The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results Raymond M
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Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-70740-4 - The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results Raymond M. Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson Index More information Index administrative responsibility. See also economic voting in, 70 concentration of responsibility Michigan School influence in, 117 economic vote of the chief executive and, political party identification in, 117 282 candidate popularity, U.S., 17 economic voting and, 253–254, 271, employment rates as factor for, 18 277–282, 284 income levels and, 18 opposition party strength and, 286 inflation rates as factor for, 18 patterns of contention and, 347 capital mobility, 181–183 Afterposten, 288 EDD/NEDD ratios and, 183 Alliance Party (New Zealand), 297 import levels and, 183 “almost majority” governments, 266 Mundell-Fleming condition and, 181, 182 Australia chief executive. See economic vote of the economic voting model specifications for, chief executive 121 Chirac, Jacque, 149, 150, 257 Austria Christian Democrat Party (Italy), 310, 313 “grand coalition” governments in, 249 Christian Democratic Party (Belgium), 82, 84 Balladur, Edouard, 257 clarity of responsibility hypothesis, 25–26, Belgium 227–228, 341 Christian Democratic Party in, 82, 84 Communist Party (Greece), 298 economic voting in, 70, 72, 299–300 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems unemployment rates in, 152 project, 253 binomial estimation methods, 97, 103, competency models, 2. See also selection 104, 105 model, economic voting “Bread and Peace” model, 18 competency signals in, 29, 30, 138, 149, British Election Survey, 171 180 Bush, George W., 65 inflation as factor in, 134, 135 limited state sector variables in, 201–203 cabinet parties. See economic vote of a multi-level results for, 200–204 cabinet party party size as factor in, 201 “cabinet partners,” 267 political ideology in, 200 voter beliefs about, 292 with two-party competition, 131–147 Cameron, David, 179 competency shocks, 14, 133, 138–147 Canada in contextual theory of economic voting, economic vote of the chief executive in, 340 71 multi-party governments and, 220–221 391 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-70740-4 - The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results Raymond M. Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson Index More information 392 Index competency signals, 29, 30, 138, 149, Social Democrat Party in, 233, 289, 311, 180 315 exogenous shocks and, 30, 149 2001 elections in, 288–289 government size as factor in, 139 voting demographics in, 77 illustrated extractions for, 149–151 Downsian rationality hypothesis, 9 responsibility augmented, 223, 225, 226, DPP. See Danish People Party 235, 238 Dutch Liberal Party (Netherlands), 84, 93 trade dependence as factor in, 139 Duverger’s law for plurality voting, 16 in U.K. elections, 168–175 competency theories, in economic voting, economic policy theory, 138–147 164 economic vote of a cabinet party, 55–57, EDD/NEDD ratios in, 178–179, 181 58, 60 incumbents in, 178–194 incumbency as factor in, 317 concentration of responsibility, 278, 282, economic vote of the chief executive, 284 55–57, 58, 59, 60, 63, 77, 85, 95, 98, economic vote of the chief executive and, 111, 112, 114, 118 279 administrative responsibility and, 282 congressional elections. See elections in Canada, 71 Conservative Party (U.K.), 82, 171 concentration of responsibility and, 279 contextual theory, economic voting, 3, confidence bands for, 64 28–31, 338–342. See also sanctioning control variables, 114 model, economic voting; selection corporatism and, 193 model, economic voting country/voter surveys for, 67 competence shocks in, 340 economic vote of the government and, cross-national comparative studies and, 57 28 in economic voting model specifications, sanctioning model in, 10–12, 28 122 selection model in, 12–15, 28 electoral volatility in, 55, 77–79 variations in, 66–67 endogenous shocks and, 124 coordinated wage and price bargaining in Germany, 61 (CWB), 191 globalization and, 184 corporatism government size and, 190 economic vote of the chief executive and, incumbents and, 55 193 interactive model for, concentration of index measurements for, 192–193 responsibility in, 282–284 statist institutions and, 191–193, in Ireland, 67–71 196 in Italy, 67 CWB. See coordinated wage and price multi-level logistic regression model for, bargaining 353 in the Netherlands, 67, 93, 350 Danish People Party (DPP) (Denmark), in New Zealand, 67 289, 292 number of contenders as factor in, 331 decision theoretic problems, 132 overtime variation in, 74, 76 Denmark political ideology and, 88, 89–90, 92, DPP in, 289, 292 119 economic vote of the government in, 80 regulation density and, 195 economic voting in, 22, 23, 72, 159–160 in Spain, 67 election studies for, 80 in statist institutions, 189, 196, 197, 199 Liberal Party in, 288 trade openness and, 184, 199 Progress Party in, 292 in U.K., 67, 170 Radical Liberal Party in, 233, 315 in U.S., 67, 255 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-70740-4 - The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results Raymond M. Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson Index More information Index 393 economic vote of the government, 57–59, economic vote of a cabinet party as, 60, 77, 80, 85 55–57, 58, 60 in Denmark, 80 economic vote of the chief executive as, in the Netherlands, 61 55–57, 58, 59, 60, 63, 77, 85, 95, 98, economic vote of the opposition, 55–57, 60 111, 112, 114, 118 in multi-party governments, 297, 300 economic vote of the government as, party share and, 304 57–59, 60, 77, 80, 85 predicted probability of entering economic vote of the opposition as, government and, 307 55–57, 60, 83 economic voting, 17–23, 27, 40–52, 54. See EDDs, 139–142, 145–147, 178–179, 181 also contextual theory, economic electoral volatility and, 53–55, 63, 78, 85 voting; economic vote of the chief empirical literature on, 17 executive; economic voting, model “enforced” symmetry in, 52 specifications for; electoral volatility; “error-in-variables” in, 348 general economic voting; governments, estimation effects on, 100, 352 multi-party; random effects model, EuroBarometer series on, 24, 69, 75 economic voting; rational economic evidence for, 343–345 voting; retrospective economic voting; federalism’s influence on, 140 strategic economic voting in France, 21, 22, 23, 69–70, 72, 75, administrative responsibility and, as 256, 261, 262 factor in, 253–254, 271, 277–282, 284 general, 41–42, 95 alternative measures for, 77–80 general hypotheses for, 342–343 alternative models for, 348–349 in Germany, 4, 7–8, 22, 69, 72, 73, 75 asymmetric, 107, 109 globalization and, 180–184 in Australia, model specifications for, 121 in Greece, 298–299 in Belgium, 70, 72, 299–300 incumbent fatigue and, 86 “Bread and Peace” model for, 18 incumbent performance and, 19–21, 83, cabinet-seat distribution and, in 320–327, 333–334 parliamentary governments, 275–277 at individual level, 42, 98, 165–168 in Canada, 70 in Ireland, 71, 72, 73, 75 candidate distinction as factor in, 339 issue importance in, 89–90, 92 clarity of responsibility hypothesis for, in Italy, 4, 22, 23, 69, 72 25–26, 227–228, 341 “luxury good” model for, 41 comparative study implications of, macro-economic outcomes for, 151–155 355 –358 magnitude variations for, 63–77 competency theories for, 164, 178–179, media reporting and, 149, 156, 175–176, 181, 194 274–275 complex causation for, 349–355 model specifications for, 113–124 contextual theory, 3, 28–31, 338–342 multi-party governments and, 209–216 cross-national comparative studies for, national economic evaluation and, 128 24–27, 71–73 NEDDs and, 139–141, 146–147, decision theoretic problems in, 132 178–179, 181 definitions of, 40–41 negative, 262, 264, 268, 270, 276 in Denmark, 22, 23, 72, 77, 159–160 in the Netherlands, 72, 93, 131, 350 directional theories for, 63 non-economic v., 85–92 distribution of, over individual parties, in non-presidential elections, 255–256 80–85 in Norway, 22, 23 within divided v. unified governments, one-stage strategy for, 96–98, 100–102, 256–262 103, 109 Downsian rationality hypothesis in, 9 oppositional strength and, by nation, 281 economic contexts for, 138–147 overtime variation in, 73–77 © Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-70740-4 - The Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results Raymond M. Duch and Randolph T. Stevenson Index More information 394 Index economic voting (cont.) in Greek elections, 121 parliamentary elections and, 253–256, in individual-level models, 122–123 259–262, 264, 265, 267–277 in Ireland elections, 120 patterns of contention and, as factor in, left-right continuum and, 120 346–347 outliers in, 120 “Policy Related Variation” in, 128 spare v. rich, 119–121 political context for, 138–147 in U.K. elections, 120 political ideology and, 81, 87–90, 101, The Economist, 3 127–128 EDDs. See electorally dependent decision positive, 276 makers post-materialism and, 90–92 elections. See also candidate popularity, presidential elections and, 253–256, 258, U.S.; elections, parliamentary; 259–262 elections, presidential; incumbency presidential popularity and, in U.S., 17 congressional, in U.S., 18–19 purged economic evaluations and, 125 in Denmark (2001), 288–289 random effects model for, 154 incumbent performance and, 19–21 rational expectations of voters and, 28 in the Netherlands (2002), 289 retrospective, 220, 226, 271 in Norway