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THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale

THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale

The NGO Safety Office Issue: 67 1-15 February 2011

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 Historically, February pre- dislodgement of AOG in fluid context where the 7 Northern Region sents as one of the least light of these operations various groups (arbakis- Western Region 14 ‘kinetic’ months of the year, will need to be monitored ALP-AOG) are beginning partially due to the harsh cli- in the short term. to clash due to competing Eastern Region 16 mactic conditions that ham- In contrast, AOG opera- interests, and the resulting Southern Region 19 per all parties to the conflict. tions, beyond the standard power struggle is creating a However, following an ex- paradoxical destabilising ANSO Info Page 23 tactical efforts of IEDs and tremely active January, this close range attacks, were element. It is advised that month will likely break with highlighted by the focus on NGOs monitor the pro- this trend as armed opposi- regional centres this period. gress of these programs as YOU NEED TO KNOW tion has accounted for 380 The concentrated IED they will be a defining dy- incidents this period alone. namic, particularly at a lo- • Security force operations in campaign in and Put into perspective, by mid- the shopping centre suicide cal level, for the upcoming the North, South, and Cen- month, 70% of the February year. tral attack in (the 2nd 2010 total has been reached this year), while notewor- This period also accounted • AOG focused attacks (see graph p.5). This can be thy, were eclipsed by the for 5 NGO incidents, with within regional centres attributed to a variety of fac- dramatic daytime siege of 2 from Central and 3 in the tors, including the unrelent- the ANP HQ in Kandahar. East. Abductions occurred • 2nd NGO staff fatality re- ing pace of security force corded this period In general, attacks of this in Kunar and Wardak, operations, a mild winter type represent a minimum along with the murder of a • Transition planning ongoing season, and the overall of tactical investment in national staff member in maturity of the conflict (as return for maximum Nangarhar, this accounting supported by the stable year strategic impact, particularly for the second NGO fatal- to year incident growth rate on perceptions of insecu- ity in 2011, both of whom ANSO is supported by illustrated on p.12). While rity. As such, they pose an were national staff. An in- many of these incidents are AOG counterpoint to the cident in Logar highlighted low level, inconclusive tacti- dialogue on security gains the diverse challenges faced cal engagements, it nonethe- achieved at the conclusion by NGO operating in con- less provides a provocative of last year. tested areas when following indicator of an extremely the occupation of an NGO active year ahead. In addition, the Afghan Peace and Reconciliation run clinic by security As noted, security force op- Process (APRP) is gaining forces, AOG forced the erations have continued momentum, primarily in the ongoing closure of the apace this period, primarily North and to a lesser de- clinic in retribution. focused on AOG strong- gree in the West. While Lastly, the topic of transi- holds in the South and large numbers of tion came to the fore this North, though Kapisa also ‘reintegrees’ have been re- period, with both Herat recorded activity. These have ported, the follow up in this and Nangarhar hosting resulted in significant num- initiative remains unclear. meetings whose agendas bers of AOG kill/captures, In some areas, the APRP is included the pending with IED discovery rates also feeding into the Afghan transfer of lead security on the increase. However, Local Police (ALP) pro- authority to the GoA and the effects of the subsequent gram, resulting in a very ANSF by 2014. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

C ENTRAL REGION

NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 Whereas the onset of the winter 40 season froze the conflict dynamics Unless further investigation or 30 in most parts of the Central Re- comments by AOG leadership 20 gion, and was reflected by only 3 contradict the current findings, it 10 should be assumed that the attack AOG initiated attacks in Kabul 0 Province, the capital city wit- was broadly aimed at hitting an- nessed the brunt, with two IED other soft-target inside the inner incidents including another sui- security perimeter, posing as the KABUL AOG KABUL Crime cide attack inside the city’s secu- AOG counter-narrative to GOA & IMF discourse on the security rity perimeter as well as a mag- intent for targeting, a willingness to limit col- netic IED against an empty ANSF gains achieved throughout 2010. The strike also underlined the lateral casualties, as well as an intention to vehicle. The present AOG pat- avoid any direct engagement with ANSF. Un- tern in Kabul City identifies less current AOG focus on selecting tactically simpler missions which til recently, ‘sticky bombs’ were not a typical reliance on larger scale complex tactical method for AOGs in Kabul. How- attacks and an increased focus on result in significant media atten- tion. NGOs should keep an eye ever, two recent cases preceded the Jade Mai- surgical strikes against softer- wand strike, one in Kabul and another one in targets. on what is to be seen as an extant threat of further attacks against Maidan Shahr. Of note, the former attack tar- Shortly after the noon prayer time civilian venues which combine the geted an ANA vehicle in Puli Omomi, PD 1, on 14 February, two armed following risk factors: a) high- on 24 December 2010 and featured striking guards, manning a lateral entry profile, b) easily accessible, and c) similarities with the latest incident. This occur- point in the / ‘target-rich’ (or perceived as such) rence may also represent a more permanent (PD 4), - for it may be assumed that this addition to AOG operational tactics in Kabul spotted a BBIED attacker on the type of attack will be reproduced, City, and is best mitigated by ensuring that street. An exchange of SAF en- adding up to the more traditional NGO vehicles are never left unattended. sued, resulting in the attacker be- portfolio of AOG suicide mis- Altogether, the picture of recent AOG attacks ing shot and injured, though he sions exploring vulnerabilities of needs to be balanced by acknowledging the was close enough to the entrance ANSF/IMF travel patterns in Ka- active stance of ANSF and IMF in disrupting to kill the two guards when his bul City. AOG networks, namely in relation to the se- charge detonated. Three bystand- ries of recent arrests of operatives implicated ers were also wounded in the ex- The other AOG attack, an IED in Jade Maiwand (PD 1) on 8 Febru- in previous suicide attacks. These have in- plosion. The area was cordoned cluded a planner involved in the December off shortly afterwards, with the ary was more typical in its target- ing (ANSF vehicle), but innova- 2010 strike in Puli Charkhi as well as in the ANSF engaging in building search January 2011 motorcycle-mounted IED in operation, though this search did tive when it comes to tactics. A magnetic IED with a time-delay Saraye Alauddin, and a ‘fixer’ who facilitated not result in any further encoun- the transportation of the ‘Finest Market’ ters with AOG. The IEA claimed mechanism was stuck and subse- quently detonated against a parked bomber to Kabul. Along with Kabul City, responsibility for the attack in a Deh Sabz, , and Khaki Jab- press-release, but did not com- Traffic Police Ranger. The light charge damaged the car but did bar have also witnessed increased numbers of ment on the target selection, police operations. rather praising the attacker for not result in casualties. The usage engaging the security forces. of a sticky bomb indicates clear THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 1 LOGAR This Report Period 1 50 On the night of 26 January, a joint 40 forces are not common, whereas ANSF and IMF detachment set 30 their base inside the Basic Health multiple other cases have been 20 Center (BHC) operated by an attributed to AOG both in Logar NGO in the Shaykhan Village of and Wardak provinces. 10 Kharwar, occupying the clinic In light of AOG modus operandi, 0 until 1 February. When the mili- this incident also followed a well- tary left, an AOG element entered established pattern of AOGs scru- the village and barred physical tinizing communities immediately LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime access into the facility in retribu- following contact with security tive calm dominated by reduced AOG activity tion. The clinic has been effec- forces, with cases of intimidation and occasional IMF & ANSF surgical strikes. tively closed down ever since. or retribution against communi- These strikes against AOG leadership in the NGO-run facilities often repre- ties accused of ‘cooperating’ with central districts along the Kabul – Gardez sent a community’s primary asset IMF documented in the past. Highway were seconded by pre-emptive opera- both in terms of access to services Besides directly impacting access tions aimed at securing peripheral areas before as well as of physical infrastruc- to NGO services, interferences by the on-set of the spring fighting season, as ture. In many areas, NGO facili- any armed parties bring about the seen in Kharwar and Charkh. risk of NGO project sites becom- ties present one of the only Overall, NGO access during this cycle tempo- ‘hardened’ structures (and usually ing targets in the wider conflict, and pose a direct threat to the rarily improved, although the risks of AOG centrally located), offering a de- checkpoints & abductions, IED activity and fendable position and tactical safety of NGO staff and benefici- aries. violent political and criminal escalations along cover for those who option to the main roads remain extant components of occupy it. Nevertheless, similar In general, and similar to Wardak, the security environment in the province. occurrences involving security Logar witnessed a period of rela-

