I SPECIAL ISSUE I

U.P. ASSESSMENT PROJECT ON THE STATE OF THE NATION

THE FAILED DECEMBER COUP View from the UP Community

BELINDA A. AQUINO Editor

University a/the Philippines Office of the Vice President for Public Affairs in co,yunction with Center for Integrative and Development Studies Diliman, Quezon City Maren 1990 About the Center For Integretlve end Development Studies The UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP-CIOS) was established In September t 985 to promote Interdisciplinary and Integrative studies on crttical topics bearing on development policies Contents and Issues. These studies should address slgnfficant concems 01 Philippine society In that they deal wnh problems whose under­ t standing and resolution have Important Implications for the well-being 01 major sectors 01 the country. The Center seeks to initiate and support broad research topics that 'ntroductlon call for Innovative methodological approaches and muni-disclplinary collaboration. While public policy questions are the primary concern of lIP-CIOS, n also encourages basic research that Is neededtoInform Intelligently the direction and substance of policy-oriented research. T~e Failed Coup and the Politics of 1 I Violence The Center functions under the Office of the UP President, currently Prof. Jose V. Abueva. For further Information, contact: Dr. C.rolln. O. By Belinda A. Aquino, Vice-Presidenf for Public A!fal~s and Pr?fes~orofPolitical Science and Hem.ndez, Director, UP-CIDS, PeED Hoefer, UP Dlllmen, Quezon City. Tel. N~. I PUblic Admmlstratlon, University ofthe 17-3540, 99-9691 and 97-6061 I~I 518. I Phlllppmes 1 AbDut the National Assessment Project ,! Part ONE The National Assessment Project was launched underUP President I, Jose V. Abueva's initiative in late 1988 to inquire into the current state Of the nation using eight vnal areas cf Philippine society. It seeks to The December Coup Attempt and the involve various faculty on all campuses to contribute, through re­ State of the Nation 6 search efforts, to the full and authoritative assessment of our nation: By J?se If. Abueva, PreSident andProfessor of ns people, their well-being, welfare, values, resources and Instnu­ j PoMlcal SCIence and PUblic Administration tions. UniverSIty ofthe Philippines Administered by UP-CIOS, the Project hopes to identify weak­ nesses and strengths in policies, programs and other measures that are currently being epplied to the resolution of our national problems. Part Two It is an ambitious undertaking, but given the extensive resources at the University communny, n should be possible to generate well­ thought out crniques and suggestions regarding the State 01 the A Time for Hard Decisions Nation. By the School ofEconomics, UP Diliman 18 For further information, contact UP-CIOS at the above address and •••• 0, •••••••••••••••••••••••••• . . number Emergency Powers for the President 29 .. ~~.~e.. COllege ofLaw, UP Diliman ...... ,. . •..•.••.....•..•..••.....•.....••..• A Historic OPportunity to Renew Democracy and Society 34 By th,!.SChoofofLabor andfndustriaf Relation UP Dillman s

...... , . .. . Self-Regulation not Repress/on By the.COllege of Mass Communication 40 UP Dillman •, 1

I INTRODUCTION

THE FAILED COUP AND THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE

By Belinda A. Aquino Vice President Cor Public Affairs and ProCessor oC Political Science and Public Administration I University oethe Philippines t is distasteful, Wnotfrightening, but whether we like tt ornot, ! I the coup d'etat (kudeta) has become part of the contem­ porary Filipino polttical landscape. The fact that we have quickly incorporated the term kudeta Into our political vocabulary is a sign that tts reamy is established in ourday-to· day lives. At the very least, tt has become a household word in Philippine polttics, something we have to live wtth. We are still feeling the effects a the coup attempt last December, the bloodiest so far since the AqUino governmant assumed power In February 1986, following the EDSA revolu­ tion. Years later, when we look back at the presidency of Cory AqUino, we will readily see that tts distinguishing characteristic was fts attempts to weather the polttics of violence spawned by the overweening ambttions of the Reform the Armed For­ ces Movement (RAM) leaders and their cohorts to rule Philip­ pine society. There are less than 800 days left to AqUino's term and the general wish at least is that she last until the scheduled presidential election in 1992. In a sense, this isa sad commen­ tary on a presidency that was gloriously Installed bya "people power" revolution not so long ago. We had such high, albeft unrealistic, hopes for and expectations from tt. Perhaps that was what was wrong all this time. Things were not going to change simply because we had overthrown the dictator. Now we see a popular presidency ending up In a lame-duck posi­ tion trying to hang on until tts legftlmate expiration in 1992. The persistent threats to fts axlstence have taken their toll. They have reduced the energies of the current leadership to sheer polttical survival. ft started wfth a bang, as the expression goes. let us hope ft does not end up in tears as well as In blood. The 1989 kudeta has been the subject of profuse and profound commentaries by media, academics, buslnass 2 3

groups, religious circles, International observers, and ordi­ east Central Europe, eastern Europe with a small 'e,' and nary people. And as usual, In our own Filipino wey, we have above ell, Individual peoples, nations, and states." ("Eastern accepted the term as part of our everyday IWe, making Rthe Europe: The Year of Truth," The New York Review of Books, tRle of sklls and even associating RwRh the occasion of love, February 15, 1990, p. 17). e.g., "Valentine coup." We have become "Kudeta Country." There is something in the Filipino polllical cuRure that con­ The remarkable thing about all these revolutions on the verts serious events of a IWe-and-death nature, such as assas­ other side of the globe was the absence ofviolence, except in sinations, kudetas, Insurgencies, etc., into material tor humor the case of Romania. Instead, the young demonstrators In and mundane conversations. And as we wrRe this, we are East Berlin and Prague, for instance, laid candles on the certain there are already 35 jOkes that have been coined by ground In front·of the police, reminiscent of our own EDSA pundlls related to the last kudeta. revolution In 1986. But on a more serious level, the kudeta last December really But the 1989 kudeta In the Philippines was something else. jolted ordinary cRizens off their seats. nwas not so much that It was the anti-thesis of the non-violent revolutions in Eastern II happened. Previous coup attempts, particularly the one In Europe toward democratic rule. In Manila, the conspirators August 1987, had somehow' created the sense that Rwould were taking the 0pposlle tack of storming Malacanang on a happen again. It was the 1989 attempt's firepower and sophis­ prelude to a poillics of violence. These self-styled RAM retor­ tication that brought home liS "stark reality" to the ordinary mists are actually frustrated men intent on seizing power. Their Filipino. And while the 1987 putsch took only a matter of hours frustrations have accumulated since the waning days of the to quell, II was taking days, in fact a full week, for the govern­ Marcos regime when "people power" pre-empted their ment 10 contain the 1989 one. Were II not for tho timely original prospect of bringing down the dictator themselves. "persuasion flights" (read: intervention) of the U.S. F-4 phan­ They were robbed of their supreme moment of glory. They tom jets from Clark Airbase on the Malacanang airspace, we had to try again, even under conditions of peace and might be liVing under the aegis of a military junta today. This democracy. They have gone so far as to sound revolutionary is another issue altogether and we will not really delve into this by calling themselves Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang in this brief introduction. Makabansa (Revolutionary Nationalist Alliance) and Soldiers of the Filipino People (SFP). Thus what comes out of all these is the increasing ability of coup plotters to mount destabilization offensives wilh Im­ To be critical of the RAM for their misbegotten dreams and punity and the diminishing capacity on the pM of the civilian violent ambitions is not to endorse the Aquino government leadership to pre-empt or prevent them. This is a damaging without reservation. TLe latter too must be faulted for not impression that causes ordinary citizens to lose fallh in the showing greater decisiveness in confronting the basic ablity of their leaders to protect them in times of grave crisis. problems of the country. By lis lapses and ineptness, rt has There is already so much lawlessness in other sectors to exacerbated the conditions which promote structural violence begin wllh. The integrity ofthe civilian poillicalleadership Is at I in the society. The drift, disarray and corruption in the civilian stake in such slluations. Its vulnorability to the ever-shifting leadership always Invlle attempts to grab power by organized currents of polhical Change is not something that re-assures atternatlve groups. The concept of "civilian supremacy" Is and strengthens the Filipino body poillic. f meaningless wllhout substance and integrity. all a deeper level, what does II all mean-what has become The ongoing debate on the latest kUdeta has not exhausted of Philippine politics? It is a season of seismic upheavals, of all the answers to and explanations of the current Philippine polltical change, violent and otherwise, of turning points In crisis. Its ramifications are still unfolding. And lis complexllies contemporary history. At the time that we were having our are being unravelled by a presidential commission. Whatever taste ot a real kudeta lasl December, Eastern Europe was the findings are, the fact is, as we have indicated in the undergoing lis own winter of severe political discontents. The beginning, the kudeta has become a familiar phenomenon on Iron Curtain came down, the Berlin Wall was torn open, the Filipino political scene. Romania executed lis long-standing tyrant, and Czechos­ lovakia installed a pla:ywright as head of state. In an effort to get a broader range of views on the matter, University of the Philippines (UP) President Jose V. Abueva It is a time of revolutions, a "springtime of societies aspiring sounded out the various UP constlluencles when the kudeta to be civil," according to wrner Timothy Garton Ash. ·Civll" struck last December. The response was quick and extensive. translates to a lot of things: democratic, non-violent, free. ·If ObViously the kudeta touched a raw nerve on the UP body we can no longer talk of communism," Ash continues, ·we poillic. The collective response was one of shock and out~ shculd no longer talk of Eastern Europe, at least with a capllal rage. Some unlls which have been researching basic Philip­ E for Eastern. Instead, we shall have central Europe again, pine problems for sometime found this occasion as an opportunity to articulate their suggestions for governmental 4 5 reform as a way to discourage future kudetas. Others con­ fined themselves to analyzing the causes of the kudeta. "Our worst enemy today Is our bed qualities­ Indifference to POb/1e affalrs, conceit, ambition, This volume puts together the thinking, reactions, respon­ selfishness, the pursuit Of personal advance.. ses and reflections of a cross-section of the UP community ment, and r1val'Y-and that Is the maln strug­ wnh regard to the failed December coup. These reactions gle we are faced with. came in various forms-from one-page resolutions to 30­ page posnlon papers. The comprehensive article by Presi­ "We are going Into free elections, and an elec­ dent Abueva sets the tone for the volume. This first section tion bellie. Let us not allow that ballie to SUlly projects nine major points related to the meanings, lessons the stili clean face Of our gentle revolution ... " and Implications of the failed coup. It analyzes the event in the (The New York Review Of Books, 15 context of the state of the nation as a whole. Februa'Y 1990, p. 22.) The second section is composed of nine contributions from With ~~e example Of Havel, It Is tempting to end with the various university campuses, schools and departments com­ propoSitIon that more artists and Intellectuals should be bining analysis, expressions of sentiment, and recommenda­ elected.l?resldents, prime ministers and chiefs of state. Havel tions for reform. The lead article here, "A TIme for Hard exemplilles ~he politics ofmorality, notviolence. This is not the Decisions" by the School of Economics in UP Diliman, con­ moral!'Y of bom-agaln" Christian fundamentalism. It Is the tains wide-ranging suggestions for social and economic morality.of non-violent political change, the pursuit of peace, reform. It has been extensively quoted in various academic the positive uses of power, and the forging Of a national and professional circles. The rest of the articles in this section consensus in the context Of democratic pluralism. come from the constnuent university campuses In Manila, Los Banns, and Visayas, and from specilic departments and col­ . We wo~ld like to mention by way of ending that the pUblica­ leges in UP Diliman. tion of ~~IS volume has been supported by the UnIVersity of the ~hllopplnes Center for Integrative and Development The third part consists of shorter statements from various StUdIes (UP-CIDS) In conjunction with the National Assess­ colleges, departments, faculty, and a student leader. There Is ment Project on the State of the Nation. Since this volume Is a unanimous condemnation of the December kudeta, but at dealing with a topic that was not part of the original proposal the same time there are criticisms of the performance and for ~he State of the Nation project, In the sense that It was not excesses of the current civilian leadership. anticipated, we are Issuing II as a SpecialIssue of the project We referred earlier to the peaceful revolutions In Eastem Europe to dramatize the contrast wilh our own Increasingly I disturbing polnics of violence. It is filling to Include here parts of a statement from neWly-Installed premier Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia, a playwright of not only considerable creativity but also of morality. In fact he believes porrtlcs should be grounded on morality. Below Is an excerpt of his New Year's Day speech:

"Masa'Yk founded his polilics on morality. Let I us t'Y In a new time and In a new way, to revive this concept of polillcs. Let us teach both our­ selves and others that politics ought to be a reflection of the aspiration to contribute to the happiness of the community and not of the I need to deceive or pillage the community. Let us teach both ourselves and others that polnics does not have to be the art of the pos­ sible, especially iI this means the art of speculating, calculating, Intrigues, secret agreements, and pragmatic manueverlng, but that It also can be the art of the Impossible, that Is the art of making both ourselves and the world beller. , 6 7

Against heavy odds, our economy seemed clearly to recover. We strove to assert our sovereignty, independence and na­ PART One tional identity. But the damage and setback of the previous two decades, including a crushing $28-billion foreign debt, and some basic and continuing problems of a longer period, such as massive poverty, ineqUity, injustice, underdevelop­ THE DECEMBER 1989 COUP ment, a cultural inferiority complex, and a surging popUlation, would continue to block or slow down the progress many of ATTEMPT AND THE STATE OF THE us so badly sought. We realize more than ever how far we had fallen behind the Newly Industrializing Economies of Taiwan, NATION: SOME LESSONS AND South Korea, Singapore and Hongkong. Even other ASEAN countries were advancing faster: Thailand, Malaysia and In­ IMPLICATIONS donesia. Reflecting on ourselves and our predicament, by and large, we appear unable as a people to achieve and hold on to a _:»:JJt4llll solid consensus on our goals and purposes, to gain the larger Uy Jose ~ Abueva and longer view, to get our several acts together, to rise Prf'sident and professor or Politicol Science and above our selfish and parochial interests, to acl boldly and Public Administration resolutely enough to come to grips with basic national issues Uni\ICr!':ity of the Philippines and problems and reduce our dependency on other countries, to assert strongly our national sovereignty, inde­ pendence and self-determination to serve the best inlerests of the majority of our people and not only of those who control n the months just before and especially during the sixth and the levers of power and decision-making. most deadly and destructive coup attempt of Decembef I1-7 1989 we saw our own ever more sharply and painfully as Let us leave that fast, macro scanning and now focus on a a t'ragmented, violence-prone nation, a fragile, elitist few perceptions and observations made vivid in the week of democracy, a dissonant cullure, a vulnerable and dependent the sixth coup artempt. economy. Ironically 1989 was a year of momentous change towards Point One. The fragility of our constitutional democracy and the in­ world peace and democracy. In astonishment and awe, stability of our politicat system derive from a basic problem: the humankind wllnessed a peaceful global revolution against serious disagreement by significant mmtant constituencies concern­ Communism in Poland, Hungary, East Germany a':ld I ing such fundamentals as the desired socio-economic and political Czechoslovakia. Romania overthrew lis violent Communist system and the manner of effecting political change and succession. dictatorship. Earlier on, Chinese students and cllizens demanded democratic reforms at TIananmen Square, but were brutally suppressed. The East-West Cold War was en­ We know there are at least three groups Violently challeng· ding the Berlin Wall made obsolete. Wllh inter-state tension ing our conSlllutional democracy: (1) the Authoritarian Right relax'ing, the prospects for democratization of societies im· (the military rebels and their political and business supporters, proved. inclUding some Marcos loyalists); (2) the Authoritarian Left (CPP/NPA-NDF); and (3) the armed secessionist Muslim After the snap election and EDSA revolution In February rebels who continue to use force or the threat of violence to 1986 we thought that unlled and peacefUlly, we had finally pursue their ends. Other groups use peaceful means to in­ broken the grip of the 14-year old Marcos dictatorship. fluence, transform or replace the present system. Among Despile the coup attempts, the Communist insurgency and these are the Popular Democrats, the Liberal Democrats, the the MNLF, we had begun to revive our democratic instllutions. 8 9

Socialists, the proponents of the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM), and other moderately-inclined groups. PoInt lWo: To repeat, most citizens all over the country want aca and peaceful means ofresolving connicts and bringing about f::ces. In contrast, in dynamically stable polijical systems, most ~ry changes. They therefore support our constitutional democracy competing political groups accept those fundamentals I have ey demand punishment for the rebels and their backers, especial: cited. They contend with each other peacefully, largely over Iy their leaders. At the same time the people are increasin Iy dis political leadership, the general direction of the government satisfred andimpatient with our government's performance. g - and specific policies.

