 25, p. 7) who suggest that the use of former civilian administrators and civil servants as army advisers must have created a situation whereby the soldier-rulers tempered force with reason. This, in effect, produced rational policies that affected many national institutions, including the press (3, p. 64; 25, p. 7; 30, p. 96).

However, it would be an error to assume that the press, despite initial problems with the military, did not contribute to the success of the army regime. The press served as a useful information conduit between the rulers and the general public (19, p. 890). Apart from reporting views and actions of the administration, the press criticized those who held public offices, and also supported government actions whenever the need arose (5, p. 77; 29, p. 248). For instance, in 1975, the federal military government decided to sell petroleum oil at cheaper rates to member states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The press criticized this action.

The Sunday Times' political editor, Horoun Adamu, in an article, described the cheap oil sale as "incredible" (11, p. 3). The Daily Times' editorial titled "Credibility and Discipline," assailed the military leaders' inconsistencies in political and financial matters (10, p. 2). 34

While the Nigerian Tribune's editorial asked "Who Speaks for Nigeria?" (23, p. 1), the Daily Sketch's editorial "Oil Fracas" warned the federal military government to stop the type of actions exhibited by leaders of Nigeria's First Republic in which the civilians spoke with "many voices" on matters of international concern (8, p. 2).

Newspapers also supported certain actions taken by the military government. In 1967 for example, Nigerian newspapers supported the federal government's stance when the British government made it known that its oil companies would pay royalties to the secessionists. The Morning Post reported that the attitude of the British government showed that they were concerned more about money than about the unity of Nigeria (20, p. 2). The New Nigerian accused the British government of openly supporting the secessionists (21, p. 2). Supporting the federal government's Decree Number 8 of 1967 (on the Aburi Agreement which sought to negotiate a peaceful compromise between the secessionists and the central government), the Daily Times commented that this decree was "the most suitable broad constitutional framework within which Nigeria's military leaders find it possible to carry on their legislative and executive work" (9, p. 2).

The Nigeria-Biafran War and After The Nigerian press was unduly critical of and antagonistic toward some government actions in the past, and it retained 35 this attitude during the military regime. But surprisingly, the civil war almost bridged the confrontational gap between the military leaders and indigenous journalists; the latter showed full support in the former's effort to crush the rebellion.

Although the press partly fueled the troubles that led to the war (3, p. 66; 14, p. 226; 16, p. 136; 17, p. 151), the moment it became evident that Ibos of the Eastern Region would declare their republic, press representatives from other parts of the federation openly criticized the move.

For instance, the Morning Post's editorial of July 30, 1967, supporting the federal government's move to crush Ojukwu's rebellion disagreed with the Ghanaian Daily Graphic's editorial that tended to support the secessionists. In one of its editorials, January 8, 1970, the Nigerian Observer ironically castigated U Thant's appeal calling on Ojukwu to surrender and stated, "It is sheer wishful thinking to think that for anyone who is aware of Ojukwu's stubborness and intransigence to expect him to end the three-year old war of his own accord. . ."

Despite their efforts at massive propaganda tactics,

Nigerian journalists stated De St. Jorre, were burdened by the problem of countering the very effective propaganda also mounted by the rebels (12, p. 351). Critical and adverse attack characteristics of the Nigerian press (1, p. 65; 3, p.

104; 15, p. 188; 20, p. 1) might have been deliberately held 36 back by journalists, as far as military policies and war tactics were concerned. The civil war, no doubt, obliged newspaper writers to embark on propaganda in support of the

federal government (20, p. 248). The military complemented

the press's role by allowing journalists (after initial bureaucratic problems) to visit some war sectors (2; 6; 28;

31). De St. Jorre said that although propaganda by

indigenous journalists was crude, the efforts were effective and had enormous impact on the public (12, p. 350).

However, when the war ended in 1970, the animosity generated by the press against the Ibos ceased.

Jakande, former president of the International Press

Institute and chairman of the Nigerian Union of Journalists,

said that the indigenous press also recognized the existence of emergency regulations and tried to conform to military rules (18, p. 86).

However drastic the military actions against the press were, journalists never failed to make the military leaders realize their mistakes. And this also incurred the wrath of certain military personnel. CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Ainslie, Rosalynde, The Press in Africa, New York, Walker and Company, 1967.

2. Ajayi, Peter (General Manager, Sketch Publishing Company, Ibadan, Nigeria), Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983.

3. Anamaleze, John, Jr., The Nigerian Press: The People's Conscience, New York, Vantage Press, 1977.

4. Barton, Frank, The Press of Africa, New York, Africana Publishing Corporation, 1979.

5. Bienen, Henry and Martin Fitton, "Soldiers, Politicians, and Civil Servants," Soldiers and Oil, edited by Keith Panter-Brick, London, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1978.

6. Chijiuka, Fred B. (General Staff Officer Grade 1, Public Relations and Staff Officer Grade 1, Army Film Unit, Army Headquarters, Bonny Camp, Lagos, Nigeria), Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983.

7. Cole, Dele, "The Press in a Military Regime," Media and Mass Communications in Nigeria, edited by Ayo Duyile, Ibadan, The Sketch Publishing Company Ltd., 1979.

8. Daily Sketch, March 21, 1975.

9. Daily Times, March 23, 1967.

10. , March 18, 1975.

11. , May 13, 1975.

12. De St. Jorre, John, The Brothers' War, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972.

13. Ekpu, Raymond (Chairman, Editorial Board, Concord Group of Newspapers, Lagos, Nigeria), Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983.

37 38

14. Ekwelie, Sylvanus A., "The Nigerian Press Under Mili- tary Rule," Gazette: International Journal for Mass CommunicationStudies, 25, No. 4 (1979), 219-32.

15. Eleazu, Uma 0., Federalism and Nation-Building, Devon, Arthur H. Stockwell Ltd., 1977.

16. Elias, T. 0., "Legal Requirements for Publishing a Newspaper," Nigerian Press Law, edited by T. 0. Elias, Lagos, Nigeria, Evans Brothers Ltd., 1969.

17. Hachten, William A., Muffled Drums, Ames, Iowa State University Press, 1971.

18. Jakande, Lateef, "Role of the Press in a Military Regime," Media and Mass Communication in Nigeria, edited by Ayo Duyile, Ibadan, Nigeria, Sketch Publishing Company Ltd., 1979.

19. Meyer, Ernest, "Another Year of Lost Battles," IPI Report, 22 (January, 1973), 1-8.

20. Morning Post, November 10, 1967.

21. New Nigerian, July 12, 1967.

22. Nigerian Observer, November 21, 1972.

23. Nigerian Tribune, March 20, 1975.

24. Nwankwo, Robert L. and George Kurian, "Nigeria," World Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, New York, Facts on File, Inc., 1982.

25. Odetola, Theophilus Olatunde, Military Politics in Nigeria, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction Books, Inc., 1978.

26. Ogunde, Adelumola, "Mass Media and National Inter- gration in Nigeria," International Perspectives on News, edited by Erwin L. Atwood, Stuart J. Bullion, and Sharon M. Murphy, Carbondale and Edwardsville, Southern Illinois University Press, 1982.

27. Ojiako, James, 13 Years of Military Rule, Lagos, Nigeria, Daily Times Publication, 1979.

28. Omozuanfo, Ramonu (Chief Photographer, Nigerian Observer, Benin City, Nigeria), Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983. 39

29. Omu, Fred I. A., Press and Politics in Nigeria 1880- 1937, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, Humanities Press, Inc., 1978.

30. Ostheimer, John M., Nigerian Politics, New York, Harper and Row, 1973.

31. Rupee, Festus (Chief Sub-editor, Nigerian Observer, Benin City, Nigeria), Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983.

32. Solarin, Tai (Newspaper columnist, proprietor and founder of Mayflower College, Ikenne, Nigeria), Letter sent in reply to mailed questionnaire dated June, 1983.

33. Sunday Times, March 16, 1975. CHAPTER IV

PRESS CRITICISM AND GOVERNMENT REACTION

The Nigerian press during the military regime did not tolerate corruption of public officials. Journalists were convinced of the need to expose graft, no matter who was involved. These revelations and accusations affected some senior government officials and the military was displeased.

The result was the arrest and detention of many journalists after any publication that suggested that a governor or official was corrupt. It was this situation that partly led to military consorship of the press in Nigeria.

Press Fights Against Corruption

It is ironic that the military regime that came to purge the country of its ills became more corrupt than the civilian government it ousted (4, p. 53). This situation further worsened the relationship between the press and military, because journalists had championed vigorously against the low standard of morality in public life (5,. p. 161) during the army regime. Newspapers repeatedly alleged that corrupt government officials who had been paupers before they came to power became millionaires with vast wealth in foreign banks (8, p. 53).

40 41

The Gowon government was most affected by these corruption charges. As a result, friendliness between the army and press dwindled from 1974 to 1975. In 1974, for example, the New Nigerian serialized Chinua Achebe's A Man of the

People, a novel that describes the corruption in premilitary

Nigeria. In its comment about the military regime, the newspaper stated that "the situation has barely changed; only the characters are different. . . .The main characters would not be men in agbada but men in khaki" (22, p. 1).

In another editorial this same newspaper described the

Gowon regime (1967-75) as a "system of drift. . . . even the unrepented sycophants in the corridors of power have conceded the fact that in a long run this country must return to a representative and responsible system of government" (24, p. 1). By 1975, the press's criticism of the military regime had increased. The Nigerian Tribune, for example, at the height of the 1975 national purge of corrupt government officials stated that permanent secretaries "were partners in crime with their political heads and quite often the masterminds of business deals" (31, p. 2).

The Daily Times, continuing the attacks, accused state military governors of massive corruption and condemned the head of state, General Yakubu Gowon, for condoning the corrupt actions of his officials (8, p. 2). On October 1, 1974,

General Gowon's broadcast to the nation attracted public criticism and mass condemnation by the press. The head of 42 state announced that the 1976 date for the return of power to an elected government was no longer realistic because " . from the general attitude, utterances and maneuvers of some individuals and groups and from some publications during the past few months, it is clear that those who aspire to lead the nation on the return to civilian rule have not learned any lesson from our past experiences" (28., p. 22).

The New Nigerian, in response to Gowon's speech commented that "the kind of peace and stability which the commander-in- chief seemed to want . . . is impossible in a huge and diverse country with a fairly well developed political cul- ture" (23, p. 1). Tai Solarin, a columnist for the Daily

Times, commenting on the broadcast wrote that "after eight years of experimental government, with only three of its nine-point program accomplished, the army is pretty well spent and it would be inhuman to expect it to pull out a new trick to save the nation within two years or the next two hundred years" (9, p. 3).