NGO Incidents DAYKUNDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 Typical for the winter season, the 40 NGO operational environment during which two Kajrani resi- 30 dents (reportedly members of was dominated by an omnipresent 20 risk of avalanches in high- ANSF) were taken hostage on mountain passes and a general their way to their home district. 10 reduction in vehicular accessibility The news flared up local passions 0 on the majority of road networks. and instigated a Kajrani potentate Kajran marked the only two en- to detain a Helmandi mullah in tries related to man-made inci- the Kajran bazaar, releasing the DAYKUNDI AOG DAYKUNDI Crime dents, which again concentrated individual once a promise had on the main roads linking the dis- been made of intervention in fa- behalf of the ten detainees in Kajran, and man- trict to the southern provinces, vour of the Kajrani abductees in aged to secure their release. The two Kajrani and illustrated the uneasy Helmand. The lack of progress abductees taken in Helmand, however, remain neighbourly relations in the bor- from Helmand prompted further in captivity. action, this time the ambitious der areas. Roadside criminality, The outlook for the upcoming weeks will un- although a perennial concern in detention of 10 passengers transit- ing in 5 trucks from Kandahar via equivocally bring about humanitarian issues the province, did not come to play linked to access and snow-related disasters and this period. Uruzgan and Kajran to Helmand on 2 February, apparently to serve sporadic escalations in the south will remain a In late January, reports reached as an incentive for his Baghran distant possibility; though both being permissi- Kajran bazaar of an abduction counterparts to release the two ble in as much as any other human endeavors perpetrated by an AOG com- Kajranis. Once again, a local dele- are allowed by the weather. mander in Baghran (Helmand), gation of elders intervened on THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 50

This Report Period 0 40 Security dynamics in Kapisa were largely dictated by an IMF & checkpoints along main roads, as 30 ANSF offensive in the districts of well as the tracking down of AOG 20 Tagab and Alasay, which also en- elements and materiel. The mo- 10 mentum remained on the IMF & compassed some of the most in- 0 tensive combat operations seen in ANSF side, with AOG opting for the Central Region thus far. disengagement from direct en- counters, withdrawing towards On 31st January, IMF initiated a safe heavens, and eventual retreat KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime series of surgical strikes in Tagab, into adjacent districts. The Uzbin which largely took form of Special Valley in Surobi reportedly ab- historical HIG commanders, who constitute Force ground operations accom- sorbed a significant portion of the core of the current IEA leadership in the panied by close-air support, seem- AOG fighters. On the ground, province, leaving other elements of anti-GOA ingly targeting known IEA leaders the AOG riposte to the offensive networks largely intact. Whether the operation along the Tagab-Surobi Road encompassed increased IED ac- was aimed at securing the main district roads, (Sheikhel) and Tagab – Alasay tivity in an attempt to secure ac- or rather eliminating the detailed circle of es- Road (Nyazkhel). As a result of cess towards the safe heavens and tablished IEA commanders, is yet to be seen. the initial push, at least 3 higher- support bases. Anecdotal evi- While recent adverse weather conditions will rank IEA commanders were killed dence also suggested that the likely affect the willingness of both sides to and one seriously injured (and AOG increased financial incen- initiate larger-scale engagements, IMF surgical detained) in Tagab, while an addi- tives for capturing or killing mem- operations may be expected to re-occur in the tional 2 IEA commanders were bers of security forces, including coming weeks. In such context, NGOs should targeted but managed to escape in those enrolled in local defence monitor for possible conflict spill-over in the Alasay (Chahar Qala cluster). The initiatives. adjacent areas and along the main roads, and follow-up operations included Local reporting emphasized that intensive IED activity and increased IMF temporary IMF bases in cluster movements should be anticipated. villages, increased amounts of the operations largely concen- trated on a particular network of

TRAINING NOTICE: ANSO will be conducting free Basic Guard training and Radio Communications training for NGOs in Kabul City beginning on the 27th of February 2011. Please note that the two training courses are separate, take one whole day each, and will only be available in Kabul City during this period; however, organisations with staff in the surrounding provinces are more than welcome to bring them in for training if feasible. Additionally, note that registration for the training will be closed as of 1630 hrs on the 24 of February – NO EXCEPTIONS. And as usual, the ANSO trainer will be rotating through the ANSO field offices in Mazar-e Sharif, Herat City, Jalalabad City, and Kandahar City at later dates to also provide this training. (ANSO will notify you of these dates at a later time). If you would like the ANSO Trainer to conduct either of these courses at your office for your staff, please refer to the registration forms emailed previously or contact the Operations Coordinator National Counterpart, Masoud Habibi, at [email protected].

THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 1 WARDAK 100 This Report Period 1 The recent incident in Wardak 80 denotes a return to the pattern of 2010 and similar to the recent 60 case, 4 of the latter involved tem- AOG-initiated kidnappings of 40 NGO staff members. On 27 Janu- porary abductions (lasting usually 20 ary, an NGO temporary worker 1 to 3 days). Besides staff’s local drove his motorcycle into an identity and high levels of local 0 AOG patrol on the Chaki Wardak recognition for established NGOs in the province, engagement of – Day Mirdad Road. As per the WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime victim’s account, the AOG unit local elders in negotiations with AOG appears to play a key role in acted based on the allegation that pertaining to ANSF & IMF operations. The the staff member was a GOA a safe release of the hostages. Equally important, compliance current patterns clearly indicate a lull in kinetic agent tasked with recruiting local operations by AOG following an intensive men for service in the police force when facing AOG checkpoints, or attempted abductions, minimises fighting season, as well as a persistent IMF & and local defence initiative. Dur- ANSF focus on targeting the AOG leadership ing questioning, the staff member the possibilities of weapons use, therefore greatly reducing staff in key areas along important routes. The most was beaten, but persistently de- likely scenario for the coming weeks will up- nied the AOG accusations, em- risk. A separate incident high- lighted this reality when a local hold occasional ‘morale-boosting’ but low- phasizing instead his employment intensity engagements by AOGs, and sporadic with the NGO. After a day in driver failed to stop at an AOG checkpoint set on an auxiliary surgical strikes by IMF & ANSF in areas pe- captivity, local elders along with ripheral to their zones of control. NGOs may the victims’ relatives engaged the road in Saydabad and was subse- quently shot dead. anticipate violent escalations to concentrate abductors in negotiations which along the Kabul – Ghazni Highway in Sayda- The overall levels of violence re- ultimately concluded in the safe bad & Nirkh, as well as on major district roads mained very low in Wardak with release of the detainee. The inci- between Jalrez and Maidan Shahr DACs. dent prolongs the series of 5 less than 20 incident records so NGO abductions recorded in far, the overwhelming majority

January-February AOG Incident Comparison: 2006-2011 (as of 16 Feb 2011) 900

800

700

600 Jan 500 Feb 400

300

200

100

0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents PARWAN Year to Date 1 PARWAN This Report Period 0 50 In counterpoint to the intensive 40 fighting in Kapisa, and more in Abdi Bay area. While high-profile 30 line with other provinces of the killings do happen frequently in Central Region, Parwan witnessed Chaharikar, and mostly relate to 20 a limited number of incidents, local power-struggles, this killing 10 mostly of a political and criminal is reminiscent of the Jabalussaraj 0 nature, with targeted killings com- strike against a popular mullah ing to the fore. Reports about a (and an outspoken critic of local late-January escalation also jihadi factions) in late 2010, an PARWAN AOG PARWAN Crime reached out from the Quli Hir incident that has yet to be plausi- cluster in Shinwari, with the event bly explained. Similarly, the cir- taking revenge and killing a brother of the IEA triggering the otherwise antici- cumstances and motives behind commander. The latest escalation, although pated ANSF operation in the area. the latest assassination have not again following the personal level of conflict, Besides the low incident volumes, been revealed so far. preceded an anticipated ANSF operation. In- security developments during this On 30 January in Quli Hir, an deed, a two-hundred police force entered Quli cycle did not represent any signifi- IEA detachment largely consti- Hir, only to encounter a minimal resistance. cant changes in the NGO opera- tuted of former HIG fighters, Yet, two days later, a unit of six AOG fighters tional environment. executed the brother of a local presumably on the move from Quli Hir was While investigations into the re- head of the arbaki militia, himself arrested by ANP close to the DAC of the cent murder of an NGO female a seasoned HIG figure. The killing neighbouring Siyagerd district. trainer in the Sayadan Area have recalls a local history of blood For the rest of the period, the situation in the so far failed to elucidate the un- feuds, played out against the back- Ghorband Valley remained calm, with NGOs derlying motives of the attack, as ground of local factional infight- concerns largely oriented towards the heavy well as the identity of the attack- ings and IEA expansion. The snowfalls in the upper part of the valley, which ers, another high-profile killing arbaki commander’s father, an temporarily blocked overland access into was reported from Chaharikar influential mullah who had fought Bamyan via the Shibar Pass. Heavy precipita- during this cycle. This time, a along the HIG during the 1980s, tions combined with mild temperatures and prominent maulawi, member of opposed IEA’s expansion in the poor visibility also impacted vehicular traffic in the Provincial Ulema Council, and area and was killed presumably by the Salang Pass, with several occurrences of a doyen of Islamic education in the same group last year. This road closures and localized avalanches re- Parwan & Kapisa, was gunned murder then triggered a tribal ven- corded during the second week of the period. down by unknown attackers in the detta, with the militia commander

