Externalization of Conflict

Société québécoise de science politique

Externalization of Conflict: Testing a Crisis-Based Model Author(s): Patrick James Reviewed work(s): Source: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 573-598 Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de science politique Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3228858 . Accessed: 08/10/2012 14:33

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http://www.jstor.org Externalizationof Conflict: Testing a Crisis-Based Model

PATRICK JAMES McGill University

Austro-Hungarianpolicy is generallycriticized but this criticismis misleading. Berchtold is almost universallystigmatized for seeking to preserve a doomed empire at the risk of a European war. Although espoused by pacifists and apologists for the other powers, this criticism could have little relevance for Austro-Hungarianstatesmen. It was their duty to preserve Austria-Hungary, not peace. Since they perceivedthat Austria-Hungarywas doomed unless war was risked [in 1914],it was their responsibilityto risk war.' Externalization is one of the most enduring theories in the literature devoted to international conflict; Austria-Hungary going to war in 1914 in a desperate effort to restore internal order and prolong its existence is but one commonly cited example. Also known as "conflict and cohesion" or "projection," the rationale of externalization is straightforward and persuasive. When national leaders are faced with internal disruption, a logical response is to divert the public eye toward an external "scapegoat."'2 A foreign menace-perceived or real-has the potential to reunite a disaffected population. Since the ostensible threat concerns the state as whole, it should result in at least a temporary suspension of internal conflict. Furthermore, if the foreign menace is met successfully-once again leaving aside whether it is real or contrived-support for the regime may be revitalized. Thus for 1 L. L. Farrar, Jr., "The Limits of Choice: July 1914Reconsidered," in Melvin Small and J. David Singer (eds.), International War: An Anthology and Study Guide (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1985), 251-52. 2 The classic expositions from sociology and social psychology may be found in Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1956); Anthony de Reuck and Julie Knight, Conflict in Society (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); Clyde Kluckhohn, Mirrorfor Man (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Books, 1960); Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955); and Mustafa Sherif and C. W. Sherif, Groups in Harmony and Tension (New York: Harper, 1955).

Patrick James, Department of Political Science, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T7

Canadian Journal of Pblitical Science I Revue canadienne de science politique, XX:3 (September/ septembre 1987). Printed in Canada / Imprime au Canada 574 PATRICK JAMES

Austria-Hungary in 1914, a successful war against Serbia might have counteracted the internal tensions that threatened to dissolve the empire in short order. Despite its plausibility, and the existence of some prominent historicalinstances, the projectionmodel has not found confirmationin systematic research by a generation of scholars; a straightforward relationshipbetween internaland external conflict has not emerged.The task of this article is to investigate this mysterious discrepancy between theory and testing. A reassessment of behavioural research on externalization, resulting in the identification of validity-related problems, is the first stage. The second task involves the formulation of a crisis-based model of projection that is intended to meet the essential criticisms. Operationalization of the model is the third stage and testing is fourth.The final stage concerns the implicationsof the findingsfor the further study of conflict and cohesion.

The Behavioural Research Programme According to the conventional wisdom of political scientists writing in decades past, elites frequently engaged in interstate conflicts in order to promote national unity and social stability.3 However, testing over the last 20 years by behavioural scientists has produced very little support for the time-honoured theory of conflict linkage. Rummel's 1963 study signalled the beginning of systematic research on externalization. His factor analysis of cross-sectional data produced no connection between various dimensions of internal and external conflict.4 In general, replication studies have supported Rummel's findings. Most researchers have found no connection, and the linkages that have emerged are highly restricted in character and do not lend support to the theory. In 1980, Stohl concluded his extensive analysis of the literature in the following manner: The two most importantgeneral conclusions we can drawfrom this review are, unfortunately, negative ones. First, there appears to be no single clear relationshipbetween internaland external conflict that holds across time and space. Second, most of the conventionalwisdom and theoretical speculation concerning the conflict nexus remains either unsupportedby, or in direct opposition to, the systematic empiricalwork that has been accomplishedthus far.5

3 Amongthe most prominentassertions are those of Quincy Wright,A Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 1016;Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, Dynamics of International Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), 62; and Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963),304, 306. 4 R. J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Withinand Between Nations," General Systems Yearbook 8 (1963), 1-50. 5 MichaelStohl, "The Nexus of Civil and InternationalConflict," in Ted RobertGurr Abstract. This study will investigate the problematic character of externalization theory, which posits that national leaders sometimes engage in foreign conflict in order to restore domestic cohesion. The first stage is a reassessment of the behavioural literature that, for two decades, has failed to support the theory, despite commonly held expectations to the contrary. Some significant discrepancies between theory and testing are uncovered during the review. These missing elements of externalization subsequently are incorporated in a crisis-oriented model. This model of crisis resolution, based on domestic conflict change as the independent variable and war versus de-escalation as the dependent variable, is tested using International Crisis Behaviour Project data from 1948-1975. The results are encouraging to the theory and suggest the value of further research in the area. Resume. Cette enqubte examine la thborie de l'externalisation, en incluant l'argument contestable que les chefs politiques engageaient autrefois leur pays dans les conflits externes afin de retablir la cohesion chez eux. Malgre les attentes des chercheurs, les r~sultats de la recherche ne soutiennent pas la thiorie depuis 20 ans. La premiire partie de l'article r~vele des discordances importantes entre la theorie et les risultats dans le programme de verification de la recherche. Ensuite, ces 6l1ments manques du processus d'externalisation font partie d'un module de crise. Ce modele de la resolution d'une crise traite du changement au niveaux des conflits internes comme variable ind~pendante de la guerre ou la d~sescalade comme variable dipendante. Le modele est v~rifi6 avec les donn~es de l'International Crisis Behaviour Project, 1948-1975. Les r~sultats indiquent dans quel sens il vaut la peine de poursuivre la recherche en la matiire.

Some examples will bring out these points quite readily. In a series of investigations, Wilkenfeld and others found domestic and foreign conflict linkages in the presence of an intervening variable-type of government. For instance, in the case of polyarchic states (Western, industrialized democracies), external belligerence could be traced to the presence of internal warfare." Other researchers discovered specific regional connections. Collins, for one, used a sample of 33 independent countries in Africa and events data for the years 1963-1965.He found that violent foreign behaviour could not be explained in terms of prior domestic strife, although anti-foreign unoffical behaviour and complaints about foreign interference in internal affairs could be predicted from the level of domestic disorder. Similarly, Onate examined the conflict behaviour of the People's Republic of China from 1950 to 1970, and his results suggested a minor relationship involving