In 1974, Joseph Tarka, the federal commissioner for communication, was accused by a businessman of graft and was forced out of office by a press-backed call for his removal.

Joseph Gomwalk, military governor of Plateau State, also was accused of official misconduct, but the press was not successful in removing him from office. Sworn affidavits and newspaper articles against suspected corrupt military-civilian 43 government officials were major factors in the successful overthrow of Gowon's corrupt government (5, p. 161).

The military answered these accusations with threats against journalists by police-military agents (4, p. 53).

Accusations of corruption by the press especially angered the military government. This culminated in the 1976 Public

Officers' (Protection Against False Accusation) Decree.

These military laws, arrests, and detentions of media professionals support Small's thesis that rulers do not share willingly what will reflect unfavorably on their governments; they will attempt to hide all secrets from the public

(37, p. 382).

Whatever the effects of these press battles against corruption during the military government, one has to acknowledge that journalists performed well in attempting to keep the country free of graft in official circles.

However, it is worthwhile to discuss the shortcomings of the press's attitude in reporting these allegations.

On the Tarka-Daboh corruption fight, Anamaleze noted that, following allegations of official misconduct against

Tarka, some journalists immediately "tried" him on the pages of their newspapers and found him guilty of the "crime"

(3, p. 106). His contention is that it is beyond the power of the press to usurp the position of the country's judiciary in finding allegedly accused persons guilty even before the courts do so. How far the press went in substantiating these 44 corrupt allegations and carefully checking the facts before they were presented to the public is another vital issue.

Elias, summing up some of the problems that might arise when journalists do not check facts before publication, said,

. . . in a society such as ours in which in the immediate post-independence years rumors were afloat and allegations of corruption were rampant mainly by opposition against parties in power, the facts should be carefully verified before newspapers . . . dis- seminated them for public consumption . . . if they could subsequently prove the charges they published were true and not just the result of partisan politics which was a hang-over from the negative journalism of pre-independence days (30, p. 1).

However, in 1976, Obarogie Ohonbamu, a retired Lagos Univer- sity teacher, wrote an article in the African Spark accusing

General Murtala Mohammed, the head of state, of official corruption. The New York Times reported that before his death, the General declared his assets to the attorney general and fully cleared himself. Ohonbamu, the Times stated, having been taken to court on charges of false accusations against a public official, pleaded guilty and asked for pardon (25, p. L2).

In 1975, David Ejoor, Nigerian Army Chief of Staff, accused journalists of being politically and economically corrupt. And from Elias' argument, it is possible that past journalistic practices lingered on during the military's tenure. If civilian-era journalists were overtly involved in partisan politics and a journalism of sycophancy (3, p. 72; 45

11, p. 348; 15, p. 188; 17, p. 151; 37; 5, p, 12), Ejoor's accusation that Nigerian journalists were corrupt might be tenable. Although some press professionals agreed that a handful of their counterparts were corrupt, they blamed the vice on publicity-seeking government officials (3, p. 26).

Some media analysts argue that when mass media practioners engage in political and economic deceit in the practice of their profession, it might be inferred that influencing such writers with any form of bribery is possible (17, p.

165; 45, p. 2). Ray Ekpu, editorial board chairman of the

Conrod Group of Newspapers, who was actively involved in military-era journalism, accused his fellow writers of political and economic corruption (38, p. 3; 39, p. 3).

Solana Olumhense, another practicing journalist, noted that Nigerian media practitioners ". . . are shamelessly turning gong-beaters and choristers for criminal 'political bands.' They cannot be more than a fresh species of thugs . . . Journalism is as weak as it is in Nigeria today because of the greed and ambition of many journalists--in one word corruption" (40, p. 9).

If one of the roles of the press is to oppose the government, scrutinize its activities, and keep its authority within appropriate bounds (18, p. 12), journalists must first set and maintain the required high standards of professionalism for themselves, live above bribery, corruption, 46 and partisan politics before the public can take them and their writings seriously (29, p. 1; 23, p. 2).

Arrests and Detentions

The military and police response to the repeated accusations of corruption against government officials was a series of arrests of journalists. The police were fully armed with emergency powers, but they seem to have over- reacted in interpreting the law.

Alhaji Babatunde Jose, chairman of the Daily Times group of newspapers said, "Almost every editor of any important newspaper including those owned by the government has seen the inside of a police cell or army orderly room (46, p. 68).

Wilcox catalogued some of these arrests and detentions thus:

. . L. K. Jakande of the Nigerian Tribune . . . detained by the military for 16 daysin1969 for writing editorials advocating a return to civilian rule. . . . Ayo Adedun, editor of the government- owned Daily Sketch, was detained by military authorities. . . . Chief Ola, news editor of the Daily Times (Lagos), was detained for a month after writing an article on the selection of a new principal for Ibadan Polytechnic. Detentions in 1974 include Minere Amakiri . . . of the Nigerian Observer, who wrote a story about the pay demands of teachers in the Rivers State. Royin Johnson, acting editor of the independent Nigerian Daily News, was detained by police for five hours after the newspaper criticized increase in bus fares (46, p. 68-69).

In 1969, "Olajide Adeleye, editor of the government- owned Sunday Sketch, was arrested . . . by Ibadan police.. . .

He was released after several hours of questioning" (42, p. 7). 47

Ekwelie recorded that "between 1973 and 1975, according to one count, there were 50 cases of government harassment of journalists . . ." (14, p. 228).

These arrests, however, were not calculated to keep journalists in jail indefinitely. James Scotten, Dean of the Institute of Mass Communications, Lagos University,

Nigeria, supports the view that police-military arrests were usually for short periods of time and some primarily for harassment (44, p. 69). For instance, the Times (London) reported that "Ayo Adedun, editor of the Daily Sketch . . . returned to his home . . . after six days in police detention in Lagos . . ." (43, p. 6F). Supporting the above contention, Ekwelie noted that journalists who were "arrested on shaky grounds . . . spent relatively short times in police custody . . ." (14, p. 228). The overzealousness and arrogance of some lower-rank police-military personnel also contributed to these arrests (3, p. 59). Barton, confirming this notion, said that some petty military officers, who saw in the newspaperman the embodiment of the flux in the nation, wanted to assert their authority over them (4, p. 51).

It is remarkable also that university student demon- strations against unlawful police arrests of journalists, coupled with the protests and petitions of press unions throughout the military period (3, pp. 58, 73; 25, p. 6), nullified military-police efforts at transforming these detentions into permanent prison sentences. 48

But on the other hand, when taking into account the ethnic, religious, and tribal-political polarization which characterize Nigeria, one might be tempted to justify these arrests as an attempt to curtail the proliferation of newspaper articles that tended to aggravate these vices. For instance, a Nigerian journalist after the civil war, wrote an inciting and provocative newspaper article on "Killing

Biafra." Shortly before the appearance of this piece, the military government had abolished the name "Biafra" as part of the name given the "Bight of Benin and Biafra." This is because the military wanted to expunge any resemblance of this name given the secessionists' republic from any part of the country (3, p. 77). In another instance, a columnist wrote a religious editorial calling the Bible inconsequential.

The federal government, having received numerous protests on account of this article, appealed to media professionals to take into account the religious diversity of the country before writing on such sensitive topics (3, p. 104).

In a letter-to-the-editor page, a writer reacting to the two-year ban imposed on Newbreed magazine by the central government in 1978, complained that,

the magazine published a nasty article which claimed that the educational backwardness of the northerners was due to their religion. This was an indirect attack on Islam. We still remember the chain of reaction which resulted from this article. There are other destructive and provocative articles which the magazine has been publishing (3, p. 126). 49

Such examples show that these might partly be the reasons for

the arrests and detention of journalists--not for reasons of

suppressing press freedom, but to prevent the constant

appearance of writings that might incite some sections of the

country against others.

However, if police-military arrests and detentions were

aimed at intimidating journalists into subjugation, the

attempts could be regarded as a failure because even more

inflammatory articles appeared after such incidents.

Press Censorship and the Military

One controversial issue in the relationship between the

Nigerian press and the soldiers is the dilemma of censorship.

Many media scholars and practicing professionals con-

tend that because of the nature of a military regime, and

citing instances where journalists were roughly treated, non-

elected governments usually censor the press. It would be

an exaggeration to argue that there was a total absence of

press censorship in Nigeria during the army's administration.

Given the different connotations and meanings of this variable,

it might be agreed that there was some form of press censor-

ship during the periods covered by this thesis.

Constant police and military arrests and detention of

journalists were forms of press censorship because the military tried to prevent the publications of news items

that were not agreeable to their taste. Another form of 50 censorship tactic adopted by the Nigerian military authorities, as described by Bruce Oades was that since .thesoldiers could not control movements of journalists by direct censorship, the journalist "was accorded first class hospitality from the Nigerian officers, to the point where it was almost embarrassing" ( 3 3 , p. 17) .

One other form of censorship used by the Nigerian military regime is what Wilcox described as "postpublication censorship," in which the government can ". . . ban, suspend, seize, or confiscate any newspaper or magazine when officials feel the content threatens public order and safety" (46, p.

54). For example, in 1978, two editors of the Newbreed magazine were arrested, their offices searched and 50,000 copies of already printed editions of the biweekly were seized by police. This is because "they published a two- part interview with Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, the Ibo leader of the 1967 Biafran secession" (27, p. 33) . The military government banned this magazine for "2 years from

June 14, 1978--signed by the head of state Lt. Gen. Olusegun

Obasanjo under decree 17 of 1967--Newspaper (Prohibition of

Circulation) Decree . . ." (3, p. 126).

Ainslie postulated that with the state of emergency that became effective in the country on May 27, 1967, there was censorship and the ban of news that did not receive authorized approval (1, p. 24). While Bruce Oades confirmed that during the first year of the civil war, the Nigerian military 51 embarked on a policy of "silly censorship" (33, p. 17),

Hachten said that the press lost its political support and became muffled (17, p. 164).

Cole described the Nigerian journalists as professionals whose pens flow expertly in praticing adversary journalism, but are not always so fervent in praise or critical con- structiveness (7, p. 92). Jakande, however, said that the press had to do its duty of criticizing the military in measured tones when occasion demands it (19, p. 90). The

Nigerian press is viewed by Anamaleze as a group suffering from a dearth of competent professionals that affects its editorial comments. He stated that, as a result, there is usually no restraint in the use of language that at best can be described as crude (4, p. 9).

