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Researched and Compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on 16 September 2009 Researched and compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on 16 September 2009 Pakistan: Information regarding a Shia Muslim sect called “Jafaria”, also known as “Yade Ali”? A list of banned extremist groups published online by the Pakistani newspaper Dawn, in a paragraph headed “Tehrik Nifaz-i-Fiqah Jafaria”, refers to this group as follows: “Also known as Tehrik-e-Islami, Tehrik-Nifaz-i-Fiqah Jafaria is a Shia political party formed in 1979 following the Islamic revolution in Shia Iran. It aims to introduce Fiqa-i-Jaffriah (the Shia legal system) for Pakistani Shias to prevent imposition of the Sunni school of thought. TNFJ later split into two groups with the second group (Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan) headed by Allama Arif Hussaini, who was assassinated in 1988 during Gen Zia ul-Haq's regime. TJP was banned two times by President Pervez Musharraf's government and its leaders were arrested. However, they continue to operate under new names.” (Dawn (6 August 2009) Pakistan bans 25 militant organisations) In a section titled “The Sectarian Landscape” an International Crisis Group report states: “The Shia community, too, has evolved into pressure groups, political parties and religious organisations. The main Shia party is the Tehrik-i-Islami (earlier called Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan, until it was banned in 2002).” (International Crisis Group (18 April 2005) The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan, p.3) This section of the report also states: “Though Shia Islam in Pakistan is sectarian, and can be both aggressive and rebellious in response to perceived threats to the faith, Shia political parties have generally supported mainstream secular parties. Shias backed the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in the 1970s and entered into a more formal alliance with it in the early 1990s. Later, the main Shia party, the Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan, joined hands with the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N). Today its newest incarnation, the Tehrik-e- Islami is a member of the MMA, an alliance with five Sunni politico-religious parties that is likely to be temporary, forged as it is on the grounds of political expediency. A distinct Shia communalism remains the basis of Tehrik-e-Islami's organisation and activism.” (ibid, p.4) In a section titled “External actors and Pakistani sectarianism” this report states: “Until the 1979 Iranian revolution, Pakistani Shias were a politically moderate community, and their associations had limited aims, such as a separate Islamic textbook. Most Shias supported Bhutto's PPP in the 1970 elections. Zia's Islamisation and the Iranian revolution spurred them into political activism. Their first political party, Tehrik Nifaz-e-Fiqhe Jafaria (TNFJ), was founded in 1979.” (ibid, p.11) In a section headed “Tehrik-i-Jafria Pakistan (Tehrik-e-Jafariya-e-Pakistan) (TJP)” an Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada response to an information request states: “The TJP was originally established in 1979 as Tehrik-e Nefaz-e Fiqh-e Jafaria (TNFJ, Movement for the Implementation of Shi'a Law) by Jaffer Hussain (Islam and Islamic Groups 1992, 187; Jane's Intelligence Review Jan. 1999, 34), as an activist group representing the interests of the Shi'a minority in Pakistan (Political Handbook of the World: 2000-2002 2002, 844; Statesman 8 July 2001). The organization was formed in response to the Islamic revolution in Iran (Islam and Islamic Groups 1992, 187; Jane's Intelligence Review Jan. 1999, 34; BBC 7 Oct. 2003) and the implementation of the Islamization policies by military dictator Zia ul-Haq, which were tailored for the predominantly Sunni population (ibid.; Dawn 8 Nov. 2000). In the late 1980s, the TNFJ was renamed the Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP) and reorganized itself as a political party.” (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (1 April 2004) PAK42530.E – Pakistan: The treatment of Shi'as by the government and the population; the government response to violence against Shi'as; the status and situation of the Shi'a political party, the Tehreek (Tehrik)-i/e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP) (2000-March 2004)) This section of the response also states: “The TJP is a member of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a religious six- party alliance (AFP 18 Nov. 2003; BBC 19 Nov. 2003) that is ‘engaged in a fierce battle with Gen. Musharraf over his un-elected presidency, refusal to quit the army and his self-awarded sweeping powers’ (ibid.). The MMA holds 17.5 per cent of the seats in the federal parliament and rules the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) (AFP 22 Feb. 2003; International Religious Freedom Report 2003 18 Dec. 2003, Sec. II). The TJP is also closely acquainted with Sipah-i- Muhammad, an extremist Shi'a organization that according to the Political Handbook of the World: 2000-2002, ‘has been a major participant in Pakistan's ongoing sectarian warfare’ (2002, 844). However, TJP leader, Hasan Turbai, said that Shi'as were the