(ed.), Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research (New York: Free Press, 1980), 325. 6 Jonathan Wilkenfeld's highly influential studies include "Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations," Journal of Peace Research 5 (1968), 55-69; "Some Further Findings Regarding the Domestic and Foreign Conflict of Nations," Journal of Peace Research 7 (1969), 147-56; Dina Zinnes and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "An Analysis of Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations," in Wolfram Hanrieder (ed.), Comparative Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays (New York: David McKay, 1971); Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Models for the Analysis of Foreign Conflict Behavior of States," in Bruce M. Russett (ed.), Peace, War and Numbers (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972); and Wilkenfeld and Zinnes, "A Linkage Model of Domestic Conflict Behavior," in Wilkenfeld (ed.), Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics (New York: David McKay, 1973). 576 PATRICK JAMES specific kinds of internal and external conflict.' It would not be difficult to cite numerous other behavioural studies that have revealed marginal linkages or none at all. What emerges from the behavioural research programme is a different picture of externalization than that presented by the conventional wisdom. There are several discrepancies, however, between the two decades of quantitative analysis and classic presentations of the theory.8 These differences may account at least in part for the lack of support that the conflict and cohesion model has received from systematic research. First, the conflict nexus has invariably been presented in static rather than dynamic terms. For example, Rummel based his dimensions on frequencies of domestic events such as general strikes, purges and riots, and foreign events like protests, threats and mobilizations. It is not clear that the impressionistic writings of Simmel, Coser and other prominent theorists implied that there ought to be a basic connection between high absolute levels of foreign and domestic conflict. Some countries experience internal disruption quite frequently, and their elites may not react automatically by trying to "export" such conflict. By contrast, the leadership of a very stable system member may feel threatened by a relatively low level of internal strife, if this represents a significant deviation from the norm. Thus a dynamic interpretation of the conflict nexus would appear to be more consistent with political realities. Argentina and Nicaragua in the 1980s provide an interesting contrast along those lines. Argentina is a relatively stable member of the international system that experienced a significant increase in domestic tension in the early 1980s. By 1982 the political standing of its ruling junta had deteriorated significantly. When engaged in a territorial dispute with Great Britain in the South Atlantic, the Argentine government went to war. Defeat in the Falklands War greatly contributed to the demise of the ruling elite. For many years Nicaragua has experienced intense internal strife, certainly in excess of any level attained by Argentina. Violent conflict, however, is more the rule than the exception in the political history of Nicaragua, and the continuing power struggle has not resulted in externalization. Instead, the factions seem to have become more fixated on each other with the passing of time. These examples suggest that the dynamics of internal conflict are most relevant to the

7 See John Collins, "Foreign Conflict Behavior and Domestic Disorder in Africa," in Wilkenfeld (ed.), Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics; and Andres Onate, "The Conflict Interactions of the People's Republic of China, 1950-1970," Journal of Conflict Resolution 18 (1974), 578-94. 8 A more extensive discussion of these issues is contained in Patrick James, "Conflit et cohesion: nouveau regard sur la litterature savant," Etudes Internationales 17 (1986), 621-33. Externalization of Conflict 577 development of externalization. The absolute level appears to be less important than the trend in domestic strife. The fragmentary measurement of conflict is a second problem that has persisted in systematic research. Is it reasonable to expect that isolated manifestations of conflict at the international level will be linked to highly specific types of domestic strife? Why should events like anti-government demonstrations be useful in forecasting accusations or other individual actions against other states? Among those who have engaged in aggregate testing, the norm either has been to concentrate on such fragmentary linkages directly, or to rely upon statistical techniques to demarcate classes of conflict behaviour. Such approaches appear to be inappropriate with respect to testing externalization. Consider the breadth and depth of external conflict that might be necessary for a regime to obtain renewed support from its citizens. If the leadership's objective is to restore (or preserve) order at home, then the process of externalization often should result in war or at least a serious confrontation with some other state. In one of the classic expositions from sociological theory, Coser observed that war, unlike other types of conflict, produces centralization of authority.9 Many of the fragmentary linkages that have found a place in previous testing become implausible when viewed in such terms. The same considerations apply at the domestic level. Unless the internal disruption it faces is pervasive and dangerous, an elite will be unlikely to accept the risks associated with involvement in a sustained international conflict. As Blainey has observed, "if a nation suffered from mild tensions it would hardly need to embark on a foreign adventure in order to allay those tensions."'0 Consider as illustrations two cases that are centuries apart. France in the late eighteenth century experienced a dramatic upsurge in domestic conflict, culminating in a full-scale revolution. Widespread internal conflict eventually gave way to wars of external conquest initiated by Napoleon. Canada's current domestic problems are fragmentary compared to those of revolutionary France. The oil industry has experienced a downturn, unemployment continues to be high, and there are other difficulties, such as regional disparity. However, these issues do not threaten the viability of the country itself, at least in the short term. The long list of economic, social and political problems that plagued the French dynasty (and subsequent revolutionary governments) appears overwhelming when juxtaposed with the troubles of modern Canada. Hence it is not surprising that one situation led to foreign warfare while the other has not. Environmental constraints are a third area of difficulty in the behavioural research programme. There is no reason for a beleaguered 9 Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, 88, 92. 10 Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (London: Macmillan, 1973), 81. 578 PATRICK JAMES elite to look "instinctively" beyond its borders for salvation. An externalstrategy is not likely to be chosen unless it holds some promise of success in foreign policy terms. As Wardand Widmaiernoted, "it seems unlikely that a nation-state would knowingly seek a losing confrontation in order to promote internal stability."" Attacking a stronger adversary in order to rally support at home could have unpleasant side effects, including destruction of property and overthrow of the regime. Thus relative capability should be recognized as a significant constrainingfactor in the process of externalization. El Salvador and the United States provide examples that bring out this point rather well. El Salvador's recent history is one of lingering unrest, with periodic outbreaks of violence. Yet externalization of conflict remainsunlikely in this case because of inadequatecapabilities. El Salvadoris a weak state with dim prospects for a successful foreign war. While the motive to project conflict outward may exist, opportunity is lacking. Vast capabilities and a wide range of interests distinguish the US from El Salvador. Diversion of the public eye toward a foreign military venture is more likely to be feasible for a US president. At any given time there almost certainly will be some ongoing conflict that involves a client state of the US. Regardless of its location, the president may be in a position to argue that the conflict concerns national security and requires action. While that does not guarantee US intervention, the capabilities and range of interests possessed by a superpower reduce the constraints on externalization, at least to some degree. In sum, projection requires a target state, and relative capabilities and the existence of some background of conflict are important in determining whether one exists. This emphasizes the role of interstate relations in the process of externalization, whereas many previous studies have not examined such basic matters. Further behavioural analysis should take these issues more fully into account. As Ward and Widmaier accurately observed, "the range of circumstances under which a 'rational' decision to enter into foreign conflict in order to diminish domestic political conflict appears, a priori, to be rather constrained." 12 While there is nothing conclusive about these examples, the aspects illustrated by them have rarely been addressed. The impact of these factors on the process of externalization is unknown. Thus renewed testing ought to include a dynamic conception of the conflict nexus. The linkages explored should be comprehensive, not fragmentary. Furthermore, the setting in which externalization is supposed to occur must be recognized as a significant component of the process.