The critical question emanating from these accusations against the Nigerian press is to find out whether the military was justified in trying to prevent a situation whereby the uncontrolled nature of the press could be allowed to continue and to fragment the loosely-held unity of the country; or whether the journalists' freedom was curtailed in order that peace and unity should continue. What the army insisted upon, according to many top military officials, was objective, reasonable, and well-meaning criticism (3, pp. 64, 104; 10, p. 1; 16, p. 129).

It might be argued that the various situations in the country during the military rule could call for some form of 52 press censorship. For example, the unity of Nigeria was seriously threatened by civil strife; religious schism and tribal intolerance were rife among the strongly polarized society. And according to Singleton (quoting an unnamed author), "War without censorhsip is an illusion because control of public opinion is as important to modern warfare as the control of men" (36, p. 727). T. 0. Elias, former chief justice of Nigeria, supports this when he stated that circumstances such as war or other grave national emergency may warrant the imposition of a form of press censorship

(16, p. 129). Elias also said that " . . . the country has . . . seen journalists perform their functions under a system of self-censorship" (30, p. 5).

In a Nigerian Tribune article, December 24, 1975, Jakande pointed out that the press is not entitled under any circumstances to publish false news deliberately. "But it has a duty in war time to withhold the publication of facts which might have a damaging effect on the war effort. . . . During the Biafran civil war, for instance, there was no press censorship in Nigeria. But the press was sufficiently patriotic to do nothing which harmed the Federal cause."

Some Nigerian war correspondents, however, also revealed that there was minimal censorship of journalists at the war fronts, and it was restricted mainly to the correction of facts related to war logistics and troop movements (2; 13; 32;

35). And Earnest Meyer said that even during the Nigerian 53

military regime, the press was as free as at any other time

(21, p. 7). Ainslie, Barton, and Hachten also noted that

the independence of the Nigerian press, although curtailed

during the military government days, was not greatly ham-

pered (1, p. 247; 4, p. 7; 17, p. 164). Some interviewed

Nigerian journalists stated that there were no military

censorship boards, or soldier-editors attached to newspaper

editorial boards (2; 20; 32; 35).

Lt. Col. Fred Chijiuka, army public relations officer,

said the army dispatched news of the war to the media but

did not force journalists to use any of the items. Referring

to the articles that were published by journalists during the

war, Chijiuka argued that if there was any typical military-

style censorship, no anti-military articles and cartoons

could have been published (6).

However, various definitions of official bureaucracy

involved when dealing with the press, for example, delay or

refusal to grant war front permits, postponement or cancella-

tion of interviews with military officials, and refusal to

issue visas to oversea correspondents, might be said to con-

stitute certain aspects of censorship during the military

regime in Nigeria (32; 35; 46, p. 95).

Indigenous journalists, due to a series of harassments

they encountered with police and military officials after publication, imposed censorship on themselves to avoid arrest and detention (11, p. 348; 19, p. 86; 38; 46, p. 54). 54

In 1978, attempts were made at appointing a three-man censorship baord over the Nigerian Observer, and radio and television stations in Bendel State. At that same time, similar conditions were occurring in other parts of the country (3, p. 127). But Dr. G. B. Leton, Federal Commissioner for Information asserted that "The federal government had not introduced censorship and did not intend to do so . . no state government has done that nor plans to censor newspapers . . . " (3, p. 128). CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Ainslie, Rosalynde, The Press in Africa, New York, Walker and Company, 1967.

2. Ajayi, Peter (General Manager, Sketch Publishing Company, Ibadan, Nigeria), Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July , 1983.

3. Anamaleze, John, Jr., The Nigerian Press: The People's Conscience, New York, Vantage Press, 1978.

4. Barton, Frank, The Press of Africa, New York, Africana Publishing Corporation, 1979.

5. Burkhart, Ford, "Nigeria: Tribalism Fosters Free-Press Values in US-Style System," The Quill (March, 1983), p. 5.

7. Cole, Dele, "The Press in a Military Regime," Media and Mass Communications in Nigeria, edited by Ayo Duyile, Ibadan, The Sketch Publishing Company Ltd., 1979.

8. Daily Times, August 31, 1974.

9. , October 2, 1974.

10. , May 13, 1975.

11. De St. Jorre, John, The Brothers' War, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972.

12. Duyile, Dayo, Media and Mass Communication in Nigeria, Ibadan, Sketch Publishing Co. Ltd., 1979.

13. Ekpu, Raymond (Chairman, Editorial Board, Concord Group of Newspapers, Lagos, Nigeria), Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983.

55 56

14. Ekwelie, Sylvanus A., "The Nigerian Press Under Mili- tary Rule," Gazette: International Journal for Mass Communication Studies, 25, No. 4 (1979), 219-32.

15. Eleazu, Uma 0., Federalism and Nation-Building, Devon, Arthur H. Stockwell Ltd., 1977.

16. Elias, T. 0., "Legal Requirements for Publishing a News- paper," Nigerian Press Law, edited by T. 0. Elias, Lagos, Nigeria, Evans Brothers Ltd., 1969.

17. Hachten, William A., Muffled Drums, Ames, Iowa State University Press, 1971.

18. , "The Press as Reporter and Critic of Government," Journalism Quarterly, 40 (1963), 12-18.

19. Jakande, Lateef, "Role of the Press in a Military Regime," Media and Mass Communications in Nigeria, edited by Ayo Duyile, Ibadan, Nigeria, Sketch Publishing Co. Ltd., 1979.

20. , (Governor of Lagos State, Nigeria), Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983.

21. Meyer, Ernest, "Another Year of Lost Battles," IPI Report, 22 (January, 1973), 2.

22. New Nigerian, September 25, 1974.

23. , October 2, 1974.

24. , May 24, 1975.

25. New York Times, April 11, 1976.

26. "Nigeria," Africa Report, 20 (July-August, 1975), 26.

27. "Nigeria," Africa Report, 22 (July-August, 1977), 33.

28. "Nigeria's Military Rule to Continue," Africa Report, 15 (November, 1974), 22.

29. Nigerian Chronicle, April 10, 1975.

30. Nigerian Observer, November 21, 1972.

31. Nigerian Tribune, August 13, 1975. 57

32. Omozuanfo, Ramonu (Chief Photographer, Nigerian Observer, Benin City, Nigeria), Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983.

33. Oudes, Bruce, "The Other Nigerian War," Africa Report, 15 (February, 1970), 15-17.

34. Pye, Lucien W., "Communication, Institution Building, and the Reach of Authority," Communication and Change in the Developing Countries, edited by Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm, Honolulu, East- West Center Press, 1967, pp. 35-55.

35. Rupee, Festus (Chief Sub-editor, Nigerian Observer, Benin City, Nigeria), Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983.

36. Singleton, Michael, "Attitude of Military Censors and Other Officers on Mass Media Issues," Journalism Quarterly, 54 (Winter, 1977), 727-32.

37. Small, William, Political Power and the Press, New York, N. W. Norton & Company, 1972.

38. Solarin, Tai (Newspaper columnist, proprietor and founder of Mayflower College, Ikenne, Nigeria), Letter sent in reply to mailed questionnaire dated June 1983.

39. Sunday Concord, July 10, 1983.

40. , July 17, 1983.

41. The Guardian, July 4, 1983.

42. The Times (London), September 29, 1969.

43. , June 21, 1971.

44. Ugboajah, Frank Okwu, "Nigerian Mass Communication Trends in the African Context," Gazette: Inter- national Journal for Mass Communication Studies, 22 (November, 1976), 156-68.

45. "What Did Amakiri Do?" IPI Report, 22 (September- October, 1973), 2.

46. Wilcox, Dennis L., Mass Media in Black Africa, New York, Praeger Publications, 1975. CHAPTER V

GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT WITH THE NATIONAL AND FOREIGN PRESS

The issue of the suppression of press preedom during the

military government is controversial because of certain

actions by soldiers. However, the government's takeover of

the prominent national newspapers suggests that the military

might have been involved in some forms of press repression.

This suggestion is partly substantiated by the relationship

that existed between the government and foreign journalists.

The press freedom issue apart, some of the military's actions

can be seen as having helped to improve the practices of

journalism in Nigeria.

Press Freedom

Certain actions by the military government tend to indicate that there was no press freedom in Nigeria between 1966

and 1979.

Critics might contend that in any country where there is press censorship, the freedom of journalists to print without punishment might be endangered. However, of the various forms of censorship listed by Ladenson and Wilcox, already cited, only a few were used by the military administration. One of these is exemplified by the federal government's takeover of

58 59

the Daily Times, Sunday Times, and other monthly periodicals.

The federal government also took control of the New Nigerian,

and the Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo. Also, arrest and dention,

including threats and intimidation against media profess-

ionals are some of the ways in which press activities were

threatened by the military government.

The government as well made use of the examples cited

by Wilcox as forms of postpublication censorship against the

press. These include banning of publications and post-

publication punishment of journalists.

It has already been shown that the federal government,

in 1978, banned the Newbreed magazine for two years, and

seized 50,000 copies containing the second part of the

interview with the rebel leader, Odumegwu Ojukwu.

Ekpu, in his column, "Journalism is in Chains," revealed

that the government of Olusegun Obasano (1975-79), having

failed to force Tunji Oseni, Sunday Times editor, to stop

the publication of an embarrasing article, "copies of the

paper had to be stopped at different points in the country"

(32, p. 3) .

In 1978 and 1979, Ekpu, Nigerian Chronicle editor, was

cautioned by the military governor of the Cross River State

and his officials after his newspaper defiantly continued

publication of anti-government articles (68, p. 3).

However, in defining an authoritarian regime, the Inter- national Press Institute described it as a society characterized 60

by a permanent censorship or a constant and general control

of the press; a free press, it said, is one in which private

owners and independent journalists are free to supply news

and opinions to the general public under libel and decency

statutes, not subject to arbitrary discriminatory interpre-

tations by rulers (53, p. 17).

Viewed against the definitions of these two variables--

authoritarian and non-authoritarian regimes--the military

government in Nigeria, it might be suggested, allowed journal-

ists a large measure of unexpected press freedom. Some

African media scholars observe that the Nigerian military

regime did not assume that the whole political order would

be dismantled; rather, the soldiers believed in compromise

and keeping various institutions intact (6, p. 104; 54,

p. 689; 55, p. 7).

