The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 67 1-15 February 2011 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 Historically, February pre- dislodgement of AOG in fluid context where the 7 Northern Region sents as one of the least light of these operations various groups (arbakis- Western Region 14 ‘kinetic’ months of the year, will need to be monitored ALP-AOG) are beginning partially due to the harsh cli- in the short term. to clash due to competing Eastern Region 16 mactic conditions that ham- In contrast, AOG opera- interests, and the resulting Southern Region 19 per all parties to the conflict. tions, beyond the standard power struggle is creating a However, following an ex- paradoxical destabilising ANSO Info Page 23 tactical efforts of IEDs and tremely active January, this close range attacks, were element. It is advised that month will likely break with highlighted by the focus on NGOs monitor the pro- this trend as armed opposi- regional centres this period. gress of these programs as YOU NEED TO KNOW tion has accounted for 380 The concentrated IED they will be a defining dy- incidents this period alone. namic, particularly at a lo- • Security force operations in campaign in Jalalabad and Put into perspective, by mid- the shopping centre suicide cal level, for the upcoming the North, South, and Cen- month, 70% of the February year. tral attack in Kabul (the 2nd 2010 total has been reached this year), while notewor- This period also accounted • AOG focused attacks (see graph p.5). This can be thy, were eclipsed by the for 5 NGO incidents, with within regional centres attributed to a variety of fac- dramatic daytime siege of 2 from Central and 3 in the tors, including the unrelent- the ANP HQ in Kandahar. East. Abductions occurred • 2nd NGO staff fatality re- ing pace of security force corded this period In general, attacks of this in Kunar and Wardak, operations, a mild winter type represent a minimum along with the murder of a • Transition planning ongoing season, and the overall of tactical investment in national staff member in maturity of the conflict (as return for maximum Nangarhar, this accounting supported by the stable year strategic impact, particularly for the second NGO fatal- to year incident growth rate on perceptions of insecu- ity in 2011, both of whom ANSO is supported by illustrated on p.12). While rity. As such, they pose an were national staff. An in- many of these incidents are AOG counterpoint to the cident in Logar highlighted low level, inconclusive tacti- dialogue on security gains the diverse challenges faced cal engagements, it nonethe- achieved at the conclusion by NGO operating in con- less provides a provocative of last year. tested areas when following indicator of an extremely the occupation of an NGO active year ahead. In addition, the Afghan Peace and Reconciliation run clinic by security As noted, security force op- Process (APRP) is gaining forces, AOG forced the erations have continued momentum, primarily in the ongoing closure of the apace this period, primarily North and to a lesser de- clinic in retribution. focused on AOG strong- gree in the West. While Lastly, the topic of transi- holds in the South and large numbers of tion came to the fore this North, though Kapisa also ‘reintegrees’ have been re- period, with both Herat recorded activity. These have ported, the follow up in this and Nangarhar hosting resulted in significant num- initiative remains unclear. meetings whose agendas bers of AOG kill/captures, In some areas, the APRP is included the pending with IED discovery rates also feeding into the Afghan transfer of lead security on the increase. However, Local Police (ALP) pro- authority to the GoA and the effects of the subsequent gram, resulting in a very ANSF by 2014. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 C ENTRAL REGION NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 Whereas the onset of the winter 40 season froze the conflict dynamics Unless further investigation or 30 in most parts of the Central Re- comments by AOG leadership 20 gion, and was reflected by only 3 contradict the current findings, it 10 should be assumed that the attack AOG initiated attacks in Kabul 0 Province, the capital city wit- was broadly aimed at hitting an- nessed the brunt, with two IED other soft-target inside the inner incidents including another sui- security perimeter, posing as the KABUL AOG KABUL Crime cide attack inside the city’s secu- AOG counter-narrative to GOA & IMF discourse on the security rity perimeter as well as a mag- intent for targeting, a willingness to limit col- netic IED against an empty ANSF gains achieved throughout 2010. The strike also