University Micrdrilms International 300 N

INFORMATION TO USERS

This reproduction was made from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this document, the quality of the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help clarify markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1.The sign or “target” for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is “Missing Page(s)”. If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark, it is an indication of either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, duplicate copy, or copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed. For blurred pages, a good image of the page can be found in the adjacent frame. If copyrighted materials were deleted, a target note will appear listing the pages in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed, a definite method of “sectioning” the material has been followed. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. For illustrations that cannot be satisfactorily reproduced by xerographic means, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and inserted into your xerographic copy. These prints are available upon request from the Dissertations Customer Services Department.

5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases the best available copy has been filmed.

University Micrdrilms International 300 N. Z eeb Road Ann Arbor, Ml 48106

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8513646

Hosseinbor, Mohammad Hassan

IRAN AND ITS NATIONALITIES: THE CASE OF BALUCH NATIONALISM

The American University PH.D. 1984

University Microfilms International300 N. Zeflb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106

In all cases this material has been filmed in the best possible way from the available copy. Problems encountered with this docum ent have been identified here with a check mark V .

1. Glossy photographs or p a______g es

2. Colored illustrations, paper or print______

3. Photographs with dark background_____

4. Illustrations are poor copy______

5. Pages with black marks, not original copy______

6. Print shows through as there is text on both sides of page______

7. Indistinct, broken or small print on several pages^

8. Print exceeds margin requirements______

9. Tightly bound cop y with print lost in sp______in e

10. Computer printout pages with indistinct print______

11. Page(s)______lacking when material received, and not available from school or author.

12. Page(s)______seem to be missing in numbering only as text follows.

13. Two pages numbered . Text follows.

14. Curling and wrinkled pages______

15. Dissertation contains pages with print at a slant, filmed as received______

16. Other ____

University Microfilms International

THE CASE OF BALUCH NATIONALISM

Mohammad Hassan Hosseinbor

submitted to the

Faculty of The College of

Public and International Affairs

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

The Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

International Relations

Signatures of

Chairman:

Dean of the '.College

[A l L u J 1. / 9 ( ate T

1984. 1,4 is The American University Washington, D.C. 20016

•THE ME R I C M UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. @ Copyright

Mohammad Hassan Hosseinbor

19-^

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. IRAN AND ITS NATIONALITIES: THE CASE

OF BALUCH NATIONALISM

Mohammad Hassan Hosseinbor

ABSTRACT

The question of ethnic nationalities divided by international

boundaries poses one of the potentially most explosive problems facing

the multi-national developing states. It involves two political forces

moving in opposing directions. On the one hand, each multi-ethnic state

is driven to integrate its diverse nationalities into its state struc

ture. On the other hand, there is the nationalist drive of divided

nationalities seeking self-rule in their national homelands. In Iran,

all non-Persian nationalities— Baluchis, Kurds, Turks, Turkmens, and

Arabs— belong to the category of nationalities divided across state

lines. Baluchis, whose homeland, Baluchistan, covers 240,00 square

miles, are divided among Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. This study

examines the Baluch national movement toward political, economic, and

cultural self-rule in Western Baluchistan since its incorporation into

Iran in 1928.

Drawing on historical materials in English, Persian, Baluchi,

Arabic, and Urdu, the study analyzes three sets of interrelated factors.

The first set relates to the evolution and dynamics of Baluch national

ism, its cohesive bases, its socio-economic and class structure, its

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. politics and political organizations, and its personalities. The second

set deals with the pattern of relationships between the Baluch national

ity and the Persian-dominated state of Iran. The third set pertains to

the regional and international implications of Baluch nationalism.

This study's findings suggest that the nationalism of the Baluch

and other subordinate nationalities in Iran is the antithesis to the

politically and economically dominant and exploit_Live nationalism of

the dominant nationality, a pattern similar to the rise of the early

nationalism of Third World peoples as a response to European colonial

ism. This general thesis, however, is based primarily on the cases of

the Middle-Eastern nationalities discussed in connection with our case

study. Any broader application of this conclusion, however, should

await the results of additional case studies of ethnic nationalities in

other geographic areas of the Third World as well.

ii.i

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PREFACE

Most of the material for this study was collected first during a

trip to Iranian Baluchistan in the summer of 1979 and then during a

separate visit to London, England, in the summer of 1983. The trip to

Iran was particularly useful because it enabled me not only to collect

some of the material needed for this research, but also to witness

firsthand an unprecedented upsurge of nationalist activities among vari

ous Iranian nationalities including Baluchis due to the open political

environment which then prevailed in the country in the immediate after-

math of the victory of the Islamic Revolution. My visit to London was

also necessary for examining the British archives and their large col

lection of historical documents on the subject. Hence, some of the

primary sources gathered on these two occasions are used for the first

time in this study.

Equally important for the completion of this dissertation is the

help of many people, particularly those whose responsibility it was to

examine and guide me. I must, therefore, thank first of all the members

of my dissertation committee— Professor Abdul Aziz Said, Professor Alan

Taylor, and the distinguished scholar and specialist of Southwest Asia,

Selig S. Harrison— for spending their valuable time reading and comment

ing on this work. Indeed, 1 shall ever remain indebted to them whose

valuable assistance was my only guide throughout this long research

project. I also would like to pay my tribute to the late Professor

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Charles Heimsath, whose help was essential in developing the original

proposal for this study.

I also would like to express my deepest gratitude and apprecia

tion to H. E. Abdelkader Braik Al-Araeri, the Ambassador of the State of

Qatar in Washington, for his kindness and assistance in allowing me to

take extra time from my work at the Embassy for the purpose of this

research. My gratitude and appreciation also must go to my brother and

friend Nasir Bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, whom I also have the honor and pleas

ure of working with. Indeed, both the Ambassador and Nasir have been a

source of inspiration and encouragement for me throughout this study,

and for this I owe them much more than I can repay. Many thanks also to

Mr. Gholam Reza Hosseinbor, Pari Delavari, Malik M. Towghi, and Deen

Mohammad Hosseinbor, whose advice and consultation helped me very much

in the course of this research. This study also owes much to Ashraf

Alehossein, whose love, companionship, patience, and encouragement

helped me endure the long and lonely period of this study.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT...... ii

PREFACE ...... iv

LIST OF M A P S ...... ix

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Nationalism and Its Study ...... 7 The Study of the Case of Baluch Nationalism ...... 10

Chapter I. THE COHESIVE BASIS OF THE BALUCH NATIONALISM ...... 14

Baluchistan...... 14 History ...... 23 Language...... 53 Culture and Religion...... 58 Ethnic Origin and Racial Consciousness ...... 61

II. THE BRITISH DIVISION OF BALUCHISTAN AND THE INCOR PORATION OF ITS WESTERN PART INTO IRAN, 1860-1928 . . . 67

The Anglo-Persian Policies and the Division of Baluchistan...... 67 The Baluchi Struggle against the Qajars and the B r i t i s h ...... 78 The Pahlavi-Baluch Military Confrontation: Annexation of Baluchistan...... 88

III. THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION UNDER THE PAHLAVIS: THE CASE OF BALUCHIS...... 95

The Pahlavi Policies toward the Non-Persian Nationalities ...... 95 The Central Government and the Baluch ...... 98 Administrative Policies ...... 100 Socio-Economic Policies ...... 107

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. IV. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND CLASS STRUCTURE OF BALUCH SOCIETY: TRIBALISM/FEUDALISM, RELIGION, AND NATIONALISM .... 115

P e a s a n t s ...... 116 Nomadic Tribes ...... 119 Tribalism/Feudalism and Nationalism: The Role of Hakoms and S a r d a r s ...... 121 Religion and Nationalism: The Role of Maulavis . . . 126 The Middle C l a s s ...... 131

V. THE BALUCH NATIONAL MOVEMENT UNDER THE PAHLAVIS: ITS ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICS ...... 134

The First Phase: The Era of Revolts and Yaghis (Rebels), 1928-1959 ...... 135 Dad Shah: The Baluchi "Martyr" and National Hero . . 136 The Second Phase: The Era of National Organizations and Parties...... 142 Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF), 1964-1979.... 145

VI. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AND THE B A L U C H ...... 156

The Muslims' Unity Party and the Role of Maulavis . . 159 Baluchistan People's Democratic Organization (BPDO) . 166

VII. THE BALUCH NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN...... 175

Baluch Nationalism and British Colonialism: The Quest for Independence: 1920-1947 ...... 178 The Baluch and Pakistan...... 182 Afghanistan and Baluch Nationalism ...... 201

VIII. THE REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF BALUCH NATIONALISM .... 207

The Baluch Factor in Relations among Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan ...... 207 The Afghan Marxist Regime and the Baluch ...... 219 The Links with Iraq and the Arab W o r l d ...... 223 Conclusion ..... 231

IX. THE BALUCH AND U.S.-SOVIET R I V A L R Y ...... 234

The Question of Baluchistan and the Anglo-Russian "Great G a m e " ...... 234 Baluchistan and the Superpower R i v a l r y . 237 The Baluch Issue and the 1979 Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan...... 245

vii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. X. CONCLUSION...... 253

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 262

viii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF MAPS

1. Ethno-linguistic Map of Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan . . 3

2. Ethno-linguistic Map of I r a n ...... 99

3. The BLF-Produced map of "Greater Baluchistan" ...... 149

4. Iran Partitioned into Spheres of Influence by 1907 Anglo- Russian A g r e e m e n t ...... 236

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. INTRODUCTION

The question of ethnic nations divided by colonially shaped

international boundaries poses one of the potentially most explosive

problems facing the multi-national developing states. It involves two

conflicting forces moving in opposing directions. On the one hand,

there is the state nationalism that is the drive by each multi-ethnic

state to integrate its diverse ethnic nationalities into its state

structure. On the other hand, there is the nationalist drive of ethnic

nations to preserve their national and cultural identity by pursuing the

quest for self-determination/self-rule in their national homelands.

Hence, the issue involves a conflict between states and nations or

between state nationalism, which in the case of heterogeneous states is

generally a manifestation of the nationalism of dominant nationality,

and the nationalism of subordinate nationalities. To underscore the

significance of the nationalities issue, here it is sufficient to men

tion that of 132 states studied, only 12 or 9.1 percent were homoge

neous, while the remaining 120 or 90.9 percent were heterogeneous

consisting of two or more ethnic groups.1

In the Middle East, Iran is a very good example of such multi

national states. Covering an area of 627,000 square miles and situated

strategically on the crossroad between the Arab Middle East, Southwest

1Abdul Aziz Said and Luiz R. Simon, eds, Ethnicity in an Inter national Context (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1976), p. 10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. z

Asia, and the Soviet Union, it is a heterogeneous developing country

comprised of six distinct nationalities including Persians, Kurds,

Arabs, Turks, Turkmens, and Baluchis, as well as other linguistic and

tribal groupings such as Lurs, Gilaks, Qashquais, etc. Although there

are no accurate data as to the population of Iran's various national

groups, the recent scholarly literature, as observed by Nikki Keddi,

tends to agree that Persians are a slight minority comprising about 45

percent or 18 million of Iran's 40 million population. Nevertheless,

they are the largest national group, thus being the dominant nationality

or the dominant minority, while the other five national groups— Turks (9

to 10 million), Kurds (4 million), Arabs (1 to 2 million),^ Turkmens (1

million), and Baluchis (2 million),3 constitute the subordinate nation

alities or national minorities. These five nationalities have one other

important feature in common, as well: they live along the state's inter

national borders, which cut across their lingo-ethnic homelands, hence

dividing them between two or three states. Therefore, they can be cate

gorized as divided nationalities, as well. (See Map 1.)

Having underscored the significance of the nationalities problem

in Iran, this dissertation is an effort to examine the case of the

Baluch nationalism— that is the Baluch national movement toward politi

cal, economic, and cultural self-rule— in Western Baluchistan ever since

its incorporation into Iran in 1928. Divided among Iran, Pakistan, and

Afghanistan, Baluchistan, with an area of more than 240,000 square miles

^Nikki R. Keddie, "The Minorities Question in Iran," in The Iran-Iraq War, ed. S. Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), pp. 91-92.

^For an analysis of Baluch population, see Chapter III.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHINA INDIA m inorities Other non-Pushtun Hazara Uzbek LNDHI Punjabi Pushtun Tajik Sindhi minorities U.S.S.R. Gwadar Arab Turkom an K urdish ARABIAN SEA Othernon-Persian .

Persian Mixcd Baluch Turkish OMAN GULF OF GULF ETHNIC MAJORITY REGIONS: IRAN, PAKISTANAND AFGHANISTAN OMAN

-c5 SEA ^TEHRAN CASPIAN QATAR r" N U N IT E D ^ BAHRAIN 500 300 U.S.S.R. 300 V.. Map 1. Ethno-linguistic map of Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan. and Source:

200 KILOMETERS ^ - • ^ K U W A I T SAUDI ARABIA NRITWAL T U R K E Y A (New York: York: Carnegie (New Endowment for International Peace, 1981), fig. 1. Selig S. Selig Harrison, S. Afghanistan's In Shadow: Nationalism Baluch and Soviet Temptations

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4

which is nearly five times larger than England, is of great geo

strategic significance by virtue of its command of nearly one thousand

miles of coastline on the Arabian Sea, including the eastern shore of

the Strait of Hormuz, its situation on the overland and maritime lines

of communication between the Middle East and Southwest Asia, its prox

imity to the Soviet Asian frontiers, and its rich potential in mineral

resources. As a result, it is viewed as one of the most likely targets

for future projection of Soviet power in Southwest Asia in the aftermath

of her 1979 intervention in Afghanistan and, therefore, a potentially

high-risk area for conflict between the two superpowers in that region.

This study serves several purposes, First, it fills as gap in

knowledge about the Baluch nationalism in Iran in the sense that it

constitutes the most comprehensive and systematic study of the case ever

undertaken. And in so doing, it enhances our knowledge and understand

ing about one of the major potential focal points of superpower conflict

in Southwest Asia as well. In addition, the study of subordinate

nationalities in Iran is important because together they constitute a

slight majority of the population in that country. In this regard, the

case of Baluch nationalism also helps shed some light on the nationalism

of other Iranian subordinate nationalities as well. Moreover, since the

case of Baluch nationalism in Iran cannot be isolated and separated,

neither theoretically nor practically, from the Baluch nationalism in

Pakistan and Afghanistan, its study also contributes, though by way of

comparison, to a better understanding of the national movements of other

subordinate nationalities in those two countries. It also hopes to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5

demonstrate how nationalism operates in multi-national states such as

Iran.

The broader objective of this study is to furnish a case study

of nationalism as it relates to the category of subordinate and divided

nationalities in the Third World. So far, the study of ethnic national

ism has been dominated overwhelmingly by cases dealing with either the

ethnic nationalities in the Soviet Union or those in the West such as

Basques, French Quebec, and others, even though all these combined are

very few as compared with those in the Third World. Hence, similar case

studies of the Third World ethnic nations is an essential step for

developing a comprehensive theory of nationalism. Therefore, the

present case study is one small step in that direction, hoping to shed

some light, along with other case studies, on the phenomenon of contem

porary nationalism.

The approach to this study is historical, describing and analyz

ing the foundations, evolution, dynamics, and implications of Baluch

nationalism. Dealing primarily with historical political materials, the

study also treats issues and events discussed chronologically using both

primary and secondary sources, whether published or unpublished. Hence,

it can be described best as a political history of Baluch nationalism.

Whatever approach one may take, any substantive treatment of Baluch

nationalism will require a systematic examination of at least three sets

of interrelated factors. The first relates to its self-contained or

internal dynamics and characteristics involving its cohesive bases—

i.e., history, language, etc.— its socio-economic and class structure,

its politics and political organizations, and so on. The second set of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 6

factors deals with the relations between that nationality and the

Persian-dominated multi-national state of which it is a component. This

is to show how the pattern of relationship between the two sides affects

the issue of Baluch nationalism. The third set of factors is concerned

with the regional and international implications of the issue.

This study is organized into ten chapters, which are preceded

by the present Introduction. The starting point is a description of the

bases or foundations of the Baluch nationalism in Chapter I. This is to

gain an insight into the cohesive elements which give nationalism its

receptivity, thus dealing with its history, territory, culture and

religion, language, and ethnic origin. In this regard, the historical

base of the Baluch nationalism has been the subject of a broader treat

ment in order to put the question in its historical perspective as well.

The second chapter enters the subject of our discussion covering the era

of British Colonial supremacy in, and division of, Baluchistan in 1972;

the Anglo-Perso-Baluch relations; and the events which led to the incor

poration of Western Baluchistan into Iran by Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1928.

Chapter III underlines the policies pursued by the central

government toward Baluch and Baluchistan during the rule of the Pahlavi

dynasty. This chapter is expected to shed some light on how those

policies affected the Baluch and to what extent they contributed to the

government's state-building strategies for integrating the Baluch into

the Iranian state structure. Chapter IV is an analysis of the social,

economic, and class structure of Baluch nationalism; while Chapters V

and VI, in order, deal with the Baluch national movement, its political

organization, and personalities under the monarchical and clerical

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. regimes, respectively. Both of these chapters serve to underline the

interaction between the central government and the Baluch.

This study will treat in the seventh chapter the Baluch national

movement in Iran in its relations with the stronger and more established

Baluchi movement in Pakistan. The regional and international implica

tions of the question will be examined in Chapters VIII and IX, respec

tively. In the former, the influence of the regional states, including

Pakistan, Afghanistan, Arab states of the Gulf, and India on the ques

tion under discussion will be analyzed; while the superpowers' rivalry

in the region and its implication for the issue will be the subject of

the latter chapter. Finally, the last chapter will contain the conclud

ing remarks of this case study and its likely theoretical implications.

Nationalism and Its Study

There is no universlaly accepted definition of nationalism, nor

is there any agreement as to the date of its appearance on the world

scene. Although some scholars, notably historians, tend to point to the

evidence of national consciousness even prior to the French Revolution,

most authorities have taken that event as the beginning of the emergence

of nationalism, thus viewing it as a contemporary phenomenon. As has

been pointed out by Professor Richard Cottara, a student of Iranian

nationalism, the latter group defines nationalism as a "phenomenon of

mass politics in the era of nation state," as is the case in this

study.^ Likewise, the Marxist school of thought views the emergence of

the phenomenon as having coincided with the epoch of capitalism when the

^Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), p. 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8

bourgeoisie began to integrate the feudal markets into an expanded

national unit, thus paving the way for further growth of capital. This

view takes a deterministic approach toward nationalism, expecting its

spread along with the growth of capitalism in non-European societies as

well. In this context, it is not necessarily a Western phenomenon, even

though it was first originated there.

There is less divergence of opinion in identifying the cohesive

bases or foundations of nationalism. There is a general agreement among

scholars of diverse persuasions— liberal idealists, the advocates of

power politics, or utopian Marxists— in viewing a common history,

language, culture, and territory as the necessary ingredients or basis

of nationalism. However, they are much divided over the inclusion or

exclusion of other ingredients such as a common economy, ethnic origin,

and religion. The Marxists insist on the inclusion of a common economy

as another major basis of nationalism, but exclude the last two attrib

utes. By contrast, other scholars view ethnicity and religion as other

important components, but attach no importance to the attribute of a

common economy.

For the purpose of this study, nationalism is defined in terms

of a belief on the part of a group of people that they form a histori

cally constituted community having a common territory, a common history,

a common language, a common culture and religion, and a perceived common

ethnic origin. In our case, the issue is less complicated because all

these ingredients are present at once.

As far as the general theories of nationalism and their rele

vance to the study of the Third World ethnic nationalities is concerned,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9

those espoused by traditionalists and behavioralists suffer from two

major shortcomings. First, both groups of theories are based primarily

on the manifestations of the phenomenon of nationalism as experienced

first in the West. Second, they are state-centered in the sense that

they are geared more often to the state nationalism as contrasted with

the nationalism of ethnic nationalities, while conceptually nationalism

is an attribute of nation, a natural unit and not of state, a juridical

unit or concept. Nevertheless, concepts, themes, and methodologies

developed by these theories are, with some conceptual adjustments, use

ful to the study of ethnic nationalism.

The theoretical study of nationalism is dominated largely by the

traditionalists. Samples of the outstanding contributions made by this

school include pioneering historical and critical studies of nationalism

by Hans Kohn, Carlton H. Hayes, and Rupert Emerson. Other

representative examples of historical studies which can shed some light

on the study of nationalism among subordinate nationalities are works by

Inis Claude, C. A. Macartney, Abdul Aziz Said and Luis Simon, and Alfred

Cobban, to name but a few.^

Although latecomers in the study of nationalism, the behavioral

ists have made some important inroads in the field since 1960. Among

the variety of theoretical frameworks developed by this school, the

^Hans Kohn, Nationalism; Its Meaning and History (Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1955); Carlton H. Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1960); Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Inis Claude, National Minorities (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955); C. A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934); Said and Simon; Alfred Cobban, The Nation State and National Self- Determination (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1970).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10

theory of communication is particularly useful in enhancing our under

standing of the process of integration within ethnic societies. Of the

outstanding works done in this field, the contributions of Karl W.

Deutsch are a prime example.^

To these schools should be added the Marxian concept which views

nationalism as a historical phenomenon whose appearance coincides with

the epoch of capitalism. This school divides nations into two cate

gories of "oppressed nationalities" and "oppressor nationalities," a

division supposed to disappear only with the disappearance of capitalism

when replaced by socialism. Although the Marxist analysis of oppressed

nationalities was originally developed with a view to colonized peoples,

it can still be helpful in understanding the present-day subordinate

ethnic nations as well. The major contributions of this school are the

works of Lenin and Stalin, which constitute the most comprehensive works

among the classical Marxist studies on the subject.'7

The Study of the Case of Baluch Nationalism

Having given a few samples of an immense body of literature

on nationalism, it is necessary to review the literature on our case

study as well. While the Baluchi national movement in Pakistan has been

able to establish itself both politically and militarily as one of the

most organized national movements in the region, its counterpart in Iran

has been less successful in this regard. As a result, the bulk of

^Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966).

7V . I. Lenin, Three Articles on the National Question (Chicago: Liberator Press, n.d.); Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National-Colonial Question (San Francisco: Proletarian Publishers, 1975).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11

literature on the subject has focused on the Baluchi national question

in Pakistan to the relative exclusion of Baluchi nationalism in Iran.

In this regard, this study would serve to fill the gap in knowledge

about the case under discussion.

A survey of the existing literature on the subject indicates

that early information on Baluchi history is scattered in the works of

the medieval Muslim historians (of both Arab and Persian origins).

These are followed by an extensive range of studies produced by the

British scholars, explorers, and officials during the colonial era.

These contributions, which are the first systematic studies of their

kind, include historical, geo-political, anthropological, linguistic,

and archeological studies on the subject. The post-colonial era in the

Pakistani Baluchistan has also witnessed an upsurge in works written in

English, Urdu, and Baluchi dealing with the general history of the

Baluch and Baluchistan which reflected the growing concern over Baluchi

nationalism in the aftermath of the British departure In 1947. In this

category, the works of Muhammad S. K. Baluch, Mir Khudabux B. Marrl,

Ahmad Yar Khan, and Gul Khan Nasir are but a few examples. There are

also several general works written by Iranian authors in Farsi dealing

specifically with the historical and the general socio-economic condi

tions of the Baluch in Western Baluchistan. These include the works of

General Jahanbani, General Razm Ara, Islam Kazmieh, Naseh, and Nasir

Askarl. These works, however, do not deal directly with the issue of

Baluchi nationalism; and, as such, they are not reviewed here. However,

they will be used extensively in the first chapter dealing with the

basis of Baluchi nationalism particularly in the section on its history.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 12

The two pioneering works on the subject of the Baluchi national

ism are by Selig Harrison and Inayatullah Baluch.** Harrison's work is

the most comprehensive and up-to-date study of the case of Baluchi

nationalism, its inner dynamics, and its regional and international

implications. Nevertheless, the work's focus of analysis is more geared

toward the Baluch movement in Pakistan than that in Iran. That is even

more so with the works of Inayatullah Baluch. The only other political

study of the case is by Akhardad Baluch, an Iranian Baluch. This work,

however, is useful only in analyzing the Baluchi national movement and

its organizations in Western Baluchistan after the Iranian revolution in

1979, while hardly touching upon the movement prior to that time.^

Further inquiries also revealed that there is another major work on the

history of Baluchi nationalism also undertaken by Inayatt Baluch, a his

torian, in West Germany. This project, however, has not been completed

as yet, but is expected to be published upon completion within the next

few months. This and other historical works to which reference will be

made in the next chapter are indispensable in any study of Baluchi

nationalism from a historical perspective. Another article dealing

specifically with the issue is by Nader Entesar, which is also geared

**Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Inter national Peace, 1981); Inayatullah Baluch, "The Emergence of Baluch Nationalism, 1931-1947," Pakistan Progressives, nos. 3-4 (December 1980).

^Akhardad Baluch, Siasat Par Baluchistan [Politics in Baluchistan] (By the author: 1983).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 13

more toward Baluch nationalism in Pakistan and Afghanistan than that in

Iran.^

l^Nader Entesar, "Baluch Nationalism," Asian Affairs, An American Review (November-December 1979).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I

THE COHESIVE BASIS OF THE BALUCH NATIONALISM

This chapter describes and analyzes the cohesive basis or common

foundations of Baluch nationalism, elements which bind the Baluch people

together and give them their sense of nationhood. These are the Baluch

homeland, language, culture and religion, history, and ethnic origin.

Of these, the historical base of Baluch nationalism has been treated

more extensively in order to place the question in its proper historical

context as well.

Baluchistan

Baluchistan is the contemporary designation for the Gedrosia,

the country of Ichthiyophagi, and parts of the Drangia of the ancient

Greek chronicles, while comprising Makuran (corresponding to the first

two names), Turan (Kalat highlands in central Baluchistan), and Sajistan

(Drangia) of medieval times.* The name Baluchistan, that is, the

Baluchi homeland, bears in itself a significant national connotation

identifying the country with the Baluch.2 Gankovsky, a Soviet scholar

on the subject, has attributed the appearance of the name to the

*See, for example, Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander trans. Aubrey de Selincourt (New York: Penguin Books^ 1971), pp. 331-40.

^That is also the case with other similar names such as Kurdi stan (the Kurdish homeland), Arabistan (Arab homeland), Uzbakistan, etc. In these names the Persian suffix "estan," meaning land or territory, is added to the name of its ethnic inhabitants.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. "formation of Baluchi feudal nationality" and the spread of the Baluch

over the territory bearing their name to this day during the period

between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries.^ Lord Gurzon has

credited Nadir Shah of Persia with giving the country its present name

in mid-eighteenth century.^ Marri Baluch has viewed the birth of the

designation to have coincided with the spread of the Baluchis throughout

the country in the early decades of the fifteenth century, thus confirm

ing more or less the first notion. This and other Baluchi historical

accounts also trace the origin of the name as far back as the fifteenth

century when the Baluch established a large tribal confederacy that

incorporated the Baluchi territories and united the Baluchi tribes under

the rule and hegemony of the Rinds.^ Henceforth, the Baluch emerged as

the predominant political and military power, and the Baluchi language

and culture became paramount throughout the country. Consequently,

there is a general agreement among scholars of Baluchi studies bordering

consensus in identifying the land as the cradle of Baluchi ethno-

linguistic identity.

This vast tract of land covers more than 240,000 square miles

with a coastline of 1,000 miles stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to

the west of the port of Karachi on the Arabian Sea. Its frontiers are

generally accepted to be bounded on the north by the Helmand Valley, on

^Yu. V. Gankovsky, The Peoples of Pakistan, an Ethnic History (Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1971), pp. 147-48.

^George N. Gurzon, Persia and the Persian Question (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1966), 11:255.

^Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijarani Marri Baluch, Searchlights on Baloches and Balochistan (Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1974), p. 10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16

the south by the Arabian Sea, on the west by the Iranian province of

Kirman, and on the east by the Sind and the North West Frontier. Under

the British, the land was divided politically into three parts. The

Goldsind Line, drawn in 1871 and demarcated in 1896, gave western

Baluchistan to Persia, while retaining the larger eastern part for

British India. The Durand Line, drawn also by the British in 1894,

further divided Baluchistan between British India and Afghanistan,

assigning to the latter a small portion of northern Baluchistan. As a

British colonial legacy, these borders were inherited by Pakistan, Iran,

and Afghanistan and have served to divide the country ever since.

Today, the eastern part constitutes the Pakistani province of Baluchi

stan covering more than 134,000 square miles with its capital at Quetta,

while the western part in Iran is administratively divided into three

parts, of which the largest is known as the province of Siestan and

Baluchistan with its capital at Zahedan, as will be described in Chapter

III.6

Baluchistan has always been the victim of its geopolitical

position as much as its formidable geography and savage climate. Geo-

politically surrounded by, and compacted between, Arabia in the west,

6Curzon, for example, has defined Baluchistan as the "country between the Helmand and the Arabian Sea, and between Kerman and Sind" (p. 255). The same definition has also been given by other British authorities of the nineteenth century, including A. W. Hughes, The Country of Baluchistan (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 1977), pp. 2-4. Eastern Baluchistan constitutes one of the four provinces of Pakistan and its area is more than 134,000 square miles or close to half of the total area of Pakistan as described in White Paper on Baluchistan (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, 1974), p. 3. Western Baluchistan is divided into three parts of which the province of Seistan and Baluchistan is the largest, while the two smaller parts are included administratively in the neighboring provinces of Kermand and Hurmozgan, as will be discussed in Chapter IV dealing with Iranian Baluchistan.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 17

Persia in the north, and the Indian subcontinent in the east and strate

gically located on the maritime and overland routes of communication

between the Middle East and South Asia, the land has always been the

scene of constant contest between its powerful neighbors, attracting the

attention of the conquerors from all directions. The attempts by Semi-

ramis and Gyrus the Great to march through the country and the disas

trous march of Alexander the Great and his armies through Gedrosia are

recorded in the books of ancient history. The Muslim armies and the

Arab traders, on their way to the Indus Valley, traversed the land in

the seventh century. Neither did it escape the devastating waves of the

Turkish and Mongol invasions of the Middle East that lasted from the

tenth to the fifteenth centuries.?

Again in the contemporary era, Great Britain colonized the land

in the mid-nineteenth century to secure the "western gate" of its Indian

empire from Tzarist Russia. Today, the growing tensions and rivalry

between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in South Asia, the Middle East, the

Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean have made Baluchistan once again a

potential area of conflict between the superpowers and their regional

clients, as will be discussed in Chapter IX.

Geographically viewed, Baluchistan is separated and isolated

from the rest of the Iranian plateau by rugged and massive mountains on

the west, northeast, and east and by the formidable Lut Desert on the

north. These natural boundaries have always formed major barriers and

strong defense lines against foreign invaders, even though they have

^Baluchistan through the Ages, vol. 2: Geography and History (Selection from Government Documents) (Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1979), pp. 569-82.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 18

not stopped the major invasions, such as the ones mentioned earlier,

from taking place. They have also served to isolate the Baluch and

to make communication between them and the surrounding cultures more

difficult. The easiest routes of communication between Baluchistan and

Iran are the two classical invasion routes going north or south through

the Lut Desert. Here it is possible to enter Baluchistan either through

Seistan or through Kirman to the Baluchi town of Bampur, as was the case

with the Arab armies in the seventh century, or the reverse as Alexander

the Great marched one thousand years before them. Again, it was through

these two routes that the Persian armies sent by Reza Shah Pahlavi

entered western Baluchistan in 1928.^

The most striking feature of the land is well known to every

outside observer: the area is a forbidding region of extreme natural

contrasts alternating between massive ranges of barren mountains, rocky

plains, deserts, and fertile valleys. Makuran's massive coastal ranges

in the south, the Bashagard mountains in the northwest, Taftan (Daptan)

volcano and the Bazman ranges which are the extension of Iran's central

and northeastern mountains into the Sarhad region of northern Baluchi

stan, the snow-covered ranges of the central Kalat highlands, and the

massive ranges of Sulaiman mountains as the extension of the Hindu Kush

mountains into the northeast and east have given the land a predomi

nantly mountainous feature. These mountains, stretching sometimes for a

hundred miles in parallel, have always formed major barriers to easy

communication within the country. At the same time they have served

^Richard N. Frye, "Remarks on Baluchi History," in Islamic Iran and Central Asia, ed. R. N. Frye (London: Variorum Reprints, 1979), p. viii (44).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 19

as natural harbors, sheltering the Baluch in cases of war and foreign

invasion. This natural aspect has been captured best by a Baluchi

ballad that runs: "The lofty heights are our comrades, the pathless

gorges our f r i e n d s . Again, the massive mountain ranges are separated

by semi-desert and rocky plains which form arid expanses separating the

scattered communities in towns and villages by great distances. There

is also the desert of Kharan and Seistan in northern Baluchistan which

is the southward expansion of the Central Lut Desert of Iran.

Naturally, the climate of such a vast territory has extraordi

nary variety. In the nothern and interior highlands, the temperature

often drops to 40®F in winter, while the summers are temperate. The

coastal region is extremely hot, with temperatures soaring between 100®

to 130®F in summer, while winters provide a more favorable climate. In

spite of its position on the path of southwest monsoon winds from the

Indian Ocean, Baluchistan seldom receives more than five to twelve

inches of rainfall per year due to the low altitude of Makuran's coastal

ranges. As a result, surface water is a scarce commodity. There is no

large river flowing through the land. Most rivers possess permanent

banks, but flow only during heavy rains. At times the water from rain

disappears most often underground only to reappear at a distance or to

be preserved in the rivers’ rocky beds.

Yet the land possesses many fertile valleys and plains which

have been the center of towns and villages for the bulk of settled

population throughout history. The agricultural life traditionally has

%1. Longworth Dames, Popular Poetry of the Baloches (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1907), 1:45.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 20

been centered in the fertile valleys of Makuran in the south, the rich

plains of Lasbella and Kachhi in the southeast, the Bampur region

irrigated by a river of the same name in the northwest, and numerous

other agricultural oases scattered throughout the country. Selig S.

Harrison, a prominent authority on the subject of Baluchi nationalism,

has estimated that out of a total of some 85 million acres in Pakistani

Baluchistan, only 3.3 million acres are cultivated, of which only

800,000 are irrigated.^ The most important agricultural products con

sist of dates, grains, beans, and a variety of fruits and vegetables.

The relatively large tracts of cultivated land in these regions are

mostly Irrigated by mountain springs and rivers, while the smaller

tracts are irrigated by means of kahn or kariz, an ancient system of

irrigation based on a chain of wells connected by a subterranean passage

which brings underground water to the surface and is prevalent in

Makuran and parts of Iran. There are also patches of land called

khushab, irrigated through occasional rainfalls that are collected and

preserved on their surface. More important, Baluchistan, for the most

part, is formed of volcanic layers, thus being fertile and capable of

cultivation when sufficiently irrigated. This is particularly the case

in light of the recent discovery of huge reserves of underground water

in many parts of the country.

On the other hand, in Sarhad and other parts of northern

Baluchistan and the central Kalat highlands where mountainous territory

and plains are better suited for grazing than farming, the semi-nomadic

tribes are roving the land in search of water and fresh pasture lands

^Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 21

for their flocks of sheep and goats. Traditionally, the agricultural

(agrarian) economy has previled in southern Baluchistan resulting in a

deep-rooted feudalism in Makuran, while the northern part of the country

has been dominated by tribalism and pastoral economy. In many parts,

however, the dual economies of settled agriculture and pastoralism are

practiced side by side engaging both the nomads and peasants. Both

sectors traditionally have practiced trade, exchanging animal products

for agricultural crops or for products of the small artisan communities

in towns or for fish catches of the coastal fishermen. In addition,

there always has been a group of traders in small towns and villages

trading different goods from region to region within the country.

Another kind of trade involved neighboring countries with Baluchistan

exporting mostly dates, metals, and animal products (skins, wool, etc.)

via the caravan routes or ports to Arabia, India, and Afghanistan. In

return for these exports, it imported spices asnd manufactured products

for agriculture and warfare.

Inevitably, the formidable geography and the harsh climate of

the land has left its marks on all aspects of Baluchi society, influ

encing its history, its socio-economic structure and institutions, and

its political psychology. The geographical isolation has served to pre

serve and reinforce the Baluchi ethnic and cultural identity, thus pre

venting its assimilation and absorption into the neighboring cultures.

As a result of the dry climate and the lack of adequate surface water

supplies, the predominantly barren land is sparsely populated with an

estimated population of 5-7 million for an area of around 240,000 square

miles. This accounts for a population density of around eight to ten

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 22

per square mile. The same ecological factors have also been responsible

for the fragmentation of agricultural centers and pasturelands, thus

shaping the formation of the traditional feudal/tribal economy and its

corresonding socio-political institutions.^

Yet, the Baluch have developed a deeply rooted sense of attach

ment and affection to their homeland, which has in turn given them their

sense of identity and national consciousness. This attachment is

closely linked with a strong sense of awareness and of admiration for

the natural features of the land as is manifested best in an ancient

Baluchi saying that "the dry wood of the homeland is better than the

world" (wai-ie vatane hoskin dar). It is often incorporated in patri

otic songs chanted at nationalist gatherings as exemplified in the

following:

Pleasant as the homeland of another may be, populous and affluent and great of name, streams of honey may run there, but for Nasir [the ruler of Baluchistan

H-There is a great discrepancy between the Baluch nationalists' estimates and the official census of the Baluchi population. The esti mates given by Baluch nationalists range from 30 million by Ahmad Yar Khan, the last ruler of Kalat (Inside Baluchistan [Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1979], p. 207), to 14 million by Marri (Searchlights, pp. 15-24). By contrast, the official Pakistani census of 1972 showed a total population of 2.428 million in the Baluchistan Province, while the Iranian census of 1976 placed the population of its Baluchistan Province at 659,297. These figures include the non-Baluch population of the two provinces as well, but exclude the Baluch population outside Baluchi stan, which is estimated to be as large as the Baluch population of the entire Baluchistan itself and concentrated mainly in Sind. Harrison has estimated the total Baluch population at 5 million (In Afghanistan's Shadow, pp. 1, 176-78). An analysis of the population of Iranian Baluchistan will be given in Chapter III. The author estimates the Baluch population at around 9 million (2 million in Iran, 7 million in Pakistan, 300,000 in Afghanistan, 450,000 in the Arab Gulf states, and 30,000 in the Soviet Union).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 23

from 1741 to 1805] the wood of the homeland is better than all the world.^

Finally, the process of modernization and economic development

has just begun to affect both the eastern and the western parts of

Baluchistan in recent years, opening a new era which is bound to

transform the Baluchi society and its divided homeland. The limited

surveys which have taken place so far in both parts indicate that the

land is endowed with rich mineral resources including oil, natural gas,

uranium, coal, chromite, marble, sulphur, iron ore, and other potential

resources that await further studies. So far, only natural gas, goal;,

and marble mines have been exploited in the Pakistani part of Baluchi

stan, while the Iranian part is lagging far behind in this regard.

There is great economic potential for developing the extensive fishing

resources and expanding the port facilities along the long coast of

approximately 1,000 miles. Given the discovery of huge sub-surface

water reserves, the potentials for agricultural expansion and urban

development have multiplied in recent years.^ in short, the process of

modernization is bound to reduce the impact of ecological barriers, as

will be discussed in Chapter III.

History

In addition to a common homeland, Baluch history also serves as

a strong cohesive force which binds the Baluch together through a set of

A. R. Barker and Agil Khan Hengal, A Course in Baluchi (Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1969), 11:400.

l^For a discussion of mineral resources in Baluchistan, see Marri, Searchlights, pp. 269-81.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 24

shared historical memories based on their common historical experience.

The Baluch nationalists express a strong sense of pride in their past

for having successfully defended and preserved their national and

cultural identity against powerful foreign adversaries throughout his

tory. Therefore, they interpret Baluch history as a history of a

perennial common struggle against surrounding empires and empire

builders and view the contemporary Baluch national movement as the

latest phase of this continuing struggle. They are still fresh with the

memories of the pre-division era in Baluchistan known as the Baluchi

Doura (era) (approximately 1400-1948 A.D.) when the Baluch not only

enjoyed self-rule, but also resisted successfully the relentless foreign

invasion for the permanent annexation of Baluchistan into the surround

ing empires. The essence of the Baluchi perception of their history is

captured best by the following observation by Selig Harrison:

Reliving their past endlessly in books, magazines, and folk ballads, the Baluch accentuate the positive. They revel in gory details of ancient battles against Persians, Turks, Arabs, Tartars, Hindus, and other adversaries, focusing on how valiantly their generals fought rather than on whether the Baluch won or lost. They point to the heroes who struggled to throw off the yoke of more powerful oppres sors and minimize the role of the Quislings who sold out the Baluchi cause. Above all they seek to magnify the achievements of their more successful rulers.^

Therefore, it is important to investigate the Baluchi accounts

of their history not only to place the contemporary Baluchi national

movement in its historical perspective, but also to understand some of

the historical explanations and interpretations used by the nationalists

to justify their present national claims.

■^Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 12.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 25

Historians have not been able to determine with certainty

whether the Baluce are the descendants of the ancient inhabitants of the

land such as the Indo-Aryan tribes who arrived there around the middle

of the second millenium B.C., ancient Gedrosians and Saks, or whether

they superseded them and inherited their legacy after having migrated to

the land from the southern shores of the Caspian Sea as is assumed by

linguists and most historians. As far as the pre-Islamic era is con

cerned, the only references to the Baluch under this name are found in

Firdausi's Shah Name (The Book of Kings), the great Iranian national

epic of the tenth century. The book for the most part deals with pre-

Islamic Persian mythology, but its last chapters recount the events and

personalities of the Sassanian period, thus purported to be historical.

The Baluchis are mentioned in both sections. They are described as

forming part of the armies of the mythical Persian kings Kai Kaus and

Kai Khusrow in the Iranian wars against Turanians. As Dames has pointed

out, "This means no more than that their name occurred among others in

the ballads or legends which Firdausi drew upon."15 The Shah Name's

description of Baluchi warriors is noteworthy:

After Gustasm came Ashkash . . . His army was from the wanderers of the Koch and Baluch, intent on war and with exalted cockscomb crests, whose back none in the world ever saw. Nor was one of their fingers bare of armour. His banner bore the figure of a tiger.*6

Historically, however, the allusion to the Perso-Baluchi wars

under the Sassanian Kings, Ardashir (presumably the founder of the

15m . Longworth Dames, The Baloch Race: A Historical and Ethnological Sketch (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1904), p. 26.

l^As cited by Sardar Khan in The History of the Baluch Race and Baluchistan (Karachi: Process, 1958), p. 29.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26

dynasty) and Chosroes Anosarvan (531-578 A.D.) is more relevant.

According to the Shah Name, Ardashir had campaigned to subdue the

Baluch, but in vain. Then, the Baluch are described to have laid waste

the country once again during the reign of Chosroes Anosarvan. This

news and the story of the failure of his predecessor enraged the emperor

whose troops succeeded in destroying the Baluch. Since this issue is a

matter of controversy between the contemporary Baluch and Persian

nationalists, it is important to quote the actual passage as it is.

Says the Shah Namei

He [Anosarvan] went his way, and tidings came to him: "The World is wasted by the Baluchis, Till from exceeding slaughter, pillaging And harrying, the earth is overwhelmed, But greater ruin cometh from Gilan, And curses banish blessings." Thence the heart Of Nausherwan, the Shah, was sorrowful, And grief commingled with his joy. He said to the Iranians: "The Alans and Hind were, In their terror of our scimitars, like silk. Now our own realm is turned against us: Shall we hunt lions and forego the sheep?" One said to him: "The garden hath no rose, Without a thorn, 0 King! So too these marches, Are ever troublesome and treasure-wasting. As for Baluch the glorious Ardashir tried it with All his veteran officers, But all his strategems and artifices, His feints, his labours, arms, and fighting failed, And though the enterprise succeeded ill, He cloaked the failures even to himself." The story of the (failure) enraged the Shah, Who went upon his way towards the Baluch, Now when he drew near those lofty mountains, He went around them with his retinue, And all his host encircled them about, And barred the passage e'en to wind and ant, The troops, like ants and locusts, occupied, The mountains-outskirts to the sandy deserts. A herald went his rounds about the host, Proclaiming from the mountains, caves, and plains: "Whene'er the Baluchis are seeking food If they be warriors and carrying arms,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 27

However many or however few, Let not a single one of them escape." The troops, ware of the anger of the Shah, Stopped every outlet with their horse and foot; Few of the Baluchis or none survived, No women, children, warriors, were left. All of them perished by the scimitar, And all their evil doings had an end, The world had quiet from their ravagings: No Baluchi 9een or unseen remained, While on their mountains, so it came to pass, The herds thenceforward strayed without a guard; "Alike on waste and lofty mountain-top, The sheep required no shepherd. All the folk Around thought nothing of past sufferings, And looked on vale and mountain as their home."

"The wolf’s clases grow too short to reach the sheep World without end strife with Baluch had raged, And filled the cities with distress and anguish. But by the grace, Nausherwan, the sky Had changed its use and f a v o u r . " ^

Whatever the historical relevance of the Shah Name’s passage,

it remains a source of contention and various interpretation between the

Baluch and Persian nationalists. Marri has taken it as evidence that

the Baluchis must have constituted a formidable adversary to contend

with when a mlghtly emperor as Anosarvan rejoices on his victory over

them, thus, "not a band of robber-tribes and troublemakers, as mali

ciously described by some contemporary Irani historians and ill-informed

western travellers."^ Sardar Khan Baluch, another Baluchi historian,

views the passage as a further indication underlining the historical

l^Ibid., pp. 29-31. See, also, Firdausi, Shah Name, trans. Arthur G. Warner and Edmund Warner (London: Kegan Paul, Trench Turner & Co., n.d.), 7:241-43.

^Marri, Searchlights, pp. 40, 45.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 28

animosity between the two sides, thus scorning the emperor for his

heavy-handed campaign against the B a l u c h . 19

Consequently, Anosarvan's military campaigns against the Baluch

are thought by some scholars to have played a major role in the latter

events when the Baluch deserted the Sassanian army and joined the ranks

of the Muslims during the Arab invasion and conquest of Iran in the

seventh century or eighty-five years later. Naser Askari, an Iranian

writer, points to the "atrocities" committed against the Baluch by the

aforementioned emperor as the likely cause that led a reputed Baluchi

general Siah Sawar Baluch to abandon other Sassanian generals and join

the invading Arabs.20 On the other hand, Bahar, an Iranian historian

and poet laureate of the Reza Shah Pahlavi, attributes the Persian

defeat on the Shustar front (al-Sus) to the treachery of the Baluchi

general Siah Sawar, whom he identifies as general Aswara of Beladhuri,^!

a renowned Arab chronicler of the ninth century. In response to Bahar,

Sardar Khan Baluch treats him as "the Baluchi hero," while Marri takes

Bahar's opinion as a sign of "his personal dislike for Baloches,"

observing that the nationalist poet "must have been influenced by the

^Muhammad Sardar Khan Baluch, The Great Baluch: Life and Times of Ameer Chakar Rind, 1454-1551 A.D. (Quetta: Baluchi Academy, 1965), pp. 19-20.

2^Naser Askari, Moghdama-i Bar Shenakht Ustan Sistan va Baluchistan [An Introduction to the Recognition of Seistan and Baluchistan] (Tehran: Intesharal-e Doniay-e Danish 1357 A.H.), pp. 59, 117-18.

^For an account of Asawiri (plural of Sawar), I have seen the Persian translation by Azartash Azarnoosh of Futah al-Buldan by Al-Balazuri (Tehran: Khaja Publication, 1967), pp. 235-41.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 29

events of his own time when late Reza Shah Pahlavi, his master, was

feverishly engaged in subduing the Irani Baluch.These two episodes

are mentioned here to illustrate how historical events, no matter how

controversial, have become the subject of nationalist interpretation,

which in turn affect and, to some extent, shape the national preceptions

on all sides.

To turn to the Islamic period, the earliest accounts of the

Baluchis are scattered in the works of the tenth century Muslim

geographers, of whom Masudi (943 A.D.), Istakhri (951 A.D.), and Ibn

Haukal are the most renowned; while in the succeeding centuries the

chronicles of Idrisi, Yakut, and many other medieval authors shed some

light on the history of the people. The Baluches are referred to as

"Balus," or "Bulus," and are mentioned together with "Qufs" as "Qufs and

Bulus," while the medieval Persian sources call them "Koch and Baluch"

(Koch-va-Baluch) as mentioned in Shah Name. Yet whether the two words

are synonymous or refer to two different people has not yet been estab

lished by historians. From these sources we learn that by the late

tenth century the Baluch were living in eastern Kerman, western Makuran,

and parts of Seistan; that they spoke their own language, not the

Persian as the prevalent language of Kirman; that they were organized

into many tribes each under its own chief; that they were occupied

mainly with stock breeding; and that they were also noted for their

marauding activities. However, Idrisi and Yakut do not confirm the last

^Sardar Khan, The Great Baluch, pp. 21-22; Marri, Searchlights, p. 96.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 30

account and describe them as a rich and prosperous people who owned

numerous cattle and did not plunder caravans.^3

The final Arab conquest of Makuran appears to have been

effected by the Umawid general Muhammad bin Qasim, who was also its

governor in 707 A.D. (89 A.H.). Thereafter, the country was ruled by

Arab governors at least until the late tenth century when the central

rule of the Abasid Caliphate began decline. The Arabs established large

garrisons and naval fortifications in the country, turning it into a

major staging point for their further conquests in Sind and beyond.

Parallel to this, Arab trade centers expadned in Makuran towns, reviving

the old trade routes going from India to Persia through Makuran. It is

also known that many Arab tribes gradually settled in the country,

particularly in coastal Makuran. ^

The period of Islamic rule under discussion constitutes the

period of direct Arab rule over Makuran that lasted until the close of

the tenth century. Not only did the Baluch gradually accept Islam and

become united under its banner during this period, but they were also

relieved from the constant political and military pressure from Persia

in the north. Moreover, they benefited materially from the growth of

Le Strange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate (Cambridge: University Press, 1905), pp. 299-334; Dames, Baluch Race, pp. 29-35; Frye, "Remarks on Baluchi History," pp. 46-47; Richard N. Frye, The Golden Age of Persia (London: W. Eidenberg & Nicolson, 1975), pp. 111-12; Sir Percy Sykes, Ten Thousand Miles in Persia or Eight Years in Iran (London: Murray, 19U2), pp. 100-102.

^Frye, Golden Age of Persia, p. 83. For an account of the strategic importance of Makuran to the Arabs as well as an account of its towns and trade routes at the time, see the work by Col. Sir Thomas Holdich, The Gates of India, (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 1977), chs. 5-12, particularly chs. 8-12, pp. 284-390.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 31

trade and commerce which flourished in towns and ports under the Arabs,

reviving the old sea and land-based trade routes that linked India to

Persia and Arabia through western Makuran. These developments appear to

have played a significant role in enabling the Baluch to form large-

scale tribal federations that led to their gradual political and mili

tary supremacy in the territories now forming Baluchistan during the

period of the tenth through thirteenth centuries.

With the decline of the central rule of the Islamic Caliphate at

the end of the tenth century, local rulers and tribal chieftains began

once again to reassert their power and influence. It is precisely dur

ing this period that the Muslim chroniclers, of whom some were already

mentioned, took notes of the accounts of the Baluchis in connection with

their conflicts with the rising local Iranian and Turkish dynasties in

Kerman, Khurasan, and Seistan. The Baluch are reported to have been

dealt a devastating blow in Kerman by the Dailami rulers Dau-al Doula

(949-982 A.D.) and his uncle Muizzu'd-doula in the second half of the

tenth century.^5 They were also defeated and routed en mass around

Khabis by the troops of Ghaznavid Sultan Mahmoud and his son Masud at

the beginning of the eleventh century.^6 Thereafter, under the impact

of the subsequent Seljuk invasion of Kerman, the Baluch moved farther

eastward spreading throughout Seistan and Makuran in the eleventh and

twelfth centuries. At the time of the Mongol invasion and under its

^Dames, Baluch Race, p. 32; Marri, Searchlights, pp. 101-8.