11 Michael D. Ward and Ulrich Widmaier, "The Domestic-Foreign Conflict Nexus: New Evidence and Old Hypotheses," International Interactions 9 (1982), 78. 12 Ibid. Externalization of Conflict 579

A Crisis-Based Model of the Conflict Nexus Previous empirical testing has not focussed on the transition from crisis to war. A crisis-oriented model of externalization would have the potential to be more consistent with the foregoing theoretical concerns. Delineation of the model should provide some reasons why that is so. Foreign conflict, the dependent variable, will be presented first, followed by the independent and intervening variables. At the foreign level, the transition from crisis to war versus other forms of resolution requires a dynamic formulation. Furthermore, both crisis and war are comprehensive, as opposed to fragmentary, manifestations of conflict. In order to clarify further the dependent variable, some definitions are essential. An international crisis is defined by Brecher and James as "a situational change in an international system characterized by two individually necessary and collectively sufficient conditions: (1)distortion in the type and an increase in the intensity of disruptive interactions, with a high probability of military hostilities; and (2) a challenge to the existing structure of the system."'3 This definition resulted from an extensive review of concepts in the field. Table 1 displays 133 international crises over the years 1948-1975that have been identified by the International Crisis Behaviour (ICB) Project using this definition. Some of these international crises escalated to war; others did not. The principal objective is to predict the result based on the internal conflict levels of crisis participants. Thus the dependent variable is dichotomous: war versus other forms of crisis resolution. Description of the independent variables requires an explanation of the actors involved in an international crisis. For a given case listed in Table 1, the antagonists (denoted by "i" and "j") are identified by specific decision rules. In addition to international crises, there are actor-level (or foreign policy) crises. Such a crisis is a breakpointalong the peace/warcontinuum of a state's relationswith any other internationalactor. A crisis is a situation with three necessary and sufficient conditions, derivingfrom a change in a state's internallexternalenvironment. All three are perceptionsheld by the highestlevel decision makersof the actor concerned:... threat to basic values, with a simultaneousor subsequenthigh probability of involvement in military hostilities, and the awareness offinite time for response to the external value threat.14

13 MichaelBrecher and PatrickJames, Crisis and Change in WorldPolitics (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1986),22. 14 For anextended discussion of this definition,see MichaelBrecher, "Toward a Theory of InternationalCrisis Behavior: A PreliminaryReport," International Studies Quarterly21(1977), 39-74. 580 PATRICK JAMES

TABLE 1*

INTERNATIONAL CRISES: 1948-1975

Adversaries Duration

Case i j Initiation Termination

1. Communism in Czechoslovakia CZE USR 02/13/48 02/25/48 2. Soviet Note to Finland I USR FIN 02/22/48 04/06/48 3. Israel Independence ISR EGY 05/15/48 07/20/49 4. Berlin Blockade USA USR 06/07/48 05/12/49 5. China Civil War CHN USA 09/23/48 12/08/49 6. Costa Rica/Nicaragua I NIC COS 12/11/48 02/21/49 7. Indonesia Independence III NTH INS 12/19/48 12/27/49 8. Pushtunistan I PAK AFG 03/ /49 10/05/50 9. Luperon GUA DOM 06/19/49 06/21/49 10. Soviet Bloc/Yugoslavia USR YUG 08/19/49 - 11. Korean War I KON KOS 06/25/50 09/30/50 12. Tel Mutillah ISR SYR 03/15/51 05/14/51 13. Punjab War Scare PAK IND 07/07/51 08/ /51 14. Suez Canal UNK EGY 07/30/51 01/30/52 15. Catalina Affair USR SWD 06/12/52 07/ /52 16. Burma Infiltration CHI BUR 02/08/53 10/15/54 17. Invasion of Laos I VTN FRN 03/24/53 - 18. East Berlin Uprising GME USR 06/17/53 07/11/53 19. Trieste II ITA YUG 10/08/53 12/05/53 20. Qibya ISR JOR 10/14/53 - 21. Guatemala USA GUA 12/12/53 06/29/54 22. Taiwan Straits I CHI CHN 08/ /54 04/23/55 23. Costa Rica/Nicaragua II VEN COS 01/08/55 01/20/55 24. Baghdad Pact UNK EGY 02/24/55 10/ /55 25. Gaza Raid ISR EGY 02/28/55 06/23/55 26. Pushtunistan II PAK AFG 03/27/55 11/ /55 27. Goa I IND POR 08/10/55 09/06/55 28. Qalkilya ISR JOR 09/13/56 10/ /56 29. Poland Liberalization POL USR 10/ /56 10/22/56 30. Hungarian Uprising USR HUN 10/23/56 11/14/56 31. Suez-Sinai Campaign ISR EGY 10/29/56 03/12/57 32. Nicaragua/Honduras HON NIC 02/26/57 05/09/57 33. Jordan Regime EGY JOR 04/04/57 05/03/57 34. Tunisia/France I FRN TUN 05/31/57 06/27/57 35. Syria/Turkey Border SYR TUR 08/18/57 10/29/57 36. Ifni MOR SPN 11/23/57 - 37. West Irian I INS NTH 12/01/57 - 38. Berlin Deadline GMW USR 12/15/57 09/15/59 39. Formation of UAR EGY IRQ 02/01/58 02/14/58 40. Tunisia/France II FRN TUN 02/08/58 06/17/58 41. Sudan/Egypt Border EGY SUD 02/09/58 02/25/58 42. Indonesia-Aborted Coup USA INS 02/21/58 05/20/58 43. Lebanon/Iraq Upheaval EGY LEB 05/08/58 10/ /58 44. Taiwan Straits II CHN CHI 07/17/58 10/23/58 45. Cambodia/Thailand CAM TAI 07/24/58 02/06/59 46. Mexico/Guatemala Fishing Rights MEX GUA 12/29/58 02/01/59 Externalization of Conflict 581

TABLE 1-Continued

Adversaries Duration

Case i j Initiation Termination

47. Cuba/Central America I CUB PAN 04/25/59 12/ /59 48. India/China Border I IND CHN 08/25/59 04/19/60 49. Shatt-al-Arab I IRN IRQ 11/28/59 01/04/60 50. Rottem ISR EGY 02/15/60 03/08/60 51. Ghana/Togo Border TOG GHA 03/ /60 04/01/60 52. Assassination Attempt Venezuela President DOM VEN 06/24/60 09/ /60 53. Congo I: Katanga CON BEL 07/05/60 02/15/62 54. Mali Federation SEN MLI 08/20/60 09/22/60 55. Cuba/Central America II CUB NIC 11/09/60 12/07/60 56. Ethiopia/Somalia SOM ETH 12/26/60 - 57. Pathet Lao Offensive I VTN USA 03/09/61 05/16/61 58. Bay of Pigs USA CUB 04/15/61 04/24/61 59. Pushtunistan III AFG PAK 05/19/61 01/29/62 60. Kuwait Independence IRQ KUW 06/25/61 07/13/61 61. Bizert TUN FRN 07/17/61 09/29/61 62. Berlin Wall GMW GME 07/29/61 10/17/61 63. Vietcong Attack VTN USA 09/18/61 11/15/61 64. West Irian II NTH INS 09/26/61 08/15/62 65. Breakup of UAR SYR EGY 09/28/61 10/05/61 66. Soviet Note to Finland II USR FIN 10/30/61 11/24/61 67. Goa II IND POR 12/11/61 12/19/61 68. Mauritania/Mali MLI MAU 02/29/62 02/18/63 69. Taiwan Straits III CHI CHN 04/22/62 06/27/62 70. Pathet Lao Offensive II VTN TAI 05/06/62 06/12/62 71. India/China Border HII CHN IND 09/08/62 01/23/63 72. Yemen War I YEM JOR 09/26/62 04/15/63 73. Cuban Missiles USR USA 10/16/62 11/20/62 74. Malaysian Federation INS MAL 02/11/63 08/09/65 75. Jordan's Internal Challenge EGY ISR 04/21/63 05/04/63 76. Dominican Republic/Haiti HAI DOM 04/26/63 06/03/63 77. Algeria/Morocco Border MOR ALG 10/01/63 11/04/63 78. Venezuela/Cuba CUB VEN 11/01/63 12/01/63 79. Kenya/Somalia SOM KEN 11/13/63 03/04/64 80. Cyprus I CYP TUR 11/03/63 08/10/64 81. Jordan Waters ISR EGY 12/11/63 05/05/64 82. Dahomey/Niger DAH NIE 12/21/63 01/04/64 83. Rwanda/Burundi BUI RWA 12/21/63 04/ /64 84. Panama Canal USA PAN 01/09/64 01/12/64 85. East Africa Rebellions TAZ UNK 01/19/64 01/30/64 86. Ogaden I SOM ETH 02/07/64 03/30/64 87. Gulf of Tonkin VTN USA 08/02/64 08/ /64 88. Congo II CON COP 08/04/64 12/30/64 89. Rann of Kutch IND PAK 04/08/65 06/30/65 90. Dominican Republic DOM USA 04/24/65 08/31/65 91. Guinea Regime IVO GUI 10/09/65 12/ /65 92. Rhodesia UDI RHO ZAM 11/05/65 04/27/66 93. Yemen War IV YEM SAU 10/14/66 09/26/67 582 PATRICK JAMES