In the global surge toward peace and democracy, the These observations were borne out by an outpourin of groups mounting the violent challenges to our constitutional pUblic Opinion expressed in the media and in numerous ~ora democracy are manifestly anachronistic, retrogressive and around the country In the wake of the failed coup. The rebels parochial. Some Marcos loyalists and other ambijious and the" supporters were seen as power grabbers and mer­ politicians opposed to President AqUino, in tactical alliance cenanes rather than reformers. with the military rebels, seek to grab political power and govern through a mjJjtary~civilian junta. Like the Communists, .The post-~oup survey of public opinion in Metro Manila the fascist coalition of forces of the Right are defying the Clled above Indicated the following sampling of opinions: desire for peace, democracy and non-violent change of majority of the people, and exploiting their hardships and • Coup attempt of 1989 even more unpopUlar than that dissatisfaction with the government. of 1987. •

There is empirical evidence that while the great majority of • Pro-government forces again seen as heroes and Filipinos are pro-democracy and prefer peaceful change, rebels as villains. I significant minorities are inclined to authoritarianism and I violent change. Thus, 67 percent of Metro Manilans surveyed • Presidential performance rating bounces back up. by the Social Weather Stations (SWS) on December 11-18, 1989 disagreed that the military rebels' reason justified the • Reb.el ration~lizations for coup have basis as factual I SOCial conditIOns, but do not justify coup. December coup, but 30 percent agreed. Forty-eight percent i. agreed that "the true objective of the rebels was to grab power for themselves or civilian backers," but 24 percent disagreed. • Rebel intentions no longer given benefit ofthe daub!. Also about 48 percent disagreed with this statement posed by • Public wants tougher disciplinary action against the survey: "If the President is not performing her duties rebels. properly, any group within the military has reason to over­ throw her, even by force." But 28 percent agreed. Thus, we • Even if rebels won, the pUblic would not have col­ have a significant number of people who are disloyal to laborated. constitutional democracy, and the dUly-constituted govern­ ment, and who condone the use of force in seeking changes • Call for (Vice-President Salvador) Laurel and (Senator in our society. Juan Ponce) Ennle, not (President) AqUino, to resign. It should be noted, however, that the survey covered only When asked what reasons led to the coup attempt the 500 respondents In the Metro Manila area. respondents cijed the fallowing: ' • Very low pay/benefits ofmilitary (73%). • Too much graft and corruption (69%). • Difficult life for mostFilipinos (69%). • Hard to relay complaints to President (67%). 11 10

much longer time to conclude. It resuned in greater losses in • Neglect of basic needs of Filipinos (660/0). lives and property and military resources and in discouraging potentia/Investors and tourists. In the end the military rebels • Weak/indecisive leadership in military (63%). In Makatl were allowed to "retum to the barracks· In their uniforms and fully armed, marching like victors rather than • Favoritism in mifitary promotions (59%). vanquished, proudly defiant and self-justified. Moreover, as • Low regard for military by government officials (58%). one commentator said: "The costs Of the last coup can only be marginaRy indicated by the damage inflicted on material • Weak/indecisive leadership in government (57%). property, or by the number Of military men and civilians killed and injured, or even the shaltered nerves of a distraught • Communist-leaning high government officials (55%). administration. The full costs of the coup can only be indi­ cated by the damage ft has wrought on our national psyche.· The putschists and their civilian allies timed the Decembe; (Felipe B. Miranda, Newaday, Dec. 5, t989). ;~~gr~~dc~~~~e ~~~;i~~n~d':n~~~~h~~~~: c~~~ft~~~;~~~I~d Against the reality that we have a new Constitution guaran­ citizen discontent regarding the governme.nt. ~hpep~~~~:~SP teeing the privacy of civilian authority, the regular election of I I ted that they would have the people s s . national and local leaders, a mulli·party system, and a reform ~~~~~ of Economics identified these conditions as follows: and independent judiciary, It was apparent that the survival of these newly restored democratic institutions hung in the (a) a severe transport crisis; (b) power failure; balance from December 1 to 7. Their survival depended criti­ (cldissatisfaction among farmers ove~ lagging cally on the capacity of the loyal Armed Forces, legally under real incomes and perceived discnml~at!on the civilian Commander-In-Chief but of course commanded against their sector; (d) ill-conceived and III-Im­ by the officer corps, to defeat the rebel forces. As the divided plemented salary-standardization. among military fought to determine the fate of our tragile democracy, government empioyees; (e) recent Increases our civilian leaders were relegated to a secondary, supportIVe in the price of fuel; (f) a perceived apathy on role. the part of the three branche.s of governme~t to address the issues affectln~ the people s Only a few days earlier, the military had to face Muslim rebels daily lives, especially the legislative and the ex­ who threatened the peaceful and orderly conduct of the pleb­ ecutive, which have been preoccupIed With iscite on Muslim Mindanao autonomy. And the military also petty political maneuvers and the expansion of still has to contend wfth the continuing assaults of the perquisites; and (g) a series of sc~ndals In­ CPP/NPA. volving government officials in possible cases Clearly, most of our leaders and tltizens feel apprecla/lVe of graft and corruption. (See. ~Ch?OI of and grateful to the defenders Of our freedom and democracy, Economics, "A Time for Hard DeCIsions , Dec. and favor belter treatment of and greater support to the 6, 1989, in this issue.) military and the police.

Point Three. Civilian authority and our constitutional ~~mocrac'{"~~: Point Four: Events and circumstances during the latest coup attempt greatly dependent for their survival on the loyal Arme orces may have increased our dependence on US military assistance; this Philippmes. (AFP) has further consequences. We must resolve to reduce this depend­ ency. In the six coup attempts In nearly four years, the AFP as a whole and the civilian police have demonstrated therr ~~~~ By the loss of our milftary hardware and by calling tor US and commftment to our consmutional democracy an ~" "persuasion flights" in support of the AFp, on the advice otthe chosen leaders. And yet the December co~p attempt a~so Secretary ot National Defense and the Chiet of Staff, an ar- involved many more rebels, wfth greater frrepower, an a ____...:1~2:... _ .. 13

guably justWlable and certaInIy ~puIardependenceact by Presidenton US Aquino, we have probably Increase our n the US use 01 Point Five. Even as we deal forcelully with the Rightists, the govem. ment, With the help of religious groups, non-govemmental organiza­ milttary. aSSlsbtancem·Tahyeh~:n;::nC:I::~~~ced. Related to our mllnary ases the AFP and the tions (NGDs), academics and civilian and military leaders, must this the close symbiotic relations betwet;ln. orts to assert creatively and persistently search for peace and the reduction of US milttary could also complicate natlonallstlcleIJ . the US viQ/ence from every source. our national sovereignty and Independence v s-a-Vls .

We must continue to strengthen our milttary, Wlhlie graduThallye Wllh respect to the armed groups tighting the government, . .. e and law and order mprove. r~duclng ns sIZe as P?:::O make tt more seW-reliant, lhat Is to let us build peace 10llowing certain principles based on the biggerta~k'i how:ver,~dent on the US lor milttary hardware, best available knowledge, lor example those summed up by ~~i~nt~~gn a UP historian as lollows: (a) recognize and eliminate the :;J tr:Pn?ng. Severallor.ces In the milflary estab­ causes ot the present COnflict, among which are repression lishment IIseW agree to this proposnlon. I and explollation, misery and Inequality, or what is called "structural violence"; (b) provide justice by restructuring the a~~evln~o~~~~~::~~~~~o:;'~ For this purpose and lor ,I ownership 01 Production, by redistributing land, capllal, and goals we need to be reso e an r aredness In income, and by restructuring the processes 01 power; (c) challenges we must meet is to ensure our p ep . and negotiation and agreement are the best way to resolve con. ~:::;~~ ~~e;'~~~~ t~~~?;a:I~nb~f~~es~~~Js e~~~~~'~ases f1ict; (d) dialogue within mutually agreed guidelines; (e) set y nt' 1991 Another is to decide not to negotiate a limits on the use 01 violence and impose them on the parties in conflict; en dissociate social, political, economic and other ~t~~~ef:f. ~~~v~~~~~~~~ g~~s~~~:70rb~:~; ~a: structures trom the war system; (g) in sum, develop a poillics the US and other Iriendly countries to have ~ccess to th~ s~ I (and I would add a cutture) 01 peace and not 01 conflict and violence. (See Maria Serena I. Diokno, Andthe Fruit ofJustice repair and maintenance lacililies, the airports, t a~ 'n the economic zones and industrial estates to be ?pera:. I is Peace, Gumersii'ldo Garcia, Sr. Memorial lecture, National ova- Council ot Churches in the Philippines General Biennial Con­ ~~~nnverted~~:Ii~Rr~~~s~hi~~~dmilllary bases. We needo~~~r~~~~e~nto be creatIVe~~~r:~~i~~an Innt~~~ vention, Quezon City, 22 November, 1989.) To be meaningfUl, President AqUino's proclamation 01 the nationalism and seW·determination, wllhout compromising n. I 1990s as the "Decade tor Peace" should Soon lead to tBpn:~g~~~~~ Vigorous and imaginative inlliatives by the implementors so If at all our leaders Independently decide that it does not become mere piOUS hope and empty rhetoric. treaty a position many ,n the Senate and we ~ Xl . nand oppose, let that treaty be lor a. briel terminaate ensl~st ad. h ut 01 US use 01 our mllnary bases them. . ea~~eg~OUS terllls lorthe ~~~~~~::s ~~~o~~I:~~i~~~ l~n~ PoInt Six. More and more citizens demand participation and consul/­ military and CIVIlian us~ 0 I '11I'es and resources ation in the making of decisions affecting their lives and well-being. simullaneous conversion of base aCI I Government and private institutions must be more responsive. These during the extension and phase·out. include some structural changes. Given the accelerating momen~u~ o~~~~s ~~~~:~~e:~ cooperation between the USA an ted democratization the . roved prospects lorworld peace an , There are many signs ot this demand lor involvement and may agree to pUll out their lacilllies a.nd t~oops IrO~t ~r partiCipation: the growth and actiVity 01 NGOs and othe, tTl people's organizations; the Inclusion ot sectoral repre­ bases by 1991 or shortly th~rel after'oIesft:c;:~~II~~ei~~e econ~ Amencans make commerCia use sentatives in various consunative and decision-making verted bases. bodies; the demonstrations and mutti-sectoral strikes; and even the activllies and grievances 01 armed rebels. The lormal instllUlions 01 government and privatI' institutions need to I 14 15

commu~ication t~ose open up channels of whh. groups One source of this imbalance leading to discontent and peacefully demanding consuhatlon and partIcIpation. How­ frustration and even aggression, Is the expansive and roman· ever there are essential norms and processes that must be tic rhetoric of the COnslhutlon, the laws, 8nd the polhicians. observed lest lawlessness and anarchy prevail. These are learnin~ Another is the Inability of the Government, because of hs subjects for mutual learning or social by all part!es inefficiency and corruption, to provide more and better ser­ concerned. Again, the need for creativity, patience, persIst­ v~9S. This causes public cynicism, apathy and alienation. A ence, goodwill. thlld are the excessive and unrealistic demands on the ~overnment There is truth in the observation that Government as a from all quarters high and low, near and far from whole, especially the Senate and House of Representatives, ns center. And these In turn arise from the people's strong is dominated by substantially weailhy men and women. ~ot sense Of dependency and their exaggerated sense Of per­ surprisingly, policies and decisions favor the upper and mId­ sonal rights and entnrements. Correspondingly, many cilizens dle classes. The benefrts of development cannot and do not and leaders have a weak sense of duty and obligation to the trickle down. Income, weailh and power are not redistributed nation and the common good. Our consthutional bill Of rights to the many who ale poor and marginalized. This has led to is not balanced by a bill Of duties and obligations. the perception that ours is an elitist constitutional democracy. Our Consthutlon and laws promise all kinds of goods and services to be provided by a supposedly generous and It is extremely difficult for persons who do not have ample respo!"sive Wenare S!ate. Unfortunately, our policy-makers resource3 to win in an p.leC1ion, given the high cost of running a!"d cnlzens ~r.e unw""nQ honestly to pay genuinely progres­ a campaign and staying in olfice. The structure of the Con­ , sIVe and suffICIent taxes ,n order for the government to afford gress and the electoral system make iI nearly impossible for to extend those benefits to the people. The biggest tax minority groups and smaller political parties to elect thell own ! evaders are professionals In private practice, businessmen , and other sen-emplOYed and otherwise well-educated and representatives to the Congress who w,ll respond to thell I interests and those of the lower classes. ~ well·to-do chizens. In other words, leaders and cilizens are , engaged in mutual deception and escapism that is not con­ I support the suggestion for a constitutional amendment to I ~uclVe to a heailhy democracy, a productive economy, and a change our form of government .into a semi-parliamentary JUst and humane soCiety. system. This means hav,ng a Presicfent as ChIef of State and symbol of national unity and a Prime Minister as the Head of I Government and leader of a unicameral National Assembly. A Point Eight. ff we do not face our problems resolutely and with the major feature of this parliament is the election of assembly necessary sense of urgency, these problems will continue to exacer­ members in fewer and multi·member districts and by propor­ bate each other, making it all the more difficult to solve them. Ul­ tional representation of the contendi~g political parties. ac­ timately, time is our prime resource because yesterday is irretriev­ cording to their combined votes. In thIS way, smaller politIcal able. Wa only have today and tomorrow and our problems are com­ parties and minority groups w~1l hav.e a chance to ~Iect thell pounding. candidates and influence publiC polley and leg,slatlon. In the long 'un, political parties will be induced to stand for a disti.nc­ live program of government and be held accountable for n. Following are some major national problems which Interact whh each other and could worsen In the absence of leaders wilh the vision, commilment, and the ability to mobilize Point Seven. Effective demand for public services and benefits farl popular support and resolve thesa problems: exceeds actual and potential slJpply. Expectations far outrun avail­ able resources. More attention is focused on the allocation and ex­ • Population Explosion/Urbanization penditure side than on the income side ofpublic finance. • Weak national consciousness and consensus • Environment Deterioration I i 16 I 17 As some UP faculty put n in a statement that Is also publish­ • Disunity/Fragmentatlon ed in this volume, "for Government to enjoy the support of the i people, n must· earn It. Enough of rhetoric. Government must • Unamployment now seriously attend to instnuting mechanisms for genuine • Elnist Democracy consultallon with the people and together wnh them, decide in favor of the people rather than of outside or selected • Indebtedness Interests. Government must not seek comfort In victory for the crisis is by no means over. Let n not view the coup attempt as • Injustice/Inequity a mere setback or a loss of foreign investments. Government must look upon the crisis as the time to seek new directions • Poverty I In meeting the most basic problems of the people: rising • Lawlessness/Violence prices, unemployment, unjust wages, graft and corruption, landlessness, power Shortage, transport crisis, potable water, I housing, malnutrnion, heavy debt burden, and so on. This, • Dependency ! too, is the lime to change Inert and indifferent government • Corruption/Weak Law Enforcement officials who do not deserve the taxpayer's money." (See UP Faculty, "Lessons from the December Coup. ") • Powerlessness I • Inefficiency/Waste I • Ignorance • Tax Evasion/Low and Regressive Taxation • Apathy/Alienation • Shortsightedness/Parochialism I • Language Problem

Point Nine. The military rebels and their allies are deluding themsel­ ves in thinking that they could govern the country if they succeeded in taking power through violence. But our civilian feaders should govern so as not to feed tho enemies ofthe state with the iffusion that they can manage better.