NOTICE: The provincial graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 9th of February 2011. THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

N ORTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents Year to Date 1 BALKH 50 This Report Period 0 Balkh was a particularly active 40 province this reporting period, der AOG operations and move- 30 with AOG activity re-emerging in ments throughout the district, 20 whether or not there have been Chimtal and Chahar Bolak Dis- 10 tricts—both known AOG strong- lasting changes in security since 0 holds that have been relatively that time remains questionable. quiet following recent IMF/ Chimtal is still considered an inse- ANSF operations in the area— cure district with 2 IEDs detonat- BALKH AOG BALKH Crime and military operations conducted ing on IMF patrols as recently as th in Dawlatabad and Nahri Shahi. late January. Later in the day fol- lage on the 6 , and an IED detonation on the th It is especially noteworthy that lowing this more recent detona- 10 . This latter likely the result of a premature insecurity in this region has begun tion, armed men approached the detonation, as the IED detonated while 2 to resurface along the roadways, destroyed vehicle in an attempt to AOG members were emplacing it along the which have been volatile in the pilfer spare parts, but were turned road in Arzan Kar village. The only person past. away by gunfire. However, they wounded was one of the AOG members plac- could not be stopped from return- ing it. In Chimtal, the head of the Crimi- ing later, and set the detonated nal Investigation Department Military operations were conducted in two dis- remains of the vehicle ablaze. (CID) in Chimtal was killed on tricts this period, both occurring during the Adding to this district’s insecurity, February 8th when an IED deto- late night/early morning hours of February a former Jihadi Commander was th th nated on his vehicle, killing him 10 /11 . One of these took place in Dawlata- assassinated outside his house in and injuring 4 other ANP soldiers. bad District, Qaraghujla Village, where IMF/ Arab Mazari on the 11th. The incident happened on a dis- ANA conducted a night raid with helicopters trict road at 1330 in Nawshahr Chahar Bolak, Chimtal’s neighbor and arrested 3 local civilians who had allegedly Naqilin area, a long standing to the north, also saw insecurity just returned from a trip to Iran. The 3 were AOG stronghold which had been on the highway along the widely suspected of being involved in the Islamic Ji- quiet of late. There have been traveled Mazar-Shibirgan road had Group (IJG)—which has known ties to unsubstantiated reports that the when, on February 5th, shots were the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), detonation was the result of a fired at an IMF convoy. Although and were accused of facilitating the movement RCIED, and that the trigger men this stretch of road has had a of AOG members from Iran and Pakistan into escaped by motorcycle immedi- number of incidents in the past, it Afghanistan. ately after the explosion. How- has been relatively quiet following The second operation was conducted in Nahri ever, contrary reports from GOA recent IMF operations. However, Shahi District, where 3 arrests pertaining to the sources indicate that this was the with the approach of spring coin- operation in Dawlatabad were made (all 3 indi- result of an older IED, and that ciding with a draw down in secu- viduals were later released). Nahri Shahi Dis- the head of CID was not the in- rity during the “hold” phase, this trict, which had previously been quiet since an tended target. For the time being, well traveled route may resurface AOG attack on a checkpoint on November it remains uncertain exactly what as a hot point. 21st 2010, was also the location of a roadside type of IED this was, and whether Like Chimtal, Chahar Bolak is IED discovery on February 1st by ANP, and the head of CID was the one tar- widely considered an insecure re- the discovery of 4 IEDs in jerry cans near Tak- geted (although this seems prob- gion with a significant AOG pres- hta Pul Village. It is unclear right now what able). Nawshahr Naqilin is close ence, and was the site of 4 security the individual arrested in this operation was to Zig Zig and Ali Zayi, which incidents this reporting period charged with. were also known as prior AOG (including the one previously Finally, Mazar-e Sharif saw criminal activity in strongholds within Chimtal. Al- mentioned). Two of the other the form of drugs and arms related arrests, as though a larger IMF/ANSF/ANP incidents included the shooting well as a SAF attack on a private vehicle, killing presence was pumped into the and killing of a pro-government 2 local citizens on the 11th Feb in PD#1 Karte area recently, in an effort to hin- militia man in Timurak Sufla Vil- Sajadia area. THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ Year to Date 1 KUNDUZ 100 This Report Period 0 Kunduz continues to be a focal 80 point for insecurity in the North- had cleared Chahar Dara, along 60 east, with significant incidents this with Archi and Imam Sahib, of 40 period in Chahar Dara, Imam Sa- AOG presence just days prior to 20 this detonation. hib, and Archi. Despite IMF op- 0 erations throughout the province It is yet to be determined whether that resulted in a large number of or not the IED that took out the AOGs in Archi and Governor was an attempt KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ Crime surrendering to the GOA, the to discredit the IMF reports of the In Imam Sahib, AOGs conducted an RPG Chahar Dara District Administra- AOG demise and demonstrate attack against an ANSF base in Aqmasjed Area tive Center was the site of a their ability to conduct complex late in the evening of February 6th, and a num- BBIED detonation that killed a operations in Kunduz, or whether ber of IED incidents took place around the high profile GOA Kunduz offi- it was simply an attack born out district as well. IED incidents often increase as cial, the second government offi- of opportunity on a high profile AOG leave an area. This is due to a decrease cial from this province to be killed government target. Regardless of in AOG ability to conduct complex attacks in the last 6 months. The first this and other incidents in the and the desire to slow down advancing IMF assassination took place on Octo- province, there is no doubt that a troops in order to buy them time to escape. In ber 8th, when an IED detonated significant number of AOGs were February, an IED exploded on a civilian vehi- inside of a Mosque in Taluqan destroyed or dislocated as a result cle on the 1st - injuring 4 in Archi, 4 IEDs were City, , killing the of the recent IMF offensive. As a discovered in the northern part of Kunduz Provincial Governor. Now, a result of these operations, a large City, and on February 6th an IED was found in little more than 5 months later, a number of AOG members sur- the Kharoti area of Chahar Dara). suicide bomber entered the Dis- rendered between January 27th The second most deadly IED incident took trict Administrative Center in and February 7th, including 53 place on February 3rd when an IED detonated Chahar Dara District, Kunduz from Archi (in 4 different groups) on a private vehicle killing 3 and injuring 2. and killed at least 6 individuals and 71 out of Imam Sahib (also in This took place in Tape Borida area near Lark- (including the District Governor, 4 different groups). The destabili- habi on the Kunduz – Gortepa road, and was a local militia leader, and a local zation of AOGs in the province the first incident in the area for over a year. elder) and injuring at least 6 oth- could mean that while ANSF/ While the area is currently considered well un- ers. This was the second targeting IMF presence remains strong in der ANSF control, in the past it was controlled of the Chahar Dara District Gov- Kunduz, nearby Takhar Province, by AOGs, and reports suggest that the area ernor, the first coming on Decem- and to a lesser extent Balkh and remains littered with IEDs, with AOGs con- ber 19th, when his vehicle was Baghlan, could see a re-emergence tinuing to place more at night in parts of both ambushed with SAF and RPGs of those same AOGs as they mi- Larkhabi and Tape Borida. along the Kunduz – Chahar Dara grate across the borders. main road. IMF reported that it THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents FARYAB Year to Date 0 FARYAB This Report Period 0 50 In Faryab, there was insecurity in 40 Qaysar and an attack on a girls’ As in , Faryab 30 school in Qaramqol, as rumors also witnessed an attack on a girl’s 20 circulated about the appointment school in Yusuf Merzaiee Village 10 of a new Provincial Shadow Gov- in Qaramqol District. The arson 0 ernor. This latest development took place late at night on the 4th, when anti-GOA elements entered coincided with anecdotal warnings FARYAB AOG FARYAB Crime about an increased threat of sui- the school and set it alight. Al- cide bombers in the province. though nobody was injured, it was more violent attacks between 2007 and 2008 Although this last threat has yet to reported that about half of the that resulted in the deaths of individuals work- manifest, the notion that the arri- school supplies were burnt or oth- ing at the schools. This period’s incident, like val of a new PSG would coincide erwise damaged. It is noteworthy those in 2010, seemed to target the school in- with a temporary increase in that this exact same school was frastructure rather than the staff, and while in th AOG activity (and more extreme/ attacked last year on the 12 of these more recent instances guards were violent activity) is a logical one March during a series of attacks beaten and tied up, it seemed that nobody who that follows established country- on girls’ schools. At the time of was attacked was intended to be killed. wide trends. Throughout Af- last year’s attack, the school was associated with an NGO, however Lastly, Qaysar remained the focal point of ghanistan, the appointment of AOG activity in the province. There were a new shadow government ele- it is now a GOA school with no NGO ties. An ANSF investiga- total of 8 IEDs found in the New Abad area ments (now often chosen from rd th tion to the matter is currently un- of the district (5 on the 3 and 3 on the 5 ), as external areas, so that they will well as AOG attacks on an ANSF/IMF patrol have no ties with the local popu- derway, and whether or not this will spark a new rash of attacks on near Shakh Village on the 3rd, and a complex lace) has often coincided with attack featuring an RCIED detonation fol- increased—and more aggres- girls’ schools remains to be seen. Faryab is no stranger to attacks on lowed by SAF on an ANP patrol in the Hazara sive—AOG activities as these Qala area on the 10th. Qaysar has been, and elements seek to establish a repu- education related targets. Besides this series of attacks that took remains, an AOG stronghold with high levels tation. How things will play out of insecurity. in this particular province remains place during the first quarter of to be seen. 2010, there were a number of