^Gankovsky, Peoples of Pakistan, p. 146; Marri, Searchlights, pp. 118-19; Richard N. Frye, ed., The Cambridge History of Iran (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968-1983), 4:173, 189.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 32

devastating impact, they appear to have traversed the eastern Makuran as

well and entered Sind in the mid-thirteenth c e n t u r y . 27

These events appear to have contributed to the disintegration of

clan organization and the formation of large-scale tribal groupings

which were more effective not only in dealing with powerful northern

adversaries mentioned earlier, but also for consolidating their power

over Makuran during the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. Dames and

other students of Baluchi folklore and genealogical legends refer to the

period between the eleventh and twelfth centuries as the time corres

ponding with the lifetime of the legendary ancestor of the Baluchis, Mir

Jalal Khan, who is said to have headed all the Baluch, then forming "one

body" divided into forty-four tribes or boloks. He left four sons—

Rind, Lashari, Hot, Korai— and one daughter— Jato— who are eponyms of

large Baluchi tribes to this day. Gankovsky confirms this notion by

asserting that "it is evidently during this period that the major tribal

unions which formed the nucleus of the Baluchi feudal nationality in the

sequel did arise." He adds that "several small feudal states" also

flourished there including Turan with its capital Khuzdar in eastern

Baluchistan, Kanabil, present-day Gandava, Kej in western Makuran and

others.28

There is evidence to suggest that the country was relatively

more prosperous in medieval times than it was during the last few cen

turies. Saniu-al-Doula, an Iranian geographer, asserts that iron,

27Frye, "Remarks on Baluchi History," pp. 46-47; Dames, Baluch Race, pp. 33-34.

28cankovsky, Peoples of Pakistan, p. 146.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 33

steel, sugar, copper, and other metals were exported from Baluchistan to

India, Khurasan, and Kabul during the middle ages.29 Relying on

twelfth-century sources, Sir Percy Sykes states that during the reign of

Toghrul Shah Seljuk of Kerman the duty on silk from Makuran was 30,000

dinars, while the duties collected only from the port of Tiz were half

that amount.in western Baluchistan, the towns of Bampur, Dizak,

Kasarkand, Ke j, and Panjgur formed major centers for cultural and

economic life. Marco Polo also visited the country, referred to as

Kesmacoran, during his travels through the Orient and gave the following

account:

This is a great kingdom with a king and language of its own. Some of the people are idolaters, but most are Saracens. They live by trade and industry. They have rice and wheat in profusion. The staple foods are rice, meat and milk. Merchants come here in great numbers by sea and by land with a variety of merchandise and export the products of the kingdom. There is nothing else worthy of note.31

However, the Mongol invasion in the mid-thirteenth century fol

lowed by the Timur forays into the country in the next century resulted

in the decline of agriculture and the breakdown of the irrigation sys

tems, forcing large-scale tribal migration from Makuran farther south

and northeast where they entered Sind and Punjab in the fourteenth and

fifteenth centuries.32

29sani-u al-Doula, Meraat al-Buldan [The Mirror of the Lands] (Tehran: n.p., 1294 A.H.).

31*Sykes, Ten Thousand Miles in Persia, p. 100.

3^-The Travels of Marco Polo, trans. Ronald Latham (New York: Penguin Books, 1958), pp. 293-94.

32oames, Baluch Race, p. 34; Gankovsky, Peoples of Pakistan, pp. 146-47.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 34

The Baluchi Doura (Era) (1400-1948 A.D.)

The Baluchi Doura or Zamana (era) is a historical concept used

by the Baluch to refer to the state of affairs in Baluchistan prior to

the political division of the country by the British in the first half

of this century. The era appears to have begun with the process of the

decline of the central rule of the Caliphate and the subsequent rise of

the Baluchis in western Baluchistan in the early years of the eleventh

century. As has already been described, by the end of the fourteenth

century most of the territories of present-day Baluchistan gradually had

been consolidated and brought under Baluch control. Again, it is during

this period that feudal and tribal relations as the predominant forms of

social and political organization took the shape which has survived in

some parts of the country to this day. Consequently, the pre-division

era is known by the Baluch as the Baluchi Doura or Baluchi Zamana, which

are synonymous terms for the Baluchi era, signifying a period when the

Baluchi political and military institutions as well as Baluchi culture

and language were paramount throughout the country. Here the concept is

specifically applied to the period between the fifteenth century and the

first half of this century when the existing division took place. The

British colonial rule (1854-1947) is also included in this period

because it did not replace Baluchi political rule and institutions, but

simply created its own parallel system of administration, as will be

described later.

The Baluchi Doura is distinguished by three main characteris

tics. In the first place, for the most part of this period, Baluchistan

maintained its independence from the surrounding empires. This was the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 35

case not only when It was united under the first Baluchi tribal confed

eracy established by Rinds in the early fifteenth century and under the

Khanate of Kalat (1666-1948), but also when it was divided among several

independent feudal states (khanates or hokomates). Only the most power

ful Iranian kings such as Shah Abbas Safavid and Nadirshah were able to

extend their sway over some parts of the country for very short periods

in the beginning of the seventeenth century and the second quarter of

the eighteenth century, respectively. As soon as their military expedi

tions or tax collectors left the country, the Baluch reasserted their

independence once again. As will be elaborated in the next chapter,

there was no permanent Iranian administrative rule over the whole coun

try during this period. Describing the state of affairs in the western

most parts of Baluchistan in the first half of the nineteenth century,

Lord Curzon states that "there was no sign of Persian authority at the

sea ports, and the Chiefs of Geh, Bahu, and Serbaz were all indepen

dent."-^ So was the condition of the rest of the country during the

entire Baluchi Doura. Therefore, the term signifies Baluchi political

independence and the absence of foreign political and administrative

rule.

Second, the period is characterized by the predominance of

Baluchi socio-political and cultural institutions in Baluchistan. The

Baluch were ruled by a set of laws, traditions, and socio-political

institutions of their own; and the Baluchi language and culture were

spoken and practiced exclusively. Of course, there prevailed a feudal-

tribal order throughout this period. The feudal order was, and still

^^Curzon, Persia, 2:235.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 36

is rooted in Makuran where the settled population was mostly engaged in

agriculture in scattered towns and villages. Each fiefdom or principal

ity called Hokomat consisted of a cluster of villages ruled by a feudal

lord known as hakom or khan. He was seated in the central fort called

Kalate Mlri— located usually in the larger town or village. The most

important hakomat were those of Kej, Dizak, Bampur, Panjgur, Kaserkand,

Sarbaz, Magas, Geh, and Bahu, which were major feudal centers each sur

rounded by several agricultural towns and villages with as many forts.

Each village with its fort was headed by a lesser hakom who collected a

tithe (dah yek) of the crops as taxes for maintaining the irrigation

system and law and order. Part of the tax was sent to the chief hakom

as well.

The tribal system prevailed in the scattered pasturelands of

northern Baluchistan. Each tribe was, and still is, headed by a chief

tain known as the sardar, selected more often from the male lineage of

the ruling clan in each tribe. It is divided into many clans and sub

clans with each having its own lesser chieftain. The tribal pasture

lands were owned collectively but each tribesman was to pay one-tenth of

his animals to the sardar in order to enable him to discharge both

intra- and inter-tribal relations of the tribe. The Baluchi tribes and

fiefdoins were linked economically through trade and exchange of agricul

tural crops and animal products. They interacted socially, cooperated

politically, and united militarily whenever faced with a common external

threat. Although both were dependent on a subsistence economy, they

were from time to time able to pool their limited resources together and

produce the kind of surpluses which were necessary for the formation of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 37

large tribal confederacies discussed below. Because of these features,

Baluchi Doura is sometimes connected with the Hakomi or Sardari era,

meaning the era of hakoms or sardars.

Third and most important, it was during this period that the

Baluch formed two independent tribal confederacies that united Baluchi

tribes and incorporated all the Baluchi territories under their central

rule. The first tribal confederacy was established by Rinds in the late

fifteenth century, while the second one constituted the Khanate of

Khalate established in 1666 A.D. This was the last independent Baluchi

state that survived British colonial rule under the name of Kalate state

until 1948. Therefore, they are the focus of nationalist claims for the

reunification of Baluchistan.

The Baluchi Doura is best identified with the Rind hegemony and

particularly with the reign of Mir Chakar Rind (approximately 1487-1511

A.D.), who established one of the largest Baluchi tribal confederacies

stretching from Kirman in the west to the Indus River valley in the

east, thus for the first time uniting eastern and western Baluchistan in

the late fifteenth century. This confederacy was centered mainly around

the two most powerful tribes of Rind and Lasharis, each in turn consti

tuting a loosely organized federation of several lesser tribes. In the

nationalists' accounts, Mir Chakar is credited with organizing the feud

ing Baluchi tribes into a formidable fighting force that swept eastern

Makuran, Kalat highlands, Sibi, and the fertile plains of Kachi in

southern Baluchistan. It was approximately after 1487 A.D. that Chakar

transferred his capital to Sibi in eastern Baluchistan leaving behind

the traditional centers of Baluchi power in Bampur and Kej in western

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 38

Baluchistan. Thereafter, Baluchi power shifted from west to east, and

it has remained there ever since. Having consolidated the eastern ter

ritories of Baluchistan, he advanced into Punjab, taking Multan and the

southern parts of Punjab in the early sixteenth century. This success

resulted in a large-scale Baluchi migration into Sind and Punjab that

has profoundly affected the demographic features and the political

scenes of the region ever since. There is still as large a Baluchi

population in Sind and Punjab as there is in Baluchistan proper.3^

Today, the Baluch nationalists hail Amir Chakar as the first

Baluchi nation builder to be credited with the political and territorial

unification of Baluchistan. Sardar Khan in The Great Baluch equates the

Chakarian rule with the "Golden Age" of Baluch and Baluchistan, thus

entitling him "The Great Baluch." In the popular historical perception

of the Baluch he remains to this day the. personification of the Baluchi

code of honor and the symbol of Baluchi martial virtues. As Dames

noted, "He is still looked upon as the ideal Baluchi chief and his

exploits are magnified by modern legends into something miraculous but

in the ballads [of his own time] there is no mixture of the super

natural."^^

Furthermore, the times of Mir Chakar are characterized as the

classical era of Baluchi epic or heroic ballads and romantic poetry in

Baluchi literary history. Apparently most of the Baluchi ballads are

rooted in this period, describing the events, exploitations,

^^Marri, Searchlights, pp. 61-62, 137-88; Harrison, In Afghan istan's Shadow, pp. 12-15; Dames, Baluch Race, pp. 43-44.

^Dames, Popular Poetry of the Baloches, 1:28.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 39

personalities, and the names of tribes and localities which collaborated

with the Baluchi history of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.36

Parallel to the expansion of the Rind hegemony in the country, Baluchi

language and oral literature also blossomed thus strengthening and

spreading a relatively homogeneous Baluchi culture and value system

throughout the country. In this respect, Chakar's contributions and

achievements proved to be more enduring than his political and military

gains.

However, Chakar's tribal confederacy was disrupted by a pro

longed civil war, known as the thirty years' war, which took place

between the Rinds and Lasharis in the early years of the sixteenth

century. It happened shortly after the Baluch had firmly consolidated

their power in the eastern territories and had begun to spread into

Punjab and Sind. The war engulfed the entire territory of Sibi, Daddar,

and Kachi; polarized the whole society into two warring camps of Rinds

and Lasharis, each camp seeking help from neighboring powers in Khorasan

and Sind, respectively; and eventually destroyed Chakar's monarchy,

forcing him to abdicate form his capital in Sibi to Punjab, where he

died around 1551 A.D. He is buried there at Satgarah.

Most of the nationalist accounts attribute the civil war to

Chakar's failure to establish an administrative structure capable of

superseding the divisive tribal-feudal institutions on which he had

based his power. Sardar Khan has described the rule of Chakar as the

rule of "sword and saddle" and contends that under him the Rinds had

36lbid., pp. xxi-xxlv; Sardar Khan, The Great Baluch, p. 40; Marri, Searchlights, pp. 61-62.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 40

alienated other Baluchi tribes by monopolizing political power in their

hands, thus causing the civil war which "brought the edifice of Baluch

sovereignty crashing down in ruin before the foundation was laid

d o w n . "37 Mir Gul Khan Nasir and Marri have expressed more or less the

same view, even though most Baluchi historians view the Baluchi tribes

of the sixteenth century as democratic institutions which required

sardars to consult the jirga (tribal c o u n c i l ) . 38 However, this first

confederacy constituted a military alliance of Baluchi tribes for

securing the eastern territories of Baluchistan. As soon as this objec

tive was accomplished, then the question of division of power between

Rinds and Lasharis and distribution of the spoils of new conquests

became a divisive issue that fueled the traditional inter-tribal feuds

once again, thus together leading to the civil war.

The demise of Rind power unleashed the centrifugal tendencies

among feudal lords and tribal sardars once again, and the ensuing state

of chaos and anarchy led to the disintegration of Baluchistan into

several independent feudal states and chieftainates known as khanat or

hokomat in eastern and western Baluchistan, respectively. Relations

among these states were characterized by constant wars and animosities

that not only prevented a semblance of political unity, but also weak

ened them and exposed them to foreign invasion. It was under such cir

cumstances that the powerful Safavid King Shah Abbas sent an expedition

under the then-governor of Kiramn Ganj Ali Khan to attack western

^^Sardar Khan, The Great Baluch, pp. 138-39.

38lnayat. Bnloch, "Tribal System in Baluchistan: Its Origin and Its Transformation into a Gruel and Reactionary System," Politics of Pakistan, April 1980, pp. 6-8, 15.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 41

Baluchistan in 1613 A.D. Subsequently, the local Saffar ruler of Bampur

was defeated, but regained his independence upon submitting a large

tribute to the s h a h . 39

The most powerful of the Baluchi feudal states was the Khanate

of Kalat, known as such after its capital at Kalat, established by the

Ahmadzai dynasty in the highlands of central Baluchistan in 1666 A.D.

Originally a confederacy of Brahui tribes inhabiting the Kallat region,

the Kalat Khanate gradually imposed its rule over other independent

Baluchi principalities in Makuran (Kej, Dizak, Punjgoor, Bampur, Magas,

Kasorkand), Las Bela, Ganddva, and chieftainates of Sarhad, Kharan, and

Bugti-Marri tribal lands. Consequently, during the eighteenth and early

nineteenth centuries, Kalat ruled over a vast territory that exceeded

the domains of Amir Chakhar. It reached the zenith of its power during

the reigns of Abdullah Khan (1714-1734) and Nasir Khan I (1745-1805

A.D.), the fourth and sixth khans of Kalat, respectively.

Abdullah Khan claimed jurisdiction over all the lands inhabited

by the Baluchi tribes, stretching from Kandahar (now in Afghanistan) in

the north, to Bandar Abbas (now in Iran) in the west, and to Dira Ghazi

Khan district on the western edge of Punjab in the east. He is known

more for his relentless military campaigns which subdued tribe after

tribe and expanded the borders of his state to include an area even

larger than the entire Baluchistan proper of today. These military

ventures, however, exhausted his resources; subsequently, he was unable

to replace the tribal-feudal state institutions with a unified adminis

trative structure for territories under his military rule. The latter

^^Sykes, Ten Thousand Miles, p. 103.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 42

years of his reign also coincided with the beginning of the Invasion of

the subcontinent by the Iranian conquerer Nadir Shah, the last Sunni

king of Iran. This event prompted him to pay tribute to that monarch in

order to save his realm from the threat of Persian invasion.

The Baluch nationalists, however, reserve their highest admira

tion for Nasir Khan I (known also as Nasir Khan Baluch or Nasir Khan

Noori), the son and the second successor of Abdullah Khan, for his

accomplishments in building a semi-modern institutional infrastructure

for the state. He occupied the Kalat throne in 1741 and ruled for more

than half a century. His realm included the port of Karachi in the

east, all of Baluchistan up to the eastern borders of Persia in the

west, and the Pashtoon-speaking regions of Dajil, Mastung, and Harran in

the northeast. He was the first Kalat ruler to embark upon the task of

replacing the traditional state structure with a centralized bureaucra

tic administration that institutionalized the central authority of the

Kalat.40

The bureaucratic institutions of his central administration

consisted of (I) the court (darbar); (2) state consultative assemblies

described by Ahmad Yar Khan, the last ruler of Kalat as a "Baluch

parliament" consisting of a tribally chosen lower chamber and a upper

chamber with appointed members; and (3) a civil administration comprised

of a vazir (prime minister), responsible for day-to-day affairs both

40Hughes, pp. 186-87. For a brief account of the history of the Kalat Khanate, see, also, H. Pottinger, Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde (Karachi: Indus Publication, 1976), pp. 276-90; Nina Bailey Swidler, "The Political Structure of a Tribal Federation: The Brahui of Baluchistan" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1969); Sardar Khan, History of the Baluch Race, pp. 75-127; Marri, Searchlights, pp. 225-49.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 43

internally and externally, a vakil in charge of state revenues, a

darougha responsible for the capital security, and naibs or provincial

governors.^ This, of course, resembled the kind of administration that

existed in neighboring countries at the time. Moreover, he created a

standing army divided into four regiments with an estimated strength of

25,000 to 60,000 troops. As Selig Harrison observed:

Nasir Khan’s most notable achievement was the creation of a unified Baluch army of some 25,000 men and 1,000 camels, an impressive force by eighteenth-century southwest Asian standards. For the first time in their history, most of the major Baluchi tribes were rallied under the banner of an agreed system of military organizations and recruitent.

Furthermore, Nasir Khan strengthened the economic infrastructure

of the state by constructing an extensive network of roads, caravan

serais, and forts; expanding the irrigation systems; and improving the

state treasury by reorganizing the collection system for taxes and other

revenues. Gankovsky asserts that Nasir Khan had an annual revenue

exceeding three million rupees, while Sardar Khan places that figure at

more than four million rupees.^3 This was despite the fact that under

Nasir Khan merchants and craftsmen were exempted from taxes in order to

encourage trade and industry; some of the major tribes did not pay

taxes, but only supplied a military quota to his array. The state treas

ury derived its revenues from the 10 percent tax (dah yek) on individual

income, revenues from the extensive crown lands scattered throughout the

country which formed large parts of the Sarawan and Kach-Gandava

^ M i r Ahinad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, p. 84.

^Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 16.

^Gankovsky, Peoples of Pakistan, p. 151; Sardar Khan, History of the Baluch Race, p. 123.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 44

districts, and the taxes imposed upon the tribes exempted from the troop

quota.^4

As mentioned earlier, with the rise of Nadir Shah and his

invasion of India in 1739, Kalat began to pay tribute to the Persian

emperor. As a result, Nadir Shah assisted Nasir Khan to win the con

tested throne of Kalat after the death of his father Abdullah Khan and

conferred upon him the title of Begller Beg of Baluchistan. Upon the

assassination of Nadir Shah in 1747 and the subsequent disintegration of

his empire, Nasir Khan declared his independence, but was contested by

Ahmad Shah Durrani, who had also declared his independence in Afghani

stan at the same time and thus forced to accept Afghan suzerainty.

However, Nasir Khan regained his independence in 1758 in the aftermath

of several inconclusive Afghan-Baluchi wars, but joined Ahmad Shah in a

military alliance which is invoked and celebrated by the Afghan and

Baluch nationalists as a basis for their continuing cooperation to this

day. Fostered by their common adherence to Sunni Islam, the Afghan-

Baluchi alliance was apparently developed as a response to the common

threat posed to their respective states by a relatively powerful and

Shiat-dominated Persian empire and in part as a counter to the growing

Sikh power in then-independent Punjab. Subsequently, Nasir Khan joined

the Afghan king in his military campaigns in Mashhad against Persia in

1759 as well as his expeditions against the Sikhs in 1761-62 A.D.

It is due to these achievements that he is accorded the title of

Nasir Khan "the Great” in the annals of Baluchi history and his name is

^Hughes, pp. 185-86; Sardar Khan, History of the Baluch Race, p. 123.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 45

invoked in the Baluchi national anthem and patriotic songs.^ Today,

the Baluch nationalists look with nostalgia to his success in creating a

politically united sovereign Baluchi state as a historical precedent

supporting their claim for a reunited Baluchistan. The passage written

by Sir Henry Pottinger, who visited Baluchistan in 1810, is noteworthy

in describing the character and achievements of Nasir Khan:

If we contemplate the character of Nasir Khan, whether as a soldier, a statesman or a prince, and call to mind the people among whom he was replaced, we shall find in him a most extraordinary combination of all the virtues attached to those stations and duties. . . . As a statesman, he reconciled to his authority in a few months an immense kingdom bestowed upon him by a cruel conqueror. What proves his address, was that the most distant districts were always equally alert in obeying his orders with those near at hand. His justice and equitable discharge of his duties as a prince were so conspicu ous that his name became, and still is a proverbial phrase among his immediate countrymen and all classes of the population of Baluchi stan on the extreme west. In short, had Nasir Khan governed an enlightened nation, or one with which Europeans were later acquainted, he would during his life have been regarded as a phe nomenon among the Asiatic princes. ^

The central authority of Kalat began to deteriorate after the

death of Nasir Khan in 1805, even though it maintained its independence

until the arrival of Great Britain on the scene in the mid-nineteenth

century. Gankovsky attributes the decline of the Kalat state to the

desire of the rulers of separate regions to raise their share in the

gross feudal tallage by reducing the share due to the Kalat Khan as head

of the state. ^ He gives the example that Mahmud Khan (1795-1816), the

son and successor of Nasir Khan, had an income of only 350,000 rupees as

compared to the more than three million rupees collected by his father.

^Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 18.

^^Pottinger, p. 285.

^Gankovsky, Peoples of Pakistan, p. 151.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 46

By contrast, Nina Swidler, an anthropologist, writes that the Khanat of

Kalat failed to impose a unified tax system on caravan trade and tribes

and instead relied more on revenues from irrigated crown lands.But,

as it has been pointed out, by the last Khan of Kalat the prevailing

system of tax collection at the time was based on the traditional

Islamic tax (10 percent or Pah yek), which was also the standard prac

tice in neighboring Islamic states such as Iran and Afghanistan as

well.^ Moreover, the division of labor in Baluchistan, at the time,

was such that it assigned the military functions to tribes which were

also the dominant elements in the dynastic rulers and armies of the

Arabian peninsula, Iran, and Afghanistan prior to this century.

Historically, the rise of Kalat in 1666 A.D.— as well as the

emergence of the independent states of Afghanistan, Sind, and Punjab, in

the eighteenth century— coincides with the decline and disintegration of

the Safavid, Mughal, and Uzbaclc empires and the simultaneous rise of

British colonial power in southwest Asia. Externally, the Baluch main

tained their independence through a set of shifting alliances with

neighboring powers. Apparently encouraged by a weakened Safavid empire,

a force of 4,000 Baluchis attacked Bandar Abbas in 1701. The Baluch

later joined the forces of Ghilzai Afghans who, under Mahmud, invaded

Persian, captured its capital, Isfahan, and overthrew the Safavid

emperor (1722), but killed his successor Ashraf when he was defeated by

Nadir Shah. For this service, Kalat was saved from invasion by Nadir,

even though it paid tributed to Persia as long as the emperor lived.

^Nina Baily Swidler.

^ M i r Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, p. 85.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 47

Again, Kalat had to pay tribute to Afghan King Ahmad Shah Durrani for

eleven years from 1747 to 1758 A.D. Thereafter, it regained its inde

pendence and joined Afghanistan in a military alliance.^ These events,

however, had hardly any lasting effect on the internal socio-political

conditions within Baluchistan.

The most significant event which took place during the course of

Baluchi Doura was the advent of British colonial rule in Baluchistan in

the mid-ninteenth century. Baluchistan attracted the attention of the

British government as far back as 1807, when Napoleon Bonaparte dis

patched a mission to Persia to explore the possibilities for an overland

invasion of India through Persia and Baluchistan. The growing Russian

expansion in central Asia in the mid-nineteenth century alarmed Britain,

prompting her to extend her colonial rule over Baluchistan in order to

protect her Indian empire and strengthen her hand at the political

chessboard of the "Great Game" then played by the European powers in

central Asia, Afghanistan, and Iran. The main British objective was to

forestall the Russian advance toward India and the warm waters of the

Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean by securing Afghanistan and Iran as buffer

states separating India from Tzarist Russia. Consequently, the British

adopted the "forward policy” that brought Baluchistan under the Raj

jurisdiction and made the borders of the empire continguous with Iran

and Afghanistan.51 In this context, Baluchistan had a twofold strategic

“•^Sykes, Ten Thousand Miles in Persia, pp. 103-4.

5lFor an account of the evolution of "the Great Game" and the eventual expansion of the frontiers of the British Raj beyond Sind and Punjab, see Edward Ingram, The Beginning of the Great Game in Asia, 1828-1834 (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1979); Richard Isaac Bruce, The Forward Policy and Its Results (London: n.p., 1900); Thomas Henry

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 48

significance. In the first place, it was turned into a British military

base for securing the buffer status of Afghanistan and Iran vis-a-vis

Russia. Second, it constituted a valuable link in the chain of British

east-west communication connecting India to the British bases in the

Middle East and Europe.

Subsequently, when the Khan of Kalat failed to ensure safe pas

sage for British troops during the first Anglo-Afghan war of 1838, the

British invaded Kalat, killed the anti-British khan, Mehran Kahn, and

occupied his capital for a short time in 1839. By 1876 the British had

gradually consolidated their power in eastern Baluchistan through a

series of wars and diplomatic contacts. Relations between Britain and

Kalat were governed by a series of formal agreements and treaties

imposed upon the latter during this period. These treaties gave the

British rights of passage through Kalat in 1839, the right to station

troops in 1854, the right to extend the Indo-Eurcpean telegraph line

through coastal Makuran in 1863, and other rights giving Britain some

major economic and territorial concessions. Article 3 of the treaty

signed between the two sides in 1854 bound Kalat ". . .to enter into no

negotiations with other states without its [Britain's] consent, the

usual friendly correspondence with neighbors being continued as

b e f o r e . "^2 These provisions were reaffirmed in a final treaty signed by

the parties in 1876 when the British government undertook ". . . to

respect the independence of Khelat, and to aid the Khan in case of need

Thornton, Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman: His Life and Work on Our Indian Frontier (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 1977).

-^Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, p. 255.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 49

in the maintenance of a just authority and the protection of his terri

tories from external attack."53 This treaty reduced Kalat to a semi

independent or protected state by limiting or transferring its responsi

bility for defense and foreign affaitrs to the British, while recogniz

ing— at least in theory— its sovereign status with respect to its

internal affairs.

British colonial rule set in motion a process that led to the

gradual disintegration of Kalat's central authority; the division of

Baluchistan among Iran, Afghanistan, and British India; and the eventual

downfall of the Kalat state as the symbol of Baluchi political indepen

dence in the aftermath of British departure from the subcontinent in

1947. In the first place, Baluchistan under the British was carved into

several political and administrative units that reduced Kalat to the

central highlands and the eastern Makuran by the turn of the century.

The northern belt adjacent to Afghanistan was occupied and administered

directly by the British, forming what was then called "British Baluchi

stan." It became the center for the British military bases which con

trolled access routes to and from Afghanistan. The principalities of

Kharan and Las Bella declared their independence from Kalat and were

recognized as such by the British. There were also the so-called

agencies territories, such as the district of Nushki and Nasir Abad,

held in lease form the khan of Kalat. Kalat, however, expected the

reversion of its sovereign rights over these territories on the cessa

tion of British power in India.

^Ibid., p. 231. For the texts of other treaties also concluded between the Kalat and the British governments, see other appendixes in the same work.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 50

More disturbing for the Kalat and the Baluch, however, was the

international division of Baluchistan. As will be elaborated in the

next chapter, the Goldsmid line drawn in 1871 by a British general of

the same name and delimited in 1896 gave western Baluchistan to Persia,

even though it remained as a British sphere of influence until the

1920s. Moreover, the Durand line drawn in 1894 transferred a small por

tion of northern Baluchistan to Afghanistan. Since western Baluchistan

will be the focus of the discussion in the next chapters, here it is

necessary to concentrate on the state of affairs in Kalat under British

colonial rule which lasted until 1947 when the Baluchi Doura came to its

end.

In the second place, the central power of the Kalat khans was

weakened and undermined by a parallel system of administration intro

duced by the British and known as the Sandman system of administration

after its author who served as the British political agent in Baluchi

stan. Under this system, the British officially undertook to arbitrate

the disputes arising between the khan in council and his sardars (chief

tains), as well as those among the sardars themselves, a role that had

been historically a prerogative of the khan prior to the British. As

the center of this administration were the resident British Political

Agent at the court of the khan with the duty of guiding the khan in

conducting the affairs of his state, the Agent to the Governor-General

of India administering British Baluchistan, and the political agents at

the district levels.

Although sardars traditionally had enjoyed a great degree of

autonomy with respect to their domains and subjects and were present at

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 51

jirgas (tribal councils) presided over by the khan or his representa

tive, they nevertheless were part of a strict hierarchy which consti

tuted a chain of command and communication centered around the khans of

Kalat. Once supported by British military power and administrative

supervision and assured of British subsidies, they were able to defy the

khan and his government at will. This parallel system transferred the

central position of authority from the khan to the British officials,

weakened the traditional institutions of upward-downward flow of infor

mation, and gave sardars an immense power over the lives and properties

of their masses. It served as a powerful instrument in the hand of the

British for controlling the rebellious tribes and regions and playing

different tribes against one another. ^

In the third place, since British interests in Baluchistan were

engendered more by strategic than economic considerations, they made

hardly any contribution to the general socio-economic and political

development of the country. The extent to which modern economic sectors

were developed was limited to construction of a few lines of railroad in

norhern Baluchistan from 1891 to 1905, the modernization of the ports of

Guvadar and Pasni in coastal Makuran, the extension of the British

telegraph line through Makuran, the construction of several cantonments

43por a general account of British policies toward the Kalat Khanate, see Terence Greaghcorn, The Indian Political Service: A Study in Indirect Rule (London: Chatto & W. Indus, 1971), pp. 151-61; Wayne Ayress Wilcoy, Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 16, 144-47; Ainslle T. Etnbree, ed., Pakistan's Western Borderlands: The Transformation of a Political Order (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1977), pp. 1-23, 24-41; Conrad Coffield, The Princely India I Know: From Reading to Mountbatten (India: Indo-British Historical Society, 1975), pp. 37-46, 115-18; Feroz Ahmad, Focus on Baluchistan and Pushtoon Question (Lahore: People's Publication House, 1975).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 52

in British Baluchistan and related servicing facilities. These were

constructed and manned by the British largely through imported labor

from outside Baluchistan. They had a very limited impact on the lot of

the masses of Baluchi population and resulted in no drastic improvement

in the persistent economic backwardness of the country. The extent of

this underdevelopment could be illustrated best by the fact that eastern

Baluchistan had only six towns with a combined population of 40,000 at

the turn of the century. In 1903 the country had two secondary and

twenty-two elementary schools, while In 1943 the number of schools did

not exceed eighty.

Nevertheless, a limited number of Baluchis, consisting for the

most part of sardars and city dwellers, were exposed to the benefits of

modern education and service facilities created mainly by and for the

use of the British themselves. They formed the original nucleus of the

modern Baluchi national movement, crystallized then in such organiza

tions as Anjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Baluchistan (Society for the Unity of

Baluchistan, S.U.B.) and the Kalat National Party, both established in

the early 1930s, as well as the Anjuman-e-Islah-e Baluchistan (The

Baluchi Reformation Society) founded in 1946. Influenced by the anti

colonial struggle of the Congress Party of India and the October Revolu

tion of the Soviet Union, the founders of the modern Baluchi nationalist

movement sought to promote the goal of establishing a united and inde

pendent Baluchistan after the British departure from the scene. It was

also in the 1930s that the first national publications like al-Baloch,

published by S.U.B., began to appear in addition to official

-^Gankovsky , Peoples of Pakistan, p. 2 0 6 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 53

publications such as Baluchistan Gazette. Although these organizations

had a narrow following, they played an important role in raising a new

national consciousness which transcended the then-prevailing tribal

outlook in the country. For this they were under constant surveillance

and suppression by the British. Moreover, they were few in numbers and

too weak in organization to reform the British-supported old state

structure or to withstand the tide of events that preceded the British

departure in 1947.^6

Upon the British departure in 1947, the Khan of Kalat, Ahman Yar

Khan, declared the independence of the Kalat state on August 15, 1947,

one day after the new state of Pakistan was established. But ten months

later, in April 1948, his state was overrun by the Pakistani army, as

described in Chapter VII. And so the Baluch Daura came to an end on

April 1, 1948, when the last sovereign Baluch political entity lost its

Independence.

Language

The Baluchi language, or Baloci, represents the most remarkable

manifestation of a cohesive base for the Baluchi national and cultural

identity. Linguists classify Baluchi, on the bases of its phonological

and etymological characteristics, as an Indo-European language belonging

to the branch of Iranian languages which include Persian, Kurdish,

Pushtu, and Baluchi. It is specifically related to the west Iranian

languages of northwest Iran, thus having a strong affinity with the

56Ibid., pp. 207-8; Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, pp. 22-23; Malik M. Towghi, "The Emergency of Modern Baluch Political Movement: 1920-1948" (Michigan: 1979), p. 11.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 54

Kurdish language as well as the Gilaki dialect of Gilan on the south

western Caspian Sea. The language is divided into two major dialects

known as the eastern Baluchi and western Baluchi prevailing in the

northeast and southwest, respectively. The former has absorbed a

greater influence from the Sindhi, the latter from Persian. In western

Baluchistan a specific distinction is also made between the dialect

spoken in the south known as Makurani Baluchi. The dialects spoken in

Seistan have such a strong affinity with the Baluchi that they could be

viewed as Baluchi dialects as well. However, all these dialects are

mutually intelligible by all the Baluch. ^

As one of the oldest languages, Baluchi traces its origin to the

ancient Parthian or Median civilization or a lost language linked to

them.-^ It survived and preserved its peculiarities in oral or spoken

form until the nineteenth century when British colonial officers and

scholars began for the first time to write its grammar, compile dic

tionaries, and collect its oral literature and folklore. The works of

E. Mockler, Longworth Dames, Maj. G. W. Gilberston, E. Pierce, R. Leech,

and others constitute the first systematic study of the Baluchi language

and literature. Prior to that, only some of the elite kept books known

as daptar in which they recorded their favorite ballads in Persian

script.

With rising nationalist activities and the spread of nationalist

organizations in recent decades, there is also a corresponding upsurge

h . Elfenbein, The Baluchi Language (London: Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1966), pp. 1-9, 27.

^Encyclopedia 0f Islam, 1960, S.v. "Baluch," by J. H. Elfenbein.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In works dealing with the Baluchi language published in English, Urdu,

Baluchi, and Farsi, particularly in eastern or Pakistani Baluchistan.

This time, however, Baluchi intellectuals themselves are the moving

force behind the literary revival of their language. They have adopted

an adjusted form of the Arabic script Nastalig to render the Baluchi in

written form. In this regard, there exist several magazines and news

papers in Baluchi, including the weekly Noken Daur (The New Era) and the

government-sponsored monthly Ulus (People), both of which are published

in Quetta, the provincial capital of Pakistani Baluchistan. The Baluchi

Academy at Quetta, a major center for Baluchi intelligentsia, is also

resonsible for publishing several hundred volumes in Baluchi, Urdu, and

English about the Baluchi language, literature, culture, and history.

There is no comparable intellectual tradition in Iranian Baluchistan due

to the strict prohibition imposed upon the usage of written Baluchi or

other non-Farsi languages spoken in Iran.

Yet the quest for the revival of Baluchi is best manifested in

the universal demand made by almost all the nationalists to reinstate

the language as the official provincial language in both Iranian and

Pakistani Baluchistan. It was the centrality of this issue that

prompted the first elected provincial government in Pakistani Baluchi

stan in 1972 to appoint Gul Khan Naseer, one of the most prominent

Baluchi historians and poets, as the Minister of Education in the pro

vincial cabinet with the official task of developing and implementing a

curriculum in Baluchi for the schools of the province, a task which was

left unfinished by the dismissal of the provincial cabinet in 1973. The

vehement opposition of the Iranian and Pakistani governments to the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 56

official usage of the language in their respective provinces is based on

their fear that it might further instigate the Baluch national senti

ments, thus hindering the ongoing process of state building in their

respective countries.

In spite of this issue, the central governments of Iran,

Pakistan, and Afghanistan have permitted daily broadcasts for several

hours of radio and television programs in Baluchi. Pakistan transmits

radio broadcasts from Quetta and Karachi; Iran from transmitters in

Zahidan, Khash, Iranshahr; and Afghanistan from Kabul. Only broadcasts

from Quetta and Kabul include occasional programs dealing directly with

the subject of Baluchi language and literature, while Iranian broadcasts

hardly are allowed to touch on the matter. These programs are, however,

primarily concerned with the explanation of official policies to the

illiterate masses, rather than promoting the cause of literary interest

in Baluchi.

Moreover, there is also a totally different kind of problem fac

ing nationalists in their effort to arouse literary interest among the

literate Baluchi in their own language. This difficulty results from

the fact that, since the latter are educated in the official languages

of Farsi and Urdu in Iran and Pakistan, respectively, they have to

undergo a process of self-education in their own language,, particularly

in the absence of Baluchi educational institutions. It is due to this

factor that some of the major nationalist publications, such as the

monthly Baluchi Dunya (The Baluch World), the monthly Neda-e-Baluchistan

(The Voice of Baluchistan), and the weekly Azad Baluchistan (Free

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 57

Baluchistan) are published bilingually using both Urdu and Baluchi, but

mostly the former in order to attract more readers.

For the illiterate, which constitute approximately more than 70

percent, the situation is very different. The significance of language

as a cohesive base is most evident among them, even though they have

been less exposed to modern nationalistic thoughts than the educated

Begraent of their society. For them, Baluchi is not only the sole medium

of communication, it is also the center of their history, culture, and

literary tradition as reflected in an immense body of classical epics,

ballads, and romantic poetry which has been preserved and transferred

from generation to generation until reaching them. This literary

tradition is the focus of cultural life.

However, there is a growing volume of publications in Baluchi,

particularly in the fields of literature and poetry, in the last three

decades. Of these, the works of Gul Khan Nasir, Sardar Khan, M. K. B.

Marri, M. Angha, and A. Jaml-ul-Din are a few examples. This trend is

expected to serve as the main instrument of spreading a standardized and

uniform literary script and style which is easily intelligible by the

educated classes of the Baluchi-speaking population within and outside

Baluchistan. The revival of Baluchi remains an important criterion by

which to measure the strength or weakness of Baluchi nationalism in the

course of its evolution. As the level of illiteracy drops among the

Baluch, the pressure for recognizing the language as the official pro

vincial language in both Iranian and Pakistani Baluchistan is most

likely to increase; with that, the nationalists will be able to broaden

the popular support for their other demands as well.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 58

Culture and Religion

The Baluch's consciousness of their common cultural heritage

constitutes another significant foundation of their nationalism. As

manifested in a set of shared social norms, value systems, traditions,

and folklore, the Baluchi cultural values together with their cultural

environment are the focus of nationalist appeals for broader popular

support for their overall demands of which cultural autonomy is only

one. The Baluch see themselves as heirs to an ancient culture which has

served as a strong unifying force, giving them the sense of a distinc

tive identity and enabling them to counter the ever-present threat of

absorption and assimilation into surrounding cultures. So they have

successfully preserved their cultural traditions throughout recorded

history. "To a great extent," wrote Selig Harrison, "it is the vitality

of this ancient cultural heritage that explains the tenacity of the

present demand for the political recognition of Baluch identity.

Naturally, the Baluch culture is a function of their natural

habitat or environment as much as their history. The geographical

isolation of the Baluch plateau and the barrenness of its land are two

major ecological factors which have left a strong impact on all aspects

of Baluchi society including its culture. Traditionally, the former has

served to strengthen its intra-dynamics by isolating and freeing it from

the ever-present menace of absorption by, and into, the adjacent cul

tures, while the latter has been responsible for the development of a

predominantly feudal and tribal economy and way of life as reflected in

the southern part or Makuran and the northern parts, respectively. "The

^Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 11.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 59

monotony and barrenness of the country," wrote Sardar Khan, "is recipro

cally reflected in the Baluch physical and mental make-up. His food and

costume are simple and so simple are his demands. Obedience, hospital

ity, tenacity, bravery and endurance are his supreme virtues."^ Many

British colonial officials have testified to Baluch hospitality and

generosity. As stated by Dames, "the Baluch exalts generosity into the

first of all virtues.Although both nomads and townsfolk are bound

by a common culture based on a historically evolved set of economic,

social, political, military, and lingual interactions, each has retained

some parochial cultural traits of its own. In western Baluchistan, for

example, the settled population applies the designation "Baluch" specif

ically to the members of the nomadic tribes, while the latter refer to

the former as Shahri or townfolk, implying a deviation of the strict

Baluchi martial code.

In cultural terms, there is a great sense of communalism affect

ing the set of rules, norms, and values governing the social and eco

nomic relations in both groups. This is best manifested in such a

social institution as open divan (council) held regularly in each vil

lage, town, and among tribes with the purpose of publicly discussing and

addressing major social, political, and legal issues of public concern.

Another such institution is hashar (communal cooperation) that is par

ticipation at the request of any individual in such affairs as sowing

the land, harvesting crops, constructing a home, mosques, etc. Yet

another example is the institution of bejjar, when an individual is

^Sardar Khan, The Great Baluch Race, p. 169.

^Dames, Popular Poetry of the Baloches, p. 28.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 60

assisted upon request on such occasions as marriage, divorce, or heavy

debt in order to enable him to cope with the expected cost or burden.

Historically, the constant threat of invasion by neighboring

empires on the one hand, and the chronic inter-tribal/feudal wars have

resulted in the spread of a Spartan-like culture dominated by and large

by a code of martial honor with all its accompanying vices and virtues

as has been testified to by medieval sources, British colonial officers

and administrators, and other European and non-European travelers and

observers. And so is the bulk of their classic poetry which, for the

most part, consists of epics or heroic ballads describing their wars and

ventures. The most striking example is the thirty years' tribal wars

between the Rinds and Lashari tribes. "For full thirty years, we fought

among ourselves," goes a sixteenth-century ballad, referring to the

event, "and this is the cause of the Baluchi misfortune.Another

sixteenth-century ballad states that "my white sandals are my steed, for

my sons you may choose the arrows, for my son-in-law the pointed dagger,

for my brethren the broad shield, for my father the wide-wounding

sword.”63 Consequently, farmers, craftsmen, and women were relegated to

a secondary position, while traits such as swordsmanship, marksmanship,

and the avenging of blood were regarded high on the social agenda.

Equally important for the Baluch is the Islamic faith and

culture to which they adhere, the overwhelming majority belonging to the

Hanafi rite of the Sunni sect. There are some Karamatis, Zikris, and

^^Marri, Searchlights, p. 60 (with some alternation in transla tion) .

^^Dames, Popular Poetry of the Baloches, p. 45.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 61

Shaites, but their number is very insignificant. Correspondingly,

Islamic laws or Sharia and Islamic institutions play a very important

role in the overall aspects of Baluchi society. This is particularly

the case in western Baluchistan where the weakening of traditional

tribal power structure by the central government of Iran, on the one

hand, and the threat perceived from the dominant Shaites, on the other

hand, have led Baluchi religious leaders, known as the Maulavis, to

enhance their power and role in recent years. Ironically, for the same

reasons that the Persians used Shiism to counter the Sunni Arabs and

Turks in the sixteenth century, the Baluch, particularly in western

Baluchistan, view Sunnism as a significant manifestation of their

nationalism, as will be discussed in Chapter IV.

Ethnic Origin and Racial Consciousness

Relying mostly on the linguistic evidence, many western

scholars— such as Richard N. Frye, M. L. Dames, and Gankovsky— have

traced the ethno-linguistic genesis of the Baluch to the Aryan/Iranian

tribes who migrated from the southern shores of the Caspian Sea toward

Kirman, Seistan, and Baluchistan.64 Historians differ as to precisely

when, and under what circumstances, they began to migrate southward.

Dames, for example, has suggested that this migration may have taken

place either as a result of the invasion of northern Iran by Ephtalites

or as a consequence of their wars with Chosroes Anosarvan, as hinted in

the Shah Name.65 There are historical conjunctures showing that Baluchi

6^Frye, ed., Cambridge History of Iran, 4:xi; Gankovsky, Peoples of Pakistan, p. 144; Dames, The Baluch Race, p. 52.

^Dames, The Baluch Race, p. 29.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 62

southward migration did not occur at once, but in several waves involv

ing several migration routes. Richard N. Frye, professor of Iranian

studies at Harvard, has relied on the similarities and parallels found

between Baluchi and the dialects of the central deserts of Iran to sug

gest that "the Baluch en route to Kirraan and Makuran settled for a time

or passed slowly through the northwest central desert region," thus,

concluding, though tentatively, that "the linguistic support for the

historical connection between the Baluchis and the people of the central

desert in the northern Kavir is at hand."66

However, the Baluch account of their origin and early history,

which is based largely on their classical ballads and traditions

recorded first in the nineteenth century, confirms the notion of their

northwest origin, but differs as to their ethnic attribution. Daptar

Shair, a classical ballad of genealogy popular among the Baluch, refers

to Allepo (in Syria) as the home or place of their origin. This

account, however, has not been substantiated by historical evidence and

is often dismissed as a legend by most historians. But, as Dames has

pointed out, Daptar Shair, together with other fifteenth- and

sixteepth-century Baluchi classics, forms the "popular poetry" and "the

illiad of Baloch race."67 They are accepted as the memories of their

remote past and are as popular among the Baluch as the epic of Shah Name

is among the Persians or the legend of King Arthur among the British.

Hence, as popular beliefs, they influence Baluchi historical and

political perceptions, which are in turn important in the study of

66Frye, "Remarks on Baluchi History," pp. 49-50.

67oames, The Baloch Race, p. 44.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63

nationalism. In the words of Selig Harrison, "these legends are cited

here not becuase they have serious histographic value but because they

are widely believed and are thus politically important. For the most

part, Allepo is a unifying symbol of a common identity in the historical

memories shared by all Baluch."68

Moreover, there are some historical accounts to support the

notion of the Baluch's Semitic Arab origin as well. Writing in 1862,

George Rawlinson, professor of ancient history at Oxford University, in

his monumental work The Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern

World, has traced the origin of the name of "Baluch" to "Belus" King of

Babylon, known as Nimrod, the son of Kush of the Old Testament. Refer

ring to the country east of Kirman to have been known as Kusan through

out the Sassanian period, he asserts that "the same region is now

Beloochistan, the country of the Belooches or Belus, while adjoining it

on the east is Cutch, or Kooch, a term standing to Cush as Belooch

stands to Belus,thus bringing the names of Gush and Belus into jux

taposition as mentioned "al-Qufs-va-al-Bulus" by the Muslim chroniclers

of the tenth century A.D.

The degree to which this belief is held by the Baluch is best

illustrated by the extent of its acceptance by some of the most promi

nent nationalist historians. M. Sardar Khan and M. K. B Marri, two

prominent Baluchi nationalist historians, have followed professor

Rawlinson in linking the Baluch to "Belus" the Semitic ruler of Babylon.

^Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 11.

^George Rawlinson, The Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1870), 1:50.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 64

They further contend that the few references made in respect to the

Baluchi ethnic origin in the historical accounts given prior to the

nineteenth century tend to support their case, thus, citing Ibn Hawkal,

a renowned Arab geographer of the tenth century; Burhan Qateh (Convinc

ing Logic), a Persian dictionary compiled in 1651-52 A.D.; and several

other medieval sources to further support their claim.^ Still, Mir Gul

Khan Nasir, another prominent Baluchi historian, advances the notion

that only one group of Baluchis belonged to old Arabia and Allepo, while

a second group came from Mount Alborz in northern Iran, and still a

third group was originally in Baluchistan.^

It remains for the historians to unravel the mysteries surround

ing the origin of the Baluch. The academic interest in the issue has

become further complicated by rival ethnic claims to the Baluch and

their homeland put forward by the Persian and some of the Arab national

ists. Almost all the contemporary Persian authors who have dealt with

the issue view the Baluch as a "Aryan/Iranian race," thus an integral

part of Iran. This phrase is a standard one repeated by Z. Naseh,

Jahanbani, Aslcari, and others. It was taught in the school history

books during the previous regime as well. On the Arab side, the work of

Mans-al-Ajli Al-Hakkarai, an Iraqi writer, Baluchistan Diar Al-Arab

(Baluchistan: Land of Arabs) is a good example. He appeals to Baluch to

unify Baluchistan by relying on "their common Arabic heritage," "an

^Sardar Khan, History of Baluch Race, pp. 1-27. See, also, Sardar Khan, The Great Baluch, p. 10; Marri, The Baluchis through Centuries: History versus Legend (Quetta: privately published, 1964), p. 12.

7lGul Khan Nasir, Tarikh-i-Baluchistan [History of Baluchistan] (Karachi: n.p., 1952), 1:17.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 65

awakening of the Arabic spirit" and using Arabic as the "language of

their ancestors."^

In spite of the presence of so many points of opinion on the

issue of their origin, there is a general accord among the scholars as

to the distinct ethno-lingulstic and cultural Identity of the Baluch who

are bound together by a common history and territory as well. They are

referred to and identified as such throughout recorded history. There

is also no doubt that some other ethnic elements, who inhabited some

parts of the land prior to, and after, the Baluchi arrival— including

some Persian and Pashtun tribes, early Arab settlers, and the remnants

of original inhabitants— were absorbed and assimilated into the Baluchi

ethno-linguistic community during the long course of their migration and

settlement in the country. Although no Baluch nationalist or national

ist movement has claimed that the Baluch are of pure racial stock, the

term "Baluchi race" is widely used in some nationalist literature, as

exemplified by M. Sardar Khan Baluch's History of Baluchi Race and

Baluchistan. In this regard, the term is used as an equivalent for the

Arabic term Qoum as the "Baluchi Qoum," which has a less racial connota

tion, meaning in Baluchi nation.

A Baluch identifies himself to outsiders as "I'm Baluch." This

is done with such staggering emphasis on the word "Baluch" that it is

taken by most outside observers as implying a belief in a sense of

racial uniqueness. Lord Curzon, for example, has stated that the Baluch

". . . are apt to round off every period with the swaggering assertion

^^Ma'n Shana al-Ajli Al-Hakkarai, Baluchistan Diyar al-Arab [Baluchistan: Land of Arabs] (Bahrain: privately published, 1979), p. 35, as quoted in Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 122.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 66

that 'I’m a Beluch.'"^ Pottinger, Hughes, and many other European and

non-European travelers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have

also taken note of this popular national sentiment. It is, however,

more an emphasis of the Baluchi distinct ethnic identity than a belief

in a sense of racial uniqueness. The term Baluch as defined here is

applied to all those who identify themselves as such either through

language or ethnic origin.

