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ch ar F se o e u R ISSUE BRIEF ● PAKISTAN ELECTIONS 2007-2008:n KEY PLAYERS r d e a v t r i e o s n b O ORF ISSUE BRIEF MARCH 2007 ISSUE BRIEF # 8 Pakistan Elections 2007-2008: Key Players By Wilson John n November this year, the world will witness one of the Given the nature of Pakistan’s politics and military, of- most keenly awaited presidential elections in Pakistan ten diffi cult to distinguish, it will be worthwhile to draw a Iwith President Pervez Musharraf seeking a second term thumb-nail sketch of key domestic players who will have a from the existing parliament without giving up his uniform. decisive infl uence on the outcome of the political process in A few months later, in early 2008, will follow the general a predominantly military regime. elections for the National Assembly. Although Musharraf, as the Army Chief, had taken over KEY PLAYERS the reigns of Pakistan in a bloodless coup on October 12, PRESIDENT PERVEZ MUSHARRAF 1999, he became the President offi cially in December 2003. President Pervez Musharraf, in the saddle since October 12, This was after the National Assembly, controlled by the Paki- 1999, is seeking re-election for a second term in November stan Muslim League-Qaid-e-Azam (PML-QA), often known 2007 with two caveats—he will be re-elected by the present as the King’s party, passed the 17th Amendment to the Con- National Assembly members and will not resign as the Chief stitution of Pakistan. of Army Staff. The amendment, which legalised the highly autocratic Contrary to perceptions, the road to re-election may not Legal Framework Order, could not have been passed with- be smooth. There are chances that the situation in Baloch- out the support of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a istan and Waziristan might adversely affect Musharraf’s po- six-party religious alliance whose relationship with Mush- sition. The killing of popular Baloch leader Nawab Akbar arraf has remained contentious since its birth. Many believe Khan Bugti in August 2006 has not dampened the rebellion MMA was fostered by the Army-ISI establishment to support in Balochistan. Military operations are still going on in the General Musharraf’s claim to power in Islamabad. The new area amidst widespread allegations of human rights viola- amendment gave Musharraf a fi ve-year term as the President, tions. The Bajaur bombing, the heavy deployment of troops besides sweeping powers to control and run many civil insti- (70,000-80,000) and the increased US propensity to aim and tutions, and the authority to dismiss the National Assembly fi re artillery guns at terrorist hideouts in Waziristan have cre- and provincial Assemblies. For all practical purposes, the As- ated a sense of deep uncertainty in the region. sembly was made subservient to the offi ce of the President. No less troublesome for Musharraf is the public airing of Observer Research Foundation is a public policy think-tank that aims to infl uence formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India. ORF pursues these goals by providing informed and productive inputs, in-depth research and stimulating discussions. The Foundation is supported in its mission by a cross-section of India’s leading public fi gures, academics and business leaders. 1 | www.orfonline.org | March 2007 ISSUE BRIEF ● PAKISTAN ELECTIONS 2007-2008: KEY PLAYERS the growing sense of disenchantment among the Pakistan political situation in Pakistan took place in the late ’60s when elite as reflected in the two letters written by retired Gener- violent religious demonstrations were orchestrated through- als, academics, social activists and political leaders in early out the country on the issue of a book written by a Jewish 2006, asking President Musharraf to step down in the inter- author of Indian descent which reportedly denigrated the est of democracy and the dismay within the military leader- Prophet. The ISI was working on the orders of General Yahya ship over the bombing of a madrasa in Bajaur. Khan to create religious opposition to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s The judicial crisis created by the suspension of Chief political aspirations. Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry in March has added to the sense But it was Zia-ul Haq who used the ISI to manipulate of instability. Despite dissenting voices within and outside the political system effectively in 1976, coaxing Zulfiqar Ali the military, the Pakistan Army leadership, for the present, Bhutto, through ISI reports, to call for an early election. Al- is firmly behind President Musharraf. In the past six years, though Bhutto won the elections hands down, Zia took over through forced retirements and supercession, the President the reigns alleging widespread poll violations and Bhutto’s has ensured that the top leadership of the Army remained involvement in the murder of a dissident party leader. loyal to him. Besides, the top and middle-rung leadership In 1988, the ISI patched together a coalition—Islami has been offered comfortable sinecures and high-level ap- Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) or Islamic Democratic Alliance against pointments in the civilian bureaucracy, Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Par- lucrative business deals through the ty (PPP). The agency also arm-twisted welfare foundations controlled by the Since it is obvious that Jamaat-e-Islami’s newly elected chief military, in addition to sizeable plots at the military will not Qazi Hussain Ahmed to join the IJI. highly subsidised prices. The agency had no choice but to ac- Musharraf is equally sure of the sup- allow a single-party cept Bhutto as the Prime Minister after port he can expect to draw from Wash- rule in the country, the her party won more seats than the IJI. ington although there are increasing To neutralize her influence, the ISI en- doubts being expressed in the Ameri- ISI’s role in working out sured that a young and upcoming lead- can media about such unqualified help. different coalitions, both er of Pakistan Muslim League, Nawaz The New York Times even suggested Sharief, be elected as the Chief Minister the possibility of the Bush administra- in the opposition and in of Punjab, the biggest and richest prov- tion looking towards the next General. the `King’s party’, will ince of Pakistan. But Musharraf, well versed in psyops, is Benazir, despite valiant attempts to quite aware that President George Bush become clearer in the consolidate her power, often played cannot risk a new General in Islamabad months leading up to into the hands of the ISI. The agency, so close to his farewell speech. Only for instance, persuaded her to facilitate Musharraf can bring a bit of cheer in an the elections. the meeting of various religious extrem- otherwise gloomy legacy which Bush is ist forces, both from Pakistan and Saudi poised to leave behind. It is reasonably Arabia, to create, what is today known clear that the Bush administration will back him, despite oc- as, al Qaida. On the other hand, the agency managed to keep casional irritants, till at least one of the three issues—Taliban, Benazir out of two critical areas of Pakistan’s foreign and de- Osama bin Laden and Iran—are resolved in favour of Bush. fence policy—the nuclear weapons programme and the In- China too is on Musharraf’s side. Significantly, his state- dia policy. ments that he would not be quitting as the Army Chief before In 1990, the ISI not only patched together another grand the elections and that he would be seeking a second term coalition against Bhutto but also distributed, according to came immediately on his return from China in mid-June Lt. General Asad Durrani (the ISI Chief in an affidavit in re- 2006. sponse to a petition filed in the Supreme Court), Rs 60 mil- lion to 20 anti-Bhutto politicians. In fact, the amount used in ISI the anti-Bhutto campaign was reported to be nearly Rs 150 The ISI’s involvement in Pakistan’s politics has been critical. million. Not surprisingly, Nawaz Sharief came to power with The agency has been regularly used not only to spy on politi- the help of the ISI and the Army. cal rivals but also to engineer defections and create situations In 2002, when Musharraf decided to hold the gener- favourable to the ruling party or the Army. al elections, the ISI facilitated the formation of the `King’s An early and telling instance of ISI’s manipulation of the party’—Pakistan Muslim League-Qaid-e-Azam—mainly by 2 | www.orfonline.org | March 2007 ISSUE BRIEF ● PAKISTAN ELECTIONS 2007-2008: KEY PLAYERS engineering defections, through money and muscle, largely by the US intelligence and security forces. Though extremist from Sharief’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML). There were groups like Sipah-e-Saheba of Pakistan (SSP) and its more ra- allegations (mainly from the opposition parties) that intel- bid offshoot, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), were officially banned, ligence personnel kidnapped and tortured political leaders they operated under various new nomenclatures, providing to browbeat them into joining the `King’s party’. shelter to al Qaida and Taliban elements. In the recent past, the ISI has been quite active in whit- With the Musharraf regime dithering on cracking down tling down terrorist groups targeting President Musharraf. on extremist and terrorist elements in Pakistan, the MMA Since it is obvious that military will not allow a single-party decided to take on President Musharraf in 2003 by demand- rule, the ISI’s role in working out different coalitions, both in ing his resignation as the Chief of Army Staff and withdrawal the opposition and in the `King’s party’, will become clearer of the Legal Framework Order (LFO) which gave wide-rang- in the coming months.
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