The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results Raymond M

Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-70740-4 - The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results Raymond M. Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson Index More information

Index

administrative responsibility. See also economic voting in, 70 concentration of responsibility Michigan School influence in, 117 economic vote of the chief executive and, political party identification in, 117 282 candidate popularity, U.S., 17 economic voting and, 253–254, 271, employment rates as factor for, 18 277–282, 284 income levels and, 18 opposition party strength and, 286 inflation rates as factor for, 18 patterns of contention and, 347 capital mobility, 181–183 Afterposten, 288 EDD/NEDD ratios and, 183 Alliance Party (New Zealand), 297 import levels and, 183 “almost majority” governments, 266 Mundell-Fleming condition and, 181, 182 Australia chief executive. See economic vote of the economic voting model specifications for, chief executive 121 Chirac, Jacque, 149, 150, 257 Austria Christian Democrat Party (Italy), 310, 313 “grand coalition” governments in, 249 Christian Democratic Party (Belgium), 82, 84 Balladur, Edouard, 257 clarity of responsibility hypothesis, 25–26, Belgium 227–228, 341 Christian Democratic Party in, 82, 84 Communist Party (Greece), 298 economic voting in, 70, 72, 299–300 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems unemployment rates in, 152 project, 253 binomial estimation methods, 97, 103, competency models, 2. See also selection 104, 105 model, economic voting “Bread and Peace” model, 18 competency signals in, 29, 30, 138, 149, British Election Survey, 171 180 Bush, George W., 65 inflation as factor in, 134, 135 limited state sector variables in, 201–203 cabinet parties. See economic vote of a multi-level results for, 200–204 cabinet party party size as factor in, 201 “cabinet partners,” 267 political ideology in, 200 voter beliefs about, 292 with two-party competition, 131–147 Cameron, David, 179 competency shocks, 14, 133, 138–147 Canada in contextual theory of economic voting, economic vote of the chief executive in, 340 71 multi-party governments and, 220–221

391

© Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-70740-4 - The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results Raymond M. Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson Index More information

392 Index

competency signals, 29, 30, 138, 149, Social Democrat Party in, 233, 289, 311, 180 315 exogenous shocks and, 30, 149 2001 elections in, 288–289 government size as factor in, 139 voting demographics in, 77 illustrated extractions for, 149–151 Downsian rationality hypothesis, 9 responsibility augmented, 223, 225, 226, DPP. See Danish People Party 235, 238 Dutch Liberal Party (Netherlands), 84, 93 trade dependence as factor in, 139 Duverger’s law for plurality voting, 16 in U.K. elections, 168–175 competency theories, in economic voting, economic policy theory, 138–147 164 economic vote of a cabinet party, 55–57, EDD/NEDD ratios in, 178–179, 181 58, 60 incumbents in, 178–194 incumbency as factor in, 317 concentration of responsibility, 278, 282, economic vote of the chief executive, 284 55–57, 58, 59, 60, 63, 77, 85, 95, 98, economic vote of the chief executive and, 111, 112, 114, 118 279 administrative responsibility and, 282 congressional elections. See elections in Canada, 71 Conservative Party (U.K.), 82, 171 concentration of responsibility and, 279 contextual theory, economic voting, 3, conﬁdence bands for, 64 28–31, 338–342. See also sanctioning control variables, 114 model, economic voting; selection corporatism and, 193 model, economic voting country/voter surveys for, 67 competence shocks in, 340 economic vote of the government and, cross-national comparative studies and, 57 28 in economic voting model speciﬁcations, sanctioning model in, 10–12, 28 122 selection model in, 12–15, 28 electoral volatility in, 55, 77–79 variations in, 66–67 endogenous shocks and, 124 coordinated wage and price bargaining in Germany, 61 (CWB), 191 globalization and, 184 corporatism government size and, 190 economic vote of the chief executive and, incumbents and, 55 193 interactive model for, concentration of index measurements for, 192–193 responsibility in, 282–284 statist institutions and, 191–193, in Ireland, 67–71 196 in Italy, 67 CWB. See coordinated wage and price multi-level logistic regression model for, bargaining 353 in the Netherlands, 67, 93, 350 Danish People Party (DPP) (Denmark), in New Zealand, 67 289, 292 number of contenders as factor in, 331 decision theoretic problems, 132 overtime variation in, 74, 76 Denmark political ideology and, 88, 89–90, 92, DPP in, 289, 292 119 economic vote of the government in, 80 regulation density and, 195 economic voting in, 22, 23, 72, 159–160 in Spain, 67 election studies for, 80 in statist institutions, 189, 196, 197, 199 Liberal Party in, 288 trade openness and, 184, 199 Progress Party in, 292 in U.K., 67, 170 Radical Liberal Party in, 233, 315 in U.S., 67, 255