^Curzon, p. 259.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I I

THE BRITISH DIVISION OF BALUCHISTAN AND THE INCOR

PORATION OF ITS WESTERN PART INTO IRAN, 1860-1928

This chapter will deal first with the British division of

Baluchistan in 1871 and then the eventual incorporation of its western

part into Iran in 1928. It is a historical analysis of events which

preceded the incorporation of western Baluchistan into Iran, beginning

with the rise of British colonial hegemony in the region and tne ensuing

division of Baluchistan into western and eastern halves in 1871. This

is essential for a better understanding of the present Baluchi national

movement which is rooted in their anti-colonial struggle for reunifica

tion of Baluchistan. In this regard, the following brief narrative is

adopted largely from the official documents found in the British

archives as well as the writings of British authorities involved in

shaping and implementing those policies. These documents are the only

major recorded sources on the internal events in Baluchistan during the

period between 1860 and 1928.

The Anglo-Persian Policies and the Division of Baluchistan

Western Baluchistan is bounded by the Lut Desert and the Iranian

province of Khorasan in the north, by the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian

Sea stretching from the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz to the port of

Guadar on the south and northwest, by the province of Kerman on the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. west, and by the Goldsmid Line separating Pakistani and Afghani Baluchi

stan on the east. Ethno-geographically it comprises the Jaz Murian

agricultural basin in the center and northwest, the Sarhad highlands in

the north, the Maskkel lowlands and the Sarawan agricultural oasis on

the east, the coastal region of Makuran in the south, and the western

most districts of Byaban and Bashkard. To this one can add the Helmand

depression inhabited by a mixed ethnic population of Baluch and

Sei3 tanis.^ (See Map 1.)

Historically, as the original homeland of the Baluch, western

Baluchistan is the cradle of their past history and the focus of their

ancient heroic ballads and popular poetry. It was from here that their

ancestors began to spread to, and consolidate their power in, eastern

Baluchistan during the period between the thirteenth and the fifteenth

century as mentioned in the previous chapter. The territory was the

center of the Rind-Lashari Tribal Confederacy prior to the shift of its

power to eastern Baluchistan under Amir Chakar Rind in the late fif

teenth century. It was also united with the rest of the country under

the rule of the Khanate of Kalat for the greater part of the eighteenth

century.

Upon the death of Nasir Khan I in 1805 and the subsequent

deterioration of the central authority in Kalat, the Baluchi chieftains

(hakoms and sardars) of the distant western provinces were the first to

succumb to their centrifugal tendencies, which were in turn a function

^Great Britain, Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division, Persia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945), pp. 389-90. As we will see in Ch. Ill, the total area of western Baluchistan can be estimated around 280,000 square kilometers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69

of their tribal/feudal loyalties, and declare their independence. Of

these, the most important were the principalities of Dizaks, Pahra

(Iranshahr), Barnpur, Baho-Dashtiari, Geh, Sarbaz, Kasserkand, and the

chieftainates of Sarhard and Bashkard. However, the Narui hereditary

rulers of Pahra enjoyed a paramount position among the rulers of these

principalities, a position which was held by them until about 1849. At

the time of his visit in 1810, Sir Henry Pottinger, a British officer,

found western Baluchistan independent and the rule of Shah Mehrab Khan

Narui acknowledged from Dizak in the southeast to Bazman bordering

Kerman in the north.^ In 1839 Haji Abdun Nabi, an Afghan sent by the

British to collect intelligence on the political conditions of the

country, reported that the Naruis— then under Mohammed Ali Khan— were

still ruling from Barnpur, but observed that Muhammed Shah, the Hakom of

Sib, had emerged as the strongest Baluchi ruler even though he had no

superior position among other c h i e f s . ^

Such were the political conditions in western Baluchistan in the

mid-nineteenth century when Britain began to move into Kalat, then

reduced to eastern Baluchistan, to establish her forward defense lines

against the growing Russian expansion in Central Asia. This objective

was accomplished by the Treaty of 1854, which reduced Kalat to a subor

dinate position by bounding her to abstain from any negotiation with

other powers without British consent and gave Britain the right to sta

tion troops in whatever part of the country she deemed necessary, as

^Pottinger, pp. 151-70, particularly pp. 169-70.

^Haji Abdun Nabi, "Notes Taken on a Tour through Parts of Baluchistan," Journal of Asiatic Studies 14, no. 2 (1844).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70

mentioned in the previous chapter. The move was part of an overall

strategy to forestall Russian southern expansion toward India and the

warm waters of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean by securing Iran and

Afghanistan as buffer states, separating the British Indian Empire from

Russia.^ Consequently, control of Baluchistan placed the borders of the

Raj as contiguous to Iran and Afghanistan, thus enabling Britain to

counter Russian moves in the two countries whose buffer status was

regarded as essential to the defense of India. Moreover, Baluchistan

was also viewed by Britain as a significant line of communication link

ing India with her bases in the Middle East and Europe.

Historically, the consolidation of British power in eastern

Baluchistan, which started with the occupation of the Kalat for a short

time in 1840, coincides with the beginning of Iranian encroachments on

western Baluchistan during the reign of Nasir-al Din Shah (1848-1896) of

the Qajar dynasty (1779-1925). In 1849, an Iranian force was sent to

punish the Baluch incursions into Kerman, defeating the latter and cap

turing Bampur, a major Baluchi town on the edge of Kerran. The Qajar

expansion, however, intensified for the extension of the Indo-European

Telegraph from Karachi to Guadar in the domains of Kalat and then up to

Jask on the coast of western Baluchistan in 1861. By the time the line

was completed in 1869-70, Iranian forces had advanced as far as Sarbaz

between the coast and Bampur. "These conquests, however," wrote Lord

Curzon, the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and a principal archi

tect of the British policies at that time, "testified to no more than

^See, for example, Rose Louise Greaves, Persia and the Defense of India, 1884-1892 (London: Athlone Press, 1959), chs. 1, 2, and 9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 71

the superior might of the victors, while they left a number of bordering

Baluchi states in a position of semi-dependence, which had no sanction

save that dictated by fear."^

During the course of the British investigation for the construc

tion of the telegraph line, they were confronted by conflicting terri

torial claims to western Baluchistan by the Shah of Persia, Khan of

Kalat, and Sultan of Muscat. At the beginning, the British took a

neutral stand by avoiding to accept pretension of sovereignty by any

side. On March 11, 1862, the government of India warned the Secretary

of State for India that by entering any arrangement with Persia as to

the recognition of her claim, "we could not expect those Chiefs

[Baluchi] to look without suspicion at such an engagement between our

government and that of Shah, although it does not in terms prevent us

from neutrality between themselves and Persia."® Another official

report, dated December 9, 1863, and prepared by the British Commissioner

Sir Frederick Goldsmid (then a colonel in charge of telegraph negotia

tions) for the Secretary of State for India in regard to the Persian

claims, places the question into historical perspective, thus, given in

extenso:

As to her [Persia] right, I know of none but of the strong over the weak; of the prestige of a high sounding monarchy over the obscurity of a small Chiefdom. More than one hundred years ago Nadir Shah appointed Nussir Khan Brahui, the Beylerbey or Governor of the whole of Baluchistan, inclusive of Mekran, and in such capacity he was no doubt to some extent a feudatory of Persia, but it is also more than a hundred years ago that he exchanged the quasi service of the Shah for that of the Afghan King. His allegiance to

^Curzon, p. 256.

6j. A. Saldanha, Precis of Mekran Affairs (Calcutta: Superinten dent of Government Printing, 1905), p. 15.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 72

Candabar was no less binding than to Persia. It was the allegiance exacted by a stronger arm than his own. When the Afghan monarchy fell to pieces, the service ceased; but Baluchistan also fell to pieces, and its Chiefs set up claims of independence for themselves. . . . Of late years she has, perhaps, been more than usually active in this re-assertion of Mekaran Sovereignty. The present state of affairs in Kelat must be specially favorable to her views. Anarchy in that quarter cannot but afford occasion for intrigue, if not for the actual advance of troops. But no new argument will be needed to show that anything like the dismemberment of Kelat would be as advantageous to Persian interests as detrimental to our own. If possession for a period of years must necessarily imply "acknowledgement by the local rulers" it is the acknowledgement of helplessness. I do not for a moment believe that the Persian yoke is acceptable to the Sirdars of Mekran west of Kelat.1

Subsequently, the British side-stepped the questions of terri

torial sovereignty and signed separate agreements with the Shah of

Persia in 1868, Sultan of Oman in 1865, and the Baluchi chiefs of Bahu,

Dastlari, Geh, and Jask in 1869. These agreements dealt only with the

question of the protection of telegraph wires and stations, and in each

case the British undertook to pay a fixed subsidy to the separate

parties involved. The agreements with the Baluch chiefs, which are dis

cussed by Mahmud Mahmud, a contemporary Iranian historian, under the

heading of "relations between the British Government and the savage

Baluchi tribes"® were entered because Persia, in spite of her claims,

had no authority in that part of Baluchistan and, as such, the British

had to negotiate directly with the independent Baluch chiefs as well as

^Great Britain, India Foreign and Political Department, Corre spondence on the Progress of Persia in Mekran and Western Baluchistan from A.D. 1860 to A.D. 1869 Inclusive (Bombay: Bombay Secretariat Records, 1969), p. 19.

®Mahmud Mahmud, Tarikh Ravabet Siasi Iran Va Englis [The History of Diplomatic Relations between Iran and England] (Tehran: Chapkhand Nagsh Jana, 1329 A.H.), 3:684.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 73

to depend on them for the protection of the telegraph lines and

stations.^

Moreover, the British were well aware that any acknowledgment as

to the Persian claims on their part would have been taken by the inde

pendent Baluchi chiefs as well as the Khan of Kalat as a sign of Anglo-

Persian collaboration and that would have endangered the success of the

telegraph negotiations which they had to enter with the Baluchi chiefs.

Colonel Goldsmid, then serving as Chief Director of the Indo-European

Telegraph and deputed to Tehran to help negotiate a telegraph treaty,

reported to the government of Bombay on October 4, 1865, that although

there were objections to the plan by Persia on the basis of her demand

for an arrangement as to the acceptance of her claims on Britain's part,

the Baluch opposition constituted the sole obstacle to the scheme.

Referring to this difficulty, he stated that:

The sole difficulty that I see in the way, is the discontent likely to be raised among the petty Beluch Chiefs on the west of Kelat line, who may look upon themselves as given over to Persia by this arrangement. The point is, no doubt, one of great delicacy, but it is presumed that the question must be met if the telegraph line is to be run eventually through these tracts of country. I cannot but believe that we might come to a satisfactory understand ing with the Persians to the effect that up to the long strip of Coast formed by the Imam of Muscat, of which Bunder Abbas is the western extremity, we treat the local chiefs as independent in regard to any subsidy given; but carefully stipulate a policy of non-interference in the general question of sovereignty, in which we neither acknowledge or disown the Persian claim.^

Once the telegraph line was completed and its security assured

by the Baluchi chiefs, the British began to shift their policy of neu

trality in favor of Persia. The official explanation was that Persian

encroachment was threatening the security of Kalat as a protected state

^Saldanha, p. 34. ^Ibid., p. 31.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 74

of British India and, as such, a settlement with Persia would serve the

interests of Kalat as well. Meanwhile, Persia took advantage of the

British presence in western Baluchistan to consolidate its conquests as

well as to further her expansion in order to enhance her claims and

strengthen her bargaining position. It was during this time that

Persian troops first advanced as far as Sarbaz and then suddenly the

Wazir of Kerman was officially entitled by his sovereign as Sardar of

Baluchistan around 1866.H With the completion of the telegraph line in

1869, the road was paved for an official investigation suggested by Lord

Mayo in the same year and the subsequent formation of a joint boundary

commission by Persia, Britain, and Kalat, as was instigated by the Shah

in 1870. Consequently, General Goldsmid was appointed as the British

Commissioner on the boundary commission.

The commission, however, was not able to hold a joint meeting

due to a strong sense of ill-feeling displayed toward the Kalat delegate

by the Persian commissioner Mirza Ma' sum Khan, who refused to meet with

his Baluch counterpart. As a result, General Goldsmid became the sole

actor and arbitrator on the issue. In 1871 he received detailed

instructions from the Viceroy in Council, who had carefully outlined the

limits of a proposed boundary line to be suggested for approval by

Persia, but had also added that "a very liberal view may, therefore, be

taken of Persian claims to the west of that line."I2 The proposed line

was, in turn, based on Goldsmid's own previous suggestions and reports

which had been prepared in connection with his mission concerning the

Makuran telegraph. In one of these reported prepared for the government

n Ibid., p. 31. 12Ibld., p. 49.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 75

of Bombay and the Secretary of State for India on April 27, 1864, he had

underlined the basic historical argument for recognizing the Persian

claims as to the latest conquests in western Baluchistan. The report

stated:

I. That, in my opinion, the claims of Persia to Mekran generally are based upon somewhat traditionary conquests of former years, more or less substantiated by the formal disposal of the prov ince to Mohbut Khan Brahui in the middle of the last century; that the later rise of a new Government and enterprise of a new Chief in Baluchistan virtually dispossessed Persia of her never well-defined Mekran territories; but that forcible reassertion of the Shah's sovereignty over certain parts of Mekran, so far as hitherto carried out, however warrantable in accordance with the rule of European politics, is not a matter with which we can interfere upon a bare principle of justice and equity. In this view, such Mekran territories as Persia now holds in tribute, are hers by mere right of possession.

II. That those portions of Mekran obeying the authority of the Khan of Kelet are that chief's by possession, and also by acknowl edgement of the local rulers. They are part of an inherited Baluchistan State, held, at first, in quasi-feudal tenure from Persia, subsequently from Candahar, but in reality on a basis of independence. The revolutions which distracted the province after the death of Nusir Khan in 1795 can only effect such petty Chiefdoms as have been successful in permanently throwing off their allegiance. Those which revolted and were afterwards sub dued still remain component parts of the inheritance of the Khans.^3

It is interesting to note how, at the time, the report had

equated the claim of Persia to the territory with that of Kalat, a

Baluchi state, thus leaving the door open for the later recognition of

Persian claims. Eventually, the proposed boundary line as sketched by

Goldsmid was accepted by Persia and was embodied in a treaty signed

between the two sides in September 1871, hence known as the Goldsmid

Line separating eastern and western Baluchistan. At present, it forms

the international boundary between Iran and Pakistan. Reflecting on the

13Ibid., p. 25.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 76

ambitions of the Persian empire in western Baluchistan and her attitude

as to "the small and unknown state of Kelat,” General Goldsmid wrote in

the final report of his proceedings to the Secretary of State for India

on November 9, 1871, that "these traits, had they power to be indepen

dent, would be independent; not having power to be independent, they are

as fair prey to the strongest neighbor.Thereafter, the name

"Persian Baluchistan" replaced "Western Baluchistan" in the official

colonial documents.

There are several principal reasons for the aforementioned

change in British policy and her decision for the division of Baluchi

stan in favor of Persia. The most important was related to the strate

gic developments in Central Asia at the time. In this regard, the late

1860s coincided with the rapid Russian expansion toward the Merv in

Central Asia as reflected in „ier conquest of Bokhara in 1866 and of

Samarkand in 1869, an event which was particularly alarming to the

British strategic interest in South Asia. These developments doubled

her resolution to strengthen and defend the buffer status of Persia and

Afghanistan against the Russian southward thrusts. Thus, by officiating

the Persian claims in western Baluchistan, the British helped strengthen

her buffer status. In one of his later lectures on Central Asia,

Goldsmid has pointed out that since Persia had lost a large portion of

her territory to Russia in the north, checked by the Ottoman empire in

the west and by the British in Afghanistan, the only avenue for her

expansion was in western Baluchistan, where the constant feuds between

the petty chiefs had made the land an easy prey to the Persian

14Ibid., p. 54.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 77

d e s i g n s . ^ Second, the British welcomed the Persian advance in the

territory as a further assistance in pacifying the unruly and

independent-minded Baluchi tribes which were viewed as a constant source

of threat to their lines of communication. As we shall see, the British

joined hands with Persia in launching several joint expeditions for

suppressing the constant tribal revolts in Baluchistan throughout the

Qajar rule. Third, Persian control and pacification of western Baluchi

stan would have prevented the spread of the tribal revolts to the east

ern part ruled by the British.

Therefore, the Persian expansion in western Baluchistan would

not have taken place had it not been for British approval and support.

"Persian Baluchistan (which) in its present shape," wrote Lord Curzon in

1892, "is the creation of the last thirty years, and to a large extent

owes its existence to the intervention and the recognition of the

British government."^ Thus, once Persia acquired British recognition

of her claims in 1871, she began to extend her power farther in the

region by seizing the district of Kohak in 1872, expelling the Arabs of

Muscat from the port of Chah Bahar, which they had held since 1789,

annexing the independent Baluchi principality of Bashkard in 1874, and

then gradually moving toward Sarhad in northern Baluchistan.1? In spite

of these military moves, the Qajar rule in the country was more nominal

than real and was directly limited to Bampur, then the capital of

Baluchistan. The rest of the country remained independent or

^Frederick John Goldsmid, Central Asia and Its Question (London: Edward Stanford, 1873), pp. 41-42.

^Curzon, p. 253. l^Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. «*<•> • * 78

semi-independent to be disturbed only by periodic military expeditions

sent to levy taxes.

The Baluchi Struggle against the Qajars and the British

The history of Perso-Baluch relations under the Qajar dynasty

has been characterized as a history of successive Qajar military expedi

tions sent for collecting taxes and pacifying the country followed by

constant Baluchi revolts. Heavy taxes were collected twice annually at

gunpoint. As observed by Naser Askari, an Iranian writer, those Baluch

not able to pay the requested tax were, themselves or members of their

families, seized as part of the tax which they could not afford to

pay. In 1883 Major Moclcler, a British official then serving in

coastal Baluchistan, recorded in an official report dated March 28 that

the taxes collected from the two districts of Bahu and Dashtiari were

raised year by year from 5,000 rupees per annum in 1865 to 15,000 rupees

in 1883, "without, of course, anything whatever having been done for the

welfare or improvement of the country by the Persian government."^ He

adds that, as a result of heavy taxation and the lack of rainfall at the

time, the district of Bahu was depopulated and its chief, on being

unable to reduce the amount of the tax, refused the sardarship and

retired to the port of Guadar.2*-* in this regard, the words of Lord

Curzon about Persian rule and its consequences in Baluchistan remains

highly expressive and authoritative, thus given in extenso;

l^Askari, p. 108. l^Saldanha, p. 61.

20Ibid., p. 60.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 79

It cannot be contended that their rule has been a success. On the contrary, it has been attended with oppression, corruption, and consequent revolt. I have frequently depicted the Persian petty governor or official as one of the most undesirable and flagitious of the human race; and with a poor unarmed population, such as they have encountered in Baluchistan, the members of his class have found ample scope for all their talents. Taxes have been collected twice over at the point of the bayonet; local chiefs have been arrested or removed; the people have been driven from their homes. The conse quence is that agriculture has fallen into decay, the irrigation system has broken down, and the miserable peasants have flocked out of the country in hundreds by India or Muscat. Owing to the neglect and collapse of the dykes on all the smaller rivers, whereby their waters were held up and diffused in canals over the land, the chan nels of the main rivers have widened to an enormous extent, the water furrowing an aimless course down their sandy beds. Thus the Dasht, which in 1876 was 357 yards in width, in 1889 was 860; the Rapch or Rabj, which in 1869 was 220 yards across, in 1889 was 616.21

Consequently, the Baluch were in a state of constant revolt

against the British-Qajar rule. As soon as the work of the Perso-Baluch

Boundary Commission was finished in 1871-72, there were disturbances at

Jask in 1873 when Mir Abdul-Nabbi, the Hakom of Byaban district,

revolted and cut the British telegraph wires, an action which brought a

strong Anglo-Persian response.22 The tribes of Sarhad revolted in

1888,22 and the next year saw a general uprising in which the exasper

ated Baluchi chiefs revolted, besieging and capturing the Persian Gover

nor of Baluchistan, Abdul Fath Khan in 1889. Subsequently, in 1891, the

Qajar Prince Farman Farma, the Governor-General of Kerman and Baluchi

stan took the sweeping measure of arresting and executing several

Baluchi chiefs after having invited them to Pahra (a major Baluchi town

now called Iranshar) with the solemn promise of protection.2^

2 ^-Curzon, 2:264-65. 22Saldanha, p. 59.

22Sykes, Ten Thousand Miles in Persia, p. 107.

2^Saldanha, pp. 62-64.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 80

la 1896, again the Baluch rose up in arms and attacked the

Persian Governor Zein-al-Abidin Khan titled Asad al-Dola near Sib, and

the following year swept away the Qajar troops and officials, disrupted

the British telegraph lines, and killed the acting British telegraph

superintendent. The revolt engulfed the whole country from the port of

Jask in the northwest to the port of Chah Bahar in the southwest and

from Dizak in the east to the provincial capital of Bampur in the north.

The leader of the insurrection was Sardar Husain Khan Narui, who estab

lished yet another confederacy of the Baluchi chiefs.^5 a s mentioned

earlier, the Naruis were the feudal rulers of western Baluchistan in the

first half of the century. Therefore, he was described by Farman Farma

in a telegram to the Granc Vazir, Amin al-Sultan, as "the cause of sedi

tion in Baluchistan." "This ungrateful Hussain Khan," added the author,

"is the same person who claimed Bampur, together with the crown-

land situated therein, as his inheritance and wanted to take possession

of the Government forts.Although he had served as governor of Chah

Bahar, Sarbaz, Kasarkand under the Qajars, he did not hesitate to

declare his independence upon the death of Naris al-Din Shah, the Qajar

king in 1896.

Subsequently, at the urging of the British, a joint Anglo-

Persian naval detachment landed at Jask, while another British force was

stationed in Chah Bahar to stem the tide of revolt in 1898. In this

connection, the "Karawan expedition" was jointly organized with the

purpose of proceeding from the coast inland to punish the Kirwan Baluchi

tribe held responsible for the disruption of the British telegraph and

2^Ibid., pp. 70-71. ^^Ibid., p. 63.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 81

the death of its superintendent. Simultaneously, another Persian expe

dition under Asef-un-Dowlah, Governor-General of Kerman, was ordered to

inarch from the north against the rebel chiefs headed by Sardar Hussein

Khan. During the course of the joint operation, the British commander,

Baker, persuaded his Persian counterpart, Ahmad Khan Daria Begi (the

Lord of the Seas), that "he should at once proceed and cut down trees

[palm trees] now that there was so large a force in British camp" and

promised to cover "his proceedings and retreat if necessary."27 Such

punitive actions proved effective in shaking the Baluchi resistance.

Another factor, however, was the British policy of imposing a total arms

embargo on the Baluch. Sir Percy Sykes, a known Persophile and the

author of several volumes on Persia and Persian history who then par

ticipated in that joint pacification operation, has asserted that

because of this policy "Persian Baluchistan is today more under subjec

tion than it has even been, but the outlook is not very bright."2b The

pacification lasted for nearly two years and eventually, Hussein Khan

was defeated and captured in 1898.

The widespread revolt is attributed to several major factors.

Sir Percy Sykes has asserted that there were two major factors at work.

The first was the assassination of the Qajar Shah Nasir-al-Din in 1896,

which prompted Hussein Khan to take the opportunity for establishing yet

another independent Baluchi confederacy. The second major reason was

the victory of the Ottoman Sultan over Greece which had become, at the

time, the cause of intense rejoicing among the Sunni Muslims everywhere,

27ibid., p. 76.

2bsykes, Ten Thousand Miles, p. 108.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 82

including the Baluch.^9 However, it should be noted that the revolt

also coincides with the final stage of the delimitation of the Perso-

Kalat boundary in 1896. Therefore, it is highly likely that the Baluch

took notice of that event which effected the separation of western

Baluchistan from the rest of the country.

The official British documents and reports, however, cite heavy

taxation and the "tyranny and oppression" of the Qajar governors as the

cause of rebellion. Colonel Mead, the British official in charge of

investigating the assassination of the telegraph superintendent deter

mined three causes for the uprising. These were: (1) a desire to "plun

der", (2) "much ferment among the Baluchis and desire to throw off the

Persian yoke," and (3) the low ebb of British prestige at the time.30

More important, another official report, written in 1907, attributes the

major cause of the revolt to heavy taxation, stating that:

Nominally forming part of Persia, the littoral, from the entrance to the Gulf to the border of British Baluchistan, is occu pied by a number of Baluch clans ruled over by their own headmen, who yield but a reluctant and passing submission to the Central Government of Tehran. The Persians keep no regular troops perman ently in the country, and their rule is maintained by periodical raids to levy revenue, in the course of which the country is laid waste, and cultivation destroyed, innocent people being killed or ruined. The Baluchis have in consequence a deep hatred for the Persians, and the history of the country of late years consists of successive revolts followed by successive conquests by the Persians, who are always able to overcome the Baluchis, who can never unite to resist attack, but are, on the contrary, always ready to betray each other should a favourable opportunity offer. . . . Though the harvest had failed, the Persians enhanced the revenue demand, and this caused deep and widespread discontent and hatred of the Persian Government.31

29ibid., pp. 274-75. 30saidanha, p. 74.

31Ibid ., p. 70.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 83

The heavy-handed Qajar policies have left their mark on Baluchi

history and perceptions ever since. To this day, the only synonym used

in Baluchi for the term "Persian" is the word "Qajar," pronounced as

"Gajar." Relying on the testimony of "every traveller without excep

tion," Lord Curzon observed that "politically they [the Baluch] have but

two feelings, an intense passion for tribal independence, with all its

murderous accompaniments of blood feuds and border raids, and an out

spoken dislike of the Persians, whom they call Gajars."^2 As has been

pointed out by Naser Askari, there is a Baluchi proverb invoked to

demonstrate the feeling of oppression which says, "I have been subjected

to such atrocity which has not been committed even by the Gajars." The

same author attributes the heavy-handed Qajar policies to Baluchi col

laboration with the Afghans against the Safavids in the eighteenth

century.33 Another likely factor appears to have been the periodic

tribal raids by the Baluch on the Persian border towns and villages.

During the course of his military operations against the tribes of

Sarhad in 1916, General Dyer witnessed how a group of raiders from the

Yar Mohammad Zai tribe had captured and carried away hundreds of inno

cent Persian women and children from their hometowns after a deadly raid

into the province of Kerman.34

The Baranzai Dynastic Rule, 1903-1928

The Baluch revolt of 1896-1898 put an effective end to Qajar

pretensions in Baluchistan and forced the British to work out a new

■^^Curzon, p. 259. 3-*Askari, pp. 64-65.

e . H. Dyer, The Raiders of Sarhad (London: Witherby, 1921), pp. 42-43, 78.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 84

modus vivendi in their relations with the Baluch sardars afterwards. In

addition, the simultaneous weakening of the Qajar dynasty during the

reign of Muzaffar-al-Din Shah also played into the hands of the Baluchi

sardards by enabling them to regain their independence for all intents

and purposes by the turn of the century. Of these, the most powerful

were Sardar Said Khan the ruler of coastal Makuran, and Amir Bahrain Khan

Baranzai (Barakzai), the able Hakom of Dizak. Meanwhile, eastern

Baluchistan had become engulfed in several anti-British uprisings that

let the rebellious Baluchi sardars escape the advancing British troops

and seek the protection of Bahram Khan in 1901. Alarmed by the danger

perceived from the likely collaboration of the Baluchi tribes of eastern

and western Baluchistan, the British once again initiated a joint Anglo-

Persian expedition which besieged Bahram Khan in his headquarters in the

forts of Dizak. This time, however, they were not successful in effect

ing a military victory against Bahram Khan and had to leave after a pro

longed siege and inconclusive negotiations with the Baluchi Hakom.

This event paved the way for the rise of Baranzai rule in western

Baluchistan.

Encouraged by this success, Bahram Khan began to expand his

power and consolidate the rest of the country under his rule. By 1907,

he was joined by Sardar Said Khan in an attempt to wrest control of

Bampur as the last Qajar stronghold in the country. In 1910, another

•^Great Britain, India Army, Intelligence Branch, Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, Selection from Government Records (Quetta: M/S Nisa Traders, 1979), 3:254-62. The leader of the Baluchi rebellion against the British was Muhammad Omar Khan Nushiravani, who was assisted and protected by Bahram Khan as well as Sardar Jiand Yar Mohammad Zai of Sarhad.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 85

Qajar force sent by Sardar Nosrat, the commander of the Kerman garrison,

attempted to recapture Bampur, but was again defeated by Bahram K h a n . 36

The fame brought by this victory made him the acknowledged ruler of the

whole country, enabling him to manage to extend his sway over the unruly

tribes of Sarhad as well as the former possession of the Said Khan in

Makuran.37 ge turned Bampur into his capital where he directly con

trolled the extensive crown lands (amlak-e diwani), which were one of

his major sources of income.

During World War I, the Germans attempted to enter into rela

tions with Bahram Khan with the aim of instigating him against the

British, thus disrupting the British lines of communications and organ

izing raids into Afghanistan and British Baluchistan. As a result,

there were several anti-British disturbances resulting in loss of life

to British officials stationed in Makuran in 1916.38 To counter German

designs, the British had to dispatch a mission of their own, headed by

Maj. T. H. Keyes of the Political Department, to enter into a political

arrangement for peaceful settlement of disputes with Bahram Khan.

Accordingly, they won over the Baranzai chief by recognizing his posi

tion as the effective ruler of western Baluchistan, thus ending his

raids into British Baluchistan. In justifying this agreement, Sir Percy

Sykes has stated that "in view of the fact that Persian Baluchistan had

36a . Jahabani, Amaliyyat-e Qushoon Par Baluchistan [The Cam paigns of the Armed Forces in Baluchistanl, 2nd ed. (Tehran: Majis Publication, 1959), p. 36.

3^Ibid., p. 37. See, also, C. P. Skrine, "The Highlands of Persian Baluchistan," Geographical Journal 78 (1931):323.

38percy M. Sykes, A History of Persia, 3rd ed. (London: MacMillan & Co., 1930), 2:449.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. broken its connection with Persia for many years, and that Bahram Khan

an upstart adventurer had recently led a raid across the British border,

Keyes deserved much credit.”39

Moreover, the agreement also served an additional purpose and

that was to distract and neutralize Bahram Khan while the British had

launched a simultaneous pacification campaign against the tribes of

Sarhad which formed, at least nominally, part of his domain. This

operation, which was led by General Dyer, started at the beginning of

1916 and was aimed at securing Sarhad, in northeastern BaluchiBtan, as a

part of the Eastern Persian Cordon linking the British with their war

time Russian ally, thus preventing the Turko-German agents from pene

trating Afghanistan and British India. During the course of the

operation, three of the Sarhad tribes, namely the Yar Mohammad Zai,

Gamshad Zai, and Ismail Zai, joined forces against the British, while a

fourth tribe, the Riki, cooperated with the enemy because one of its

sardars had entered British service as a levy guiding Dyer in his march.

After several months of hostilities, the British general captured thou

sands of their sheep and other livestock, thus forcing them to accept

his terms of settlement.4*^

Bahram Khan was succeeded by his nephew Amir Doust Mohammad Khan

Baluch Baranzai, who ruled Independently until 1928. He successfully

pursued the vigorous policies of his precedessor in consolidating the

39Ibid., p. 454.

40 Ibid., pp. 454-55. According to Dyer, the Yar Mohammad Zai tribe was headed by Sardar Jiand Khan; the Gamshad Zai tribe by Sardar Khalil Khan, who was killed in the battle of Gosht; and the Ismael Zai tribe by Sardar Jumma Khan.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 87

entire western Baluchistan under his rule. In this connection, he

launched a centralization campaign which curbed the immense powers

traditionally enjoyed by the hereditary hakoms of the various principal

ities. Although the majority were confirmed in their positions upon

submission, those who refused were harsely treated and often eliminated,

as was the case with the Bozorg Zada hakoms of Dizak. They were, how

ever, allowed to retain part of the taxes collected as hagh-al-hokoma

(the share or duty for government) in return for maintaining a contin

gency of armed men to be supplied to his government upon request. His

revenues consisted of the income from the large agricultural estates

held by his family in Dizak, the revenues from the crown lands, and the

traditional tax of tithe levied on crops and other individual incomes.

Amir Doust Mohammad Khan's successful attempt at consolidating

his power in western Baluchistan coincided with the rise to power of

Reza Khan in 1921, when his British-supported military coup d'etat

established him, first, as the Minister of War, and then as the Prime

Minister in 1923. By the time he abolished the Qajar dynasty and

ascended the Peacock throne with the title of Riza Shah Pahlavi in 1925,

he had subjugated the autonomous provinces of Gilan in 1921, Kurdistan

in 1922, and Luristan in 1924. In 1925, he annexed the British-

protected Arab principality of Khuzistan or Arabistan, as it used to be

called, which was ruled then by Shaikh Khazal of the Bani-Ka'b tribe.^1

These events did not pass unnoticed by Amir Doust Mohammad. In

1923-1924, he moved to impose his authority over the Sarhad region,

^Great Britain, Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division, Persia, pp. 307-8.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 88

which had been controlled by the British since 1916. This action was

strongly resisted by the latter, thus reviving the old anti-British

feeling in the Baranzai ruler as had been the case with his predecessor.

In 1926, he is said to have offered and paid a sura of money as tax to

the Persian government on the condition that the latter would not inter

vene in the affairs of Baluchistan. This step appears to have been

taken to buy time to strengthen further his position for the anticipated

eventuality of the Persian invasion. In addition, he had also begun to

improve his relations with the Baluchi hakoms as as further step in

strenghtening his internal base of power. Moreover, he fortified his

military position by stationing a force of more than 5,000 to guard the

major forts which were scattered throughout southern and western

Baluchistan.^

The Pahlavi-Baluch Military Confrontation: Annexation of Baluchistan

The anticipated final military showdown between the forces of

Reza Shah and Amir Doust Mohammad Khan Baluch took place in 1928.

General Jahabani, the commander of the Iranian forces, in his book

Amalyyat-e Qushoon Par Baluchistan [The Campaigns of the Armed Forces in

Baluchistan], has stated that the decision to invade Baluchistan was

taken by Reza Shah in 1927, but the military operations were postponed

for the following year pending further preparation. Prior to the begin

ning of the conflict, the commanding Iranian general issued a statement

in which the Baluch were promised exemption from all the previous unpaid

taxes and that the taxes collected afterwards would be

42jahanbani, pp. 39-40, 59-60.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 89

spent exclusively for the development of their own region for the next

ten years, thus hoping to lessen their support for Doust Mohammad. As

to the plight of Amir Doust Mohammad Khan himself, the statement said

that since he had ruled and protected his "ancient cradle," and had

faced many difficulties for that sake, "his services would be taken into

consideration and his place [position] secured provided that he surre

nder, and of course, he would be endowed with royal favors as w e l l . "43

The ruler of Baluchistan, however, refused to surrender and

replied that "he is not at war with the government and trust in God"

according to General Jahabani. The author, however, has confirmed that,

on the basis of the final military intelligence report received by him,

the Baluch religious leaders had issued an opinion (fetva) to the effect

that "the military forces [of Iran] were infidel and the enemy of the

honour and religion [of the Baluch], thus calling for Jihad [holy war]."

As a result, the report added, the pouplace had taken up the call for

preparation to join military actions and "were extremely suspicious of

the Armed Forces."44 The report underlines not only the extent of the

hostile feelings between the two sides, but also underscores the wide

spread popular support for Doust Mohammad's decision to confront the

Iranian forces.

The Iranian forces consisted of three regiments (teep) brought

together from the neighboring provinces of Kerman, Khorasan, and Seistan

and supported by the units of the then-small Iranian air force. In

addition, they were also assisted by a force of 500 Baluchi militia from

Sarhad. Jahanbani calculated the total Baluchi men-at-arms at more than

43Ibid., pp. 51-54. 44Ibid>> p. 5 7 ,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 90

14,000, of which 5,000 were headed directly by Doust Mohammad's comman

ders and a little more than 7,500 were to be supplied by other hakoms

under his rule upon request. Doust Mohammad Khan had stationed his

forces in the forts of the major Baluchi towns— such as Dizak, Pahra,

and Bampur— while the forts of coastal Makuran were protected by the

local rulers.4^

Subsequently, General Jahanbani launched his pre-planned opera

tion in 1928. Contrary to the anticipation of the Baluchi ruler that

the main attack would come against Bampur through the classical invasion

route from Kerman, the Iranian general directed the thrust of his offen

sive toward the forts of Dizak bordering British-held Baluchistan, thus

utilizing the element of surprise. The main goal of this military move,

however, was to prevent Doust Mohammad from receiving any aid from his

"brethren" in eastern Baluchistan and Afghanistan, on the one hand, and

to cut his escape routes to those countries, on the other hand. The

general also stated that, prior to the operation, the Iranian government

had also secured British cooperation to prevent the Baluch under their

control from coming to the aid of their "religious brethren” in western

Baluchistan. Moreover, as one of the main agricultural centers of

Baluchistan, the heavily defended Dizak region constituted a major base

of supply of men and materials for the Baranzai rules— thus, capturing

it first would have forced the latter to submit much earlier bysqueez

ing his resources.4^

Nevertheless, the government forces confronted heavy resistance

and were forced to advance slowly from fort to fort, suffering heavy

4 5 Ibid., pp. 41-47, 58. 4 6 Ibid., pp. 49, 58-70.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 91

casualties. In this regard, Iranian air power proved effective in

reducing the Baluchi forts. As a result, the war lasted for seven

months before Doust Mohammad was persuaded to surrender with the promise

of royal favor. The extent of the intensity of the resistance is best

evidenced from the observations of General Jahnbani himself In the

battle for the main fort of Dizak:

I was amazed by [seeing] how much a smaller force dared to resist the victorious regular forces equipped with artillery and machine gun and even not giving any importance to being surrounded and what hope did they have and what feelings did stimulate such a sacrifice In them? Was such a resistance a manifestation of bravery or the result of a deficiency in thought and the lack of awareness as to the principles of warfare? Of course, there were no sacred feelings to encourage such a savage multitude for sacrifice. The few religious declarations by their [religious] leaders had caused them to view the newly arrived armed forces as infidel and had spread the word that their honour and religion would be in danger in the case of victory by the armed forces. In my opinion, the reason for such resistance with no result and with such a madness, as was being observed, lies in the historical legends, namely, the stories told by the elders of the nation in which the arrival of the Iranian forces in the land of Baluchistan was always viewed with a sense of ridicule and described how the Iranian forces had come to this region time after time and in the face of the great and invincible forts left for their country with heavy losses and the utmost sense of hopelessness and the small groups which had more courage to remain behind lost their lives after the arrival of the hot season or evacuated Baluchistan upon having been fully humiliated.47

He has also acknowledged that since none of the defenders surrendered,

they had to be eliminated one by one in order to secure the fort.48

There is no explanation for such a resistance other than the Baluch

desire to preserve their traditional independence and to resist politi

cal control by the non-Baluch.

4 7 Ibid., p. 70. 48Ibid., p. 76.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 92

There were several important factors contributing to the defeat

of Doust Mohammad and the incorporation of Baluchistan into Iran. The

first was British approval and support of Reza Shah's move. In this

regard, British policy was motivated by its concern for strengthening

the Iranian government and the state in order to contain the spread of

the Bolshvilc revolution of 1917. Britain feared that an independent

western Baluchistan under the anti-British Doust Mohammad could have

inflamed the same tendency among its own Baluch and would have made a

weak Baluchi entity an easy potential prey to the new Soviet state.

Relying on British military reports on Khurasan (Iran), Inayatullah

Baluch, a Baluchi historian, has asserted that the majority of the

Baluch in Iran were at the time in favor of the Soviet Union because of

their anti-British feelings. ^

Moreover, as has been pointed out by C. P. Skrine (then a

British consular officer serving in Kerman, Baluchistan, and Seistan),

the British transferred the control of the Sarhad district (which had

been connected by a railway to east Baluchistan) to Persia in 1924 in

order to support her planned move in Baluchistan.^ Accordingly, the

district was used as a staging point for Iranian operations against the

settled southern hinterland of Baluchistan in 1928. Correspondingly,

the British-controlled tribes of Sarhad were persuaded through the

instrumentality of Eido Reiki, a Sarhad chieftain in the British serv

ice, to join the Iranian forces against their fellow Baluch. Therefore,

^Inayatollah Baluch, "Afghanistan-Pastunistan-Baluchistan," Aussen Politik 31 (1980):293.

^Skrine, p. 323.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 93

the Baluchi ruler was denied some of the best tribal fighting men inhab

iting the strategically located mountainous region which had histori

cally shielded the settled agricultural towns of the southern hinterland

from Iranian threats.

Second, once assured of British support for their operation in

Baluchistan, the Iranian forces were quick to utilize their qualitative

and quantitative superiority against the Baluch feudal army equipped at

most with rifles and confined in medieval forts. In this regard, Reza

Shah's "New Army" (artesh novin), which was equipped with modern heavy

weaponry and air power and schooled in modern warfare, proved highly

effective.

Third, the division of Baluchistan also served to weaken further

the Baluchi forces in that they were not able to receive any assistance

from their brethren in eastern Baluchistan, a factor which was a con

stant source of fear by Iranian forces, as is evident from the writing

of General Jahanbani.

In the fourth place, the successive Perso-British pacification

of Baluchistan had also weakened the Baluch, thus not allowing them time

to build either their military strength or work toward developing their

feudal socio-political institutions.

Finally, in spite of the large popular support enjoyed by Doust

Mohammad in his confrontation with Iranian forces, his feudally struc

tured government was highly divisive and vulnerable to defection by some

hakoms or sardars who viewed the increasing concentration of power in

the hands of the Baranzai ruler as a threat to their traditional heredi

tary privileges. As a result, Jahanbani reports that several hakoms in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 94

the Dizak district defected to him during the course of the military

operation. Moreover, although few members of the ruling class may have

been exposed to modern nationalistic ideas through their contacts with

the British and the Baluch of the east, the society at large was highly

underdeveloped socially and economically. There were no notable middle

class or other modern classes, which are identified as the base of

modern nationalism, as will be seen in the next chapter.

The military incorporation of western Baluchistan into Iran is

the most significant historical event in the modern history of the

Baluch and their homeland. It marks the end of an era known by the

Baluch as the Baluch Doura, during which they were free from any

pretension of political control by the non-Baluch.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I I I

THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION UNDER THE PAHLAVIS:

THE CASE OF BALUCHIS

The Pahlavi Policies toward the Non-Persian Nationalities

The policies pursued by Reza Shah and his successor Mohammad

Reza Shah toward the Baluch were part of a broader national campaign to

consolidate and integrate the diverse nationalities and ethnic groups

and their respective provinces into a modern and highly centralized

state. Correspondingly, the Persian-dominated central government util

ized the immense state resources for that purpose. Both in theory and

practice, the state structure was based on a highly unitary system which

deliberately discounted the diverse ethno-linguistic reality of the

country. Thus, the case of relations between the central government and

the Baluch is part of a larger panorama reflecting the plight of other

non-Persian nationalities as well.

In this context, the state-building campaign was, and still is,

equated with the process of nation-building whereby the six nationali

ties comprising Iran— namely, Persians, Arabs, Turks, Turkmans, Kurds,

and Baluchis— were officially described and designated as constituting

one single nation referred to as Millat-e Iran or "the nation of Iran."

As embodied in the first Iranian Constitution of 1906 and as it was

interpreted and implemented under the Pahlavis, the concept of Millat-e

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 96

Iran" was a historical manifestation of Persian nationalism which was,

in practice, equated with Iranian nationalism. It reflected the outlook

of nationalist forces which led the constitutional revolution of 1906,

including the secular intellectuals influenced by enlightenment, the

merchant class determined to enhance an environment favorable to the

growth of their business interests, and a faction of Shi'ite clergy who

advocated a revived Islam.^ As such, it placed a heavy emphasis on

individual rights and political freedom to the exclusion of the collec

tive national rights of the non-Persian nationalities. Apparently, it

adopted Persian and recognized Shi'ism as the only official state

language and religion, respectively.

Accordingly, the non-Persian national groups or nationalities

were not recognized and, as such, accorded no national rights such as

administrative and cultural autonomy. To be sure, the Baluch, like the

Arabs of Khuzistan, were independent at the time of the constitutional

revolution and did not play any role in that event. Nevertheless,

Persia had not relinquished its claims to those provinces prior to their

incorporation in the 1920s. In addition, some elements from other

nationalities, such as the Bazaris of Tabriz, the capital of Turkish

speaking Azarbaijan, actively participated in the revolution. Moreover,

some of these nationalities did not share in the Shi'ism of the

Persians, but adhere to Sunni Islam, which was not accorded constitu

tional recognition. These included the Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and the

Baluch.

^Richard W. Cottam, "Human Rights in Iran under the Shah," Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 12 (1980):122-23.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97

In the absence of constitutional guarantees for, and recognition

of, the national rights of the non-Persian nationalities, the government

attempted to translate its nation-building campaign into a set of inte-

grationist policies and practices aimed at their economic integration

and socio-cultural assimilation into the Persian-dominated state struc

ture, culture, and society. In this regard, the administrative policy

of the central government was a good example. Although all those

national groups possessed historically defined geographic homelands

corresponding more or less to their ethno-linguistic boundaries, none

was constituted as a separate administrative unit let alone as a self-

autonomous province. Each ethnic region or homeland was, and still is,

divided into several parts which were incorporated in different prov

inces at different times. For instance, under the last shah, Kurdistan

was divided into three parts, each forming part of a separate province—

namely, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, and western Azarbaijan— while Azarbaijan

itself was also divided into western and eastern halves each forming a

separate province. And so was the case of western Baluchistan as will

be discussed below.

In terms of non-Persian languages and cultures, the government's

policies went beyond integration and took more or less an assimilation-

ist or Persianization line. The use of those languages was strictly

prohibited for literary purposes as well as for official use in their

respective homelands. As pointed out by Eden Naby, only Persian history

was taught as the "Iranian" history, never the history of other national

groups. No cultural institutions or activities were tolerated among the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 98

non-Persians.^ Even the Iranian census data did not reflect the nature

of its ethnic heterogeneity. Instead, it used religious designation to

emphasize Muslim homogeneity, thus distorting the multi-ethnic nature of

the country. Therefore, there is no accurate data about the size and

distribution of the population of different ethnic groups in Iran.3 As

we have seen, however, the combined numbers of the non-Persian national

groups— Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, Turkmen— together with other

lingo-tribal minorities are slightly more than half of the population of

the country. (See Map 2.)

Thus, government relations and policies toward the Baluch were

in no way distinct or different from those pursued toward other non-

Persian national groups. The differences, if any, were merely in

degree, not in kind, reflecting historical, socio-economic, and politi

cal peculiarities in each case. Therefore, the following discussion of

the government’s administrative and socio-economic policies toward the

Baluch may also help shed some light on a larger panorama involving

other nationalities as well.

The Central Government and the Baluch

Upon the incorporation of western Baluchistan, the government

initiated the process of its integration into the Iranian state struc

ture in 1928. Since it was the last ethnic region to be incorporated

into the state, the government had to undertake the immediate task of

3Eden Naby, "The Iranian Frontier Nationalities: The Kurds, the Assyrians, the Baluchis, and the Turkmen," in Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers, ed. William 0. McCagg, Jr., and Brian D. Silver (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), pp. 72-79, 83-110.

3Ibid., p. 83.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 99

Turkish X..

P e rsia n...... P.... Turkish a Fhrsian.. Caspian Ffcrjian.

Kurdish.. . .K. . Luri...... Luri i Kurdish.. . Arabic....A... Arabic a Lun__ fersian a Arabic..

Baluchi...... B____ fersian a Baluchi.l Armenian.R Assyrian..N Hazara.. H

Map 2. Ethno-linguistic map of Iran. Source: Naval Intelli gence Division, Geographical Handbook Series, Persia (Oxford: Oxford University Press for H.M. Stationery Office, 1945), p. 318, fig. 50.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 100

imposing and implanting its administrative machinery in the region for

the first time. Under Reza Shah, the government relied for the most

part on the military for its administration. This was so because the

military not only had effected its incorporation, but was also to pave

the way for the gradual introduction of the civil bureaucracy in the

area. For this purpose, the military had to pacify a series of succes

sive tribal revolts which lasted until 1935 in order to secure its own

hold in the region. Ironically, the same tribes of Sarhad which had

cooperated with the military in 1928 were the first to rise up and take

arms aginst the government once they realized that their tribal indepen

dence was effectively checked and reduced by military rule. These

revolts were particularly widespread in the district of Kohak and to the

north of it in the Sarhad region, where the tribes of Yar Mohammad Zai

and Ismael Zai engaged the military forces in hit-and-run guerrilla

warfare until 1935.^ According to General Jahanbani, the Kohak rebel

lion resulted in a mass execution of its chiefs by General Alborz, the

military governor and the commander of the Baluchistan regiment in

1931.5

Administrative Policies

The original administrative plan prepared by the War Department

of the Armed Forces (Arkan-e Harbe Kull-e Qushoon) called for constitut

ing Baluchistan as a separate province (ayalat) after the completion of

^Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs (London: John Murray, 1964), p. 254.

5Amanullah Jahanbani, Sargozasht-e Baluchistan va Marz Hai-e Aan [The History of Baluchistan and Its Boundaries] (Tehran: n.p., 1959), p. 69.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 101

the military operations of 1928. The map of the proposed province

incorporated more or less all the Baluchi ethnic regions including those

portions in the north and west which had been annexed to the province of

Kerman during the Qajar period.^ In spite of this plan Baluchistan was

officially constituted as a military province (ustan nezami) in 1937

when the administration of the provinces was revised, while at the same

time, it nominally formed part of the Eighth Ustan (province), namely,

the Kerman province.^ On the surface, this may be taken as a sign of

confusion in the government's administrative policies. But, in reality,

the government had not been able to extend its civil bureaucracy in the

region by that time and, therefore, had to rely on the military gover

nors for its administration. By 1938, military garrisons and stations

had been established in the major Baluchi towns such as Dizak, Bampur,

Magas, Khash, Pahra, and other places.^

With the Anglo-Russian invasion of the country and the forced

abdication of Reza Shah in 1941, the central government temporarily lost

control over the region due to the ensuing disintegration of the Iranian

armed forces and the simultaneous uprising among the Baluch, events

which disrupted the process of its integration into Iran during the war.

Thereafter, his son and successor, Mohammad Reza Shah reinstated central

authority and initiated a more aggressive integrationist policy which

continued to progress until his downfall in 1979.

^Jahanbani, Amalyyat-e Qushoon, p. 9, n. 1.

^Hossein All Razm Ara, Joghraphiary-e Nezami Shahrestan Haie Marzi [Military Geography of the Border Districts] (Tehran: Chaphkana-e Sherkat Matbooat, 1319-1318 A.H., 1940), p. 97.

8Jahanbani, Amalyyat-e Qushoon, p. 84.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 102

Indeed, Mohammad Reza Shah should be credited with the adminis

trative integration of the Baluch ethnic regions into Iran by firmly

establishing its civil bureaucracy in those regions. As a result of his

revision of the provincial administration in 1958-59, western Baluch

istan was administratively divided into three major and separate parts,

as has been the case ever since. The northern part was included in the

neighboring Persian-speaking province of Kerman. It comprises the

northern part of the Jaz Murian Basin, including the major districts of

Roud Bar; Kahnouj up to the city of Kiruft, as well as the southern

portion of the Lut desert known as Baluch-ab; and parts of Narmanshir

district. The westernmost part was included in the Governorate-General

of the Ports and Coasts, which later became a full province called the

Coastal Province (Ustan Saheli) and is presently known as the province

of Hurmuzgan. It stretches on the coast of the Gulf of Oman from the

Rudian River on the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz to the provincial

border line on the south. It consists of the districts of Byaban,

Bashkard, Minab, and the ports of Jask and several smaller ports.9

The third and the largest part constitutes the "province of

Seistan and Baluchistan." It covers 181,578 square kilometers, which is

in itself the second longest province after Khorasan. It is divided

into six Shahristan (districts or townships)— namely Zahidan (the

provincial capital), Iransharh (Pahra), Sarawan, the port of Chah Bahar,

^For a detailed geographical and ethnological description of these two parts, see Great Britian, Admiralty, Naval Intelligence Division, Persia, pp. 107-13, 119-27; see, also, Iran, Army, Geography Department of the Army Staff, Far hang-e Joghraphiai-e Iran [The Geographic Encyclopedia of Irani, vol. 8 : Ustam Kerman va Mokran [Province of Kerman and Makuran (Tehran: Chapkhana-i Artesh, 1953).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 103

Khash, and Seistan or Zabol. Of these, Seistan, with an area of 8,117

square kilometers or 5 percent of the area of the province, is the

smallest district inhabited by a mixed ethnic poulation of Siestanis and

Baluch,I® but more than half of its population is comprised of Shi'ites.