In view of this consensus, many media critics also sug-

gest that Nigeria, more than any other country under military

government, succeeded in maintaining, up to a reasonable

extent, elements of press freedom (14, p. 232; 22, p. 33; 46,

p. 1; 76, p. 157). Not only was any individual free to own

some media facilities, but he also had the right to criticize

government policies.

It, nevertheless, would be an understatement to hold the view that there was no repression of press freedom in Nigeria by the military. As has been discussed, some top government officials, and especially those in the lower cadre of police 61

and military circles, capitalized on their being in power to

harass press professionals (44, p. 794; 61, p. 6; 3, p. 77;

67; p. 3).

But when judged against the type of publications that

dominated newspapers for a considerable portion of the army

rule, it would be surprising how much freedom Nigerian

journalists enjoyed. Although the central government's ban

on Newbreed and other similar incidents seem to support the

thesis that press freedom was nonexistent during the military

administration, the army authorities and other officials of

the government at various times supported a free press

which must be responsible enough not to incite the weak

religious, tribal, and political hatred of one section of

the nation against the other (3, pp. 64, 70; 4, p. 52;

9, p. 1; 56, p. 36). But at times, when journalists pub-

lished articles inimical to the fragile unity of Nigeria,

the military reacted. This, perhaps, was to assure the

populace that they were not in support of whatever opinions

journalists paraded on pages of newspapers. Not to have

reacted to certain inciting newspaper articles by journalists

would have meant acquiescence to such views.

In spite of the confrontations and deteriorating relation-

ship between the military and press, journalists were fully

backed by the country's judiciary, which was free of government control. Courts awarded damages in favor of the press against government officials (1; 3, pp. 59, 60). In 1973, 62

Mineri Amakiri, chief correspondent of the Nigerian Observer in the Rivers State, was whipped and detained by soldiers because of his critical article against the state government policy towards teachers. He sued the governor's agent and the court awarded damages against the state government.

Barton observed that this is the only case on record of a journalist in Africa successfully suing an official of a military junta (4, p. 55) .

When Joseph Tarka, in 1974, sued the Daily Sketch for libel, the court dismissed his case. Justice Candido Johnson ruled that newspapers were free to talk fearlessly and without favor in matters of public interest. He advised journalists to always follow their motto of publish and be damned (3, p. 58).

It was in view of the successes of these judicial decisions that Alhaji Babatunde Jose, chairman of the Daily

Times group of companies said that the Nigerian military was benevolent government that allowed the press to continue its "noble tradition of fearlessness" (9, p. 3).

However, a media analyst observed that Nigerian journalists might have misused the privileges given them by the military, thereby incurring the government's anger (20, p. 7).

Government Acquisition of Media

A major controversy generated during the military reign was the takeover of mass media institutions in the country. 63

Although this behavior portrays the soldier-rulers as dic- tatorial, by carefully analyzing the whole effects and benefits for both press and government, it is reasonable to argue that the acquisition was more advantageous to the

Nigerian press.

In August 1975, the Murtala regime took over a 60 percent share of the Daily Times group of companies, publishers of the Daily Times, Sunday Times, and a series of other publications. The government also acquired the New Nigerian newspaper. Before this time, only the Daily, and Sunday

Times were independent papers; the New Nigerian was jointly owned by the governments of the six northern states (44, p.

B 794). After the civil war, most state governments had established their own newspaper or taken over the existing ones (3, p. 4). Almost all the radio and television networks in the country were at the time of the federal takeover government owned and controlled (58, p. 151).

Major General I.B.M. Haruna, Federal Commissioner for

Information, said the media takeover was to prevent proliferation of networks at the expense of the taxpayer and to defray some of the media's expenses (58, p. 150). Another rationale for government participation in the media, argued

Cole, is if the government did not embark on this action, some individuals with unknown and questionable motives would control these powerful media (8, p. 100), Brigadier Shehu

Yar'Adua, Nigerian Army Chief of Staff, echoing a similar 64 fear, said the government had acquired some of the newspapers because they represented regional, rather than national interests (42, p. 27).

Financially, most Nigerian newspaper establishments could not have survived without any form of government assistance; they were poorly produced, constantly in financial difficulty, and had no sound economic resources

(3, p. 3; 65, p. 28). Hachten stated that with the with- drawal of Europeans from participating in African media, government was the most capable institution to run the media

(17, p. 28).

In the face of acute economic difficulties, mass illiteracy, constant political instability, and the low level of development in Africa, media experts advise it is dangerous for such societies to dabble in the complexities of modern media (21, p. 3; 23, p. 38; 64, p. 10; 66, p. 80).

The major reason for this takeover, some press analysts argued, was to make sure the cultural values and education of the people were at the top of the agenda of media professionals (18, p. 25; 66, p. 79). Before this takeover, however, there were persistent calls by some newspapers and media organizations for financial support by state and federal governments (3, p. 44; 58, p. 153).

After the acquisition, the federal government allocated large sums of money for the construction and expansion of 65

media facilities in all states of the federation (3, p. 44;

58, p. 158).

Although media critics argued this takeover spells doom

for press freedom, various studies on this issue have

strongly disproved this contention as regards Nigeria's

case.

In a 1979 Northwestern State University of Louisiana

master's thesis, Akinrinade, analyzed the impact of govern-

ment control on its own newspapers, as against independent

dailies. He concluded that although government newspapers

carry more favorable news items on government activities

than independent dailies, the federal government did not

dictate policy directives for the newspapers it controlled

(2, p. 75-82).

In a 1980 Indiana University master's thesis analyzing

the ownership and development content in government and

private newspapers, Utomi argued that "It would seem logical

then to infer that government control would lead to a

situation where the newsroom mirrored governmental objectives,

and, consequently, increased the developmental content of

the paper. But when all the available data is analyzed,

this is not shown to be the case" (76, p. 36).

A Lagos University Communications Department study of the impact of shared government ownership on papers, noted that state-owned newspapers are more responsible and as critical as some privately owned newspapers (75, p. 38). 66

Interviews with editors of some government-owned news-

papers also indicate that their editorial contents were not

subject to the whims and caprices of the military govern-

ment (1; 2 p. 58; 76, p. 31).

Mamman Daura, editor of the New Nigerian during the

military government, stated that his paper was not subject

to sustained government interference; he contended his

workers criticized government actions more than did most

privately-owned newspapers (10, p. 43). Pat Oputa, a lawyer,

in his support for the government takeover of media,

observed that this action will ensure effective standardi-

zation in the journalism profession in Nigeria, provide job

opportunities and make for effective cooperation between

the rulers and the press (69, p. 1).

Foreign Press Dilemma

An emotional aspect in the military's relationship with

the media was its confrontation with foreign news corre-

spondents.

Nigeria, during the First Republic (1960-66), and in

the early years of the military rule, had almost all the

Western media representatives in the country. But when the

civil war was intensified, only Agence France-Presse was

left (22, p. 38). Representatives of other news agencies were either expelled or refused entry permission. 67

During the Nigeria-Biafran War, some foreign journalists believed the coverage was devoted virtually to irrelevancies (60,p. 5; 17, p. 94; 24, p. 39), perhaps due to inadequate knowledge of Nigerian socio-political history.

For example, the Nigerian civil war was regarded as tribal confrontations by some reputable international newspapers and magazines. The Wall Street Journal reported ". .

Nigeria plunged briefly into a near-civil war and uncounted thousands of persons were slaughtered as tribe fought tribe" (77,-p. 11),. Again, this same newspaper stated that

"The confrontation now shaping up in Nigeria stems from fierce tribal fighting between the Ibos and tribes in the huge northern region" (78, p. 1).

The U.S. News and World Report reported that "Only a trip through Nigeria can make clear the fearful toll tribal warfare is taking in a country that just a few years ago, was seen as the one nation in black Africa with the best chance of making independence a success . . . " (6, p. 56).

On the civil war, Newsweek reported that "more and more, the war looked like a tribal showdown between. the Moslem

Hausas of the north and the Ibo stronghold of Biafra . ."

(49, p. 35). The New York Times stated that the breakaway of Biafra from Nigeria "culminated in a violent struggle between northerns, predominantly Moslems of the Hausa tribe, and Easterners, Ibo tribesmen of Christian and animist religions" (25, p. 1). 68

However, in 1968, a Nigerian Roman Catholic Church bishops' delegation went to Rome to explain the civil war situation to the Pope for fear "that the war may be mis- interpreted both within Nigeria and overseas as a religious conflict" (70, p. 4) .

In a New York Times column, "The Danger Facing Africa,"

Sulzberger noted that "the Nigerian civil war didn't involve the north's powerful Muslim Hausa tribes, but was aimed at squashing an insurrection in Biafra" (30, p. 13:2).

In a New York Times letter-to-the-editor column, Abdul-

Aziz Garuba, Vice Counsul, Information Consulate General of

Nigeria, clarified the contradictions regarding the war thus:

. . . I wish to make it clear that the crisis in Nigeria is political and economic rather than religious or tribal. Moreover, there is not a quarrel between the Hausas and the east. It is a struggle for the survival of a nation--between the overambitious who want to split Nigeria and those who want to see Nigeria remain a sovereign, independent, strong nation (37, p. 44).

Not only did these renowned newspapers and magazines mis- represent facts about the Nigerian civil war, there were obvious contradictions of news items they reported. Newsweek in 1967 noted that "some 9.5 million Yorubas of the Western and Midwestern regions seemed to be sitting on the fence, and there were reports that the Midwest had refused to allow any of its troops to take part in the fighting" (49, p. 35).

In its next edition, however, this magazine apparently con- tradicted what it reported. 69

Meanwhile, the Third Battalion from Ibadan in the Western Region, plus a renaissance squadron of armoured ferrets and saladin--about 1,000 men--is on its way to reinforce the troops already in Nsukka. With these new men--many of them Yorubas who speak fluent Hausa from their years in the mainly northern army--the federal troops may soon begin their drive Southwards towards Enugu (51, p. 43).

When the rebel troops invaded the Midwest in 1967, Newsweek reported that the ". . . Midwest Region proclaimed its independence and announced that it was joining forces with the secessionist Republic of Biafra" (47, p. 41). The following week, this same magazine carried contradictory news on the invasion different from what it had published, saying that

. . . a brigade of Biafran troops led by Brig. Victor Banjo broke through federal blockade and invaded the Midwestern Region. . . . In a stirring radio broadcast, Banjo announced that he planned to set up a Midwestern regime independent of both Biafra and the federal government . . . (50, p. 41).