Index 393

economic vote of the government, 57–59, economic vote of a cabinet party as, 60, 77, 80, 85 55–57, 58, 60 in Denmark, 80 economic vote of the chief executive as, in the Netherlands, 61 55–57, 58, 59, 60, 63, 77, 85, 95, 98, economic vote of the opposition, 55–57, 60 111, 112, 114, 118 in multi-party governments, 297, 300 economic vote of the government as, party share and, 304 57–59, 60, 77, 80, 85 predicted probability of entering economic vote of the opposition as, government and, 307 55–57, 60, 83 economic voting, 17–23, 27, 40–52, 54. See EDDs, 139–142, 145–147, 178–179, 181 also contextual theory, economic electoral volatility and, 53–55, 63, 78, 85 voting; economic vote of the chief empirical literature on, 17 executive; economic voting, model “enforced” symmetry in, 52 specifications for; electoral volatility; “error-in-variables” in, 348 general economic voting; governments, estimation effects on, 100, 352 multi-party; random effects model, EuroBarometer series on, 24, 69, 75 economic voting; rational economic evidence for, 343–345 voting; retrospective economic voting; federalism’s influence on, 140 strategic economic voting in France, 21, 22, 23, 69–70, 72, 75, administrative responsibility and, as 256, 261, 262 factor in, 253–254, 271, 277–282, 284 general, 41–42, 95 alternative measures for, 77–80 general hypotheses for, 342–343 alternative models for, 348–349 in Germany, 4, 7–8, 22, 69, 72, 73, 75 asymmetric, 107, 109 globalization and, 180–184 in Australia, model specifications for, 121 in Greece, 298–299 in Belgium, 70, 72, 299–300 incumbent fatigue and, 86 “Bread and Peace” model for, 18 incumbent performance and, 19–21, 83, cabinet-seat distribution and, in 320–327, 333–334 parliamentary governments, 275–277 at individual level, 42, 98, 165–168 in Canada, 70 in Ireland, 71, 72, 73, 75 candidate distinction as factor in, 339 issue importance in, 89–90, 92 clarity of responsibility hypothesis for, in Italy, 4, 22, 23, 69, 72 25–26, 227–228, 341 “luxury good” model for, 41 comparative study implications of, macro-economic outcomes for, 151–155 355 –358 magnitude variations for, 63–77 competency theories for, 164, 178–179, media reporting and, 149, 156, 175–176, 181, 194 274–275 complex causation for, 349–355 model specifications for, 113–124 contextual theory, 3, 28–31, 338–342 multi-party governments and, 209–216 cross-national comparative studies for, national economic evaluation and, 128 24–27, 71–73 NEDDs and, 139–141, 146–147, decision theoretic problems in, 132 178–179, 181 definitions of, 40–41 negative, 262, 264, 268, 270, 276 in Denmark, 22, 23, 72, 77, 159–160 in the Netherlands, 72, 93, 131, 350 directional theories for, 63 non-economic v., 85–92 distribution of, over individual parties, in non-presidential elections, 255–256 80–85 in Norway, 22, 23 within divided v. unified governments, one-stage strategy for, 96–98, 100–102, 256–262 103, 109 Downsian rationality hypothesis in, 9 oppositional strength and, by nation, 281 economic contexts for, 138–147 overtime variation in, 73–77