TABLE 1-Continued

Adversaries Duration

Case i j Initiation Termination 94. El Samu JOR ISR 11/12/66 11/15/66 95. Che Guevara CUB BOL 03/23/67 10/10/67 96. Six Day War EGY ISR 06/18/67 06/11/67 97. Cyprus II CYP TUR 11/15/67 12/04/67 98. Pueblo KON USA 01/22/68 12/23/68 99. Karameh JOR ISR 03/18/68 03/22/68 100. Prague Spring CZE GME 04/09/68 10/18/68 101. Essequibo Territory VEN GUY 07/09/68 08/ /68 102. Pre-War of Attrition EGY ISR 09/07/68 11/07/68 103. Beirut Airport ISR LEB 12/28/68 01/ /69 104. Ussuri River CHN USR 03/02/69 10/20/69 105. War of Attrition I EGY ISR 03/08/69 07/28/69 106. EC-121 Spy Plane KON USA 04/15/69 04/26/69 107. Shatt-al-Arab II IRQ IRN 04/15/69 10/30/69 108. Football War HON ELS 06/15/69 07/30/69 109. Cairo Agreement SYR LEB 10/22/69 11/03/69 110. Black September JOR SYR 09/15/70 09/29/70 111. Cienfuego Base USR USA 09/16/70 10/23/70 112. Portuguese Invasion of Guinea POR GUI 11/22/70 12/11/70 113. Bangladesh PAK BAN 03/25/71 12/17/71 114. Chad/Libya I IBY CHA 05/24/71 04/17/72 115. Caprivi Strip SAF ZAM 10/05/71 10/12/71 116. Uganda/Tanzania I UGA TAZ 10/20/71 11/25/71 117. Uganda/Tanzania II TAZ UGA 09/17/72 10/05/72 118. North/South Yemen I YES YEN 09/26/72 11/28/72 119. Zambia RHO ZAM 01/19/73 02/03/73 120. Libyan Plane IBY ISR 02/21/73 02/21/73 121. Iraq Invasion-Kuwait IRQ KUW 03/20/73 06/08/73 122. Israel Mobilization EGY ISR 04/10/73 06/ /73 123. Cod War I ICE UNK 05/14/73 11/13/73 124. October--Yom Kippur War EGY ISR 10/05/73 05/31/74 125. South Yemen/Oman YES OMA 11/18/73 03/11/76 126. Cyprus III TUR CYP 07/15/74 02/24/75 127. Mayaguez CAM USA 05/12/75 05/15/75 128. War in Angola ANG ZAM 07/12/75 03/27/76 129. Moroccan March---Sahara MOR SPN 10/16/75 11/14/75 130. Belize I GUA UNK 11/01/75 11/30/75 131. Sahara MOR ALG 11/14/75 04/ /75 132. Cod War II ICE UNK 11/23/75 06/01/76 133. East Timor POR INS 11/28/75 07/17/76 * Note: (1) The 133 cases in the data set include all international crises initiated in the years 1948-1975;(2) for cases in which a precise point of initiation or termination cannot be specified, a blank appears in place of a day and a dash appears in place of a complete date; (3) crises that resulted in war are distinguished by italics; (4) the acronyms correspond to those used by the Correlates of War (COW) Project. For reasons of space, the names of countries are not given, but a full listing is available from the author. Externalization of Conflict 583 This definitiondetermines which states are includedin the list of actors for an internationalcrisis and in what roles.15The defender "j" in an internationalcrisis is the first state to perceive an actor-level crisis, while the initiator"i" is the state responsiblefor "j's" perceptionof a crisis.'"The case of Essequibo Territoryin 1968(no. 101in Table 1)will be describedbriefly, in order to illustratethese role designations. Until 1962, when Britain announced Guyana's forthcoming independence,Venezuela had accepted the territorialstatus quo in the region. However, from that time onward, Venezuela demanded a revision of the existing boundary with Guyana. The area in dispute covered 62 per cent of Guyana.After Guyanaachieved independencein 1966it pressed for a settlement of the issue. In February1966, Britain, Guyana and Venezuela established a commission to seek a solution to the territorialconflict within four years. It did not succeed, setting the stage for an internationalcrisis. On July 9, 1968,Venezuela's President Dr. Raul Leoni issued a decree. It annexed to Venezuela the territorial waters lying from three to twelve miles along the coast of the Guyana Essequibo. This action signalledthe onset of disruptiveinteractions and challengedthe existing structureof the region. In addition, Venezuelan naval craft were reported on patrol outside the three-mile limit, thus increasing the probabilityof military hostilities. These developments combinedto produce an internationalcrisis and an actor-levelcrisis for Guyana, the defender. Guyana responded with a note of protest to Venezuela, the initiator, and other diplomatic measures, including a complaintby the foreignminister to US PresidentJohnson. Although the US reportedly wanted to maintain a neutral stance, it did appeal to Venezuela to revoke the decree. When Guyana declared Venezuela's decree to be nulland void and announcedthat it would resist an invasion, the crisis faded away, terminatingat some point in August.'7 This summaryfacilitates the furtherexplanation of internalconflict as an independent variable. With respect to domestic conflict, the concern is with the initiator's experienceprior to the outbreakof crisis. Crises are conflicts of interest between states and, in the context of externalization,escalation to war should be associated with an increase