NGO Incidents TAKHAR Year to Date 1 TAKHAR 50 This Report Period 0 While this reporting period was 40 relatively quiet for Takhar Prov- the new district Chiefs of Police in 30 ince, there is a strong chance that Takhar coming from Kunduz 20 this inactivity will not last as Tak- province. One of these (in Talu- 10 har may be the recipient of an qan), has already been replaced 0 increased number of AOGs who after a demonstration took place earlier this month, due to his al- are being pushed out of Kunduz TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR Crime (Archi and Imam Sahib) due to leged involvement in unethical the proliferation of IMF opera- behaviour from the province. Jerga candidate, Taluqan saw 4 ACG incidents, tions in that neighboring prov- The government met to discuss and in an armed individual shot ince. Khwaja Ghar, which has a the situation during the demon- and killed two civilians. Lastly, 10 AOG mem- strong existing AOG presence, stration, and ultimately agreed that bers joined the peace process in the District and shares a border with Archi, he should be removed. Center Area of , and in would potentially be a natural rally Rounding up the significant secu- Kalafgan, an Iranian who had been working as point for fleeing AOGs. rity events in the province, in a pharmacist and then a doctor was arrested The links between Kunduz and Bangi, an IED was found outside for working illegally. Takhar continue, with many of the residence of a failed Wolesi THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 0 BAGHLAN This Report Period 0 50 Baghlan Province saw a wide 40 range of security incidents over This would not be a first for the 30 this reporting period. Amidst the Northern region, which saw a 20 string of attacks on girls’ school usual mix of ANP/AOG/ACG 10 last year in Faryab (see the Faryab clashes, and Bagh- 0 lani Jadid continued a pattern of section of this report for more details). reduced security, and less com- BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN Crime mon incidents surfaced including Baghlani Jadid District continues an attack on a girl’s school, the to be one of the least secure dis- IED activity in the district. shooting of an education official, tricts in the province, and saw 5 In , an AOG attacked an ANP and the discovery of a large num- very diverse incidents this report- checkpoint in the District Center on the 3rd, ber of mortar rounds. ing period. These included 2 rob- and there are anecdotal reports from this dis- In Banu District, a girls’ school beries (one resulting in the shoot- trict that more attacks like this may be forth- was attacked with RPG fire. This ing of a government employee, coming. While Burka District has seen a num- was one of two attacks on girls’ and the other the robbery of a ber of AOG/ANP clashes, including two at- schools in the North this report- private radio station), the killing tacks on ANP checkpoints last month; this ing period (the other occurring in of a low ranking education official was the first attack on the District Center itself Faryab). On the evening of Feb- in Jar Khoshk, Firqae Haji Majid since November 2010. th Area on the 12th (allegedly by pro- ruary 4 , two rockets were fired Finally, Nahrin District continued to see vio- towards Banu Girl’s school, im- government militia members who claim that the official was at- lence as a result of ACG activity. On February pacting an open area and causing st tempting to attack the militia’s 1 in Bashi Qala Village a clash between 2 some damage, but no injuries. ACGs left 3 ACG members dead, and 1 in- Although there have been con- checkpoint), and the discovery of 35 mortar rounds amidst the ru- jured, while in the same district on February flicting reports about whether or th ined remains of a compound on 4 , a group of unknown men attacked and not the missile purposefully tar- robbed a private vehicle. Nahrin District had geted the school or whether it was the 8th. The discovery of a large number of mortar rounds is sig- only 12 security incidents in all of 2010, but aimed at an ANP checkpoint a has already seen 4 over the first 6 weeks of this few hundred meters away, initial nificant since these are used not only for mortar attacks, but in the year and 10 over the last 6 months, 9 of which reports seem to confirm that the have been attributed to ACGs. attack school itself was the target. construction of IEDs, and could signal a forthcoming increase in THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN Year to Date 0 JAWZJAN 50 This Report Period 0 Headlining analysis of Jawzjan 40 Province (although technically saw signifi- 30 taking place in Balkh), a prestig- cant action in the last days of the 20 PRP when, on January 30th, AOG ious AOG commander from Jaw- 10 members came to villages in the zjan Province was arrested in a 0 joint Jawzjan/Balkh police effort. District and took hostage and tor- tured the relatives of former- This commander has been linked JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN Crime to anti-GOA activities, including AOG members who had recently significant IED activities and ille- joined the peace process. The after one group has been “deputized,” and gal checkpoints along the main aggressors issued warnings to often it is the family members and villagers Jawzjan-Sar-e Pul road. It is said those present that whomever who get caught in the middle. This is more of that he was supported by an AOG joined in the peace process an issue than ever during the harsh winter leader who operates in Sayyad needed to either rejoin their ranks, months when resources are scarce. These con- District of Sar-e Pul. The details or leave Afghanistan altogether. ditions create a strong temptation amongst of his arrest—and what it may The incident was reported in the farmers and fighters alike to “temporarily” join mean for security along this same location as that of a fire- the peace process in order to gain access to the stretch of road—have yet to come fight which had occurred between food and funds (when they actually come to light, although it is likely that ANP and AOG the previous eve- through) that are allotted to those who do. he will be replaced quickly with ning. This underscores some of However, how many of those who join are someone who is just as eager and the serious issues arising out of previous combatants, are actually interested in capable. In the meantime there the peace process. AOG have supporting the government, or who intend to are anecdotal reports that the ar- begun to respond more critically stick with the program when the spring arrives, rest may have been made while to areas where large numbers of is questionable. Worse yet, those who do stick the suspect was riding in a GOA the populace are engaging, negoti- with it are not held accountable for their ac- vehicle. ating with and surrendering to the tions, and have often continued to conduct GOA, and often this has resulted In Khwaja Du Koh District, in themselves in the same manner as when they in the creation of further insecu- the Madrassa area, AOG attacked were outlaws. This has caused locals to fear rity. Furthermore, strained rela- an ANP checkpoint on the 11th. many of these groups and turn to other tionships between competing This was only the 3rd attack in that ACGs/AOGs for protection. AOG groups continue to exist district over the last 12 months.