394 Index

economic voting (cont.) in Greek elections, 121 parliamentary elections and, 253–256, in individual-level models, 122–123 259–262, 264, 265, 267–277 in Ireland elections, 120 patterns of contention and, as factor in, left-right continuum and, 120 346–347 outliers in, 120 “Policy Related Variation” in, 128 spare v. rich, 119–121 political context for, 138–147 in U.K. elections, 120 political ideology and, 81, 87–90, 101, The Economist, 3 127–128 EDDs. See electorally dependent decision positive, 276 makers post-materialism and, 90–92 elections. See also candidate popularity, presidential elections and, 253–256, 258, U.S.; elections, parliamentary; 259–262 elections, presidential; incumbency presidential popularity and, in U.S., 17 congressional, in U.S., 18–19 purged economic evaluations and, 125 in Denmark (2001), 288–289 random effects model for, 154 incumbent performance and, 19–21 rational expectations of voters and, 28 in the Netherlands (2002), 289 retrospective, 220, 226, 271 in Norway (2001), 288 sanctioning model of, 10–12, 28 elections, parliamentary selection model of, 12–15 administrative responsibility and, skepticism about, 62–63 271 social class as factor in, 128 “almost majority” governments and, in Spain, 70, 93 266 statist institutions and, 195–198 cabinet coalitions and, 263–267 strategic, 15–16, 31 cabinet-seat distribution in, 275–277 survey proximity and, 112 economic voting and, 253–256, 264, 265, in Sweden, 22 267–277 symmetry of, 108 economic/finance ministers and, 271–275 theoretical foundations of, 8–16 negative economic voting and, 264, 270 theoretical literature on, 16, 27 presidential v., 259–262 trade dependence as factor for, 7 retrospective economic voting and, 271 two-stage strategy for, 98–102, 103, by type, economic vote as factor for, 265 109 vote distribution within, 267–271 in U.K., 21, 22, 68–69, 72, 75, 86, 93, voter beliefs about, 290 172 “wrong-signed” economic voting, in U.S., 17–21, 68, 72–73, 116–117, 261 313 variation in, 337–338 elections, presidential voter preference measurements in, in divided v. unified governments, 109–112 256–262 voter utility function in, 9 economic voting and, 253–256, “wasted,” 15 258 World Values Survey on, 24 in France, 149, 254–256 “wrong signed,” 313 non-presidential v., 255–256 economic voting, model specifications for, parliamentary v., 259–262 113–124 in U.S., 17, 18, 20–21, 68, 254–256, 261 alternative specifications for, 115–119 electoral volatility, 53–55, 63, 85 in Australian election models, 121 in economic vote of the chief executive, control variable variation in, 113–116 55, 77–79 economic vote of the chief executive in, in E.U., 160 122 GDP and, 161 endogenous shocks in, 123–124 general economic voting and, 53, 54