Becuase of these two factors, its name is included in the offical prov

incial designation "Ustan Seistan va Baluchistan." It reflects the

prominence given to the segment of Shi'ite Seistanis in key positions in

the provincial administration.

As one of the twenty-one provinces into which the country was

last divided in 1972-73 (1351 A.H.), the province was administered by an

ustandar(governor-general) appointed by royal decree, while the

Shahristans were directed by farmandars (governors) appointed by the

Interior Ministry.H There were no Baluch ever appointed to either of

those positions or, for that matter, to any other decision-making posi

tion through the Pahlave reign. In fact, the first Baluchi governor-

general. was appointed immediately after the revolution of 1979, a posi

tion which he held for less than a year.

The policy of dividing and assigning large portions of western

Baluchistan into the adjoining Persian-speaking provinces appears to

have been intended to speed up the process of its consolidation under

the Iranian civil and military machinery, thus facilitating its

^Edareh Koll-e Ershad-e Melli Ustan Seistan va Baluchistan [Department of National Guidance of Province of Seistan and Baluch istan] , Shonosai Mokhtasar Ustan Seistan va Baluchistan [A Brief Description of the Province of Seistan of Baluchistan] (Zahidan, 1358 A.H. [1979/80]), p. 11. Thereafter, this work is referred to under its translated heading.

^Kayhan Research Associates, Iran Year Book 1977 (Tehran: Kayhan, 1977), p. 47.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 104

integration into the state. Areawise, all three parts of Baluchistan

combined cover around 280,000 square kilometers. As a result, western

Baluchistan is the second largest ethnic region after the Persian-

speaking areas, as compared with Azarbaijan, covering 110,000 square

kilometers, or Kuristan, covering less than 100,000 square kilometers.

As to the total population of the Baluch or other ethnic groups

in Iran, the official census does not provide any data as mentioned

earlier. This issue has led to various estimates for Baluch population

ranging from 750,000 to more than 2 million at the present time.^ In

1892, Lord Curzon estimated the population of "Persian Baluchistan" or

western Baluchistan at 250,000. He attributed this estimate to a

Persian authority. And it should be noted that Persians have been

politically inclined to overestimate their own population, while

underestimating those of non-Persian nationalities. He also has given

various estimates about the populations of the whole country of Persia

which ranged from less than 6 million to 9 million.^ These estimats

were based on extensive British studies of the country and of its

population which were, in turn, the only systematic studies of their

kind at the time. At the same time, it should be noted that his esti

mate of the Baluch population excludes the Baluch population scattered

ia the rest of the country. The comparable Iranian estimates gave a

l^Lois Beck gives a figure of 2 million Baluch in Iran (MERIP, May 1980, p. 16); R. Weekes and Stephen Pastner give the estimate of 1.53 million in Muslim Peoples; A World Ethnographic Survey (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 64, 510; Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 1, estimates the Baluch of Iran at 1 million; Keddi, in "The Minorities Question in Iran," gives an estimate of 1.5 million Baluchi in Iran.

^Curzon, pp. 491-94.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 105

figure of 7.5 million for the entire population or Iran in 1906.^

The total population of the country had reached 34 million as of

the 1976 census and is estimated at a little more than 40 million at the

present tirne.^ A comparison of the earlier estimates of 6 or 7.5 mil

lion with the most recent figures indicates a five- or sixfold increase

in the population of the country between 1892 and the 1976-1984 period.

Therefore, if we assume that the Baluch population has also multiplied

by the same ratio during the same period, the present population of

western Baluchistan should be between 1.25 to 1.5 million. To this, one

should add an estimated 500,000 Baluchi population scattered in other

parts of Iran, but mainly in the province of Khorasan particularly in

Birjand, Turbat Jam, Sarakhs, and Gorgan. Thus, even if one accepts the

figure given by Curzon's Persian source, the total Baluchi population of

Iran would be close to 2 million. But if one leaves room for under

estimation by such a source, the Baluch poulation will be more than 2

million.

The aforementioned estimate appears to correspond with the geo

graphic distribution of the Baluchi pouplation as well. Of the esti

mated total of 1.50 million population of western Baluchistan, around 1

million reside in the "Province of Seistan and Baluchistan" and the rest

are concentrated in the other two parts attached to neighboring prov

inces of Kerman and Hurraozgan with each having more or less equal popu

lation. In the census of 1976, only the population of Baluchistan

l^Iran Almanac and Book of Facts (Tehran: Echo of Iran, 1977), p. 369.

15Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 106

province itself was placed at 659,298.16 of this, 174,070 is the popu

lation of S e i s t a n , 17 which has a mixed population comprising 60 percent

ethnic Seistanis and the rest Baluchis. At the same time, the provin

cial capital of Zahidan, with a population of 94,288, contains an esti

mated 30 percent non-Baluchi immigrant population. This will leave a

total Baluchi population of around 520,000 for the province, which is a

little more than the estimate of 400,000 to 500,000 given by General

Jahanbani for 1956 or twenty years earlier.

Therefore, the figure given for the population of the province

in the 1976 census is a gross underestimation for the following reasons.

First, more than 75 percent of the population of the province consists

of rural and nomadic people scattered for the most part in remote vil

lages or pasturelands. As a result, major parts of that population

were beyond the reach of the newly expanded government bureaucracy and

thus not covered by the census officials. Second, even in areas most

accessible to officials, many Baluchis refuse to acquire birth certifi

cates for their children for fear of being conscripted upon reaching the

legal age. Third, there are an estimated 250,000 Baluch seasonal

laborers moving back and forth to the Arab states of the Gulf in search

of jobs. Therefore, the census officials were hardly able to take

account of this large segment of the population.^

16Ibid., p. 370.

^Department of National Guidance of the Province of Seistan and Baluchistan, A Brief Description of the Province of Seistan and Baluch istan, p. 2.

18Ibid., p. 1.

l^In 1956, Jahanbani, in Sargozasht-e Baluchistan, p. 72, ridiculed the results of the first national census taken in 1955 on the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 107

Socio-Economic Policies

Under the Shah, Baluchistan became a striking example of the

uneven process of development which engulfed the country as a result of

his national economic policies. Until the early 1970s, the province was

characterized as the "forgotten land" in the pouplar jargon, implying a

long-time economic and social neglect. Indeed, it was in the early

1960s that the government began to conduct the first preliminary surveys

about the mineral resources and the agricultural potential of the prov

ince. The task was entrusted to an Italian concern known as Italconsult

in 1958. The result of the surveys revealed that the land was, for the

most part, fertile, formed of volcanic layers, and that there were sub

stantial underground water reserves— thus suggesting a series of plans

for bringing the water to the surface and improving the existing irriga

tion systems in order to improve the overall agricultural conditions in

the province.20 They also confirmed that the land was rich in minerals

Including krumit, oil, manganese, coal, marble, iron ore, and cooper.21

In spite of the positive result, no step has been taken yet for the

development of these resources.

In 1962, the shah launched his White Revolution, involving a

series of reforms intended for the general economic and social transfor

mation of the country. Baluchistan, however, barely benefited from

same ground for its gross underestimation of the Baluchistan population at the time.

20ltalconsult, Socio-Economic Development Plan for the South-Eastern Region: Preliminary Report (Agricultural Survey) (Rome: Italconsult, 1959).

2lDepartment of National Guidance of the Province of Seistan and Baluchistan, A Brief Description, pp. 21-23.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 108

these reforms. This was due to the fact that some of the major points

of the revolution, such as land reform and profit-sharing of the workers

in factories, were hardly applicable in the province where there were no

large-scale land-holdings nor any light or heavy industries. For

instance, when the first stage of land reform was complete in 1964, five

Khaliseh villages (crown lands) near Khahs, one small village in Iran-

shahr, and some small villages in Bampur were transferred to peasants.

Of these, the first five villages were distributed among the Persian

speaking Yazdi immigrants. In the second stage of land reform in 1965,

only 214 peasants were affected. ^ The results of the profit-sharing

programs were still more negligible, affecting only two plants or units

involving only fourteen workers.^3

The size of the labor force and the industrial units are two

additional indicators given to illustrate further the insignificant

impact of the White Revolution on the development of the province. In

1971-72, there were only forty-eight industrial units, of which thirty-

eight were related to non-metal mining, excluding cement, oil, and coal;

two were related to textile and apparel carpets; and the last one was

the paper and drinking unit. There were no noticeable light industries,

let along heavy machinery industries. There were a total of 1,777

workers in the province. During the same period, the total labor force

employed in industry as 6,800, as compared— for instance, with 41,400

for the Persian-speaking province of Yazd, which is one of the smallest

^A n n K. S. Larabton, The Persian Land Reform 1962-1966 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966).

2^Iran Year Book 1977, p. 355.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 109

provinces in the country with a population less than half of that of

Baluchistan even if one accepts the official census d a t a . 2 4 The gap

would be much larger if the same comparison was made with other larger

Persian-speaking provinces such as Central Province (Tehran), Isfahan,

or Ears.

Beginning with the 1970s or the last decade of his rule, the

shah's government began to place greater emphasis on the development of

the province. This was particularly the case with the Fifth Development

Plan (1973-1978), during which the government began to increase sharply

the province's development allocations and laid plans for building its

economic infrastructure for the first time. For this purpose, the

Baluchistan Development Organization (Saseman-e Tausea-i Baluchistan)

was established in 1973. According to Selig Harrison, government expen

ditures for the development of the province were $750,000 per year in

1972, while the following year saw talk of increasing that figure to

$100 million for the. ensuing five years coinciding with the Fifth Devel

opment Plan (1973- 1978).25

The overwnelming share of development projects expenditures,

however, were geared toward building the provincial economic infrastruc

ture involving extensive road-building projects, housing complexes for

government employees, hotel and tourist facilities, military bases, and

administrative infrastructure. Of these, the most important project was

the construction of the first asphalt road in the province, 692 km in

length, linking Zahidan to the port of Chah-Bahar on the Gulf of Oman.

24ibid., pp. 547, 551, 556.

25iiarrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 99.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 110

This project, however, was undertaken in connection with the construc

tion of the huge tri-service military base at Chah-Bahar, which had

begun at the same time in the early 1970s. Other major projects

included the housing complexes built for government employees in each of

the six provincial districts, which occupied a separate quarter called

Kooy-1 Kaarmandan (Employer's Quarter), expansion of tourist hotels and

facilities in each city, and the military barracks and facilities con

structed in Khash.

These projects, however, had a very limited immediate impact on

the lots of the Baluchi masses. Rather, they were expected to stimulate

the provincial economy in the long run, after having its economic infra

structure fully laid down. The downfall of the shah's regime in 1979,

however, left most of those programs incomplete or aborted by the revo

lutionary government, as was the case— for instance— with the large

air-naval base at Chah-Bahar.

As far as the productive section of provincial economy was

concerned, the government programs did not include any noticeable plan

for Introducing any major industrial complex or factory in the province,

extracting its rich mining potential, improving its agriculture, or

developing its ports or the immense maritime and fishing resources along

the more than 400-mile coast on the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea.

The single exception was the construction of a textile factory in Iran-

shahr known as Baft Baluch, which was the only important industrial

project ever to be undertaken by the shah's government in the whole

province. It was not, however, completed at the time of his removal

from power.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I l l

These were the kinds of projects which were necessary for the

growth of the productive section of the economy and would have been of

direct benefit to the population.

The result of the shah's economic policies was a huge gap

separating Baluchistan from the rest of the country. The following two

indicators are good examples. In 1972, the estimated annual per capita

income in the province was $975, as compared to $2,200 for the national

average for rural areas, and less than one-fifth if compared with the

overall national average as demonstrated by Selig Harrison.Again,

durig the same period (1971-72), the average monthly household expendi

ture for the province was 5,012 rials, as compared— for instance— with

8,711 rials for East Azar Abijan and 8,329 for Gilan, two of the

northern provinces.27

By contrast, the shah's educational programs were considered

more successful than his economic plans. In 1971-72, the total number

of literate population seven years of age and over was listed at 73,300

for the province.28 gy comparison, in 1978-79, only the numbers of

students of all ages enrolled in different provincial schools at various

levels totaled 128,274, which by itself exceeded the previous figure

given for total literates.29 Still more impressive was the growth in

26Ibid., p. 99.

27m . H, Pesararn, "Income Distribution and Its Major Determinants in Iran," paper presented at Aspen-Persepolis Symposium, 15-19 September 1975, Persepolis.

28iran Year Book 1977, p. 547.

29tiatija-i Amar Girl Edara-i Koll-e Amouzesh va Parvaresh Ustan Seistan va Baluchistan dar Saale Tahsili 2536-2537 LThe Results of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 112

the field of higher education in the 1970s as compared to the 1960s.

According to Askari, no single Baluchi student was enrolled in any

institution of higher education in the period 1955-1965, when two or

three students were admitted. Thereafter, four students were admitted

in 1966 and five in 1967.30 By contrast, the 1970s saw the establish

ment of the first two institutions of higher education in the province:

the Teacher Training College of Zahidan and the University of Baluch

istan, created in 1972 and 1973, respectively. The inauguration of

these institutions brought a simultaneous sharp increase in the number

of Baluchi students enrolled at the college level. For instance, in the

academic year of 1972-73, there were 198 students enrolled in the

Teacher Training College.31 By 1978, the University of Baluchistan had

a student body of 450.32 Although the overwhelming majority of the

student body in the two institutions was comprised of Persian immi

grants, the total number of Baluchi students has been estimated at

between sixty to 100 during the period between 1972 to 1979.33 still,

the estimated figure for the 1970s is much higher than the similar

estimates for the previous decades.

In spite of this progress in provincial educational programs,

the illiteracy rate in the province remained much higher than the

Statistics Done by the Department of Education, Province of Seistan and Baluchistan in the Educational Year 1977-1978), Table 19.

30Askari, p. 209.

31flarrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 102.

3^Iran Year Bok 1977, p. 548.

33'rhe estimate is baesd on interviews with the Baluchi students enrolled in the university in 1979.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 113

national average, indicating a gap similar to the economic one explained

earlier. In 1965-66, the literacy rate in the province's population of

seven years of age and over was 16 p e r c e n t , 34 as compared with the

national literacy average of 29.4 percent.35 gy 1972, the national

literacy average for the same age group rose to 36.9 percent, as com

pared with the estimated provincial average of 21 percent.36 The educa

tional gap shown by these figures is similar to the economic gap between

the province and the rest of the country, as explained previously.

The change in the urban/rural ratio of the population in the

last two decades is another important indicator in measuring the overall

impact of the government's economic and educational programs on the

development of the province. In the 1966 census, the ratio of urban to

rural population in the province was 17 percent to 83 percent. In 1976,

that figure changed to 27 and 74 percent, respectively, thus Indicating

a 9 percent increase in the urban population.37 gy comparison, in

1977-78, the national average for the urban and rural segments of the

population was given as 47.1 and 52.9 percent, respectively; this com

parison indicates that one-fourth of the population in the province is

urban as compared with close to one-half of the population of the

country as a whole.38

Ironically, the development projects undertaken in Baluchistan

during the 1970s served to widen the socio-economic gap between the

3^Akhardad Baluch, Siasat Par Baluchistan, p. 59.

3^Iran Year Book 1977, p. 42. ^Ibid., p# 42 #

37shonasae-i Mokhatasar-e, p. 1.

3^Iran Year Book 1977, p. 29.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Baluch, on the one hand, and the Persian bureaucrats and their fellow

immigrants, on the other hand, more than ever before. This was due to

several important reasons. First, most of the development expenditures

were geared toward the expansion of the military-related infrastructure

such as roads, military bases, and facilities— hence, hardly benefiting

the Baluchi masses. Second, as far as non-military projects were con

cerned, they were planned behind closed doors in Tehran, due to the

highly centralized nature of economic planning in Iran under the shah,

and implemented through the Persian-controlled provincial bureaucracy.

As a result, the needs and wants of the Baluchi population were not

taken into consideration because no Baluchi ever served in a decision

making position at the provincial level let alone at the national level

to be able to communicate the socio-economic needs of his people to

Tehran. Even the number of Baluchis in the provincial administration

was, and still is, hardly more than 5 percent of total civil servants.

Third, these latter programs were often geared toward the Persian

bureaucrats and Immigrants serving and living in the province because

they were the ones whose opinions and voices were heard in Tehran.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER IV

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND CLASS STRUCTURE OF BALUCH SOCIETY:

TRIBALISM/FEUDALISM, RELIGION, AND NATIONALISM

In the pre-modern era, the Baluch society was divided mainly

into two social categories of shahris (townsfolk) and baluch (nomadic

tribesman), a division based on the dual nature of agrarian and pastoral

economies then prevailing in the country. The former were and still are

the backbone of the feudal order which was predominant in the central,

southern (Makuran), and western parts of Baluchistan, while the latter

were the cornerstone of the tribal order prevailing mainly in the Sarhad

region of northern Baluchistan. Both groups, however, were bound

together by a set of historically evolved relationships based on eco

nomic, social, political, military, and lingual interactions.

The main social stratification among the settled population or

the shahris placed the hakoms or mirs (the feudal ruling class) at the

top of the hierarchy; followed by arbabs or zamin wajahs (landowners),

peasants, and tajirs (traders) in the middle; and the ustakars (arti

sans), louris (entertainers), and slaves (gholams) at the bottom, as was

the case with the feudal order in many surrounding societies. To this

should be added the ulamas or maulavis (clergy), who occupied an influ

ential position next to the hakoms by virtue of their control over

judicial, religious, and educational affairs. The social differentia

tion among the nomadic Baluch was less hierarchical, placing the sardar

115

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 116

and his ruling clan on a raore-or-less equal status with his tribesmen.

Together, they occupied the higher social position followed by gholams

and other dependent servants of the tribe at the bottom.

In the contemporary era, however, the Baluch society, like other

traditional Third World societies, is being transformed under the impact

of the socio-eocnomic modernization engulfing our world. In this

respect, this society is also in the state of transition whereby the

traditional socio-economic structure is being rapidly transformed and

replaced by new economic relations and class-oriented social division

even through the process of class differentiation is far from talcing its

final shape. The most immediate impact of this transformation is most

evident in the growth of urban classes such as middle class and working

class.

Therefore, as a prelude to our main discussion of politics of

Baluch nationalism In the upcoming chapters, an attempt is made here to

analyze the role of, and interaction among, various social groups and

classes, including peasants and nomads, hakoms and sardars, maulavis,

and the middle class. This will enable us to see how nationalism,

religion, and tribalism/feudalism manifest themselves in the Baluch

national movement as well as in the Baluch society as a whole.

Peasants

The population of western Baluchistan is predominantly comprised

of peasants and nomads who together constituted 74.1 percent of the

total Baluchi population in 1976. Of this, an estimated 60 percent was

rural, while the remaining 14 percent was nomadic. Given their weight

in numbers, the peasantry is certain to affect every social trend and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 117

political movement in Baluchistan for years to come. The overwhelming

majority of Baluch peasants are small and independent landholders fol

lowed by the landless peasants who engage in cropsharing for a subsis

tence living. As a result, there are very few, if any, Baluch villages

owned entirely by one or more landlords. By contrast, in other parts of

Iran, the larger number of peasants were landless who lived in villages

owned by one or more landlords or by the crown or by the church prior to

the 1962 land reform.*

This pattern of small landholding in Baluchistan is a function

of the scarcity of both arable lands and water resources. The prime

irrigation system is based on qanats or kahns described previously. The

distribution of qanat-based irrigation waters is based on a twelve-hour

cycle called hangam, of which there are usually twenty-four hangams

corresponding to twelve successive days and nights. Each small land-

holding peasant owns from one to several hours of irrigation water,

which determines the size of his cultivated land. The hakom of each

village usually owned one or, at most, a few hangams, the rest being

divided among small landholders with their shares ranging from one to

several hours of irrigation water. The cropsharing peasants receive

about 20 to 40 percent of the harvest for their services. Another 10

percent of the produce (day-yak) went for the traditional Islamic tax.

The remainder was left for the landowner.

Traditional wisdom holds that since the peasant's world outlook

and loyalties center around family, clan, and village, his inertia and

narrow horizons permit him but a vague conception of nationalism.

^Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 34.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 118

That may have been the case previously during the time he was a prisoner

of his village environment by such circumstances as the absence of roads

and modern means of transportation, fear of punishment by his feudal

landlord, or the threat of being harmed by highway robbers had he

decided to leave his village home. But this is no longer the case today

because even peasants cannot escape the impact of changes brought by

modernization and communication in our time. First, he is easily con

nected by networks of roads and railroads as well as through radio

transistors, cassette players, and so on with the world at large, a

development which is certain to transform his outlook and loyalties.

For instance, in the case of Baluch peasants, an estimated 200,000 to

300,000 have been traveling frequently back and forth to the Arab states

of the Gulf in search of jobs during the last several years. Not only

has this movement across the border exposed them to socio-economic and

political development in the region, but also has enabled them to con

trast and compare the plight of their impoverished people and homeland,

which is larger than France areawise, to the progress of the Arab city

states. Hence, upon return, they have served as carriers of modern

goods such as radio transistors, as well as modern ideas to the most

remote villages of their homeland.

Second, parallel to the decline of feudalism, present-day

peasants are the target for politicization and indoctrination by various

political forces such as nationalist organizations and parties all seek

ing to enlist the peasants’ support for their causes as demonstrated by

efforts made by various Baluch nationalist groups to organize them into

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 119

councils of peasants during the 1979 revolution in Iran as described in

the succeeding chapters.

In the third place, in the case of Baluch peasants, they are no

longer insulated from the growing intrusion of Persian-dominated govern

ment in their daily lives, a factor which has sharpened the ethno-

linguistic, cultural, and religious differences between the two sides.

As to the role played by peasants in the Baluch national move

ment, here it suffices to mention that they formed the bulk of the

forces of Amir Doust Mohammad Khan in his confrontation with Reza Shah's

army in 1928. Again, Dad Shah, one of the most venerated Baluch heroes

and "martyrs," emerged from the ranks of the peasantry and led the most

popular revolt against the shah's government during the 1944-59 period,

as described in the next chapter. At the same time, it is the peasantry

in which maulavis and feudal hakoms still retain their socio-political

base of influence even though, in the case of the latter group, its

power base has been progressively eroding in recent years. And parallel

to the decline of feudalism, the peasants have become increasingly inte-

gerated into the religious and nationalist movements which have emerged

as the dominant political forces in present-day Baluchistan.

Nomadic Tribes

The general arguments made about Baluch peasantry can be more or

less applied to the case of Baluch nomads as well. The Iranian census

does not provide any data as to the number of nomadic population in

western Baluchistan. But, as mentioned earlier, they are not likely to

constitute more than 14 percent of the total Baluch population of about

2 million. Organized into tribes headed by sardars (chieftains), the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 120

Baluch nomads live in tents and tend their herds of sheep, goats, and

camels upon which they depend for a subsistence living. Although some

are scattered throughout the province, the overwhelming majority inhabit

the northern belt, particularly the Sarhad region separating Baluchistan

from the adjoining Persian-speaking regions.

Although nomads were far more numerous in the past, they have

been continuously declining in size and numbers during the last three to

four decades due to their gradual sedentarization and settlement in the

ever-growing Baluch urban centers. Indeed, the towns of Zahidan— the

provincial capital— and Khash are largely an outgrowth of settlement by

the Baluch tribes of Sarhad; while Sarawan, Iranshahr, and the port of

Chah-Bahar have attracted mostly the rural population of their surround

ing villages. The city of Zabol has absorbed settlers from both nomadic

tribes as well as peasantry.

In spite of their fewer numbers compared with peasants, the

Baluchi tribes have historically played a significant political and

military role in shaping the course of events in the Baluchi society.

This is due in part to the fact that they inhabit the mountainous Sarhad

highlands which separate Baluchistan from Iran, thus giving them a stra

tegic location. Another equally important factor has been their nomadic

way of life involving seasonal migrations from one pastureland to

another, a factor which has provided them with a greater degree of

mobility suitable both for offensive and defensive purposes, thus making

them traditionally less vulnerable to attack and control by central

governments. These two factors, combined with their intense passion for

tribal independence, made their control and integration into the larger

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 121

Baluchi society difficult even for the Baluchi rulers and nation-

builders such as Doust Mohammad Khan. Traditionally, the degree to

which the tribes and their sardars cooperated politically and militarily

with the Shahris and their hakoms was determined by their need to

exchange their animal products with the agricultral product of the

latter, their need for safe haven whenever faced with hot pursuit from

neighboring countries such as Iran or Afghanistan, and the patronage

they received for serving as the military arm of hakoms.

At the same time, the tribes can claim a strong nationalist

credit for the role they have played in fighting the foreign invaders as

demonstrated by the resistance displayed by the tribes of Sarhad against

the British during World War I or their successive revolts against the

central government during the 1928-1935 period or the rebellion of the

Hut tribe under Mirza Barkat against both Reza Shah and his son which

led to a mass immigration of that tribe to Arab states of the Gulf in

the mid-1950s. It is the fear of tribal revolts which has led Iranian

central governments to wage successive waves of military campaigns in

order to first disarm the Baluch tribes and then to impose upon them an

authoritarian policy of sedentarization. The settled portion of tribes

also provide their nomadic brethren with an important channel of commu

nication, through which they become exposed to major socio-political

changes and developments in the Baluch society as a whole.

Tribalism/Feudalism and Nationalism; The Role of Hakoms and Sardars

Traditionally, the political power in Baluchistan was concen

trated in the hands of hakoms (feudal lords) and sardars (chieftains),

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 122

who constituted the upper classes of Baluch society, as described in

Chapter II. They headed the feudal/tribal order by ruling over peasants

and nomadic tribes, respectively. The incorporation of western Baluch

istan into Iran hardly had any immediate impact on this traditional

tribal/feudal structure. The government intervention was limited mainly

to its military campaigns aimed at preventing Amir Doust Mohammad Khan

from consolidating Baluchistan into an independent state. Once that

political goal was accomplished the feudal/tribal order was left intact

as was the case in many other parts of the country, excluding the major

urban centers concentrated in the Persian and Turkish regions.

More important, the political vacuum created by the collapse of

the Baranzai rule, on the one hand, and the near absence of government's

civil bureaucracy in Baluchistan for the first two or three decades

after its incorporation into Iran, on the other hand, enabled hakoms and

sardars to establish themselves as intermediaries between the central

government and the Baluch masses, a role which they continued to play

throughout the Pahlavi period. Moreover, the downfall of Doust Mohammad

Khan also had the effect of freeing them from the fear of popular con

tempt for collaborating with "Shi'ate Gajars," a weapon which had been

used effectively by the former for keeping them under his rule. In

addition, since the government's presence in the province was limited to

its few military garrisons established in major Baluchi towns at the

time, it found hakoms and sardars as the only other instruments through

which to carry out its policies in the region, hence initiating the

process of coopting them by employing their services for that purpose.

And government's reliance on this indigenous group, together with its

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 123

military presence in the province, proved effective for controlling

Baluchistan and paving the way for the gradual introduction of its civil

bureaucracy in the region in the decades that followed.

Consequently, most hakoms and sardars were rewarded by generous

annual stipends and subsidies. In return they collaborated with govern

ment officials in dispensing whatever development funds were allocated

to the province. These funds were most often, if not always, subject to

abuse and trade-offs by Persian bureaucrats and their Baluch intermedi

aries, with the former usually receiving the lion's share. Describing

the role of a Baluch intermediary, Philip Salzman, a Canadian anthro

pologist who did fieldwork among the Yar Mohammad Zai tribe for two

years, observed that the sardar of the tribe kept sixty hours of an

irrigation pupmp supplied to his tribe by the government for himself,

giving another thirty to his brother, and selling the remaining seventy-

eight hours to his tribesmen. The sum of 168 hours accounted for the

entire operation of the pump per week.^

Therefore, backed by the government's military and bureaucracy

and supported by its substantial subsidies, most hakoms and sardars were

able to preserve their power and influence in Baluchistan throughout the

Pahlavi era. The extent to which the members of this group were coopted

by the regime is best evident from the fact that all Baluch members of

Parliament (Majlis) were hand-picked at the discretion of Tehran from

their ranks, a practice which continued until the 1978 revolution. The

main criterion for their selection was the degree of their assistance to

^Philip C. Salzman, "Adaptations and Change among the Yarahmadzai Baluch" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1972), pp. 266-68.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 124

the government forces in disarming the tribes, suppressing revolts, and

keeping a watchful eye on the activities of nationalist groups within

and without Iran, The numbers of these hakoms and sardars serving in

the Majlis ranged from five to six, of which three were usually hakoms

and the remaining two came from the ranks of sardars. Some of them

served for four to five consecutive four-year terms.^

Hakoms and sardars, however, in no way formed a cohesive or

united political force, but were divided along feudal and tribal lines

with each seeking to enhance his power and prestige at the expense of

others, a factor which enabled the government to play them off against

one another by enflaming the traditional feuds and rivalries among them.

This was the mechanism used effectively for their control. Most often,

but not always, those who saw themselves as less favored by the govern

ment, or at a disadvantage vis-a-vis their rivals, revolted or joined

the nationalist camp. For instance, Musa Khan, a hakom from the Lashari

tribe, escaped to Iraq and joined the Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF)

in the early 1970s largely because of the then-heightened rivalries

among the hakoms of that tribe. In such instances, the shah's govern

ment usually relied on coopted hakoms to persuade their kindred rebels

to cease their political activities and return to Iran in exchange for

amnesty and royal favors, a tactic which did not work in the case of

Musa Khan.

Therefore, the role played by hakoms and sardars in the Baluch

national movement can be described as a devisive one. In contrast to

^During the 1960s and 1970s, the Baluch members of Majlis included Amanullah Rikki, Karim Bux Saidi, Abdul Hossein Khan Narui, Eisa Khan Mubaraki, Mohammad Khan Lashari, and Bahman Barakzai.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 125

the coopted hakoms and sardars, there were others who lent their support

and prestige to the national cause. For example, Mir Abdi Khan, the

powerful chieftain of the Sardar Zai tribe inhabiting the Baho-Dashtiari

region, joined BLF during its crucial formative phase in the late 1960s,

thus significantly boosting its reputation as well as its mass follow

ing. Another example is the case of Aryan, a sardar from the Narui

tribe in Seistan, who first escaped to Afghanistan and then after

several years went to Pakistan to join Baluch nationalists in their con

flict with the Bhutto regime in 1973. In both cases, their kindred

intermediaries helped SAVAK arrange for their return from exile in 1974.

They were, however, kept in Tehran far from their native land until the

revolution of 1979 when they were able to return to Baluchistan.

Parallel to the decline and disintegration of feudalism and

tribalism in Baluchistan, hakoms and sardars have also lost their base

of power and influence in Baluch society. This has been the case par

ticularly during the last two decades during which rapid growth in the

urbanization process, expansion of modern means of communications,

spread of modern education, and economic modernization in the province

began to undermine drastically the feudal/tribal socio-economic struc

ture. These changes in turn brought with them a new Baluch elite iden

tified with the middle class, as described later. Politically, the

cooperation of hakoms and sardars with the shah's regime representing

"Shi'ate Gajars" also served to undermine their traditional legitimacy

among their peasant and nomadic followers and, as a result, enabled

maulavis, the religious elite, to move in and fill part of the political

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 126

vacuum created by the weakened traditional feudal/tribal power structure

as discussed next.

Politically, however, it was the 1979 revolution that inflicted

the most significant blow to the influence of hakoms and sardars. This

was due to the fact that with the collapse of the shah's regime, they

also lost their main source of power, which was the political and mili

tary support and economic patronage they had been receiving from that

regime. Moreover, their cooperation and identification with the previ

ous regime also served to place them automatically on the list of the

enemies of the newly established Islamic regime, whose rage they largely

avoided by escaping from the country.

Finally, compared to the largely coopted hakoms and sardars of

Iranian Baluchistan, their counterparts in Pakistani Baluchistan have

continuously identified themselves with the cause of Baluch nationalism.

This is in part due to their early Involvement in the Baluch anti-

colonial struggle for independence and in part due to their early expo

sure to modern education under the British, as discussed in Chapter VII.

Religion and Nationalism: The Role of Maulavis

As we have seen in Chapter I, the overwhelming majority of

Baluchis adhere to the Sunni branch of Islam. Hence, Islamic laws

(Sharia), institutions, and culture play a very significant role in the

daily lives of the people as well as the overall aspect of their

society. In this respect, Baluch society is no different from other

traditional societies in which religion is generally considered impor

tant. In the case of the Iranian Baluch, however, Sunnism has taken on

a political significance as well, in the sense that is has always served

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 127

as a major rallying point against the ruling Persians, whose overwhelm

ing majority follows Shiism.

Ironically, as Shiisin served to unify the Persians against the

Sunni Turks of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century, so has

Sunnism helped the Baluch rally against the perceived threats from the

dominant Shii Persians. Ever since Shiism was imposed as Iran's state

religion by the Safavid Empire in the sixteenth century, Shiates have

been gradually expanding themselves at the expense of Sunnis, including

Baluchis. Sir Henry Pottinger records how some of the Baluch tribes

living in the central Perso-Baluch border regions in Kerman were con

verted by Persian authorities to Shiism and settled there during the

first decade of the nineteenth century.^ Writing in 1872, Henry Bellew

also testifies that the ruling clan of the Narui tribe in Seistan was

converted to Shiism after the region fell to Persia in 1865.5

These examples are not isolated cases, but represent a general

historical process and pattern of political-religious and territorial

expansion by Shii Persians against Sunni Baluchis. The signs of this

pattern are clearly evident throughout the Perso-Baluch border regions.

In northwest Baluchistan, most of the tribes of Bashkard and Minab

living in the vicinity of the Persians have been gradually absorbed by

the religion of their neighbors. The process is best evident in Seistan

in northeast Baluchistan, where some ruling sardar families in towns

have become Shiates, while their nomadic tribesmen have retained their

^Pottinger, pp. 178-93.

^Henry Bellew, From the Indus to Tigris, a Narrative of a Journey through the Countries of Baluchistan, Afghanistan, Korasan, and Iran (Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1976), p. 205.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 128

Sunni faith. Similarly, the bulk of the settled population in Seistan

are Shiates, while their nomadic brethren are Sunnis. This is so

I because Seistan towns were often occupied by the Safavid and other Shii

dynasties for a prolonged period of time and, as a result, their inhabi

tants were gradually forced to accept the religion of the occupying

forces, while the nomadic tribes were mostly able to retain their Sunni

religion by avoiding such control by those forces due to their mobility.

Surprisingly, those Baluch, whether settled or nomadic, converted to

Shiism have retained their Baluchi ethno-linguistic identity.

It is this threat of domination, absorption, and assimilation by

Shii Persians that has provoked a corresonding upsurge of religious

activity among the Baluch, thus forcing them to rally behind the banner

of Sunnism, particularly after the incorporation of western Baluchistan

into Iran in 1928. It was such a fear that prompted the Baluch Ulema

called Maulavis (clergy) to issue a religious Fetva declaring the

Iranian armed forces "infidel" in order to mobilize the popular support

for Daust Mohammad Khan against Reza Shah in 1928, as mentioned in Chap

ter II. As Sunnism has emerged as a rallying point for Baluchis, so it

has become a major ingredient of Baluch nationalism in Iran as much as

Shiism is a manifestation of Persian nationalism. Correspondingly, the

Maulavis have grown in power and importance in the Baluch movement in

Iran. By contrast, in Pakistani Baluchistan, the Baluch face no such

threat from Shiates; as a result, the Baluch national movement in that

country has been historically dominated by secular forces.

There appears to be a correlation between the revival of

religion and religous activities among the Baluch and the growing

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 129

incursion and intrusion by the Shii-dominated bureaucracy and institu

tions in Baluchistan during the last fifty years. Beginning with the

annexation of Baluchistan, the ruling Shiates backed by the Iranian

military and bureaucracy, have enjoyed the right to immigrate en masse

to Baluchistan and other Sunni-dominated regions, to establish their

mosques and other religious institutions, and to practice freely and

propagate their theology in those regions. As a result, today there are

Shii mosques established in all major Baluchi towns such as Sarawan,

Khash, Iranshahr, and Chah-Bahar, while prior to its incorporation no

such institutions ever existed in Baluchistan. By contrast, the Sunnis

never had such opportunities in the Shii-dominated areas. And, of

course, Shiism has been recognized and sanctioned as the only state

religion by both the previous, as well as the present, constitutions.

Thus, alarmed by the continuing expansion of Persian Shiates in

Baluchistan, the Baluch have reacted by reviving their Sunni religion

and rallying behind the Maulavis. The effects of this upsurge in

religious activity among the Baluch is best evident in the rapid spread

of Sunni theology schools in almost all major Baluchi towns and dis

tricts during the last five decades, while prior to the incorporation of

Baluchistan into Iran, the numbers of such institutions were very few,

estimated between three to five. Parallel to this, the Maulavis have

also been growing both in numbers and in power controlling a network of

mosques, theological schools (madrasa), and endowments (aaughaf)

throughout Baluchistan. And because of this, they maintain close con

tacts with the people at a grassroots level where they have their real

base of power. Most high-ranking Maulavis, however, pursue their

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 130

higher theological education in other Sunni countries, particularly in

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, hence being relatively exposed to various

ideolgoical and political developments in the region.

In additon to the fear of Sunni Baluch from Shiate Persians,

there is another factor which has also enabled Maulavis to assume a

greater political role than before and that is the weakening of the

traditional feudal/tribal power structure described earlier. This

development has enabled the Maulavis to move in and fill the political

vacuum created by the erosion of the power of hakoms and sardars. In

fact, Maulavis themselves have played an active role in undermining the

power of hakoms through challenging their right to receive the tradi

tional Islamic tax (a tithe of crops and products) or any other kind of

levy from peasants. Here it should be pointed out that although hakoms

were legally barred from collecting any kind of taxes after the annexa

tion of Baluchistan, they continued to receive such taxes though under

different names as recently as the late 1950s. About that time, Maulavi

Abdul Vahed Goshti, known as Hazrat Sahib, spearheaded a widespread

movement resembling a revolution against hakoms and their pretension to

collecting the Islamic tax of dah yak (a tithe). Upon completing his

education in Pakistan, this young puritanist Maulavi returned to Baluch

istan and established one of the major schools of theology known as Dar

al Ulum (The Abode of Sciences) in his hometown of Gosht. From there,

he launched his crusade against hakoms, a movement which resulted in a

widespread civil war between the followers of hakoms and Maulavis in

many parts of Baluchistan. Eventually, the Maulavis succeeded in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. defeating the hakoms and, as a result, have been able to collect the

Islamic tax for their religious institutions in the last two decades.

As will be seen in Chapter VI, the Maulavis have assumed the

roles of leadership and chief spokesmen for the Baluch after the victory

of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Although they were initially alarmed

by the rise to power of the Shii clergy, which revived their historical

fear of the latter, Maulavis soon found themselves as the only Baluch

force accepted by the Islamic regime to deal with, in part because the

hakoms and sardars were widely discredited for their association with

the previous regime and in part due to the hostility shown by the new

regime toward secular forces.

The Middle Class

As indicated here, the middle class includes business people,

professionals, white-collar workers, intelligentsia, and bureaucrats.

The Baluch middle class, like that of other traditional societies in the

Third World, is still very small in size as compared to other classes

such as the peasantry. Its rise has been a function of the spread of

urbanization, expansion of economic development and modernization,

growth of modern education, and the spread of modern means of communica

tion in Baluchistan. The growth of urban population where the middle

class has its prime base of power is a good indicator for demonstrating

the slow, but steady, growth of the middle class in Baluchistan. In

1966, the urban population constituted only 17 percent of Baluchistan's

total population, while a decade later that percentage had increased to

26 percent, indicating a 9 percent increase in a decade. This urban

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 132

population, however, includes both the working class as well as the

middle class.

Although numerically small, the Baluch middle class, like its

counterpart everywhere, plays a crucial role in society by virtue of its

hold on key roles relating to intellectual, economic, educational,

administrative, and political arenas. This is so in spite of the fact

that the Baluch middle class, like other social groups and classes in

Baluch society, is dominated by the ruling Persians, whose middle-class

elite is largely responsible for controlling Iranian state structure

politically and economically. Within Baluch society, however, the role

of its middle class is as important as that played by its counterparts

in other societies.

What distinguishes the Baluch middle class from other tradi

tional social groups are its national orientation, outlook, and loyal

ties, as contrasted with the tribal/feudal outlook of the latter. As a

synthesis of all traditional social classes, this class signifies the

rise of Baluch national consciousness and acts as a catalyst for the

spread of nationalistic ideas and thoughts in Baluch society at large.

In this respect, it serves as a conduit through which nationalism is

spread in Baluch society as it the case universally with the middle

class everywhere. In so doing, this class is playing a very important

role in promoting awareness among the Baluch of their heritage and

historical past, fostering their sense of pride, developing Baluchi

language and culture, and strengthening their feelings of community.

Unlike the rural population which is largely insulated and

separated physically from the ruling Persians, the Baluch middle class,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 133

due to its urban base, is in direct contact with its Persian counter

parts and competes with it for power in the provincial administration

and economy. But since the Persian elite in Baluchistan, whether in the

provincial bureaucracy or in the private section, are supported by, and

acting in cooperation with, the Persian-dominated central government,

they have always enjoyed the upper hand, thus reducing the Baluch middle

class to a subservient position both politically and economically.

Hence, to challenge the dominance enjoyed by Persians, the Baluch middle

class has sought to rally the Baluch masses to its support by raising

their political and cultural awareness and national consciousness,

defending their rights, and articulating their demands and aspirations.

In doing so, they have spearheaded the Baluch national movement, whose

quest for self-rule inevitably involves politicizing and organizing the

Baluch masses along national lines.

Since the role of middle class is discussed extensively in suc

ceeding chapters, it is appropriate here to mention that the outlook and

direction of the Baluch national movement is a synthesis of the action

and interaction of these classes and social groups.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER V

THE BALUCH NATIONAL MOVEMENT UNDER THE PAHLAVIS:

ITS ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICS

The Baluch national movement in Iran has been steadily taking

shape as a response to aggressive Persian nationalism as reflected first

in the subjugation of the Baluch by Reza Shah in 1928 and then in the

continuing incursion and intrusion of the Persian-dominated governments

in Baluchistan ever since. The moving force behind it is the Baluch

concern and preoccupation with the preservation of their national

identity and cultural rights against the threat, real or perceived, of

absorption and assimilation by the dominant Persians. In attempting to

analyze this movement, the present chapter will trace its evolution by

describing its politics, organizations, and personalities under the

Pahlavis.

Moreover, one can discern and distinguish two separate phases in

the evolution of the Baluch national movement in Iran. The first one is

characterized by the spontaneous and parochial nature of the movement

during the 1928-1959 period. This phase corresponds to what is known in

Baluchi as the era of Yaghis— that is, the rebellious tribes and chief

tains who raised the flag of revolt against the "Gajars" in different

parts of Baluchistan at various times. The second phase represents the

era of organizational transformation of the movement which manifested

itself in modern national organizations with a national orientation and

134

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 135

outlook that transcended the tribal/feudal parochial loyalties charac

teristic of the preceding phase. Chronologically, this phase started

with the beginning of the emergence of the Baluchistan Liberation Front

in the early 1960s.

The First Phase: The Era of Revolts and Yaghis (Rebels), 1928-1959

To begin with its initial phase, the movement lacked any central

organization or national coordination in the sense that it took the form

of intermittent uprisings which erupted spontaneously in different

localities and among various tribes separated, and more often isolated,

from each other by the absence of modern communication networks. As a

result, they were limited in scope and duration, affecting only those

tribes and localities directly Involved in the uprising against the

central government, while leaving others not involved unaffected, if not

indifferent. In this respect, the best examples are the seven-year

revolt by the Yar Mohammad Zahi and Ismael Zahi tribes in the Sarhad

region in northern Baluchistan during the 1928-1935 period, the uprising

in the Kuhak district in the southeast in 1930, the rebellion of the Hut

tribe in the northwest in 1950, and the celebrated uprising by Dad Shah

in central Baluchistan in 1957-59, as will be elaborated on in the

coming passages.

In spite of their spontaneity and parochial nature, these upris

ings had several major features in common. In the first place, they

were essentially provoked by religious or ethnic conflicts involving the

Sunni Baluch and Shi'ate Persians. Secondly, they were generally aimed

at resisting attempts by the central government to superimpose its

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 136

military and bureaucracy in Baluchistan. Third, given the fact that any

form of open political activity was banned throughout the Pahlavi era,

these rebellions constituted the only political-military alternative for

the Baluch to express and back their demands and grievances. Fourth,

since the government response often involved sweeping military measures

taken for suppressing these revolts and disarming the rebellious tribes,

they all had the impact of reinforcing the traditional sense of

antagonism between the two sides.

Given the commonality of their cause, goal, and impact, these

revolts were the popular manifestation of a political-military movement

against the central government or, as stated by the Baluch, against

"Gajars." Apart from their economic and military costs to the Iranian

regime, they also served to politicize the masses, awaken Baluchi

national consciousness, and— in short— to keep the spirit of resistance

alive. The extent of popularity of these insurgencies and their impact

on Baluchi society as a whole is best exemplified in the revolt of Dad

Shah against the shah's rule during the 1944-59 period.

Dad Shah; The Baluchi "Martyr" and National Hero

Dad Shah raised the banner of revolt in the mountainous region

of Ahurran in central Baluchistan, where he had his roots as a small

landholding peasant in the early 1950s. The popular accounts attribute

the cause of his rebellion to the aggressive encroachment of "Gajar"

officials and gendarmes on the everyday life of his fellow countrymen,

the heavy taxation and briberies extracted from the impoverished

peasants in his region, and the disrespect shown by them against the

Baluch code of honor and customs. By contrast, the government officials

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 137

portrayed him and his followers as a "bandit gang" and "highway rob

bers. Indeed, the term "Yaghi" as applied to Dad Shah and other

rebels, is a classic example in demonstrating the differences in percep

tions between the two sides. In Baluchi, the term signifies a sense of

veneration for those who rose up in arms against the "Gajars," while in

Farsi it is used as an equivalent for the brigand and lawless groups and

individuals who deserve nothing but contempt and suppression for chal

lenging the king's authority.

In spite of this contrast in perceptions, one thing is clear and

that is the "anti-Gajar" and anti-government theme of Dad Shah's revolt.

He and his followers, estimated at from seventy to more than 700, waged

a legendary campaign against the shah's government by attacking Iranian

military outposts, ambushing government convoys, disruptiong lines of

communication, and terrorizing non-Baluch bureaucrats and officials in

Baluchistan. Aided by his knowledge of terrain as well as strong popu

lar support in rural and tribal areas where he was provided with hide

outs and provisions, Dad Shah eluded capture by the superior Iranian

forces mobilized against him, surprising them by daring ambushes and

hit-and-run skirmishes that made him a legendary household name in

Baluchistan.^ By 1956, his reputation had captured the headlines in the

Iranian press, which ran his story under such titles as "How Dad Shah Is

■^See, for example, Jahanbani's account of Dad Shah in Sarogzasht-e Baluchistan, pp. 12-14.

^For various accounts of Dad Shah's revolt, see Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, pp. 104-5; Skhardad Baluch, Siasat Par Baluchistan, pp. 52-57; Mohammed Akbar Baluch, Baluch Qaum Afni Tarikh Ke Aineh Men [The Baluch Nation and Its History] (Quetta: Bolan Book Corp., 1975).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 138

Pursued and How He Eludes Capture and Escapes."^ Of course, these

accounts depicted him as a "Baluch adventurist" in order to omit the

socio-economic and political factors which had caused this revolt.

By 1957, several eventa brought Dad Shah's revolt to the world's

attention. The first involved the ambush of a convoy headed toward the

port of Chah Bahar on the Baluchi coast of the Gulf of Oman, in which

two Americans— a military aide and a contractor— were mistakenly killed

as Iranian officials and a third one captured by Dad Shah's party on 24

March 1957. The incident was considererd serious enough to find its way

into the headlines of the American and European mass media, which raised

questions about the stability of the shah's regime. This issue, how

ever, was responsible in large part for the sudden resignation of the

Iranian Prime Minister Hossein Alla, the U.S. halt of its economic aid

to southeast Iran, and its pressure on Iran and Pakistan to put an end

to Dad Shah and his revolt.^ Another major event was the beginning of

the scheduled work of Iran-Pakistan border commissions on the demarca

tion of their boundaries in Baluchistan in the same year. In this

respect, the head of the Iranian commission, Senator Jahanbani, then

retired from the array, reported to his government that it was "inadvis

able” for the Joint Commission to proceed with its task as long as the

"episode of Dad Shah" had not been brought to its conclusion.^

•^Ali Javher Kalam, "Dad Shah Ra Chegoona Taghib Mikohanand va Ou Chegoona Migorizad," [How Dad Shah Is Pursued and How He Eludes Capture and Escapes], Ittelaat-e Haftagy, no. 839, 1336 A.H. (1956).

^Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 105. For an account of the incident in the U.S. press, see, for example, New York Times, 26 and 29 March 1957 and 27 April 1957.

^Jahanbani, pp. 12-14.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 139

Subsequently, the Pakistani army and police joined the counter

insurgency operations against Dad Shah, whose party frequently crossed

the border and engaged in armed clashes with Pakistan's forces and

militias inside that country. In one of these incidents in 1957,

Pakistani forces captured one of Dad Shah's brothers, Ahmad Shah, and

extradited him to Iran even though no such treaty existed between the

two countries. This issue enraged the Baluchi nationalists in Pakistan,

who denounced the action of their government and began a widespread cam

paign to publicize his case internationally. In this respect, Jumma

Khan, ex-president of the Baluchi Academy, played a leading role in

identifying Dad Shah's struggle with the cause of Baluchi nationalism,

thus enflaming the nationalist sentiment in his support. As a result of

this activity, Jumma Khan was fired from his position as announcer and

producer for Baluchi programs on Radio Karachi, through which he had

become an influential celebrity, well known among Baluch everywhere.^1

These events— the U.S. pressure for punishing the Baluchi rebels

for slaying its citizens, the shah's concern over the Western perception

about the stability of his regime, and his fear of the growing tide of

Dad Shah's revolt and his emergence as a popular hero— forced the gov

ernment to take some measures for suppressing the insurgency. There

fore, the shah entrusted the matter to the veteran general Jahanbani,

who— then a senator— was also the government's leading expert on Baluch

istan. Given his military experience in fighting in Baluchistan in

1928, he quickly reached the conclusion that "destroying Dad Shah and

his brothers and followers by the gendarme units or military forces

^Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 105.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 140

would require lengthy time and heavy costs," thus suggesting that "it

would appear better to have the task accomplished by the local chief

tains." Accordingly, he arranged for a court audience during which he

introduced Sardar Eisa Khan Mubaraki, along with several other leading

chieftains, to the shah and recommended them as "loyal and patriotic

subjects" ready to quell the revolt upon royal approval.^ The Baluchi

chieftains, however, gave a different version, contending that they were

summoned by the shah to be issued a blunt warning to the effect that

they either put an end to the insurgency or face the prospect of arrest

and confiscation of their properties, thus forcing them to obey his

order.