Cnizens are In a sense partly to blame for our ills. But leaders must bear greater rasponsibility because they are the ones who should define our prohlems, seek courses of action to deal with those problems, nnd mobilize support for those courses of action and for their leadership. If our problems are not rendered manageable by decisive progress and success, there will be more want and suffering for the many and lillie glory and no fun to those who shall govern the nation. 18 19

Dissatisfaction and Passivity I PARTTWO I There Is no doubt the mllftary rebellion has fts own roots peculiartothe politics and economics ofthe mllftary organiza­ tion. We shall not speak on these here. What we address is A TIME the presumption on the putschists' part that they couid count on some popular support for their cause-aUhough apathy FOR HARD DECISIONS would surely have sufficed. From hindsight, ft is not difficuft to understand the liming of the coup. The putschists struck at a time ofrelative weakness, when significant pieces of the government's economic pro­ By the School of Economics gram had failed to fall Into place and various segments of the VI) Diliman popUlation had legftimate grievances against one or another aspect of the government's program. Especially In the metropolis, the putschists' main target, the i obvious sources of dissatisfaction were: I l • a severe transport crisis manilested in a shortage of introduction public transport, inadequate infrastructure, and con­ gestion; he latest attempt by military elements to seize state power T should be taken as linal proof that social and economic • the power failure which crippled Industries and reforms cannot be postponed. These reforms should be real­ households alike; ized even as criminal responsibility is assigned and the guitty punished. • the widespread dissatisfaction among farmers over lagging real incomes and perceived discrimination Before this coup attempt, one could conveniently take com­ ,I against their sector; fort in the view that taking difficuU economic decisions and redressing glaring social inequities were intemperate or un­ • the III-formulated salary standardization among wise-or at least they could be postponed-because large­ government employees; scale changes would antagonize entrenched social interests • the recent Increase in fuel prices jYhich threatened to whose resistance could destabilize the government. provoke strikes for higher transport fares and worker's This comfortable view has been exploded by the recently wages; attempted putsch, which has capitalized precisely on the administration's procrastination in resolving outstanding so­ • a perceived apathy on the part of the three branches cial issues, Us failure to take sides between conflicting class of government to address the Issues affecting Interests, and the often technically inconsistent policies Uhas people's daily lives, especially the legislative and ex­ chosen to adopt. This state of affairs has allowed the plotters ecutive, which have been preoccupied wilh petty to portray themselves as all things to all men: both revolution­ polilical maneuvers and the expansion of perquisiles; ary and conservative, both pro-poor and elitist, both and democratic reformist and totalitarian, and nationalists and fair-haired boys all at once. Nevertheless Ushould be recog­ • a series of scandals Involving government officials In nized by all that this action was no more than a sheer grab for possible cases of graft and corruption. power. All of these were occurring against a baCkdrop of double­ That the December putschists could expect to ride to power digft inflation, high Interest rates, and economic growth far on such a nebulous and meager social agenda is less a below planned targets. Apprehension was growing both on tribute to their audacity than an indictment of the the part of business which had to bear the rising cost of government's own aUernative program and pelformance, capital, and workers whose real Incomes were being rapidly which In many crucial aspects, have failed to gain the active eaten up by Inflation. support of large segments of the population. 20 21 The economy's current vulnerability has baen aggravated by the failure of the present debt strategy to achieve even the The present energy crisis Is mainly a failure of decisive modest financing goals tha negotiators set for themselves. implementati?n. The decision not to operate the nuclear The new money from the commercial creditors for 1989-90 power plant In 1986 was In fact followed by contingency under the current scheme seems certain to fall far short ofthe measures to replace the energy it was expected to generate goal sei by the negotiators. This has placed a strain on the as well as by other plans to meet Increased demand. But lines balance of payments and on the exchange rate, which can ba of authority were unclear, the bureaucracy was disorganiZed relieved only by choking the rest of the economy through a and unwarranted interterence from external agencies made ;i regimen of high interest rates. diff,cuh for these plans to be implemented on time. These problems have provided the obvious focal points for We therefore' recommend a complete overhaul of the discontent and passivity among the populace. A!1d while they Nallonal Power Corporallon (NAPOCOR) management are certainly not enough to Induce people to actively support and the lines of decision-making of energy maUers. a putsch, they are dangerous enough In that they may paralyze the people's resolve to support the present govern­ The other issue on energy is the pressure on the NAPOCOR ment. from "5 creditors to raise user Charges in order to recover costs. While there is much to be said in principle for cost If we are not to relive the same experience, lessons must be recovery. the requirement that users shoulder the entire bur­ drawn and actions must be taken. The violence of th~ most den of NAPOCOR'S debt-service is unreasonable. recent coup attempt has once more placed urgent social and economic reforms on the agenda. We propose that the servicing of NAPOCOR'S old loans be assumed by the nallonal government, In exchange for In what follows, we detail two types of reforms. The .first which Its management should be revamped. This solution deals with those which can be readily Implemented to reheve has been adopted. after all, in the rehabilitation ot PNB and Immediate problems; the second, those that ma~ b~ Imple· I DBp, as well as for NAPOCOR itselt in the case ot the nuclear mented only through some legislation or reorganizatIon. We power-plant loan. There is no reason Why it cannot be argue that all of these measures must ba taken as a whole. adopted on a general basis. This move should help There are no halfway measures: immediate problems merely NAPOCOR obtain new loans to expand capacity. reflect more deeply rooted ones, ~nd none of thes~ F"!'easures can be implemented without hurting some sector s Interests, Changing Personnel all of them entail sacrnices.

There should be a change of personnel In order to match Immediate Measures persons with the demands of their posillons. For one, the present assignment imposes too great a contlict at interest on the occupants of key economic departments and agencies in the government. For another, it has resuhed in poor perfor­ Addressing the Transport Crisis mance due to incompetence.

The present transport problem has arisen due to the high To illustrate: the appointment ot commercial bankers to the cost of replacement and spare parts of vehicles on the one Central Bank governorship which runs the risk of decisions hand, and the regulation of fares, on the other. In the last f!JW that favor commercial banks, given the sociological tendency years this has led to the bankruptcy of several bus companoes for people to identity with their own kind; the appointment of who were caught in the squeeze of controlled fares and high people to oversee trade and industry when their families are prices of parts and replacement. The Importatl0!1 of cheap involved in cartels which enjoy priVileges that ought to ba replacements and parts (especially second·hand) IS effe~lve­ removed; the retention of agency heads who have clearly not Iy prevented, however, by the existence of iii-conceIved performed according to targets, or who have continuously progressive manufacturing programs of the government. reduced targets in order to make their performance appear at par (e.g. transportation and social wellare). Cases abound We propose that Imports of vehicles and spare-parta for not only among the upper echelons but also at lower levels. use In public transport be freed from any kind of govern­ ment regulallon or restriction. Formulating and Implementing Economic Policy Meeting Energy Needs I 23 22 An important Incipient effect 01 the coup attempt has been Try hard as one might to lormulate sound policy advice, I to increase uncertainty and reduce loreign capital flows to the however the effort is stililutile so long as the institutions and economy. One lorm 01 this may be reduced direct loreign arrange';'ents to implement them do not exist. This has been Investments. Or a reduction 01 loans from loreign commercial the tragedy 01 the present administration. Complaints have banks, yet, even before the coup, grave doubts could already been rile that the management style 01 the admirristration be raised on whether pre-coup attempt estimates oIlinancing gives the impression that no one is in charge and that the gap would be bridged by loreign investments and loans. government, or even the administration, does not speak with one voice. Now that the autonomous capilal inflows are likely to be reduced, the advantages 01 asserting the country's interest As lar as economic policy goes, this problem is publicly over that 01 the loreign banks have become even greater. We manilested in the differences 01 opinion between the Depart­ contend that the country at this time still has the political ments of Agricuilure and 01 Trade and Industry over incen­ leverage iI had in early 1986 to seek a renegotiation of the tives; within the legislature, on debt policy; and between the terms 01 its package with the commercial creditors. executive and legislative, over decentralization. We recommend the eppolntment 01 a new and lUll-time What is needed at the very least is coherence in the negotiating team whose Immediate goal Is to reduce the economic policies enunciated by the executive branch, al­ country's net resource transler to Its lorelgn creditors to though we should not overlook the necessity lors.imitar action enable It to close Its linanclng gap. In relation to commer­ within the legislature and between the legIslatIve and the cial bank loans, putting a debt cap or going Into temporary executive. This is quite apart from the correctness 01 the I arrears should be a part 01 the new team's set 01 options, policies adopted, an issue we treat below. • ! We believe that the aftermath 01 the putsch-i1 used wisely We propose that the NEDA Director General be presents a unique opportunily lor the country to improve upgraded In his powers and responsibilities as prim'!s I (; considerably the terms 01 its agreement wilh the commercial inter pares with whom all department heads charged WIth banks. Such an opportunity should not be squandered, as the economic matters must coordinate. This secretary of country did in 1986. economic affairs should have the complete confidence 01 the i President; secretaries and heads 01 all other economic agen­ cies should be appointed upon his recommendation. I The Exchange Rate This should help ensure consensus among the economic As lor the currency's value Itsell. however, II should be departments and compel them to speak with one voice within set at a low enough level to deliver the domestic the Cabinet and in public. i producers and make our products competitive abroad as well, Intermediate Policies Having said this, we stress the lollowing: Depreciation will always cause some inllation through higher prices lor imports All the loregoing are measures that can be implemented and to this extent will also hurt the people, especially in the within the short period. However, many 01 them are linked to urban areas. However, it should be clear that iI depreciation is larger issues that have been outstanding lor some time. For to work, some real incomes must be cut, and adjustments in example, the reliel 01 the transportation problem reqUires consumption must be made (especially Irom tradeable to imports of cheaper vehicles and parts, but this runs against nontradeable goods). The gain is that more people would be an existing industrial program. Said program then needs to be employed in producing substitutes lor imports and producing reassessed. Similarly, the need lor better inlrastructure is lor exports. evident, but expenditures lor il lace the constraint 01 trade deficit. The required depreciation must be accompanied by a removal 01 Inlrastructure bottlenecks II the maximum Even these difficuil problems will have to be addressed. The benellts Irom It are to be derived, More employment oppor­ period immediately after a lailed coup may not bo the most tunities will be opened within a shorter time iI the government opportune moment to do so. But we do not think that simultaneously solves the crises in transport, energy and decisions postponed will become any easier. other infrastructure services. Otherwise the inflation which normally accompanies depreciation will be unnecessarily The Debt Problem prolonged. 24 25

In orderto cushion the Inflationary effects and distribute mend that the composition of the Monetary Board be the burden of adjustment more equhably, the government overhauled to reduce the participation of Cabinet mem­ should reduce Indirect taxes, especially on fuel. This is bers to a minority. Only the NEDA Director-General should also in line wijh our recommendation below to make the tax sit as an ex-officio member. system mora progressive. Finally, in regard to fiscal policy, we caution agalnat a sudden surge In government consumption spending at Monetary and Fiscal Policy this time, even If some pork-barrel methods seem attractive after a fresh threat to political stabilijy. The noise about the Another priorijy in the field of policy should be to revamp revival of pump-priming activijies such as the Countryside monetary policy and move away from the present high-inter­ Employment Development Program at this time is particularly est rate regime. High Interest rates have been maintained worrying. While these may have been appropriate in 1986 mainly through the auction of T-bllls beyond what Is re­ when there was large excess capacijy, they are uncalled for quired to finance fiscal deficits and through large reverse­ today when no slack exists; they are rather likely to lead to repurchase agreements, under which the Central Bank inflation or a worsening payments deficij, or both. Such a borrows from commercial banks. Together with bot­ move would be partiCUlarly unwise if the foreign financing gap tlenecks In Infrastructure, the restrictive monetary policy IS not closed through the appropriate debt policies. has prevented Investment and hence output from keeping up with demand thereby giving rise to Infiationary pres­ sures. Infiatlon In turn has caused the erosion of real Industrial Policy wages. Implicitly violating the social pact and fueling dis­ r content and mistrust In the ranks of wage-earners. ~ The high degree of concentration in industry and the government's implicit sanction for this has been one of the There are two infiuences working to keep interest rales high. most potent examples used to argue that the government is One is related to the debt problem: because foreign financing t for .the rich and not for the poor. Even as the poor must pay is unavailable and foreign reserles are low, the Central Bank Indlfect taxes and take cuts in real incomes through inflallon and the government have had to resort to issuing high-yield­ large amount of taxes are being foregone by the governmeni ing T- biils to prevent speculation on the currency and cover t rn the form of incentives given to big business. the budget deficits. If the debt problem were resolved more satisfactorily and no nominal level of the exchange-rate was There is a general perception that the Board of Investments targeted, then the CB wouid be less obliged to resort to high (BOI) has served less to promote than to restrict, and then Tbiil rates to keep liqUidity down and to prevent exchange­ despite i1s large discretion, ij has not designed a coherent rate speculation. industrial program in any event. Surprisingly, this view Is now shared even by businessmen themselves, proof thaI those But the second aspect of high interest rates relates to the who manage to avail of such privileges are restricted to a large margins between commercial bank lending and deposit small coterie. rates; this also contributes distinctly to discouraging invest­ I ments. The existence of such wide spreads indicates a high We propose that the BOI be abolished as an Inde­ degree of concentration or monopoly power in the financial pendent body. and that the entire system of Investment sector, and this is something the CB is abetting by erecting Incentives be re-examined with a view to their elimination. barriers to entry in the commercial banking system. CB cur­ Henceforth, industrial priorities should, Wat all, be set indica­ rently emphasizes the rehabilitation of insolvent banks. This is tively by NEDA without the need for incentives. The elimina­ itself an empty barrier since ij forces new investors to take tion of 801 tax credits should replace tax revenues forgone over bad portfolios. The implications of this policy are worse from fuel taxes or generate revenues for required pUblic in­ in the case of rural banks, since this means a further reduction vestments. Barriers to entry In Important cartellzed In­ 0: the credit made available to the countryside. dustries such as shipping, cement, flour, among others, should be removed. Quite apart from the relaxation of monetary policy, therefore, we recommend that the Central bank revamp Its policy Tariffs should be set af a low uniform rate mainly for revenue regarding entry Into the banking system and adopt more purposes to eliminate discretion and discrimination against liberal rules to break the existing cartel In the financial potentially viable industries. The exchange rate should system. replace tariffs and nontarlff barriers as the appropriate and nondiscriminatory measure of protection, To effect the required changes in monetary. exchange rate, and debt policies, and in line with the Constitution, we recom- I 26 27 The protection given to the III-conceived progressive manufacturing programs, especially for cars and truclla, acquisitions, Which is a long way from actual land valuation should be phased out within a short period. The protection and transfer. Plans for support services for beneficiaries are hazy and blurred. given to these industries in the form of prohibftions on imports should immediately be replaced by a simple tariff. The government should give priority to solving the cen­ Finally government should devote tts industrial promotion turies-old land tenure problem of the rural populace It efforts where ft can do the most good and where they are shoul.d concretize the call for people's participation in ihe most needed, namely, supporting scientific and technological agrar!an reform process by directing the Department of research, acquisitions, and dissemination of information. Agranan Reform. (DAR) to take seriously the operation of the Barangay AgrarIan Reform Committee (BARC) to ensure popular repre;sentation of genuine peasants' o;ganizations Progressive Taxation of Assets and Incomes andrural.'olk. ,n the comminees, and to ensure their genuine partlclpatoon In the process of imprOVing land tenure, helping The charge tI,at the government is only for the big finds program beneficl8nes and resolution of conflicts. support in the current system of taxation. This system relies heavily on indirect taxes which hit the poor more than the Other Problems affluent. By contrast, there is a consensus that income taxes f are not collectively being collected, and that taxes on wealth, especially on landed property, me too low. Certain onerous Other problem areas are no less important but space does features of the tax structure, especially those that discriminate I not allow .os to address them iii this paper. Among the more against the poor, should be removed. For example, the dif· • pressIng Issues are: population, natural resources and en. ferential treatment of fixed and nonfixed incomes penalizes Vlronment, the quahty of education, and the lag in technology. the low-income classes. The final tax on interest income also favors the more affluent, since their marginal tax rates would We reiterate our earlier statement: These reforms are inter­ cortainly be much higher than 20 percent. dependent and must be regarded as i\ whole. A piecemeal Implementation would cause possibly unforeseen outcomes We recommend that taxes on property be raised and that or worse, lead to outcomes which are socially unjust. ' the tax on Interest Income be treated as a withholding tax, rather than the final tax. The elimination of tax credits Conclusion through the BOI and the entire omnibus incentives code should also provide additional revenue for the government. Our newly regained democracy has just survived the most It is remarkable that dnspite perennial calls for improved senous threat thus far to tts existence. It is said that the collection efforts, no major tax evader has been prosecuted, presence ?f large .threats often cements solidarity among much less imprisoned. nor,,:,~lIy dIsparate Interests, enabling them to undergo great sacrfflces and subsume selfish concerns under a higher goal We propose Instead to reduce the discretion of The recent coup anempt was such a threat. The call to all 0; bureaucrats In the disposition of tax-evasion cases and us, eSpec!ally to those who are in posllions of power, Is to take leave these to the impartial operation of the penal code. the long vIew and reahze that our survival is bound up with the Just resolution of our nation's problems. We must answer the Agrarian Reform call now. RUPERTa P ALONZO Nowhere is the government's lack of political will for social reform clearer than in the field of agrarian reform. More impor· RAUL V. FABELLA tant than the Garchttorena estate scandal and the fuss over Congress' reluctance to confirm the new agrarian reform ARSENIO M. BALICASAN secretary is that the actual process of transferring land to the tiller is proceeding too slowly and has too narrow a scope. MARIA SOCORRO H. GOCHOCO Two years after the enactment of the agrarian reform law, most CARLOS C. BAUTISTA beneficiaries are still confined to rice and corn lands. Agrarian reform has hardly touched sequestered and foreclosed lands. ALEJANDRO N. HERRIN Agricultural lands of more than 50 Ilectares (Which are not rice and corn lands) are only starting to be given notices of DANTE B. CANLAS 29 28

JOSEPH Y. LIM RAMON L. CLARETE SOLITA C. MONSOD ROLANDO A. DANAO EMERGENCY POWERS MANUEL F. MONTES FOR THE PRESIDENT EMMANUEL S. DE DIOS FIDELINA B. NATIVIDAD By the College orLaw JOSE ENCARNACION, JR. UP Dilimao EDITA A. TAN FELIPE M. MEDALLA GWENDOLYN R. TECSON CASIMIRO V. MIRANDA Grant of Emergency Powers to the President (The authors are faculty. members 01 the UP Schoo) 01 n the light the existing national emergency, as declared Economics. This paper, which supersedes preliminary ver­ 0.1 a by the President, Congress should enact an Emergency sion dated 8 December 1989, is the resun 01 a workshop held I Power Act vesting the President with full powers to carry on 6-8 and 14 December 1989. de Dios selVed as rappor­ E. out a declared national polley of ensuring polltlca', leur.) economic and social atablllty throug!,out the nation, In pursuance 01 the declared principle in Sf!l:Iion 5, Art. II 01 the Constnution that "Ihe maintenance of peace and order, the protection oflife, liberty andpropertyandthe promotion ofthe general we"are are essential for the enjoyment by al/ the people of the blessings ofdemocracy." Such a measure may be attained through enactment 01 a law passed by Congress, upon certification by the President, of the necessity for such a measure in the light of existing national emergency, as declared by Executive Order No. 503 series of 1989. (Sec. 26(2), Art. VI, Const.). Such law should set forth the following or similar provisions:

Section 1. The recent coup d'etat attempt staged by rebels from the Armed Forces and the present economic crisis have created a na­ tional emergency which makes n necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the emergency. Section 2. Pursuant to the provisions 01 Ar· ticle VI, sec. 23(1) of the Constnution, the President Is hereby authorized, during the ex­ istence 01 the emergency, to adopt, promul. gate end enforce measures as she may deem 30 31 necessary to carry out the national policy declared in Section 1. Accordingly, she Is, Section 8. This Act shall take effect immedi­ among other things, empowered to take ately upon lis approval. measures: (a) to prevent, suppress and eliminate conditions wnhin the Armed Forces Emergency Measures That may be Adopted under of the Philippines causing or likely to cause such Act anempts at any coup d'etat, mutiny or similar disturbance; (b) to regulate the national economy, including among others: (1) to en­ • Estabf/shlng Spec/af Mllltaty Dfstrfcts: sure the delivery of essential services to the people and to facilitate the free and continuous The President may, by Executive Order, create special movement of goods; (2) to regUlate rents and military districts in any area wllhin the Philippines, where the prices of prime commodities; (3) to disturbed conditions of peace and order present a serious threat to political, economic and social stability. In any such prevent hoarding, monopolization and private special military district, the President may take any of the controls affecting the supply, distribution and following measures, or all of them: (a) assign new military movement of commodities required in agricul­ units created through partial Mobilization of the Reserve ture and industry; (c) to maintain peace and Army; (b) assign units formed from components of the regular order, protect life, liberty and property and Arnled Forces follOWing reorganization; (c) assign volunteer promote the general welfare; and (d) to exer­ units drawn from the Reserve Forces; and (d) assign local cise such other powers as she may deem militia organized by local governments in such area, pursuant necessary to enable the Government to fulfill to authority granted such governments by Executive Order. tls responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority. In any such Special Military District, the President shall appoint District Commanders and officers of her own choice, Section 3. The President shall issue rules and either from the Reserve Army or from the RegUlar Force. regulations to carry out the purposes of this Act. The rules and regulations herein enacted • Creating a Palace Militaty Advlsoty Staff shall be in force unless otherwise provided in said rules and regulations or until repealed or The President may, by Executive Order, establish a Palace Military Advisory Staff, to guide her in the issuance of direc­ amended by Congress. tives to the Commanders of the Special Military Districts. Section 4. The President may designate any • Reorganizing the Armed Forces officer in any department, bureau or office, agency or inslrumentality of the Government The President, by Executive Order, could undertake a mas­ for Ihe purpose of adrninistering this Act and sive reorganization of the existing military units, to weed out carrying out its objectives. officers of dubious loyalty to the Constitution, who may be retired wilh special incentive pay, or assigned to less sensitive Section 5. Any person violating the measures positions. and rules and the regulations adopted and promulgated by the President under this Act • Assigning PresIdential Representatives to Certain shall be punished by imprisonment of not Field Commands more than 5 years or by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos. For all mlltlary districts and military camps presenting any condition affecting political or economic stability, the Presi­ Section 6, The President shall report to Con­ dent as Commander in Chief, may require, by Executive Order gress from time to time the measures adopted and implemented through general orders, all and any military under this Act. commander in such districts or camps, to consult wilh a special representative of the President assigned to such dis­ Section 7. The grant of emergency powers trict or camp. No order for the movement of troops may be under this Act shall be for a period of one year authorized by the commander, without wrinen clearance from from the approval of this Act, unless sooner such Presidential representative, or from the President her­ withdrawn by Congress. self. • Lowering the Retirement Age for FIeld Commanders and Officers 32 33

The President may, by Executive Order, fix a lower retirement Long Term Structural Changes age than that fixed by existing law, for all field and camp commanders and officers wnh the rank of major and up. Liberal retirement incentives should be provided to all volun· Amendments to the Constnution to effect the following tary retirees. changes are hereby proposed: • Commissioning of Reserve Office,. e Sem/-pllrlillmentary system, aimed 81 "ery sl1onl1 Ex· ecutlve. The President may, by Executive Order, place on active duty for at least a year, reserve officers for assignment to field unns. The proposed system should provide for a Unicameral legislature consisting of 26 elected representatives from the 13 regions, 6 elected from the autonomous regions, and ex • Creallng II Metropo/ltlln Pollee Commllnd officio membership of all provincial governors and cny mayors. Elected members shall have a term of 8 years. The President may, by Executive Order, create a Metropolitan Police Command, which shall take charge of The President shall have a term of 8 years. In times of special police brigades for the security and protection of all emergency, he/she shall have the power to enact laws by government centers and key offices, as well as public utilnies Executive Order. Such law shall take effect immediately, and and facilities, in Metro Manila and surrounding provinces. The shall continue in full force until Congress shall provide other· Pr~sldent shall have direct control and supervision over such ! wise. . brigades. Such brigades shall be eqUipped with sunable arms I and eqUipment needed for the proper discharge oftheir func. The President shall designate members of the legislature tions. who shall be his/her personal representatives in their respec­ tive regions, In the enforcement and implementation ofnation­ al development policies. Medium Term Measures • Land shall be a natlonaf resource, and may not ". privately owned. • Conversion of the AFP Into a citizen armed force, liS mandated by the Constitution (Art. XVI, Sec. 4). Rear. The government shall Instnute a long range system of ganizallon of the present AFP Into e smaller regulllr acquisnion by purchase and expropriation. Cullivation of all force. publicly owned arable lands shall be by lease to Individual farm famHies for parcels not In excess of five hectares, and to The citizen armed force shall consist of regional militia and cooperatives of farm families for parcels, and to cooperatives ~eserve the army. The regional militia shall be on regular of farm families for parcels not In excess of 200 hectares. 0 tralOing through?ut the year during week-ends and holidays, and may be available to assist the national police in maintain­ • A/I public ut/llt/es shall ba state owned, but ad· Ing peace and order. The regular force shall be utilized only ministered lind manllged through wo"'e,. coopera· against external aggression. tlves. • Creallon of the national pollee force, which shall talre charge ofpeace and order throughout the nation. • Reorgenlzallon of the AFP officer corps, In connec. tlon with special retirement law. This isaimedat reducing the officer corps now existing, and beefing n up With reservists on volunteer service. The phase. out of the present officer corps from colonel upwards shall be effected in three years.

• S/Ilng AFP camps and forts away from cente,. of pop!J/atlon. 35 34 devaluation threatening to fuel further price Increases, the trade and balance of payments deflclls widening, and un­ employment swelling again. Those who were expecting the Aquino administration to Instllute sweeping socio-economic reforms In the euphoric A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO people power days of t986 and 1987 have long been disap­ pointed. Agrarian reform has become a mangled and scan­ RENEW DEMOCRACY AND SOCIETY dal-ridden program. Mass housing and urban renewal programs have not received the attention that they deserve. And Philippine subservience to the dictates of foreign credllors has not only been continued but also strengthened. By the School or Labor and Industrial Relations One of the most disaffected sectors of society is organized UP Diliman labor. The sector's sentiments and opinions on a whole range '?! Issues are being ignored by both the executive and legisla­ tive branches of the government. One clear illustration of this was the effort of our School In 1987 to gatherthe major groups so that they could collectively flesh out their views on labor relations, economic growth and development, and social jUs­ Walang puwang sa Isang demokrasya ang mga pamamaraan ng tice and human rights-all in the context of strengthening the kudeta. (COUP attempts have no place In a democracy.) country's newly-acquired democracy. The product of the 1987 workshops was the book Labor's Legislative Agenda which was submitted to all members of the Cabinet and the eizure of power by a minori1y through the barrel of a gun newly-elected Congress. But nellher the legislative nor the is a mockery of a people's sovereign right to choosethelr executive branch of the government has responded so far. ownS government freely and peaceably. No matter how well-In­ tentioned, the leaders and organizers of the .latest coup And looking around, there Is no shortage of studies, semi­ deserve condemnation. There is no room for military power .. nars, workshops, symposia and conferences organized by academic institutions, people's organizations, non­ grabs in a democracy. governmental agencies and cause-oriented groups outlining the kind of socio-economic reforms that the country urgently Nakatulong sa coup ang mga kahlnaan ng pamahalaan. (The needs. Yet, the response is ellher lukewarm or stony silence. The government is obviOUSly not too keen on initiating radical government's weaknesses helped launch the coup,) socio-economic reforms for fear of antagonizing the eille as amply illustrated by lis ambivalent and piecemeal approach to the legislation and implementation of land reform. The December 1989 coup nearly succeeded in toppling down the Aquino government. This is ironic. The 1986 people powerrevolution generated mass enthusiasm preqisely because the masses were ex­ One reason for this Is the declining populari1y of the Aquino atte~pts, ~ere pecting the AqUino administration to usher in radical changes administration. Unlike in the previous coup in the various spheres of social life. The failure of the ad­ was no popular outpouring of support for the admlnistratl0l"!' ministration to attend to the needs of the masses by way of As the media chronicled it, the civilians who came out of thelf efficient government services and socially-relevant reforms is lIomes to be near the war zones came as spectators, not as what accounts for lis growing unpopularity, which in turn, is supporters. contributing to lis unstable existence. In fact, the coup was launched at a time when a growing number of the population, includil"!g supporters of t~~ Aquino administration, was getting Impatient with the Inablii1y of the Ang Hamon ng Bagong Kalagayan: Pagbabagong-Buhay. (The government to deliver essential services In the areas of Post-Coup Challenge: A Renewed Society) transport, energy generation, communications ~nd cereal distribution. There was a breakdown of public services amidst widespread publlci1y on graft and corruption. And to top it all, This is why the main lesson that can be distilled from the the economy was tottering, with the Innatlon rate r~nnlng at December 1989 coup and the February 1986 people power double digitS, the oil price Increase and creepmg peso revolution Is that a government is stable as long as it enjoys 37 36 fo a question of electoral politics dominated by treditional the popular support ofthe masses. A government Is strong as politicians, to a tripartite system composed oI/egls/ature, long as ns programs are ahuned to the needs and aspirationS judiciary and executive branch. She has /all9f1.to app"!clate of the masses. t'le essence of a democracy: people patticlpatlon '" the determination and Implementation ofpolicies and p,,?grams Hence, apart from the Immediate task of securing the stale directly affecting their lives. Sha has faIled to institutionalize against coup plohers, the biggest challenge confronting the people polVer in tha governmenf. administration Is how to renow ns ties wnh the popular forces of the country, how government can be an eIlective instru­ This is precisely the reason why the government is shaky. ment of the masses in realizing long-sought reforms in This is also the reason why her government has beco"'!e society. In short, the challenge is how the government can captive to tile dem~ndsof th~ milnary e~tab"shment which 's forge a new pal1nership with the masses In the overall task of now seeking a bigger vOice III socIety. ThiS IS clearly renewing democracy and society. dangerous. Fortunalely for the AqUino administration, the extraordinary Already, organized labor, mod8rates, radicals together, have polnico-economic circumstances created by the coup pro­ articulated uneasiness over the proposed emergency vide n wnh a historic opportunity 10 launch a new reform powers During the Martial Law period of Marcos, labor was program and overcome the traditional elilist resistance to the main victim. Hence, labor cannot appreciate. why labor such reforms. rights have to be suspended in the na"'!e of a national emer­ gency which they did not create rn the Iltst place. As rt IS, the The question, howevor, is: will the AqUino administratiOn do government, through the Labor Code, has ~uhicient powers such a thing? Is n ready to break the pahern of elnism, reform to stabilize industrial relations, especially In Industnes Involv­ vacillation, cronyism of a new kind, and toleration ofinellicien­ ing so called national interest. cy and corruption that have marked ns first three and a hall years ofgovernance? Is n now prepared to listen tothe voices Labor finds II doubly ironic that the proposed emergency of labor and the marginalized sectors of society? powers are directed against the organized masses rather than the coup ploners. Hence. tne argument raised by some sog­ The next three months will show ~ the AqUino administration ments of societythat the real objective olthe coup, successful is ready-and more importantly, willing to face the challenge or not is to create an emergency snuation where the central of this histprical crossroad in our nation's me. gover~ment, led by the civilians or not, can conc~ntr~e powers in lis hands in pursuing an unpopular forelgn-II.",­ posed politico-economic program, such as the economIC Ang Panganlb ng Bagong Batas Mil/tar. (The Dangers of an blueprints prepared by the World Bank-IMF group. ThiS was Empowered Military) the case during the Marcos period. Now, thIS scenano seems to be being played out again in another !orm with the I?,adlng actors resorting to all kinds 01 euphemrsms such as emer­ Meanwhile, there are ominous signs that the AqUino ad­ gency powers without martial law. " ministration, after crushing the visible power grab ahemp! by the rebel soldiers, is capnulating to the demands ofthemilllaPj establishment to have a bigger say on national affairs. The Paano llIyo Makakaahon sa Krlsls? (How Can We Overcome the proposal empowering Malacaiiang with emergency powers is Crisis?) tantamount to a proposal to clo!h the mililary establishment ._------wnh extra powers. There are no easy answers to the present crisis. It should be noted that the present emergency was caused by the divisions and arnbllions emanating from the military Unfortunately, President Aquino's first majOr address after establishment, and yet tho emergency powers being sought the coup, in the EDSA rally last December 8, was a letdown. are directed against the organized masses, in particular, the It was a disappointment not because she poured out a lot of trade union movement. Thus, n is ironic that the presidential virulent ahacks against her poillical enemies fike an enralled call for people power in support of constllutional democracy hometown tradllional polnician but mainly becausa she failed is now contradicted by the presidential demand for emergen­ to outline a vision ofPhilippine sociaty in the post co.up-era. cy power&-a clear derogation of people power. What are the concrete measures and programs l;ile IS plan­ ning to undertake in order to stabilize society and This brings us to a major flaw in the ripe of governance that democracy? There were no clear answers. President AqUino has followed since the February 1986 revolution. She I,as reduced democracy to a question ofform, 38 39 tors and worse, certain sectors cannot even tolerate each In her second year In power, hwill be recalled, she madethe other's biases. following declaration: .My mandate was not just to make a country One <;:Iear directi,?n of reform In theposf-coup era, therefore, rich, but to make democracy work: To make It is the mstllutionallzatlon of pluralism in society. All polilical parties and movements, Irrespective of their polhico- ideologi­ work as a system of genuine popular par­ cal tendencies, must be allowed to operate freely as long as 6cipation. To maka it meaningful to the lives of they do not advocato the violent overthrow oItha duly- con­ tha common people by giving them jobs and sthuted authorily.. The military must be taught how to respect jus6ce work with dignity, health and educa­ pluralIsm and dlstmgUlsh betwoen legitimate dissent and tion, a~d the reason to hope that. the future will armed rebellion. be better for themselves and the"children. In the t~adhi?n of. democracy, we must allow the full airing of I believe that nowhere could you lind more effective cures contending Views In the open market of ideas. for the Ills ot the country-such as the haM of oppression, the inclination to corruption, betrayal of the public interests-than We must also learn to conduct honest dialogues among in the blessings of democracy: freedom, rights; transparent ourselves, learn from each other, and understand each other. dealings; and a government ot the people by the peC!ple Somehow, through the process of social dialogue we must themselves." (See Corezon C. Aquino, State of the NatiOn. learn to forge national consensus on howto renew ~ur society Fooklen TImes Philippine Yearbook, 1987-88.) within the framework of our democracy. But exactly, what has she done and what is she planning to . Fin~liy, we must ~tress that time is running out. Our society do to make the above mandate work, especially after the IS crying for sweeping reforms that must be put in place at the coup? soonest tIme poSSIble. Any temporizing is fatal. And making hah- baked pIecemeal reforms Is useiess and dangerously On another level, one should also accept the fact that Philip­ counter- productive. pine society is badly divided into contenllous factions. The coup has even revealed that the threats to our democracy are To do all these, h will do well for the Aquino administration to emanating not from the organized mas~es, whose clvilliber­ c~1I out on people power behind a concrete reform program ties the proposed emergency powers Will curta,l, but from the w,th which tM "'!ass?s can readily identify with. Failure to violent divisions within the country's politico-economic eme. respond to thIS hlstonc opportunily might bring the country Historically, these violent divisions within the elite camp are back to the dark ages of authorharianism and servhude. partly a legacy of colonialism, which tried to divide the native elite into two or moro contending camps which ahernated in power (the ins versus the outs), wllh some subtle and not too subtle support from the colonial masters. These divisions were aggravated by Marcos when, in declaring Martial Law In 1972, he also declared war against his polhical and economic rivals, whom he called tile oligarchs (and I~ter replaced whh his cronies). Afterthe February 1986 revolutIon, the roles were reversed and this time h was the Aquino camp declaring war on Marcos' business and polhical associates, sequestering their properties left and right and thus fuelling a never-ending cycle of enmhies and revenge polilics whhin the camp of the eille. This cycle of violence must come to an end. And so does the growing alienation of the governed from the government. In Industrial relations, we have long learned that the two basic ingredients that can bring about peace and stabilily between two or more quaneling parties are: heahhy respect for the other parties, and honest dialogue among the parties. In our limiled analysis of Philippine society today, we believe tllat these two elements are sadly lacking. There is nogenuine dialogue taking place between and among the different sec- 41 40 tempted to take, and which n has In fact taken in the case 01 at least two radio stations-will not lead to Improved proIes­ sionaland ethical standards, nay, only to a unnormny destruc­ tive 01 the free flow 01 Information, and therefore 01 the people's democratic aspirations. SELF-REGULATION NOT This was a fundamental lesson from the martial law ex­ perience, of which both government and the people need no REPRESSION reminder. r Yet, media are once again In danger 01 being a major casuany 01 the latest pomical manifestation 01 the unresoived Philippine crisis, as they were a casuany ofthe Marcos period. By the College or Mass Communication We renerate that media repression will not serve the end 01 defending any avowedly democratic government, nor the UP Ililiman Interest of the publiC that government is committed to serve and protect. Now therefore, on the one hand, we call on President he Philippine mass media are getting mixed reviews ~or Aquino and her milnary advisers as well as on Congress, tile their performance in the Six-Day December Coup. ut Judiciary and such agencies as the National Telecommunlca· Tboth the praise as well as crllicism have been exagge::~ tions CommiSSion to reconsider the emerging government tending to ellher beatify media practllioners as heroes t policy 01 muzzling the press. We urge them to call to mind the hour, or to condemn them as licentious demagogues. martial law experience and to realize that repression Inevllably breeds resistance. The truth is perhaps somewhere in between. While we grant that some abuse 01 press freedom did occur There is no denying the courage and prolessional commll· during the Six-Day Coup, we submn tl;at government cannot ment of individual broadcasters, reporters, Phot09~l1el8 deny freedom to some and still permn n for others-and that and cameramen who covered the events 01 the coup, en aI media repression, no matter how Inllially selective, will in­ the risk of their own lives. evnably lead to general repression. There Is no denying either that some media practilioners In We submit further that government even in the present crisis both print and broadcast journalism went beyond their duty to has other options. Government, for example, has lis own re ort the news and give II fair comment.. Howeve.r, some media facilmes which n can use to counter the disinforrnation bfcame unwitting purveyors of disinformatlon and I~S asifya and falsehoods II claims are being disseminated by pro-rebel, consequence of their failure to check .source~ an .ver privately-controlled media organizations. The maximal use of rumors. Still others, moved by their pC?III,cal boases, these faclillies, together wllh the still immense influence 01 deliberately disseminated false Information on an effort to government Over the majorny of broadcast and print media, influence the outcome of events. can in fact overwhelm rebel-friendly media organizations wllhout the President's having to resort to such extraordinary Both lapses deserve condemnation: the fir~t !or the un· measures as the closure of media establishments. professionalism n betrays, the second for lis criminal mls~~ of mass media In the service 01 narrow partisan ends an n Government is not so bereft of resources that II has to fall violation of media's basic commnment to publiC interest. back on the methods of dictatorship to address ns perceived problems wllh media. We urge government to utilize those These lapses must be recognized and appreciate~ by the . resources In combatting the present threats to II, rather than profession lisen, which h~S the ultimate responslbllny ~ imperil the rights of the people and ns own future vlabilny. seeing to II that they are minimized, as well as by the pub the media serve. On the other hand, we call on media to perform their obliga­ tion to diSCipline their erring members and to Impose neces­ In saying this, we are moved by one realization: the. CC;lrrec­ sary sanctions that will prevent the use 01 their vast powers In tive mechanisms media need can come only from wnh,n tile the service 01 forces hostile to the democratic aspirations 01 profession as well as the publiC, and not from government. the people. The press Is particularly duty-bound by generally accepted standards to def9nd ns own freedom by tempering The closing down 01 radio and lV stations, as well as ns enthusiasms wnh restraint, by exercising Judicious control newspapers- -an option government Is being more and more 42