NGO Incidents SAMANGAN Year to Date 0 SAMANGAN This Report Period 0 50 Although the first period of Feb- area, 5 of whom have not yet been 40 ruary was mostly quiet in Saman- returned). There have been anec- 30 nd gan, on February 2 , 20 AOG dotal reports from multiple 20 members surrendered to the sources that some of the individu- 10 GOA at the District Center in als who surrendered may have 0 Dara-i-Sufi Payin. Dara-i-Sufi been from the group widely con- Payin has been a source for inse- sidered accountable for incidents SAMANGAN AOG SAMANGAN Crime curity in the region, and has against NGOs and these con- hosted attacks against—and ab- struction workers. Whether this render to GOA will actually result in any sig- ductions of—construction work- group consisted of individuals nificant changes in actual security (be that an ers in the area (including the re- from the responsible party, and increase or a decrease), or the return of the still cent kidnapping of 7 internation- whether or not the group’s sur- missing construction workers, remains to be als working on a project in the seen. THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents SAR- E PUL Year to Date 1 SAR‐E PUL This Report Period 0 50 Although there were few security 40 incidents in Sar-E Pul this report- dotal reports suggest that this 30 large offensive was conducted as ing period (and none in Kohis- 20 retribution against the villages and tanat), there were significant 10 families of those former AOG events in the province including a 0 large complex attack in Sayyad members who had joined the peace process, as the large num- and an ANP/AOG clash in Sar-e SAR‐E PUL AOG SAR‐E PUL Crime Pul. Sozma Qala also saw the first bers of AOGs surrendering to the attack on an ANP checkpoint GOA have begun to frustrate Qala District, about 5 kilometers northeast of since May of 2010. AOG elements across the region. the District Administrative Center. Although These types of retaliatory strikes Less than a week after the surren- the attack resulted in no injuries, a stray RPG have become more common der of 60 AOG from Sayyad Dis- round impacted the camp causing damage to countrywide as more alleged trict to the GOA in late January, three tents. The AOG withdrew after the AOGs have joined the peace a group of 100-150 AOGs ANP engaged them for over 2 hours. This was process in places such as Kunduz mounted a large scale attack with one of only two such attacks in Sozma Qala and Qush Tepa, Jawzjan. SAF and RPGs on Aqso Shrqi, over the past year, the first conducted on an Aqso Gharbe, and Nawadar vil- A second complex attack took ANP checkpoint on May 11th, 2010. lages in on Febru- place late at night on February 1st Lastly, an armed clash took place between ary 4th. ANSF deployed to the when a group of approximately 20 AOG and ANP on Feb 6th in Sar-e Pul Dis- area and engaged in a prolonged AOG on motorcycles targeted an trict around Sar Takhta Village which resulted fire-fight with the group that ulti- ANP checkpoint with SAF and in deaths to 1 AOG member, 1 ANP member, mately left 6 AOG members dead, RPGs. The checkpoint was set up and injuries to a female civilian. 3 wounded, and 1 arrested. Anec- close to a returnee camp in Sozma

February AOG Initiated Incident Volumes: Yearly Comparison 2006-2011 (as of 16 Feb 2011) 600

500

400

300

200

100

0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents BADAKHSHAN Year to Date 1 BADAKHSHAN This Report Period 0 50 While Baharak continued to be 40 the focal point for expressed inse- Less significantly, Fayazabad also 30 curity in Badakhshan this report- saw a demonstration in Chawk 20 ing period, Fayzabad—historically Kheyaban Area (PD#3) where 10 locals expressed discontent over a benign working environment for 0 NGOs in the North—witnessed the handling of the recent parlia- an unpopular change in leadership mentary elections. Locals pro- BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN Crime and a large demonstration. Fayza- tested the disqualification of a candidate, and the fact that three bad has seen the presence of hu- month and a half of 2011, with 3 occurring in other candidates were not allowed manitarian workers in its midst the last 3 weeks. To put this in perspective, to count the votes that they re- steadily grow as stability in there were only 14 total incidents in the district ceived, despite official complaints neighboring Takhar has begun to in 2010, and of those 14, only 1 was an attack being lodged to the ECC on their decrease. While these new devel- on GOA infrastructure (a May 20th RPG attack behalf. This was the second dem- opments in Fayzabad may not yet on ANP HQ). Although the nature of these onstration in the province this have a significant effect on the attacks mirror established trends country wide period, the first being a slightly current security paradigm for of AOGs assaulting GOA targets, there is an- smaller demonstration in the Dis- NGOs operating in the district, ecdotal evidence that this could be the work of trict Administrative Center of they remain noteworthy. ACGs who are fearful that police actions could Khwahan District over the gov- Firstly, the head of municipality of disrupt their drug trade. The district is not ernment’s February 6th killing of Fayzabad was replaced by a known to have a substantial AOG presence, an alleged drug dealer. known powerful actor with a his- and it has been reported that ACGs involved tory in the province, who pos- Elsewhere in the province, Ba- in the drug trade are unhappy with the newly sesses an imposing following. harak District continued to see an appointed chief of police. When reviewed in Despite this ‘prestige’, anecdotal increase in violence. Following this light, it is very likely that these attacks may reports from the region suggest January’s IED detonation inside be ACGs sending “messages” to the local au- that this change has been an un- an NGO compound and an early thorities, either warning them against disrupt- popular one among the civilian January attack on a fuel station. ing their “business,” or expressing their dis- population. For now, this lack of There were RPG attacks on ANP pleasure with their current involvement. How support for the new “Mayor” is HQ in the DAC on both January this increase in anti-GOA activity plays out as unlikely to lead to civil unrest, as 30th and February 6th, and then on the spring arrives—which has historically he is generally considered too February 9th unknown individuals spiked AOG activity, also coinciding with the strong a force to reckon with, but hurled 2 hand grenades into an harvesting of opium (therefore increasing drug whether this has long term effects ANBP position. This has brought related crime)—remains to be seen. on stability in the district remains the total number of attacks in the to be seen. District up to 5 for the first THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

W ESTERN REGION

NGO Incidents HERAT HERAT Year to Date 0 80 This Report Period 0 70 In , IED related 60 incidents figured prominently, ondary road in a remote area of 50 40 with five discoveries and three District 8, the explosive device in 30 detonations during this reporting Injil was located on the Herat- 20 period. The discoveries in dis- Zinda Jan Road between Shahrak- 10 tricts with a typically higher level I-Sabz and Pule Rawashan areas. 0 of AOG activities such as Shin- IED related incidents on this road dand, Adraskan and Kushk were are rare with only three recorded HERAT AOG HERAT Crime not unusual. However, the discov- in the last 13 months, including a AOG commander in the district and a compet- eries in Bande Boghorcha of discovery in December 2010 and ing group. Anecdotal reports suggest that the Kushk, were. This marked the an earlier detonation (July) while incident was the result of attempts by the local third IED discovery on the main an IMF EOD team was attempt- AOG commander to disarm the other group. Herat – Turghundi Road since 5 ing to defuse it. At present such Intra-AOG tensions are likely to intensify dur- November 2010, in an area which incidents are expected to remain ing the handover of lead security responsibility is approximately 1-2 km south rare as the usually quiet district of from ISAF to ANSF as this transition process from the District Centre. AOGs Injil generally reports low levels of may be perceived as an opportunity to disrupt in Kushk typically concentrate support for AOG. the status quo. their activities in areas north of Armed clashes between AOGs Of note, on the 12th of February, representa- the DC and at present it is were reported from Pashtun Zar- tives of ANSF and ISAF Regional Command unlikely these incidents mark a ghun and Gulran districts. While West agreed on a document defining regional concentrated effort to expand the background in the Gulran objectives for operations and cooperation, in- further south – not least because incident remains unclear, and may cluding security and transition. The ANSF will of their lack of influence in the be linked to smuggling in the dis- be in the lead to implement the agreed objec- southern areas. Further IEDs trict, AOG tensions in the village tives and the document will be the main refer- were discovered in of Rawandan in Pashtun Zarghun ence for all operations in RC-West for the up- and Herat City. Whereas the IED are reportedly caused by power coming year. in Herat City was found on a sec- struggles between the leading