Of the Benin invasion, Time magazine reported that ". . . Two weeks ago, after Ojukwu's Midwestern administrator proclaimed the 'autonomous independent and sovereign republic of Benin' federal troops poured across the border in force.. ." (46, p. 42). This magazine also reported that this Mid- western invasion by the Biafran rebels was made possible by

"Biafran sympathisers in Benin . . . already staging a military coup against the Midwestern governor . . . (45, p. 29).

However, the Times (London) said that the Benin invasion was a

Planned 'betrayal' led by Midwestern officers of the Ibo tribe . . . It may be significant that the man who led the force which 'liberated' them [Midwest] is a Yoruba 70

and that some of the 1,000 troops whose mutiny allowed the column such an easy passage, were themselves Ibos (71, p. 19).

At the initial stage of the war, not only did most foreign

journalists undermine the federal government's might at

crushing Ojukwu's rebellion, but they wrote articles which

supported the rebels. An example of this was this London

Times report by a columnist who stated that

The federal government may prefer to see the counter- attack as Colonel Ojukwu's last throw, but their own decision to attack Biafra was always a gamble. . . . The only way then to preserve the country's integrity would be to regard the events of the past two months as a personal confrontation between the two military commanders, General Gowon and Colonel Ojukwu, and jettison the former (70, p. 6).

The Biafran war propaganda concentrated efforts at mak-

ing it known that the civil war was genocide against the Ibo

tribe. In 1967 Newsweek echoes the fear that

Already the toll is staggering. No one knows exactly how many peasants and villagers have been killed in the crossfire of the war. . . . In the Midwest capital of Benin alone, 1,000 Ibos are estimated to have lost their lives at the hands of the revenge-seeking populace and federal troops. And 500 more . . . have been massacred in the town of Warri (48, p. 68).

The Wall Street Journal, reporting on the accusation of

genocide said

genocidal tendencies were charged to the federal forces by some observers some months ago. . . . A Toronto newspaper had carried a report that 500 people in the Ibo village of Urua Inyang were wiped out on Oct. 4. The team [of observers] visited the Urua Inyang and found the charge to be false (79, p. 1).

Moreover,the New York Times in 1968 stated that "An international observer team reported that it had seen 'no evidence of any intent' by Nigerian troops to wipe out Ibo people in 71

the civil war with Biafra . . .'the use of the term genocide

is in no way justified,' three members of the team said" (38,

p. 12). Also in 1969, the New York Times again reported that

a team of international military observers ". . . was con-

vinced that 'the federal military government has no inten-

tion to destroy--wholly or in part--the Ibo people.' . . .

It 'makes continued allegations of genocide a gross distor-

tion of the facts'" (31, p. 5).

An Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) observer team,

comprising military representatives from Canada, Poland,

Sweden, and the United Kingdom, in 1968 reported that " . .

apart from unavoidable losses of lives and destruction of

property in the prosecution of the war, Federal troops have

not engaged in any act of genocide against the Ibo tribe"

(59, p. 6).

Some foreign war correspondents, years after the uphea-

vals in Nigeria, accept the fact that news items of the war

were falsified (60, p. 16; 11, p. 354). For example,

Frederick Forsyth, a veteran war correspondent, who worked

extensively with the secessionists during the war, observed

that the British Broadcasting Corporation (B.B.C.), throughout

the entire war period, misrepresented situations they

reported to their audiences (16, p. 274).

John De St. Jorre, who was involved in reporting news

from Nigeria and the rebel's strongholds during the civil war, complained that "Foreign correspondents covering the 72 war were shallow, emotional and showed such bias that reflects little credit on a profession whose primary task is to establish facts and analyze them with simple objectivity"

(11, p. 354).

Some media scholars argue that ethnicity does affect news values. The Western practices of "crisis journalism,"

"journalism of exception," and "wire service nationalism," all of which stress the disasters, the problems and upheavals, still bother press critics (17, p. 88; 19, p. 94; 22, p. 203;

62, p. 174; 63, p. 5).

The reaction of the military regime to these news items by foreign newspapers and magazines were the expulsion of correspondents from the country, the banning of some magazines, and deliberate official bureaucracy that restricted foreign journalists' movement.

Transition magazine in 1968 was banned because, according to the distributors, "It would be against the public interest and peace to sell this magazine because it contained shocking and most slanderous photographs of victims of the

13-month old conflict" (27, p. 35).

In 1969 Peter Stewart, the B.B.C. West African correspondent was expelled because "both Nigerian and Biafran officials have been . . . accusing the B.B.C. of favouring the other side" (72, p. 8).

In this same year, the federal commissioner for information, chief Anthony Enahoro, said the federal government 73 had suspended some of the facilities of the B.B.C. in Nigeria because of what he called "biased war coverage. . . . When the

Commonwealth Prime Ministers met in London . . . the B.B.C. television devoted 135 minutes to what he termed Biafran case and only six and a half minutes to the federal Nigerian side . . .," (29, p. 17). The restriction included the right of the B.B.C. correspondent in Nigeria to make use of the local radio station, to attend official news conferences, and to travel on official trips in the country.

After the surrender of the secessionists in Nigeria, four

London based journalists who defiantly visited the war area were expelled from the country (34, p. 4). Also in 1970, two C.B.S.-TV newsmen were arrested in Lagos "for three and one-half hours" (36, p. 3), for an undisclosed offense.

Andrew Jaffe, a correspondent of Newsweek "was expelled from Nigeria. . . . Jaffe was barred from entering Nigeria apparently because of a Newsweek article on the situation in

Biafra after the civil war" (37, p. 6 H).

In 1977, the New York Times correspondent for West

Africa "was arrested and jailed in Lagos, Nigeria, Friday, and then expelled from the country yesterday . . . " (39, p. 3).

The British government in 1970 charged a London newspaper editor, a noted young journalist-politician, and Col.

Douglas Jeffreys, a British representative on an international observer team in Nigeria, for violating the official Secrets

Act. 74

The implied accusation was that he had leaked the Scott document. . . . The report gave what were said to be the precise dispositions of the federal forces on the date it was written. . . . And the Sunday Telegraph article said another copy of the report had been transmitted to the rebel leader . . .(38, p. 2).

It was on account of this incident that in 1970 the Nigerian

military government expelled Col. Robert Scott, defense

adviser to the British High Commission, from the country.

Other forms of censorship imposed on foreign corre-

spondents in Nigeria were restricting them from sending any

of their news items out of the country, restriction to a

particular area of the country, and refusal to issue travel

documents to overseas journalists seeking to enter Nigeria.

However, in 1967, the military regime lifted "censorship on

dispatches sent by foreign newsmen in Lagos" (26, p. 2).

The New York Times of January 14, 1970, reported that

the military government disallowed journalists from visiting

the war zones for sometime (32, p. 16). But three days

later, this same newspaper reported "The government which

has restricted the 200 foreign newsmen here to the Lagos

area, said that it would fly some of them to the former

Biafran territory over the weekend" (33, p. 1).

In 1973, after his official visit to Britain, General

Yakubu Gowon told journalists "the ban on some British jour-

nalists entering Nigeria had been lifted" (40, p. 4h).

Criticizing the role of the press in reporting the

Nigerian civil war, Lord Hunt, Prime Minister Harold Wilson's 75

representative, said ". . . The British press is full of accounts of homeless and hungry Ibos. . . . What they have not reported is the great return home by hundreds of thousands of people who have been displaced . . . without let or hindrance." He described some television reports on the

situation as unbalanced (35, p. 12).

It was in consequence of the conflicting news items and misrepresentation of facts that the Gowon regime issued a decree prohibiting foreign reporters from writing and sending news abroad that was not in the best interests of the nation's unity (17, p. 88). It was under this decree that many foreign news reporters fell victims; they were either expelled from the country or were not given entry permission.

Ironically, while foreign press people complained bitterly against the military government, some Nigerian journalists were not pleased with the preferential treatment given their oversea counterparts. Dayo Duyile, a radio journalist, and editor of the Daily Sketch, asserted that the British Reuters was guilty of yellow journalism (12, p. 118). Peter Ajayi and Remonu Omozuanfo, domestic journalists involved in reporting war news, said that even after foreign reporters were given special treatment, they went home to publish things different from what they actually experienced (1; 57).

After the civil war, the army extended its mag- nanimity to foreign news writers. The temporary censorship 76

imposed on them in 1970 was lifted in 1973. The head of state, General Gowon, told the gathering of newsmen and women in London that the military was not against the press, but

insisted on truth, objectivity, and fairness as basic ingredients when writing about developing African nations

(15, p. 10) .

The Military Regime's Achievements for the Nigerian Press

Not many media writers of Nigeria's military history seem to believe the soldiers had positive effects on the indigenous press. One could argue that the military influ- enced the press in a positive manner much more than professional journalism unions or past governments of the country.

Although individual journalists might not have changed some inherent attitudes carried over from the past, the over- all professional image, standard of the trade, and financial capabilities of the press were highly enhanced by the military administration.

Some media analysts noted that the condition of the Nigerian press was hampered by poor financial and technical resources--a situation which the government, with its sound economic status, could easily remedy (3, p. 3; 18 p. 28; 65, p. 28). The federal government in 1975 allocated $183 million for the expansion of broadcasting; and in the development plan period for 1975-80, states were given autonomy 77

in expanding radio and television facilities with federal

assistance (58, pp. 158-9). The management of the Daily

Star newspaper asked for $4 million from the Anambra and

Imo state governments to defray costs of production (3,

p. 112).

The Nigerian press lacked one unified and well-enforced

professional code of ethics. In an effort to infuse some smooth working programs in the nation's broadcasting, the military regime in 1977 decentralized the Nigerian Broad- casting Corporation (NBC). This corporation, hitherto, was in charge of radio and television broadcasting in the country. From the above date the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) became solely responsible for radio;

Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) took control of television activities (75, p. 32).

In 1976, the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) was established.

This agency embarked on recruiting university-trained media professionals whose academic background placed them in a position to write, interpret, and discuss news in relation to political, economic, and social events.

Lacking a strong central body to discipline erring journalists, the military in 1978 founded the Nigerian Press Council. This council's duties and responsibilities include preparing a code of conduct for media professionals in

Nigeria, registration of all journalists, and disciplinary powers (12, p. 160). 78

Until recently, the three professional journalism

groups in the country had different codes of conduct for journalists. But six months before the establishment of

the military-backed press council, these organizations

finally agreed to a unified code.

