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Pakistan – NWFP – Jamaat-I-Islami – PPP – Political Violence

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Pakistan – NWFP – Jamaat-I-Islami – PPP – Political Violence Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: PAK30102 Country: Pakistan Date: 11 April 2006 Keywords: Pakistan – NWFP – Jamaat-i-Islami – PPP – Political Violence This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Questions 1. Have there been any reports of significant political violence in the NWFP involving the Jamaat and the PPP since 2001? RESPONSE 1. Have there been any reports of significant political violence in the NWFP involving the Jamaat and the PPP since 2001? Jamaat and the PPP – reports of violence post-2001 Only two reports could be located in reference to the occurrence of significant political violence between the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Jamaat-i-Islami (Jamaat or JI) in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in recent times. Reporting on the situation in the NWFP during the local elections in August 2005: • A Pakistan Times bulletin states that “activists of PPP and Jamaat-i-Islami [were said to have] entered into clashes on the premises of Primary School Ghorkai and opened crossfire [sic]. The clash claimed two lives and injured another” (‘Polls-related Violence: LB Elections take 33 Lives in Pakistan’ 2005, The Pakistan Times, 26 August http://www.pakistantimes.net/2005/08/26/top.htm – Accessed 6 March 2006 – Attachment 1); • A Dawn bulletin states that “[w]orkers of People’s Party Parliamentarians (PPP) and Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) [had] clashed in union council Banda Gai of tehsil Talash in Lower Dir, but police intervened and brought the situation under control” (‘Low turnout, thin women attendance in NWFP’ 2005, Dawn website, 25 August http://www.dawn.com/2005/08/26/nat1.htm – Accessed 6 March 2006 – Attachment 2). • The Member may be interested to know that a Jang Group article reported that “[f]ive persons were killed in different incidents in NWFP on Thursday [polling day] but local police said that it had nothing to do with elections and were the result of personal enmities” (Amir, Intikhab. 2002, ‘Fragile opposition likely in NWFP Assembly’, Dawn website, 19 October http://www.dawn.com/2002/10/20/nat9.htm – Accessed 15 March 2006 – Attachment 3). Jamaat and the PPP – further information The PPP and Jamaat have a complicated relationship: they have operated as both allies and as rivals in provincial politics and at in national politics also. Jamaat and the PPP – in the NWFP In September 2001, Newsline (Pakistan) reported that “traditional political rivals” the PPP and Jamaat-i-Islami had, for “the first time”, “entered into an electoral alliance” in the local elections which were occurring at the time. “The two parties put up joint candidates for Nazims in Lahore, Peshawar [the provincial capital of the NWFP] and some other districts”. The cooperation that this alliance engendered has not been continuous or without complication and the PPP and Jamaat have proven to be partners in some causes at some times in some place but opponents in others. As one writer for the Jang Group has noted, “[i]n the last [national] election…the Jamaat owed its National Assembly seats from Lahore to the backing it got from the PML-N not only against the Pakistan Muslim League-Q candidates, but also against those belonging to the PPP”. In the NWFP provincial elections of October 2002, Jamaat played a significant role in bringing to power the current NWFP Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) coalition government. “Out of the 99 general seats, in a house with a total strength of 124 members including 22 reserved seats for women and three for minorities, the MMA…won 48 seats becoming the single-leading group in the provincial assembly”. The PPP won only 8 seats and has functioned, along with the Awami National Party (ANP), as one of the two leading opposition parties within the Assembly’s marginal collection of opposition members (for the Newsline report of September 2001, see: Hussain, Zahid. 2001, ‘An Engineered Order’, Newsline (Pakistan) website, September http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsSept2001/specialreport1.htm – Accessed 26 February 2006 – Attachment 4; for the Jang Group report on Jamaat–PPP competition in the national elections, see: Naqvi, Ather. 2003, ‘The Party Remains’, The Jang Group website, 31 August http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/aug2003-weekly/nos-31-08-2003/spr.htm – Accessed 21 February 2005 – Attachment 5; for a break down of the October 2002 election results by party, see: ‘Elections 2002 – Results’ (undated), South Asia Terrorism Portal website http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/nationalassembly_results.htm – Accessed 15 March 2006 – Attachment 6; for reports detailing the PPP’s place in the NWFP Provincial Assembly as an opposition party, see: Amir, Intikhab. 