Index 395

electorally dependent decision makers causal effects in, 42 (EDDs), 139–142, 145–147 change estimation for, 51–52, 56–57 capital mobility and, 183 control variables in, 47–49 competency theories for, economic correlation analysis in, 43 voting, 178–179, 181 economic perceptions in, 44–47 monetary unions and, 146 electoral volatility and, 53, 54 under statist institutions, 187, 190, 205 estimation for, 43, 44 tariff regimes and, 146 EU and, attitudes toward, 48 EMS. See European Monetary System issue preferences and, 47–48 endogenous shocks linguistic cleavages and, 47 economic vote of the chief executive and, measuring for, 42–52 124 MNL for, 50, 51, 106, 107 in economic-voting model specifications, in the Netherlands, 52 123–124 non-voting and, 45 “error-in-variables,” 12, 348 sociological traditions and, 47 EuroBarometer series, 24, 69, 75 statistical models and, estimations of, European Monetary System (EMS), 152 49–51 European Union (E.U.). See also Austria; in U.K., 52 Belgium; France; Germany; Ireland; vote choice in, 44–45, 47 Italy; the Netherlands; Norway; Spain; Germany, 3–8 Sweden; United Kingdom economic discussion in, party dominance attitudes toward, as factor in general as factor in, 4, 6 economic voting, 48 economic vote of the chief executive in, economy, perceptions of as economic 61 voting factor, 166 economic voting in, 4, 7–8, 22, 69, 72, electoral volatility, histograms for, 160 73, 75 exogenous shocks, 14, 15 “grand coalition” governments in, 249 competency signals and, 30, 149 patterns of cabinet contention in, 295 macro-economic outcomes and, 161, 164 trade dependence in, 7 in U.K., 173 global connectedness, 165 expectation theories, rational global dependency, 163, 164 in selection model, 13 globalization, 205–206 economic vote of the chief executive and, federalism 184 economic voting and, influence on, 140 economic voting and, 180–184 Fianna Fael Party (Ireland), 84, 231 trade openness and, 183 Fianna Gael Party (Ireland), 231 World Bank and, 183 formateur system, 232 governments. See also “almost majority” Fortuyn, Pim, 289 governments; economic vote of the Forza Italia Party, 298 government; elections, parliamentary; France elections, presidential; governments, divided government in, 257 multi-party economic voting in, 21, 22, 23, 69–70, definition of, 294 72, 75, 256, 261, 262 divided v. unified, 256–262 GDP growth rates in, 149, 150, 151 governments, multi-party, 209–216 presidential elections in, 149, 254–256 alternative governments and, RPR Party in, 255 competence of, 242–250 Socialist Party in, 255 alternatives to, from previous governments, 224–235 GDP. See gross domestic product clarity of responsibility hypothesis and, general economic voting, 41–42, 95 227–228

396 Index

governments, multi-party (cont.) economic vote of the chief executive and, with coalitional executive positions, 88, 89–90, 92, 119 218–242 economic voting and, 81, 87–90, 101, competency shocks and, 220–221 127–128 distribution of contention within, 238 Left-Right continuum in, 87–88, 90, 93 distribution of responsibility within, 212, Post-Materialism, 93 220–227 IIA. See independence of irrelevant economic vote of the opposition in, 297, alternatives 300 import levels, 183 with generic selection process, 216–218 income levels “grand coalitions” within, 248–249 in U.S., 18 in Italy, 216 incumbency patterns of cabinet contention and, 225, alternative coalitions and, as members 228, 229, 238 of, 311, 314, 318 patterns of electoral contention and, 211 in “Bread and Peace” model, 18 pivot probabilities and, 210, 212, competency theories and, 178–194 218–220 definition of, 57–58, 268 policy making in, 220–224 economic vote of a cabinet party and, political bargaining within, 218 317 responsibility augmented competency economic vote of the chief executive and, signals and, 223, 225, 226, 235, 55 238 economic voting and, based on retrospective economic voting and, 220, performance, 19–21, 64, 320–327, 226 333–334 strategic economic voting within, 210, “familiarity” as voting factor for, 250–251 321–323, 324, 326, 327, 328 “grand coalition(s),” 248–249 patterns of contention and, 308–320, 333 in Austria, 249 regressions models for, 202 in Germany, 249 in sanctioning model, 11 Great Britain. See United Kingdom in selection model, 13 Greece incumbent fatigue, 86 Communist Party in, 298 incumbents. See incumbency economic voting in, 298–299, 329 independence of irrelevant alternatives New Democracy Party in, 298, 329 (IIA), 50, 105–106 PASOK Party in, 298, 329 MNL and, 106 voting model specifications for, 121 individual-level vote-choice models, 42, 98 gross domestic product (GDP) economic perceptions as factor in, in economic-voting random effects 165–168 model, 155 economic voting model specifications for, electoral volatility and, 161 122–123 in France, 149, 150, 151 multinomial estimation for, 103–107 in Italy, contraction of, 3 inflation rates in U.K., 168–175 competency models and, as factor in, 134, 135 Hagen, Carl I., 288 in economic-voting random effects hazard model. See sanctioning model, model, 154–155 economic voting in U.S., 18 Heseltine, Michael, 171 Inglehart, Ron, 90 Ireland ideology, political economic vote of the chief executive in, in competency models, 200 67–71