over the kind of Information Rdisseminates, and by adheri~g 43 to those standards of fairness, accuracy, and responsibility the profession RseW demands of Rs practRioners, as these are embodied In Rs Code of Ethics. The press-media as a whole:-!l.lust ~erci~ these restraints not only because irresponsibility and licentiousness only give the enemies 01 free expression the excuse to ro se the curtailment of press freed~. R Is ~Iso most TOWARDS CHANGES IN funramentally necessary because the dissemination 01 a~­ curate information is among media's most crucial public GOVERNMENT duties. WRhout this commRment to seW-regulation, media will con­ tinue to be the first casuaUy 01 every polRical upheaval and By the Colleae of Education every crisis in Philippine society. They must reform-or Vl'mlim•• perish.

he College of Education FaCUlty supports the Constitution Tand rallios behind dUly constituted authority. We strongly condemn violence as a means to effect change and we salute the loyal soldiers who risked their lives in defense of democracy.

In a free-wheeling discussion, we reviewed the chain of events that might have precipilated the recent coup attempt, e.g., poor delivery of basic services like electric power and water, the government's failure to anticipate the coup, etc. The ideas generated during the discussion may be summarized in the following suggestions to the various sectors of Philippine government and society.

For the Executive

• Declare a National Period of Mourning for the loss of lives, property and the reversal of the democratic gains we have made these past three years. Ours is a pyrrhic Victory in which we all came out losers in a no~win situation.

• Political leaders and coup plotters who instigated the rebellion should be Investigated and punished.

• Cabinet members should tender their resignation, which should be accepted by the President to enable her to replace them with less self-serving indiViduals . who will be more responsive to the needs of the people.

• The President should listen to feedback on problems like the poor delivery of basic services, monopolies such as PLOT, and do something concrete about them. 45 44

• The President should ellow the Investigation of her relatives and close friends who are accused of corrup­ For All Filipinos tion and of enriching themselves. • Condemn all forms of violence. For the Legislature • Examine our consciences to find out where we have been wanting. • Pass legislation for the support of families of the loyal government soldiers who gave their lives in defense of • Rally behind President AqUino as the duly elected tile Const~ution and democracy. head of our country. • Inniate the public censure of pol~lcians who are guilty • Develop a strong sense of national discipline. of grandstanding, fence-sil1lng and Interceding for violators of the law. • Ban excessive overseas travels of members of the legislature. • Review the salary scale and allowances of legislators.

• Inniate legislation to censure ostentatious display of wealth by government officials and their families and encourage simple living.

For the Military

• The PMA may have become too pol~icized. the inst~u· tion should introduce courses to be taught by civilians with no militaristic orientation. • Improve tho intelligence capability of the military to predict unusual activities by certain sectors in the In­ st~ution. • Strengthen military capability to enSure the security and safety of the whole country.

For the People (Particularly the UP Community)

• Give financial aid to the families of soldiers who lost their lives in dofense of the Constitution. • Raise specific questions directed to the President and the different government offices regarding: _ the clamor of the people for reforms; _ corrupt or inept officials; and _ changes to be made in the circle of advisers of the President and top leaders of the country. 46 47 d. Hindi rl~ n~lulutas ng gUbyerno ang mga lehill. mong hlnalng ng mga karaniwang sundalo sa buong AFp, bagay na nagagamil ng mga liwaling elemento para sa kanilang pansariling interes. • Malaki an!l aming pagkabahala sa pagkasangkapan ng PARA SA MAKABULUHAN AT liang puliliko'l malalaas na upisyal·mililar sa mga pang. karal1lwang sundalo. MABILIS NA PAGBABAGO • Mala~i ang aming pagkabahala sa mga implikasyon ng paghlngi ng dlrektang suportang mililar mula sa Eslados Isang Mariing Panawagan sa Unidos. Ano ang kapalil ng pagtulong na i10? Sa aming palagay. batay sa rekord ng gubyernong Pilipino sa Pangulong Corazon C. Aquino mal~.aliping pakikipag.ugnayan sa US, malakl ang epek. 10 11110 sa pagpapahina ng pansariling kapasyahan ng ;xmas _OW::EG.A.W§.tu&:xaz.:az gubyerno sa usapin ng pambansang soberanidad unang·una na sa usapin ng mga base militar ng US sa Uep:trtamenlo ng KaS3)'S3)'Un bansa. liP IJiliman • Malaki ang aming pagkabahala sa kawalan 0 di epek. tibong. paglutas ng gUbyerno sa mga pambansang sullranln al mga kaugnay na isyu bago naganap ang kudela. alid ng mga guro ng UP Departamento ng Kasaysayan H sa Panglilo ng Repllblika ng Pilipinas Corezon C. Aquino • Malaki ang aming pagkabahala sa kakayanan ng gubyer. ang sumusunod na pahayag ng pagkabahala al mga no na lalagang makabalik sa normalidad bunga ng di rekomendasyon kaugnay ng naganap na kudeta. Layunin ng pagkalutas ng mga pambansang suliranin at dahil sa pahayag na ito na makatulong sa anumang hakbangin ng kalagayan ngayon na ang gubyerno'y mislulang ipil sa gllbyerno sa pagbabalik ng bansa sa normalic1ad at sa nation· naglalabanang mga puwersa sa loob ng AFP at ng mis­ af reconstruction. mong gUbyernong sibil.

~ga Pagkabahala ng Sayan na Dapat Isaalang-alang Mga Rekomendasyon Tungo sa National Reconstruction • Malaki ang aming pagkabahal3 sa lumalaking panganib ng paghaharing militar na magmumula sa Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) kahil matapos ang kudelang i10 dahil sa sumusunod na kalagayan: A. Kaugnay ng Mga Nasangkot sa Kudeta:

a. Wala pang garantiya sa lubos na pagkasugpo ng Nais naming ipahayag na malaki rin ang pananagulan ng mg3 elemenlong nagpakana ng klldela. Bakil gubyerno sa mga nangyari. Nuon pa ma'y dapal ilong naging hindi ipab3tid sa bayan ang resuila ng negosas· delermlnado na tunay na usigin at parusahan ang mga utak yon sa pagilan I1g mga rebeldeng mililar at ng al puwersang nasa liked ng kudeta. Iiderato ng AFP? Ano ang ibig sabihin ng "return to tho barracks"? • TUkuyin al ihayag sa publiko ang mga puwersang responsable sa kUdeta. b. Kaugnay nito, nakaamba ang pnganib na ang state ofnat;onalemergency ay lumungo sa martial • Tunay na parusahan ang mga nasangkol sa kudeta. law kung hindi IBlaga masugpo ang mga nasa Iikod ng kUdeta; • Gawing publiko ang pag-uusig sa mga kasangkol sa kudeta. k. Ang gubyerno ay maaaring kinakasang·kapan ng isang military clique na nagnanais ng paghaharing militar; maari ding pinupuwersa ng kudela ang ganitong hakbang mula sa gubyerno. 49 48 OahU sa mga kakulangan nilo: B. Kaugnay ng AFP ij Bigyan ng pagkakataong maging bahagi ang mga non· governmental organizations (NGO) sa pagbubuo ng mga patakaran at • Tugun"n ang mga lehnlmong hlnaing ng mga kawal programang magpapaunlad at magpapa­ ng AFP tulad ng mga sumusunod: tatag ng bansa. Maraming NGOs na ma­ laon nang kasangkot at epektibo sa mga a. Pagtataas ng sahod sa makatwirang antas; gawalng napatunayang mablsang nakatu­ b. Ibatay sa propesyonalismo ang promosyon ng tugon sa mga suliranin at pangangailangan mga kasapl ng AFp, hign lalo ang mga junior ng pangkaraniwang mga mamamayan. officers na tunay na tapat satungkulin sa bayan; Marapat lamang na sangguniin, sa Isang regUlar at Instllusyonal na paraan, ang mga k. Ihayag sa publlko ang mga kahilingan ng RAM organisasyong no sa kapasidad na ad­ tungkol sa mga repormang hinihlling nno para sa visory units ng Tanggapan ng Pangulo at AFP. ng iba't Ibang ahensyang pampamaha­ laan. • Baguhin ang oryentasyon ng AFP. nayo no bilang 'sang hukbo na tunay na nagmamalasakn sa kapa­ Ii) Sa pamamagllan ng isang Executive kanan at mga demokratikong karapatan ng samba· Order, itayo ang mga consultative council yanang Pilipino, at hindi maging kasangkapan ng mga sa iba't ibang antas ng pamahalaan na puhtiko at dayuhang interes. Kaugnay nito, ang gani· magsisilbing tunay na daluyan ng mga tong oryentasyon ay dapat maging bahagi ng forma­ hlnaing at mungkahi ng mga pangkaranl­ tion at kurikulum ng mga kadete sa PMA at Iba pang wang mamamayan kaugnay ng pagpapa­ institusyong militar. unlad ng kanilang kalagayang pangkabu­ hayan at pagsulong ng kanilang mga karapatang demokratiko. Ang mga con­ K. Kaugnay ng Pamamalakad ng Gubyerno: sultative council ay bubuuin ng mga kina­ tawang pinili mismo ng mga tao sa kani­ Nais naming ipahayag na hindi na pwedeng palaging Isisl kanilang komunidad at gagampan ng kani­ sa nagdaang admlnist,asyong Marcos ang nagpapatuloy na lang mga tungkulin sa paraang boluntaryo. krisls pang-ekonomya't pampulitika. Panahon na para kUa· lanIO ng kasalukuyang gubyerno ang mga kahinaan at pag­ b. Dapat na maging maagap ang Pangulo sa pag­ kukulang nno: dama sa pulso ng sambayanang Pilipino. Napapanahon nang maging tunay na sensllibo • Sa aming palagay, kinakailangang baguhin ang gabl· ang Pangulo sa mga hinlhiling ng iba't Ibang nete at palnan ng mga taong tunay na nagmama· sektor ng ating IIpunan tulad ng mga gure, lasakn sa kapakanan ng taumbayan. Sila'y dapat ding manggagawa, magsasaka, mangingisda, mag­ may tapang ng loob at kakayanang magsagawa ng aaral, at iba pa. Dapat isaalang-alang ng Pangu­ kailangang mga maka-mamamayang reporma kahn 10 ang katotohanang ang batayan ng tunay na no sumasalungat sa interes ng mga dayuhan 0 ng pag-unlad ay ang pag-asa sa lakas ng mama­ mayan at sa sariling pagsisikap na malaya sa mga makapangyarihan sa ating Iipunan. pagdidikta ng mga dayuhan. • Kaugnay nno, napapanahon nang tunay na isangkot k. Kaugnay nito, dapat nang magpatupad ang ad­ ang mga mamamayan sa pagbubuo ng mga pata­ ministrasyong Aquino ng mga paraang pang­ karang may kinalaman sa kanilang mga karapatan at ekonomya na hindi nakaasa sa pangungutang kagalingan. sa mga dayuhan. a. Kilalanin ang mga kakulangan ng Kongreso sa d, Sa Kabila ng naihayag nang pagtulong ng Es­ pagbubuo ng mga patakaran at batayan ng mga lados Unldos sa pamahalaang Aquino, dapat na pagbabago sa Iipunan. IgIII nllo ang soberaniya at kalayaan ng Pilipinas sa pamamagitan ng isang nagsasariling foreign policy lalo na sa suliranin kaugnay ng mga base milnar, 50 51