Whatever the truth of the matter, Eisa Khan, as the chieftain of

the Mubarraki tribe to which Dad Shah belonged, contacted the latter

asking him for an urgent meeting in order to convey in person an

important message sent by the shah. To gain Dad Shah's confidence, he

swore by the holy Quran to attend the meeting unarmed and to keep its

place and date secret from the government. According to popular

accounts, he also offered his word of honor to Dad Shah by invoking the

Baluch proverb that "a Baluch does lose his head, but not his promise"

to further assure Dad Shah of his good intentions. This plan, however,

was part of an arrangement worked out by the government and Eisa Khan

and his Baluch collaborators in advance. It also called for the Iranian

troops to act as soon as the meeting began to take place. Unaware of

this plan and confident of Eisa Khan's swearing by the Holy Book and

word of honor, Dad Shah attended the meeting to find himself entrapped

^Jahanbani, p. 13.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 141

by the government forces. Upon refusing to surrender, a pitched gun

battle ensued in which he and the followers accompanying him were

killed.

Dad Shah and his rebellion, however, acted as a catalyst in

awakening Baluchi national consciousness and reviving their sense of

pride. Baluch masses saw in him a symbol of a "true Baluchi" who upheld

the Baluch code of honor and martial virtues against the "Gajars," thus

identifying with him to the extent that everyone saw himself as a poten

tial Dad Shah. The nationalists venerate him as a "national leader who

raised the flag of revolt" and "gave great sacrifices for the cause of

independence, for awakening the Baluch nation and fighting against

imperialism."^ To this day, he remains one of the most celebrated

national figures in recent Baluchi history, elevated to the level of a

Baluch hero whose life and struggle are popularized in numerous ballads

recounted daily throughout Baluchistan. As observed by a Le Monde

Diplomatique corespondent in 1973, he is still hailed as "one of the

greatest martyrs of the Baluch movement in Iran."^

The end of Dad Shah’s insurgency also marks the close of the

traditional era of rebellion and Yaghis and the beginning of a new phase

characterized by the emergence of modern nationalist organizations and

parties. Although other revolts have erupted sporadically here and

^Baluchistan Liberation Front, Baluchistan: Introduction and Liberation Struggle, a pamphlet published clandestinely, thus bearing no date or place of publication, p. 12, as quoted by Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, p. 105.

^Jean Viennot, "Baluchistan: A New Bangladesh?" Le Monde Diplomatique, November 1973.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 142

there since then, they are no longer the dominant force in the Baluch

movement as will be discussed below.

The Second Phase: The Era of National Organizations and Parties

The emergence of a new and modern national movement in Baluch

istan in the aftermath of Dad Shah's rebellion was in itself a crystal

lization of the growing Baluch national consciousness and the rising

tide of Baluch nationalism. Its seeds were conceived first in the ranks

of the urban middle class and educated youth, whose prime loyalty went

to Baluch nationalism as contrasted to the tribal/feudal attachments of

their forefathers. The modern education and the urban base of these

groups enabled them to study their past history, to analyze the contem

porary plight of their people, to follow other similar movements else

where, and to get acquainted with the general social and political

developments which were taking place in the Middle East, South Asia, and

the world at large. Thus, from the ranks of these groups emerged the

original nucleus of politically active and conscious nationalists who

spearheaded the new movement of which nationalist organizations and

parties are the main feature. Given the national orientation, outlook,

and loyalty of these institutions, they have become the main vehicle

used by nationalists in their quest for recognition of Baluch national

and cultural rights in Iran beginning with the early 1960s.

There were two main factors responsible for the late arrival of

such organizations in western Baluchistan. In the first place, the

extremely slow pace of urbanization, the absence of social and economic

modernization, and the very limited modern education introduced in

western Baluchistan prior to the 1960s were major obstacles to the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 143

growth of the Baluch middle class, without which no such function could

take place. The second factor relates to the repressive Pahlavi rule,

during which no political and cultural activity was tolerated, particu

larly among non-Persian nationalities. As a result, the first Baluch

nationalist organizations were formed underground or in exile in the

early 1960s. By contrast, in the more favorable environment of British-

controlled eastern Baluchistan, the modern Baluch national movement took

shape in the early 1920s when the first major nationalist organizations

such as the Young Baluch Party began to emerge. As will be seen in the

Chapter VII, this largely explains the greater strength achieved by the

Baluch movement in Pakistan, as demonstrated in the next chapter.

By the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Baluch middle class had

just begun to emerge from its embroyonic stage carrying with it the

forerunners of the modern movement. These early nationalists, however,

were few in number, lacked any political and organizational experience,

and were faced with the constant surveillance of the shah’s security

forces. As a result, originally most identified themselves with the

Baluch revolts by helping publicize their struggle in the urban centers.

By the time of Dad Shah’s rebellion, about several dozen of these

nationalists had joined his forces in his mountainous stronghold,^

while the majority took a more passive role, lending at best moral

support far from the watchful eye of the government or the scene of

conflict. The lessons learned from the suppression of that revolt,

however, forced nationalists to conduct a reappraisal of the Baluch

movement as a whole.

^Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 144

To the nationalists, the defeats of this and other similar

revolts were clear examples demonstrating that political and military

struggles against the shah's modern army and bureaucracy in Baluchistan

along traditional lines were futile. To them, the main reason for the

failure of the traditional revolts was that they lacked both modern

organizational structure and ideological cohesion, without which they

could not, and did not, survive the prolonged struggle necessary for

achieving the Baluch national rights and demands. To prove this argu

ment, they were quick to point out how Dad Shah's revolt faded away with

his "martyrdom," thus leaving behind no political or military organiza

tion capable of representing and advancing the cause of the Baluch

movement.

That evaluation led nationalists to the conclusion that, as a

national liberation movement, the Baluch struggle could best be carried

out through nationally based and ideologically coherent modern organiza

tions and parties capable of devising long-term strategies and plans for

a sustained political-military struggle required for winning Baluch

national rights. Given the national outlook, orientation, and loyalties

of such organizations, they would, in turn, spearhead the Baluch

national awakening by seeking to politicize and recruit the masses into

their ranks, thus gradually broadening their base of support and creat

ing a popular movement symbolizing the ideals of Baluch nationalism.

Based on such reflection, the first nationalist organizations

were formed in the early 1960s. Of these, the Baluchistan Liberation

Front emerged as the dominant political force in championing the cause

of Baluch nationalist as demonstrated in the coming passages.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 145

Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF), 1964-1979

The Baluchistan Liberation Front represents the first major

nationalist organization formed in western Baluchistan in 1964. Its

founders and original core members came largely from the ranks of Dad

Shah's nationalist supporters and sympathizers who had survived by going

underground or leaving for self-exile into the Arab states of the

Persian Gulf. In terras of both its leadership and membership, the BLF

represented a truly national organization involving individuals from all

strata and classes in Baluchi society. Its prominent founders included

Jumma Khah, who had championed the cause of Dad Shah in Pakistan as

mentioned earlier, and Abdul Samad Barakzai, a poet-writer, both from

the intelligentsia; Mir Abdi Khan and Musa Khan from the upper class

hakoms; and Rahim Zard Kouhi, a commoner. Of these, Mir Abdi Khan, the

chieftain of the Sardar Zai tribe, and Musa Khan, a leading member of

the Lasharl tribe, belonged to two traditionally feuding tribes which

were united under the banner of the Front.

The BLF defined its ultimate goal to be the creation of an

"independent Greater Baluchistan." In this respect, it also published a

controversial map which depicted "Greater Baluchistan" as contiguous to

the southern borders of the Soviet Union by claiming and incorporating

into Baluchistan proper the ethnically mixed border region between Iran

and Afghanistan extending northward from Seistan up to the point where

the boundaries of Iran, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union meet. Of

course, this was a far exaggerated claim because Baluchis living in that

area constitute a minority as compared to other ethnic groups, mainly

Persians and Turkmen, who also inhabit the same region. (See Map 3.)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 146

- j? f '> Ai 4V* * *u> v ^ i V ^ 'V*

TURKMENISTAN (U.S.S.R.)

Turballam Turbat Haldeit 1 Khal X»lnn- „ .... Yazdlit arMTaSM\F o Faizabad 0 n i w i|i Musakhsl Dosliakh 0 Neh Khash^ ^ — ,, ^

ushkl SlbT •"tf1" ) Saldabadfe Zah^'°o\~~~^*»gaI BuQliToKashmor KalJI /•Jacobibad Bandai Slxxab0 Khash j^ l °ladgaslil * ^ * * " - if)hampw„ Saawaij,0 L , Panigur g \.m « L ~ ry „ Vjfcflnab Saibai. I'bb ",muIV-te kjln l Ctiab HoSiab Sonmlw flasaikhaima l~ & * 5nar|N i '

Map 3. The BLF-produced map of "Greater Baluchistan" (top). In the redrawn and translated version (bottom), Selig Harrison has marked the dotted lines, which according to him indicate the extent of Baluch majority areas. (Both the dotted lines and solid lines showing international boundaries are in red in his redrawn map.) Source: Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nation alism and Soviet Temptations (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981), fig. 4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 147

To achieve that goal, the Front espoused the strategy of "armed

struggle of the masses" as "the only way of liberating Baluchistan." It

rejected totally any other form of political compromise short of

independence by clearly stating that "we do not believe in the so-called

stage-by-stage pursuit of independence, i.e., first to struggle for

linguistic, cultural, and political rights as part of Iran, and then,

afterwards, to struggle for independence."^ Of course, the Front's

espousal of such a radical goal and strategy was largely a function of

the environment in which it was formed in the early 1960s. First, there

was a general realization by its founders that the widespread popular

discontent with the shah's rule, which had fed the Baluch revolts, was

still there and had to be channeled into organized resistance on a

national scale. Second, Dad Shah's insurgency had served to widen the

sense of antagonism between the central government and the Baluch more

than ever before. This and the tremendous awakening generated by that

insurgency made the idea of independence highly appealing at the time.

In short, the long economic neglect and the heavy-handed policies pur

sued by the shah's regime toward the Baluch were major factors which

made Baluchistan the most centrifugal region in the whole country, thus

enabling the BLF to place the goal of independence on its agenda.

Externally, the BLF allied itself with the radical and national

ist Arab forces by recalling its similar ideological stance and invoking

the historical notion that the Baluch were ethnically linked with the

Arabs. In identifying the Baluch as part of the "great Arab nation,"

the Front confirmed the Arab claims over the Arab-inhabited "Arabistan"

^Baluchistan Liberation Front, Introduction, p. 17.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 148

called Khuzistan, supported "the just right of Palestinian Arabs over

Palestine and sided with the "Arab brethren in their struggle against

imperialism, colonialism, and Zionism."I2 Consequently, the Front

attracted various degrees of support from several Arab sources including

Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and the PLO. Yasser Arafat's Fatah admitted Jumma

Khan, the head of BLF, to its central advisory committee, while Syria

and Egypt allowed him to open offices in their capitals. Syria,

however, even went a little further, granting and recognizing him as a

representative of a "provisional Baluchistan government-in-exile" during

the 1965-66 period.13

THe most substantial Arab support, however, came from Iraq after

the Baath Party seized power in that country in 1968. In addition to

raising the issue of Baluchistan along with that of "Arabistan," in the

inter-Arab forums, the Baathist regime of General Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr

and Saddan Hussein allowed the BLF to establish its headquarters in

Baghdad and provided it with arms and other military equipment, training

facilities inside Iraq, and access to radio Baghdad for daily broad

casts in Baluchi. There is no accurate figure as to the number of guer

rillas sponsored by the Front to undergo military training in Iraq; but

if one is to accept the figures given by some of the participants, the

total estimate varies from 2,000 to 3,000. Of these, the overwhelming

majority were recruited from the large population of Baluchi immigrant

laborers in the Arab states of the gulf, while another 400 to 50 0 ^ were

12Ibid., p. 18.

13"Arab Support for Baluchistan," London Economist, 14 February 1973, p. 5.

l^Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 107.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 149

sent directly from various parts of Baluchistan for a short training

period of three to six months. A large segment of both groups comprised

former sympathizers of Dad Shah’s rebellion.

There were several major reasons prompting the Iraqi Baath

regime to support the Front. The chief ideological justification given

was the anti-imperialist stance of the Baath Party. In this respect,

the BLF was accorded the status of a national liberation movement which

was fighting against Western imperialism as represented by the shah’s

regime in the region. Again, the Iraqi regime had also played a very

important role in portraying the Baluch struggle as an Arab cause by

reviving the issue of the Baluch’s Arab origin. Accordingly, the Iraqi

government should have seen its support of the BLF as a natural move

aimed at fulfilling its pan-Arab commitment.

More significant, however, were political and military consider

ations in Iraq's calculated move toward the Front. In this respect,

Iraq’s rivalry with Iran for supremacy in the Persian Gulf, particularly

after Britain decided in 1968 to withdraw its forces east of Suez by

1971, its territorial dispute with Iran over Shatt-al-Arab waterway,

Iran's support of anti-Iraqi Kurdish insurgency headed by Mulla Mustafa

Barezani, and the shah's ties with Israel were the main factors account

ing for Iraq's calculated support of the BLF. Iraq also served as a

haven for other anti-shah opposition groups including the religious

forces headed by Ayatollah Khomeini, then living in exile in Najaf, and

the leftist National Front of the Iranian People, sponsored by the pro-

Moscow Tudeh Party. Militarily, Iraqi leaders anticipated that the

Front's guerrilla operations in Baluchistan would serve to divert some

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 150

of the shah's forces to Iran's eastern front, thus reducing his military

pressure on I r a q .

Iraq also sought to bring together the various opposition groups

in a united anti-Shah camp, but with little success. In this respect,

only the National Front of Iranian People, headed by an Iranian ex

general Mahmoud Panahiyan, represented a coalition organization involv

ing several branches established by its supporters among Kurdish,

Baluchi, Arab, and Turkish communists. Its Baluch branch was called the

Democratic Party of Baluchistan. As a result, it published its organ, a

journal called Rah-e-Ittehad (Path of Unity) in all languages spoken in

Iran. Similarly, it made broadcasts in all those languages from its

clandestine radio. Of course, the underlying lgoic of Panahiyan's

coalition was its recognition of the right to self-determination (hagh-e

taieen-e sar novesht) for all nationalities within Iran, a standard

position taken by the Tudeh Party and other communist factions in Iran

to this day. The organization's platform, however, added that different

nationalities should join other "progressive" forces for establishing a

"Federal socialist" state rather than working for secession and indepen

dence, thus equating self-determination to self-autonomy. Given the

BLF's unequivocal support for independence, it refused to join Pana

hiyan's National Front or to cooperate with its Baluch branch, the Demo

cratic Party of Baluchistan, which advocated only administrative and

cultural autonomy, including the use of Baluchi as the official medium

of instruction in Baluchistan.^

15Ibid., p. 107-8.

l^See "Political Program of the Democratic Party of Baluch istan," in Mohmoud Panahiyan, Farhange-e Jographiye-e Melli Baluchistan

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 151

As a symbolic tribute to Dad Shah, the BLF launched its insur

gency in the Ahurran region where his revolt had first erupted in 1944

twenty years earlier. The region was also the home base of the comman

der of the military arm of the Front, Rahim Zard Kouhi, and its moun

tainous terrain was regarded as an ideal place for guerrilla warfare.

By 1968, when it gained Iraqi support, the Front had established an

underground network of a series of camp bases in various parts of

Baluchistan, which enabled it to absorb the newly arrived recruits and

weapons smuggled through the numerous port villages on the long coast of

Baluchistan on the Gulf of Oman. Additional arms and military equipment

were also captured by disarming the army and gendarme outposts ambushed

by the Front guerrillas throughout the province. The insurgency was

particularly strong in central and southern Baluchistan, where two of

the Front leaders, Mir Abdi Khan and Mus Khan Lashari had their tribal

base.

The Front issued regular statements from its Baluchi broadcasts

from Radio Baghdad to announce its daily guerrilla operations against

Iranian forces in the province, to invite Baluch youth to join the ranks

of the Front's fighters, called sarmachar (self-sacrificers), and to

encourage the general populace to assist them in whatever way possible.

According to interviews with three members of Komiteh Baluchi (Baluchi

Committee) of the National Iranian Radio and Television, whose tasks

also included the monitoring of Radio Baghdad's Baluchi programs, the

Front's broadcasts were highly popular in Baluchistan because of their

Iran [Culture and Geography of the Baluch Nation in Iran[ (Baghdad: n.p., 1971), pp, 8, 11, 15-19; as quoted in Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 109.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 152

emphasis on Baluchi history, culture, and language to which any refer

ence was strictly prohibited in Iran's own one-hour Baluchi program of

Radio Zahidan. These three members, living currently in exile, were

part of an eight-member committee formed for coordinating, producing,

and supervising, Baluchi programs from their office in Tehran. In this

connection they frequently traveled to Baluchistan to assess the impact

of various Baluchi programs on their audience.

Apparently, the Front's mounting guerrilla activities, its

declared goal of an independent Baluchistan, and its connection with

Iraq and other radical Arab forces were a major cause of concern to the

Shah and his regime. This concern was further exacerbated by the vic

tory of the leftist-oriented National Awarai Party (NAP) in Baluchistan

and NWFP in Pakistan's general election in 1970 and the subsequent rise

of Baluch and Pashtun nationalists to power in their respective provin

cial governments in 1972. The event undoubtedly strengthened the momen

tum gained by the BLF. To the shah's regime, the emergence of the BLF

in Iranian Baluchistan and the simultaneous ascendency to power of NAP

and the Baluch nationalists, who were always suspected of having close

ties to Afghanistan, were not a matter of coincidence; but, rather, the

whole event was perceived as part of an elaborate scheme designed most

likely by Moscow and implemented by its clients in Baghdad and Kabul for

the purpose of creating an independent Baluchi state which "might pro

vide the Soviet Union with access to the Persian Gulf."I? In this

regard, the discovery of a large Soviet-made arms cache consisting of

300 machine guns and 60,000 rounds of ammunition in the Iraqi Embassy in

^ Kayhan [Weekly English], Tehran, 21 April, 1973.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 153

Islam Abad and its alleged destination for the Baluch rebels in Iran was

particularly alarming to both Iran and P a k i s t a n . ^

Consequently, the shah's government took some drastic military

measures to suppress the BLF and simultaneously initiated a series of

economic programs designed to win over the Baluch population, beginning

in the early 1970s. On the military side of this policy of carrot-and-

stick, the government intensified its counter-insurgency operations

against BLF guerrillas by sending a whole new mechanized army division

into Baluchistan, which was permanently stationed in the border city of

Khash near Pakistan, in 1972. At the same time, Iranian naval units

were reinforced along to coast of the Gulf of Oman in order to prevent

the entry of any smuggled weapon for Baluchi insurgents, while construc

tion work on the largest tri-service military base in the port of Chah

Bahar was speeded up.

Equally important, however, were economic measures taken to

undermine the Front's popular base of support among the population. As

was mentioned in Chapter III, the BLF's activities were one major factor

prompting the shah's regime to increase drastically the development

allocations for Baluchistan, to expand educational facilities, to intro

duce the first institutions of higher education such as the University

of Baluchistan, and to develop the provincial economic infrastructure by

constructing the first network of asphalt roads beginning in the 1970s.

Moreover, to counter the effects of Baluchi broadcases from Radio

Baghdad, as well as Radio Kabul, the Baluchi programs of Radio Zahidan

were expanded from sixty minute to ninety minutes while three new radio

^ Middle East Monitor, 1 March 1973, p. 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 154

stations were built in other Baluchi towns of Iranshahr, Khash, and

Zabol. Obviously, the regime realized that by providing the Baluch a

stake in the Iranian economy, it might attract their loyalties toward

the state, thus neutralizing the Front's appeal for an independent

Baluchistan.

In addition to military pressure and economic inducement, the

central government initiated a policy of general amnesty for Baluchi

guerrillas who laid down their arms, promising them employment and

subsidies as well. The program proved largely successful, particularly

after SAVAK (State Organization for Intelligence and Security) used its

intermediaries to convince Mir Abdi Khan to return from his exile in

Iraq in 1973. Subsequently, an estimated 1,000 guerrillas were reported

to have turned themselves in.

The final blow to the BLF, however, came as a result of the

Iraqi termination of its support in the aftermath of the Algiers agree

ment signed between the shah and Saddan Hussein in 1975. Consequently,

not only did the BLF lose its external base of support, but its leaders

were forced to disperse from Baghdad and seek haven in other Arab Gulf

states where Abdul Samad Barakzahi and Musa Khan Lashari were eventually

captured and assassinated by SAVAK.

In spite of these devastating blows, Rahim Zard Kouhi, the mili

tary commander of the Front, and a small group of hard-core nationalists

continued to maintain a skeleton of their guerrilla organization until

1979. In 1975, his group began to strike for the first time against the

co-opted Baluch hakoms who had assisted the government campaign against

the BLF. The most notable target was Hadji Karim Bux Saidi, a four-term

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 155

deputy of Majis, who was seriously wounded in an assassination attempt

by the Baluch guerrillas in the same year. As a result, his followers

joined the government forces in hunting the remaining elements of the

Front and eventually captured Rahim Zard Houhi himself in 1977. During

the chaotic period of revolution in 1979, he was released from jail,

collected his followers, and resumed his insurgency against the newly

established Islamic Republic until killed in a battle with the Revolu

tionary Guards in 1979.19

Although overwhelmed under the weight of the shah's combined

military and economic pressures, the BLF's activities had some major

impact on the Baluch national movement in Iran. First, it signaled the

beginning of a new era of organized resistance along modern lines

whereby, for the first time, a coordinated political, military, and

propaganda campaign was launched against the shah's government in

Baluchistan. In this regard, the Front's use of radio broadcasts in

Baluchi were as effective, if not more so, as its guerrilla warfare in

raising the Baluch national consciousness. Second, the advent of the

BLF gave the question of Baluch and Baluchistan a new urgency in Iran,

thus forcing the central government to reverse its long-practiced policy

of economic and social neglect toward the Baluch. Third, it succeeded

in gaining a limited degree of international support and recognition for

the Baluch movement even though that was limited to the radical Arab

sources. In this respect, the case of the BLF's relations with Iraq

clearly demonstates how the issue of Baluch nationalism could affect,

and be affected by, inter-state relations.

l^Akhardad Baluch, Siasat Par Baluchistan, p. 63.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER VI

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AND THE BALUCH

As the victory of the anti-shah militant Shi'l clergy under the

leadership of Ayattolah Khomeini appeared imminent in late 1978, it

revived the old fears of the Sunni Baluch of the Shi’i theocracy, thus

provoking a corresponding upsurge in political activities with a

religious overture among them. This fear was largely responsible for the

reluctance of the larger religious-oriented segment of the Baluchi popu

lation to join the anti-shah campaign. Instead, they rallied behind the

Maulavis, the Baluch clergy, thus enabling them to come to the forefront

of the political scene in Baluchistan from the beginning of the revolu

tion. Only the Baluch intellegentsia, students, workers, and other

urban classes displayed a strong sense of solidarity with revolutionary

forces in the rest of the country by waging anti-government demonstra

tions of their own In Zahidan and other major cities of Baluchistan.^

The collapse of the raonarchial regime and the triumph of the

Islamic Revolution in February 1979 led to a total breakdown of

government authority in Baluchistan, as well as other non-Persian ethnic

regions. As a result, the Baluch began to reassert their power by

ousting non-Baluch officials from their positions, occupying the offices

left vacant by SAVAK in various cities, and In many instances by

^Akhardad Baluch, Siasat Par Baluchistan, p. 66.

156

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 157

disarming the gendarme and army units stationed in Baluchistan. So,

also, was the case with the Kurds, Turks, Turkmans, and Arabs in their

respective provinces. Faced with the prospect of loss of control in

Baluchistan, the provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan responded

favorably to the demand for appointing Baluchis to positions of author

ity in the province. Thus, Danesh Narui, a mathematics professor at the

University of Baluchistan and a Baluch favorite, was appointed to the

post of Governor-General of Baluchistan. This was the first time a

Baluch was allowed to occupy that position since the incorporation of

Baluchistan into Iran in 1928. Similarly, among other top positions

headed by Baluch appointees was the Chancery of the University of

Baluchistan, which went to Gamshad Zai, a statistics professor. Both

officials, however, were replaced in less than six months by Persians.

More important, however, were the political and cultural free

doms enjoyed by the Baluch in the fully open political atmosphere which

prevailed in the country during the first eight months of the Islamic

Republic. Once released from the pressure of the Procrustean bed used

by the shah's regime to squeeze the non-Persian nationalities to fit his

dreams of a new Persian empire, the Baluch, like other national minori

ties, found themselves free to express their national sentiments; carry

out open political activities; use their national dress in school and

public offices without prohibition by the government; and read, write,

and publish in their language for the first time in fifty years.

Although this spring of freedom was short-lived, it gave birth to multi

ple political parties and organizations as well as numerous publications

in Baluchi and Farsi. The Baluchi periodicals included the monthly

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 158

Makuran, a literary journal; Mahtak (Monthly Dispatch), also a literary

journal; Roshna-ie (Light), a weekly nationalist publication; Koo Kar

(Cry), an organ of Marxist forces; and Grand (Majesty), a monthly

journal dealing with revolutionary doctrines also published by leftist

forces. Referring to this season of freedom, Makuran hailed the liberty

to publish in various languages spoken in Iran as a "Gift by the Iranian

Revolution to the peoples of Iran.”^

Unlike the BLF and its ardent demand for independence, the major

nationalist organizations which came into existence during or after the

revolution limited their demand to self-autonomy for Baluchistan within

a unified Iran. This contrast in goals is largely a function of the

different political environments in which they were born. Given the

free and democratic environment in the initial phase of the revolution,

the latter organizations were less adamant in their desire for separa

tion, while the opposite was true in the case of the BLF. Among the

major nationalist organizations which appeared during or immediately

after the revolution and demanded autonomy were Hezb-e Ittehad al-

Muslemin (Muslims' Unity Party), formed by a group of Maulavis and

religious-oriented intellectuals under the leadership of Maulavi Abdul

Aziz Mullazadeh, the most prominent religious and political leader in

Baluchistan; Sazeman-e Demokratic-e Mardom-e Baluchistan (Baluchistan

People's Democratic Organization, BPDO), an umbrella organization for

various leftist factions, headed by an engineer, Dr. R. Hosseinbor; and

Kanoon-e Siasi va Farhangi-e Khalgh-e Baluch (Baluch People's Cultural

^Makuran, no. 1 (1979):2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 159

and Political Center), formed by a group of leftist and nationalist

youth.

The Muslims' Unity Party and the Role of Maulavis

THe Muslims' Unity Party (MUP) and its Maulavi leadership,

however, emerged as the chief spokesmen for presenting the Baluch demand

for religious, cultural, and administrative autonomy for Baluchistan

during the process initiated for drafting a new constitution for the

Islamic Republic. Not only did the Party have a strong following at the

grassroots level, but also its religious orientation made it the only

acceptable forum for the Islamic regime to deal with.^ Soon after his

return from exile in Paris, Ayattolah Khomeini met a Baluch delegation

headed by Maulavi Abdul Aziz in March 1979 and reportedly promised them

to give equal treatment to both Shi'ia and Sunni branches of Islam in

the projected constitution and to direct the provisional government to

consult the leadership of the MUP with respect to government appoint

ments in Baluchistan.^ Thus, upon returning, Maulavi Abdul Aziz

declared to the Baluch that "all your national and religious wishes have

been accepted"^ by the new Islamic leadership, hence inviting them to

vote for the establishment of the Islamic Republic as proposed in the

referendum of April 1979.

^Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 113.

^"Baluch Movement Congratulates the Revolution," Foreign Broad cast Information Service Daily Report (Iran), 12 February 1979, p. R-32; and "Khomeini Sends Envoy to Sistoen-Baluchistan," Foreign Broadcast Information Daily Report (Iran), 2 April 1979, p. R-13.

^"Sunni Leader in Baluchistan," Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (Iran), 28 March 1979, p. R-6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 160

By contrast, the BPDO boycotted the referendum, as did other

major secular forces throughout the country. These groups objected to

the concept of "Islamic Republic" for lacking any precise definition in

its form, substance, and content. As a result, BPDO followers waged

violent demonstrations against the new government by attacking many

polling places and officials and burning numerous ballot boxes in

various cities. In many instances the demonstrations erupted into

active fighting between BPDO members and government f o r c e s . ^ Although

the leaders of MUP attempted to calm the situation by mediating between

the two sides, they were not successful due to the growing polarization

between the secular and religious forces in Baluchistan as well as in

other parts of the country.

In spite of the strong opposition by national minorities and

secular oposition, Khomeini's forces won the referendum with an over

whelming vote for the Islamic Republic. Taking notice of strong

opposition demonstrated by different national groups, Ayattolah Khomeini

attempted to calm their fears in his message of congratulation to the

nation for the approval of the Islamic Republic by stating that: "...

Congratulations on such a government [Islamic government] which does not

discriminate between races, black or white, Turk, Ears [Persian],, Kurd

or Balouchi. All are brothers and equal. Superiority is accorded to

piety and virtue, ethics and good deeds.

^Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 258.

^Iran, Ministry of Islamic Guidance, The Dawn of the Islamic Revolution (Tehran: Echo of Islam, 1982), p. 50.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 161

In spite of this and other favorable gestures toward Baluch

demands by the new Islamic leaders, the first draft of the proposed

constitution left no doubt as to their intentions of keeping the state's

unitary political system intact. As presented in the summer of 1979 to

an elected Council of Experts (Majlis-e Khobragan), dominated by pro-

Khomeini clergy, the draft recognized only Shi'ism as the state religion

and Farsi as the only official languages in Articles 13 and 15, respec

tively. It accorded no equal recognition to the Sunni branch of Islam,

nor did it include any proivision for granting administrative or cul

tural autonomy to non-Persian nationalities. As a result, the Baluch

members of the Council of Experts, Maulavi Abdul Aziz and Mir Murad

Zahi, a lawyer, both elected by MUP, tried in vain to persuade the

council to introduce the necessary changes in the draft to meet Baluch

demands. Commenting on the draft in an interview with Ayandagan, a

Tehran daily newspaper then used by the Iranian opposition for airing

its views, Maulavi Abdul Aziz expressed his opposition to the provision

of Article 13 for recognizing only Shi'ism as the official state

religion by stating that:

The ethnic and religious rights of Iranian Sunnites will be safe guarded only if Article 13 omits any reference to Shiites and Sunnites and merely stipulates that Iran's official religion shall be Islam, period. The Sunni branch of Islam has nearly 10 million adherents in Sistan-Baluchistan, Kurdestan, Gonbad, Gorgan, Khorasan, and Iran's southern ports. Thus, making Shiism Iran's official religion will automatically make second-class citizens out of these 10 million Iranians.®

^"Baluchistan: Its Political Economy and History," Review of Iranian Political Economy and History (RIPEH), 4 (Spring 1980):74—75. The interview was part of a series of articles done by Ayandegan on Baluchistan on 22, 23, and 24 July 1979. These articles were originally published by Joint Research and Service Near East and North Africa and then adopted and published by RIPEH,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 162

He was equally adamant in expressing Baluch opposition to the

draft for failing to address their demand for autonomy, which was

described by him as the Baluch's "birthright." It articulating the

quest of his constituencies for autonomy, he stated in the same

interview that:

We are not secessionists. And it is not in our interests to be independent in all fields. Our goal is to see that the Baluchis make their own decisions in cultural and political fields, instead of being forced to accept decisions made in Tehran. We want to choose our own Governor General, Governors, and administrators (although not military officials). That is what the Baluchis mean by autonomy.^

These and other similar objections by Baluchis and other

national minorities, however, were not heeded by the dominant pro-

Khomeini clerical forces in the final document adopted by the Council of

Experts as "The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran." Aside

from its theocratic color and content, it hardly differs from the

constitution of 1906 in respect to preserving the unitary state system

in the country. Like it predecessor, the new constitution ruled out the

question of autonomy or any other form of recognition for national,

cultural, and religious rights of non-Persian nationalities. It

declared in Article 12 that "the official religion of Iran is Islam and

the Twelver Ja'fari School of Thought and this principle shall remain

eternally immutable.” Similarly, Article 15 recognized Persian as the

official state language, while prohibiting the use of "regional and

national languages" (Zabanhay-e Qaumi) in schools, offices, or for any

other official purpose in their respective ethno-linguistic regions.^

9Ibid., p. 75.

^Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980), pp. 32-34.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 163

Moreover, the rights of the Baluch and Iranian Sunnis in general

were further restricted by the provision of Article 115, which excluded

them from holding the office of Presidency of the Republic, which was

reserved only for Shiates, thus reducing the former to the status of

second-class citizens. In addition, the provision of Vilayet-e

fagih (governance of religious jurist) in Article 5 had no base in the

tenets of the Sunni branch of Islam and, as such, it was not acceptable

to Sunnis. The concept represents a purely Shiia interpretation of

Islam introduced by Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers in the consti

tution in order to institutionalize the power of the Shi'i clergy as the

dominant political force in the new republic. According to Article 5,

the valil-e fagih or governing jurist, a position held currently by

Ayattolah Khomeini himself, is not elected, but recognized by people in

that capacity; he is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and

enjoys ultimate authority over all three branches of government. As the

non-elected supreme leader, he is empowered to dismiss the elected

president, as was the case with the first president, Bani-Sadr, to dis

solve the parliament, and to remove the supposedly independent judicial

authorities at his discretion. Obviously, the concentration of such

broad and unchecked powers in the hands of one individual was strongly

opposed by Iranian secular forces, a position which made them allies of

the national minorities in opposing the constitution.

Consequently, the Baluch boycotted the nationwide referendum

held for approval of the constitution on 2 and 3 December 1979. So,

also, was the case with the Kurds, Arabs, Turks, Turkmen, and most of

the secular opposition. In spite of sharp ideological divisions between

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 164

them, both MUP and BPDO, as well as other lesser nationalist organiza

tions, joined forces to organize large demonstrations to protest the new

constitution. The protests, however, quickly spread throughout the

province and took a violent turn. Soon, armed clashes between the

Baluch and Revolutionary Guards became daily occurrences in the provin

cial capital, where there existed a substantial Shi'i population.^ The

unrest grew so intense that an angry mob stormed the office of Governor-

General Jaririe, a Persian who had replaced the first and only Baluch

governor, and held him captive until he was released through the inter

vention of Maulavi Abdul Aziz three days l a t e r . ^

As the demonstrations grew violent, they took on a religious and

ethnic tone, turning the Sunni Baluch against the Shi'i "Gajars" and

Sistanis. Outnumbered and isolated in their fortified headquarters in

Zahidan, the Revolutionary Guards, all Shi'ates sent to Baluchistan from

Persian-speaking areas such as Isfahan, Yazd, Mashhad, etc., sought help

against the Baluch from the large Immigrant Shi'ate population, consist

ing of Persians and Sistanis, by arming and mobilizing them. The latter

groups were also fearful of the Baluch demand for autonomy, viewing an

autonomous Baluchistan as a threat to their interests. Thus, they

responded quickly in assisting their fellow Shi'ate Revolutionary

Guards. This action, however, had the adverse effect of further enrag

ing the Baluch and leading to large-scale riots and open warfare between

the two sides. During only one week in late December, the toll on both

sides had reached twenty-four killed and eighty wounded. Meanwhile,

^ New York Times, 23 December 1979.

l^Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 16.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 165

Tehran dispatched Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi, then a member of the Revolutionary

Council, to deal with the growing unrest in Baluchistan. Upon arrival,

however, he was confronted by an angry mob and barely managed to escape

injury, thus leaving the province without being able to begin his task

of calming the situation. This event prompted the central government to

declare martial law and impose a dusk-to-dawn curfew in Zahidan in order

to quell the riots.

There were, however, a long list of accumulated grievances and

resentments which culminated in the outburst of the December unrest in

Baluchistan. First, as observed by Selig Harrison, the Baluch felt

"betrayed" by the Islamic leaders in failing to meet their constitu

tional demands as had been promised earlier by Ayatollah Khomeini and

other high-ranking officials. Second, as an impoverished region,

Baluchistan was particularly hard hit by the general economic chaos and

stagnation which overshadowed the country's economy after the revolu

t i o n . ^ Third, the quick dismissal and replacement of the Baluch

governor-general and officials by Persians was seen as a clear sign of

government policy of discrimination against the Baluchi and in favor of

Shi'ate Persian and Sistanis.14 Fourth, there was, and still is, a

popular resentment toward the presence of Khomeini's Revolutionary

Guards in Baluchistan, As a protest, the Baluch have refused to join

the force so far. By contrast, the government used the incident of the

American hostages to blame the December riots in Baluchistan on the

"Great Satan" (i.e., the U.S.) and other foreign powers determined to

13Ibid., p. 116.

^Akhardad Baluch, Siasat Par Baluchistan, p. 108.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 166

destabilize the newly established Islamic Republic without providing any

evidence to support its case. This is a standard practice used regu

larly by the regime to attribute the continuing underground opposition

by Baluch and other ethnic groups to foreign powers. Of course, the

practice originated with the shah's regime.

Baluchista nPeople's Democratic Organization (BPDO)

Less broadly based than MUP, but more articulate and vocal in

its demand for autonomy was the BPDO, formed by the Baluch supporters

and sympathizers of the two Iranian Marxist organization, Sazeman-e

Cherikhay-e feda'i-e Khalg (Organization of People's Self-Sacrificer

Guerrillas) and Sazeman-e Paikar-e Tabaghay-e Kargar (The Organization

of the Working Class Struggle), shortly after the revolution. As a

front, it represented a loose coalition of Marxist and leftist-oriented

nationalist factions, including Kanoon-e farhangi va Siasi-e Khalge

Baluch, a youth organization representing nationalist students with

socialist tendencies; Nabard-e Baluch (The Baluch Struggle), serving as

the provincial arm of the Pikar organization; the Bame-i Estar (The Red

Star), affiliated with feda-i organizations; and several lesser groups.

BPDO derived its main support from Baluch intelligentsia, students, and

the nascent working class. It also absorbed large groups of leftist-

oriented Persians who were working and living in Baluchistan in order to

broaden its base of support. It was the inclusion of the latter group

in its ranks that led to the adoption of "Baluchistan People's Demo

cratic Organization" as its official name, rather than "Baluch People's

Democratic Organization," as had been suggested originally by its over

whelming Baluch members.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 167

In its manifesto, UPDO rejected "all the manifestations of

secessionism" in favor of "self-autonomy" in a united Iran, It defined

autonomy (khod mokhtari) in terms of full administrative autonomy by the

Baluch, the adoption of Baluchi as the official medium of instruction

and administration in Baluchistan, the revival of Baluchi culture, full

control by Baluch over their natural resources, their representation and

participation in the highest organs of the central government, and pro

tection of the Sunni religion.^ With the single exception of the last

item concerning religion, the BPDO's views on autonomy, as well as its

platform of social and eocnomic programs, were similar to those held by

Iranian Marxists in general. As far as its international stand was con

cerned, BPDO was divided ideologically into two camps of anti- and pro-

Moscow groups as was the case with the Iranian Marxists throughout the

country. Its leader, Dr. Rahmat Hosseinbor, and the Nabard-e Baluch

faction, followed the Maoist Pikar Organization, which equated U.S.

"imperialism" with Soviet "social-imperialism," thus opposing both. The

Red Star faction, affiliated with the feda'i organization as well as the

independent element of the BPDO, however, took an independent stand on

the issue even though they were tilted more or less toward Moscow by

concentrating their attacks on "imperialism" as identified publicly with

the U.S. The feda'i organization, along with the staunchly pro-Soviet

Tudeh party, however, were, and still are, the dominant Marxist forces

in Iran.

l^For the text of the manifesto of the BPDO, see Akhardad Baluch, Siasat Par Baluchistan, pp. 75-81.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 168

Of course, the main factor responsible for the strong influence

enjoyed by the Marxist organizations among the educated classes of

national minorities was their strong stand on, and recognition of the

right to, self-determination for the latter groups within Iran. The

thrust of their ideological doctrine and political campaign, however,

centered around the issue of class struggle, which took precedent over

the "national struggle" of Iranian nationalities. Although they

strongly advocated the thesis that national minorities were subject to

double national oppression (setame-e muza'af-e milli), i.e., both class

oppression and national oppression by the Persian bourgeoisie, they

insisted that these nationalities should pursue their national struggle

through class struggle. In this respect, they viewed the working class

as the only force capable of representing the interests of its people.

The issue, however, was a divisive factor between the Marxist-Leninist

and the leftist-oriented nationalist elements within the BPDO. The '

former placed foremost emphasis on the class struggle, while the latter

gave its first priority to the issue of the national struggle whereby

all classes of national minorities could, and should, participate in the

quest for securing their national and cultural rights.

Given the predominance of the Marxist-Leninist faction in its

leadership, BPDO sought to secure Baluch national rights through the

victory of the working class over the bourgeoisie in Baluchistan, thus

relegating the Baluch national struggle to a secondary position.

Accordingly, it waged a campaign for organizing councils of peasants,

workers, and students against the "reactionary forces"— i.e., Maulavis,

hakoms, sardars, and the "dependent bourgeoisie," namely, the very small

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 169

commercial middle class. This strategy, however, was doomed to failure

from the beginning due to its miscalculation and misperception of the

prevailing social and economic structure of Baluch society as well as

its political equations. First, the thesis of class struggle as

elaborated by the Iranian Marxists was developed with a view to the

major industrial areas in Persian-speaking regions where there existed

relatively strong classes of the proletariat and bourgeoisie. By con

trast, there hardly existed more than a nascent working class in Baluch

istan. As a result, BPDO's championship of the cause of the proletariat

and its leadership in the Baluchi national struggle found no ready

ground for its acceptance because Baluchistan lacked a significant work

ing class due to the lack of industrialization, as mentioned earlier.

Second, not only did the attacks on Maulavis serve to arouse a

strong hostility on their part against BPDO, but also to alienate their

large number of supporters at the grassroots level as well. This was

particularly the case in the immediate aftermath of the revolution when

the rising religious and ethnic tensions between the Baluch and Persians

had made the Maulvais the major rallying point for the Baluchi masses.

Similarly, the organization’s campaign against sardars and hakoms also

fell on deaf ears because this group had lost the last vestiges of its

power with the collapse of the shah’s regime and no longer posed any

visible threat against the "toiling masses" as propagated by BPDO.

Third, BPDO's ideological identification and organizational

cooperation with the Iranian Marxists also served to erode the credibil

ity of its leadership, which ironically attempted to discredit Maulavis

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 170

and hakoms by branding them as "stooges" used by Persian-dominated

clerical and monarchial regimes, respectively.

In addition, the BPDO's cooperation with the Iranian Marxist

groups was partly a function of its need to publicize through them the

Baluchi demand for autonomy in other parts of Iran and in part to bene

fit from their long experience in organizational fields. Conversely, in

assisting national minorities to form national organizations for advanc

ing their national demands, the left movement in Iran hoped to

strengthen its own bargaining power vis-a-vis the Islamic regime. For

instance, with the victory of the revolution, the feda1i organization

helped organize Kanoon-e farhangi Siasi-i Kahlg-e Baluchi (Political-

Cultural Center of Baluch People) in Baluchistan, Kanoon-e farhangi

Siasi-e Khalg-e Turkmen (Political-Cultural Center of Turkmen People) in

Turkmen Shara, and Kanoon-e farhangi Siasi-e Khalg-e Arab in Khuzistan.

It played an important role in helping the national minorities to estab

lish a collective forum called Shooray-e Khalg-Hay-e Iran (The Council

of Peoples of Iran), which held its first congress in the Kurdish city

of Mahabad in the summer of 1979.

Of course, the BPDO was short-lived and banned after seven

months of open political activity in mid-August 1979, when Ayatollah

Khomeini ordered a general mobilization of the army and the Revolu

tionary Guards against the autonomy-seeking Kurds. Similarly, the MUP

was also forced to dissolve itself and submerge in the provincial branch

of the government-sponsored Islarainc Republican Party in early 1981.

Thereafter, all Baluchi publications were also banned, as has been the

case ever since. The real political crackdown, however, came during

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 171

the power struggle between the former President Bani-Sadr and his cleri

cal opponents during 1981. Although BPDO had been declared illegal long

before that event, its members and sympathizers were suddenly singled

out once again for their leftist ideology and nationalist demands and

were arrested en masse, as was the case with other opposition groups

throughout the country. By mid-February 1982, an estimated 3,000

Baluch, most "accused of belonging to the Baluch separatist movement,"

had crossed the border to seek refuge in Pakistan, while another 4,000

of their fellows were reportedly being held in the jails of the provin

cial capital Zahidan.16 Other groups of Baluch exiles took refuge in

Great Britain and Sweden as well. The overwhelming majority of these

exiles were former members of the BPDO, while a smaller number were

followers of nationalist Maulavis who had broken away from the MUP

during the Baluch boycott of the constitutional referendum in December

1979. The latter group, which criticized the conciliatory policies of

Maulavi Abdul Aziz, was headed by Maulavi Nezar Mohammad and Maulavi

Aman-u-llah, both of whom escaped to Pakistan in 1980. Of the

detainees, several dozen were executed after being charged and tried for

counter-revolutionary activities as well.

From exile, the Baluch nationalists have continued their

struggle against the regime by forming several underground nationalist

organizations which have been active in conducting a guerrilla campaign

in Baluchistan for the last three years. The most notable of these are

Jebhay-e Vahdat-e Baluch (Baluch Unity Front), Sazeman-e Fedaiyan Baluch

l^The Economist, 13 February, 1982, p. 50.

l^Akhardad Baluch, Siasat Par Baluchistan, pp. 120-22.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 172

(The Organization of Baluch Self-Sacrificers), Baluch-e Raj-e Zorombesh

(Baluch People's Movement), and Baluch Pish Margeh (Baluch Self-

Sacrif icers ) . Of these, Baluch Raj-e Zorombesh is a Marxist organiza

tion formed by pro-Moscow elements of the BPDO. Its manifesto calls for

the "recognition of right to self-determination of all peoples of Iran

including the right to separation" in a "federal-socialist" I r a n , *8

while BPDO's had renounced all "manifestations of secessionism." Saze

raan-e fedaiyan-e Baluch is the rallying point for the moderate national

ists consisting of Baluch bureaucrats and professionals living in exile.

Organizationally, Baluch Pesh Marga is part of Jebhay-e vahdat-e

Baluch, in which the feuding Baluch hakoms and sardars have formed a

united front against a common enemy, namely, the Islamic regime. As a

result, it has close links with the Iranian opposition groups supporting

the return of constitutinoal monarchy, including the Council of National

Resistance headed by Shah Pour Bahktiar, the shah's last prime minister;

Iran's Salvation Front also headed by another ex-prime minister, Ali

Amini; and the royalist forces headed by former Crown Prince Reza

Pahlavi. In cooperation with these groups, Jebhay-e vahdat-e Baluch

reportedly has been receiving financial and military assistance from the

Iraqi government against the Iranian regime. As reported recently, it

has stepped up its guerrilla campaign against the Islamic government to

the extent that it has forced Tehran to divert a large number of its

l ^ B a l u c h Raj-e Zorombesh, Barnameh-1 Khod Mukhtari-e Baluch Raj-e Zorombest Baray-e Baluchistan-e Iran [The Platform of Baluch People's Movement for Self-Autonoray of Iranian Baluchistan] (Aban Mah-e, 1362 A.H. [1983]), p. 5. This pamphlet was publishesd clandestinely in Pakistan and acquired by the author from Baluch exiles in that country.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 173

Revolutionary Guards from the war front with Iraq to Baluchistan. 19

Finally, the presence of such a large number of politically

active Baluch exiles from Iran in Pakistan and their contacts with the

far more experienced and sophisticated Baluch nationalists in that

country could have a significant impact on the future of the Baluch

national movement in Iran. Depending on their ideological persuasions,

large numbers of these exiles have reportedly joined, and are cooperat

ing with, the various Baluch national organizations in that country.

This development is certain to enhance their political and organiza

tional skills to neutralize the effects of "Persianization," to which

they have been exposed through education in Iran and association with

the Iranian political groups, and to lessen their dependency on the

like-minded Iranian political organizations mentioned earlier.

THe impact of this event is already evident among Iranian

Baluch. As an example, the Baluch Raj-e Zorombesh In its manifesto has

clearly stated that

The self-autonomous government of Baluchistan [Iran] shall place its resources at the disposal of the revolutoinary Baluch in neighboring countries in order to enable them to pursue the struggle for their just rights and to welcome them [to Iranian Baluchistan] by granting them political asylum.2b

It also adds that the central government should be informed of this

matter, but its consent would not be required. By contrast, BPDO and

other natinalist organizations formed after the revolution envisioned no

l% e w York Times, 12 June 1984. In its issue of 11 July 1984, the weekly Kayhan, published by constitutional monarchist groups in London, also gave a detailed account of the recent Baluchi guerrilla operations in which 700 Revolutionary Guards were reportedly killed in Baluchistan.

^Obaluch Raj-e Zorombest, p. 17.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 174

such provisions in their charters. Another example is the attraction

to, and membership by Baluch exiles in Europe in, the London-based World

Baluch Organization (WBO), originally established and controlled by

Baluch nationalists from Pakistan. Although it is a non-political

organization striving for the "welfare, progress and prosperity of the

Baluch people and Baluchistan,"^ WBO has emerged as a significant

rallying point for exchange of views and cooperation among Baluch from

everywhere.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the Iranian Revolution of

1979 acted as a catalyst in awakening the national aspirations of the

Baluch and other natinalities and-politicizing their masses to an extent

never known before in the history of these poeple or that of Iran.

^World Baluch Organization, "Aims and Constitution of World Baluch Organization," published as a pamphlet in London and bears no date or place of publication; acquired by the author during a research trip to London in the summer of 1983.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER V II

THE BALUCH NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN PAKISTAN

AND AFGHANISTAN

As ties of language, history, religion, territory, and ethnicity

maintain a unified Baluch national identity that spans state frontiers,

so does Baluch nationalism transcend the international boundaries which

cut across its ethno-linguistic homeland. Therefore, this chapter will

attempt to place the Baluch national struggle in Iran in the context of

the broader nationalist movement engulfing the Baluch in Pakistan and

Afghanistan as well. In this respect, the focus of analysis will be on

the Baluch movement in Pakistan because it has achieved such a maturity

in terms of its organizational structure, its political and military

strength, and its national leadership that make it the unchallenged

leader and spokesman of the Baluch national movement as a whole. The

last part of the chapter deals with the question of the relationship

between Afghanistan and its Baluch pouplation as well as its supportive

policies toward the Baluch in general.

In analyzing the Baluch national movement in Pakistan, it is

first necessary to outline its historical, political, and cultural set

tings, which are primarily responsible for explaining its present

strength that by far exceeds that achieved by its sister Baluch movement

in Iran as demonstrated in the coming passages. Not only does eastern

Baluchistan, with an area of more than 135,000 square miles, comprise

175

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 176

more than 45 percent of the land mass of Pakistan as a whole, but demo-

graphically also the bulk of the Baluch population dwells in that

country, with their number estimated from fewer than 4 million to more

than 6 million. Of this population, one-half resides in the province

itself, while the remaining half is scattered in the other three

provinces of Pakistan, particularly in Sind and its major urban centers

such as the port of Karachi.^

More important, however, are the historical context and the

political environment in which the Baluch national movement in Pakistan

are rooted and have evolved. From the time of the battle of Miani, when

the Baluch Dynasty of Talpour Mirs (rulers), who ruled over Sind for

nearly seventy-five years, was defeated and overthrown by the British in

1834, the eastern Baluchis first came in direct contact with European

colonialists. This and the subsequent direct control of eastern Baluch

istan itself by the British in the mid-nineteenth century paved the way

for the gradual appearance of the first sparks of modern nationalism in

that part of the country. By contrast, western Baluchistan was cut off

economically and isolated politically from the rest of the world by

Britain and Persia from the time of the division of Baluchistan in 1871

until 1828 and then by the Pahlavi regime until the late 1950s.