Tunji Oseni, editor of the Sunday Times, observed in an editorial that "It appears the present awakening of standards in the country instigated by the military provided the psychological atmosphere for discussing codes of conduct by professional bodies" (75, p. 59). CHAPTER BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Ajayi, Peter (General Manager, Sketch Publishing Company, Ibadan, Nigeria), Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983. 2. Akinrinade, Olusoki Olusegun, "Ownership Control V. Editorial Content: A Study of Nigerian Daily Newspapers," unpublished master's thesis, Depart- ment of Journalism, Northwestern State University, Natchitoches, Louisiana, 1979.

3. Anamaleze, John, Jr., The Nigerian Press: The People's Conscience, New York, Vantage Press, 1977.

4. Barton, Frank, The Press of Africa, New York, Africana Publishing Corporation, 1979.

5. Bienen, Henry and Martin Fitton, "Soldiers, Politicians and Civil Servants," Soldiers and Oil, edited by Keith Panter-Brick, London, Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1978.

6. "Bloody War in the Showplace of Black Africa," U.S. News and World Report (November 20, 1967), pp. 56-58. 7. Chijiuka, Fred B. (General Staff Officer Grade 1, Public Relations and Staff Officer Grade 1, Army Film Unit, Army Headquarters, Bonny Camp, Lagos, Nigeria), Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983. 8. Cole, Dele, "The Press in a Military Regime," Media and Mass Communications in Nigeria, edited by Ayo Duyile, Ibadan, The Sketch Publishing Company Ltd., 1979.

9. Daily Times, May 13, 1975. 10. Daura, Mamman, "Editing a Government Newspaper in Nigeria," Reporting Africa, edited by Olav Stokke, New York, Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971. 11. De St. Jorre, John, The Brothers' War, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972. 12. Duyile, Dayo, Media and Mass Communication in Nigeria, Ibadan, Sketch Publishing Co. Ltd., 1979.

79 80

13. Ekpu, Raymond (Chairman, Editorial Board, Concord Group of Newspapers, Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983.

14. Ekwelie, Sylvanus A., "The Nigerian Press Under Military Rule," Gazette: International Journal for Mass Communication Studies, 25, No. 4 (1979), 219-232.

15. Enahoro, Peter, "The Devitalization of the Press in Africa," African Journalist, 9 (September, 1973), 3-6.

16. Forsyth, Federick, The Making of an African Legend: The Biafran Story, London, Penguin Books, 1977.

17. Hachten, William A., Muffled Drums, Ames, Iowa State University Press, 1971.

18. _, "Newspapers in Africa: Change or Decay?" African Report, 15 (December, 1970), 15-17.

19. _, World Press Prism, Ames, Iowa University Press, 1981.

20. "Helping Press Freedom in Developing Countries," African Journalist, 5 (September, 1972), 5-8.

21. Hopkinson, Tom, "Africa: Battle for Survival," WAY FORUM, 57 (December, 1965), 3.

22. Legum, Colin, "The Mass Media--Institutions of the African Political Systems," Reporting Africa, edited by Olav Stokke, New York, Africana Pub- lishing Corporation, 1971.

23. Lent, John A., "Mass Media in the Developing World: Four Conundrums," Developing World and Mass Media, Prague, International Organization of Journalists, 1975.

24. Meisler, Stanley, "Covering the Third World (or trying to)," Columbia Journalism Review, 17 (November- December, 1978), 34-38.

25. New York Times, May 31, 1967.

26. , June 24, 1967.

27.- ,.August 11, 1968. 81

28. ,r October 14, 1968.

29. ,F January 26, 1969.

30. ,r June 12, 1969.

31. ,r October 9, 1969.

32. January 14, 1970. ,I 33. January 17, 1970.

34. ,I January 18, 1970.

35. , January 22, 1970.

36. ,I January 28, 1970.

37. , February 23, 1970.

38. March 18, 1970. , 39. June 18, 1973. , 40. February 24, 1974.

41.. March 14, 1977.

42. "Nigeria," Africa Report, 23 (March-April, 1978), 27.

43. "Nigeria," Africa Report, 24 (May-June, 1979), 28.

44. "Nigeria," African Contemporary Record, Vol. 1, edited by Colin Legum, London, Rex Collins, 1976.

45. "Nigeria," Time, 90 (August 18, 1967), 29-30.

46. "Nigeria," Time, 90 (October 6, 1967), 42. 47. "Nigeria: The Last Hope," Newsweek (August 28, 19 6 7 ),p.' 41.

48. "Nigeria: No Place to Go," Newsweek (October 23, 1967), p. 68

49. "Nigeria: The Right Sort of Chaps," Newsweek (July 24, 1967), p..35. 50. "Nigeria: Setting Sun," Newsweek (October 9, 1967), p. 41.

51. "Nigeria: The Time for Slaughter," Newsweek (July 31, 1967), p. 38. 82

52. Nigerian Observer, November 21, 1972.

53. Nixon, Raymond B., "Factors Related to Freedom in National Press System," Journalism Quarterly, 37 (1960), 15-28.

54. Nwankwo, Robert L. and George Kurian, "Nigeria," World Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, New York, Facts on File, Inc., 1982.

55. Odetola, Theophilus Olatunde, Military Politics in Nigeria, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction Books, Inc., 1978.

56. Ohonbamu, 0., "State Security and the Press," Nigerian Press Law, edited by T. 0. Elias, Lagos, Evans Brothers Ltd., 1969.

57. Omozuanfo, Ramonu (Chief Photographer, Nigerian Observer, Benin City, Nigeria), Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983.

58. Oreh, Onuma 0., "The Beginning of Self-Censorship in Nigeria' Press and the Media," Gazette: Inter- national Journal for Mass Communication Studies, 22, No. 3 (1976) , 150-55.

59. Organization of African Unity, No Genocide, Final Report of the First Phase From 5th~October to 10th December by the Organization of African Unity Observers in Nigeria, December 1968, Lagos, Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Information, 1968.

60. Oudes, Bruce, "The Other Nigerian War," Africa Report, 15 (February, 1970), 15.

61. "Press Stresses and Strains in Africa's Biggest State," African Journalist, 8 (December, 1973), 6-7.

62. Rosenblum, Mort, Coups and Earthquakes, New York, Harper and Row Publishers, 1979. 63. Schobowska, Henryka and Ulf Himmelstrand, Africa Reports on the Nigerian Crisis, New York, Africana Pub- lishing Co., 1978.

64. Schramm, Wilbur, "Communications and Change," Communica- tion and Change in Developing Countries, edited by Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm, Honolulu, East- West Center Press, 1967. 83

65. Stokke, Olav, "The Mass Media in Africa and Africa in the International Mass Media--An Introduction," Reporting Africa, edited by Olav Stokke, New York, Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971.

66. , "Mass Communication in Africa--Freedoms and Functions," Reporting Africa, edited by Olav Stokke, New York, Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971.

67. Sunday Concord, July 3, 1983.

68. , July 24, 1983.

69. Sunday Observer, November 30, 1975.

70. The Times (London), August 10, 1967.

71. , December 2, 1968.

72. , June 16, 1969.

73. , March 11, 1971.

74. Ugboajah, Frank Okwu, Communication Policies in Nigeria, Paris, UNESCO, 1980.

75. , "Nigerian Mass Communication Trends in the African Context," Gazette: Inter- national Journal for Mass Communication Studies, 22 (November 22, l176, 156-6.

76. Utomi, Patrick, "Ownership and Development Context of Nigerian Newspapers," unpublished master's thesis, Department of Journalism, Indiana State University, Evansville, Indiana, 1980.

77. Wall Street Journal, March 16, 1967.

78. , March 31, 1967.

79. _, February 26, 1969. CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The Nigerian press system got its foundation from

foreign journalists who, in the 1850s, established various

types of newspapers in the country. After independence,

however, the indigenous press became tribalized and exploited for political gains. In drawing conclusions for this thesis,

the supporting evidence and the different social and politi-

cal situations in the country from 1966 to 1970 are taken

into consideration. The conclusions answer the questions

stated at the beginning of this study and suggest areas

for further study which might further explain the relation-

ship between the military and press freedom in Nigeria.

Summary The missionaries introduced the press into Nigeria in

1859, as a form not only for discussing and disseminating religious information, but also as a teaching technique for their followers. Individuals, some of whom were non- Africans, also started their printing presses and, as time went on, they embarked on newspaper publications which they thought could help eliminate illiteracy.

84 85

Under British rule, Nigerians were refused participation

in the politics that governed them, and newspapers became a way not only to criticize the British, but also for cultural, economic, and social emancipation. The names of Ernent

Ikoli, Herbert Macaulay, James Bright Davis, and other news- papermen became household words synonymous with the journalism of confrontation against the British government.

The 1922 Richards Constitution gave indigenous politicians more power in vying for legislative council seats.

Newspapers, as a result, reflected this change; they became more of a political instrument for winning votes than for reporting news.

Nnamdi Azikiwe in 1937, and Obafemi Awolowo in the late 1940s, introduced chain newspapers for political purposes. These two prominent nationalists and other journalists joined with politicians to win independence for Nigeria.

Whenever a colonial governor attempted to silence the press, it proved difficult. There was the reasoning that since

British journalists were accorded press freedom, there was no justification for denying colonial newspapers the same right.

After independence, the domestic press was tribalized along lines of political and racial affiliations. Various kinds of unethical behavior characterized the journalism of this period. By 1965, political problems had deteriorated 86

so much that it was clear that the unity of the nation was breaking. On January 15, 1966, the soldiers seized power.

Military leaders feared giving too much freedom to the press because of the role journalists played in the demise of the First Republic. In this relationship, there were instances of arrests, detentions, and physical abuse of journalists by soldiers. Because of the free judiciary which fully backed the press, the military was unable to further punish the press.

Although there were arrests, detentions, and physical abuse of journalists, the military's power of emergency was curtailed by the courts' support for the press. For instance, there was no war censorship board, as has been characteristic of most military regimes. Although there was occasional suppression of the press, there was no attempt by the central government to transform the press into a propaganda arm of the information ministry.

Conclusions

The relationship between the press and military in Nigeria was cordial, but with occasional infringements caused by emotional excitement and paranoia by some military and police personnel, especially during the Gowon regime. But however intense the confrontations between the two groups, there was adequate press freedom in the country during this period. 87

What seems to have caused occasional disagreements

which disrupted the freedom already assured by the military

was the attitude of some military officials, the antagonistic

and tribal-oriented Nigerian press, and the conflicts in the country between 1966 and 1979.