Mensahe sa Pangulong Aquino

Isang leksyon ang ninuturo ng madugo't mapinsalang kudeta. Nagbabadya sa malapn na hlnaharap ang hign na madugong pagtatangkang ibagsak ang pamahalaan kung magpapatuloy ang di-mapagtatakpang pagwawalang-bahala SUGGESTIONS FOR ng gubyernong Aquino sa Olga pambansang suliranin na nananatili at patuloy na lumulubha. INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS Wala nang panahon sa pag.uurung-sulong sa pag· papatupad ng kinakailangang Olga makabuluhang reporma. Matagal nang umaasa at naghihintay ang buong samba­ By UP Los Banos yanang Pilipino sa katuparan ng Olga ipinangako ng Rebo­ lusyong Edsa nuong Pebrero, 1986. Nasa gUbyernong Aquino na ang responsibilidad kung didinggin nito ang Olga kahilingang no ng bayanl Editor'. Note: UP Los Banos's response to the December coup attempt was a reiteration ofvarious suggestions and recommenda­ tions, particUlarly in the area of agriCUlture, land reform, rural IKA-8 NG DISYEMBRE 1989 development, and human development that it has made in the pas/. Vice Chancellor William Padolina put together these various ZEUS A. SAlAZAR G. suggestions from the faCUlty and other sectors of the Los Banos MILAGROS C. GUERRERO campus. The implication here is that Instituting these reforms would help undercut the reasons for general discontent-reasons ELSIE S. RAMOS which give rise to coup attempts and otller forms of unrest in the country. ROMEO C. PILAR The Center for Policy and Development Studies and the College of MYRA ANGELI A GRIPALDO Human Ecology contributed to these recommendations for institu­ MA. DOLORES CASTRO tional reforms. ROWENA T. QUINTO MA. CECILIA A. SAMONTE General Suggestions FERDINAND C. LLANES D. POLICARPIO • Accelerate Impfemental/on of the ComprehensIve Agrarian Reform law (CARL) R. YUMUL Current ellorts involve the conversion 01 larmer-tenants into KHADIJA L. MAMORNO . stockholders, but decision-making and corporate control remain wnh the 10rmer landowners. This snuation must be BERNADEnE L ABRERA corrected and a more equnable arrangement must be OSCAR M. ALFONSO achieved. DIOSDADO R. ASUNCION We also suggest that adequate technical and economic support system be provided by appropriate government D. V. TAYLO agencies to backstop farmers as they start to manage their own allairs. • Strengthen Ruraf Development Program There is a general perception that the present overall rural development program of the Aquino government is not doing 52 53 well. The programs ofthe kay departments Involved (Depart. and programs. Some of the most Important areas are dis­ ment of Agrlcu~ure, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and Department of Agrarian RaIorm) are not well· cussed below: coordinated, and are even confused. In this regard, we sug· • The bias of economic policies, notably trade and ex­ gest the creation of a body that will have lull powers to change rate policies, against agriCUlture must be coordinate rural development eIIorts of both govemment removed. Trade and exchange rate policies const~ute agencies and non·government organizations (NGOs). the most palVasive source 01 the depression 01 produc­ Rural development must be based on sustainable agricul­ tion incentives in agricu~ure, thereby deflecting the ture to minimize or prevent damage to the environment. movement of much-needed capnal away from the Strong measures to control the raJe of explo~atlon of our agrlcu~ural and rural sector. non·renewable natural resources (mineral deposns) must be instnuted as soon as possible. • Public seelor spending on agriculture, particularly public Investments In rural Infrastruelure supportive • Revamp CabInet and other vital government office. 01 Increased agricultural productivity and Incomes, need to be Increased to levels commensurate with the We suggest that a serious revamp 01 the Department of sector's contribution to national Income and employ­ Foreign Affairs, Department 01 Trade and Commerce, Depart­ ment. Examples of these investments are rural, roads, ment 01 National Defense, Department 01 Education, Cu~ure ports, marketing facilities, electrification, communication, and Sports, Department of Social Work and Development, and irrigation and drainage. Dev~lopme!'t in these areas Department of Agricunure and the Central Bank be con­ I facilnates the carrying out of a Wide variety of econo""!,c sidered. Former mMary personnel from government offices activnies in the rural and agricunural sector, thereby rais­ should be scrutinized carefUlly and removed, II warranted. ing employment and household incomes, helping al­ industrialization"throu~h • Adopt stranger pratecl/on pollc/e. In trade leviate poverty, and promoting the expansion of the domestic market for Industrial Local producers must be protected against unfair competi­ goods. tion posed by subsidized agricu~ural products of other countries. It Is worth noting that transport costs in the cou~try have been high compared to other Southeast ASIan • Relorm taral/on system countries, due In part to the di,smal state of transp,?rt infrastructure and selVices at the countryside. Industnal Our present taxation system must be corrected because ~ policies conferring protection to local vehicle producers places the tax burden on the middle class and the low-income and transport operators have also aggravated the snua­ groups, both of which are usually fixed·wage earners. The tion. In inter-island shipping, handling oosts In public upper classes are not taxed as much as they should be. ports are onerous due largely to inefficiencies spawned handlin~ ~er­ • Reaffirm oppositIon to eIfens/on of the term 01 by the monopolistic arrangements in cargo Military Base•. vices. Such transport bottlenecks hinder the eII,clent movement of goods and selVice and, more oflen than The UP Los Banos commun~ remains committed to the not, translate into higher prices paid by consumers and termination of the US mil~ary bases fOllowing the expiration 01 lower prices received by producers. the MiI~ary Bases Agreement in 1991. We reaffirm our opposi­ tion to any extension of the agreement. • Rural development requires the Intensification 01 reo search and development to Increase agricultural • Accelerate pre.ent e"orts to decentralize govern· productivity and rural Incomes. Studies show that ment operal/on returns to investments in agricunural research have been particularly high, typically e~ceeding 35 p~rcent. It is hard Oparations 01 the national government and, where ap­ to imagine other typas of investments-In either private inst~utions proprlate, government including UP. must be or public sector-that would produce more favorable decentralized. rates of return. Unfortunately, the country's public expen­ dnures on agricu~ural research, when expressed as a Suggested Policy Reforms for Rural Development proportion of the gross value added in agriculture, h~ve bean low In relation to those of other ASian countries, Sustained agricunural and rural development in the Philip­ inclUding Pakistan and Bangladesh. pines demands the inst~ution of Inter-related policy ralorms 54 55 • The pace of land reform and the delivery of support services to farmers and rural workera need to be ac­ Along this line, the following are our recommendations: celerated. The first is necessnated by the highly skewed distribution of land ownership and operational hold­ • Roads, Ports Facilities and Interisland Shipping. The ings-rather unique in Asia and resembling the agrarian deplorable state of many roads points to giving the structure in Latin America-and by the fact that the highest priority to restoration and maintenance activllies. poorest of the poor are the landless. As long as this Barangay roads directly serve the needs of farmers and skewed landholding structure remains, an egriculture-Ied rural dwellers, yet amounts currently programmed for the development strategy will be unsuccessful in alleviating maintenance of barangay roads are only 35 to 40 parcent abject poverty and high unemployment and under­ of the required amounts. Rural roads must also be con­ employment. Any other growth strategy is unlikely to al. structed to penetrate areas with higher concentrations of leviate these problems unless naddresses the question poverty. Aside from the need for a larger budget for of the poor's access to land and employment oppor. roads and bridges, administrative reforms are necessary tunliles. to decentralize planning and financing. Infrastructure development encourages local inllialive, promotes ac­ • The level of social services covering education, countability and lower costs, and ensures the salisfaction health, and nutrition, aimed at promoting rural welfare of local needs. and human capital development, has to be Increased. Human capital development enhances the poor's prime The efficiency of port facilities is essential to both domes­ asset-their own labor-and, hence, their contribution to lie and international trade. Tho CUrlent inefficiency of national economic development. Philippine ports arises from: (1) outmoded cargo han­ dling facilities; (2) long ship turnaround time; and (3) By no means are these policy reforms and programs ex­ institutional constraints to efficient management. The first haustive of all areas and pOlicy concerns in rural develop­ two issues may be addressed via investments in modern ment. But they are suggestive of the critical reforms and cargo handling eqUipment and the accelerated dredging programs that have to be underiaken to effectively get agricul. of harbors and ports. The management of port facilijies ture and rural development mOVing. by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) may be improved, and port fees reduced, ff full autonomy for the PPA is Specific Policy Recommendations granted. To pay for the requirements in port operation and maintenance, the PPA receives only a fraction of collection from port fees. An allernative may be to auc­ tion the right to operate various Philippine ports to private Rural Infrastructure groups to allow competition to set efficiency standards in port management. Th~ inadeq~a':Y ,?f rural infrastructure, including com­ • Postharvest Facilities. Philippine government and munrcat,on facilltres, IS a serious obstacle to agricullural diver­ sificali,?n and rurai in.dustrialization. Manila and nearby areas society have a lot to gain from the diminution of posthar­ have historically receIVed the major share of market infrastruc­ vest losses. Investments could be enlarged and storage ture relative to the total investment in roads and bridges as facilities could be improved with mechanized handling well as communication facilities. ' eqUipment. Education and training in loss prevention techniques will also bring great returns. Budget alloca­ A massive program ,?f infrastructure-building in the rural tions for postharvest technology, however, are almost areas Will have far-reaching benefits, such as: (a) employment negligible in relation to the level of loss. Even in the case for landless households will be generated in the Short-run; (b) of grains, the allocations are very small, and for fruns and the overall level of demand in the economy will be raised' (c) vegetables close to zero. Yet fruits and vegetables in new market opportunities for the economy's outputs wili be partiCUlar, have significant foreign exchange-earning opened; (d) the benems from more favcrable input-output potentials. Of course, improvements in transport, roads, prices will be accorded to farmers; (e) consumers will face rails, communications and shipping facilllies also reduce lower costs ofagricullural products; and (I) the cost of deliver­ postharvest losses. In addition, pricing and grading sys­ ing economic and social services to the countryside will be tem for grains and perishables must be developed, intro­ reduced. duced and enforced. • Irrigation. The expansion and upgrading of irrigation in­ frastructure are important requislles for improving land 56 57 productivity because they augment current land supply, as well as enhance per-hectare yield. The former be­ • Strengthening Market Information and Export Promo­ comes possible through Increased cropping Intensity tion. The government should Improve lis marketing Infor­ and the latter resulls from the posllive complementarities mation system not only for the tradllional crops (rice, among modern rice varieties, optimal fertilizer applica­ com. sugar, and coconut) but more especially for the tion, and proper water management. non-tradilional agricullural crops. II should provide (on a regular basis) the agrlcullural sector as well as agrlcul­ It should be noted, however, that Irrigation development turaltraders, processors and exporters wllh vllat informa. in the country is currently experiencing a deceleration tion relating to market outlets, pricing, supply and due to serious scarcity in financial resources and in­ demand data, and market requirements. The public sec. creasing cost of construction per unll area. Faced with tor could seek the assistance of the media and non­ this dilemma, the government, through the National Ir­ government organizations In disseminating this Informa. rigation Administration (NIA) , Is currently adjusting lis tion. In line wllh this, more Investments for the Improve­ development strategy by concentrating on the construc­ me"! O! the national (as well as Intemationa~ com. tion of small-scale irrigation projects and rehabililation of mUOlcat,on system must be made to link up the rural existing systems which have deteriorated due to the poor areas wllh the urban centers. operation and maintenance as well as agroclimatic fac­ tors. AgriCUltural Resource Conservation and Given the major role of irrigation in increasing agricullural Protection output, as well as the decreasing share of government allotments to irrigation development relative to the total The appalling condilions of the Philippine environment national bUdget, II is necessary to establish priority areas wrought by cumulative relentless explollation of the nation's for irrigation investment within the country which may nat~ral .resources, have moved the policymakers to formulate serve as agricultural growth points. legislation measures that adopt strategies for sustainable development. In this regard, there must be greater coordination with the Department of Agricullure in terms of identifying these In the Phil!ppines, the present scenario is qulle alarming. areas where conditions of poverty. inequily and un­ The worseOlng environmental deterioration has aggravated employment need to be alleviated. But II should be men­ poverty and hunger, particularly among those on marginal tioned that greater budget allocations for irrigation invest­ subsistence. The pressing demands of a population that has ment must be made by the government ~ the country's grown from 54 million to about 60'million In five years have irrigation development is to improve over lis current state taken precedence over everything else. The drive for of about 1.4 million hectares (or about 13% of total economic recovery, the desperate struggle to meet payments potentially irrigable area). on external debts, and the poillical maneuverings of our leaders have relegated crucial ecological concerns to the There is also a need to develop an irrigation technology background. which will be applicable to high-value agricultural crops, which may permit farmers to diversity crop production as The following are key priority Issues and problems In the well as realize higher farm incomes. agricultural resource conservation and protection: It is a well-known fact that irrigation projects require sub­ • Soil erosion stantial amounts of investment. in terms of capital and • Land tenure/occupancy problems human resources. This is why II is of utmost importance that these systems are operated, maintained and • High cost of agrlcullurallnputs managed properly. In order to ensure this. a continuous and effective monlloring and evaluation of irrigation sys­ • Reduced fertility of cullivated lowlands due to exces­ tems should be undertaken by an Independent agency. sive Inorganic fertilization and pesticide application Information thereby generated will serve as the basis for • Conversion of agrlcullural land for residential and/or identifying emerging problems confronting the irrigation commercial purposes subsector. as well as provide the basis to develop aller­ native soltrtions to these problems. 59

58 farmers, as training Is only one component of our extension program. • Lack of land classification We propose the following recommendations: The following measures are Buggested: • Inst~utionalize and rationalize research and extension • Protect productive cropland areas through land use programs of the country Involving agrlcuhural.schools planning and zoning provisions which preve'nt their and unlvers~ies w~h the DA and other agencIes. Th,s development from non- agrlcuhural uses. would mean the development of a national research and extension program coordinated by DA and SCU­ • Eliminate Incentives bulh Into price systems which en­ based scientists and extension personnel. courage the use of expensive Inputs and provide economic Incentives for ecologically sound manage­ • Establish strong linkage wrih NGOs in technology ment practices. transfer and utilization. • Incorporate conservation principles Into all foreign-as­ • Provide adequate funds for research and extension sisted agrlcuhural programs. programs. • Require stricter compliance w~h conservation require­ ments in the management of pasturelands and other Human Development land use practices under government permns and leases. Genuine development policies must facilitate the rapid and continuous improvement in the quality of life of our ~ople, • Stop all conversion of remaining forests. especially the poor and disadvantaged, through the satIsfac­ tion of their basic needs. • Re-examine polici~s regarding land tenure of upland communities wnhin public lands. The College of Human EcolOgy declares that.'he state must assert ~s right to full and permanent sovereignty over our • Develop professional, technically-trained and sOCially­ country's wealth, natural resources and economic activnies. sens~ive field personnel to enforce national policies Further, ~ should give prlor~ to the improvement of the rural and laws, as well as introduce ecologically sound environment. land-use management practices to the reSidents of marginal lands. We propose the promotion of family education, covering skills development for self-sufficiency a~d livelihood and value formation/re-orientation, particularly ,n regard to family Research and Extension roles and relatl.:Jns, family resource utilization and manage­ ment, population education, child rearing, and care for the Research and extension are essential for the acceleration of elderly. agricuhural production and rural development. They should be linked strongly as their functions must Interlock to serve a To these ends, the following are suggested: common clientel&-the farmer, and the end-user. They must have proper and adequate supporl (in terms of funding, • Pre-school programs in barangays should serve as facilnies, manpower, structure and policies) to be more effec­ venues for value formation and re-orientation. tive and efficient. • Workshops, seminars, and individual family counsel­ At present, however, research and extension are com­ ing in pilot barangays---particularly on the issue 'of partmentalized. This has given rise to organizational and Responsible Parenthood, which covers Population operational weaknesses. There Is a need to strengthen and Educalio~should be held. Technical consuhancy systematize the interface of these two factors. Research and and implementation of programs in baranflays for extension are rather weak, as many of the programs/projects skills development for self-suffiCiency and livelihood are not responsive to the needs and problems of farmers, should be provided. especially the small farmers. Also, the conversion of the Bureau of Agrlcuhural Extension (BAEx) Into Agrlcuhural • Mobile Libraries in pilot barangays would contribute to Training Instnute (ATI) does not answer the needs of the literacy and value formation among our people. 60 61

disturbances can only result In misdirected courses of action that will serve as mere palliatives.