Index 397

economic voting in, 71, 72, 73, 75 media reporting employment rates in, 152 economic voting inﬂuenced by, 149, 156, Fianna Fael Party in, 84, 231 175–176, 274–275 Fianna Gael Party in, 231 macro-economic outcomes and, 157–160 Irish Labour Party in, 314 Michigan School, 48, 116 left-right continuum in, 120 Canada election studies inﬂuenced by, Irish Labour Party, 314 117 Italy, 3 Mitterrand, Francois, 257 Christian Democrat Party in, 310, 313 MNL. See multinomial logistic model economic discussion in, party dominance MNP. See multinomial probit model as factor in, 3–4, 6 monetary unions, 146 economic vote of the chief executive in, multinomial logistic model (MNL), 50, 51, 67 106, 107 economic voting in, 4, 22, 23, 69, 72 binomial v., 97, 103, 104, 105 Forza Italia Party in, 298 IIA and, 50, 105–106 GDP contraction in, 3 individual-level vote-choice models and, GDP growth in, 3 103–107 Lombard League in, 297–298, 307, 311 multinomial probit model (MNP), 106, multi-party governments in, 216 107 PCI Party in, 307 multi-party governments. See governments, multi-party Key, V.O., 10 Mundell-Fleming condition, 181, 182 Kramer, Gerald, 123 NEDDs. See non-electorally dependent Labour Party (Norway), 331 decision makers Labour Party (U.K.), 168–175 negative economic voting, 262, 268, 276 Left-Right continuum parliamentary elections and, 264, 270 economic voting models and, 120 the Netherlands in Ireland voting models, 120 Dutch Liberal Party in, 84, 93 model estimations for, 88 economic vote of the chief executive in, in political ideology, 87–88, 90, 93 67 in U.K. voting models, 120 economic vote of the government in, 61 Lewis-Beck, Michael, 87 economic voting in, 72, 93, 131, 350 Liberal Party (Denmark), 288 general economic voting in, 52 Livable Netherlands Party, 289 List Pim Fortuyn Party in, 289 Ljist Pim Fortuyn Party (the Netherlands), Livable Netherlands Party in, 289 289 2002 elections in, 289 Lombard League (Italy), 297–298, 307, 311 New Democracy Party (Greece), 298, 329 “luxury good” model, 41 New York Times, 156 New Zealand macro-economic outcomes, 151–155, 182 Alliance Party in, 297 exogenous shocks and, 161, 164 economic vote of the chief executive in, intraclass correlations in, 155 67 in U.K., 169, 174 non-economic voting, 85–92 in U.S., variances in, 157 non-electorally dependent decision makers variance information in, 156–157, (NEDDs), 139–141, 146–147 161–165, 167 capital mobility and, 183 voter attention to media information as competency theories for, economic factor in, 157–160 voting, 178–179, 181 Maldonado, Fraile, 70 regulation density and, 193–194 Maravall, Maria, 70 under statist institutions, 187, 190, 205