The direct British presence in eastern Baluchistan brought with

it the construction of the first networks of roads, railroads, and tele

graph lines; the introduction of modern education, though on a limited

^For various estimates of Baluchi population in Pakistan, see chap. I; also, Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, pp. 175-78; Robert Wirsing, The Baluchis and Pathans, Report no. 48 (London: Minority Rights Group, 1981), p. 8.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 177

basis; the establishment of several large cantons; the development of

several coal mining fields; and the related servicing facilities in that

part during the second half of the nineteenth century, as mentioned in

Chapter I. By comparison, similar measures in the western part had to

wait until the late 1950s and early 1960s, as mentioned in Chapter III.

For instance, in 1903, there existed two secondary and twenty-two ele

mentary schools in the eastern part,^ while the first such institutions

were introduced nearly half a century later in the western part. As a

result, the first educated and politically conscious Baluchis emerged in

eastern Baluchistan and formed the original nucleus of the modern Baluch

national movement in its embryonic stage in the 1920s.

Furthermore, the Baluch national movement in eastern Baluchistan

has operated under a much more favorable political environment than that

in which its sister movement in Iran has functioned. The extent of

cultural tolerance and democratic freedoms allowed by the British in the

eastern part was unknown in the western part under the Pahlavis. These

values were inherited by Pakistan and have survived to a limited degree

to this day even though the country has been ruled for the greater part

of its short history by military regimes. This favorable environment

has led to the growth of such cultural institutions as the Baluchi

Literary Society and the Baluchi Language Association, which have func

tioned successfully for nearly three decades.^ These and the Baluchi

Academy in Quetta have made a significant contribution to Baluchi

^Gankovsky, p. 206.

^Dictionary of Oriental Literatures (London, n.p., 1974), 2:56, 58.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 178

publishing and other literary and cultural activities. By contrast, no

such institutions have ever been allowed to function in Iranian Baluc

histan.

Baluch Nationalism and British Colonialism: The Quest for Independence: 1920-1947

The modern Baluch national movement is rooted in its anti

colonial struggle for a separate homeland. In its embryonic stage, the

movement was spearheaded by educated Baluch youth coming mostly from the

ranks of upper-class sardars and the small Baluch urban classes of east

ern Baluchistan and Sind. Commenting on the role played by such groups

in the 1920s, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, the last ruler of the state of Kalat,

then a British protectorate, records that most of the Baluch youth at

the time were inspired by the advent of the Bolshevik Revolution, hoping

that it would serve the cause of their anti-colonial drive aimed at

gaining independence for Baluchistan.^ According to Anayat Baluch, a

Baluch historian, in 1920, a group of these young nationalists under the

leadership of Yausul Ali Magasi and Abdul Aziz Kurd secretly established

the first Baluch political party known as the Young Baluch Party, which

was later renamed as Anjuman-e Itihad-e Baluchistan (Society for Unity

of Baluchistan, SUB) in 1933. In its weekly organ al-Baluch, published

in Karachi, the organization championed the cause of an independent

Greater Baluchistan. As depicted in its issue of August 1933, the map

of the envisioned state embraced Baluchistan proper, the Baluch-

inhabited district of Dera Ghazi Khan in Punjab, and the province of

^Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, pp. 110-14.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 179

Sind where the Baluch constituted a significant minority (less than 25

percent), but occupied a privileged economic and social position.^

In 1935, SUP began to operate openly by adopting the name of

Kalat National Party, which with the tacit approval of the last Kalat

ruler, sought to promote the goal of establishing a united and indepen

dent Baluchistan after the British departure from the scene. Like their

contemporary counterparts in other Third World countries, the founders

of the Baluch nationalist movement were heavily influenced by European

nationalism in their vision for an independent homeland or "nation

state" for Baluchis. In the words of Malik Towghi, a Baluch historian

at Michigan State University, "the concern to identify a homeland, to

establish a political identity in a national homeland, to bring home

ethnic Baluchis scattered among many states . . . and to establish a

constitutional government linked the Baluch movement to the European

model of the 18th century."6

Moreover, they were further inspired by the anti-colonial

struggle of the Congress Party of India and the October Revolution of

the Soviet Union, both of which were seen as the Baluch's moral allies

against British imperialism.

In spite of their small number, the forerunners of the Baluch

national movement for independence played a very important role in

raising a new national consciousness which transcended the

-*Inayattulah Baluch, "Tribal System in Baluchistan," p. 8; see, also, his "The Emergence of Baluch Nationalism"; and his article "Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-Baluchistan," p. 300.

^ T o w g h i , "The Emergence of Modern Baluch Political Movement," p. 10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 180

then-prevailing tribal outlook in the country. For this, they were

under constant surveillance and suppression by the British, as reflected

in the ban of Kalat National Party in 1939. Within a few years, how

ever, the party resumed its open activities and along with several other

national organizations such as the Anjuraan-e Islah-e Baluchan (The

Baluch Reformation Society), established in 1946, pursued the goal of

independence.

As the prospect for British withdrawal was increasing, the Kalat

National Party and other nationalist organizations joined the Khan of

Kalat to seek independence for Baluchistan. The khan made a strong

legal case for independence, arguing that Kalat, like Nepal, enjoyed a

legal status based on direct treaty relations with Whitehall and was not

bound to deal with the British Raj government in New Delhi, as was the

case with the other princely or "native states” of the subcontinent. He

invoked the treaty of 1876, which committed Britain to respect the

"independence of Kalat" and to protect its territories against external

aggression. In presenting his case in an official memorandum submitted

to the British Cabinet Mission in March 1946, the khan stated that Kalat

expected to restore its pre-1876 status by regaining its full indepen

dence and recovering its sovereign rights over all the Kalat territories

held or leased by Britain upon the cessation of her power in India. As

stated by the memorandum, the state of Kalat:

will become fully sovereign and independent in respect to both internal and external affairs, and will be free to conclude treaties with any other government or state. . . . The Khan, his government, and his people can never agree to Kalat being included in any form of Indian Union.?

^Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, pp. 255-96.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 181

Subsequently, the Khan of Kalat, Ahmad Yar Khan, declared the Indepen

dence of Kalat on 15 August 1947, one day after the new state of Paki

stan was established. This move was overwhelmingly approved by the

lower house of the Kalat parliament (Diwan), convened especially for

that purpose in September of 1947. The majority of the fifty-two

assembly members voted for independence, but did not foreclose the pos

sibility for a special relationship between independent Kalat and the

newly established state of Pakistan. The case for independence was

articulated best by Mir Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, then an assembly member from

the majority party of Kalat National Party and the most prominent

nationalist leader to this day, who argued in the Diwan meeting of

December 1947 that:

We have a distinct culture like Afghanistan and Iran, and if the mere fact that we are Muslims requires us to amalgamate with Pakistan, then Afghanistan and Iran should also be amalgamated with Pakistan. They say we Baluch cannot defend ourselves in the atomic age. Well, are Afghanistan, Iran, and even Pakistan capable of defending themselves against the superpowers? If we cannot defend ourselves, a lot of others cannot do so either. They say we must join Pakistan for economic reasons. Yet we have minerals, we have petroleum and we have ports. The question is, what would Pakistan be without us?8

The independence of Kalat, however, did not last for more than

eight months. On 1 April 1948, the Pakistani army marched on Kalat,

forcing the khan to accept the incorporation of his state into Pakistan.

This event provoked a large-scale rebellion by his brother Prince Abdul

Karim, who unsuccessfully sought to gain help from Afghanistan. Conse

quently, the state of Kalat with its weak socio-economic and political

®Malik Allah Bakhsh, ed., Baluch Quomke Tarlkh-ke Chand Parishan Saftar Auraq [A Few Pages from the Official Records of the History of the Baluch Nation], comp. Malik Allah Bakhsh (Quetta: Islamiyah Press, 1957), p. 43, as cited in Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 25.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 182

state structure collapsed in the face of Pakistan's relatively very

strong economic infrastructure and its modern civil and military insti

tutions inherited from the British. With the annexation of Baluchistan

by Pakistan, the Baluchi Doura came to its end; but the division era has

also produced a new Baluchi national movement which is fundamentally

different in outlook and organization from the tribal/feudal order of

the Baluch era, as discussed below.

The Baluch and Pakistan

The founders of the newly created state of Pakistan, Muhammad

Ali Jiunah and his Muslim League Party, espoused the "Two-Nation Theory"

that led to the original division of the subcontinent into a Muslim and

a Hindu state, namely, Pakistan and India, respectively. As observed by

Lawrence Zlring, the idea, however, found its receptivity in the Indian

cosmopolitan regions where the Muslim minority perceived an immediate

threat from the Hindu majority. But it was opposed from the beginning

by the Baluch and Pashtuns, who did not feel such a threat from the

distant Hindus to their remote frontier regions of Baluchistan and

North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), respectively. Instead, they feared

that incorporation into Pakistan not only would place their less-

populated regions at a disadvantage vis-a-vis more populous provinces

such as Punjab and Sind, but also would expose them to the threat of

absorption and assimilation by the more numerous nationalities as well.^

As a result, Baluchis opted for independence, as described earlier,

while the Pasthun nationalists under the leadership of Khan Abdul

^Lawrence Ziring, The Subcontinent in World Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), pp. 89-90, 96-100.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 183

Ghaffar Khan, the head of Khodai Khetmat Kar (Red Shirts), joined

Nehru's Congress Party in opposing the division of the subcontinent and

the creation of Pakistan.

Successive Pakistani rulers have attempted to propagate Islam as

the basis of state natinoalism in the hope that religious homogeneity

would supersede ethnic heterogeneity and would eventually serve to unite

and integrate its various nationalities into the state structure. But a

common Islamic faith has not prevented different nationalities from

colliding or from harming each other ever since the Independence of

P a k i s t a n . There are other major historical, ethnic, political,

economic, and sociopsychological factors which compound the question of

nationalities comprising Pakistan, as well. In this respect, the case

of relations between the Baluch and the Pakistani central government is

a good example.

Indeed, the seeds of ethnic conflict and tensions were sown from

the beginning in the Pakistani state structure that emerged after inde

pendence. Originally comprised of two geographically separated eastern

and western wings, the newly created state came to be dominated from the

outset by the Punjabis in alliance with the Muhajirs (Muslim immigrants

from India), who together dominated Pakistan's economy and controlled

its civil and military administration as inherited from the British.

This was the case in spite of the fact that, at the time, they were a

minority as compared to the 55 percent East Bengalis, let alone other

non-Punjabi nationalities. Given their urban base and dominant economic

K. Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-1958 (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976), pp. 139-78.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 184

position as well as their control of the state bureaucracy, the ruling

Punjabis and their Muhajir allies began to shape and define the state

identity and structure according to their own perceptions and image. A

prime example was the imposition of Urdu, spoken only by Muhajirs, as

lingua franca of the state to the exclusion of the various other

languages used by the indigenous national groups, a decision which led

to the 1952 language riots in East Bengal and the subsequent defeat of

the Muslim League at the polls in 1954. ^

Another example was the adoption of the One Unit Plan designed

to merge the four ethnically distinct regions of Baluchistan, Punjab,

Sind, and NWFP into a single wing of Western Pakistan in 1954. The

purpose of this scheme was to counter the numerical majority of the

Eastern wing in order to ensure Punjabi control of the government as

well as to prevent the growing political alliance eand cooperation

between the non-Punjabi nationalities of West Pakistan with the East

B e n g a l i s . The plan, however, had the effect of reviving the original

Baluch and Pashtun fears of domination and assimilation by the dominant

Punjabis, thus prompting open opposition and demonstrations throughout

Baluchistan and NWFP. Naturally, the minority nationalities demanded

the abolition of the One Unit Plan in favor of provincial autonomy and

proportional representation in all levels of central government as well.

The Baluch opposition to the plan was spearheaded by the Ustoman

Gal (People's Party) and the National Awami (People) Party, both formed

Hziring, Subcontinent, p. 91.

l^lnayattulah Baluch, "Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-Baluchistan," p. 295; Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 27.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 185

in 1955 in order to advance the Baluch demand for full administrative

autonomy in a unified Baluchistan Province. In 1958, the Khan of Kalat

also publicly denounced the One Unit Plan and threatened to revive his

demand for independence unless the scheme was revoked. Alarmed by the

growing unrest in Baluchistan, the government sent its army into Kalat,

arrested the khan and his advisors, confiscated his property, and

rounded up around 300 Baluch leaders in other parts of Baluchistan. It

accused Prince Abdul Karim, the khan's brother, of collaborating with

Afghanistan in assembling a tribal force of 80,000 for rebellion and

plotting against the central government. The charge, however, was vehe

mently denied by the khan, who saw the whole episode as a fabricated

pretext for a declaration of martial law by Gen. Ayub Khan's military

government in October 1958.13

Whatever the validity of these charges and countercharges, the

expedition of the army into Baluchistan and the arrest of the khan pro

voked the second major Baluchi rebellion in less than a decade after

Prince Abdul Karim had led the first rebellion against the forced acces

sion of Baluchistan into Pakistan in 1948. The revolt was led by the

ninety-year-old Nauruz Khan and lasted until 1960, when he allegedly

received the government's promise to withdraw the One Unit Plan, thus

agreeing to a cease-fire with the army. Ayub Khan's military govern

ment, however, denied such a promise by his officers.^ The whole issue

is a prime example of distrust between the two sides.

l^Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan, pp. 180-90; Karim Baluch, "The Democratic Struggle in Baluchistan," Siasat, no. 3 (London, 1975):5. See also Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 42-43.

^Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 28.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 186

Beginning with the 1960s, a group of Baluch nationalists headed

by Shir Mohammad Marri, the leading Baluchi strategist of irregular war

fare, began to lay down the organizational infrastructure of the Parari

Movement with the aim of waging all-out guerrilla warfare for backing

the Baluch demand for the withdrawal of the Pakistani army from Baluch

istan, cancellation of the One Unit Plan, and the restoration of Baluch

istan as a unified p r o v i n c e . 15 i n its weekly organ Chingari, published

in Baluchi, Urdu, and Bengali, the Movement declared its ultimate goal

to be Baluchi self-determination without defining the concept in terms

of self-autonomy or independence. Pararis, however, had close ideologi

cal affinity and organizational links with the NAP and, in fact, served

as its military arm. And since NAP had clearly stated its goal as

Baluchi self-autonomy within a "federal-socialist" Pakistan, one can

assume that Pararis had tacitly accepted the NAP's position on self-

determination, i.e., autonomy.1^

Influenced heavily by the concept of "popular war"— as experi

enced in Algeria, Cuba, China, and Vietnam— Pararis gradually estab

lished a network of twenty-three camp bases in the major strategic

points of central and eastern Baluchistan. By 1969, these camps

employed a command force of 900 full-tiime activists resonsible for

organizing and training reserve forces, operating schools and medical

facilities, and manning logistical supplies in areas under their co

ntrol. With this organizational infrastructure, they were able to wage

15Ibid., p. 29.

l^Inayatullah Baluch, "Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-Baluchistan," p. 296.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 187

a nine-year guerrilla war of attrition which ended in 1969 when Gen.

Yahya Khan replaced Marshall Ayub Khan as head of the military govern

ment. The new military ruler agreed to withdraw the One Unit Plan and

establish a unified Baluchistan province, thus effecting a cease-fire

between the two sides.^

Of course, the restoration of Baluchistan as a unified province

constituted a major achievement for Baluch nationalists because it ended

the division of eastern Baluchistan into several smaller provinces known

as the Baluchistan States Union, a plan originated under the British and

inherited by Pakistan. By contrast, western Baluchistan still remains

divided into three separate administrative units, as mentioned in

Chapter III.

In spite of the dismemberment of the One Unit Plan, the govern

ment's refusal to accede to the Baluch's demand for full provincial

autonomy and proportional representation in the central government con

tinued to poison relations between the two sides. Similar demands were

also persistently voiced by Pashtun, Sindis, and Bengalis. The central

government, however, did not heed the quest by these four nationalities

for restructuring the Punajbi-dominated state structure to respond to

their national and cultural aspirations, as well as their economic and

political grievances.

The result was growing tension between the central government

and the latter groups as well as increasing polarization of the country

along ethnic lines, as seen in the outcome of the general election held

in 1970. Mujib-ur Rahman's Bengal-based Awarai League party won the

^Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, pp. 29-33.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 188

majority in the National Assembly by virtue of its total victory in East

Bengal, while Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) came second by

securing the absolute majority in Punjab and Sind provinces. The PPP's

share of the popular vote in Baluchistan was only 2 percent. The

National Awami Party (NAP), formed as a coalition party for Baluchis and

Pashtuns, won the election in Baluchistan and NWFP. It also had a close

working relationship with Mujib's majority party. The Punjabi-dominated

government, however, refused to allow the Bengal-based majority party to

form the new government, thus provoking the chain of events which led to

the Indo-Pakistani War and the independence of Bangladesh in 1971.

The shocks resulting from the loss of East Bengal compelled the

new government, headed by Bhutto, to grant a degree of self-rule to the

Baluch, thus allowing them to form the first autonomous provincial gov

ernment in April 1972. On the basis of the results of the 1970 elec

tion, it was formed by the Baluchi branch of NAP, which not only had a

thirteen-to-seven lead in the Baluchistan Assembly, but was joined by

the only two additional independent assemblymen, thus increasing its

majority to fifteen-to-seven.Almost all the opposition parties

represented Pashtun and other non-Baluch settlers in the province. This

first provincial government was headed by two prominent Baluch national

leaders, Mir Ghaus Bux Bizenjo and Sardar Attaullah Mingal, serving as

Governor and Chief Minister, respectively. These two, along with the

chairman of the Baluchistan branch of NAP, Sardar Khair Bux Marri, also

l^Inayatullah Baluch, "Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-Baluchistan," p. 297 (Table I).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 189

a fierce nationalist, have been serving as a national triumvirate

leadership for Baluchis to this day.

Soon after its inauguration, the Baluchistan government found

itself in conflict with the federal government over the scope and extent

of autonomy to be exercised by the provincial authorities. In fulfill

ing its electoral mandate, the Baluchistan government attempted to con

solidate its power by purging the overwhelmingly non-Baluch officials

from the provincial bureaucracy, by taking control of the police and law

enforcement forces,and by resisting the habitual Pakistani military

intervention in provincial affairs. These actions were strongly opposed

by Bhutto's government for being incompatible with the national consti

tution. At the same time relations between the two parties were further

deteriorating because of growing popular Baluchi resentment over non-

Baluch settlers who were competing with the Baluch for the limited

arable lands in the province. In this respect, the resentment gi-ew so

intense that several Baluchi tribes defied the provincial government and

attacked farm settlers in the agricultural district of Katchi in Novem

ber 1972. Bhutto, however, blamed the incident on the Baluch leaders.

On 12 February 1973, Bhutto abruptly dismissed the ten-month-old

Baluchistan governemnt charging its leaders with repeated violations of

their constitutional authority. The decision came two days after the

discovery of a large cache of Soviet-made arms in the Iraqi Embassy in

Islamabad, which were allegedly destined for the BLF in Iran, as men

tioned in previous chapters. As observed by Selig Harrison, Bhutto's

dismissal of the Baluch leaders was timed to coincide with this incident

in order to give his action a "broader international significance" by

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 190

alleging that the Baluch leaders not only "had repeatedly exceeded their

constitutional authority," but they had done so "in collusion with Iraq

and the Soviet Union as part of a sinister, long-term plot to dismember

both Pakistan and I r a n . "19 xn its White Paper on Baluchistan, issued on

19 October 1979, the Pakistani government repeated the same charges, but

relied almost entirely on circumstantial evidence to support its case

that the Baluch NAP leaders had sought in concert with unnamed hostile

foreign powers to bring about the country's disintegration.20 Iraq,

however, rejected the Pakistani allegations claiming that the weapons

were destined solely for Iranian Baluchis, while the Baluchi leaders

viewed the whole episode as a "conspiracy” plotted by Bhutto to justify

their removal from office.21

One can discern at least two sets of explanations given by vari

ous scholars for interpreting Bhutto's decision to end Baluch's short

self-rule. The first set emphasizes the factors relating to the consti

tutional questions, while the second one attaches a greater importance

to external factors. According to the former view, the event was mainly

a function of Bhutto's utter intolerance of any limit to his authority,

which was under challenge from autonoray-minded forces such as the

Baluch. While neither accepted nor rejected the government charges

against Baluchi leaders, Robert Wirsing, Associate Professor of Inter

national Studies at the University of South Carolina, observed that the

latter had already won a major concession from Bhutto on the issue of

^Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 35.

^Government of Pakistan, White Paper on Baluchistan, p. 39.

21Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 35.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 191

provincial autonomy and therefore "it seems unlikely that they would

have so quickly and so clumsily risked destroying it."22 He also adds

that the government's evidence of "seditious" behavior and intrigue with

foreign powers on the part of NAP leaders was almost entirely circum

stantial.

More plausible, however, is the second explanation. Noting that

the constitutional disputes betweewn Bhutto and the Baluch were not of

"decisive importance in themselves," Selig Harrison viewed "Bhutto's

larger political objectives in Pakistan, pressure on Islamabad from the

Shah of Iran, Iraqi-Iranian tension, and Soviet support for Baghdad in

its conflict with Tehran" as "key factors" that also contributed to

Bhutto's dismissal of Baluch leaders and the subsequent outbreak of

hostilities between the two s i d e s . 23 i n this respect, the role of Iran

was particularly important. As the main supplier of economic assistance

to Pakistan at the time, the shah's regime was particularly apprehensive

that the autonomous Baluch government in Pakistan might provoke a simi

lar quest for self-rule among Iranian Baluch. Moreover, the shah also

suspected the leftist-oriented Baluchi leaders of assisting and harbor

ing the Iraqi-backed BLF's guerrillas, who were then very active in

Iran, as mentioned in the previous chapters. In addition to the shah's

pressure, Bhutto's move against the Baluch was encouraged further by the

1972 Simla agareement with India, an event which paved the way for the

massive transfer of Pakistani troops to Baluchistan.

22wirsing, The Baluchis and Pathans, p. 11.

23Rarrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 34.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 192

The dismissal of Baluchistan's provincial government and the

arrest of its elected leaders— Mir Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, Attaullah Mingal,

and Khair Bux Mari— provoked the fourth armed confrontation between the

Baluch and the Pakistani central government in the state's short history

of fewer than four decades. It is beyond the scope of this study to

enter into the details of this latest conflict, which lasted from 1973

until the overthrow of Bhutto by the military in 1977. Here it suffices

to mention that this little-known war involved more than BO,000 Paki

stani troops and some 55,000 Baluchi guerrillas at various stages of the

fighting. It resulted in the loss of at least 3,300 troops and 5,300

guerrillas with even higher casualties among the civilians caught in the

crossfire. ^ Still thousands more were forced to leave their villages,

razed by the Pakistani army. The conflict ended only after the over

throw of Bhutto by Gen. Zia ul-Hag, the coup leader, and his release of

the Baluch leaders along with the insurgents. This action paved the way

for an uneasy truce between the two sides which has lasted to the

present.

Ironically, Bhutto's decision to unleash the military in Baluch

istan was partly responsible for his own eventual downfall in 1977. The

incessant nature of the conflict, its heavy economic costs, its human

toll, and it prolonged duration were major factors which served to

strengthen the grip of the army generals on Pakistani politics at the

expense of the civilian government. Obviously, Bhutto himself had come

to realize the danger of the use of the military in Baluchistan long

2^For the most authoritative study of this conflict, see Selig Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan," Foreign Policy 32 (Fall 1978): 136-60; see, also, Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, pp. 35-40.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 193

before his overthrow, as is evident from his written appeal to the

Supreme Court of Pakistan while awaiting trial. Blaming the generals

for mishandling "the National Question," he wrote in his appeal that "on

a number of occasions I pressed for a withdrawal plan [by the array from

Baluchistan] but on each occasion I was requested to extend the period

for a number of m o n t h s . "25 In spite of this realization, he had been

either unwilling or unable to force the military to comply with his

request.

On the Baluch side, the war had some far-reaching consequences

for the Baluch national movement, as well as Baluch society as a whole.

Given its duration, scope, and intensity, the four-year conflict

affected almost all the Baluch population and regions at various times,

generating an unprecedented politicization and political awareness among

the Baluch of all classes and social strata. Psychologically, it inten

sified the ever-widening gap of distrust and mistrust between the Baluch

and the central government. Even after the release of the Baluch

leaders from jail and the pronouncement of general amnesty by the mili

tary government, the majority of Baluchi guerrillas, including the main

fighting force, Pararis, refused to surrender and lay down their arms.

Instead, they chose to cross the border into Afghanistan, where they

have maintained their state of combat readiness in their military camps

to this day. A major portion of the refugees are also still in

Afghanistan.

25a review of "If I Am Assassinated," appeal submitted by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to the Supreme Court of Pakistan in his Criminal Appeal Number Eleven of 1978, Siasat-i-Pakistan 4 (April 1980):10-11.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 194

Politically, the war served to radicalize the Baluch national

movement as demonstrated by a comparison of political forces and organi

zations before and after the conflict. Prior to the beginning of hos

tilities in 1973, the NAP was the main political force in Baluchistan

and was dominated by the democratic-minded and parliamentary-oriented

forces represented by the populist Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, who is widely

regarded as the "Father of Baluchistan” (Ba Bay-e Baluchistan). It was

due largely to his moderating influence that more radical elements

within and without the NAP limited their demands to self-autonomy within

a constitutionally restructured federal state of Pakistan and took part

in the democratic process which brought the first autonomous Baluch

government to power in 1972. In this respect, the dissolution of the

elected provincial government and the ensuing conflict were major blows

to the moderate forces represented by the NAP, which was banned in 1975.

By contrast, all the major political forces currently active in

the political arena of Baluchistan advocate the goal of self-

determination interpreted as the creation of an independent Baluchistan,

a change reflecting the hardening of the nationalist position in the

aftermath of the conflict. These include the Baluch People's Liberation

Front (BPLF), the Baluchistan Liberation Organization (BLO), and the

Baluch Student Organization (BSO). All three espouse a revolutionary

doctrine in their programs, and all are known for their pro-Moscow

tendencies. In 1979, Bizenjo attempted once again to hold his ground

against the growing radicalization of the Baluch national movement by

establishing the Pakistan National Party (PNP) as a successor to the

NAP. The party promoted socialism, federalism, and secularism for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 195

Pakistan, but was banned within six months along with all other Paki

stani political parties by the present military regime. Most observers,

however, believe that PNP still commands a large following particularly

among the small, but politically significant middle class, and is .likely

to win a majority if elections were to be held in Baluchistan in the

near future.^6

Among the three major forces currently active on the Baluchi

political scene, the strongest is the Baluch People’s Liberation Front

(BPLF), which pursues a Marxist-Leninist approach toward the solution of

the Baluch national question. As its objective, BPLF envisions the

establishment of a socialist Baluchi state through the armed struggle of

the masses. Since it is organized as a front, rather than as a commu

nist party, BPLF has left room for absorbing many non-Marxist national

ists in its ranks as well. As a successor organization to the Parari

guerrilla movement, the Front adopted its present name in 1976. Its

decision-making organ, People's Revolutionary Command, is still headed

by the former Parari military commander Mir Hazar Khan, also a disciple

of the Shir Mohammad Marri, the founder of the Parari movement. Since

1976, it has maintained its military camps intact inside Afghanistan,

where it has been training an estimated force of 7,500-12,000 combatant

guerrillas. The BPLF also claims some 60,000 supporters inside Baluch

istan. The Front also is reported to have the tacit support of the

elected ex-chairman of the NAP in Baluchistan, Sardar Khair Bux Marri,

^Inayatullah, Baluch, "Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-Baluchistan," p. 299; Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, pp. 87-88.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 196

who is also currently living in self-exile in Kabul. This is certain to

enhance it power and legitimacy greatly.27

The second major political force is the Baluchistan Liberation

Organization (BLO), which serves mainly as the forum for independent-

minded nationalists. Founded also after the war of 1973-1977, the BLO

is committed at least theoretically to the goals of socialism, but

actually gives its first and foremost priority to the issue of indepen

dence. The BLO program clearly defines its goal as "the establishment

of an independent and sovereign state of Baluchistan, comprising eastern

and western Baluchistan and all contiguous Baluch areas" (namely the

Baluchi part of Afghanistan) and to "institute a progressive national-

Democratlc system of government."2® Its weekly organ, Azad Baluchistan

(Free Baluchistan), is published in London and distributed widely in

Pakistan and Iranian Baluchistan and among the large Baluch community

living in the Arab states of the Gulf. It largely derives its strength

from the wide popular support enjoyed by its chairman, Sardar Attaullah

Mingal, the former elected Chief Minister of Baluchistan.

Yet another important nationalist organization still active in

Pakistani Baluchistan is the Baluch Students organization (BSO), founded

originally in 1977. In spite of the present ban on political activities

in Pakistan, the BSO has maintained its organizational structure intact

to this day. It has played a major role in organizing Baluchi students

27lnayatullah Baluch, "Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-Baluchistan," p. 299; Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow,, pp. 72-83.

-®An English copy of "The Program of the Baluchistan Liberation Organization" was acquired by the author during a research trip to London in summer 1983.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 197

not only in educational and cultural fields, but also on issues relating

to Baluch national rights. For instance, the BSO actively opposed the

One Unit Plan and then took a leading role in the 1970 election cam

paign which resulted in the victory of the NAP in Baluchistan. As a

miniature of the Baluch national movement as a whole, the BSO was also

transformed and polarized as a result of the four-year insurgency

against the Bhutto regime. In 1978, it split into two camps of moder

ates and revolutionaries known as BSO and BSO-Awami, respectively.

Although organizationally both are operating independently, ideologi

cally the former tilts toward the Pakistan National Party and the latter

toward the BPLF, respectively.

Equally important are the intellectual activities of the BSO and

BSO-Awami as reflected in their publications. The former publishes

Giruk (Lightning), a monthly newsletter; Sangat (Comrade), an ideologi

cal monthly; and Bami Estar (Morning Star), a literary monthly. The

latter's publications include Pajjir (Awakening), a monthly newsletter;

and Labzank (Treasure of Language), a monthly literary journal. Between

1967 and 1981, 25,000 students had joined the BSO at one time or

another.29 its current strength is estimated at 10,000-15,000 mem

bers. 30 in this respect, it serves as one of the most important

recruiting grounds for nationalist organizations, as well.

In spite of the present uneasy truce between the Baluch nation

alists and the central government, the eruption of another confrontation

^^llarrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 83.

-^Inayatullah Baluch, "Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-Baluchistan," p. 300.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 198

between the two sides is highly likely because the causes underlying the

previous conflicts remain unresolved and still boiling beneath the

surface. Of course, the major cause driving the Baluch national move

ment in Pakistan is the Baluch concern for protecting their national and

cultural identity against the perceived threat of assimilation by the

more numerous Punjabis. Professor Lawrence Ziring of Western Michigan

University has equated the fear sensed by the Baluch, Pashtuns, and

Sindis of the dominant Punjabis with the same fear originally exploited

by Jinnah to get the British to partition the subcontinent and create

Pakistan. In this respect, it is noteworthy to quote the author's

description of the fear just described. He states that:

Just as the Muslim League raised the cry of "Islam in Danger" and mobilized a movement for the independence of a Muslim state in the subcontinent, Sindis, Baluchis, and Pathans believe their way of life and particularly their distinctive culture are in jeopardy, especially given their experience with the Pakistan movement and their fear of the more numerous Punjabis. In some ways it is the same fear that Jinnah exploited to get the British to partition India. Only now that fear seeks to dismember what is left of Pakistan that Jinnah created. The question might be asked if the fear is real or imaginary. As has already been explained, many Pathans felt the Muslim League fear of a Hindu-dominant India was unjustified. Today, the Pakistani government would argue that Pathan fears are more a manifestation of attitude than factual experience. The point in all this lies not so much in the avail ability of tangible evidence as it does in the minds of those who have a feeling of deprivation. It is, in other words, academic if the fear is real or imaginary; what is important is that it is there and it is a threat to Pakistan's survival as a national entity. It cannot be wished away or forcibly purged. If the fear is to be treated, authority will have to come to grips with the psychology of the Many-Nation Theory and foster a political structure that maxi mizes provincial expression. Pakistan's real quest for identity is quite possibly related to variety and diversity rather than to some mystical sense of ideological unity.31

31ziring, The Subcontinent in World Politics, pp. 100-101.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 199

Equally dissatisfying to the Baluchis are the large economic gap

and social disparities separating Baluchistan from the rest of the coun

try. Economically Pakistani Baluchistan, like the Iranian part, is the

most neglected and impoverished province in the country, as demonstrated

by the following figures. In 1976, Baluchistan's annual per capita

income was fifty-four dollars, as compared with eighty dollars for

Punjab, seventy-eight dollars for Sind, and sixty dollars for the

NWFP.32 in 1977, life expectancy in rural Baluchistan was forty-two

years, as compared with the national average of sixty years.^ Simi

larly, the national literacy average is 16 percent, while that of

Baluchistan is only 6-9 percent.^ To the Baluch, such an economic gap

can hardly be justified in the light of Baluchistan's rich maritime

resources along the several hundred miles of coast as well as its land-

based mineral resources including coal, natural gas, copper, uranium,

marble, onyx, oil, and other potentialities needing further study. By

contrast, the government views the development of such resources in

sparsely populated Baluchistan with its weak economic infrastructure to

be highly uneconomical.

Moreover, the Baluch contend that they have not benefited from

the limited extent by which the mineral resources of their homeland have

been exploited so far. For instance, the Sui gas field in Baluchistan,

^Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan under Bhutto (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 94, Table 5.1.

^Robert Wirsing, "South Asia: The Baluch Frontier Tribes of Pakistan," in Protection of Ethnic Minorities: Comparative Perspec tives , ed. Robert G. Wirsing (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 18.

^Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 161.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 200

the largest of its kind in Pakistan, is piped to industrial belts in

Sind and Punjab, leaving the Baluch to "burn wood trucked in from

Sind."35 In this respect, the exploitation of Baluchistan's resources

by government-backed business interests from Punjab and Sind is highly

resented by the Baluch. Equally alarming to the Baluch are the growing

number of settlers from other provinces and their cultivation of Baluch

istan's limited arable lands, such as in the Katchi district. As a

result, many Baluchis have been forced onto more arid and less suitable

agricultural fields, a factor which has severely damaged the Baluch

economy as a whole.

Furthermore, the Baluch have also voiced strong grievances about

the lack of proportional representation on their part in the Pakistani

bureaucracy and armed forces or the provincial administration of Baluch

istan itself. Of the 179 persons named to central cabinets during the

1947-1977 period, only four were ethnic Baluchis, and only one of them

held such a position prior to the 1970s.36 According to one estimate,

only about 2,000 (5 percent) of nearly 40,000 civil servants of all

kinds in Baluchistan itself were Baluchis, the overwhelming majority of

whom held the inferior jobs on the provincial bureaucratic scale.37 The

only time Baluchis were able to take over the decision-making positions

35flew York Times, 15 February 1980.

36shaheen Mozaffar, "The Politics of Cabinet Formation in Pakistan: A Study of Recruitment to the Central Cabinets, 1947-1977" (Ph.D. dissertation, Miami University, Ohio, 1980).

37yjirsing, The Baluchis and Pathans, p. 9; Stephen L. Pastner, "Lords of the Desert Border: Frontier Feudalism in Southern Baluchistan and Eastern Ethiopia," International Journal of Middle East Studies 10 (1979):99.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 201

in the province was during the short period of self-rule in 1972, as

described earlier. In this respect, however, the Pakistani record is

better than that of Iran, where the Baluch so far have held no cabinet

position.

The aforementioned grievances as the causes underlying the

successive confrontations between the central government and the Baluch

have made Baluchis the most serious separatist threat to Pakistan, as

compared to the other two national minorities, Sindis and Pashtuns.

Ironically, it has been largely the Pakistani opposition groups, and

particularly the secular opposition, which have realized the seriousness

of such a threat and, therefore, have supported the Baluchi demand for

safeguarding their national rights and meeting their economic grievances

within Pakistan.

Afghanistan and Baluch Nationalism

Like Iran and Pakistan, Afghanistan, with an estimated popula

tion of 20 million, is a multinational state comprised of Pashtuns, as

the dominant national group, Tajiks, Hazaras, Turkmen, Uzbecks, Nuri-

stanis, Baluchis, and several other ethnic groups. Its small Baluchi

population is estimated around 300,000, who are concentrated mainly in

the southwestern part of the country adjoining Iranian Baluchistan. 38

They are divided into several major tribal groupings, including Brahuis,

Gorgich, Sanjarani, Narui, and several lesser tribes. There are also

scattered Baluchi tribes and settlements along Afghanistan's borders

38l o u 1s Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 59-64; Inayatullah Baloch, "Afghanistan-Pashtunistan- Baluchistan," p. 284.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 202

with Iran, extending from south to north where the boundaries of Iran,

Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union meet.

In contrast to Iran and Pakistan, Afghanistan has traditionally

maintained close links with its Baluchi population through lending vary"

ing degrees of political and moral support to the Baluch nationalists,

particularly in Pakistan. This policy has been pursued by the succesive

Afghan regimes irrespective of their form of government or ideological

persuasions. During the reign of Mohammad Zahir Shah, Afghanistan

actively supported the Baluch and Pashtun opposition to the imposition

of the One Unit Plan in West Pakistan, which was seen as an attempt by

the ruling Punjabs to absorb the minority provinces of NWFP and Baluch

istan.-^ After the overthrow of the monarchial regime and the estab

lishment of the republican regime in 1974, Kabul pursued a much more

vigorous policy of support for Baluch nationalists. During the Baluch

insurgency against the Bhutto regime in the 1973-1977 period, President

Mohammad Daud provided Baluchi guerrillas and refugees with sanctuary

bases in southern Afghanistan and allowed them daily access to the

Baluchi programs of Radio Kabul, as will be discussed in the next

chapter.

Similarly, the 1978 overthrow of the Daud regime by the present

pro-Soviet Marxist regime did not affect Kabul's basic policy toward the

Baluch nationalists. Both factions of Afghanistan's ruling Communist

Party, Khalg (Masses) and Parcham (Banner), have reaffirmed their

support for the "Baluch liberation movement." Soon after its takeover,

•^Inayatullah Baloch, "Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-Baluchistan," p. 508.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 203

the Khalg government headed by Taraki formally recognized the Baluch

People's Liberation Front and granted Baluchi guerrillas political

asylum, while under Daud they had enjoyed only refugee status.40 Also,

following the example of their non-Communist predecessors, the Marxist

leaders have treated the Baluch on a par with the Pashtun nationalists

in Pakistan. In a speech on 20 September 1979, Hafizullah Amin,

Taraki's successor stated that "Our sincere and honest brotherhood with

the Pashtuns and Baluchis has been sanctified by history. They have

been one body in the course of history and have lived together like one

brother,"41 a theme which had been universally echoed by the previous

Afghan rulers as well. So far, the 1979 Soviet intervention and

replacement of Amin by Babrek Karmal, the leader of the Parchan faction,

has not changed Kabul's attitude toward the Baluch, as will be elabo

rated further in the next chapter.

In publicly justifying this policy, Afghan rulers, all Pashtuns,

have stressed the historical, cultural, and religious bonds of brother

hood between the Baluch and Pashtuns. The historical basis of his

notion appears to be the Baluch's cooperation with Afghans in their

invasion and overthrow of the Safavid empire, Baluchistan's tributary

status under Afghanistan for a short period of fourteen years (1744—

1758), and the 1758 treaty of Afghan-Baluch military alliance formed

largely as a response to the more powerful Persian empire as mentioned

in Chapter I. In this context, not only did the Baluch and Pashtun

maintain closer political and military ties due to a common threat

40yarrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 81.

4^-Kabul Times, 20 September 1979.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2.04

perceived from Persia, but also shared similar tribal organizations and

were bound by the Sunni religion vis-a-vis Shi'a Persia. Although these

ties have served to provide both sides with some justification for their

continuing cooperation, they in themselves are not the most significant

factors motivating Afghanistan's consistent policies toward the Baluch.

More fundamental, however, are geopolitical considerations in

Kabul's calculations. As will be elaborated in the next chapter,

Afghanistan's irredentist claims to the Pashtun-speaking areas in

Pakistan, her desire to gain a foothold on the sea through Baluchistan,

and her territorial dispute with Iran over the distribution of the

waters of the lower Helmand River are the main factors accounting for

Kabul's support of the Baluch national movement. In this respect,

Afghanistan's primary aim is to bolster her demand for "Pashtunistan,"

an issue which has been the cornerstone of her foreign policy ever since

the independence of Pakistan in 1947. As a result, she has attempted to

revive the historical Afghan-Baluch alliance and ties by calling for

self-determination for both peoples and also through working for closer

cooperation between Baluch and Pashtun nationalists in Pakistan. As

previously mentioned, Pashtun and Baluch did form a coalition within the

NAP, which first opposed the One Unit Plan and then came to power in

Baluchistan and the NWFP as a result of its victory in those provinces

in the general election held in Pakistan in 1970.

Moreover, Afghanistan's interest in Baluchistan appears also to

be motivated by her geographically landlocked position, which could be

overcome through access to the coasts of Baluchistan on the Arabian Sea.

An indication of this is found in some Afghan maps of Pashtunistan,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 205

which have depicted the entire area of Baluchistan as constituting

southern Pashtunistan. The historical base of such a territorial claim

appears to be Afghanistan's fourteen-year tributary rule over Baluch

istan during the 1744-1758 period. Baluch, however, reject such a claim

by invoking the 1758 treaty signed by the Afghan ruler King Ahmad Shah

Durrani and the Baluch ruler Khan Nasir Khan, which restored Baluchi

independence in exchange for a military alliance, as mentioned in

Chapter 1.^2

So far, the issue of Afghanistan's vague territorial claims on

Baluchistan has been downplayed by both the Afghan government and the

Baluch nationalists due to the overriding concern with their disputes

with Pakistan. Kabul's demand for Pashtunistan is generally implied to

include only the Pashtu-speaking region of Pakistan. Afghanistan has

not described the Baluch as "Afghans" or Pashtuns, but has always

referred to them as "Baluch," thus recognizing their separate national

identity. Instead, it has emphasized the historical links of "brother

hood" between the Afghans and Baluchis. The Baluch have also responded

in kind by reaffirming their historically close links with the Afghans

and by demonstrating a strong willingness to accommodate the Afghan need

for access to the open sea whenever they establish a state of their own.

Afghan-Baluch cooperation is certain to continue as long as the issue of

Pashtunistan is not solved and as long as the Baluch and Pashtun

national rights and demands are not accommodated within Pakistan.

^2por further Information on this treaty, as well as the official position taken by the former ruler of Kalat State, see Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, Khan-l-Tarihk Baluch Kaum Wa Khawanin-1 Baluch (Quett: n.p., 1972), p. 126.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 206

The present Marxist regime has specifically recognized Baluchis

as a separate nationality by adopting and implementing the Soviet

Union's "nationalities model" in Afghanistan. Accordingly, it has

embarked upon reconstituting the Baluchi majority areas as an autonomous

adrainistrive unit having Baluchi as its official language. In this

respect, Baluchi and three other minority languages (Uzbek, Turkmen,

Nuristani) have been added to the traditionally recognized Pashtu and

Dari (Afghan Farsi) as official languages of Afghanistan and are pro

moted through the Ministry of Information and Culture. In accordance

with government plans for providing Baluchi-language schools in pre

dominantly Baluchi regions, Baluchi first-graders were scheduled to

attend classes in their own language in September 1979. The government

also inaugurated a Baluchi weekly newspaper, Soub (Victory), in Septem

ber 1978.^3 civen the present chaotic political situations in Afghan

istan, it is too early to judge the effects of these measures. It

remains to be seen whether these are genuine steps taken for improving

the lot of the Afghanistan Baluchis or are propaganda means aimed at the

Baluch population in Iran and Pakistan.

^%aby, "The Iranian Frontier Nationalities,” pp. 102-3. See, also, Eden Naby, "The Ethnic Factor in Soviet-Afghan Relations," Asian Survey 20 (March 1980):240.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER V II I

THE REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF BALUCH NATIONALISM

This chapter is a historical analysis of the regional dimensions

and implications of Baluch nationalism. The purpose is to investigate

the extent to which external factors within the region have helped or

hindered the Baluch movement. The chapter will begin with an examina

tion of how the issue has affected, and is influenced by, interstate

relations among Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, the three states

directly involved in the question by virtue of their control over the

Baluch territories and population. Thereafter, the issues will be

placed in the larger panorama of Middle Eastern political equations in

order to demonstrate how and why other regional states have become

involved in the Baluch movement for various geopolitical, historical,

and cultural reasons. In this respect, the last part of the chapter

will concentrate on the interests shown in the issue by Iraq and other

Arab countries.

The Baluch Factor in Relations among Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan

Given the control by Iran and Pakistan of the land mass of

Baluchistan, as well as the overwhelming portion of Baluchi population,

the two countries have always viewed the Baluch quest for self-rule as a

threat to their territorial integrity and, therefore, have joined forces

to deal with the issue. By contrast, Afghanistan has felt no such

207

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 208

threat from its small Baluch population concentrated in its remote

southwestern corner, but rather has viewed them as a great asset for

developing through them close relations with the Baluch nationalists, who

are seen as natural allies against her st*.> nger neighbors, Iran and

Pakistan. Moreover, for land-locked Afghanistan, Baluchistan is the

only hope for gaining access to the sea.

Consequently, Iran and Pakistan developed very close ties on a

bilateral basis, as well as within the Central Treaty Organization

(CENTO) and the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), both of

which also included Turkey, in order to take a coordinated stand on the

issue of the Baluch movement. Both countries treated Baluch nationalism

as a "subversive" and "anti-status quo" force suspected of being part of

an overall Soviet plot for gaining access to the Indian Ocean and con

trolling the Persian Gulf through Baluchistan. In this respect, they

inherited from Britain not only Baluchistan, but also her geopolitical

thinking, thus viewing the land as an ever-tempting prize for the Soviet

Union by virtue of its command of nearly 1,000 miles of coastline on the

Arabian Sea, including the eastern shore of the Strait of Hormuz, its

situation on the overland and maritime lines of communications between

the Middle East and Southwest Asia, its proximity to Soviet Asian fron

tiers, and its rich potential in mineral resources.

It was largely on the basis of such perceptions that the Iranian

rulers and their Pakistani counterparts formed their policies toward the

Baluch movement ever since British hegemony in the region came to its

end after the second world war. The essence of these policies was best

underlined by the shah's foreign minister, Khalat-bary, also an

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 209

ex-director-general of CENTO. During an interview with Selig Harrison

in 1977, he bluntly stated that: "In CENTO, we always assumed that the

Baluch would attempt to create their own independent state some day,

with Soviet support, so it was desirable to keep them as politically

weak, disunited, and backward as possible.

Cooperation between the two states appears to have increased

parallel to the growing strength of the Baluch national struggle. In

1957, they assisted each other on a bilateral basis to suppress Dad

Shah's revolt in Iran, as mentioned in Chapter IV. The two countries,

however, intensified their friendship after the rise of the Baluchistan

Liberation Front (BLF) in Iran in 1968 and the victory of Baluch nation

alists in eastern Baluchistan during the 1970 election in Pakistan.

Given the cold war beween the shah's government and the radical Arab

regimes during the 1960s, Pakistan assisted the shah's government by

bringing strong pressure on Syria to extradite Jumma Khan, a BLF leader.

As a result, he was forced to escape from Damascus to Baghdad in 1968,^

Still, relations between the two countries were further

strengthened as a result of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war and the ensuing

independence of Bangladesh, events which dramatized the issue of the

Baluch movement as the next potential separatist threat to Pakistan,

thus serving to bring the two countries closer together than ever

before. Not only did the shah's government play a very important role

in instigating Bhutto to dissolve the elected provincial government in

Baluchistan, but also provided him with military and economic aid and

^1-Iarrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 159.

^Ibid., p. 107.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 210

political support for suppressing the 1973-77 Baluchi insurgency, which

took place as a reaction to the dismissal and arrest of the elected

Baluchi leaders in Pakistan. Within a few weeks after the outbreak of

hostilities between his government and the Baluch insurgents, Bhutto met

with the shah in Tehran in April 1973 and received $200 million in emer

gency military and financial assistance. Again, in mid-1974, Iran dis

patched thirty U.S.-supplied Huey Cobra helicopters, manned mostly by

Iranian pilots, to Pakistani Baluchistan to assist Bhutto's forces

against the Baluch rebels.^

In 1973, the shah's government repeatedly expressed its commit

ment to the maintenance of security and integrity of Pakistan mainly as

a response to the perceived threat of Baluchi separatism. In April

1973, the Iranian ambassador to Pakistan, Manuchehr Zelli, stated in a

newspaper interview that Iran considered the security of Pakistan

"vital" to its interests.^ The shah himself was more blunt in stating

in an interview in the same month that "we must see to it that Pakistan

doesn't fall to pieces," and should that happen, Iran would respond with

"some kind of protective reaction in Baluchistan," a view interpreted by

the interviewer, C. L. Sulzberger, a New York Times columnist, as an

indication of the shah's intentions to seize Baluchistan "before anyone

else does" in case of further disintegration of Pakistan.^ Again,

during President Bhutto's state visit to Iran, the shah also stated on

^Ibid., pp. 38-39.

^Rouhcllah K. Ramzani, Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975), p. 434.

5C . L. Sulzberger, "Belief in Crude Reality," New York Times, 22 April 1973.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 211

11 May 1973 that "we strongly affirm that we would not close our eyes to

any secessionist movement— God forbid— in your country" and expressly

confirmed his commitment not to tolerate "other changes or difficulties

in Pakistan.This informal commitment by the shah was described by

the semi-official Tehran daily Ittela'at as a "defensive agreement"

(ahdnamih-ye difa'l) between Iran and Pakistan.*7

The shah's use of his newly acquired military weapons against

the Baluch nationalists in Pakistan and Iran, like his military aid to

Oman against the Dhofar rebels, was a step taken for fulfilling his

assumed role of the Persian Gulf gendarme in the 1970s. Given Baluch

istan's long shore on the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian

Sea, the shah viewed the BLF's guerrilla operations in Iranian Baluch

istan and the eruption of Parari-led Baluchi insurgency in Pakistan as a

potentially disruptive force in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and

beyond. It was largely this preoccupation that led his regime to

develop the road and communications systems speedily in Iranian Baluch

istan, to expand the size of the armed forces in the province by sta

tioning a whole new division in the border city of Kash, and to embark

upon the construction of probably the largest tri-service military base

in the Middle East near the Baluch port of Ghah Bahar in the early

1970s, as mentioned in Chapters III and V.

In the larger political panorama of the Middle East and South

Asia, the shah's governemnt saw the rise of the Baluch national movement

as part of a comprehensive plan plotted by Moscow and implemented

^Middle East Monitor, 1 June 1973, p. 2.

^Ramazani, pp. 434-35.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 212

through her allies in Baghdad, Kabul, and New Delhi in order eventually

to gain access to the Arabian Sea and control the Strait of Hormuz

through Baluchistan. In this regard, the shah's suspicions were aroused

by the Iraqi support of the BLF in Iranian Baluchistan during the

1968-75 period and Afghanistan's traditional friendly attitudes toward

the Baluch nationalists in Pakistan, which became specially warm after

the overthrow of the monarchial regime in that country in July 1973.

