The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project AMBASSADOR MARSHALL GREEN Interviewed by: Self Copyright 1998 ADST TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction US Hard- ine Policy in the 1950s % Robertson and Dulles % Taiwan Straits Crisis China as Seen from Hong Kong 1961-196, Need for Re-./amining our China Policy Frustrated .fforts To 0odify US China Policy 196,-1965 Indonesia 1965-1969 China1s Role in Aborted Communist Coup 0eeting 2ith Ni/on Real 3eginnings of US-China Rapprochement 1969-1971 President Ni/on1s Trip to China February 1972 Ni/on Trip Aftermath6 7isit to Asian Capitals6 Asian and US Reactions Concluding Obser8ations INTERVIEW .7O UTION OF US-CHINA PO IC9 1956-197, 0.0OIRS OF AN INSID.R 3y 0ARSHA :R..N A03ASSADOR (R.TIR.D) 1 INTRODUCTION Though entering the Foreign Ser8ice as a Japanese area specialist, fi8e of my assignments between 1956 and 197, had much to do with US-China policy during critical years of change. These fi8e assignments were: (1) Regional Planning Ad8isor for the Far .ast, 1956-606 (2) American Consul :eneral to Hong Kong, 1961-6,6 (,) Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Far .ast, 196,-656 (A) American Ambassador to Indonesia, 1965-696 and (5) Assistant Secretary of State for .ast Asia and the Pacific, 1969-7,. 2hen I was assigned to Indonesia in June 1965, the 2ashington Post editorially deplored the sending of an American Ambassador to Indonesia because of President SukarnoCs destructi8e policies and because D:reenCs departure would remo8e from 2ashington the one policy man in the administration charged with taking a long-range look at US relations with Communist China.D 0y four years in Indonesia ne8ertheless turned out to ha8e a lot more to do with China and China policy than anyone could ha8e foreseen. It was also in Indonesia in April 1967 that I first met 0r. Ni/on (a New 9ork lawyer at that time) and engaged in the first of se8eral con8ersations I had with him o8er the ne/t se8eral years on US-China policy. I am no scholar, historian or writer, and I ha8e long 8owed that I would ne8er author one of those now-it-can-be-told books. On the other hand, I recogniEe that all of us who ha8e participated in the formulation of American foreign policy--in whate8er role--are under obligation to pass on to posterity some record of our in8ol8ement and insights. This is the central purpose of the recently inaugurated oral history program of the Association of Diplomatic Studies6 and it was while re8iewing transcripts of my oral history that I recogniEed the need for reporting my China e/periences in a more accurate and complete manner. Hence this manuscript which is almost entirely based on personal diaries, memoranda, letters and notes, almost all of them preser8ed and filed by my in8aluable assistant and secretary o8er the years, .mma Johnson. I am also greatly indebted to a number of Foreign Ser8ice China language/area specialists--especially Jack Ser8ice, John acey, indsey :rant and John Holdridge--with whom I ser8ed at one time or another and from whom I learned much. 3ob 0artens, a Foreign Ser8ice So8iet specialist who inter8iewed me for my oral history, deser8es 2 special mention for his enlightening assistance. Howe8er, any errors or shortcomings in this manuscript are certainly my own. It is to be hoped that this record, along with those of other Foreign Ser8ice Officers in8ol8ed in China policy, will be made widely a8ailable to scholars, diplomats and others. Perhaps, some day, a complete record of the Foreign Ser8iceCs role in China policy can be assembled, from the dark days of 2orld 2ar II and subseGuent 0cCarthyism to the brighter days of the 1970Cs and 1980Cs brought on by the rise of pragmatism in Peking and of maturity in 2ashington. CHAPT.R I 2ORKIN: 2ITH RO3.RTSON AND DU .S6 TH. TAI2AN STRAIT CRISIS OF 1958 0y in8ol8ement in China policy dates back to 1956 when, on lea8ing the National 2ar College, I was assigned as Regional Planning Ad8isor for the Far .ast working in the State DepartmentCs 3ureau of Far .astern Affairs. The 3ureau at that time was dominated by Assistant Secretary of State 2alter Robertson, the Guintessential 7irginia gentleman, a banker by profession, who had powerful connections in the Administration and Congress. RobertsonCs o8erriding interest in world affairs was to uphold the position of :eneralissimo Chiang Kai-shek as President of all of China, e8en though Chiang and his defeated Nationalist forces had fled the mainland in 19A9 to take refuge on Taiwan, ChinaCs island-pro8ince. 3ecause of RobertsonCs sinocentrism and because I had to draft a number of his speeches, I was automatically drawn into China-policy issues--especially those relating to the defense of what we called Free China or the Chinese Nationalists (Chinats) or, most correctly, the Republic of China (ROC), as opposed to the Chinese Communists (Chicoms) or the Chinese Reds, or, most correctly, the PeopleCs Republic of China--a term we rarely used in those days. For me, this was not an assignment I contemplated with unalloyed joy. I liked Robertson personally. He was kindly and thoughtful towards all members of his staff. He was also a strong defender of the Foreign Ser8ice at a time when many Foreign Ser8ice Officers were still reeling from the effects of 0cCarthyism. All 1A of the Ambassadors in his area (.ast Asia and Australasia) were careerists--a record ne8er before or since achie8ed by any bureau in the State Department. I was also fortunate in ha8ing Ambassador J. :raham Parsons as my immediate superior. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State at that time, and was to replace Robertson in 1959. Jeff Parsons was one of the ablest officers in the Foreign Ser8ice, articulate and a master of diplomatic practices, so essential in our business. On the other hand, 2alter RobertsonCs single-minded dedication to upholding the position of Chiang Kai-shek as the 3 President of all of China was one I could not altogether share, and writing acceptable speeches ta/ed my New .ngland conscience to its limits. 2e also e/pended 8ast amounts of diplomatic capital on upholding the ROCCs position in the United Nations as the sole legal representati8e of all of China6 and our highly 8isible military presence on Taiwan, especially in Taipei, was bound to affront the nationalistic feelings of people on Taiwan. It certainly affronted the sensibilities of foreign diplomats like the Japanese Ambassador who was billeted in a US military area in the center of Taipei identified on large billboards as DFreedom 7illage.D I happened to be 8isiting Taipei in 0ay 1957 as a member of a Presidential 0ission headed by Frank Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense, which was looking into problems related to our world-wide base presence. Just as we were being reassured by the US ChargI dCAffaires in Taipei that there was no problem with the public o8er our base presence in Taiwan, our .mbassy was attacked by a mob which sacked the .mbassy, beat up some of our personnel hiding in the basement, and scattered official US files all o8er the streets of Taipei. This mob action was touched off by the shooting of a Taiwanese peeping-tom by an American sergeant, who was then acGuitted by an American military court in Taipei amidst the cheers of his compatriots and in the presence of the peeping- tomCs weeping widow and her friends. Armed with e8idence like this, the Frank Nash mission came up with con8incing conclusions and recommendations that did much, world-wide, to help lessen friction o8er the presence of US bases o8erseas. Another China-related issue of major interest to my office at that time was e8idence of a growing split in Sino-So8iet relations. I twice 8isited the Rand Corporation at Santa 0onica, California, where a team of e/perts was analyEing PekingCs reactions to the launching of Sputnik in 1957. It was increasingly clear to these e/perts (including my former State Department colleague Alice Hsia) that China efforts to share in, and benefit from, So8iet technological breakthroughs were being rebuffed by 0oscow. Two China delegations returned to Peking empty-handed. This was briefly followed by Chinese propaganda broadcasts calling for a nuclear-free Far .ast, but it was clear that this line, probably parlayed to Peking by 0oscow, was in conflict with PekingCs own aspirations to become a nuclear power. It was not until the following year that I became directly in8ol8ed in the formulation of US policy toward China. This occurred during and after the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958 when I fortuitously became Secretary of State John Foster DullesC action officer at the working le8el dealing with the crisis. I will undertake to describe this incident in some detail because e/isting accounts (at least the ones I ha8e read) are incomplete with regard to how 2ashington policymakers grappled with the crisis. 4 - - - - - - - For se8eral months before the Chinese Communists (Chicoms) opened up their artillery barrage against Juemoy on August 2,, 1958, I had been chairing a working-le8el interagency task force (State, Defense and CIA) which was one of se8eral established by the 2hite House to e/amine US capabilities to cope with two or more simultaneous military crises in 8arious parts of the world. One of the scenarios our task force had just completed related to a Chicom aerial or artillery interdiction of the Juemoy island group (3ig Juemoy, ittle Juemoy, Tatan, .hrtan and Tungting) held by the Nationalists but located just a few miles off the shore of mainland China.