PAKISTAN: THE MULLAHS AND THE MILITARY 20 March 2003 ICG Asia Report N°49 Islamabad/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. MMA: AN UNNATURAL ALLIANCE ....................................................................... 5 A. ROOTS OF DIFFERENCE.........................................................................................................5 B. JAMAAT-I-ISLAMI: A NATURAL ALLY ................................................................................6 C. JIHAD AND THE ISLAMIC STATE ...........................................................................................7 D. TIES WITH THE MILITARY ....................................................................................................8 E. STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................9 F. THE JI’S EXTENDED FAMILY...............................................................................................10 G. JUI: DEOBAND’S POLITICAL FACET..................................................................................11 1. Corridors Of Power..................................................................................................11 2. Deoband’s Militant Facets ......................................................................................13 H. WHAT BRINGS THE MMA TOGETHER?................................................................................14 III. MMA’S ELECTORAL VICTORY ............................................................................ 15 A. POLITICAL ADVANTAGES....................................................................................................16 B. ELECTION ANOMALIES........................................................................................................17 IV. RHETORIC AND REALITY...................................................................................... 19 A. MMA AND MUSHARRAF ....................................................................................................19 B. INTERNAL DISCORD ............................................................................................................20 C. WOMEN AND MINORITIES ..................................................................................................20 V. OFFICIAL ISLAM....................................................................................................... 22 A. THE MINISTRY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS ..............................................................................22 B. THE COUNCIL OF ISLAMIC IDEOLOGY..............................................................................23 VI. SHARIA AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM ..................................................................... 25 A. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION...............................................................................................26 B. GENDER DISCRIMINATION ..................................................................................................28 C. IMPLEMENTING THE SHARIA...............................................................................................29 VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 31 APPENDICES A. MAP OF PAKISTAN ..............................................................................................................33 B. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................34 C GLOSSARY OF NON-ENGLISH TERMS ..................................................................................35 D ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................36 E. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS .................................................................................37 F. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................42 ICG Asia Report N°49 20 March 2003 PAKISTAN: THE MULLAHS AND THE MILITARY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The resurgence of the religious parties in the The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, October 2002 elections portends ill for Pakistan’s the largest parties in the MMA, have maintained political, cultural and social stability. For the first close ties with the military for decades. Musharraf’s time in the country’s history, an alliance of six major aversion to the mainstream political parties led by religious parties – the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif and the military’s (MMA) – has won power in two provinces, vowing declared intent to keep those two former prime to Islamise state and society through Taliban-like ministers out of power presented the MMA with an policies. The MMA based its electoral campaign on open political field. As a result, religious parties Islam and anti-U.S. slogans, targeting President have gained political clout, and religion is again at Pervez Musharraf’s pro-U.S. policies and pledging the heart of debates on legislation and public policy. the enforcement of Sharia law. It now runs the government in the Northwest Frontier Province The MMA’s political domain is as yet restricted to (NWFP), bordering on Afghanistan, and shares two out of four provincial governments. It has chosen power in Baluchistan. not to join the ruling pro-military Muslim League – Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q) – at the centre, and has The MMA’s zeal might encourage the supporters of adopted a confrontational stance in the National its component parties to take up arms against U.S. Assembly. However, the alliance shares power with forces in Afghanistan or their Afghan allies. the PML-Q in Baluchistan. This strategy helps it Pakistani military and paramilitary troops on the promote an anti-American agenda while avoiding border should be able to contain such a threat. More direct confrontation with the military’s support for significantly, however, the rise of religious parties the U.S.-led war on terrorism. Aware that foreign and threatens to undermine civil liberties, freedom of defence policy is the military’s preserve, the MMA expression, legal reforms and religious tolerance in restricts its opposition to the generals to rhetoric. Its Pakistan. In particular, the situation of women and goal, in any case, is not to confront the military but to minorities may become more difficult in the two consolidate its political gains. provinces under MMA control. By assisting the military’s electoral manoeuvres, The MMA program runs counter to President including formation of suitable governments in the Musharraf’s pledges of reform. Having taken power centre and the provinces, the MMA has obtained in October 1999, Musharraf promised to end major concessions, such as the release from jail of religious extremism and promote moderate Islam – a party workers and the dropping of several program that would have been a revolution of sorts. prosecutions. In the NWFP and Baluchistan, His decision to join the international coalition against Islamisation is now official policy. Initial steps, terrorism after 11 September 2001 did bolster his such as a ban on music in public, attacks on cable image as a reformist and secular ruler. But the television operators, and police action against video general has opted to follow the path of his military shops are signs of what lies ahead as the MMA predecessors, forging alliances of convenience with implements its program. religious organisations to counter secular political adversaries. Though MMA leaders have tried to allay worries that their governments might adopt Taliban-style policies, Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military ICG Asia Report N°49, 20 March 2003 Page ii their actions show preference for strict religious rule. resentment of the Punjabi-dominated military. There The MMA agenda includes an end to co-education, a is also anger there at Musharraf’s efforts to empower first step towards the total segregation of women in religious parties at the expense of their moderate, public life, and the addition of more Islamic texts to secular counterparts with an ethnic or regional base. school and college curricula. The MMA plans to screen and register NGOs in the NWFP and While moderate sections of Pakistani society are Baluchistan. Moral policing by the student wings of being marginalised, religious parties and their causes its parties in NWFP and Baluchistan educational are flourishing. The military follows pro-U.S. institutions enjoys official backing. Similar trends are policies but the compulsions of domestic legitimacy visible elsewhere in public life. have resulted in an alliance of expediency with the religious sector. As a result of the military’s It remains to be seen how much room the MMA will unwillingness to extricate itself from domestic be given to apply its version of Sharia law in the two politics, the religious right, jihad and Islamisation provinces. The MMA stresses that implementation are again acceptable currency in political life, will remain within constitutional confines. Although threatening regional peace and fundamental political, the constitution is Islamic, the form and substance of economic and social rights of Pakistanis. Islamisation is determined by the centre, and federal legislation has primacy.