15 Onlythe principaladversaries are listed for each crisis. Otherstates also mayperceive a crisis (or become involvedin some way), but these additionalactors do not concern the model of the conflict nexus that is being presentedhere. 16 Some of the role designations may appear unusual given the political logic of externalization.For example,in cases 1, 18and 90, the much strongerdefender would appearto have been the aggressor.However, the codingused is appropriatebecause each initiatortried to changethe statusquo in an areaof basic concernto the defender. Moralconsiderations deliberately are left out of the formulation,hence the existence of some counterintuitiverole designations. 17 This descriptionfollows InternationalCrisis Behaviour (ICB) Project Case Summary #195, in Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfield, Handbook on International Crises, forthcoming. 584 PATRICK JAMES in the domestic conflict experienced by the initiator. If internal disruption is on the rise, the motive for war will be greater than otherwise; from a war with "j," "i"' would stand to benefit in terms of foreign and domestic policy. In the previous example, if Venezuela's elite had faced rising internal discontent in 1968, it would stand to gain more than just territory from a war with Guyana. A successful war also might result in significant domestic political gains. Internal conflict change for the initiator from the year preceding the crisis to the year of crisis itself will be the independent variable.'s For example, in the case of Tel Mutillah (no. 12 in Table 1), which began in 1951, internal conflict change for Israel ("i") is assessed from 1950 to 1951. In keeping with the concern for dynamics, increases in domestic conflict are hypothesized to have a more frequent linkage with crisis escalation, while decreases should be associated more often with de-escalation. While the choice of a one-year measurement period may appear simple and arbitrary, it is conventional when constructing a model to add complexity only as it becomes necessary. In addition, a longer period would increase the difficulties in distinguishing the effects of internal conflict change from other events, while a shorter time-frame would make the gathering of data virtually impossible. With respect to the model's intervening variable, an appropriate environmental constraint on escalation in this context is the expected value from war in terms of foreign policy. Bilateral expected utility provides a more comprehensive assessment than power asymmetry alone. As will become apparent later, it incorporates the amount of policy change at risk in addition to the probabilities of victory and defeat. If the expected value for "i" from a bilateral war with "j" is denoted by E(Ui)b, the reformulated model of the conflict nexus may be presented as follows:'9 An increasein domesticconflict for the initiatorof an internationalcrisis raises the probabilitythat the crisis will escalate to war, subject to the constraint E(Ui)b > 0.

Several measurements must be derived prior to testing this model. In particular, domestic conflict, expected value for the initiator, and foreign conflict, all require operational rendering.

18 The internalconflict data are aggregatedon an annualbasis, so it is impossible to measure change over the exact one-year period preceding the outbreak of an internationalcrisis. However, the current approach does give an approximate measurementof the trend in domestic conflict over the pre-crisisphase. 19 The notation used for expected value corresponds to that of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). Externalization of Conflict 585

Operationalization of the Model There is an extensive record from which to draw when considering measurement strategies for domestic conflict. Comprehensiveness is the primary consideration, and data are available on a wide range of political interactions. In separate investigations, both Gurr and Hibbs have concluded that there are two fundamental kinds of domestic conflict: protest behaviour and civil war. Their research has produced empirical support for the existence of these discrete dimensions, which have been used in subsequent studies of conflict linkage.20 One rigorous application is that of Ward and Widmaier, who used variables from the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators to construct indices for each of the two dimensions identified by Hibbs and Gurr. To operationalize protest behaviour, they relied upon protest demonstrations and political strikes, while for civil war they used armed attacks and deaths resulting from domestic political conflict.21 In the present study, domestic conflict will be based on an aggregation of the indicators from the Ward and Widmaier study. Each component of domestic conflict will be structured in the manner described for protest demonstrations:

m, = ? log (1 + mt - ml(t-)) (1) where m, = change in the number of protest demonstrations for "i"; = the number of protest demonstrations in the year of the mlt crisis (t); = the number of protest demonstrations in the previous m,(t-1) year (t- 1). The other components are: m2 = change in the number of political strikes; m, = change in the number of armed attacks;

m4 = change in the number of deaths from domestic violence. The properties of equation (1) require some explanation. It measures the proportional change in protest demonstrations for the initiator from the year preceding the crisis (t- 1) to the year of crisis (t). 20 Rigorousderivations of these categoriesappear in Ted RobertGurr, WhyMen Rebel (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1970);and Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National CausalAnalysis (New York: Wiley, 1973). While some of the studies relying upon factor analysis also produced wide-ranging componentsof internaland externalconflict, they derivedfactors statisticallyand then correlatedthem. The currentapproach is differentbecause civil war andprotest behaviourare hypothesizedto show specific linkagesto crisis outcomes. 21 Wardand Widmaier("The Domestic-ForeignConflict Nexus") also consideredthe use of riots to representdomestic conflict. However, they discovered that data on 586 PATRICK JAMES

The focus on proportional change-involving a logarithmic transformation-reflects a concern with cross-national comparison of conflict. Absolute change in the frequency of events (for instance, from 9 to 23 political strikes) is not a commensurate indicator because size of population varies from one state to the next. Larger states will tend to have more events of all kinds, thus resulting in a biased assessment of change. The logarithmic transformation reduces the impact of extremely high absolute frequencies and facilitates cross-national comparison.22 Within the logarithmic expression, when mit - = 0, then = 0 also, which explains the increment of one unit.ml(t-1) The protest mldemonstration component (and any other component) becomes positive or negative depending upon the direction of the change. Comprehensiveness requires that the four components of internal conflict be aggregated. Among the constituents of such an index, positive and moderate levels of association are desirable. As Table 2 demonstrates, the indicators of internal conflict have these properties. The correlation coefficients range from r = 0.1290 to r = 0.6036. Higher correlations would imply redundancy among the components. Very low (or negative) values also would be inappropriate, because the indicators are supposed to be measuring different aspects of the same underlying phenomenon.23 There are two options available with respect to the aggregation of components: summation and multiplication. Table 3 displays six versions of the model of internal conflict change generated by these approaches. The summated models are X1 for protest behaviour, X2 for civil war and X3 for the two combined; models X4, X, and X6 are analogous but the components are multiplied, not added. The fundamental difference between the two forms of aggregation is that multiplication gives greater weight to an even distribution of scores. Consider the following sets of component values: (4,2,4,2) and (3,3,3,3). riots exhibitedreliability problems across the two volumes of the WorldHandbook and therefore excluded that variable from the measurementof civil war. For definitions of protest demonstrations,political strikes, armed attacks, and deaths fromdomestic violence, see CharlesLewis Taylorand David H. Jodice (eds.), World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (3rd ed.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). 22 The use of percentages rather than logarithmswould create a bias in the other direction.For example,in percentageterms a change from 1 to 2 would outweighan increasefrom 10to 15(100% compared to 50%).By contrast,in logarithmicterms the respective scores generated by equation (1) would be 0.30 and 0.78. Another alternative-weightingthe scores by populationsize-would have approximatelythe same effect as the logarithmictransformation. However, it also would requirethe incorporation of further data, thus increasing the risk of using unreliable cross-nationalstatistics. 23 This analysis is borrowed from Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth,1983), 371. Externalization of Conflict 587

Addition of the components would produce an overall score of 12 in each instance, while multiplication would result in scores of 64 and 81, respectively. The rationale behind the multiplicative variant is that consistent scores across the categories of conflict represent more dramatic change than high magnitudes on some components and not on others. TABLE 2

COMPONENTS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT: PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (N= 131) Protest Political Armed demonstrations strikes attacks

Political strikes 0.3774 Armed attacks 0.2796 0.2927 Deaths from domestic violence 0.1636 0.1290 0.6036

TABLE 3

SIX MODELS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT

2 2 X = mj X4= II mj j=1 j=1 4 4 X2= mj Xs = II m1 j=3 j=3 4 4 X = ~ m X6= II mj j=1 j=1 mj : ",th" componentof internalconflict (j= 1, .... ,4). X, : Summationof componentsof protest behaviour. X, : Summationof componentsof civil war. X3 : Summationof componentsof protestbehaviour and civil war. X4 : Multiplicationof componentsof protest behaviour. X, : Multiplicationof componentsof civil war. X6 : Multiplicationof componentsof protest behaviourand civil war. 588 PATRICK JAMES

Calculations for each of the six models will be illustrated using the case of Essequibo Territory. In that crisis Venezuela played the role of initiator. Its event frequencies for 1967 and 1968 (years t-1 and t, respectively) appear in Table 4, as do the transformed component (mi through m4) and model (X1 through X6) scores.