To argue that there was total freedom of the press in

Nigeria during the military government is an illusion because

certain actions by the military and police officials were

geared toward suppressing the press.

To conclude that there was a lack of freedom for jour-

nalists would presuppose that the judiciary was in chains,

that there was the existence of a military censorship board,

and that a considerable number of journalists were either

imprisoned throughout the military's stay in power, or that

some media personnel were publicly executed to serve as a deterrent to their counterparts.

Although the military introduced laws that limited press

freedom, an atmosphere of relative free press existed and

this allowed journalists to perform their duties to a considerable extent.

In conclusion, therefore, it is the view of this thesis that there was sufficient freedom for journalists to criti-

cize the government and to carry out many press-related activities throughout the military interregnum in Nigeria.

At the beginning of this study, four major questions were raised to help elucidate the relationship between the 88

Nigerian military regime and the press, as far as press free-

dom is concerned. Material collected and interviews held

with some journalists and military personnel have helped

clarify answers to these questions.

Question l--"Why were there confrontations between journalists and military-police personnel?" The findings of this study show that two major factors contributed to the

military regimes' confrontations with the press.

First, the country was undergoing a phase of politico-

economic transformations which were compounded by tribal-

religious differences. Whenever journalists published articles that seemed to incite, to ignore, or to jeopardize the fragile unity binding the 250-tribal groups in the country, the military reacted. This reaction was in the form of arrests, detentions, and bans of newspapers and magazines.

Second, the military which had intended to eradicate corruption became as corrupt as the civilians they ousted. Military officers were not happy with the press whenever they were accused of graft. The more they were attacked by the press as being corrupt, the more the army and police intensified efforts to prevent journalists from exposing them to

public ridicule. The results were the constant arrests, detentions, and seizure of newspapers, all of which caused the confrontations between the press and the military. 89

Question 2--"What military actions had an effect on press freedom?" Actions that had some effects on press freedom in Nigeria were arrests, detentions, and threats and intimidations against journalists. Newspaper and magazine bans also had some effect on press freedom. As a result of all these, journalists were very careful about the type of articles they published. They imposed a self-censorship for fear of reprisals from the government agents.

One major effect the military regime had on the press was the takeover by the federal government, in 1975, of some prominent national dailies. Although some government officials tried to prevent publication of certain materials, it does not seem that government ownership of some dailies affected the news printed. There was also no evidence that indicates the government did appoint censors who used their influence to control content of the papers.

Question 3--"Did the military censor the press before, during, or after publication and what effects did this have?" There were few instances of prepublication censorship by the military. This study has no evidence that the government censored the press during publication. However, the most predominant type of censorship embarked upon by the military was postpublication censorship. The effect of this form of censorship on journalists was the fear it caused media practitioners, and resulted in their withholding some information to the public. 90

Question 4--"What court decisions affected the relation-

ship between the press and military?" Certain court decis-

ions bolstered the power of the press. The most important one was the Mineri Amakiri case against the Rivers State police commissioner. This case caused the military and police to be wary of issues of press freedom. It became necessary for the police and military to verbally caution journalists who published offending articles rather than to put them in detention.

Suggestions for Further Study

In a study of this nature and magnitude, it is impossible to touch on all related and essential parts in detail. As a result, these suggestions are made for further studies to clarify questions in the relationship between the Nigerian military and the press.

First, there is need for a study that would determine the involvement of military-police officers in trying to suppress press freedom in the country. This is necessary because, in spite of the federal government's guaranteed press freedom, some army personnel tried to capitalize on their influence to muffle the press.

Second, a study is necessary in the amount and nature of press coverage given the military government's involvement in politics. This is suggested in order to analyze the positive or negative attitudes of the press towards genuine efforts of the soldiers for the country's development. 91

Third, the issue of how much change the press experienced during the military government is essential as a study area. This could be a comparative analysis that would study the past and present, and contrast attitudes of Nigerian journalists toward the various governments.

Fourth, studies should be conducted which would suggest ways and means of elevating the professional standards of the Nigerian press in order for our journalists to live above partisan-tribal political groups; and avoid the journalism of confrontation and antagonism.

Fifth, the issue of press censorship during the

Nigerian-Biafran war should be explored by further research.

This would analyze the attitudes of war commanders toward journalists who were at the war front to write and report events. Was the war-front censorship different from the bureaucratic activities of the government officials at home?

Was there an attempt by the central government at dictating to state governors as to how best to censor the press in their states?

This further study will help other researchers to seek solutions to some of the problems related to press freedom in Nigeria during the military regime. It will also serve as guidelines to foreign journalists who are interested in

African nations' mass media systems. 92

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TABLE II

PROMINENT GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPERS DURING THE MILITARY REGIME*

Name of Newspaper Government Owner

1. Evening Times . . . . .Federal Government Partnership

2. Daily Times . . . . . Federal Government Partnership

3. Sunday Times . . . Federal Government Partnership

4. Sporting Record . . Federal Government Partnership

5. Lagos Weekend . . . Federal Government Partnership

6. Times International Federal Government Partnership

7. Business Times Federal Government Partnership

8. New Nigerian . . . . .Federal Government

9. Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo Federal Government

10. Daily Sketch . . . . Western State Government

11. Sunday Sketch . . . . . Western State Government

12. Nigerian Observer Bendel State Government

13. Sunday Observer . Bendel State Government

14. Daily Star ...... East-Central State Government 15. Weekly Star ...... East-Central State Government

16. Nigerian Standard . . Plateau State Government

17. Nigerian Herald . . . Plateau State Government

18. Nigerian Chronicle . Cross Rivers State Government

19. Sunday Chronicle Cross Rivers State Government

20. Nigerian Tide . . . . Rivers State Government

21. Sunday Tide . . . . Rivers State Government

*Source: Ugboajah, Frank Okwu, Communication Policies in Nigeria, Paris, UNESCO, 1980, pp. 18-19.

94 APPENDIX C

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE NIGERIAN PRESS*

The public is entitled to the truth and only correct information can form the basis for sound journalism and ensure the confidence of the people.

It is the moral duty of every journalist to have respect for the truth and to publish or prepare for publication only the truth and to the best of his knowledge.

It is the duty of the journalist to publish only facts; never to suppress such facts as he knows; never to falsify such to suit either his own purposes or any other purposes.

It is the duty of the journalist to refuse any reward for publishing or suppressing news or comments, other than salary and allowances legitimately earned in the discharge of his professional duties.

The journalist shall employ all legitimate means in the collection of news and he shall depend at all times on the right to free access, provided that due regard is paid to the privacy of individuals.

Once information has been collected and published the journalist shall observe the universally accepted principle of secrecy and shall not disclose the source of information obtained in confidence.

95 96

It is the duty of the journalist to regard plagiarism

as unethical.

It is the duty of every journalist to correct any pub-

lished information found to be incorrect.

*Source: Ugboajah, Communication Policies in Nigeria, p. 58. 97

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MAILED QUESTIONNAIRE

1. What type of press censorship was prevalent or intro-

duced by the military government in Nigeria between 1966-1979?

2. Was any such censorship forcibly imposed on the press?

3. Who was in charge of the censorship (_if any)--military

officers, new civilian editors, or the ministry of information appointee?

4. Was there any type of censorship board or commission by

which all news items must pass before publication?

5. By what means was the censorship introduced--military

decrees or judicial laws?

6. Did military agents or representatives censor the press

before, during or after publication?

7. If there was no typical military censorship, what tactics

did journalists adopt to avoid breaking the laws or to

avoid constant confrontations with the military?

8. In the absence of censorship, was there a compromise,

agreement, or covert understanding between the military

and the press in regards to newspaper content?

100 101

9. Were military personnel, agents, or representatives

imposed on the editorial boards of newspapers?

10. Were local and foreign journalists given equitable

treatment in covering war front news?

11. Could you give statistical information on the number of

detained, imprisoned, or arrested journalists and how

long they were kept in military or police custody?

12. What role did the judiciary perform in the relationship

between the military and the press; did it favor the

former or the latter?

13. Did both federal and state governments dictate to

editors the content of newspapers in which they owned or had shares?

14. Were military government activities freely and con-

stantly criticized by journalists in government controlled papers?

15. In what ways did the military government's ownership of

newspapers affect your profession as a journalist? BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

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Anamaleze, John, The Nigerian Press: The People's Con- science, New York, Vantage Press, 1978.

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De St. Jorre, John, The Brothers' War, Boston, Houghton Misslin Company, 1979.

Dudley, Billy J., An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982.

Duyile, Dayo, Media and Mass Communication in Nigeria, Ibadan, Nigeria, The Sketch Publishing Co. Ltd., 1979.

Eleazu, Uma 0., Federalism and Nation-Building, Devon, Arthur H. Stockwell Ltd., 1977.

Forsyth, Frederick, The Making of an African Legend: The Biafra Story, London, Penguin Books, 1977.

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World Press Prism, Ames, Iowa State University Press, 1981.

Hanna, William John, Independent Black Africa, Chicago, Rand McNally & Company, 1964.

Horton, Philip C., The Third World and Press Freedom, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1978.

Kelly, Sean, Access Denied, London, Sage Publications, 1978.

Ladenson, Robert F., A Philosophy of Free Expression and Its Consitutional Applications, Totowa, New Jersey, Rowman and Littlefield, 1983.

102 103

MacKintosh, John P., Nigerian Government and Politics, Evanson, Northwestern Univeristy Press, 1966.

McPhail, Thomas L., Electronic Journalism, London, Sage Publications Ltd., 1981.

Merrill, John Calhoun, The Imperative of Freedom, New York, Hastings House Publications, 1974.

Odetola, Theophilus Olatunde, Military Politics in Nigeria, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transactions Books, Inc., 1978.

Ojiako, James 0., 13 Years of Military Rule, Lagos, Nigeria, Daily Times Publications Ltd., 1979.

Okoli, Ekwene Felix, International Structure and Conflict in Nigeria, Washington, D. C., University Press of America, Inc., 1980.

Omu, Fred I. A., Press and Politics in Nigeria, 1880-1937, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, Humanities Press, 1978.

Ostheimer, John M., Nigerian Politics and Military Rule, Bristol, Western Printing Services Ltd., 1970.

Rosenblum, Mort, Coups and Earthquakes, New York, Harper & Row Publishers, 1979.

Rubin, Barry, International News and the American Media, London, Sage Publications, 1977.

Small, William J., Political Power and the Press, New York, N. W. Norton and Company, 1972.