NGO Incidents FARAH Year to Date 0 FARAH 50 This Report Period 0 AOG activity during the current 40 reporting period was lower than , remains to be 30 usual; however, this does not nec- seen in light of the usually high 20 essarily indicate a change in AOG level of AOG and ongoing migra- 10 presence or for the long-term se- tion from the southern provinces. 0 curity situation. The usually quieter Qala-I-Kah

In contrast to the last cycle, when District saw an IED incident as FARAH AOG FARAH Crime Bala Buluk saw a number of AOG well as a killing. In the afternoon attacks, reconciliation was the of 3rd of February, a roadside IED place in December 2010, involving the arrest prominent issue this period. In hit the vehicle of an ANBP patrol, of AOG members with explosive devices. In Safarak Area, eleven AOG mem- killing one ANBP officer; with addition, ANP found the corpse of a local ci- bers, including a commander, sur- this incident following an ANSF vilian in Korghi Zard Area on 1st February; rendered and handed over their operation conducted in the area 3 though the background of this incident re- weapons to GoA authorities. The days earlier. Of note, the only mains unclear and it is therefore not necessar- sustainability of reconciliation in other recorded IED related inci- ily connected to AOG activity in the district. Bala Buluk, and other districts of dent in the last 13 months took THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 0 GHOR This Report Period 0 50 continued to be 40 stable during the first two weeks Governor of Ghor are supported 30 of February 2011. The key inci- by plans to establish reintegration 20 dents recorded included the ar- offices in several districts in the 10 rests of criminals in Lal Wa Sar- province including , 0 jangal and Pasaband, as well as a Du Layna, Pasaband and Taywara. killing of a local due to a personal Despite these efforts, unspecific, GHOR AOG GHOR Crime dispute in Pasaband on 12th of and mainly unconfirmed, threat February. reports in regard to further AOG success of reconciliation efforts in both these Apart from that, reconciliation attacks have been circulated. In- areas and the Murghab Valley. It is unlikely efforts in Ghor continue. While dications suggest that Charsada that AOGs – especially non-local ones – will 25 AOG members from may see more AOG activ- be able to keep their level of influence if local reconciled at the end of January, ity, and the north-western parts of commanders, who are still perceived as the key recently 40 AOG members, in- appear less to control, reconcile. This will be also a crucial cluding two local AOG com- stable since the assassination of a question in the critical southern areas of Tay- manders, surrendered to the GoA prominent local commander in wara and Pasaband districts come spring, when on the 5th of February in Pasa- December 2010. Efforts to stem non-local AOGs from Helmand are expected band. Previous reports of ongo- possible deterioration in security, to return. If the reconciliation process contin- ing negotiations between influen- as seen in the Murghab Valley last ues in the southern districts, armed clashes tial local commanders and the year, will largely depend on the between these two groups are to be expected.

NGO Incidents BADGHIS Year to Date 0 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 70 60 IED related incidents in Qala-I- 50 Naw continued after an IED AOG during the last year. In ad- 40 strike was reported during the dition, IMF conducted an airstrike 30 targeting AOGs on 1 January 20 previous period; though the re- 10 cent incidents were limited to dis- 2011, which usually indicates a 0 coveries. On the 1st of February significant AOG presence in an area. Altogether, IED related in- ANSF discovered a motorcycle BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS Crime rigged as a RCIED in Khaja cidents remain rare in Qala-I-Naw Tawakkol Area followed by two and Qadis though a slight increase thermore, intra-tribal tensions were reported other IEDs in Qarachaghai Area is not unlikely due to a generally from the Morichaq area of Murghab District four days later. Whereas this last higher AOG activity in the spring. which turned violent and resulted in an armed discovery in was in a remote area, In addition, 50% of all recorded clash that killed one and wounded two others. the Qarachaghai Area has also direct fire attacks by AOGs tar- In addition, the corpse of an ANBP officer noted an IED discovery on the geting ANSF/IMF in the prov- was found, who was reportedly killed due to a main road between Qala-I-Naw ince took place in Murghab while personal dispute one day before. Perhaps re- and Qadis on the 31st of January. IMF conducted an airstrike on 4th lated to this find, unconfirmed reports suggest The IED discovery in January was of February in Chelanak Area, that an ANBP commander is also involved in the third one on the main road in targeting AOG locations. As a the recent tribal tensions. While at present the Qarachaghai Area since April result, four to five AOG members background behind these tensions remain un- 2010. The area saw also a direct and at least seven civilians were clear, they remain unresolved are further such attack against an ANP checkpoint killed or wounded, demonstrating incidents are expected in the short-term. and a polling centre as well as an again the risk for civilians of being armed clash between ANSF and caught up in the hostilities. Fur- THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

E ASTERN REGION

NGO Incidents NANGARHAR Year to Date 1 NANGARHAR This Report Period 2 100 reported two 80 NGO incidents involving two disputes common to the area. 60 separate NGOs this period, mark- The second incident, on February 40 ing the first such occurrences this 9 in involved an year. On the 1st of February in INGO marked vehicle that was 20 the body of an struck by an RCIED while return- 0 NGO staff member was found by ing from a daily mission. While this resulted in no casualties, local villagers, the victim of what NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR Crime appears to be an execution style damage was sustained by the vehi- killing, as his hands were found cle as the device detonated an 4th a religious training centre. It would appear bound behind his back. On the estimated 2 meters in front of it. that various factors precipitated these inci- afternoon of the 1st of February While it is unlikely that the organi- dents, including a pending high level regional the staff member had been travel- sation was directly targeted, it is conference in the city, along with the funeral ling on a motorcycle from the unclear what the initiating factor of a prominent Hesb-i Islami Maulawi Khalis Khogyani DAC towards his home behind this incident was, be it (HIK) commander. Of note, reports indicate village (after completing a site opportunistic targeting or mis- that many AOG members attended this fu- visit) when he went missing, ap- taken identity. neral, which took a decidedly anti-US/ISAF parently abducted from the same A series of IED incidents within tone, likely in an effort to rally support, as this area where his body was subse- Jalalabad City warranted attention commander died (of apparent natural causes) quently found two days later. The this period, with 4 devices deto- while in captivity at the Guantanamo Bay de- victim’s valuables and motorcycle nating over the course of two tention facility. were missing, though a note had days. Two of these devices tar- The aforementioned conference included both been written (in ink on the vic- geted the daily commute (a tactic high profile governmental officials from tim’s hand) stating that anyone seen in other regions) of staff throughout the region along with government who wants these items back from the Police Regional Training Ministers from Kabul. The agenda of the con- should contact them. However, Centre, and detonated sequen- ference involved discussions and planning for no contact details were provided. tially, likely in an attempt to target an ongoing, four month, cyclical development Investigations into this incident the first responders following the plan as well as the pending transfer of lead remain inconclusive at this time initial incident. A third device security authority from NATO to the ANSF due to the blend of local and non- appeared to be targeted at a Pro- by 2014. local AOG, factionalism, and local vincial Council member and the THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

NGO Incidents KUNAR Year to Date 1 KUNAR 200 This Report Period 1 Kunar was the location of the 3rd 150 NGO incident reported this pe- ing, abandoned the vehicle and 100 riod from the Eastern Region. continued on foot with the driver On the 5th of February in Manogai remaining in their custody. Upon 50 the guards return, he reported the District on Main Asadabad-Pech 0 valley Road an ambulance driver incident to the INGO office, who employed by an INGO was ab- subsequently engaged local leader- ducted following the transport of ship for assistance in securing the KUNAR AOG KUNAR Crime a patient by ambulance from safe release of the driver. On the Manogai to Asadabad that morn- 6th February the vehicle was re- tance (from both communities and AOG), this ing. The driver was returning to covered and on the same day at also playing a key role in staff safety and quick Manogai along with a guard (also 1800hrs the driver returned to release. employed with the INGO) when duty following the mediation of they were stopped by an AOG his release by the local leaders. remains the most volatile operating in the area. The INGO This marks the first NGO related province within the East, contributing the ma- guard was immediately released incident for Kunar Province this jority of AOG initiated incidents for the re- unharmed, while the group ab- year, while in 2010 there were 3 gion, accounting for almost half of the period’s sconded with the driver and the occurrences of AOG abduction of total. The majority of these incidents were ambulance, travelling towards the NGO staff, and in 2 of these the concentrated within the districts of Manogai, Shoraik area (located in the same staffs were detained temporarily Sirkanay, and Wata Pur, with these areas also district). As Shoraik is a moun- (roughly 1 day); all of which in- the focal points for recent security force opera- tainous area, the INGO driver volved the engagement of local tions as highlighted by the IMF airstrike in advised his abductors that due to leadership to secure re- Sirkanay on February 4. This denotes a stan- the rough road conditions the lease. Taken into context with dard incident distribution pattern, as these ar- vehicle wouldn’t be able to travel this recent incident, NGO interac- eas have been ongoing ‘contested’ areas for a any further. However, disbeliev- tions with AOG in Kunar have considerable period of time, hosting a volatile ing this, the group attempted to been relatively benign, primarily mix of a pervasive AOG presence and active operate the vehicle and upon fail- due to high levels of local accep- security forces.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