TABLE 4

COMPONENTS AND MODELS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT: VALUES FOR ESSEQUIBO TERRITORY

The generic equation appears first, followed by the four component equations: = + mi [log (1+ mit-mi(t->1) ) ] ki* (i=1, ..., 4) m, = [log(1+ 1- 0 )] + 2.15 = 2.45 m2 = [log(1+ 0- 0 )]+ 2.56 = 2.56 m3 = - [log(l+ 3-17 )]+ 2.56= 1.38 m4 = [log (1+ 23-21 ) ] + 4.41 = 4.89

The scores for the six models are derived as follows:

X, = m1 + m2 = 2.45 + 2.56= 5.01 X2= m3+ m4= 1.38 + 4.89 = 6.27 X, = X1 + X2 = 5.01 + 6.27 = 11.28 X4= m2 = 2.45 x 2.56= 6.27 m1• X5 = m3 x m4 = 1.38 x 4.89 = 6.76 X6 = X4 x X5 = 6.27 x 6.76 = 42.44

* For the models in which components are multiplied, zero or negative component scores would render the overall scores meaningless. Thus each component requires an increment (ki, i = 1 ..., 4) to ensure that its value will be above zero.

Bilateral expected value is the intervening variable in the model. Internal conflict supplies an important motive for escalation; expected value gauges opportunity. Expected utility for "i" from a war with "j" is calculated as follows:

E(Ui)b = Pi(1 - U1i) + (1 - - 1) (2) Pi)(Ui where E(Ui)b = "i's" expected value from a bilateral war with "j"; P, = the probability that "i" would defeat "j" in a war; Externalization of Conflict 589

U, = "i's" utility for "j's" policies; 1 - Pi = the probability that "i" would be defeated by "j" in a war.

These components are derived at great length in The War Trap, Bueno de Mesquita's highly acclaimed study of war, so only a brief explanation will be offered here.24 The expected value for "i" from a bilateral war with "j" depends on two factors. One is the probability of winning; the other is the amount to be gained or lost. The first component of equation (2) represents the product of "i's" probability of winning (Pi), with the amount to be gained (1 - U1,), the current discrepancy between "i's" utility for its own policies (1, the maximum) and those of'"j" (Uu, a value ranging from -1 to +1). The second component is analogous, with the probability of "i's" losing (l-Pi) being multiplied by the amount of policy change that "j" would enforce on "i" (U1, - 1). Utility scores have been derived in the manner followed by Bueno de Mesquita in his study, which relied upon alliance commitments to measure congruity in foreign policy.25 The probability terms, however, are measured differently. Gross National Product (GNP) figures have been used to assess relative power, upon which probability is based.26 The term Pi, for example, is represented by "i's" fraction of the combined GNP for "i" and "j." Following Bueno de Mesquita, the power of the initiator is adjusted using a "loss of strength" gradient to account for the effects of distance on capability.27 With respect to validity and reliability of measurement, GNP is a reasonable choice. Compared to the most likely alternative-the Correlates of War (COW) Project Index-GNP appears to produce equal or less distortion. A prominent example cited by Organski and Kugler is the comparison of Egyptian and Israeli power at the outbreak of the Six Day War. Although each measurement favours Egypt, GNP grants it 61 per cent of the power while for COW the share is 73 per cent.28 Based on this example, and the otherwise relatively close connection between the indicators, there is little reason to believe that the addition of five other components from the COW Index would constitute an improvement. Another reason for the choice of GNP is the nature of the task at hand. Organski and Kugler observed that GNP is less useful in predicting outcomes of wars that involve developing countries.29 However, the

24 Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap, 46-49. 25 Bueno de Mesquita has made his data available for many of the 133 cases; the other utility scores have been calculated as described in The War Trap, 109-18. 26 The primary source for GNP data is the United Nations Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook (New York: UN Department of Social Affairs, 1948-1975). 27 The War Trap, 105. 28 A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 67. 29 Ibid., 68. 590 PATRICK JAMES

present research is not concerned with forecasting which state will win a war. Instead, the goal is to use expected value to help distinguish wars from crises that have de-escalated. Modifying GNP with a measurement of political capacity (like Organski and Kugler) would not necessarily constitute an improvement. And some crisis outcomes undoubtedly have occurred because national leaders assess their relative power in terms of salient and relatively simple indicators, like GNP. On reliability, limitations of space prevent a full response to Moul's critique of GNP as a measurement of power.30 However, one significant consideration is that his analysis concentrated on the traditional great powers of Europe. It did not include the full range of Third World states for which data reliability problems are severe in the case of multivariate measurements. Bilateral expected utility will have three values: positive, zero and negative. It is hypothesized that these values will have significant threshold effects on the probability of crisis escalation. As internal conflict increases to higher levels, war is most likely to result when expected utility is positive, less probable at zero, and least likely when losses are expected.31 War, and other forms of crisis resolution, are the two categories of the dependent variable. The definition of war will follow closely that of the COW Project. An international war is distinguished by (1) the political status of participants, which must be nation-states; and (2) 1,000 or more battle-related casualties.32 Crises that are less destructive than the threshold set by the second condition are classified as de-escalations. In the data set of 133 international crises, there are 19 wars, each of which is distinguished in Table 1 by italic type.

30 William B. Moul, "Measuring the Balances of Power: A Look at Some Numbers," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, 1986. 31 The zero cases occur only between allies with identical alliance commitments. Thus even small positive or negative values are regarded as fundamentally different from scores of zero. 32 These rules of categorization are discussed at length in Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980), 31-61. There are a few points of disagreement with COW concerning the wars that are included in Table 1. China Civil War (1948), Indonesian Independence (1948) and War of Attrition (1969) are here counted as wars even though they are not in the Singer-Small compilation. The first case is regarded as suitable because the US and Nationalist China were involved in the crisis and each was a nation-state, with the transition for the People's Republic into recognized status being difficult to pinpoint. When the military operations of the Dutch are taken into consideration, the Indonesian case is consistent with the conventional meaning of warfare, even though the casualty levels sustained are not easy to specify. An exception also is made for the War of Attrition because the historical record demonstrates that the participants considered it to be a war in the common sense of the word. Externalization of Conflict 591