2002, ‘Fragile opposition likely in NWFP Assembly’, Dawn website, 19 October http://www.dawn.com/2002/10/20/nat9.htm – Accessed 15 March 2006 – Attachment 6; also: Shahid, Shamim 2005, ‘No justification for opposing Hisba Bill: Fazl’, The Nation website, 11 July http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/july-2005/11/index5.php – Accessed 15 March 2006 – Attachment 7; and: Ebrahim, Zofeen. 2005, ‘Pakistan: Taliban-Style Law in North West Worries Liberals’, Inter-Press Service, 20 July – Attachment 8; for reports indicating Jamaat’s distrust of the PPP, see: ‘PPP-P Being Used as a Tool to Weaken Opposition: MMA’ 2005, Baluchistan Times, 1 May – Attachment 12). In the recent 2005 local elections, the MMA’s constituent parties contested the polls independently and without the cooperation of the PPP. The Pakistan press saw the resulting election as something of a victory for the PPP and a defeat for Jamaat, and the other parties associated with MMA. In the NWFP, the influence of Jamaat, and its MMA associates, was rolled back by PPP wins and, to an even greater extent, the victories of the ANP (see: Khan, Ismail 2005, ‘ANP, PPP regain position in NWFP’, Dawn website, 21 August http://www.dawn.com/2005/08/21/nat8.htm – Accessed 15 March 2006 – Attachment 9; and: Ahmad, Aziz-Ud-Din 2005, ‘An epitaph for MMA’, The Nation, 1 September http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/sep-2005/1/columns3.php – Accessed 15 March 2006 – Attachment 10). Jamaat and the PPP – nationally and ideologically Nonetheless, the PPP remain in a partial, and discontinuous, state of cooperation with Jamaat (and the larger MMA coalition with which it remains associated) at the provincial and national level. The demonstrations which followed the publication of caricatures of the Prophet are a case in point. As one writer for the Jang Group noted, “the Bhutto-led PPP, seemed reluctant partners with MMA, especially Jamaat-e-Islami, in this campaign as they felt they have been left with little choice as the caricatures issue has taken the political scene of the country by a storm”; choosing “to jump onto the MMA bandwagon, fearing their opposition partners might steal the show” (for the Jang Group report on the PPP’s reluctant support of the MMA’s recent demonstrations, see: Khan, Fasihur Rehman 2006, ‘MMA rally makes future political landscape clearer’, Jang Group website, 20 February http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/feb2006-daily/20-02-2006/main/main8.htm – Accessed 14 February 2006 – Attachment 11). In terms of both their respective ideologies and networks of support, the PPP and Jamaat are very different political creatures. The International Crisis Group (ICG) has observed that “the PPP [is] widely characterised by a moderate, left-of-centre philosophy”; while Jamaat is an Islamist revivalist movement with “close ties to the military”. In fact, as the ICG observes, “[i]n the National Assembly, the military-led government continues to rely upon MMA support to counter the pro-democracy Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD), spearheaded by the PPP and PML-N”. Nonetheless, the MMA and the ARD have had occasion to cooperatively act in opposition to the military-led national government. Recently, on 4 February 2006, it was reported that “[t]he Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) [had] agreed to bring joint candidates for the vacant Senate seats”. Under the terms of this agreement “the MMA would support candidates of the ARD in the Punjab and Sindh, while the ARD would endorse MMA candidates in Balochistan and NWFP” (for an overview of Pakistan’s political parties see: International Crisis Group 2005, International Crisis Group 2005, Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan, Asia Report no.102, 28 September http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/102_authoritarianism_and_poli tical_party_reform_in_pakistan.pdf – Accessed 9 December 2005 – Attachment 13; for a report pointing to the ideological divide between a Jamaat–PPP alliance, see: ‘Political match-making’ 2003, The Jang Group website, 31 August http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/aug2003-weekly/nos-31-08-2003/spr.htm – Accessed 21 February 2005 – Attachment 14; and also: Ali, Mujahid. 2005, ‘PPP steps up attack on ruling party’, Gulf News, 16 August – Attachment 15; for information on the recently announced alliance between the ARD and the MMA, see: ‘MMA, ARD to Field Joint Senate Candidates’ 2006, The Nation, 4 February – Attachment 16). The Nation’s Aziz-Ud-Din Ahmad has noted the “vulnerabilities” which attend the new “proposed alliance”: The MMA which rules the NWFP and is a part of the PML dominated government in Balochistan has stakes in the system and has therefore been careful not to cross the red line in its tussle with Islamabad.
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