Political Issues LAST CHANCE TO RESTRUCTURE While the Constitution states that 'sovereigntyresides in the PHILIPPINE SOCIETY people andthe government's authority emanates from them, • there is a growing perception that government IIsell ;s becom­ Ing isolated and estranged from majority of lis constlluency because of incompetent and Insensilive Cabinet members, By UP Manila grandstanding poillicians, vested Interest groups, and the Intervention foreign powers. Graft and corruption in government remain unabated. In addition, opportunistic relatives of high-ranking officials are once again on the loose. Peace and order conditions con­ tinue to deteriorate as evidenced by the increase in the crime Introduction rate, the continuing Insurgency, the proilieration of private armies, and forced evacuation of civilian residents from their homes. Social justice remains unattained and human rights he recent coup attempt launched by misguided milnary violations persist. A sense of helplessness weighS down on Tfor~es deserves t? be denounced by all freedom-loving the ordinary cnizen. These internal problerns are aggravated peOple!n th~ most stn!'gent terms possible. The University of by a pervasive American presence which seeks to strengthen the.Philippines Manila expresses its strong indignation lis influence over our national Ille. against this .sh!'meful pi?! by self-proclaimed messiahs to undermine cIvilian authonty and Install a milnary dictatorsh'p The President should revamp her· Cabinet and fire the in· by~~ I competent and callous ones, as well as those identified wnh vested interest groups. Big time grafters should likewise be We say "NO TO THE COUP' as a means for redress of prosecuted and jailed. The President should stop her relatives gnevanc.~s by the military. We condemn the use of arms to from being liabilities to her government. She must also review grab political power and overthrow the constnutional system the performance of her ruling coalnion and get ns members to of government. It is obvious that the coup plotters bereft of discard the ways of tradllional polnics. any clear program of government and unable to present a viable alternati~e. to th.e present order, have sought to take Members of Congress should cease their grandstanding !'dvantage .Of ."sing dissatisfaction among the people and acts, set aside their personal Interests and address the Impos~ therr vIsionless will on the country. We refuse to allow problems of their consliluents, particularly the lack of basic the military to appropriate the people's agenda for reform by services. Mechanisms for popular participation in policy for­ way of a coup. mulation and Implementation should be put in place. Consult­ ations with proper organizations and non-governmental We say "YES TO CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVILIAN organizations must be held regularly. In fine wllh this, all AUTHO~I1Y"and ~rm. our faith In democracy and peaceful sectoral representatives to Congress should be appointed at mec~anlsms for articulating alternative policies andprograms once in order to provide some balance in the composnion of and, II necessary, for change of leadership in government. the elne-controlled Congress. But at the sam~ time, we urge the duly-constlluted govern. We urge more openness and tolerance in the discussion of me~t under PreSident Corazon C. Aquino, the legislature and our national problems and in proposing solutions to them. All the Judiciary to recognize their failure to provide a better Iiie for points of view from various schools of thought must be the majority of Filipinos. They must accept the reality that presented and argued provided these are done wnhin the m.ountlng social, political and economic I/Is have caused the constitutional framework. alienation of many sectors of society from government. The anti-Insurgency campaign and the total war policy that . We therefore call on the government to confront the real directs II must be re-examined. Negotiations for a ceasetire Iss~es and problems that weigh heavily against efforts for wllh all warring groups must be inlliated and an eventual national development. Failure to awaken to the root causes of peaceful sertlement of armed conflicts must be aimed at. 62 - 63 The leaders of the failed December coup should be iden­ tified, tried, and severely punished for their criminal act. the business eille must discard their ostentatious IWestyles Politicians who have directly helped the coup must also be and live humbler or simpler roves. They must forego salary dean wllh accordingly. Civinan courts should try the mililary increases and higher prolll margiriS and instead redistribute offenders to ensure an impartial trial. Mililary education, par­ these among their low-salarted workers. ticularly the curriculum 01 the Philippine Mililary Academy (PMA), should be reviewed and reoriented so that II does not Agrarian tensions will persist unless government provides breed future coup plollers. The AFP as a whole badly needs a genuine land reform program that will completely restruc­ to be re-educated and redirected to the ways 01 democracy. ture modes 01 land ownership. In this regard, President Aquino must show the way by giving up her own family's The executive and legislative branches ofgovernment must control over Hacienda Luislla. Agricunural support programs be resolute in ending, once and for all, foreign dominance 01 must be rechanneled to serve the small direct producers and intervention In our national affairs. We should work Instead of big agribusiness Interests and large-scale farms. towards realiZing the constllutional mandate for an Inde­ pendent and sovereign foreign policy that has our national Economic policies and thrusts must be re-examined and and people's interest as lis foremost concern. weaned away from subordination to foreign concerns_ Greater support must be accorded to small-scale and labor­ Socio-economic Issues intenSive business enterprises. Price control must be Imposed and stricUy enforced not only Long standing socio-economic structures have been the in retail trade but also at the wholesale level. Minimum wage rnain cause of poverty and marginalization among the people, levels must be raised to provide a decent livelihood for partrcularly the peasant and labor sectors. Gross inequaltties workers. The SSL must be fOrmulated so as to grant greater in income and wealth distribution, ownership and control over benefits to low Income employees. A rollback In oil prices land and other natural resources, and in access to basic and must be ordered and the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) support services continuously fuel disaffection and unrest. abolished. The foreign debt negotiators must be replaced wllh those who would favor and work for our national interests. 8i9. business groups have established themselves in high posItrons In government, dictating economic policy In sup­ Cultural Issues port oftheir Own agenda. Transnational corporations and their local partners exercise an overriding innuence over the direc­ tion of the Philippine economy. These same forces have also The educational system has become too commercialized participated In the degradation of the environment by their and marketable college Courses produce graduates who are ruthless and uncontrolled exploitation 01 our natural resour­ totally insensllive to social concerns and end up serving ces for profit. foreign and local corporations. Others eagerly desert the country and work abroad. While economic condllions may Low incomes and rising prices plague wage earners-the have forced such distorted priorllies, one can also point to the laborers, ordinary employees, and worker-professionals. The fact that values of Philippine patriotism and nationalism are controversial Salary Standardization Law (SSL) has only wor­ not being assimilated properly at the classroom level by Our sened wage ineguities as huge increases accrued to higher school population. offrclals, whrle minuscule raises or nothing at all went to the rank-and-file employees. The mass media, especially television and movies, glorffy violence as the ultimate solution to contlict. Values extolling The foreign debt issue remains a paramount concern. Our foreign cuhures exercise a negative influence on young debt negotiators have shown nothing but subservience to the minds. foreign credllors and to the dictates 01 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). We are made A thorough revIew of the education system must be to pay foreign debts acquired and squandered by the pre­ conducted towards strengthening trsnsmlsslon VIOUS Marcos regime at the cost of depriving our people 01 a mechanIsms for positive 'ISlues such ss nationalism and just and decent life. social consciousness. /I Is also recommended that media review the content of /Is progrsms slong the same lines. No doubt sacrnices and ben-tightening are called for as we strive to undo the damage wrought by !wenly years of misrule The UP Manila communffy considers this the last chance for and plunder. But II is an unwritten law that those who have government 10 Ins!nute needed changes and bring about a longer and faller bells should be the first to give up unneces­ restructured society. II is also an opportunffy for the Filipino ssry privileges and benellis. High government officials and people to harness their Indefatigable strength, tap their boundless creativlly, and rise above the present crisis. 64 65

DECEMBER ", 1989 MINDA LUZ QUESADA TAGUMPAY MANIQUIS ANGELA P. SARILE ASSESSING THE FAILED JULITA I. YABES COUP ATTEMPT JOSE S. BAENS SOFRONIO P. SAN JUAN By UP Visay.s EDUARDO TADEM AMANTE CRUZ CESARYABUT Ed/lor'. Nole: the following assessment of the failed coup attempt MARIANO CAPARAS In December 1989 was derived from the minutes of a meeting among officle/s and faculty ofthe UP In the Visayas called by Chan­ JANUARIO ESTRADA cellor Francisco Nemenzo shortly aIIer the coup. The facully who HORACIO ESTRADA a/lended the meeting came from the following units: Graduate School, College of ArIs and Sciences (CAS), School of Manage­ BERNIE BILLENAS ment Development (SDM), end College ofFisheries (CF). ARTURO PESIGAN ERLINDA ORTIN MARILOU REBULLIDA Causes of the Coup AURORA YAPCHIONGCO COOKIE DOMINGO president Corazon Aquino Is now encountering the usual problems of pos!-revolutlona/y governments. All leaders MICHAEL MAGTOTO who acceded to power through non-constttutional means are beset by problems of legttimizatlon and economic recove/y. CRISTINA TORRES Indeed, tt Is much easier mounting a revolution than ruling the ALBERTO ROMUALDEZ count/Y afterwards. ERNESTO O. DOMINGO Most revolutiona/y leaders handle challenges wtth an Iron fist. President Aquino does not seem to have the stomach for this: she used kid gloves in dealing wtth previous coup at­ tempts. As a consequence, the ploners have tried again. De-professionaAzatlon of the mlltta/y was Identified as a legacy of the Marcos dictatorship. As borne out by the ex­ periences of otherThird World countries, when soldiers have had the taste of power, tt Is difficutt to bring them back to the barracks. Corruption In the civilian bureaucracy and among politicians also provld9 the poltt~lzed soldier an excuse for poltticallntervention.

Most COLAp leaders In the Philippines are graduates of the Philippine Mlllta/y Academy (PMA). Perhaps, more humanities courses should be Included In the PMA cur- 66 67

rlculum, On the other hand, humanttles and social science But this might be a simplistic assessm~nt,Of a complex courses may have contributed Immensely to the poIttlcallza­ personaltty. Like Honasan, most polilicians and reformers are tion ot PMA cadets, (Soon after the Imposttlon of martial law, power-oriented, You cannot bring about reforms unless you Marcos ordered a revamp of the PMA curriculum and this have power, As Machiavelli said, only a prophet armed suc­ resuned In the insertion of more non-mililary courses, These ceods; the prophet unarmed is doomed to fail, Being power­ courses served to propagate Marcos's Filipino ide%gy.) oriented does not mean he is moved by selfish considerations alone, Perhaps the problem does not lie In the curriculum, The professors who teach the non-milttary courses are an impor­ One who knows Honasan attested that the RAM leader is tant faClor, If pOlillcal science, for example, Is taught by a fiercely idealistic, Most PMA cadets are imbued with idealism, civilian professor with a milttarlstic bent, iI will not engender even if their ideals may be misplaced from our POint of View, appreciation for democratic values and Ideals, The honor system at the academy nurtures idealism, Perhaps, too, the entire atmosphere on the PMA campus Some Of uS take exception to a point made in the Diliman nurtures a praetorian frame of mind, the belief articulated by manifesto that the plotters have no vision, no program, In a "Gringo" Honasan hlmseif that the milttary has the sacred long interview with another journalist, Cecilio Arillo, Honasan duty to save the nation from inept and corrupt poIi1iclans. actually spelled out some sort of program, We may disagree Hazing not only instills a strong sense Of brotherhood (esprit with his assumptions, especially the assumption that the de corps) which is useful in organizing a coup; if also warps mililary is best fitted to lead the development process, but let the minds of the cadets, us admtt that his vision is more coherent and better thought­ out than Cory Aquino's when she campaigned for the It was suggested that PMA cadets should be exposed to presidency, non- milttary courses by enrolling at UP. Assuming this gets the approval of PMA authortties, iI could dilute milttary dis­ A participant pleaded, "Why not give RAM a chance, as we cipline, similar to sending seminarians to a co-educational have given Cory four years?" A mililary junta may be what we institution to experience the real world, need to achieve the stabiltty, order and discipline essenlJal for national development, according to this one view, The concept of military training has Indeed been changing in other r-!)untries, The negative consequences ot a purely military education Is being recognized, The Royal Milttary The Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) Academy of Britain (Sandhurst) now offers only short graduate courses ranging from six month,S to two years, The RAM boys are mostly staff officers wilh no combat Applicants must have completed regUlar degrees In civilian experience, They enter the corridors of power immediately unlversilies, after graduation from the PMA, Yet, all PMAers are reqUired to spend at least two years of combat duties before they get staff Dunlroon, the Royal Australian Mllttary Academy, offersfour­ assignments, Honasan and Eduardo Kapunan (another RAM year courses during which cadets simuifaneously work for a leader), for example, have exemplary combat records, Bachelor of Science degree at the Unlverstty Of New South Moreover, RAM includes PMA graduates in the field, They are Wales, UNSW supplies the academy wilh civilian lecturers in fact the RAM's main source of strength, and professors to teach the non-mllttary subjects. The latter are chosen by the unlverstty, not by the mililary establishment; RAM's image was tarnished by ils identification wilh Juan and the universtty apparently sends to Duntroon the most Ponce Enrile, the Defense Minister in the Marcos regime, unmililarlstic types of academics, A few Duntroon faculty Being a West Pointer, Fidel Ramos does not have much members are unabashed leftists so the cadets are exposed to influence among the PMAers, It is these PMA people who plot all kinds of ideas, a trUly liberal education, coups, Enlisted men have only been used as pawns, Honasan said in previous coups that the RAM boys are Motivations of the Plotters Willing to die but reluctant to kill, Now, they are willing to die and to kill, Most Of us are Of the opinion that the coup plotters are motivated by personal Interests, the drive fOr power, We see Honasan as eccentric, power-oriented, hence, messianic, In his interview wtth journalist Ninez Cacho-OrlVares, he projects an Image of himself as a legendary hero who Is out to save the nation, 68 69

The US Factor People's Power

Some saw the December 1989 coup as a moro-mora or­ There was no people's power this time. People converged chestraled by the US to ensure retention ofthe bases. The fact on the vicinity of fighting out 01 curiosity rather than to express that few mililary people were killed in several days of intensive support for Cory. Because 01 graft and corruption, rtsing fighting lends credibility to this suspicion. prices, the oil price hike, salary standardization, etc., people could not care less. In February 1986, by contrast, the people Others put forward the opinion thal the moro-mora theory were unlled against a common enemy. And there was a oversimplifies a complex phenomenon. nimplies thal there credible ailernative. Now they would not risk their lives for are no real conflicts in the mililary, which is patently wrong. Cory, but neilher are they willing to die for Vice President Dey More likely, the RAM boys timed the coup on the eve 01 the Laurel. bases talks, hoping iI would be easierto get US support since President Aquino is unable to ensure retention of the bases. Cardinal Sin called for preyerpower, asked people to go to This is different from saying that the US 9rchestrated the the churches and pray. Based on radio reports, however, few whole thing. responded. Sin's credibility has been going down even before the coup. Some of us justify President Aquino's request for US assis­ tance to stop the onslaught ofthe rebels and regain control 01 The comparison between the February 1986 revolution and the air on the principle that the first duty 01 the state is to the December 1989 coup could be over-stretched. Perhaps survive. Perhaps she also wanted to test the sincerity 01 the there is no basis for comparing the two wilh respect to US pledge to give all-Out support to her government. people's power. In February 1986 the government did not pull a trigger, whereas Honasan and company In 1989 started Aquino's request for US mililary assistance may also be shooting. justified in terms of valuss that transcend her government: democracy and the presentation of internal sovereignty. As There was shooting In February 1986, ailhough not as ex­ for external sovereignty, a country under ils construction and tensive; but the people were not scared. We have yet to under international law has the right to seek foreign mililary explain why people went out Into the streets In February 1986 assistance to save ilseil or ils democralic instilutions. but not In December 1989, I.e., not until after the coup. It should be noted that Aquino's decision to seek US air cover became necessary because, tradilionally relying on Strategy Clark Air Base for protection from aerial aIlack by a foreign power, our armed forces never bothered to provide for the RAM tried utilizing people power, which explains why defense 01 the legilimate government against a faction 01 lis rumors 01 an Impending coup spread before iI could be own air force. Hence, the Malacal'\ang securtty group had no executed. People who behaved like Marcos loyalists accom­ anti-aircraft guns. panied the rebels when they attacked Channel 4 and oc­ cupied the junction 01 EDSA and Quezon Avenue. Moreover, the request for US assistance was unnecessary because, as the government claims, iI had the P-5s 01 the 5th The timing was right. RAM explOlled discontent over the 011 Fighter Wing on ils side and iI had superiority 01 infantry. price Increase, salary standardizallon, the PNP bill, etc. But These were more than enough to neutralize the air power 01 RAM might have gained broader support had iI wailed forthe the rebels. full impact 01 the 011 price hike to hil tha pockets 01 everyone. The request, justified or not, has weakened our bargaining Nowthe government has a scapegoal. ncan blame the coup posilion vis-a-vis the mililary bases. for the deterioralion 01 the people's economic well·being. The electronic media are a usual target 01 coups. In August 1987, Gringo's men captured Broadcast City and gained tremendous propaganda mileage when a harmless-looking lieutenant wllh fierce-looking subordinales began reading mililary orders on Channel 9. The RAMboys failed to repeal thal performance when they captured Channels 2 and 4 In the first few hours 01 the coup. All TV channels have a system for seil·disabling should a coup occur. 71 70 TEODORO LEDESMA Rumor was spread by government propagandists that the rebels were paid as much as P300 a day. Some find n easier TOMASITO TALLEDO to concede that big businessmen must have been Involved. For example, the Group of 40 led by lormer student aelivist EMILITA AGBAYANI Jerry Barlcan Is reportedly sympathetic to RAM. Honasan, PEPITO FERNANDEZ, JR. Kapunan and other RAM leaders like Vic Batac, must have extensive business contaels sincsthey all graduated lrom the TITA TORIO Asian Instnute of Management (AIM). JOSEPH LOOT Treatment of Military Rebels NYGIEL ARMADA ROMMEL LAO Rebels ought to be punished. One suggested that they should be lined up against the wall and shot. But the junior NATHANIEL SAMSOM officers and enlisted men were just lollowing orders. Harsh punishment should be confined to the top leadership, those JACOBTIO who consciously violated mililary discipline. RAMON ZAMORA But how can the government punish those who returned to barracks tully armed? Howcan II punish the leaders whowere apparently let loose and have gone underground?

Effects of the Coup

Cory Aquino may now be a hostage to the milllary. While agreeing to return to barracks, the rebels have the capabilily to resume fighting. They have a sword ofDamoc/es over the President and she may have to yield to their demands. This is a set pattern. In previous coups, the mUllary emerged more powerful than before. In her effort to placate the rebals, she has given a lot 01 concessions to the mUllary. The economic impael of the coup could only be disastrous. The stock market could take a dip. Land values in, say, Cabu must have tumbled, although the effect of the coup on real estate has yet to be ascertained. As early as Thursday after­ noon (November 30, 1989), coup rumors provoked a bank run: P2 billion were withdrawn by depositors. The Central Bank had to declare a bank holiday lor about two days. The New People's Army (NPA) may be happier now that mUnary is' weakened. So are the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the criminal elements.