Analysis of Data Since the dependent variable in the model is binary (war versus other forms of crisis resolution), probit analysis is appropriate for testing. This technique resembles Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, but has certain modifications that take the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable into account. Like a regression analysis, probit generates a coefficient and standard error for each independent variable, along with a significance level (from a one-tailed t-test).33 However, the estimated value for the dependent variable is analogous to a probability score, ranging from 0 to 1. In other words, an estimated probability of war is produced for each case in the analysis. Probit also uses a chi-square distribution to assess whether residuals are distributed homogeneously along the regression line.34 Finally, unlike regression's R2, there is no well-accepted summary statistic, and expert opinion currently is that use of such a statistic would be rather dubious.35 Application of probit analysis to the six models of externalization is straightforward. X,,...,X6 are independent variables, the effects of which are to be appraised seriatim. In each instance, bilateral expected value is the intervening variable which partitions the data set into three groups with hypothetically different response rates (probabilities of war). The binary dependent variable is coded as 0 or 1, corresponding to de-escalation and war, respectively. Table 5 contains the general results of the probit analysis.36 For each model, the coefficient is in the predicted direction and significant at the 5 per cent level or better. The chi-square values are favourable, with P > 0.964 at the minimum, indicating that the residuals are distributed homogeneously around the regression line. Based on the t-statistics, the best models are X3 and X6. Each of these models incorporates all four components of internal conflict. This result offers support for the argument made in favour of comprehensiveness. It is interesting to note that X6, the model in which the components are multiplied together, performs the best of all. This suggests that a comprehensive, interactive model of internal conflict is most capable of predicting crisis outcomes.

33 Probit is a "particular nonlinear specification of the probability model" for a dichotomous dependent variable. It is based on the cumulative normal distribution function. See John H. Aldrich and Forrest D. Nelson, Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Models (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984), 34-37. 34 Useful explanations of probit analysis can be found in SPSS, User's Guide (2nd ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986); and Aldrich and Nelson, Linear Probability, Logit, and Probit Models. 35 Ibid., 57-59. 36 Seven cases have been dropped from the analysis because of missing data, including two wars: Korean War I (1950), Ethiopia/Somalia (1960), Congo I: Katanga (1960), Mali Federation (1960), Congo II (1964), Guinea Regime (1965) and War In Angola (1975). 592 PATRICK JAMES

TABLE 5

RESULTS OF PROBIT ANALYSIS

t-statistic X2 Standard with with Model Coefficient error p value* p value*

X1 2.97 1.80 1.65 0.050 36.07 0.964 X2 2.38 1.26 1.88 0.050 60.23 0.999 XS 3.96 1.81 2.19 0.025 70.47 0.993 X4 1.51 0.89 1.69 0.050 36.82 0.995 X5 1.25 0.61 2.04 0.025 62.46 0.999 1.19 0.48 2.47 0.010 69.47 0.998 X6 * The p value representsthe thresholdprobability that has been passed by the test statistic. For example, p < 0.025 for Model X3's t-statistic in a one-tailed test of significance.

TABLE 6" INTERNATIONALWARS: PROBABILITIES OF OCCURRENCEACCORDING TO MODELSX1 -X,

Estimated probability

War E(Ui)b X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 Xl Israel Independence 3 .243 .127 .138 .251 .127 .146 China Civil War 3 .194 .391 .382 .196 .414 .374 Indonesia Independence III 3 .194 .223 .201 .201 .228 .210 Hungarian Uprising 3 .338 .357 .419 .347 .373 .477 Suez-Sinai Campaign 3 .267 .189 .206 .276 .157 .196 India/China Border II 3 .218 .278 .268 .224 .293 .290 Yemen War I 2 .201 .230 .257 .200 .249 .289 Gulf of Tonkin 1 .019 .017 .015 .019 .017 .015 Rann of Kutch 3 .491 .386 .533 .503 .413 .639 Yemen War IV 2 .135 .223 .212 .135 .234 .210 Six Day War 3 .218 .223 .214 .224 .228 .229 War of Attrition I 3 .170 .164 .135 .174 .174 .143 Football War 2 .135 .136 .123 .135 .137 .123 Bangladesh 3 .417 .501 .613 .431 .521 .681 North/South Yemen I 2 .135 .238 .228 .135 .239 .214 October-Yom Kippur War 3 .233 .189 .188 .228 .191 .194 Cyprus III 3 .267 .154 .174 .276 .151 .187

* Korean War I and War in Angola are excluded because of missing data. The values for E(Ui)b are 1 = negative, 2 = zero and 3 = positive.

Limitations of space prevent inclusion of the probability distributions for each model. There are three such curves per model, corresponding to the subsets of cases isolated by the intervening variable. Figure 1 shows one of these 18 curves, the probability Externalization of Conflict 593 distributionfor Model X, with E(Ui)b > 0. The classic probit curve is evident in this figure. Decreases in internalconflict are associated with a very low probabilityof war. Aroundthe centre of the distributionthere is an accelerationin the likelihoodof war. At the high end of the spectrum, a point of saturation is reached, and further increments of internal conflict have little effect on the probabilityof war.

FIGURE 1

PLOT OF PROBIT ANALYSIS FOR MODEL X6 WITH E(Ui)b > 0

1.0

0.9-

0.8-

0.7

0.6-

0.5

0.4-

0.3

0.2-

0.1

0. OI I

2.19 x 10 3.14 x 10: 2.39 x 104

Although the models have received general confirmation, it is interesting to focus more directly on the wars in the data set. Table 6 displays the wars, their classifications according to bilateral expected 594 PATRICK JAMES value and the probability of war estimated by each model. At first glance the predicted probabilities appear to be rather low, with only a few in excess of 50 per cent. However, these conservative estimates are an artifact of the skewed nature of the dependent variable. Since the results generated by Models X3 and X, are very similar, X6, the marginally better of the two, will receive further attention. Bilateral expected utility clearly plays an important role in determining the probability of war in Model X6. Table 7 displays the relative median potencies for the three subgroups based on bilateral expected utility. For any pair of subgroups, the score represents the ratio of stimulus tolerances. In each subgroup the stimulus tolerance is the level of the independent variable (X6) required to produce a 50 per cent chance of war. The differences across the subgroups with respect to stimulus tolerances are striking. For example, the ratio between the negative and positive expected utility subgroups is greater than 15. In other words, when E(U1)b is negative, as opposed to positive, the level of X, required to produce a 50 per cent estimated probability of war is over 15 times as great. TABLE 7

RELATIVE MEDIAN POTENCIES AND PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR EXPECTED UTILITY SUBGROUPS

Pair of Groups Relative Median Potency Negative/Zero 6.64 Negative/Positive 15.88 Zero/Positive 2.39

Expected Utility Subgroup Intercept/Standard Error Negative 0.70/1.07 = 0.66 Zero 1.68/1.01 = 1.66 Positive 2.13/0.90 = 2.36

With respect to the estimated models for each subgroup, the parallelism chi-square value is 18.99 (p < 0.001). This chi-square is sizeable and indicates that the regression slopes are not equivalent across the subgroups. Furthermore, the ratio of the intercept to the standard error for each subgroup (also listed in Table 7) shows that the response rate increases with ascending levels of bilateral expected utility. Based on these results, it might be suggested that the success of Model X, merely reflects bilateral expected value. However, a comparison of E(Ui)b alone with crisis resolution does not support that assertion. Table 8 crosstabulates the three categories of expected value Externalization of Conflict 595 with the two crisis outcomes. It is clear from this table that non-negative expected utility is virtually a necessary condition for war; 45 out of 46 cases with negative expected utility resulted in de-escalation. But when expected utility is positive, 41 out of 53 crises-77.4 per cent-still do not result in war. This high "false alarm" rate indirectly brings out the value of internal conflict change as a predictor of crisis resolution. Models such as X3 and X, are able to distinguish "false alarms" from actual wars by assigning them different probabilities of occurrence. As a general rule, cases of war have received higher probability scores, as would be expected on the basis of the favourable statistics from Table 5. TABLE 8