Given his concern with the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of 1972 and his belief

that the anti-monarchial Afghan coup of 1973 had been instigated by the

Kremlin, the shah suspected that Baghdad and Kabul were acting on

instructions from Moscow in their support of the Baluch movement.

Moscow's support of India for dismembering Iran's ally Pakistan in 1971

was another event which also fitted into a pattern of long-term Soviet

plans for encircling Iran as perceived by the shah's regime.®

In assisting the Baluch nationalists, Kabul and Baghdad, how

ever, had and still have their own strategic interests in mind, rather

than acting in collusion with the Soviet Union. In this respect,

Afghanistan's policy toward the Baluch has been a direct function of its

conflict with Pakistan over the question of Pashtunistan, namely, the

Pashtu-speaking areas of Pakistan, which has been the cornerstone of her

foreign policy ever since the independence of the latter in 1947. ^ As a

result, Kabul has directed its assistance mainly toward the Baluch

®For a similar argument on the shah's fear of encirclement by the Soviet Union, see, for example, A. llottinger, "Iran and Its Neighbors," Swiss Review of World Afafirs, November 1973, pp. 4-6.

^Entesar, pp. 101-2. See, also, Shaheen F. Dil, "The Cabal in Kabul: Great Power Interaction in Afghanistan," American Political Science Review (June 1977):468-76.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 213

nationalists in Pakistan in order to strengthen its hand in that regard.

By contrast, Iraq’s interest in the issue of the Baluch movement has

always been motivated basically by her desire to enhance her position in

her overall strategic rivalry with Iran for political and military

supremacy in the Persian Gulf, thus gearing her support mainly toward

the Iranian Baluchis. That is the case in spite of the fact that both

Kabul and Baghdad have always publicly characterized their support for

Baluchis in general terms. Only after the discovery of a large cache of

arms in the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad in 1973, Baghdad went out of its

way to declare that the weapons were soley intended for Iranian

Baluchis.

To begin with Afghanistan, the successive Afghan regimes, irre

spective of their form of government or ideological persuasion, have

found it geopolitically expedient to maintain friendly relations with

their own Baluchi population, as well as to lend a varying degree of

political, moral, and propaganda support to Baluch nationalists, partic

ularly in Pakistan. Kabul's relatively consistent policy in this regard

is a function of her geopolitical interests, which serve as constant

factors in motivating her irredentist claims to the Pashtun-speaking

region of Pakistan, as well as her desire to gain access to the open sea

through Baluchistan. Another related factor, though less significant,

is her dispute with Iran over the distribution of the lower Helmand

River waters flowing from Afghanistan into Iran, an issue which has not

been resolved as yet. Afghan rulers, however, have always invoked the

historical ties of brotherhood between the Afghans and Baluchis to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 214

justify publicly their advocacy of the Baluch national cause as men

tioned in the previous chapter.

Consequently, Afghanistan has continuously pursued a policy of

interweaving the question of Baluchistan with that of Pastunistan by

almost always raising the two issues together and working for closer

cooperation between the Pashtun and Baluch nationalists. Accordingly,

the Afghan government— whether under King Zahir Shah's monarchial reign,

Daoud's republican administration, or under the present Marxist regime—

have persistently denounced the British-drawn Durand Line for being

imposed upon her under duress and for unjustly separating the Baluch and

Pashtuns from their co-ethnic brethren in Afghanistan, thus refusing to

recognize it as the international boundary between Afghanistan and Pak

istan. Similarly, in their call for self-determination for their co

ethnic Pashtuns in Pakistan, Afghan rulers have also demanded the same

right for Baluchis as well. These are two basic ingredients of Afghan

istan's foreign policy that have not been affected so far by the change

of regimes in Kabul.

The degree of political commitment and support displayed by

various Afghan governments toward the Baluch and Pashtuns has fluctuated

from time to time depending on the prevailing political circumstances in

Kabul and Afghanistan's overall relations with its neighbors at any

given time. Kabul has generally refrained from extending any military

assistance to Baluch nationalists in order to avoid being drawn into an

armed clash with the militarily stronger Iran and Pakistan, hence limit

ing its support to political, humanitarian, and propaganda means.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 215

Given its strong advocacy for the cause of the Baluch and

Pashtuns in Pakistan, Afghanistan's government under King Zahir Shah

refused to join other Northern Tier states in CENTO or its predecessor,

the Baghdad Pact, formed in 1955. In the same year, it also played an

active role in supporting the Baluch and Pashtuns in their opposition to

the imposition by Pakistan of the One Unit Scheme in the heterogenous

West Pakistan wing, a plan designed for merging Baluchistan, Pashtun-

speaking North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Sind, and Punjab into one

administrative unit, as described in the previous chapter. Afghanistan

feared that the plan would pave the way for absorption of minority prov

inces of NWFP and Baluchistan by the dominant Punjabis. In response,

Afghanistan initiated massive anti-Pakistani demonstrations in its major

cities, mobilized its armed forces, and broke its diplomatic relations

with that country in 1955 and again in 1961.

Afghanistan, however, became more vigorous in its support for

Baluchis and Pashtuns after the overthrow of the monarchy and the assum

ption of power by President Mohammad Daoud in July 1973. The new Afghan

leader was well known for his intense and passionate interest in the

issue of Baluchistan and Pastunistan from the years he had served as

prime minister under King Zahir Shah during the 1953-63 period. There

fore, his return to power as president assured the Baluch of a staunch

supporter in Kabul, particularly at a time when their insurrection in

Pakistan against Bhutto had erupted four months earlier, thus greatly

adding to the momentum of their struggle. Not only did he revive the

question of Baluchistan and Pashtunistan immediately after the coup, but

also welcomed into Afghanistan the Baluch refugees fleeing the war

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 216

between the guerrillas and Pakistani troops and provided the Baluch

nationalists with daily access to Radio Kabul for broadcases in Baluchi,

which were aimed at the Pakistani and Iranian Baluch populations.

More important, however, was the high priority given by Daoud to

the issue of Baluchistan and Pashtunistan in Afghanistan's foreign

policy as reflected in his numerous efforts to raise the question at

international forums. In 1973, the Afghan ambassador to the U. N., in a

speech before the General Assembly, referred to Baluchistan and Pashtun

istan as "usurped land.Daoud himself also raised the issue at the

1973 Algiers meeting of non-aligned nations and the Islamic Summit Con

ference held in Lahore, Pakistan, in February 1974.H Again, during his

state visit to Moscow in June 1974, President Daoud, in his luncheon

speech, spoke of the "destiny of our Pashtun and Baluch brethren" and

denounced "the unlawful and stern attitude and course adopted by the

rulers of Pakistan toward the Pashtun and Baluch patriots and people."1^

This key passage, however, was omitted from Tass and Moscow Radio with

out explanation, a clear indication of disagreement between the two

sides on the subject matter. The Soviet action also casts strong doubts

on reports suggesting that Afghanistan had Soviet backing in its support

for Baluch insurgents fighting for autonomy during the 1973-77 period. 13

10 As ian Recorder, no. 46, 1974.

Ushirin Tahir-Kheli, "The Foreign Policy of 'New' Pakistan," Orbis 20 (Fall 1976):747.

12FBIS/USSR, 7 June 1974, JI; see, also, Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983), pp. 62-63.

l^See, for example, Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 June 1978, p. 32.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in

Daoud's intensified political and propaganda support for

Baluchis became a major concern for Pakistan and Iran, both of which

were faced with large-scale insurrections in their respective Baluch

areas at the time. On a number of occasions in 1974 and 1975, Paki

stan's Prime Minister Bhutto attacked Kabul's involvement in "provoca

tive attacks." Convinced of Afghan complicity with Baluch insurgents,

Bhutto viewed the attempt to assassinate him while he was touring

troubled Baluchistan in 1974 as an action inspired by Afghanistan. He

also appealed to the United Nations by sending a personal note to U.N.

Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim detailing Afghan intrigue, sabotage, and

terrorist activities.^ The suspicion of Bhutto, as well as that of the

shah, was based on Afghan action providing the Baluch and Pashtun

nationalist leaders, who were identified mostly with Pakistan's NAP

Party, with haven in Kabul. Since the NAP was a coalition forum of

autonomy-seeking Baluchis and Pashtuns, it was always suspected of com

plicity with Afghanistan. Bhutto, however, did not respond militarily,

largely because of his "greater absorption with the Baluch insurrection

(1973-77)."15

Still fresh with the memory of Pakistan's dismemberment in 1971

and alarmed by the guerrilla activities of the Iraqi-backed BLF in

Iranian Baluchistan as well as the nearly simultaneous Afghan-supported

Baluchi insurrection in Pakistan, the shah saw improving relations

between Iran and Afghanistan and mediating the dispute between Pakistan

^Lawrence Ziring, Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 95; see, also, FBIS/Pakistan, 17 July 1974, TI.

^Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Policy toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 140.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 218

and Afghanistan as measures necessary for suppressing the rising tide of

Baluchi nationalism on a regional base. Tehran's relations with Kabul

were deteriorating, particularly after Daoud1s coup in July 1973,

largely due to his reluctance to ratify and implement the agreement on

the apportionment of the waters of the lower Helmand River which had

been signed shortly before the coup.^ Daoud's hesitance in this regard

was caused partly by the Afghan-Iranlan border clash in the Seistan-

Baluchistan region in October 1973 and partly to enhance his prospects

for receiving larger Iranian loans.^

The shah's attempt to mediate the dispute between Pakistan and

Afghanistan was part of a wider campaign aimed at wooing Kabul away from

Moscow by offering it large amounts of economic aid, as well as access

to the Iranian ports of Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar (on the Baluchi

coast) as an alternative for transit of Afghan goods through the Soviet

Union or Pakistan. Accordingly, when Daoud met with the shah in Tehran

in April 1975, he received an offer of $2 billion credit, of which $300

million was earmarked for various development projects in Afghanistan's

Sever Year Plan, while the remainder was to go toward construction of an

800-mile railroad linking Afghanistan to the aforementioned ports in

Iran. Although this ambitious ten-year project later turned out to be

an illusion, its immediate impact was to pave the way for reconciliation

between Pakistan and Afghanistan.^

l^A. h . H. Abidi, "Irano-Afghan Dispute over the Helmand Waters," International Studies 16 (July-September 1977):370-75.

^Rubinstein, p. 148.

l^Ibid., p. 149; see, also, Bradsher, pp. 61-62.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 219

Encouraged by the shah, Bhutto paid his first visit to Kabul in

early June 1976 and, in turn, received Daoud in Islamabad in August of

the same year, the most important steps taken as yet in the process of

normalization of relations betweeh the two countries. During Daoud's

visit with Bhutto in Islamabad, the two sides reportedly reached a

far-reaching agreement whereby Pakistan agreed to grant provincial

autonomy to the NWFP and Baluchistan in exchange for "simultaneous

recognition by Afghanistan of the Durand Line as the permanent border

between the two countries."^ During both meetings, the two sides

affirmed their commitment to the principles of peaceful coexistence for

resolving their differences as well as to refrain from hostile propa

ganda against each other. This policy of reconciliation, however, was

short-lived due to the military take-over in Pakistan by Gen. Zia-ul Hag

in October 1977 and the subsequent overthrow of Daoud and the establish

ment of the present Marxist regime in Kabul in April 1978, thus hardly

affectint Baluch-Afghan relations in the interval between these changes.

The Afghan Marxist Regime and the Baluch

Within a few days the new regime confirmed Kabul's commitment to

the policy of promoting the right to self-determination for the Baluch

and Pashtun peoples through peaceful negotiations between the Democratic

Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and Pakistan,20 a standard position taken

^Michael Richardson, "Breaking the Territorial Ice," Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 July 1976, p. 11; see, also, Louis Dupree, "Toward Representative Government in Afghanistan, Part I: The First Five Steps," AUFS Reports (Asia) (1978):7—9.

2QBBC Summary of World Broadcases (SWB), Far East, 5808, 9.5.78; see, also, Rosemary Foot, "The Changing Pattern of Afghanistan's Relations with Its Neighbors," Asian Affairs, February 1980, p. 58.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 220

by both the Khalq (Masses) and Parcham (Banner) factions of the Afghan

Communist Party, People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), to

this day. The Khalq-dominated Taraki government promptly changed the

refugee status given to the Baluch by Daoud and formally recognized the

Baluch People's Liberation Front (BLF) as the legitimate representative

of the Baluch people. Also for the first time, the name "Baluchistan"

was included in the annually held Pashtunistan Day celebration by offi

cially renaming the occasion as Pashtunistan and Baluchistan National

Day. Although Gen. Zia ul-Ilag paid a short visit to Kabul on his way to

Iran in September 1978 to express his intention to continue the normali

zation process initiated by his predecessor, the Taraki government

reiterated its position and raised the Baluch and Pashtun issues at the

preparatory meeting of the non-aligned conference in Belgrade and at the

U.N. General Assembly.

After the ouster of President Taraki and assumption of power by

Amin ir March 1979, the latter further intensified Kabul’s pro-Baluch

rhetoric by repeatedly describing Afghan's "brotherhood with the Pash

tuns and Baluchis" as "sanctified by h i s t o r y ” ^ aac[ that they, along

with other "nationalities" living inside Afghanistan, formed part of

"one homeland" whose supposed boundary reached from the Oxus River

bordering the Soviet Union to the Abasin (the Pashtu term for the Indus

River in Pakistan).These themes, though dressed and concealed in

Marxian jargon, were undoubtedly reminiscent of the Greater Afghanistan

^■^•Foot, p. 60.

^^Kabul Times, 20 September 1979.

^•^Kabul Times, 5 and 21 August 1979.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 221

rhetoric as had been voiced by Daoud and other non-comraunist leaders as

well. In reviving the Baluch and Pashtun issues, Amin apepars to have

been motivated in part by his strong Pashtun nationalist commitment and

in part to counter the Iranian and Pakistani support and manipulation of

the spreading resistance to his rule inside Afghanistan. Thus, unlike

his Marxist predecessor, Taraki, who had welcomed the Iranian Revolu

tion, Amin, who also belonged to the Khlaq faction, reversed that posi

tion by attacking Tehran's Islamic leadership as a "reactionary force."

Amin's attempt to play the Baluch and Pashtun issues appears to

have been one of the factors which led to his removal and replacement by

Babrak Karmal after the Soviet move into Afghanistan in December 1979.

As observed by Selig Harrison, Amin used those issues to strengthen his

nationalist credentials among his followers, while "Moscow wanted no

play down the Pashtun and Baluch issues until it had a secure foothold

in K a b u l . " Whether or not he took that stand to demonstrate a degree

of independence from the Kremlin is not clear, but to Moscow it conceiv

ably fitted into an overall pattern of defiant behavior as reflected in

Amin's denouncement of the "reactionary" regime in Tehran in deviation

from Moscow's official line of portraying Khomeini then as an "anti

imperialist" force, his resistance to Soviet control of Afghan armed

forces, and his brutal suppression of the followers of the Parcham

faction, which was doctrinally more in line with the Soviet communist

party. Amin's defiance became more intolerable with his inability to

deal with the deteriorating internal political situation in Afghanistan.

24(iarrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 146.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 222

There is, however, one major indication that the Marxist regime,

particularly under its present leadership, is moving away from the posi

tion of its non-communist predecessors, who used to interweave the ques

tion of Baluchistan with that of Pashtunistan by lumping, more often

than not, the Baluch and Pashtun issues together as a single national

issue in keeping their options open for incorporating Baluchistan into

the scheme of Greater Afghanistan. First, in accord with the Marxist-

Leninist doctrine on the "national question," the regime has recognized

the Baluch as a separate nationality entitled to self-determination on

its own, thus according that status to the Baluch in Afghanistan. There

is, however, still some ambiguity in Kabul's position on self-

determination because the concept has not been defined in terms of

whether it means only autonomy or the right of secession as well. If

Kabul is to interpret the term broadly to include both options, it

clearly would negate Afghanistan's claims on Baluchistan. It also would

have the effect of politically attracting the Iranian and Pakistani

Baluch to Afghanistan more than ever before.

But since Afghanistan's "nationalities" policy is clearly

modeled on that of the Soviet Union, it can be assumed that Kabul's

interpretation of self-determination is that it should be exercised

within Afghanistan. This thesis is given further credence by the posi

tion taken on the issue by present leader Babrak Karmal and his Parcham

faction, which has generally called for pursuing Baluch and Pashtun

national rights within Pakistan. This stand is also more in tone with

that of the Soviet Union, which has generally called for solution of the

"nationalities question" within Iran and Pakistan as reflected in the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 223

position of the pro-Moscow communist parties in those countries. It was

also clearly confirmed by Karmal himself in late February 1980, when he

stated that:

The national issue of the Pashtun and Baluchi niationalities in Pakistan is entirely their own. If the Pashtuns, Baluchis, or Sindis are not satisfied with their regime, it is up to them to take any action. It is also quite clear that we have always nurtured warm fraternal sentiments toward Pashtuns and Baluchis, due to the common historical bonds binding us, but their problems is theirs.^5

The significance of that position is that it clearly reverses

Afghanistan's traditional territorial claims on Baluchistan, thus sig

naling Kabul's willingness to come to terms with its neighbor on the

issue of Baluch and Baluchistan. It also implicitly hints at the com

munist regime's readiness to accept the Durand Line as the international

boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Links with Iraq and the Arab World

As we have already seen in Chapter IV, the Baluch question was

given an added international dimension by Iraqi support of the Baluchi

stan Liberation Front (BLF) against the shah's regime during 1968-75.

Prior to analyzing this aspect of the case, it should be pointed out

that Arab-Baluch relations are not a new phenomenon. They predate the

spread of modern nationalism and the emergence of existing state enti

ties. Historically speaking, prior to the advent of colonialism and the

division of Baluchistan, the Baluch always maintained close political

ties with the Peninsula Arabs in order to preserve their independence

against the constant pressure of the Persian empire as explained in

Chapter I. Georgraphically, Baluchistan is separated from the Arabian

^Kabul New Times, 17 January 1980.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 224

Peninsula by the narrow Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. This

geographic proximity had led to the constant back-and-forth movement of

people— and with them goods, ideas, and values— between the two regions.

As a result, today there is an estimated population of more than 350,000

Baluchis living and working in the Gulf Arab states.^6 The Baluch are

estimated to form 5 percent of the population in each Gulf state. In

Oman, they are the largest minority, forming an estimated 40 percent of

its armed forces and 20 percent of its population. Oman also controlled

part of the Baluch coast as late as 1950, when it was sold to Pakistan.

In addition, the Baluch and the Gulf Arabs share a common religious

denominator that is Sunni Islam, as well as similar tribal social organ

izations .

In the contemporary era, however, Arab interest in the Baluch

issue has been largely a function of their overall strategic rivalry

with Iran for supremacy in the Persian Gulf region. Accordingly, their

support has been directed mainly toward the Iranian Baluchis. Beginning

with the Perso-Arab cold war in the early 1960s, the natinoalist Arab

regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq were the first to raise the issue of

Baluchistan along with the question of "Arabistan"— namely, the Arab

speaking Iranian province of Khuzistan— thus reviving the historical

notion of identifying the Baluch ethnically with the Arabs. Enraged by

the shah's pro-Western stand and membership in CENTO, his de facto

recognition of, and relations with, Israel, and his claims over Bahrain,

the three Arab states as well as the PLO extended a varying degree of

political and propaganda support to the Baluchistan Liberation Front

^garrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 178.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 225

(BLF) as a means of retaliating against his regime during the 1960s as

described in Chapter V.

Aside from Iraq, other Arab states, however, have been facing a

major dilemma in their relations with the Baluchis. On the one side,

these states have found it politically expedient to express strong sym

pathy and support for the Baluch movement against their arch-rival Iran.

On the other side, they enjoy very close and friendly relations with

Pakistan, which— like Iran— views the Baluch movement and its drive for

Greater Baluchistan as a threat to its territorial integrity. Conse

quently, these states have been "unwilling to associate themselves with

the Greater Baluchistan concept," in order to avoid offending Pakistan,

a friendly state. For instance, Syria recognized Jumma Khan, the leader

of the BLF, as the representative of a "provisional Baluchistan-

governmeng-in-exile" during the 1964-66 period and thereafter expelled

him from Damascus as a result of Pakistan's p r e s s u r e . 27

Unlike other Arab states, Iraq's overriding concern with

checking Iran's ambitions for political and military hegemony in the

Persian Gulf region has been a major factor in her support of the Baluch

movement against both the present Iranian regime as well as its

precedessor, the shah's government. Baghdad's aims in this respect

were, and still are, to harrass its rivals in Tehran politically and to

reduce Iran's military pressure on Iraq by diverting part of its

resources to Baluchistan and Iran's eastern front. Similarly,

beleaguered Baluch nationalists, intent on pressing their demand for

27Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, pp. 106-7; see, also, "Arab Support for Baluchistan," Foreign Report, 14 February 1973, p. 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 226

self-autonomy or self-determination, have come to lean on Iraqi support

to advance their cause further, as is the case universally with all

national movements which seek outside help whenever no other course is

left available to them through which to redress their demands.

Iraq's support of the Baluch movement, however, has fluctuated

with the changing circumstances in her relations with Iran in particular

and the overall Perso-Arab equation in general. Whenever her relations

with Iran have been intense, Iraq has revived her interest in the issue.

Conversely, when the ties between the two countries have improved,

Baghdad has reduced or terminated its ties with the Baluch nationalists.

For instance, the Iraqi Ba'ath regime actively supported the BLF against

the shah's government, providing it with military equipment, training

facilities, and access to Radio Baghdad for Baluchi broadcasts during

1968-75. During that period, the Iraqi action was prompted mainly by

her territorial dispute with Iran over Shatl al-Arab, Tehran's support

of Kurdish rebels in Iraq, and Iran's capture of the three Arab-claimed

Persian Gulf islands in 1971. Conversely, with the improvement in rela

tions between the two countries after settling their differences and

signing the 1975 Algiers Agreement, Iraq terminated its support of the

BLF.

But with the deterioration of relations between the two coun

tries after the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran four years

later, Iraq once again resumed its support for the Baluch and other

non-Persian national minorities largely as a means of countering the

efforts by the new militant Iranian Shi'a regime to entice the Iraqi

Shi'a population against their Sunni-dominated secular government. This

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 227

time, however, Baghdad took the upper hand by repeatedly calling upon

Tehran to grant autonomy not only to the Baluch and Arabs, but also for

Kurds as well. In October 1979, for instance, using a leading Beirut

newspaper, An Nahar, for airing his government's views, Abdel Husseim

Muslim Hassan, the Iraqi ambassador to Lebanon, reiterated Baghdad's

support for the Baluch, Arabs, and Kurds in their demand for autonomy in

I r a n . 28 Here, it should be noted that Iraq had already granted a degree

of nominal autonomy to its Kurds in the early 1970s. Comparatively

speaking, although the Iraqi gesture certainly did not meet all Kurdish

demands, it was the first time such a step was taken by a Middle Eastern

country with respect to its minorities. So far, Turkey and Iran have

not taken even such a nominal gesture toward their Kurds.

Baghdad's support for the Baluch and other national minorities

in Iran, however, was intensified after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq

war in late 1980. Given Iraq's upper hand in the first phase of the

war, Baghdad demanded that autonomy for the above groups was one of its

main conditions for peace negotiations with Iran and the withdrawal of

its troops from Iranian territory occupied in the early months of the

war. After the tide of the war turned against Iraq, Baghdad downplayed

that condition, but appears to have increased dramatically its military

support for the Baluch insurgents in order to divert a greater number of

Iranian forces away from the war front and into Baluchistan.

In addition to Iraq, the conservative forces in the Arab world

also began to show for the first time a considerable interest in the

Baluch movement in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, while prior

28yfashington Post, 1 November 1979, p. A29.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 228

to that event, only the Arab nationalist and radical sources had done

so. As the latter had been motivated in their sympathy for the Baluch

cause by their animosity toward the shah's regime, the interest shown by

the conservative Arabs, particularly in the Gulf region, in the issue is

motivated by their fear of the Khomeini regime and its threat to export

its fundamentalist revolution to neighboring Gulf states, its revival of

the Iranian claims over Bahrain, and its manipulation of the large Shi'a

population in those countries. In spite of this public interest in, and

sympathy for, the Baluch cause in the Gulf Arab states, the rules of

those countries so far have taken an ambivalent position toward that

movement. But should the existing tensions between these Sunni-dominant

states and Shi'a-ruled Iran explode into open hostilities, they are

likely to follow the example of Iraq and support the Baluchis.

Another major event which served to arouse greater interest in

the issue of Baluch and Baluchistan among conservative Arab states

particularly in the Gulf, was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in

1979. Given the proximity of Baluchistan to the Arabian Peninsula, the

Gulf Arab states fear that any direct Soviet move toward that direction

or its exploitation of Baluch nationalism for creating a Marxist Baluch

istan state would seriously jeopardize their security. As a result, the

Arabs have shown a stronger tendency to view the Baluch movement as part

of the Arab movement by reviving the historical notion that the Baluch

are ethnically Arab in origin. For instance, to prevent Baluch nation

alists from succumbing to Soviet arms, Riyad Njib Al-Rayyes, an influen

tial commentator for the Paris-based Al-Mustakbal (The Future) weekly,

called upon Arab countries to support:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 229

an independent Baluch nation. First, because the Baluch movement is a movement of Arabs, whose Arab history goes back centuries and would fill volumes of books. Second, if the Arab3 do not protect the Baluch movement, it will definitely succumb to Soviet influence. Instead of having a new Arab nation, a communist Marxist nation will take its place, and the Arabs would have lost their chance to assert the Arab heritage of the Baluch.29

Citing the Khomeini threat to the Gulf Arab states and the

Soviet drive towa'd the Strait of Hormuz, the author adds that "the

establishment of a Baluch nation would positively secure the political

systems in the Gulf" and that "by helping Baluch leaders, the Gulf

states will be protecting the Arabian Gulf from Persian and Asian expan

sion." He also argued that the creation of an "Arab nation" is more

important for the Arabs than saving Pakistan, "an already-divided

Islamic country ruled by railitray leaders and suffering from political

ins tabili ty."

Another major indication of heightened Arab interest in the

Baluch issue was the appearance of a voluminous work entitled Baluchi

stan: Diar al-Arab (Baluchistan: The Land of the Arabs), by M. S.

al-Ajli al-Hakkami, an Iraqi writer, which was published in Bahrain in

1979. The work is primarily a detailed historical study of a large body

of evidence already cited by many other historians, including several

Baluchis to support the Arab origin of the Baluch as well as to identify

Baluchistan as an Arab territory. Appealing to the Baluch for a revival

of their ancestral Arabic language and for "an awakening of the Arab

^^Najib al-Rayes, "Tahridan ala Urubat Baluchistan," [Calling for the Arabization of Baluchistan]," Al-Mostakbal, 2 February 1980, p. 10, as translated and quoted in Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow,, p. 121.

30ibld., as quoted in Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 12.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 230

spirit," al-Hakkami, like al-Rayyes, sees Pan-Arab interests overriding

Arab relations with Islamic Pakistan, thus calling upon the Baluch to

pursue their struggle for "the unification of Iranian and Pakistan

Baluchistan . . . through their common Arabic heritage.

Of course, this resurgence of Arab nationalism and its growing

interest in the Baluch movement is a direct response to Khomeini's

Islamic fundamentalist revolution on the one hand and the likely spread

of Soviet-backed Afghan Marxism in Baluchistan on the other hand.

Correspondingly, the stronger these threats become to the Arabs of the

Gulf, the greater the likelihood that the present widespread Arab

sympathy for the Baluch movement would be translated into an active

policy of support, an eventuality which would certainly give a new

urgency to the issue in the Middle East. This is likely to happen if,

for instance, the Iran-Iraq war is escalated further to engulf the

conservative Arab states of the Gulf as well. The government-controlled

mass media in Iran are already accusing Oman, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and

Egypt of supporting the Baluch rebels. As far as the Baluch national

ists are concerned, they are likely to continue seeking Arab help as

long as their quest for autonomy or self-determination is not accommo

dated in Iran and Pakistan. Finally, it should also be pointed out that

the Baluch drive for self-rule is certain to continue with or without

external support.

3^al-Hakkami, p. 35, as translated and quoted in Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow, p. 122.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 231

Conclusion

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the Baluch conflict

with Iran and Pakistan over the issue of self-rule has acted as a con

stant variable in determining their movement's attitude and behavior

toward the various regional and international alliances. In this

respect, although the Baluch movement is a non-state actor, its pattern

of behavior toward these political equations clearly resembles that of

state actors.

To illustrate our case, during the U.S.-Iran-Pakistan alliance

in CENTO (1959-1979), the Baluch nationalists were highly critical of

that pact. Both the NAP in Pakistan and the BLF in Iran opposed politi

cal and military support for the two countries because they feared that

such help would serve to strengthen further the two countries in their

attempts to suppress the Baluch demand for self-rule. Of course, the

U.S.-engineered CENTO military alliance was designed in accordance with

her global strategy for containing Soviet expansion in the region and,

as such, it was not directed against the Baluch national movement per

se. Put in practice, it had the same effect because the U.S.-supplied

arms were used repeatedly by Iran and Pakistan to put down the Baluch

movement in both countries. In this regard, the most striking example

was deployment of the sophisticated U.S.-made weapons by the shah's

regime against the BLF rebels in Iranian Baluchistan during the 1968-75

period, as well as against the Baluch insurgents in Pakistan from 1973

to 1977.

Consequently, the external stand taken by the Baluch was asym

metrical to that taken by the above-mentioned three states. For

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 232

instance, the NAP Baluch leader, Bizenjo, supported the Soviet-sponsored

"Collective Security System for Asia,” outlined by Brezhnev in 1969,

which sought to isolate China, a close ally of Pakistan, as well as to

undermine the CENTO and SEATO pacts, while Pakistan rejected the plan.

Similarly, the Baluch nationalists endorsed Afghanistan in her non-

aligned policy, as well as in her Pashtunistan claim against Pakistan.

Equally, they also supported the Arab national regimes in their "strug

gle against imperialism, colonialism, and Zionism," slogans directed

mainly aginast the West. The BLF also supported Iraq in her territorial

claims against Iran. Again, the Baluch nationlists have demonstrated

strong feelings for non-aligned India, wihch has traditionally been

sympathetic to the Baluch cause mainly because of her animosity toward

Pakistan.

Therefore, the anti-CENTO position of the Baluch movement was

clearly in line with what can be described as a Baghdad-Kabul-New Delhi

axis, which was, in turn, closer in its stance on international issues

to Moscow than Washington, even though its members professed non-

alignment. All three opposed, through for different reasons, a CENTO-

centered Tehran-Islamabad-Washington axis. In this pattern of alliance,

however, the two superpowers were not directly involved in the Baluch

issue, even though their policies clearly influenced that movement,

particularly in its external orientation and outlook. All this, how

ever, was changed dramatically by the events of 1979 in Iran and

Afghanistan.

The advent of the Iranian Revolution and Soviet intervention in

Afghanistan in 1979 are two historical events which not only

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 233

dramatically upset the post-World War II political and military equa

tions in the region, but also brought the issue of Baluch and Baluchi

stan to the direct attention of the two superpowers for the first time,

as discussed in the next chapter.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER IX

THE BALUCH AND U.S.-SOVIET RIVAL'S'/

Given the close links between the regional political equations

in the Middle East and Southwest Asia described in the previous chapter

and the international balance of power, the two superpowers and their

policies have affected and influenced the Baluch national movement,

though for the most part indirectly, through their relations with the

regional states involved in the issue. In addition, the strategic sig

nificance of Baluchistan is also of direct interest to the two super

powers in the context of their rivalry in Southwest Asia, as had been

the case with the Anglo-Russian competition for control of Central Asia

in the nineteenth century. This chapter will begin first with a brief

analysis of how the question of Baluchistan as a legacy of the nine

teenth-century Anglo-Russian "Great Game" in Central Asia was inherited

by the two superpowers and then traces, chronologically, the evolution

of their interest in the issue after World War II.

The Question of Baluchistan and the Anglo-Russian "Great Game"

The whole question of Baluchistan and its division as it exists

today is rooted in the nineteenth-century Anglo-Russian rivalry for

control of Central Asia. This great-power competition referred to by

historians as the "Great Game," brought Baluchistan under the hegemony

of Britain as her forward base for securing Iran and Afghanistan as

234

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 235

buffer states io order to prevent further Russian advances toward the

British Indian Empire and warm waters of the Indian Ocean and the

Persian Gulf. In this strategic context, the British-sponsored division

of Baluchistan was designed to strengthen the buffer states of Iran and

Afghanistan by giving the western part to the former and the small

northern part to the latter in 1872 and 1894, respectively, while

retaining the larger eastern part under the control of the British

Indian Empire.

But even with this arrangement in place, observers of the

nineteenth-century Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia did not view

the question of Baluchistan, Iran, and Afghanistan as settled perma

nently. Instead, they predicted that the "Great Game" would continue

toward its logical conclusion, that is, the ultimate victory of one

great power over the other. For instance, writing in 1872, Henry

Bellew, a British historian and official, predicted that:

The region lying between the Russian conquests in Central Asia and the British Empire in India [namely Iran, Afghanistan, and Baluchi stan] is now the barrier that separates these two forms of civili zation. It cannot always remain so. It must sooner or later suc cumb to the one form or the other.1

Of course, Bellew's assertion was less a political prophecy than

an explanation of the rivalry between the two great powers on the basis

of the logic of power politics as demonstrated by the events which have

taken place ever since. For instance, with the Anglo-Russian agreement

to divide Iran into three parts in 1907, western Baluchistan became once

again a British sphere of influence separated by a narrow buffer belt in

central Iran from the Russian sphere in the north. (See Map 4.)

^Bellew, p. 3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. J 1914- / Lj J RUSSIAN ZONE j oH cro t 1891

S Birjand Uirjand I\ <0/7b Afghanistan •N Isfahan0'- 1856 "-^YcYczcl / L 1072 IRAQ NEUTRAL ZONE {jKirman , Formerly Turkey ^ • \ To British I BRITISH ZONE Protection

andnrj Abbas IB7.°i Bahrain International 0 T \ To B ritish Boundary ...... Protection 1867 Miles > 0 200

Map 4. Iran partitioned into spheres of influence by 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement; excluding cities of Bandar Abbas, Kerman, and Birjand, the British zone consisted entirely of western Baluchistan. Source: Naval Intelligence Division, Persia (Oxford: Oxford University Press for H.M. Stationery Office, 1945), p. 287, fig. 49.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 237

Britain, however, reversed its policy with respect to Baluchistan after

the advent of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917. Thereafter,

concerned with containing the spread of the October Revolution she

assisted Iran in incorporating Baluchistan in 1928 in order to

strengthen the latter country as a barrier to Soviet expansion south

ward. The same concern also led to the annexation of eastern Baluchi

stan to Pakistan in 1948. Whatever the explanatory power of the para

digm of power politics on which the "Great Game" theory is based, it has

historically ignored the wishes of the small nations and local peoples

caught up in the rivalry of the great powers. Hence, the Baluch and

their homeland were divided against their will into three states, in

order to enable one great power to enhance its strategic position

against another big power. This superimposed division, in turn, has

provoked the rise of Baluch nationalism and the Baluchi sense of irre-

dentism, thus bringing them into conflict with their respective states

which are intent on preserving the status quo inherited from the big

powers. It is the superimposition of this division that has served as

the main cause of conflict between the Baluch and the states in which

they were incorporated.

Baluchistan and the Superpower Rivalry

With the exit of the great powers from the scene and the sub

sequent resumption of their role by the two superpowers after World

War II, the question of Baluchistan was automatically transferred and

placed on the agenda of the new rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet

Union in Southwest Asia. Even before the conclusion of the war, Baluch

istan had become the scene of competition between the Allied powers

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 238

which invaded Iran in August 1941. As early as November 1943, U.S.-

based Standard Vacuum Oil Company showed interest in acquiring an oil

concession in Iranian Baluchistan. By that time, two British oil repre

sentatives had already arrived in Iran negotiating for a similar Baluch

istan concession. Iranian Premier Sohaily, however, wanted to have the

"concession go to America," thus urging the U.S. to dispatch oil company

representatives to Iran as soon as possible during late 1943.^

Similarly, when both the British Royal Dutch Shell Company and

the U.S. Standard Vacuum Oil Company had officially submitted their

proposals in the winter of 1944, the Iranian government once again

wished American oil interests to enter Iran because it feared that

granting that concession to the British would have the entire "southern

coast of Iran tied up under British concessions."-*

By the spring of 1944, another American company, the Sinclair

Oil Company, entered the picture of the oil concession in Baluchistan.

Claiming that the Standard group was closely tied to British Shell, the

Sinclair group attempted to promote its own bid. The State Department

took an impartial stance by supporting both companies, while at the same

time drawing a distinction between their interests and those of the U.S.

government. Nevertheless, when the oil concession negotiations had

matured by August 1944, American officials in Tehran emphasized that

bothAmerican companies involved should send representatives from the

^Foreign Relations of U.S., 1943, Diplomatic Papers, vol. 4.: The Near East and Africa (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 627-28.

^Foreign Relations of U.S., 1944, Diplomatic Papers, vol. 5: The Near East, Southeast Asia, and Africa (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 627-28.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 239

highest executive level because the American charge had been "reliably

informed that one bid or another will be accepted by [the] Cabinet and

presented to [the] Majlis for approval by September 1."^

Given the British colonial rule in eastern Baluchistan at the

time, the Iranian government was afraid that granting Britain an oil

concession in Iranian Baluchistan could revive that power's interest in

western Baluchistan once again, thus it attempted to get American oil

interests to enter Baluchistan in order to counter British influence

there. Moreover, Iranian officials also hoped that getting Americans

involved in Baluchistan would help facilitate the withdrawal of British

forces from the southern part of Iran, including Baluchistan, after the

conclusion of the war. The Anglo-American quest for an oil concession

in Baluchistan, however, led to similar demands by the Soviet Union in

the northern part of Iran in 1944, thus promoting a chain of events

which led to the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by

Premier Musadiq in 1951.

The Russians, like the British and Americans, were also active

in Iranian Baluchistan during wartime. During the 1945-46 period, the

Russian Consular officials in Zabol were taking an active part in the

affairs of western Baluchistan by establishing contacts with the Baluch

tribal leaders, by frequently touring the major Baluch towns throughout

the province, by disseminating Russian propaganda in the region, and by

trying to open a branch of the Tudeh Party (Communist Party in Iran) in

^Foreign Relations of U.S., 1944, p. 452.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 240

Zabol.^ These activities, in turn, alarmed the U.S. and Britain about

Soviet designs in Baluchistan, particularly after the latter engineered

the autonomous republics of Mahabad (in Kurdistan) and Azarbiajan in the

1945-46 period. It was mainly this fear that prompted Britain to sup

port the move for incorporation of eastern Baluchistan into Pakistan.

For the same reason, the policy of strengthening Iran and Pakistan as

major barriers to Soviet expansion southward has been the cornerstone of

the U.S. containment doctrine in Southwest Asia ever since.

After the war, the question was forced to the background of the

superpower rivalry in Southwest Asia, first by the events of the cold

war era and then by detente, until it was brought to the surface by

the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. But even

during the interval period, the issue of Baluchistan did not escape the

effects of U.S.-Soviet competition. For instance, the U.S. political

and military alliance with Iran and Pakistan within CENTO, as well as

her commitment to each country on the basis of the bilateral agreements

signed with each one in 1959, were efforts designed to serve her global

strategy for containing the Soviet Union. But U.S. policies also helped

strengthen the two countries in their attempts to suppress the Baluch

movement for self-rule, as is evident from their use of U.S.-supplied

arms against the Baluch for that purpose. In this regard, the most

striking example was the deployment by the shah of sophisticated U.S.-

made weaponry mainly against the BLF rebels in Iranian Baluchistan

^Inayatullah Baluch, "Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-Baluchistan," pp. 293-94.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 241

during the 1968-75 period and against the Baluch insurgents in Pakistan

in the 1973-77 p e r i o d . ^

Moreover, in the interest of further strengthening her alliance

with Iran and Pakistan, the U.S. took a seemingly indifferent posture

toward the issue of natinal minorities in the two countries. For

instance, when visiting Pakistan on an official visit for President John

F. Kennedy in 1962, Henry Kissinger, then a Harvard professor, was asked

by a reporter about the then-growing Baluchi insurgency in Baluchistan.

His reply was that "I would not recognize the Baluchistan problem,an

arrogant response reflecting the overall U.S. attitude toward the small

nationalities and their quest for self-rule. The U.S., however, has not

hesitated to exploit the issue of nationalities in the Middle East when

ever it has served her interest. Such was the case, for instance, with

her support of the Iraqi Kurdish rebels headedby Mulla Mustafa Barazani

against the present Iraqi Ba'ath regime in the 1974-75 period. This

U.S. action was motivated by her desire to punish the anti-Western

Ba'athist regime for its 1972 treaty of friendship with the Soviet

Union, its support of the Baluch nationalists in Iran, and its bitter

territorial and ideological disputes with the shah's regime, a U.S.

ally.

The Soviet Union, like the U.S., did not show any direct

interest— at least publicly— nor did it become involved directly in the

^For a discussion of the Baluch's negative reaction toward the U.S. military support of Iran and Pakistan, see, for instance, Jonathan Kwitny, Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World (New York: Congdon & Weed, 1984), pp. 199-204, 317-18.

^Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1974), pp. 63-64.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 242

issue of Baluch nationalism during the period under discussion. That

was the case in spite of the fact that the Baluch movement was always

suspected by Iran and Pakistan of being supported by Moscow through her

friends in Kabul, Baghdad, and New Delhi, as described before. The

Soviet hesitancy in manipulating the Baluch movement during the 1960s

and 1970s was partly due to keeping in line with her stated policy of

co-existence, of which non-interference was a major principle, partly

due to her detente with the West and in part due to her desire to

maintain good relations with Iran and Pakistan in the hope that they

would change their pro-Western course. By contrast, the Soviet Union

did not show any reluctance to manipulate the problem of nationalities

in neighboring contries during the cold war era, as was the case with

her open support for the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad and Turkish

Republic of Azarbaijan in Iran in the 1945-46 period.

Moreover, in spite of its bitter conflict with Iran and Paki

stan, the Baluch movement in both countries was dominated by non

communist forces represented by the NAP and BLF in Pakistani and Iranian

Baluchistan, respectively. Although both nationalist organizations were

closer in their external orientation to Moscow than Washington, their

espousal of a non-communist ideology probably made them less appealing

and reliable to Moscow than had been the case otherwise.

Unlike the U.S., the Soviet Union has always attempted to export

its "nationality model” by either including it in the modernization

packages recommended to developing countries or through pro-Moscow com

munist parties in those countries. Based on the Lenin-Stalin national

ity doctrine, the Soviet nationality policy calls for the "formal

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 243

recognition of the rights of minority nationalities," granting them ter

ritorial and cultural autonomy, and extending to them the benefits of

socialist industrialization. China and Iraq are two examples of devel

oping countries which adopted the Soviet model. The former implemented

that model immediately after the victory of the Chinese communists in

1949, while the latter, though a non-communist state, accepted a similar

model in the early 197Us.^ Similarly, the pro-Moscow Tudeh Party in

Iran and its counterpart in Pakistan have propagated the Soviet model in

their respective countries by recognizing the right of national minori

ties to self-determination within these countries and by calling upon

them to join other progressive forces to work for the overthrow of

imperialist-controlled regimes in Tehran and Islamabad.9

Parallel to the growing strategic rivalry between the two

superpowers in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf in the early 1970s, the

question of Baluchistan and Baluch nationalism appears to have attracted

much greater attention in their calculations than had been the case

during the previous two decades. This heightened Interest in the issue

at the time was primarily a function of the increasing strategic signif

icance acquired by the Persian Gulf region for its petroleum resources

and their flow through the Strait of Hormuz on the one hand and the

naval competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the Indian Ocean

on the other hand. Inherent in this rivalry was the quest for

®See the introduction to Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers, ed. William 0. McCagg, Jr., and Briden D. Silver (New York: Pergamon, 1979), p. xvi.

^Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley: University of Claifornia Press, 1966), pp. 180-183.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 244

acquisition and use of naval bases and facilities by the U.S.— on the

island of Diego Garcia, in Oman, and Bahrain— and by the U.S.S.R.— in

Aden and the Horn of Africa. These strategic considerations, in turn,

served to bring to light the geostrategic significance of Baluchistan by

virtue of its command of nearly 1,000 miles of coastline on the Arabian

Sea, including the eastern shore of the Strait of Hormuz, viewed so

vital to the flow of oil from the Middle East to the market economies.

Consequently, it was not accidental that the U.S. assisted Iran in con

structing one of the largest tri-service military bases in the world on

the Baluchi coast of Chah Bahar beginning in the early 1970s.

It was, indeed, the strategic significance of Baluchistan that

served to draw U.S. attention to the issue of Baluch nationalism and the

danger of its maniuplation by the Soviet Union in the early 1970s.

Alarmed at first by the dismemberment of its ally Pakistan in 1971 and

then by the support given thereafter to Baluch nationalists by Iraq and

Afghanistan, both of which— like India— had close relations with the

Soviet Union, U.S. officials in the State Department privately conveyed

their sympathy to Iran and Pakistan for their concern over the threat of

Baluch "separatism."^ Moreover, during the CENTO ministerial meetings

in June 1972, as well as in June 1973, the Baluch issue was high on the

agenda of the Iranian and Pakistani foreign ministers when they

discussed the "subversive activities" in the Persian Gulf region.11

1(-*See Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 141.

^See, for instance, United States, Department of State, Bulletin, 3 July 1972, pp. 23—26; see, also, Ramazani, p. 356.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 245

The superpowers, however, were prompted to take a closer look

than before at the issues of the Baluch national movement as a result of

the 1978 Marxist coup in Afghanistan and the 1979 Islamic Revolution in

Iran and the ensuing political instability caused by these events in the

region. It does not appear to have escaped the attention of U.S. stra

tegic planners that these events greatly enhanced Soviet opportunities

for manipulating the issue of nationalities in neighboring countries for

furthering her influence in the Middle East. There was plenty of evi

dence to have aroused U.S. concern in this regard, including the adop

tion by the Afghan Marxist regime of the Soviet nationality model in

Afghanistan, its confirmation of Kabul's traditional support for

Baluchis, and— most important— the revival of the quest for autonomy

among Iranian nationalities including Baluchis immediately after the

revolution. It was that fear that led the U.S .to confirm repeatedly

its commitment to the territorial integrity of Iran in spite of the

anti-American posture taken by the new Islamic regime in Tehran.

Similarly, Soviet strategists are highly likely to have contemplated the

use of the issue of nationalities in neighboring countries as a poten

tial weapon against the tide of Islamic fundamentalism on her southern

borders.

The Baluch Issue and the 1979 Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

The Soviet military move into Afghanistan in December 1979, how

ever, directly injected the question of Baluchistan and Baluch national

ism in the superpowers' rivalry in the region, as had been the case

during the Anglo-Russian "Great Game" for control of Central Asia in the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 246

nineteenth century. Whether or not it was taken to save a friendly

Marxist regime, as called for by the Brezhnev doctrine, the Soviet

action brought a dramatic change in the post-World War II regional

balance in the sense that it eliminated Afghanistan's buffer status and

transformed that country into a Soviet forward base in the Middle East

and Southwest Asia. It resembles, to some extent, the nineteenth-

century British occupation and transformation of Baluchistan into her

forward base for maintaining the buffer status of Iran and Afghanistan,

as mentioned previously. The only difference is that Baluchistan lost

its independence since then, while Afghanistan still remains a sovereign

state. By advancing into Afghanistan, the Soviets have also entered

Baluchistan because they also control the Baluch areas in that country.

THe Soviet move has provoked a continuing debate in the West

over both Moscow's design in Baluchistan and Washington's response to

it. On the one side of this debate are "maximalists," who view the

Soviet action as part of a "master plan" prepared in advance for gaining

access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and the control of the

Persian Gulf, thus predicting the conquest of Baluchistan as the next

logical Soviet move in that direction. Pointing to the historical

Russian drive for warm-water ports, the "maximalists" argue that, by

entering Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has already accomplished the

first leg in opening a corridor to the sea, thus predicting the

completion of the second leg— namely, Baluchistan.*2

■^See, for instance, Richard Pipes, "Soviet Global Strategy," Commentary, April 1980, pp. 31-39; Kiri Valenta, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Difficulty of Knowing Where To Stop," Orbin 24 (Summer 1980):201-18; A. G. Noorani, "Soviet Ambition in South Asia," International Security (Winter 1979-80):31-59.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 247

Challenging this view, the "minimalists," at the other pole, do

not see the Soviet move as necessarily meaning further Soviet expansion

southward. Rather, the proponents of this view, like George Kennan,

depict the Soviet action as a function of her concern with the political

instability caused by the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism in

neighboring countries to the south and its danger of spilling over into

Soviet territory.^ Also rejecting the "maximalist" view, Selig

Harrison has attributed the Soviet move to the accidental ascendency to

power by a national communist leader, Hafizullah Amin, who was seen by

Moscow as a potential Tito.^

Whatever the academic merits of the two political debates, both

underscore the heightened Western concern with the question of Baluchi

stan as one of the most likely targets for the future projection of

Soviet power in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. This is not only

because of its strategic situation, but also due to the existence of a

strong Baluch nationalist movement which could turn to the Soviets for

assistance in pursuing its quest for self-rule. In analyzing the cor

relation of forces in the Persian Gulf, W. Scott Thompson, Associate

Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and

Diplomacy, points out that the Soviet "military conquest of Baluchistan

— the irredentist Pakistan region lying between Afghanistan and the

Indian Ocean— would not be overwhelmingly complicated" as compared to a

l^See Kennan's testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 27 February 1980 in U.S. Security Interest and Politics in Southwest Asia (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), pp. 87-120.

l^Selig S. Harrison, "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit through Finland," Foreign Policy 41 (1980-81):163-67.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 248

Soviet thrust toward the Persian Gulf through Iran. In his calculation,

a Soviet invasion of Iran would be regarded as a direct threat to vital

Western interests, as clearly indicated by Washington. At the same

time, given the concentration of the bulk of Pakistan’s armed forces in

her eastern border, the author concludes that the Soviets might find it

less dangerous "to move south by way of Baluchistan," an option which

would be even more promising if Moscow decides to use a "Baluch alterna

tive" to counter Pakistani support for Afghan "freedom fighters."^

Given this Western preoccupation, President Carter's National

Security Adviser Zbigniew Brezinski underscored the applicability of the

"Carter doctrine," which declared the Persian Gulf "vital" to Western

interests, to Baluchistan in the context of the U.S. commitment to the

territorial integrity of Pakistan.16 Similarly, in approving a five-

year $3.2 billion economic and military aid package for Pakistan to

shore up her defenses, the Reagan administration has sought to earmark

part of the economic half of that package for use in Baluchistan in

order to prevent Moscow's manipulation of Baluch economic discontent in

Pakistan. But, as pointed out by Selig Harrison, without constitutional

reforms for giving the Baluch a stronger voice in decisions relating to

the economic development of their province, "the political benefits of

such aid for Islamabad are likely to be minimal," especially if it is

Scott Thompson, "The Persian Gulf and the Correlation of Forces," International Security 7 (Summer 1982):176. See, also, his discussion of the various assumptions held by "maximalists" and "minimalsts" on pp. 159-61 of the same article.