underlined the lateral casualties, as well as an intention to vehicle. The present AOG pat- avoid any direct engagement with ANSF. Un- tern in Kabul City identifies less current AOG focus on selecting tactically simpler missions which til recently, ‘sticky bombs’ were not a typical reliance on larger scale complex tactical method for AOGs in Kabul. How- attacks and an increased focus on result in significant media atten- tion. NGOs should keep an eye ever, two recent cases preceded the Jade Mai- surgical strikes against softer- wand strike, one in Kabul and another one in targets. on what is to be seen as an extant threat of further attacks against Maidan Shahr. Of note, the former attack tar- Shortly after the noon prayer time civilian venues which combine the geted an ANA vehicle in Puli Omomi, PD 1, on 14 February, two armed following risk factors: a) high- on 24 December 2010 and featured striking guards, manning a lateral entry profile, b) easily accessible, and c) similarities with the latest incident. This occur- point in the Kabul City Center/ ‘target-rich’ (or perceived as such) rence may also represent a more permanent Safi Landmark Hotel (PD 4), - for it may be assumed that this addition to AOG operational tactics in Kabul spotted a BBIED attacker on the type of attack will be reproduced, City, and is best mitigated by ensuring that street. An exchange of SAF en- adding up to the more traditional NGO vehicles are never left unattended. sued, resulting in the attacker be- portfolio of AOG suicide mis- Altogether, the picture of recent AOG attacks ing shot and injured, though he sions exploring vulnerabilities of needs to be balanced by acknowledging the was close enough to the entrance ANSF/IMF travel patterns in Ka- active stance of ANSF and IMF in disrupting to kill the two guards when his bul City. AOG networks, namely in relation to the se- charge detonated. Three bystand- ries of recent arrests of operatives implicated ers were also wounded in the ex- The other AOG attack, an IED in Jade Maiwand (PD 1) on 8 Febru- in previous suicide attacks. These have in- plosion. The area was cordoned cluded a planner involved in the December off shortly afterwards, with the ary was more typical in its target- ing (ANSF vehicle), but innova- 2010 strike in Puli Charkhi as well as in the ANSF engaging in building search January 2011 motorcycle-mounted IED in operation, though this search did tive when it comes to tactics. A magnetic IED with a time-delay Saraye Alauddin, and a ‘fixer’ who facilitated not result in any further encoun- the transportation of the ‘Finest Market’ ters with AOG. The IEA claimed mechanism was stuck and subse- quently detonated against a parked bomber to Kabul. Along with Kabul City, responsibility for the attack in a Deh Sabz, Paghman, Bagrami and Khaki Jab- press-release, but did not com- Traffic Police Ranger. The light charge damaged the car but did bar have also witnessed increased numbers of ment on the target selection, police operations. rather praising the attacker for not result in casualties. The usage engaging the security forces. of a sticky bomb indicates clear THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 1 LOGAR This Report Period 1 50 On the night of 26 January, a joint 40 forces are not common, whereas ANSF and IMF detachment set 30 their base inside the Basic Health multiple other cases have been 20 Center (BHC) operated by an attributed to AOG both in Logar NGO in the Shaykhan Village of and Wardak provinces. 10 Kharwar, occupying the clinic In light of AOG modus operandi, 0 until 1 February. When the mili- this incident also followed a well- tary left, an AOG element entered established pattern of AOGs scru- the village and barred physical tinizing communities immediately LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime access into the facility in retribu- following contact with security tive calm dominated by reduced AOG activity tion. The clinic has been effec- forces, with cases of intimidation and occasional IMF & ANSF surgical strikes. tively closed down ever since. or retribution against communi- These strikes against AOG leadership in the NGO-run facilities often repre- ties accused of ‘cooperating’ with central districts along the Kabul – Gardez sent a community’s primary asset IMF documented in the past. Highway were seconded by pre-emptive opera- both in terms of access to services Besides directly impacting access tions aimed at securing peripheral areas before as well as of physical infrastruc- to NGO services, interferences by the on-set of the spring fighting season, as ture. In many areas, NGO facili- any armed parties bring about the seen in Kharwar and Charkh.