BILATERAL EXPECTED UTILITY AND CRISIS OUTCOMES

Crisis Outcome

De-escalation War

Negative 45 1 46 97.8% 2.2% 36.5%

Bilateral Expected Zero 23 4 27 Utility 85.2% 14.8% 21.4%

Positive 41 12 53 77.4% 22.6% 42.1%

109 17 126 86.5% 13.5%

Some cases involving Pakistan from the E(Ui)b > 0 subgroup provide useful illustrations of this. The crises over Pushtunistan I-II (nos. 8 and 26 in Table 1) featured Pakistan as the initiator and Afghanistan as the defender. For each of the cases of de-escalation, the estimated probability of war is less than 0.20. The crisis that escalated to war over Bangladesh (no. 113) also included Pakistan as the initiator 596 PATRICK JAMES

(with Bangladesh as the defender), but its estimated probability of war exceeds 0.68. Although extreme by comparison to the differences within other subsets of cases, this discrepancy in estimated probabilities brings out the variation among cases of war and de-escalation in the subgroup. There are two subsets of deviant cases to consider: wars with low estimated probabilities of occurrence and de-escalations with high estimated probabilities of war. Among the 17 cases of war, the two lowest probabilities assigned by Model X, are 0.015 and 0.123, for the Gulf of Tonkin and the Football War, respectively (nos. 87 and 108 in Table 1). The first case signalled the onset of the Vietnam War, a conflict that has stimulated numerous discussions of its peculiarity. An explanatory model based on expected value and internal conflict experienced by the crisis initiator cannot encompass the dynamics of escalation in this case. North Vietnam pursued its war of reunification despite overwhelming physical capabilities possessed by the United States. It is reasonable to conclude that the sustained warfare reflected the incongruous boundaries that had resulted from colonialism, not the domestic politics of North Vietnam. With respect to the Football War, Honduras and El Salvador fought as a result of demographic and economic issues, although escalation occurred soon after soccer-induced rioting in each country. Model X, assigns a relatively large value to this case, 66.38, a level exceeding more than 58 per cent of the other crises. However, given that E(Ui)b = 0 for Honduras, the resulting probability score is not very high. In such cases, only a very exceptional increase in domestic conflict will generate a significant likelihood of war. When further information about the situation in Honduras is considered, there is reason to believe that the value of X, may understate the level of instability. Consider this description of the background to the crisis: Honduras,a sparsely-populatedcountry, was the domicile of large numbersof Salvadoranswho had left overcrowdedEl Salvadorin the decade precedingthis crisis. Salvadoransslipped over the borderinto Hondurasto farm,squat or work on the bananaplantations. Reports of their ill-treatmentwere broughtto the attentionof El Salvador.In Honduras,the economic situationwas bleak, with societal unrest increasing.37 This suggests that conflict within Honduras had a primarily latent character. Protest behaviour and civil war remained much the same from 1968 to 1969, but those are explicit, collective activities. Discontent in Honduras simmered below the surface, with ethnic tensions and economic problems requiring only a catalyst to produce violent conflict. Although Model X, has produced lower estimates than chance for Vietnam and the Football War, these cases have some unusual 37 Brecher and Wilkenfield, Handbook, Case Summary #203. Externalization of Conflict 597 characteristics. Those of Vietnam are almost legendary. In the case of the Football War, some limitations are revealed in the measurement of internal conflict on the basis of collective action. Virtually all of the cases with the greatest estimated probabilities actually became wars. Two exceptional crises are Prague Spring and Goa I (nos. 100 and 27 in Table 1). Among the de-escalations, these cases have the highest probabilities in the E(Ui)b = 0 and E(Ui)b > 0 subgroups, respectively. As anticipated, cases in which E(Ui)b < 0 have uniformly low estimated probabilities of war. Model X, assigns Prague Spring a probability of 0.417 and Goa I an estimate of 0.487. Factors producing de-escalation are not difficult to identify in the first case. Liberal trends in Czechoslovakia in 1968 threatened not only the stability of East Germany, the defender in the crisis, but that of the entire Warsaw Pact. On June 27, about two weeks after the outset of the crisis, a Czech publication called for acceleration of political reforms, and that triggered a crisis for the USSR, the coalition leader. After a series of unsuccessful negotiations, a Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia took place on August 20 and met with no resistance.38 With respect to the model of crisis resolution, increasing internal conflict and a non-negative bilateral expected value suggest that Czechoslovakia might have gone to war against East Germany over their political differences. However, the Prague Spring included one of the superpowers as an intermediary favouring East Germany. Thus a systemic analysis that emphasizes coalition dynamics is more useful in explaining the outcome of this crisis. Goa I, the 1955 crisis initiated by India against Portugal, features positive expected utility and an increase in domestic conflict that is among the highest in the data set. Tension increased that summer over the Portuguese enclave of Goa on the west coast of India. On August 15, Indian demonstrators crossed the Goan border and Portuguese police and soldiers responded by firing on the crowd. Diplomatic exchanges between Portugal and India followed, and the crisis de-escalated when Indian Prime Minister Nehru asserted in Parliament that India had no intention of fighting a war over Goa.39 India's government had not inspired the demonstrations over Goa, and that had some impact on the resolution of the crisis. Nehru disapproved of the agitation over Goa, preferring a negotiated settlement of the issue. Despite favourable expected value conditions and a motive to project conflict, the potential gains did not justify fighting a war, at least in the mind of Nehru. Looking beyond the anomalous cases, there are several directions which could be followed by subsequent research. One would be to investigate specific regions and time periods to determine whether these

38 Brecher and Wilkenfield, Handbook, Case Summary #194. 39 Brecher and Wilkenfield, Handbook, Case Summary #115. 598 PATRICK JAMES are significant intervening variables. Another possibility is the pursuit of individual case studies. Specific cases would provide the depth of analysis that necessarily is lacking in an aggregate study.40 It also would be interesting to reverse the direction of cause and effect between internal and external conflict. For example, the ICB data set could be used to examine the impact of crises on their participants in the post-crisis period.

Conclusion The conflict and cohesion model has a mixed character. It is plausible in theory, yet previous testing has not provided it with much support. Testing in the nexus of crisis and war is helpful in explaining why that contradiction has persisted. Foreign and domestic conflict appear to have a connection, but only when concept formation and measurement meet precise specifications. Conflict, this article has suggested, should be assessed in dynamic and integrative terms. Environmental constraints on projection also must be incorporated. When these factors are given due consideration, the results are encouraging. Further research on externalization should emphasize the crucial linkage of theory with the practice of testing.

40 Lawson's conclusions about Syria's 1976 intervention in Lebanon are consistent with several of the arguments made in the present study. See Fred H. Lawson, "Syria's Intervention in the Lebanese Civil War, 1976: A Domestic Conflict Explanation," International Organization 38 (1984), 451-80.