NGO Incidents KHOST Year to Date 0 KHOST This Report Period 0 150 While Khost demonstrated steady incident growth rates through Beyond the standard conflict re- 100 2010, AOG attributed incident porting, of note there were two volumes are poised to reach the cross-border clashes between 50 levels noted at the height of last Pakistani military forces and year (Sept-Nov) at the beginning ANSF this period, both occurring 0 of this one, bringing them almost in Gurbuz District, on the 2nd and rd in line with the levels reported then again on the 3 . While light KHOST AOG KHOST Crime from Kunar. casualties to the security forces occurred on both sides, despite The ongoing targeting of GOA the proximity of the engagements fortunately denied this request. However, fol- leadership came to fore again this to populated areas there were no lowing these events, a coalition of local leader- period, with the Gov- civilian casualties. Presently it is ship from the area in Khost offered their sup- ernor (Interim) the victim of a unclear what the initiating causes port, apparently willing to provide manpower bold daylight small arms attack by of these exchanges were; however, in the case of further clashes with the Paki- a group dressed in ANA uni- unconfirmed anecdotal reports stanis, suggesting a ‘wild card’ element to an forms. He has been the acting suggest that in one case mortars already tense environment. The close prox- DG since the previous one re- fired by AOG resulted in a re- imity of these two national forces, along with signed (in anticipation of his dis- sponse by one side, which forced ongoing pressure to deny AOG cross-border missal) in July of 2010. As with the engagement, with both sides transit and safe havens, and an active AOG many such incidents, the exact believing they were being engaged presence provide the general reasons for these motivations behind this attack by AOG. Despite requests for incidents, also suggesting that further occur- remain murky, though it is likely escalation by ANBP in one case, rences are possible. the coalescence of AOG & local their HQ showed restraint and political/interpersonal goals.

NGO Incidents NURISTAN Year to Date 0 NURISTAN 50 This Report Period 0 While the regular dynamics in se- 40 curity remained relatively un- would be auctioned. The appar- 30 changed for the province this pe- ent timing for these requests is to 20 riod, efforts in the political sphere take advantage of restrictions the 10

present future implications for the winter weather has on IEA capa- 0 context. The Provincial Gover- bilities, allowing the IMF/GOA nor of Nuristan held meetings to gain a stronger foothold in ad-

with officials of the Ministry of vance of AOG reinforcement NURISTAN AOG NURISTAN Crime Interior and NATO in both Ka- which would follow the spring bul and Nangarhar in order to clearance of cross-border access influence of GOA/ANSF in this isolated, and discuss the situation in Nuristan. routes. While this presents a rea- isolationist province, gave AOG the opportu- The Governor requested the MOI sonable rationale, it is worth not- nity to consolidate their control, as noted by increase the number ANSF per- ing that these efforts (on the gov- their actions reported in past reports. Rather sonal, in particular the ANBP ernment side) come at a time ironically, due to the weather conditions ef- presence in Barg-e-Matal and the when the AOG presence in this fects on access, no action is likely to occur on ANP in Kamdesh, while simulta- province is already both well en- the GOA/ISAF side until spring as well they neously requesting that NATO trenched and pervasive, both too are constrained by these issues. Nonethe- and the GOA launch clearing op- from a military and political stand- less, one thing is certain however, this would erations in the same. While the point. The vacuum that followed serve to destabilize the present status quo as MOI and ISAF both responded the reduction of IMF elements in AOG would actively contest such efforts, thus positively to the requests, no time- the region previously, along with resulting in a period of increased instability. line was given as to when this the generally limited strength and THE ANSO REPORT Page 19

S OUTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR Year to Date 0 KANDAHAR 200 This Report Period 0 This reporting period AOGs in 150 engagement of the . An- Kandahar were extremely active, 100 initiating a series of attacks against other , this time in- a variety of targets. The most no- side the Customs Compound in 50 table incident occurred on 12 Feb- District 5 on the 7th, targeted an 0 ruary when AOG carried out a IMF detachment, killing 3 IMF well-coordinated complex attack soldiers and one national inter- against the ANP HQ in Kandahar preter and wounding one other KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR Crime City, using a combination of tac- IMF soldier. tics, including BBIED, VBIED The AOG campaign of targeted mined to show that their capacity to lead coor- and SAF. Besides the six killings of GOA and ANSF per- dinated and sophisticated attacks has not been VBIEDs that were deployed in sonnel and officials has continued undercut by coalition efforts and that ISAF’s the vicinity of the ANP HQ (of as well throughout this reporting statement of ‘reversed momentum’ in Kanda- which 3 detonated apparently period. On 1st of February in Dis- har was premature. prior to reaching their target) 4 trict 4, an IED made of explosives BBIED attackers managed to en- placed in a plastic oil container Besides attacks on high profile officials, this ter and occupied a nearby wed- detonated against the convoy of reporting period saw targeted killings of three ding hall (Zarnegar Saloon). From the Chief of Police of Kandahar, civilians associated with GOA and ANSF/ this location they engaged security causing no casualties. Three days IMF in districts 2, 8, 5 of Kandahar City. In forces in a four-hour-long fire later, AOG attempted once again addition, 3 ANP officials were killed in differ- fight. As a result of the attack, 21 targeted the said official, this one ent areas of the city and another one in individuals were killed (including 3 involving an SVBIED against his . Another well established civilians) and a further 55 persons private residence, though he was element of the conflict in this province con- wounded (including 27 civilians). absent during the attack. How- sists of IED deployment. In the past two This casualty figure marks this ever, four civilians including one weeks, there have been around 23 IED related attack (along with the complex child, and one ANP were incidents (detonations and discoveries) which attack of 13th of March 2010) as wounded as a result of the blast. were concentrated mainly in Panjwayi and to a the deadliest AOG action within This recent series of attacks seem lesser extent in Arghandab, Arghistan, Zhari Kandahar City since the re- to indicate that AOGs are deter- and Kandahar City. THE ANSO REPORT Page 20

NGO Incidents URUZGAN Year to Date 0 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 100 In the overall 80 rate in security incidents remained Tirin , where as a re- 60 slightly lower relative to the previ- sult of an RCIED targeting an ous report. During the present ANP vehicle, one ANP and one 40 period IED deployment contin- tribal elder were killed and an- 20 ued to represent the main threat other two ANP officials were 0 in the province, with a total of 20 wounded. Similar to other south- IED related incidents reported in ern areas, the AOG campaign of URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN Crime Tirin Kot, Chora and Dihrawud attacks on high profile personali- districts. As noted previously, the ties manifested also in Uruzgan, AOG. This reporting period ANSF/IMF con- large majority of IEDs were dis- where on 14th of February in Ba- ducted at least 9 operations in Tirin Kot, covered and defused by the secu- zaar Area of Dihrawud District a Chora and Dihrawud districts which resulted rity forces, but four separate IED motorcycle mounted RCIED in seizure of a quantity of explosive materials strikes reported across the prov- detonated against the vehicle car- and weapons. These operations were often ince accounted for a total of one rying the brother of Char Chino also accompanied by the detention of sus- IMF, one ANP and three civilians District Governor, wounding him pected AOG members. The most notable th killed with an additional one IMF and six civilians. Another incident operation was conducted on the 8 in Mirabad soldier, one civilian and two ANP of targeted killing took place in Area of Tirin Kot where security forces ar- wounded. The deadliest single Tirin Kot, Naicheen Area where rested up to 21 suspected AOG members. incident took place on 11th of an ANP official riding on a mo- February in Khanaqa Area of torbike was shot and killed by