victims and not the perpetrators of sectarian violence” (ibid) An Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada response quotes a human rights activist based in Lahore as saying that the TNFJ: “Is not participating in politics. Its leaders however are often able to participate at seminars, political gatherings etc, including those held by the MMA [Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal], the religious alliance. The TJP -- as a group known now as the TNFJ, the Islami Tehrik-e-Pakistan, etc., somewhat at random, is also still seen as a main political spokesgroup for the Shia community, and its opinions on sectarian or religious issues [are] often sought, by the press, at conferences, etc. The group remains well organised and conducts its own meetings.” (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (4 August 2005) PAK100475.E – Pakistan: Confirmation of whether the information in PAK42530.E of 1 April 2004 under the heading Tehrik-i-Jafria Pakistan (TJP) is correct and currently valid, including the current status and activities, if any, of the Tehrik-e Nefaz-e Fiq-e Jafaria (TNFJ); if still active, whether the TNFJ has any links with any extremist/Islamist/banned group(s) (April 2004 - September 2004)) In a section titled “Sectarian violence” a Human Rights Commission of Pakistan report on the events of 2007 refers to the assassination of a former president of Tehreek-e-Jafaria as follows: “Sectarian violence has claimed more than 4,000 lives since the late 1980s. (RNE, May 6) In 2007 increased violence resulting from intolerance and bigotry once again took the form of sectarian violence. The Shia community remained the main target of such attacks. Some of the worst incidents of sectarian violence were reported from Peshawar, Hangu and Parachinar. In an Al-Qaeda strike in Peshawar unidentified gunmen shot dead the Shia leader Syed Ali Imam Jafri, a former president of Tehreek-e-Jafaria, when he was on his way to the imambargah.” (Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (29 March 2008) State of Human Rights in 2007 - Chapter 3: Fundamental freedoms (Freedom of movement; Freedom of thought, conscience and religion; Freedom of expression; Freedom of assembly; Freedom of association) A Pakistan Newswire report states: “Two persons including Tehreek Jafaria leader were gunned down armed motorcyclists near here Saturday. Police said that Pesh Imam of Markazi imam bargah of Sibi Syed Saqlain Ali Shah Naqvi was sitting in his shop along with his guard Syed Ghulam Ali Shah here today. Five armed men riding a motorcycle opened indiscriminate fire on Syed Saqlain Ali Shah who died on the spot.” (Pakistan Newswire (11 January 2009) Tehreek Jafaria leader, other killed in firing) This response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Refugee Documentation Centre within time constraints. This response is not and does not purport to be conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Please read in full all documents referred to. References: Dawn (6 August 2009) Pakistan bans 25 militant organisations http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content- library/dawn/news/pakistan/provinces/18-25-militant-organisations-banned-am- 02 (Accessed 16 September 2009) Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (29 March 2008) State of Human Rights in 2007 - Chapter 3: Fundamental freedoms (Freedom of movement; Freedom of thought, conscience and religion; Freedom of expression; Freedom of assembly; Freedom of association http://www.ein.org.uk/members/country/print.shtml?cmd[113]=x-113-237724 (Accessed 16 September 2009) Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (4 August 2005) PAK100475.E – Pakistan: Confirmation of whether the information in PAK42530.E of 1 April 2004 under the heading Tehrik-i-Jafria Pakistan (TJP) is correct and currently valid, including the current status and activities, if any, of the Tehrik-e Nefaz-e Fiq-e Jafaria (TNFJ); if still active, whether the TNFJ has any links with any extremist/Islamist/banned group(s) (April 2004 - September 2004) http://www2.irb- cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=450104 (Accessed 16 September 2009) Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (1 April 2004) PAK42530.E – Pakistan: The treatment of Shi'as by the government and the population; the government response to violence against Shi'as; the status and situation of the Shi'a political party, the Tehreek (Tehrik)-i/e-Jafria Pakistan (TJP) (2000-March 2004) http://www.unhcr.org/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=printdoc&docid=485ba8761e (Accessed 16 September 2009) International Crisis Group (18 April 2005) The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/095_the_state_of_s ectarianism_in_pakistan.pdf (Accessed 16 September 2009) Pakistan Newswire (11 January 2009) Tehreek Jafaria leader, other killed in firing http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/l (Accessed 16 September 2009) Sources Consulted: Electronic Immigration Network European Country of Origin Information Network Google Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada International Crisis Group LexisNexis Refugee Documentation Centre Query Database UK Home Office UNHCR Refworld .
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