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World at War The World at War ● Review: During the American Revolu- ● Student Activity Page 36-3. Label Pa- tionary War and the War of 1812, how cific Ocean, Japan, Hawaii, and United did troops move? How did the army States. move supplies? What invention changed the method of moving troops in the Civil War? Cultivating Student Mastery ● In World War I, troops had moved and 1. Why did the Japanese bomb the attacked only on land. What invention United States base at Pearl Harbor? made World War II different? How? Why did that attack force the United States to enter the war? ● Student Activity Page 36-2. Title the page, “Remembering Pearl Harbor, De- 2. What inventions were important in cember 7, 1941”. The students may list World War II? the losses suffered at Pearl Harbor, or summarize how the Americans were 3. How did military leaders communi- taken by surprise. cate? Why? Leading Anticipating the Enemy Idea Student Text, pages 209-210 ● “Less than six months after their vic- flank. tory at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese sent “The result was by no means a fore- forth an enormous, combat-seasoned fleet gone conclusion. The Japanese spearhead of eighty-eight surface warships with the held the veteran carriers Akagi, Kaga, dual mission of capturing Midway atoll Hiryu, and Soryu, under the command of and luring the remains of the weakened Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo. This was U.S. Pacific Fleet to their destruction. the admiral and four of the six carriers “But events did not conform to the which had attacked Pearl Harbor on De- Japanese pattern. Forewarned through cember 7, and since then the Nagumo superior cryptanalysis and radio intelli- task force had scored one victory after an- gence, American naval forces much infe- other in the south Pacific and Indian rior numerically to the Japanese. but Oceans.”158 superbly led and manned, sped past Mid- Gordon W. Prange, Miracle at Midway way and were waiting on the enemy’s For Reflection and Reasoning ica into the war? Why did Japan attack Pearl Harbor? ● Review: Who controls the battle? ● How did individual nations communi- ● Review: What European countries be- cate with their military commanders? How gan World War II? Why? did they protect their communications so the enemy would not know their plans? ● Review: What major event drew Amer- Copyright © Ruth Smith 217 The Mighty Works of God: Divine Providence ● How did the Americans know that Ja- ● Student Activity Page 36-4. Write a pan was planning a major attack? What summary of Japan’s plan. Begin to list did they not know? How did they “trick” the Providential events which changed the Japanese into revealing their target? the results of the battle. The Student Ac- tivity Page will be completed in a later ● Why did Japan want to attack Hawaii lesson. or Midway? Leading A miracle at Midway Idea Student Text, pages 210-212 ● “Nagumo, his carrier captains, and his equally so until the last-minute linking airmen fought skillfully and bravely at up and successful marksmanship of the Midway as flight after flight of American dive bombers. In view of the fact that six bombers struck impotently. Then, sud- months of war had passed since Pearl denly, superb command decision, preci- Harbor, with consequent combat season- sion dive bombing and a pinch or two of ing on the part of commanders, ships and luck all came together. When the battle crews, one cannot help but suspect that, ended, Japan had lost her four carriers, a had the U.S. Pacific Fleet sortied to meet heavy cruiser, and over 300 aircraft. Yet Nagumo’s task force on December 7, re- the battle could have gone the other way, sults might have been just as bad if not and even so, the United States lost one worse. This was the opinion of Admiral carrier, Yorktown, and a destroyer, Ham- Nimitz, who frankly considered it ‘God’s mann. mercy’ that Admiral Husband E. “Events at Midway cast serious doubt Kimmel’s ships were at their moorings upon the popular contention that, had instead of on the deep Pacific. the Japanese not achieved surprise at “In some ways, Midway was the re- Pearl Harbor, they would have been open verse image of Pearl Harbor. This time to almost certain defeat. This time the the story was one of Japanese overconfi- U.S. Pacific Fleet knew the Japanese dence, careless planning, slipshod train- were coming, almost to the minute when ing and contempt for the enemy; of they would strike, where and in what American cool-headedness, ingenuity, strength. American ships were in the and intelligence well acted upon. At the open sea, free to maneuver and with the time, the nation rejoiced that Pearl Har- advantage of surprise. Nevertheless, the bor had been at least partially avenged. results were such a narrow squeak that Yet Midway was much more than that; it we believe the title Miracle at Midway is is generally conceded to have been the not so much alliterative as exactly fac- turning point in the Pacific war. .”159 tual. Land-based bombing proved totally Gordon W. Prange, Miracle at Midway ineffectual and carrier-based efforts For Reflection and Reasoning ● How did the American ships keep the Japanese from knowing of their prepara- ● Review: What was Japan’s plan? How tions? Could this be accomplished in a had the Americans learned of the plan? war today? Why? 218 Copyright © Ruth Smith The World at War ● The Japanese had three brand new bat- and provided better targets. tleships. Why did Commander Yama- moto decide not to use them in the battle ● On Student Activity Page 36-4, con- of Midway? tinue to identify the Providential events which changed the results of the battle. ● Instead of surprising the Americans at Midway when the Japanese began their ● Review: See Student Activity Page 19-3. attack — what happened? Note how a series of small events were used by God to bring forth the turning ● What change of plans did Nagumo point in the Revolutionary War. make when the Japanese pilots spotted the American fleet? How did this change ● As in the Revolutionary War, how did a of plans help the Americans? Taking the series of small events produce a turning time to load a different type of bomb de- point in World War II? How is this an ex- layed the planes from leaving the carriers ample of Divine Providence? Supplemental Activities ● Student Activity Page 36-5. Students may decode the message. ● Armistice Day, later called Veterans Day, has been a special time of honoring the sol- diers who have fought to preserve liberty in America. The Unknown Soldier was buried in the Tomb at Arlington Cemetery November 11, 1921. Students might enjoy re- searching the history of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington Cemetery. Copyright © Ruth Smith 219 .
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