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 0 HELMAND This Report Period 0 200 The already extremely high rate of 150 security incidents reported previ- districts, which resulted in two ously across Helmand has contin- IMF soldiers and two ANP re- 100 ued to increase during the present ported wounded. Furthermore, 50 cycle, indicating the strategic and an AOG initiated ambush that th symbolic importance of the prov- took place in Nad Ali on 10 of 0 ince for the parties involved in the February caused the death of two IMF soldiers. This reporting pe- conflict. AOG direct attacks on HELMAND AOG HELMAND Crime ANSF/IMF and IED related inci- riod saw also 20 IED strikes tak- dents constituted the vast majority ing place in Musa Qala, Sangin, the province. During this period security of recorded incidents. In total Nahri Sarraj, Garmser and Lash- forces launched 13 separate operations and there were around 70 AOG direct kar Gah districts, which resulted focused their efforts on Nad Ali, Sangin, Marja attacks reported in the past two in two more IMF fatalities and and Kajaki districts. It is worth noting that weeks primarily targeting ANSF/ another two wounded. ANSF/IMF were particularly successful in the IMF patrols. In this period these As noted in the previous reports, discovery and disposal of IEDs, as an esti- attacks were concentrated in Nad ANSF/IMF continue to conduct mated 50 devices were disposed of from across Ali, Nahri Sarraj and Musa Qala numerous operations throughout the province. THE ANSO REPORT Page 21

NGO Incidents GHAZNI Year to Date 0 GHAZNI This Report Period 0 250

Although a downturn in the num- 200 ber of reported incidents has been with security forces, preferring observed in Ghazni, the province rather ‘hit and run’ tactics in order 150 continues to be extremely volatile to avoid protracted fire fights and 100 and insecure. As with the last avoid significant casualties. Con- 50 reporting period AOG indirect sequently there were no reported 0 attacks played a minor role, with casualties associated with these only one recorded incident that attacks this reporting period. GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI Crime occurred in Muqur District, with IED deployment across the prov- the bulk of AOG activity consist- ince remained limited, with only In line with the previous periods ANSF/IMF ing of numerous direct attacks. In five IED related incidents, of operations have continued unabated. Security the past two weeks there were at which only one device detonated forces conducted at least 18 operations in least 13 such occurrences. The (targeting an IMF vehicle). Also Giro, Andar, Dih Yak, Gelan and Muqur dis- majority of these attacks took in , where a signifi- tricts. For instance, on the 8th, in Latif Area of place in Andar and Muqur dis- cant portion of attacks were con- ANSF/IMF arrested eight sus- tricts targeting IMF convoys and centrated, on the 9th of February pected AOG members. The same day, but in facilities, and ANP checkpoints. AOG abducted six local employ- Muqur, security forces killed one AOG and As noted previously, AOGs oper- ees working for a private com- arrested another five. ating in the province frequently pany. Their whereabouts are un- avoid prolonged engagements known at present.

NGO Incidents ZABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL This Report Period 0 100 The level of recorded security 80 covered during a search operation. incidents in Zabul decreased com- 60

pared to the previous reporting IED deployment remains a dis- 40 period. In line with previously tinctive concern in the province. 20 observed trends, ANSF/IMF ac- Whereas the last reporting period tivity accounted for the bulk of saw four separate incidents that 0 reported incidents; in this report- killed a total of 11 ANP, this cycle

ing period ANSF/IMF operations experienced five IED related inci- ZABUL AOG ZABUL Crime were concentrated particularly in dents of which two devices deto- Qalat and Shahjoy districts. In nated. While an IED detonation Beside IED deployment, this period the issue the past two weeks at least six in Tarnak Wa Jaldak District of security along district roads was highlighted operations were conducted in the against an IMF vehicle caused no by the presence of armed men stopping private aforementioned districts and re- casualties, in Shamulzayi District a vehicles travelling through Shar-e-Safa and sulted in the reported detention of roadside IED caused the death of Folad Ghai areas in Tarnak Wa Jaldak District, several suspected AOG members, two civilians. In addition, an IED robbing the passengers of their valuables. As including two local commanders. was located and safely defused in noted in the previous report, motor vehicle In addition, following a raid in the the Gaza Area of Arghandab Dis- accidents continue to result in numerous casu- Mirwais Mena Area of Qalat Dis- trict. Another device was re- alties across the province. In the most notable trict, security forces seized 25 kg ported to have been discovered in incident, a total of 13 civilians were injured of explosive materials from a local Shinkay and finally, two IEDs while a local bus turned over in . shop. Also in Qalat District, Ni- were located on the road in Zan- azian Area a suicide vest was re- zir Area of Qalat District. THE ANSO REPORT Page 22

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA Year to Date 0 PAKTIKA 150 This Report Period 0 This reporting period the level of 100 security incidents in Paktika con- have little effect with these being tinued their decline. Nonetheless, no exception as no casualties were 50 as observed in previous periods, reported. In regards to IED re- AOGs persisted in leading numer- lated incidents, the majority of 0 ous attacks on DACs across the explosive devices were located province, in particular indirect fire and defused. However, on the attacks on DACs in Dila, Barmal 10th an IED detonated against a PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA Crime and Omna. It is worth noting joint ANSF/IMF convoy in that AOG efforts were concen- Ghaibi Khel Area of Yahya Khel and the seizure of explosive materials. trated particularly on wounding two IMF sol- diers and one ANA. Finally, during the second week of this period DAC with at least five such occur- heavy snowfalls were reported in several areas rences. The sole reported AOG ANSF/IMF led eight operations of , primarily affecting Bar- th direct attack occurred on 13 of which were concentrated mainly mal, Gayan and Ziruk where the majority of February, when an AOG attacked on Yahya Khel, Sarobi, Waza districts roads were blocked. with SAF and RPGs the Yahya Khaw and Urgun districts and Khel DAC. As is often the case, resulted in the reported detention AOG attacks on DACs in Paktika of 14 suspected AOG members

NGO Incidents NIMROZ Year to Date 0 NIMROZ This Report Period 0 100

Nimroz Province has been rela- 80 tively quiet over the past two note, an IED was reported to weeks with only four reported have been located and defused by 60 security incidents. The majority IMF in which 40

were related to ANSF/IMF activi- marks the second IED related 20 ties and took place in Zaranj, incident this year in the district. Khash Rod and Chahar Burjak As seen in the past, the security 0 districts. The most notable inci- situation in the Khash Rod is fre- dent occurred in the latter district quently linked to the develop- NIMROZ AOG NIMROZ Crime when IMF killed several AOG ments in the neighbouring Hel- along the border remains the concern as on the members and seized an assort- mand Province as AOG elements 10th Iranian border police shot and killed two ment of weapons and ammunition active in Helmand had been using Afghan civilians as they were illegally crossing during an operation that took the district as a support base to the border. place on the 6th of February. Of reorganize themselves. Incidents THE AFGHANISTAN NGO SAFETY OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the prov- CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) inces of: ANSO is hosted by Tomas Muzik - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Mukhtar - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 Bamyan Panjshir NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) Laghman Brian Laguardia - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 Paktya To Register with ANSO Firoz - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 contact: [email protected] EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) This is because we Rory Brown - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 do not know enough Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014 about the area to ANSO is managed by an NGO comment on the sig- Board. If you have any SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) nificance of the inci- feedback, good or bad, let Vacant - [email protected] 0796 688 416 dents occurring them know on: there. Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550 [email protected] ANSO ACRONYMS WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) If you can help us Rachel Adam - [email protected] - 0799 322 192 understand the prov- ACG-Armed Criminal Group / Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707 474 135 ince better, please AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces contact us. / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANBP-Afghan National Border COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) Police / ANP-Afghan National Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 Police / AOG-Armed Opposition Group / APPF-Afghan Public Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Protection Forces (local depu- Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0793 230 118 tised militias) / DC-District Centre / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / IED-Improvised Explosive Device / IMF- International Military Forces / NDS-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / PRP- Previous Reporting Period / FEEDBACK ON ANSO SERVICES: Advisory Board email address PSC-Private Security Company / RPG-Rocket Propelled Gre- nade / SAF-Small Arms Fire / ANSO welcomes your feedback. To provide confidential feedback, please email the VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- vised Explosive Device / PDO- ANSO Advisory Board at [email protected]. Private Development Organisa- tion / ALP-Afghan Local Police / LDI-Local Defence Initiative / IEA-Islamic Emirate of Afghani- stan (Taliban) / PSG-Provincial Shadow Governor (IEA) / DSG- District Shadow Governor (IEA)

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