The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results Raymond M
Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-70740-4 - The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results Raymond M. Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson Index More information Index administrative responsibility. See also economic voting in, 70 concentration of responsibility Michigan School influence in, 117 economic vote of the chief executive and, political party identification in, 117 282 candidate popularity, U.S., 17 economic voting and, 253–254, 271, employment rates as factor for, 18 277–282, 284 income levels and, 18 opposition party strength and, 286 inflation rates as factor for, 18 patterns of contention and, 347 capital mobility, 181–183 Afterposten, 288 EDD/NEDD ratios and, 183 Alliance Party (New Zealand), 297 import levels and, 183 “almost majority” governments, 266 Mundell-Fleming condition and, 181, 182 Australia chief executive. See economic vote of the economic voting model specifications for, chief executive 121 Chirac, Jacque, 149, 150, 257 Austria Christian Democrat Party (Italy), 310, 313 “grand coalition” governments in, 249 Christian Democratic Party (Belgium), 82, 84 Balladur, Edouard, 257 clarity of responsibility hypothesis, 25–26, Belgium 227–228, 341 Christian Democratic Party in, 82, 84 Communist Party (Greece), 298 economic voting in, 70, 72, 299–300 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems unemployment rates in, 152 project, 253 binomial estimation methods, 97, 103, competency models, 2. See also selection 104, 105 model, economic voting “Bread and Peace” model, 18 competency signals in, 29, 30, 138, 149, British Election Survey, 171 180 Bush, George W., 65 inflation as factor in, 134, 135 limited state sector variables in, 201–203 cabinet parties.
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