16"Issues and Answers," American Broadcasting Company, 30 December 1979.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 249

geared primarily to military-related projects such as roads and air

fields .17

As to the Soviet role or intentions in Baluchistan, in the

absence of accurate information and suitable evidence, our discussion

remains conjectural. There are at least three sets of major inter

related factors which are certain to condition and influence, if not to

determine, future Soviet attitudes, behavior, and policies toward the

Baluch and Baluchistan. The first set relates to the state of Soviet

relations with the U.S., as well as the overall state of East-West

balance of power. The second set of factors are regional factors con

cerning relations of the Soviet Union and her Marxist ally Afghanistan

with neighboring Iran and Pakistan. Of course, given the close links

between the international balance of power and the regional political

equations, Soviet-Afghan relations with Iran and Pakistan would also be

affected by overall East-West ties. The third group of factors are the

function of the Soviet-Afghan relations with the Baluch nationalists.

As far as the strategic balance between the two superpowers in

Southwest Asia is concerned, if one is to accept the assumption that

Soviet behavior is motivated by geopolitical interest, as is the case

with the Western advocate of power politics, then the Soviet move into

Baluchistan is likely to become a self-fulfilling prophecy because

access to that strategically located and minerally rich piece of land

would enable the Soviet Union to fortify her naval power in the Indian

^Harrison, "Dateline Afghanistan," p. 201. See, also, Selig S. Harrison, "The Baluch Nationalism and Superpower Rivalry," International Security 5 (Winter 1980-81):152-63; this is probably the best.article written on the issue so far.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 250

Ocean and to control the Strait of Hormuz and through it the flow of oil

from the Persian Gulf, an eventuality that would negatively affect the

international balance of power elsewhere as well.

In such a scenario, the Soviet Union would be aided not only by

her advantage in conventional forces, but also by the factor of geo

graphic proximity to the scene where the shortest distance separating

Soviet-controlled Baluch areas in Afghanistan from Baluch ports in Iran

and Pakistan is more or less around 300 miles. The scenario becomes

still more plausible if East-West relations continue to deteriorate and

if the existing political instability continues to engulf the region.

After all, if Baluchistan was geostrategically significant

enough to become a British forward base in Central Asia in the nine

teenth century, there is no reason that it would not assume the same

importance in Soviet strategic considerations at the present or in

future times. Should the Soviets be tempted to do that, then the Red

Army would certainly overrun Baluchistan to transform it into a major

Soviet forward position in Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and the

Indian Ocean basin. In such a hypothetical scenario, the U.S. option

would be limited to a nuclear response to counter Soviet superiority in

conventional forces, particularly if one takes into consideration the

fact that U.S. reliance on the Pakistan-China alliance would be neutral

ized by an Afghan-Indian alliance with the Soviets. It is improbable

that the U.S. would take such a high risk for Baluchistan; instead, it

would possibly settle for a Russian guarantee of an uninterrupted flow

of oil to the West form the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz as

well as some other concessions— probably some sphere of influence

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 251

elsewhere. However, the risks and uncertainties involved in such a

scenario, including the mere threat of a confrontation with the U.S.,

are more than likely to deter such a move on the part of the Soviet

Union.

In addition to the aforementioned strategic considerations,

regional developments, the second set of factors, could also provoke

Soviet involvement, whether directly or indirectly, in the Baluch issue.

These factors range from Soviet concern with the tide of Islamic funda

mentalism and its threat to her southern borders, to Moscow's preoccupa

tion with the assistance provided to the Afghan rebels by or through

Pakistan and Iran, to the Kremlin's unhappiness with Islamabad's eco

nomic and military ties with Washington. In response, the Soviet Union

could well be tempted to use the threat of Baluch nationalism to force

Iran and Pakistan to be more accommodating toward her policies or even

to carve up the two countries into smaller satellites. Neither of the

two scenarios is likely to happen if Moscow sees good prospects for

enhancing its Influence in Islamabad and Tehran and particularly if

there is a strong likelihood for the pro-Soviet communist parties to

take power in the two countries.

Conversely, should Moscow decide to write off Iran, for

instance, for its anti-communist theocracy or to give up hope on Pakis

tan for its military ties with the U.S. and China then the likelihood of

Soviet support for the Baluch movement would increase, particularly if

that movement was to embrace the Moscow line of Marxism. Moreover,

Moscow may also find itself involved in supporting the Baluch through

its Marxist allies in Kabul if the latter were to be drawn into another

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 252

conflict with Pakistan over the issues of Pashtunistan and Baluchistan.

Any of these actions could lead to the Balkanization of the region, a

scenario that would entail both risks and benefits for the Soviet Union.

But since the Balkanization of the Balkans eventually resulted in Soviet

hegemony there, Moscow could well be tempted to apply that experience in

Iran and Pakistan in the hope that it would produce the same results.

The Soviet Union, however, could also avoid a full Balkanization of the

region by limiting its action to the creation of a Marxist satellite

state in Baluchistan to serve its strategic interest, while leaving the

rest of Iran and Pakistan as it is.

All the previous scenarios, however, ultimately hinge upon a

third set of factors relating to the Baluch national movement and the

added options it can provide the Soviet Union with respect to her stra

tegic and tactical calculations in the region. The Baluch factor would

be particularly important if Moscow was to decide that the strategic

gains of transforming Baluchistan into her forward base in Southwest

Asia and the Middle East would override the costs and risks involved in

such an action, or even if the Soviets opted for the less riskier course

of using the Baluch alternative for countering the destabilization

efforts by Iran and Pakistan in Afghanistan. In either case, the

Kremlin would have to justify its action either on the grounds that it

is requested by a Baluch government-in-exile or on the basis that the

Baluch movement represents a national liberation movement struggling for

self-determination, thus entitled to receive the recognition and support

of the socialist countries.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

In these concluding remarks, we attempt to examine the phenome

non of ethnic nationalism in the Third World by identifying and defining

its causes, manifestations, characteristiccs, and goals on the basis of

the general findings drawn from our case study as well as other cases

dsicussed in connection with it. The purpose is to see how Baluch

nationalism and generalizations formulated to characterize it relate to

the overall phenomenon of ethnic nationalism in the Third World.

To begin with, our case study has demonstrated that Baluch

nationalism was first sparked by British colonial hegemony over, and

division of, their homeland in the second half of the nineteenth century

and then inflamed by the politically and economically dominant and

exploitative Persian nationalism after the forceful incorporation of

western Baluchistan into Iran in 1982. Its principal goal is Baluch

national self-rule in their homeland, an aim sought to preserve their

national and cultural identity, thus advocated and pursued universally

by Baluch of all classes and social strata. Therefore, it represents a

popular movement against external or alien domination and for self-

determination as was the case with early anti-colonial nationalism of

Third World peoples. That is also the case with the nationalism of

other subordinate nationalities in Iran, as well as in its neighboring

states such as Pakistan, Iraq, and Turkey.

253

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 254

As demonstrated also by our case study, what has provoked the

nationalism of the Baluch and other subordinate nationalities in Iran is

the imposition upon them by the dominant nationality, Persians, of a

unitary state system which has denied and suppressed not only the

national identities of the former groups, but also has subjected them to

political, economic, cultural, and military domination by the latter.

Controlled by, and shaped in the image of, the Persian ruling classes,

this unitary political system has deliberately discounted the ethno-

linguistic diversity of the state under the guise of religious homogene

ity by portraying all Iranians as constituting a single nation referred

to as Millat-e Iran. But both in practice and theory as embodied in the

previous and present Iranian constitutions, the concept of Millat-e Iran

is a clear manifestation of Persian nationalism, which is— in turn—

equated with, and propagated as, state nationalism. This is best evi

dent from the fact that both the constitution of 1906 and the present

one, adopted in 1979, imposed Farsi and Shi*ism, two major manifesta

tions of Persian nationalism, as the only recognized state language and

religion, respectively. And, of course, no school of thought in Islam

has ever favored or sanctioned one language or culture over others.

Accordingly, the Persian-dominated governments have turned their

state-building strategies into a "Persianization" campaign aimed at

socio-cultural assimilation and absorption of subordinate nationalities

into the Persian-dominated state structure, culture, and society. As a

result, the non-Persian nationalities have not been accorded constitu

tional recognition and protection, thus denied administrative and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 255

cultural self-rule, let alone proportional representation in the central

government. All decisions with respect to these nationalities were, and

are, made in Tehran and carried out through provincial bureaucracies

dominated overwhelmingly by the Persians. For instance, in the case of

Baluchistan, no Baluch ever occupied a decision-making position in

his/her province throughout the Pahlavi period, while the number of

Baluchis in the provincial bureaucracy hardly exceeded more than 5-10

percent of the total civil service. This situation has hardly changed

under the present regime. Similarly, the literary and official use of

non-Persian languages was, and still is, strictly prohibited even in

their respective provinces, while no cultural institutions or activities

are tolerated among them either. Under the Pahlavis, some champions of

Persian nationalism, like Dr. Afshar, even went to the extent of calling

for the eradication of linguistic diversity in Iran by uprooting the

non-Persian-speaking nationalities from their homelands and scattering

them in other parts of the country.1 As observed by Richard Cottam,

even liberal-minded "Iranians," meaning here Persians, have favored

banning publications in non-Persian languages.^

Obviously, the above-outlined system of domination has had some

severe impact not only on the subordinate nationalities, which are a

slight majority of Iran's population, but also on the evolution of the

state structure as a whole. Politically, by denying these national

groups self-rule, as well as proportional representation in the central

1-Iraj Afshar, "The Problem of Nationalism and the Unity of Iran," Ayandeh (Spring 1927):566-67.

^Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 32.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 256

government, the system has concentrated all the political power in the

hands of the ruling classes of the dominant natinality, or in fact, a

dominant minority, thus inevitably giving rise to undemocratic or

oppressive regimes such as the previous monarchial or the present

clerical dictatorships. This monopoly over political power, in turn,

has enabled the ruling nationality to utilize the immense state

resources for superimposing its lingo-cultural hegemony over the subor

dinate nationalities and to developed economically the Persian-inhabited

central plateau, where the overwhelming number of urban centers, indus

trial complexes, and educational institutions are located. And, of

course, in the absence of participation by the non-Persian nationalities

in the state's decision-making process, they were unable to demand com

parable socio-economic modernization for their respective homelands.

Hence, the large economic gap between the Persian and non-Persian

regions has made Iran a prime example of uneven development in the Third

World.

The pattern of domination by the dominant nationality over the

subordinate nationalities in Iran clearly corresponds to what is

described as internal colonialism as contrasted with the classical form

of colonialism. Robert Blauner has identified five "basic components of

colonialization process,” whether classical or internal, as follows:

(1) the forced entry of colonizers into colonies; (2) their economic

domination over the colonized, as reflected in a separation of labor

status (dual labor market) between the two sides; (3) the colonizers

hold politico-legal and governmental control over the colonized; (4) the

cultural oppression of the latter by the former; and (5) form of racial

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 257

superiority is also employed by colonizers.-* According to Blauner and

Liu, the most striking difference between classical and internal coloni

alism is that, in the case of the former, the colony is geographically

separated from the mother country, while in the latter case it is incor

porated within the boundaries of the mother country. A second differ

ence relates to the population ratio in the two instances: in the

classicas case the colonizers are usually a very small minority in rela

tion to the colonized, while in an internal colonial situation, they are

likely to constitute a majority. A third difference added by Liu is

that "the classical colonial model considers the colonized legally sub

ordinate, while the internal colonial model considers them legally

equal.

Consequently, it is not surprising to see that as classical

colonialism provoked the early Third World nationalism, so has internal

colonialism given rise to the nationalism of subordinate nationalities.

In other words, the nationalist movements of the subordinate nationali

ties are an antithesis to the oppressive nationalism of the dominant

nationalities in the multi-national developing states as much as early

nationalism in Third World colonies was to European colonialism, which

was also a manifestation of expansionist nationalism of Western states.

Not only that, but also the impact of internal colonialism on the subor

dinate nationalities has not been less, if not more, severe than that of

^Robert Blauner, Racial Oppression in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 83-84.

^John Liu, "Towards an Understanding of the Internal Colonial Model," in Counterpoint: Perspectives on Asian Americans, ed. Emma Gee (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 164-66.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 258

classical colonialism upon the colonies. Referring to internal coloni

alism within the multi-national Third World states as "poor peoples'

colonialism," Ismet Sheriff Vanly has described its effects upon subor

dinate nationalities, such as Kurds, as follows:

Within the artificial frontiers inherited from imperialism, many Third World states practice a "poor peoples' colonialism." It is directed against often sizeable minorities, and is both more fero cious and more harmful than the classical type. The effects of economic exploitation are aggravated by an almost total absence of local development and by a level of national oppression fueled by chauvanism and unrestrained by the democratic traditions which in the past usually limited the more extreme form of injustice under the old colonialism.^

Moreover, our case also demonstrates that the nationalism of

subordinate nationalities is ironically similar to the early anti-

colonial nationalism of the Third World peoples, both in its manifesta

tions and characteristics, as well as in its goals. Like the latter,

the former is also a function of the struggle of those nationalities

against external domination and toward political, economic, and cultural

self-rule. Similarly, it embodies the yearnings of those nationalities

for strengthening the feelings of national community among their

peoples, promoting awareness of their historical pasts, fostering their

national prides, and stimulating the development of their cultures and

languages. In short, it signals the appearance of natinal awakening

among those peoples and represents their longing for freedom and recov

ering their national dignities.

The outcome of the ongoing clash between the nationalism of

subordinate nationalities and that of the dominant ones over the issue

^Ismet Sheriff Vanly, "Kurdistan in Iraq," in People without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, ed. Gerard Chaliand (London: Zed Press, 1980), pp. 204-5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 259

of self-rule is far from certain in the case of multi-national develop

ing states like Iran. But it has been generally observed that, the more

oppressive a state system toward its nationalities, the more ardent

will become the desire for separation among them and vice-versa, an

observation also confirmed by this case study. For instance, the

oppressive state system in Pakistan was the major cause of its disinte

gration and secession of Bangladesh, as much as it has been responsible

for the four successive armed clashes between the Pakistani central

government and the Baluch in the last thirty years, including the brutal

1973-77 conflict described in Chapter VII. Such is the case also with

the continuing clashes between the Iranian government and the Baluch; or

between Iran, Iraq, and Turkey and their respective Kurds. By contrast,

in multi-national states in which the right to self-rule of their vari

ous nationalities is recognized, violent conflicts such as the above are

very rare. That is the case both in Western democracies such as Canada

and socialist countries like the Soviet Union. In such cases, the state

has accorded its nationalities self-rule, while at the same time keeping

its own primacy, hence, demonstrating how the right to self-

determination can be exercised by various nationalities within multi

national states without leading necessarily to disintegration.

On a macro-historical level, the nationalist movements of the

subordinate nationalities represent the latest manifestation of the

universal phenomenon of nationalism in our world. These movements

embody the underlying demand of nationalism that is self-determination

of each nation in its homeland, an ideal captured originally in the con

cept of nation-state, meaning that each nation is entitled to its own

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 260

state. Ever since its appearance in Western Europe in the aftermath of

the French Revolution, nationalism has been an ongoing historical

process affecting various nations, big or small, at different times, as

reflected in its spread in Eastern Europe after World War I, then bring

ing independence to the Afro-Asian colonies after World War II, and

currently engulfing the remaining natinalities whose aspirations for

self-rule have not materialized as yet. In this respect, the demands of

natinalism still stand on the agenda of nations denied self-rule.

Ideally and theoretically, should nationalism as a historical process

take its full course until reaching its logical conclusion, then it is

supposed to end imperialism and domination of one nation by another.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the generalizations made

in this concluding chapter about the phenomenon of nationalism as it

relates to ethnic nationalities are primarily based on our examination

of Middle Eastern cases. Although these formulas are broad enough to be

applied to other ethnic nations elsewhere, they need further testing

before any definitive conclusion can be drawn with respect to the

phenomenon under investigation. To that end, it is suggested that more

ethnic cases should be studied in all geographic areas of the Third

World and then the results of these researches should be compared and

contrasted with the findings of studies done on the ethnic cases in the

developed states such as the Soviet Union, Canada, Yugoslavia, and so

on. Only then can we realistically hope to succeed in our attempts to

develop a comprehensive theory capable of explaining the universal

phenomenon of nationalism as it manifests itself everywhere. And so

this study is concluded by echoing the words of Alfred Cobban to guide

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 261

us in our efforts toward a better understanding of the phenomenon of

nationalism:

The demands of nationalism, therefore, still stand on the agenda of world politics. We may hail the nation-state as the supreme politi cal achievement of Western civilization, or we may regard national ism as a disease which if not taken in time will destroy civilized life— and it is not uncommon for both views to be held at once— but neither approval nor disapproval is very relevant to something that may be regarded, at least for our time, as a natural force, a mighty torrent which is equally capable of serving the purposes of man or destroying him. Our duty is not to shut our eyes to it, and not to pretend that it does not have the consequences which it does have. These consequences fall primarily into two groups, according to whether we look at the demand for national self-determination from the point of view of individual states or of international rela tions. Internally, nationalism has passed from the stage of state- making to that of state-breaking. The newer nation-states of Asia and Africa have hardly even had the time to be born before repro ducing the situation, which it used to be thought was peculiar to imperial regimes, of two or more nations warring in the bosom of a single state.6

^Cobban, p. 17.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Public Documents

Great Eritain. Admiralty. Naval Intelligence Division. Persia. Geographical Handbook Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press for H.M. Stationery Office, 1945.

India Foreign and Political Department. Baluchistan through the Ages. (Selection from Goverment Documents.) 2 vols. Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1979.

India. Foreign and Political Department. A Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads Relating to India and Neighboring Countries. 5th ed. Compiled by C. W. Atchison. Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1933.

India. Foreign and Political Department. Correspondence on the Progress of Persia in Mekran and Western Baluchistan, from A.D. 1860 to A.D. 1869 Inclusive. Bombay: Bombay Secretariat Records, 1869.

India. Foreign and Political Department. List of Leading Personages in Baluchistan. Calcutta: Government of India Central Publication Branch, 1937.

India. Foreign and Political Department. Official History of Mekran Telegraph from Karachi to Jask. By J. A. Saldanha. Calcutta: Superintendent of Goverment Printing, 1895.

India. Foreign and Political Department. Precis of the Affairs of the Persian Coast and Islands, 1854-1905. By J. A. Saldanha. Simla: Government of India Central Publication, 1906.

India. Foreign and Political Department. Precis of International Rivalry and British Policy in the Persian Gulf, 1872-1905. By J. A. Saldanha. Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1906.

India. Foreign and Political Department. Precis of Mekran Affairs. By J. A. Saldanha. Calcullta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1905.

262

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 263

India Foreign and Political Department. Precis on Slave trade on the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf, 1873-1905. By J. A. Saldanha. Simla: Government of India Central Publication Branch, 1906.

India Indian Army Intelligence Branch. Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India. Selection from Government Documents. Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1979.

India. Indian Army Intelligence Branch. Military Report on Persia. Vol. 4, Part 1: Persian Baluchistan. Simla: Government Central Press, 1923.

India. Persian Gulf Political Residency. Administrative Report on the Persian Gulf Political Residency and Muscat Political Agency. Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1873.

Iran. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Translated by Hamid Algar. Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980.

Iran. Geography Department of the Army Staff. Farhang-e Jographiay-ie Iran: Ustan Kerman Va Makran [The Geographic Handbook or Iran: Province of Kerman and Baluchistan]. Tehran: Chapkhana-ie Artesh, 1953.

Iran. Ministry of Islanic Guidance. The Dawn of the Islamic Revolution. Tehran: Echo of Islam, 1982.

Iran. Province of Seistan and Baluchistan. Department of Agriculture. Joghrafhiay-e Igtesadi Va Keshavarzi Seistan Va Baluchistan [Economic and Agricultural Geography of Seistan and Baluchistan]. Zahidan: Provincial Department of Agriculture, 1351 A.H. (1972-73).

Iran. Province of Seistan and Baluchistan. Department of Education. Nati.ja-i Amar Giri Edara-i Koll-e Amouzesh Va Parvaresh Ustan Seistan Va Baluchistan Par Saale Tahsili 2536-2537 [The Results of Statistics Done by the Department of Education, Province of Seistan and Baluchistan, in the Educational Year 1977-78]. Zahidan: Department of Education, 1978.

Iran. Province of Seistan and Baluchistan. Department of Finance. Gozaresh Egtesadi Seistan Va Baluchistan Par Se Mahay-e Awale Saale 1358 [The Economic Report of Seistan and Baluchistan Province for the First Three Months of the Year 1358 (1979)]. Zahidan: Provincial Finance Department, 1979.

Iran. Province of Seistan and Baluchistan. Department of National Guidance. Az Nimrooz va Taftan [From Seistan and Baluchistan], Zahidan: D.N.G., 1359 A.H. (1980-81).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 264

Iran. Province of Seistan and Baluchistan. Department of National Guidance. Shonasale-e Mokhtasar Ustan Seistan Va Baluchistan [A Brief Description of the Province of Seistan and Baluchistan[. Zahidan: D.N.G., 1358 A.H. (1978-80).

Iran. Province of Seistan and Baluchistan. Planning and Budget Organ ization, Center for Statistics. Amarnama-i Ustan Seistan Va Baluchistan [Statistics of the Province of Seistan and Baluchistan]. Tehran: Planning and Budget Organization, 1974.

Iran. Province of Seistan and Baluchistan. Planning Office. Seistan Va Baluchistan: Mutala-at Bar Nameh Tausa-i Igtesadi Va Ijtema-i [Seistan and Baluchistan: Studies in Economic and Social Development]. Zahidan: Planning Office of Seistan and Baluchistan, 1976.

Pakistan. Board of Economic Inquiry. An Economic Analysis of the Annual Budgets of the Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier and Baluchistan. Lahore: Board of Economic Inquiry, 1972.

Pakistan. Directorate of Education. Baluchistan Educational Statistics Showing Enrollment in the Eucational Institutions in Baluchistan and Staff Working Therein on 30th September 1975. Quetta: Directorate of Education, 1976.

Pakistan. Department of Finance. Baluchistan, White Paper on the Budget, 1973-74. Quetta: Department of Finance, 1973.

Pakistan. Directorate of Information. Baluchistan. Quetta: Directorate of Information, 1970.

Pakistan. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Achievements of the People's Government, 1972-76: Baluchistan. Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1976.

Pakistan. New Face of Baluchistan. Islamabad: Pakistan Publication, 1979.

Pakistan. Report of the Committee on Constitutional and Administrative Reforms in Baluchistan. Karachi: n.p., 1951.

Pakistan. Report on the Progress Achieved in Baluchistan, 1972 to 1975. Lahore, n.p. 1976.

Pakistan. White Paper on Baluchistan. Islamabad, Government of Pakistan, 1974.

United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Access to Oil - The U.S. Relationship with Saudi Arabia and Iran. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 265

United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Military Sales to Iran. 94th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, D.C.: 1976.

United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Security Interest and Politics in Southwest Asia. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981.

United States. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1943. Diplomatic Papers, vol. 4: The Near East and Africa. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965.

United States. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1944. Diplomatic Papers, vol. 5: The Near East, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965.

Books, Biographies, and Memories

Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch. Baluch Qaum ke Nam Khan-e Baluch Ka Paigham [Message from the Khan of the Baluch to the Baluch Nation]. Karachi: Litho Art Press, 1972.

______. Inside Baluchistan: A Political Autobiography of His Highness Baiglar Baigi: Khah-e-Azam. Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1975.

______. Mukhtasar Tarikh-e Qaum Baluch Va Khawaneen-e Baluch [Short History of the Baluch Nation and the Baluch Rulers]. Quetta: Islamiyya Press, 1970.

Alla Bakhsh, Malik. Baluch Qaum Ke Tarikh Ke Chaud Parisham Dafter Auraq [A Few Pages from the Official Records of the History of the Baluch Nation], Quetta: Islamiyya Press, 1970.

Echo of Iran. Iran Almanac and Book of Facts. Tehran: Echo of Iran, 1977.

Goldsmid, Frederic J. Central Asia and Its Question. London: Edward Stanford, 1873. 1

______, ed. Eastern Persia, an Account of the Journeys of the Persian Boundary Commission. 2 vols. London: MacMillan & Co., 1876.

Italconsult. Reports on Baluchistan. Rome: Italconsult, 1959.

Jahanbani, Amanullah. Amaliyyat-a Qushoon Par Baluchistan [The Cam paigns of the Armed Forces in Baluchistan]. Tehran: Capkhanch Majlis, 1957.

. Sargosasht-e Baluchistan Va Marz Hai-e Aan [The History of Baluchistan and Its Boundaries]. Tehran: n.p., 1959.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 266

Kayhan Research Associates. Iran Year Book, 1977. Tehran: Kayhan, 1977.

Razra Ara, Hossen Ali. Joghraphiay-e Nezaml Shahrestan Haye Marzi [Military Geography of the Border Districts]. Tehran: Chapkhaneh Sherkat-e Matkooat, 1940.

Thornton, Thomas H. Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman. Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1977.

Tucker, Alexander, L. P. Sir Robert G. Sandeman, K.C.S.I., Peaceful Conquerer of Baluchistan. Lahore: Traiq Publishing House, 1979.

Secondary Sources

Books

Abdulla. The Historical Background of Pakistan and Its People. Karachi: Tanzeem Publishers, 1973.

Adamiyyat, Faridoon. Amir Kabir va Iran. Tehran, 1965.

Ahmad, Feroz. Focus on Baluchistan and Pushtoon Question. Lahore: People's Publication House, 1975.

Al-Hakkami, Ma'n Shana al-Ajll. Baluchistan Diyar al-Arab [Baluchistan: Land of Arabs]. Bahrain: Privately published, 1979.

Ali, Sheikh Sadiq Ali Sher. A Short Sketch, Historical and Traditional, of the Musalman Races Found in Sind, Baluchistan and Afghani stan, Their Geneological Subdivisions and Sents Together with an Ethnological and Ethnographical Account. Karachi: n.p., 1901.

Aga Khan, Muhammad Hasan Huseini Mahallati Hasan Ali Shah. Ebrat Afza. Edited by Husein Kuli Kerraani. Tehran: n.p., 1964.

Arfa, Hassan. Under Five Shahs. London: John Murray, 1964.

Arrian. The Campaigns of Alexander. Translated by Aubrey de Selincourt. New York: Penguin Classics, 1971.

Askari, Naser. Moghdama-i Bar Shenakht Ustan Sistan va Baluchistan [An Introduction to the Recognition of Sistan and Baluchistan], Tehran: Intesharate-e Doniay-e Danesh, 1957.

Aziz, K. K. Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-1958. Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976.

Bahar, Malek-u-Shoara. Tarikh Seistan. Tehran: Intesharat Khavar, 1314 A.H.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 267

Baloch, Mir Khua Bakhsh Bijarani Marri. Searchlights on Baloch and Balochistan. Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1974.

______. The Baluchis through the Centuries: History versus Legend. Quetta: n.p., 1964.

Baluc, Muhammad Husain Anga. Inqilabi Baluch Tarikh [The Ancient History of the Baluch Nation, 2600 B.C. to 1956 A.D.]. Quetta: Gosha-e Adab, 1974.

Baluch, Akhardad. Siasat Par Baluchistan [Politics in Baluchistan]. Privately publishes, 1361 A.H.

Baluch, Mohammed Akbar. Baluch Qaum Afni Tarikh ke Aineh men [The Baluch Nation and Its History]. Quetta: Bolan Book Corp., 1975.

Baluch, Muhammad Sardar Khan. The Great Baluch: Life and TimeB of Ameer Chakar Rind, 1454-1551 A.D. Quetta: Baluchi Academy, 1965.

______. History of the Baluch Race and Baluchistan. Karachi: Process, Pakistan, 1958.

. The Literary history of Baluchs. Quetta: Baluch Academy, 1977.

______. Pelang va Baluch [Baluchi]. Quetta: Baluchi Academy, 1970.

Barker, N. A. R., and Mengal, Agil Khan. A Course in Baluchi. 2 vols. Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1969.

Bellew, Henry Walter. From the Indus to the Tigris: A Narrative of a Journey through the Countries of Baluchistan, and Afghanistan. Karachi: Royal Book CO., 1976.

Billimoria, N. M. Bibliography of Publications Relating to Sind and Baluchistan. Lahore: S. H. Mubarak Ali, 1977.

Blauner, Robert. Racial Oppression in America. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

Borghaie, Mohammad. Nezari be Baluchistan [Baluchistan in a Glance]. Tehran: Itesharat-e Sapeed, 1973-74.

Bradsher, H. S. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1983.

Bray, D. Ethographic Survey of Baluchistan. 2 vols. Bombay: n.p., 1913.

Bruce, Richard Isaac. The Forward Policy and Its Results. London: n.p., 1900.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Burki, Shahid Javed. Pakistan under Bhutto. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980.

Burrell, Robert Michael. Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Tensions and Dilemmas. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1974.

Busch, B. C. Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914. Berkeley: Uni versity of California Press, 1967.

Cobban, Alfred. The Nation State and National Self-Determination. New York: THomas Y. Crowell Co., 1970.

Coffield, Conrad. The Princely India I Know: From Reading to Mountbatten. India: Indo-British Historical Society, 1975.

Cottam, Richard. Nationalism in Iran. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979.

Claude, Ines L. National Minorities. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955.

Curzon, G. N. Persia and the Persian Question. 2 vols. London: Frank Cass & Co., 1966.

Dames, M. L. The Baloch Race: A Historical and Ethnological Sketch. London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1904.

______. Popular Poetry of the Baloches. 2 vols. London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1907.

Deutsch, Karl W. Nationalism and Social Communication. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966.

De Windt, H. A Ride to India across Persia and Baluchistan. London: n.p., 1891.

Dickson, W. E. R. East Persia a Backwater of the Great War. 1924.

Dupree, Louis. Afghanistan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Dyer, R. E. H. The Raiders of Sarhad. London: Witherly, 1921.

Elfenbein, J. H. The Baluchi Language. London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1966.

Embree, Ainslie T. Pakistan's Western Borderlands: The Transformation of a Political Order. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1977.

Emerson, Rupert. Fro~~ Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 269

English, Paul W. City and Village in Iran. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966.

Faridi, Nur Ahmad Khan. Baluch Qoum or Oski Tarikh [History of the Baluch Nation]. Pakistan: Wasr Adab, 1968.

Farmanfarma, Firooz Mirza. Safarnameh-i Kerman va Baluchistan [Notes on a Journey to Kerman and Baluchistan]. Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami Ketaab Haye Iran, 1963.

______, ed. Tarikh Kerman [History of Kerman]. Tehran, n.p., 1961.

Feldman, Herbert. Revolution in Pakistan. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Ferrier, J. P. Caravan Journeys and Wandering in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkistan and Beloochistan, etc. London: n.p. 1857.

Firdausi. Shah Name. Translated by Arthur G. Warner and Edmund Warner. London: Kegan Paul, Trench Turner & Co., n.d.

Firooz, Ahmad. Focue on Baluchistan and the Pashtoon Question. Lahore: People's Publication House, 1975.

Floyer, Ernest Aycoghe. Unexplored Baluchistan. Quetta: Gosa-e Adab, 1977.

Fraser, James Baillie. Historical and Descriptive Accounts of Persia Including a Description of Afghanistan and Baloochistan. New York: Bradley Co., 1833.

Frye, Richard N., ed. The Cambridge History of Iran. 5 vols. London: Cambridge University Press, 1968-1983.

Gankovsky, Yu. v. The Peoples of Pakistan, an Ethnic History. Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1971.

Greaghcorn, Terence. The Indian Political Service: A Study in Indirect Rule. London: Chatto & W. Indus, 1971.

Greaves, Rose L. Persia and Defense of India: 1884-1892. London: Athlone Press, 1959.

Hayes, Carlton H. Nationalism: A Religion. New York: McMillan, 1960.

Harrison, Selig S. In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations. New York: Carnegie Endowment for Inter national Peace, 1981.

Hattu Rum. Tarikh Baluchistan [History of Baluchistan], Quetta: Baluch Academy, 1973.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 270

Holdich, Thomas Hungerford. The Gates of India. Quetta: Gosha-e Adab, 1977.

Hughes, Albert Williams. The Country of Baluchistan. Quetta: Gosh-e Adab, 1977.

Ingram, Edward. The Beginning of the Great Game in Asia, 1828-1834. Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1979.

Jahanbani, Amanullah. Sar Gozasht Baluchistan va Marze Haye An [Baluchistan and Its Boundaries]. Tehran: n.p., 1959.

Kalb, Marvin, and Kalb, Bernard. Kissinger. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1974.

Kazamyya, Islam. Jaie Pale Iskandar va Safare Par Baluchistan [On the Footsteps of Alexander in a Journey in Baluchistan], Tehran: Javidan Publications, 1977-78.

Kaihani, M. Joghrafia-i Muffasal-e-Iran [A Comprehensive Geography of Iran]. 3 vols. Tehran: Ibn-e Sina Publication, 1931.

Keddie, Nikki R. Roots of Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.

Khan, Delawar. Baluchistan. Islamabad: English Book House, 1977.

Kohn, Hans. Nationalism: Its Meaning and History. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1955.

Kwitny, Jonathan. Endless Enemies. New York: Congdon & Weed, 1984.

Lambton, Ann K. S. The Persian Land Reform. London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Lenin, V. I. Three Articles on the National Question. Chicago: Liberator Press, n.d.

Le Strange, G. The Lands of Eastern Caliphate. Cambridge: The Univer sity Press, 1905.

Lorrimer, J. G. Gazeteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman andCentral Arabia. 2 vols. Calcutta: n.p., 1908.

McCagg, William 0., Jr., and Silver, Briden D., eds. Soviet Aslan Ethnic Frontiers. New York: Pergamon, 1979.

Macartney, C. A. National States and National Minorities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934.

Macgregor, C. M. Wanderings in Baluchistan. London: n.p., 1882.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 271

Mahdavian, Iraj. Mughadama-ie Bar Jamea Shenasy Mardom Baluchistan [An Introduction to the Sociology of the People of Baluchistan], Tehran: Intesharat-e Pivand, 1973-74.

Mahmud, Mahmud. Tarikh-e Ravabete Iran va Englis [History of Diplomatic Relations between Iran and England]. 8 vols. Tehran: n.p., 1966.

Masson, Charles. Narrative of Various Journeys in Baluchistan and Afghanistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1974-77.

Mathison, Sylvia A. The Tigers of Baluchistan. London: Barbers, 1967.

Mokhber, Ali. Marz Hai-e Iran [The Boundaries of Iran]. Tehran: Kagham Newspaper Publications, 1945.

Nafisi, S., ed. Tarikh Baihaqi [Baihaqui's History]. 3 vols. Tehran: n.p., 1953.

Napier. Collection of Journals and Reports on Special Duty in Persia. London: n.p., 1874.

Naseh, Zabihullah. Baluchistan. Tehran: Intesharate--e Ibn Sina, 1965.

Nasir, Gul Khan. Tarikh-i Baluchistan [History of Baluchistan]. Quetta: Qallat Publishers, 1979.

Oliver, Edward Emerson. A cross the Border or Pathan and Biloch. Lahore: Al-Biruni, 1977.

Panahiyan, Mahmud. Farhange Joghraphiyee Melli Baluchistan Iran [Cul ture and Geography of the Baluch Nation in Iran], Baghdad: n.p., 1971.

Pottinger, Henry. Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde. Karachi: Indus Publications, 1976.

Ramazani, Rouhollah K. Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1975.

Raverty, Henry George. Notes on Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Quetta: Gosh-e Adab, 1976.

Rawlinson, George. The Five Great Monarchies of the Ancient Eastern World. 3 vols. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1862.

Razm-Ara, Ali. Joghraphiy-e-Nezami Baluchistan Englis [Military Geography of British Baluchistan]. Tehran: n.p., n.d.

. Joghraphiy-e-Nezami Iran [Military Georgraphy of Iran]. Tehran: n.p., 1940.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 272

Riahi, Ali. Zaar va Bad va Baluch [. . . Wind and Baluch[. Tehran: Intesharate-e Tuhoory, 1977.

Ross, E. C. Report on the Coast of Mekran from Cape Jask to Gwadur. 1867.

Rubin, Barry. Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran. New York: Penguin Books, 1981.

Rubinstein, Alvin Z. Soviet Policy toward Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. New York: Praeger 1982.

Sabir, Abdur Rahim. Baluchistan Ki Vadiyun men [In the Valleys of Baluchistan]. Karachi: Baluchi Adabi Board, 1982.

Said, Abdul, and Simmons, Luis, eds. Ethnicity in an International Context. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1976.

Sani-u Daula. Merat-Al-Beldan [The Mirror of Countries]. Tehran: n.p., 1294 A.H.

Sasani, Khan Malek. Past Penhan Siasat-e-Englis Par Iran [The Invisible Hand of British Policy in Iran]. Tehran: Hedayat, 1973.

Satish, Kumar. The New Pakistan. New Pelhi: Vikar, 1978.

Sepehr, Mirza Muhammad Taqi Lisan al Mulk. Nasekh al Tawarikh, Paureh-i Kamel tarikh-i Qajarieh [A Complete History of the Qajar Pynasty]. Edited by Jahangir Qaem-Maqami. Tehran: Amir Kabir Pub., 1956-57.

Shams Uzzuha. Hamara Baluchistan [Our Baluchistan]. Quetta: Bolam Books, 1972.

Stalin, J. Marxism and the national Colonial Question. San Francisco: Proletarian Publishers, 1975.

Sykes, Percy M. Ten Thousand Miles in Persia or Eight Years in Iran. London: Murray, 1902.

______. A History of Persia. 2 vols. 3rd ed. London: MacMillan & Co., 1930.

Swidler, Warren W. Technology and Social Changes in Baluchistan, West Pakistan. New York: n.p., 1968.

Tate, George Passman. The Frontiers of Baluchistan. Lahore: East and West Publishing Co., 1976.

Toynbee, Arnold T. Between Oxus and Jumna. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.

Valian, Abdul Azim. Pakistan. Tehran: Zovvar, 1960.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 273

Weekes, R., and Pastner, S. Muslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic Survey. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978.

Wilcoy, Ayress. Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.

Wirsing, Robert G. The Baluchis and Pathans. London: Minority Rights Group, 1981.

Yate, C. E. Baluchistan. London: Central Aslan Society, 1906.

Zabih, Sepehr. The Communist Movement in Iran. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.

Ziring, Lawrence. Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan. New York: Praeger, 1981.

______. The Subcontinent in World Politics. New York: Praeger, 1978.

Articles

Abdun, Nabee, Hadji. "Notes Taken on a Tour through Parts of Baluchi stan. Journal of Asiatic Studies 14, no. 2 (1844).

Abidi, A. H. H. "Irano-Afghan Dispute over the Helmand Waters." Inter national Studies 16 (July-September 1977):370-75.

Afshar, Iraj. "Baluch Ha Va Jang Ba Iskandar" [The Baluch and the War with Alexander the Great]. Ittelaat Haftagy, no. 855 (1956-57).

. "The Problem of Nationalism and the Unity of Iran." Ayandeh (Spring 1927):566-67.

Afzal Kermani, Sheikh Mahraood. "Joghraphia-i-Baluchistan" [Geography of Baluchistan]. Majalla Yadgar, nos. 8-9, pp. 85-113.

Ahmad, Kazi Suad. "Baluchistan." Encyclopedia Brittanica (1957 ed.), 3:7ff.

Ames, M. L. "Baluchistan." Hastings Encyclopedia (1909 ed.), 2:355-41.

Anjom Rooz, Abbas. "Baluch va Baluchistan." Iran Novin (1971).

Arami, Sharif. "Iran: From the Shah's Dictatorship to Khomani's Dema gogic Theocracy." Dissent (Winter 1980).

Aref, M. (pseud.) "Baluchistan." Elm va Jamea, nos. 23, 24, 25 (Wash ington, D.C., 1983).

Auliaee, Ehtesham. "Auza-i Ijteraaei vh Iqutesadi va Tarikhcha Baluchistan." Gomrok, no. 33, series 2 (1956):4-9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 274

______. "Auza-i Ijtemaei va Iqtesadi Baluchistan" [Socio-economic Conditions of Baluchistan]. Tehran Economist, no. 221 (1956): 12-25.

Baluch, Inayatullah. "The Emergence of Baluchi Nationalism: 1931-47." Pakistan Progressive, December 1980.

"Afghanistan-Pashtunistan-Baluchistan." Aussen Politik, no. 3 (1980).

______. "Tribal System in Baluchistan: Its Origin and Transformation into a Cruel aud Reactionary System." Politics of Pakistan 4 (April 1980).

Baluch, Karim. "The Democratic Struggle in Baluchistan." Sivasat, no. 3 (1975).

Baluchi (pseud.). "The Mekran Expedition." United Service Magazine (1902).

Barth, F. "Competition and Symbiosis in N.E. Baluchistan." Folk 6 (1969):15-22.

______. "Ethnic Processes on Pathan Baluch Boundary." In Indo- Iranica. Edited by G. Renard. Wreshaden: Harrassowitz, 1964.

Bennigsen, A. "The Baluc of U.S.S.R." Encyclopaedia of Islam (1960 ed.), 1:1005.

Bolookbashi, Ali Akbar. "Chah Bahar va Baluch Haye Ann" [Chah Bahar and Its Baluchis]. Majalla-l Daneshkada-i Adabyyat va Uloom Ensani (1969).

Cottam, Richard W. "Human Rights in Iran under the Shah." Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 12 (1980):122-23.

Dastarac, Alexander, and Dersen, Robert. "Baluchistan: The Forgotten War." Le Monde Diplomatique, August 1976.

Dil, Shaheen, F. "The Cabal in Kabul: Great Power Interaction in Afghanistan." American Political Science Review (June 1977).

Dupree, Louis. "Toward Representative Government in Afghanistan, Part I: The First Five Steps." AUFS Reports (Asia) (1978):7—9.

Ehteshami, Abdul-hasan. "Baluchistan." Ittilaat Mahaneh 3, pp. 35-37.

Elfenbein, J. H. "Baluchi." Encyclopedia of Islam (1960 ed), 1:1006.

Entessar, Nadar. "Baluch Nationalism." Asian Affairs, An American Review (November-December 1979).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 275

Floyer, E. A. "Journal of a Route from Jask to Bampur, 1876." Journal of the Royal Geographic Society 45 (1977).

Foot, Rosemary. "The Changing Patterns of Afghanistan's Relations with Its Neighbours." Asian Affairs 11 (February 1980).

Frye, R. N. "Baluchistan: A Geography and History." Encycopaedia of Islam (1960 ed.), 1:1005.

______. "Notes on a Trip to Biyabanan, Sistan, and Baluchistan in the Winter 1951-52." Indo-Iranica (1954).

"Remarks on Baluchi History." Central Asiatic Journal 6 (1961):44-50.

Gabriel, A. "The Southern Lut and Iranian Baluchistan." Geographic Journal 42 (1938):193-210.

Gershvitch, I. "Travels in Bashkardia." R.C.A.S. 384 (1959):213-25.

Goldsmid, F. J. "Diary of Proceedings of the Mission into Mekran, etc." Journal of the Royal Geographic Society 33 (1863).

______. "Notes on Eastern Persia and Western Baluchistan." Journal of the Royal Geographic Society 37 (1867):269-98.

Grant, N.P. "Journal of a Route through the Western Parts of Makran." J.R.A.S. 5 (1839).

Hamadani, N. "Baluchistan." Majalla-i Iran Abad 2 (1960).

Hamilton, Angus. "The Anglo-Russian Agreement: The Question of Persia." Fortnightly Review, November 1907.

Harrison, J. V. "Coastal Makran." Geographic Journal 47 (1941):1-18.

. "The Jazmurian Depression." Geographic Journal 49 (1943):206-25.

Harrison, Selig S. "The Baluch Nationalism and Superpower Rivalry." International Security 5 (Winter 1980-81):152-83.

» "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit through Finalnd." Foreign Policy 41 (1980-81):163-67.

"Nightmare in Baluchistan." Foreign Policy 32 (Fall 1978):136-60.

Holdich, T. H. "The Arabs of Our Indian Frontiers." Journal of the Anthropological Institute 29 (1899).

. "The Perso-Baluch Boundary." Geographic Journal 9 (April 1897):416—22.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 276

Holland, Henry T. "A Meeting with Dost Mohammed." Asiatic Review 30 (1936):694 ff.

Holland, N. "35 Years in Baluchistan." Asciatic Review 30 (1936):689.

Hottlnger, A* "Iran and Its Neighbors." Swiss Review of World Affairs, November 1973.

Houtun-Schindler, A. "Notes on Persian Baluchistan." J.R.A.S., New Series (1876-7).

Jafari, Ali Akbar. "Baluch va Baluchi." Ma.1alla-i Sokhan 14, no. 8 (1945).

Javaher Kalam, Ali. "Dadshah Ra Chegoona Donbal Mikonand va ou Ghegoona Migorizad" (How Is Dad Sha Pursued and How Is He Escaping]. Ittelaat Haftagy, no. 839 (1956).

______. "Dar Mokran Che Migozarad" [What Is Happening in MokranJ. Ittelaat Haftagy, no. 742 (1949-50).

______. "Sarnovesht Baluchistan" [The Baluchistan Questions]. Ittelaat Haftagy, no. 647 (1952-3).

______. "Shooreshha-i Baluchistan" [Rebellions of Baluchistan]. Ittelaat Haftagy, no. 110 (1956).

Keddie, Nikki R. "The Minorities Question in Iran.” In The Iran-Iraq War. Edited by S. Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983.

Liu, John. "Towards an Understanding of the Internal Colonial Model." In Counterpoint: Perspectives on Asian Americans. Edited by Emma Gee. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976).

Mockler, E. "On the Identification of Places on the Makran Coast, etc." J.R.A.S. 11, New Series (1897).

______. "On Ruins of Makran." J.R.A.S. 9 (1877).

______. "The Origins of the Baluch." Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (1895).

Modi, J. J. "The Country of Mekran - Its Past History." East and West (1904).

Mogenstiern, G. "Baluch Language." Encyclopaedia Britannica (1947 ed.).

Mokhber, Mohammad Ali. "Baluchistan." Yadigar 3 (1945):22—33.

Naby, Eden. "The Ethnic Factor in Soviet-Afghan Relations." Asian Survey 20 (March 1980).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 277

______. "The Iranian Frontier Nationalities: The Kurds, the Assyrians, the Baluchis, and the Turkmen." In Soviet Asian Ethnic Frontiers. Edited by W. 0. McCagg and B. D. Silver. New York: Pergamon Press, 1979.

Noorani, A. J. "Soviet Ambitions in South Asia." International Security (Winter 1979-80):31-59.

Pastner, Stephen L. "Lords of the Desert Border: Frontier Feudalism in Southern Baluchistan and Eastern Ethiopia." International Journal of Middle East Studies 10 (1979).

Pesaran, M. H. "Income Distribution and Its Major Determinants in Iran." Paper presented at Aspen-Persepolis Symposium, 15-19 September 1975, Persepolis.

Pipes, Richard. "Soviet Global Strategy." Commentary, April 1980, pp. 31-39.

Pishva, Zadeh. "Hakemiyyat Iran Bar Baluchistan" [Iran's Sovereignty over Baluchistan], Ittelaat Haftagy, no. 644 (1953).

______. "Inast Dad Shah Baluchistan" [This is Baluchistan's Dad Shah[. Ittelaat Haftagy, no. 843 (1957-57):9.

______. "Jang Sard Bar Sar Kharid Naft Qom va Baluchistan" [The Cold War over the Oil of Qom and Baluchistan[. Ittelaat Haftagy, no. 644 (1953).

Qureshi, S. M. M. "Pashtunistan: The Frontier Dispute between Afghani stan and Pakistan." Pacific Affairs 39 (Summer, Spring 1982):478-506.

Raikes, R. L. "The Ancient Cabarbands of Baluchistan." East and West 15 (1965):26-35.

Richardson, Michael. "Breaking the Territorial Ice." Far Eastern Economic Review 30 (July 1976):11.

Rcss, E. C. "Memorandum of Notes on Mekran: Together with Reports on a Visit to Kej and Routes through Mekran from Gwadur to Kurraohea." Trans Bombay Geographical Society 18 (1865-6).

RIPEH. "Baluchistan: Its Political Economy and History." RIPEH 4 (Spring 1980):68-93.

Sasani, Khan Malek. "Baluchistan." Ittilatt-1 Mahanah 1, 2, pp. 12-16.

______. "Safari Dar Baluchistan" [A Journey in Baluchistan]. Majalla-Em va Zindagy, no. 7, 8, 9 (1952).

Salzman, Philip C. "Adaptation and Political Organization in Iranian Baluchistan." Ethnology 10 (1971).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 278

______. "Continuity and Change in Baluchi Tribal Leadership.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 4 (1973).

______. "Islam and Authority in Tribal Iran: A Comparative Comment." Muslim World, no. 3 (1979):186-92.

______. "The Proto-State in Iranian Baluchistan." Origins of the State: The Anthropology of Political Evolution. Edited by R. Cohen and E. Service. Philadelphia: ISHI, 1978.

______. "Why Tribes Have Chiefs: A Case from Baluchistan." In The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan. Edited by Richard Tapper. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.

Skrine, C. P. "The Highlands of Persian Baluchistan." Geographic Journal 78 (1931):321-40.

Spooner, Brian. "Kuch u Baluch and Ichthyophad." Iran 2 (1964).

______. "Politics, Kinship, and Ecology in Southeast Persia." Ethnology 8 (1969).

______. "Religion and Society Today: An Anthropological Perspective." In Iran Faces the Seventies. Edited E. Yar-Shater. New York: Praeger, 1971.

Steuffer, Thomas. "The Economics of Nomadism in Iran." Middle East Journal 19 (1965):284-302.

Stein, A. "The Indo-Iranian Borderlands." Journal of the Royal Anthropology Institute 64 (1934):179-202.

. "On Alexander's Route into Gedrosia.” Geographic Journal 102 (1943)193-227.

Sulzberger, C. L. "Belief in Crude Reality." New York Times, 22 April, 1973.

Sykes, H. R. "Historical Notes on South East Persia." J.R.A.S. (1902):939-49.

______. "Our Recent Progress in Southern Persia and Its Possibili ties." Proceedings of Central Asian Society (March 1905).

______. "Some Notes on Journeys in Southern and Southeastern Persia." Journal of Manchester Geographical Society 21 (1905):1—12.

Sykes, P. M. "A Fifth Journey in Persia." Geographic Journal 28, (1906):424-54, 560-92.

"A Fourth Journey in Persia, 1897-1901.” Geographic Journal 19 (1902):121-72.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 279

______. "Recent Journeys in Persia." Geographic Journal 10 (1897).

Tahir-Kheli, Shirin. "The Foreign Policy of New Pakistan." Orbis 20 (Fall 1978).

Thompson, W. Scott. "The Persian Gulf and the Correlation of Forces." International Security 7 (Summer 1982).

Towghi, Malik M. "The Emergence of Modern Baluch Political Movement: 1920-1948." Unpublished ms, Michigan, 1979.

Valenta, Kiri. "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Difficulty of Knwoing Where To Stop." Orbis 24 (Summer 1980):201-18.

Vanly, Ismet Sheriff. "Kurdistan in Iraq." In People without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan. Edited by Gerard Chaliand. London: Zed Press, 1980.

Viennot, Jean. "Baluchistan: A New Bangladesh." Le Monde Diplomatique, November 1973.

Wirsing, Robert. "South Asia: The Baluch Frontier Tribes of Pakistan. In Protection of Ethnic Minorities: Comparative Perspective. Edited by Robert Wirsing. New York: Pergamon, 1981.

Yate, C. E. "Baluchistan." Proceedings of the Central Asian Society, 14 February 1906.

Dissertations

Mozaffar, Shaheen. "The Politics of Cabinet Formation in Pakistan: A Study of Recruitment to the Central Cabinets, 1947-1977." Ph.D. dissertation, Miami University (Ohio), 1980.

Salzman, Philip C. "Adaptations and Change among the Yarahmadzai Baluch." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1972.

Swidler, Nina Bailey. "The Political Structure of a Tribal Federation: The Brahui of Baluchistan." Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1969.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.