398 Index

non-political shocks, 133 rational economic voting. See also Norway economic voting economic voting in, 22, 23 “competency signals” and, 29, 30 Labour Party in, 331 voter expectations and, 28 Progress Party in, 288 rational expectation theories. See 2001 elections in, 288 expectation theories, rational regulation density opposition parties. See economic vote of economic vote of the chief executive and, the opposition 195 NEDDs and, 193–194 parliamentary elections. See elections, under statist institutions, 193–194, 196 parliamentary rent maximization, 11 PASOK Party (Greece), 298, 329 responsibility augmented competency patterns of cabinet contention signals, 223, 225, 226, 235, in Germany, 295 238 multi-party governments and, 225, 228, The Responsible Electorate, 46 229, 238 retrospective economic voting patterns of contention, 287–334 multi-party governments and, 220, administrative responsibility and, 234–235 347 parliamentary elections and, 271 economic voting and, as factor for, rational model for, 339 346–347 Retrospective Voting in American National among incumbent parties, 308–320, 333 Elections, 10 number of contenders and, 328–333 Retrospective*Deviation interaction terms, among opposition parties, 293–308 167 summary measures of, 316, 328–333 The Right Approach to the Economy, 170 voter beliefs about, 287–293, 333 patterns of electoral contention sanctioning model, economic voting, multi-party governments and, 211 10–12, 28 PCI Party (Italy), 307 context for, 11–12 PEW Global Attitudes Project, 163, 176 “error-in-variables” in, 12 pivot probabilities, 210, 212, 218–220 incumbents in, 11 “Policy Related Variation,” 128 rent maximization as factor in, 11 political ideology. See ideology, political selection model, economic voting, 12–15, positive economic voting, 276 28 Post-Materialism competency shocks in, 14 economic voting and, 90–92 context for, 14–15 political ideology and, 93 exogenous shocks in, 14, 15 presidential elections. See elections, incumbents in, 13 presidential rational expectations theories in, 13 Progress Party (Denmark), 292 shocks. See competency shocks; Progress Party (Norway), 288 endogenous shocks; exogenous shocks; nonpolitical shocks Radical Liberal Party (Denmark), 233, 315 social contracts, 191 random effects model, economic voting, Social Democrat Party (Denmark), 233, 154 289, 311, 315 GDP as factor in, 155 Socialist Party (France), 255 inﬂation rates in, 154–155 Spain unemployment rates in, 154 economic vote of the chief executive in, Rassemblement pour la Republique´ (RPR) 67 Party (France), 255 economic voting in, 70, 93

Index 399

SPD Party, 4 economic vote of the chief executive in, statist institutions, limited v. extensive, 67, 170 185–198 economic voting in, 21, 22, 68–69, 72, corporatism and, 191–193, 196 75, 86, 93, 172 CWB and, 191 exogenous shocks in, 173 domestic economy privatization under, GDP growth in, 168–175 185 general economic voting in, 52 economic vote of the chief executive in, Labour Party in, 168–175 189, 196, 197, 199 left-right continuum in, 120 economic voting and, 195–198 macro-economic outcomes in, 169, 174 EDD v. NEDD under, 187, 190, 205 political party identiﬁcation in, 117–118 globalization and, 198–200 unemployment rates in, 171 regulation density under, 193–194, 196 United States (U.S.). See also candidate social contracts under, 191 popularity, U.S. state size and, 187–190, 196 candidate popularity in, 17 strategic economic voting, 15–16, 31 congressional election factors in, 18–19 Duverger’s law for plurality voting and, divided government in, 257 16 Downsian rationality hypothesis and, as incentives for, 15–16 election factor, 9 multiparty contexts for, 31 economic vote of the chief executive in, within multi-party governments, 210, 67, 255 250–251 economic voting in, 17–21, 68, 72–73, voter utility function and, 16 116–117 Sweden income levels in, 18 economic voting in, 22 inﬂation rates in, 18 macro-economic outcomes in, 157 Thatcher, Margaret, 170, 207 Michigan School in, 48, 116 trade dependence, 173 presidential election factors in, 17, 18, for Germany, 7 20–21, 65, 254–256, 261 trade openness, 183, 184 unemployment rates in, 18 economic vote of the chief executive and, 184, 199 voter beliefs trade policy literature, 162 about “cabinet partners,” 292 about parliamentary elections, 290 UDF Party (France), 84, 93 about patterns of contention, 287–293, unemployment rates 333 in Belgium, 152 voter utility function, 9 in economic voting random effects strategic economic voting and, 16 model, 154 voting. See also economic voting; rational in Ireland, 152 economic voting; strategic economic in U.K., 171 voting in U.S., 18 conceptual models of, 39–40 United Kingdom (U.K.). See also Thatcher, Margaret Washington Post, 156 competency signals in, during elections, World Bank, 183 168–175 World Values Survey, 24 Conservative Party in, 82, 171 “wrong-signed” economic voting, 313