Ugboajah, Frank Okwu, Communication Policies in Nigeria, Paris, UNESCO, 1980.

Wilcox, Dennis L., Mass Media in Africa, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975.

Articles

Biene, Henry and Martin Fitton, "Soldiers, Politicians and Civil Servants," Soldiers and Oil, edited by Keith Panter-Brick, London, Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1978.

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Burkhart, Ford, "Nigeria: Tribalism Fosters Free-Press Values in a US-Style System," The Quill (March, 1983), p. 5.

Cole, Dele, "The Press in a Military Regime," Media and Mass Communications in Nigeria, edited by Ayo Duyile, Ibadan, The Sketch Publishing Company Ltd., 1979.

Daura, Mamman, "Editing a Government Newspaper in Nigeria," Reporting Africa, edited by Olav Stokke, New York, Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971.

Ekwelie, Sylvanus A., "The Nigerian Press Under Military Rule," Gazette: International Journal for Mass Com- munication Studies, 25, No. 4 (1979), 219-32.

Elias, T. 0., "Legal Requirements for Publishing a Newspaper," Nigerian Press Law, edited by T. O. Elias, Lagos, Nigeria, Evans Brothers Ltd., 1969.

Enahoro, Peter, "The Devitilization of the Press in Africa," African Journalist, International Press Institute, 9 (September, 1973), 3-6.

Hachten, William A., "Newspapers in Africa: Change or Decay?" African Report, 15 (December, 1970), 15-17.

, "The Press as Reporter and Critic of Government," Journalism Quarterly, 40 (1963), 12-18.

"Helping Press Freedom in Developing Countries," African Journalist, 5 (September, 1972), 5-8.

Hopkinson, Tom, "Africa: Battle for Survival," WAY FORUM, 57 (December, 1965), 3.

Jakande, Lateef, "Role of the Press in a Military Regime," Media and Mass Communications in Nigeria, edited by Ayo Duyile, Ibadan, Sketch Publishing Company Ltd., 1979.

Legum, Colin, "The Mass Media--Institutions of the African Political Systems," Reporting Africa, edited by Olav Stokke, New York, Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971.

Lent, John A., "Mass Media in the Developing World: Four Conundrums," Developing World and Mass Media, Prague, International Organization of Journalists, 1975.

Meisler, Stanley, "Covering the Third World (or trying to)," Columbia Journalism Review, 17 (November-December, 1978), 34-38. 105

Meyer, Ernest, "Another Year of Lost Battles," IPI Report, 22 (January, 1973), 1-8.

"Nigeria," Africa Report, 20 (July-August, 1975), 26.

"Nigeria," Africa Report, 22 (July-August, 1977), 33.

"Nigeria," Africa Report, 23 (March-April, 1978), 27.

"Nigeria," Africa Report, 24 (May-June, 1979), 28.

"Nigeria," Time, 90 (August 18, 1967), 29-30.

"Nigeria," Time, 90 (October 6, 1967), 42.

"Nigeria: The Last Hope," Newsweek (August 28, 1967), pp. 41.

"Nigeria: No Place to Go," Newsweek (October 23, 1967), p. 68.

"Nigeria: The Right Sort of Chaps," Newsweek (July 24, 1967), p. 35.

"Nigeria: Second Chance for Democracy," Newsweek (March 30, 1980), pp. 42-44.

"Nigeria: Setting Sun," Newsweek (October 9, 1967), p. 41.

"Nigeria: The Time for Slaughter," Newsweek (July 31, 1967), p. 38.

"Nigeria's Military Rule to Continue," Africa Report, 15 (November, 1974), 22.

Nixon, Raymond B., "Factors Related to Freedom in National Press System," Journalism Quarterly, 42 (Winter, 1965), 13-14.

Ogunde, Adelunda, "Mass Media and National Intergration in Nigeria," International Perspectives on News, edited by Erwin L. Atwood, Stuart J. Bullion, and Sharon M. Murphy, Carbondale and Edwardsville, Southern Illinois Press, 1982.

Ohonbamu, 0., "State Security and the Press," Nigerian Press Law, edited by T. 0. Elias, Lagos, Nigeria, Evans Brothers, Ltd., 1969. 106

Omu, Fred I. A., "The Dilemma of Press Freedom in Colonial Africa: The West African Example," Journal of African History, 9 (1968), 279-98.

Oreh, Onuma 0., "The Beginning of Self-Censorship in Nigeria's Press and the Media," Gazette: International Journal for Mass Communication Studies, 22 (1976), 150-55.

Oudes, Bruce, "The Other Nigerian War," Africa Report, 15 (February, 1970), 15.

"Press Stresses and Strains in Africa's Biggest State," African Journalist, 8 (December, 1973), 6-7.

Pye, Lucien W., "Communication, Institution Building, and the Reach of Authority," Communication and Change in the Developing Countries, edited by Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm, Honolulu, East-West Center Press, 1967, pp. 35-55.

Schramm, Wilbur, "Communications and Change," Communication and Change in Developing Countries, edited by Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm, Honolulu, East-West Center Press, 1967.

Singleton, Michael, "Attitude of Military Censors and other Officers on Mass Media Issues," Journalism Quarterly, 54 (Winter, 1977), 727-32.

Stokke, Olav, "The Mass Media in Africa and Africa in the International Mass Media--An Introduction," Reporting Africa, edited by Olav Stokke, New York, Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971.

, "Mass Communications in Africa--Freedoms and Functions," Reporting Africa, edited by Olav Stokke, New York, Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971.

Ugboajah, Frank Okwu, "Nigerian Mass Communications Trends in the African Context," Gazette: International Journal for Mass Communication Studies, 22 (November 22, 1976), 156-68.

"What Did Amakiri Do?" IPI Report, 22 (September-October, 1973), 2. 107

Publications of Learned Organizations

Dodson, Don and William A. Hachten, editors, Communication and Development: Africa and Afro-American Parallels, Lexington, Kentucky, Association for Education in Journalism, 1973.

Journalism Abstracts, Association for Education in Journalism, Vols. 1-4, 1966-81.

Organization of African Unity, No Genocide, Final Report of the First Phase from 5th October to 10th December by the Organization of African Unity Observers in Nigeria, December, 1968, Lagos, Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Information, 1968.

Richstad, Jim A., The Press Under Military Law: The Hawaiian Experience, Lexington, Kentucky, Association for Educa- tion in Journalism, 1970.

Ullrich, Werner, "Tasks and Problems of Mass Media in the Political, Ideological, Economic and Cultural Process of Transformations in the Countries of Sub-Sahara Africa," Developing World of Mass Media, Prague, Inter- national Organization of Journalists, 1975.

Encyclopedia Articles

"Nigeria," African Contemporary Record, Vol. 1, edited by Colin Legum, London, Rex Collins, 1976.

Nwankwo, Robert L. and George Kurian, "Nigeria," World Press Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, New York, Facts on File, Inc., 1982.

Unpublished Material

Akinrinade, Olusoji Olusegun, "Ownership Control V. Edi- torial Content: A Study of Nigerian Daily Newspapers," unpublished master's thesis, Department of Journalism, Northwestern State University, Natchitoches, Louisiana, 1979.

Hilkermeier, Donald, "Cold War Censorship: Guidelines for Censorship During Limited Military Actions," unpublished master's thesis, Department of Journalism, Uni- versity of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 1965. 108

Moore, Charles Benton, "Informal Censorship of the Press on Vietnam by the U. S. Military," unpublished master's thesis, Department of Journalism, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas, 1972.

Ohyedike, Udemefung E., "Origin and Development of Press Laws in Nigeria," unpublished master's thesis, Univer- sity of Iowa, Ames, Iowa, 1979.

Utomi, Patrick, "Ownership and Development Context of Nigerian Newspapers," unpublished master's thesis, Department of Journalism, University of Indiana, Evansville, Indiana, 1980.

Newspapers

Daily Sketch, March 21, 1975.

Daily Times, March 23, 1967.

, August 31, 1974.

, October 2, 1974.

, March 18, 1975.

, May 13, 1975.

Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo, March 28, 1966.

The Guardian, July 4, 1983.

Morning Post, July 30, 1967.

, November 10, 1967.

New Nigerian, April 5, 1966.

, April 7, 1966.

, April 19, 1966.

, July 12, 1967.

, September 25, 1974.

, October 2, 1974.

May 24, 1975. 109

New York Times, May 31, 1967.

June 24, 1967.

August 11, 1968.

October 14, 1968.

,1 January 26, 1969.

, October 9, 1969.

,I January 14, 1970.

,I January 17, 1970.

, 1 January 18, 1970.

,I January 22, 1970.

,I January 28, 1970.

,I February 23, 1970.

, March 18, 1970.

June 18, 1973.

February 24, 1974.

April 11, 1976.

, March 14, 1977.

Nigerian Chronicle, April 10, 1975.

The Nigerian Citizen, February 23, 1964.

Nigerian Observer, January 8, 1970.

, November 21, 1972.

Nigerian Tribune, March 20, 1975.

, August 13, 1975.

, December 24, 1975. 110

Sunday Concord, December 26, 1982.

, June 26, 1983.

, July 3, 1983.

, July 10, 1983.

, July 17, 1983.

, July 24, 1983.

Sunday Observer, November 30, 1975.

Sunday Times, March 16, 1975.

The Times (London), August 10, 1967.

, December 2, 1968.

, June 16, 1969.

, September 29, 1969.

March 11, 1971

, June 21, 1971.

Wall Street Journal, March 16, 1967.

, March 31, 1967.

, February 26, 1969.

Questionnaire Respondents

Ajayi, Peter (General Manager, Sketch Publishing Company, Ibadan, Nigeria), Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983.

Chijiuka, Fred B. (General Staff Officer Grade 1, Public Relations and Staff Officer Grade 1, Army Film Unit, Army Headquarters, Lagos, Nigeria, Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983.

Ekpu, Raymond (Chairman, Editorial Board, Concord Group of Newspapers, Lagos, Nigeria), Reply to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983. 111

Jakande, Lateef (Governor of Lagos State, Nigeria), Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983.

Omozuanfo, Ramonu (Chief Photographer, Nigerian Observer, Benin City, Nigeria), Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983.

Rupee, Festus (Chief Sub-editor, Nigerian Observer, Benin City, Nigeria), Answers to mailed questionnaire dated July, 1983.

Solarin, Tai (Newspaper columnist, proprietor and founder of Mayflower College, Ikenne, Nigeria), Letter sent in reply to mailed questionnaire dated June, 1983.