FRANCISCO NEMENZO LOURDES DE CASTRO RODOLFO BALDEVARONA LEAZAPANTA 72 73

look upon the crisis as the time to seek new directions in PART Three I meeting the most basic problems 01 the people: rising prices, unemployment, unjust wages, graft and corruption, landless­ ness, power Shortage, transport crisis, potable water hous­ Ing, ~alnutrltlon, heavy debt burden, and so on. thiS: too, Is LESSONS FROM THE the tIme to change inept and Indifferent government officials who do not deserve the taxpayers' money. DECEMBER COUP Government, however, cannot succeed alone. We, the people, must work wfth the Government to strengthen our .. democratic instftutlons end rebuild our nation, By VI' Diliman t'aculty and StalT We at the University pledge 10 peacelully resist any govern­ ment that comes to power through milftary lorce or violence,

e, the undersigned members 01 the University 01 the 6 December 1989 W Philippines community, condemn the latest coup at­ Diliman, Quezon City tempt by RAM lorces and their supporters in and outside the AFP. They mock democracy and invoke the name 01 the people to hide their seW-serving motives. We also condemn opportunist politicians and prolfteering businessmen who capftalize on this national tragedy lor personal gain. We affirm our adherence to the Constftution and democratic processes and in this spirft support the duly constftuted authority. We commend the loyal soldiers, the media who were our vftal Source 01 inlormation, the Philippine National Red Cross and other volunteers who risked their lives to ease the conflict. But we call on the Aquino Government to recognize fts own failure in responding to the factors that caused the present crisis. The lessons 01 the December coup are clear: One, the way 01 a coup d'elal is not the way 01 democracy, and ft will not obtain the support 01 the people. We cannot allow the military to dictate the national agenda in the name of the people. Two, lor Government to enjoy the support 01 the people, ft must earn ft. Enough 01 rhetoric. Government must now seriously anend to instftuting mechanisms lor genuine can· sultation wfth the people and together wfth them, decide In lavor of the people rather than 01 outside or selected Interests. Three, the Victory achieved through U.S. support is holtow especially in the light of the upcoming negotiations on the bases. Foreign intervention aggravates the problem and In· suits our national dignity. Government must not seek comfort In victory lor the crisIS is by no means over. Lot ft not view the coup anempt as a mere setback or a loss 01 loreign Investments. Government must 74 75

magpasiya sa pabor ng nakahlhigll a! hindi ng dayuhan 0 piling mga interes. Pangallo, ang tagumpay na nakamll sa tulong ng Estados Unidos ay walang halaga, lalung-Ialo na kung isasaalang­ MGA LEKSYON MULA SA alang ang nalalapll ng negosasyon sa base mililar. Ang dayu­ hang panghihimasok ay nagpapalala sa problema at huma­ DISYEMBRENG KUDETA hamak sa aling pambansang dignidad. (Filipino Version of UP Dillman Statement) Sa panahong 110, di dapat hanapin ng gobyerno ang kagin­ hawaan sa lagumpay pagka! dl pa tapes ang krisis. Huwag nitong tanawin ang tangkang kudela na isang sagabal 0 di =;; & kava pagkawala ng foreign investments. Ang krlsis ay dapal magbunsod sa Gobyerno na maghanap ng mga bagong direksyon upang matugunan ang mga pangunahing suliranin ng mga mamamayan: ang tumataas na presyo ng mga bilihin, kawalan ng trabaho, di makatarungang sahod, pangu­ nguwalla at katiwalian sa gobyerno, kawalan ng lupa't taha­ nan, pagkakapos ng koryente, krisis sa transportasyon, kaku­ inukondena ng mga miyembro ng komunidad ng langan ng tubig na mainom, malnulrisyon, dayuhang ulang K Unibersidad ng Pilipinas ang pinakahuling tangkang na pabigal sa bayan, at iba pa. Napapanahon na ring palilan kudeta ng puwersang RAM at mga sumuporta sa kanlla sa ang mga walang silbi at pabayang opisyales na aksaya sa loob a! labas ng AFP. Kinukutya nila ang demokrasya at pera ng taumbayan. dinadahilan ang taumbayan upang Ikubll ang mga makasarili nilang motibo. Kinukondena din namin ang mga oportunis­ Ngunil di kakayanin ang laha! ng 110 kung ang Gobyerno'y tang puilliko at mapagsamantalang negosyante sa paggamll nag-lisa lamang. Kailangan ang tulong nating mga mama­ ng pambansang trahedyang 110 para sa personal nilang paki­ mayan sa pagpapalakas ng mga demokratikong institusyon nabang. al sa muling pagbangon ng ating bayan. Pinaninindigan namin ang Konstllusyon at mga demok­ Nanunumpa kaming nasa Unibersidad na tululan namin sa ratikong proseso, a! alinsunod sa diwa nllo'y sumusuporta mapayapang paraan ang anumang gobyernong aagaw ng kam! sa mga nahirang na awtoridad. Plnupuri namln ang mga kapangyarihan sa pamamagitan ng dahas 0 puwersang mili­ sundalong naging tapat ng Konstitusyon, ang media na pl­ tar. nagmumulan ng mahalagang bailia a! Impormasyon, eng Philippine National Rod Cross at iba pang mga bolunlaryo na nagsapanganib ng kanilang buhay upang mabawasan ang pinsalang dulot ng labanan. 6 Disyembre 1989 Gayunman, nananawagan kaml sa Gobyarnong Aquino na Diliman, Lungsod ng Quezon kilalanln ang sarili nllong kablguan sa pagtugon sa mga suliraning pinag-ugatan ng kasalukuyang krlsls. Malinaw ang mga leksyon ng Disyembreng kudeta. Una, ang pamamaraan ng kudeta ay hindi pamamaraan ng demokrasya. Hindi 110 kailanman makakakuha ng suporta ng taumbayan. Hindi nalin maaaring pahintululan na ang mililar eng siyang megdidikta ng pambansang adyenda sa ngalan ng taumbayan. Pangalawa, upang mapanalill ng Gobyerno ang pagtang­ kilik ng taumbayan, kailangang maglng karapaldapa! 110. Tama na ang retorika. Kailangan asikasuhin sa lalong mada­ ling panahon ang pagtfllatag ng mga mekanlsmo para sa tunay na konsullasyon sa mga mamamayan, a! kaakiba! nila, 76 77

,J' REAFFIRMING OUR COMMITMENT AFFIRMING OUR COMMITMENT TO TO DEMOCRAC'{, PEACE AND UNITY CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRAC'{,

• JUS THE RULE OF LAW, POPULAR By UI' Los Banos Faculty SOVEREIGNT'{, AND SUPPORT FOR THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITY ,.Thereas, the latest coup attempt staged by misguided l" elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines sup­ ported by some civilians, has resulied in: • the incalculable loss of lives and Injury to hundreds of By College of .::ducation Faculty combatants and innocent civilians; UP Diliman • the senseless destruction of government and private property;

• the generation of undeserved fear and anxiety among '.]HEREAS, we believe in democracy, peace, brother­ our people; l', hood and unity; • the polarization in the mil~ary hierarchy and the civilian WHEREAS, we support and uphold the 1987 Const~ution populace; and and the duly constituted authorities; • the setback of the gains achieved in the national WHEREAS, we are deeply shocked and outraged by the use economic recovery efforts. of violence to overthrow the present government; Whereas, these deplorable results have undermined our WHEREAS, we are deeply grieved by the loss of innocent f~ndamental values and rights as enshrined in the Const~u­ lives, the senseless destruction of property, the sowing of tlon; fear and anxiety among our people. not only here but in many parts of the world; Whereas, the attempted coup has derailed our efforts towards the promotion of unity and the peaceful means of WHEREAS, we share the despair of our people over the loss effecting reforms in our society; of economic gains that we have painstakingly achieved since 1986; Therefore, we, the faculty and staff of UP Los Banos, strong­ ly c.onde":"n the coup and other forms of violence as a means WHEREAS, the image of peace-loving Filipinos projected of ,"st~utlng changes in our country and we reaffirm our during the EDSA revolution has been brutally shattered; commitment to consmutional democracy, peace and unity. NOW, THEREFORE, We, the faculty of the College of Education: CONDEMN in strongest terms the blatant use of force to Signed by 874 members of usurp power from the dUly consmuted author~ies as well UP Los Baiios Faculty and as the use of civilians as shields/leverage to gain their Staff. objective; 78 79

REGISTER our vehement objections to a mllnary or any other form of dictatorship as an anernatlve of constnu­ tional democracy; and DENOUNCE some countrymen who instead of rallying to the defense of our ConstnUlion fanned the coup d'etat by their expression of support for the rebels. INSTITUTING ON THE OTHER HAND: GOVERNMENT MECHANISMS We express admiration, esteem and gratnude to Presi­ dent Cory Aquino, the military leadership, and the FOR BETTER SERVICE courageous soldiers who stood loyal to the Constitution and sacrificed their lives to defend and save democracy in our land. By Cesar Saldana We also salUle the valiant and generous men and women Dean, College orUusiness Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross, the Department of Health, the mass media (especially DZRH, Radio Vernas, all TV stations), the Department of Social Wellare and Development,the Department of Tourism, local officials and civic and religious groups who made their service~ his Is a brief statement suggesting some measures and available under hazardous situations and 'whose actions Tmechanisms designed to respond more speedily to have made us unwavering in our faith in God, country people's concerns In the area of business and industry. and people. Mechanism No.1: Allow for direct access by the President to the people on economic concerns. In this manner, the President can see II the policies affecting business and industry genuinely reflect the best Interests and welfare of the people or the sell-Interests of the few and their more visible representatives. There are already existing mechanisms for formulating economic policies affllL1ing the people's wellare. However, these are only through the Congressional representatives and through the Cabinet agencies. Congress Is limned by tha well-known problems of vested Interests and lobby organiza­ tions. The Cabinet Is known to be preoccupied wnh stop-gap measures and more immediate concerns of government. There is a need for a more Independent and direct way whereby top leadership-the President and the leaders of Congress-can get a diagnosis of the people's economic needs and concerns. This will validate and strengthen the existing mechanisms. At the same time, new insights are generated by the Chief ExecUlive's exposure to firsthand Information from her contact with her people. Thus, Im­ plementing actions tend to be more sensitive to the underly­ ing concerns of the peeple and long-ranging in effects. Mechanism No.2: Develop constructive industrial policies and programs specifically direcfed at the poor and underprivileged sectors ofsociety. 81 80

Many of the ongoing policies and programs of the govern· ment are rational, but only from the viewpoint of the overall economic well·being of the country. One can see that most of these policies are about large-scale Inflows of foreign invest­ ments, expanded Industrial output, development of the finan­ THE NEED FOR REFORM cial sector and the like. These can bring economic development but stili perpetuate the unequal distribution of weallh currently existing in the country today. The social malaise prevailing over the last 20 years reflacts the failure of economic development policies in eddresslng the social By College orBusiness Administration Faculty equity aspact. UP Diliman Historically, the poor end underprivileged sectors have benefned only as by-products of E1Conomlc development programs rather than as the Intended beneficiaries of the programs. This was seen, for Instance, during the Marcos he latest coup coming after five previOUS attempts, Is regime which relied on technocrats for lis economic develop­ symptomatic Of deep-seated problems in th~ Philip~ine ment programs. The Aquino administration has not fallen Into Tbody politic. While there is a need to conduct a~ inqUIry Into the same trap. However, II appears to have been unwillingly the grievances of certain segments in the mlillary estab­ taking a passive approach on the social/economic equity lishment, which fuel such acts of rebellion, there is. clearly a aspect of development. The attempted December coup indi­ need for the leadership of this country to act deCIsIvely on cates that such passivity shall be equally disastrous and many fundamental problems and issues in Philippine society. cannot be an adequate response to the true demands of Philippine society. Below are some aspects of our national life, which the current leadership might consider as areas of relorm. • Government Bureaucracy: Its size, tenure of govern· ment employees and conflicts among Cabinet members.

• Social Services: Basic services and national population program. • Education: Filipino history values, language and cullure, and tertiary education. • Local Government: The issue of federalism and local autonomy. • Judiciary: Judicial reform and prosecution of grafters. • Military. Involvement In decision-making and personnel benelils. • Economic Policy: Rural development, trading of basic commodllies BOI reorientation, imports and smuggling regUlations, ~rikes, foreign participation. • Legislature: Coordination of bicameral legislation. • Information: Communications and information dissemi­ nation on the programs, achievements, and problems of the government. 82 83

Many proposed solutions ara of a shot-taon nature that can be undertaken Immediately with: no resistance from a large sector; no large financial outlays; ImmedlateMslble resuftslbeneffts; and may be done administratively whhln ex­ Isting laws. A CALL TO STRENGTHEN OUR BIENVENIDO ARAGON DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS ERLINDA ECHANIS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ By the Department or Political Science ROY YBANEZ College orSocial Sciences and Philosophy UP Diliman

"X7HEREAS, this government came to power through the t't' 1986people's power; WHEREAS, the Filipino people ratified the 1987 Constllutlon that provides the national goals and the framework 01 govern­ ment; WHEREAS, the President swore to abide by this Constllu­ tlon and pursue the national goals and interests but seems to have neglected several of these goals; WHEREAS, this has given rise to widespread discontent culminating in this violent and most serious coup against her three-year old government; WHEREAS, the Department of Poillical Science of Ihe UnlVerslly of the Philippines believes In a democratic state and In peaceful and consthutional change in society; Now therefore, we the undersigned facuhy of the Universlly of the Philippines strongly condemn: • The use of violence to change the dUly constlluted government of the Republic of the Philippines; • Opportunist poIhicians who are capllalizing on this na· tlonal tragedy to further their own personal ambllions; • The manipulation of enlisted men by the rebel mHllary leaders for their own polhlcal objectives; • Proflleering businessmen who are taking advantage of these tragic events for their personal gains; and • The Interference of fOreign milllary and civilian elements in Philippine affairs. 84 85 Believing that the Filipino people cherlsh democratic prin­ ciples, we strongly support: • To refrain from further foreign borrowing and reduce the automatic allocation for servicing our external debt; • The principles of democracy and non-violence; • To break up monopolies such as PLDT, Meralco, PAL • The duly constnuted democratic government of the and allow quaJnied companies to compete and operate Republic of the Philippines, and lis efforts towards the same services; peaceful and constllutional change; • To enunciate a clear-cut foreign policy In consonance • The loyal soldiers of the government who have laid down wnh our national Interest. their lives to ensure the safety of our Republic and our people; We call on Congress to provide enabling laws and imple­ ment provisions to confront and take immediate action on • The media for facilnating communications between Issues such as social justice, inequnies, high rate of popula­ government and the people, and the government and the tion growth and related problems. rebels; We call on the polnicalleaders: • The volunteers for risking their lives to help our suffering countrymen who have been caught in the crossfire; and • To respect and preserve the integrity of the military in the effective performance of their duties; • The people for offering to serve as negotiators to facilitate the restoration of peace. • To reduce excessive polilicking and help stamp out grail and corruption in all ns manifestations. In the aftermath of this violent coup, the Department of Political Science hereby brings to the atlention of the Presi­ We call on our government to heed the legitimate grievan­ dent of the Philippines: ces and complaints ofall concerned and to make government more sensitive and responsive to the needs of the people. • Her failure to provide decisive, sensnlve and responsive We call on all Filipino people to unne in the task of leadership; I strengthening our democratic instnutions, rectifying iniqunies, • Her administration's failure to ensure the continuous and and healing the wounds caused by this tragedy and of satisfactory delivery of basic social services to the rebuilding our nation. people. We pledge to undertake massive civil disobedience should We urge the President of the Philippines therefore: any government be established in the Philippines through military force or any form of violence. • To select competent and responsible cabinet officials, presidential advisers, milnary and other government offi­ cials, and periodically assess their performance wnh a Signed by Department faculty view to replace them when the public interest so re­ present during meeting except quires; one. In this connection we urge that all cabinet members tender their Immediate resignation to give the President a free hand in selecting more qualWied, competent and commilled public servants; • To look into the legnimate grievances of the milnary, give full material and moral support, upgrade their condnions and purge their ranks of corrupt officials; • To review and recommend the necessary changes In Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) wnh a view to Increase productivity and Improve the people's wal­ fare; 86 87

c. These perceptions are part of a wider view among our I people that the government is indeed suffering from these ills and therefOre a Change must be made within . the government set-up. . RESPONSE TO THE d. Such a point of view of the situation leads to demoralization; and when that demoralization creeps DECEMBER COUP ATTEMPT Into the ranks ofthose charged with the defense olthe state, It produces people willing to risk their lives in I rebellion in order to bring aboul change. 2 Jl t Quelling the coup alone is nof enough; ~ is merely treating By the ",purtm'Dt orAnthropology the symptoms of a deeper malady. For complete recovery, the College ofSocial Sciences and Philosophy roots of the malady have to betraced and removed complete- UP Uiliman ly. I . I.n light of the situation, It is suggested that the government In~late a program of seff-examination and selt-cleaning in , Jjolence as a means of inst~utionalchange is a dangerous order to restore its credibility to the Filipino people. l' tool. It is a two-edged sword that may as easily turn upon I Specijjcally, the following are suggested: its wielders with as much devastating effect as upon those on ~ whom ~ is used. It costs lives, lives that may prove useful in a. That the government identify and remove those offi­ building a nation. When used as a means of settling grievan­ cials gUilty of misuse of their office for personal gain, ces and/or attempt to alter instnulions, the violation of the as well as those found inefficient and incompetent for democratic processes existing, ~ must be condemned. their office, regardless of who they may be and their relationship to those In power. The use of forco by the RAM to achieve their objectives is all the more to be condemned. Such use of force works oulside b. That the government, especiany the President, ap­ of the existing processes for bringing aboul change. poi~t officials Widely known to be honest, upright, full of.VIsion, integrity and blameless in fheir public and Yet, while we condemn the use of violence by the RAM, ~ private lives. Such officials should not be office­ must be noted that this is the seventh and by far the bloodiest seekers bul yet, when appointed, may nevertheless of all the attempts to seize power by the RAM. Such persist­ carry oul a good job. ence must mean either of two things: c. That the government Initiate measures fo ensure that 1. There is indeed something seriously wrong with the dishonest people will have no chance to gain office. management of the government that precip~ated such a drastic action on the part of the RAM, d. That the government Initiate a program that will enable the country. to reCOVer from the effects of grall, corrup­ 2. Certain elelments within the mil~ary establishment wish tIon, iefflclency and nepotism that are currently to restore their former preeminence under the past demoralizing the nation. regime. These suggestions are made in the hope that It the govern­ In case of 1, the following points must be raised: ment. pays close attention to the needs of Its people, the a. The coup attempt must not be viewed as an isolated condrtlons that create a coup attempt will no longer exist. ~selt, fact by bul within the wider context of the social, On the other hand, in case 2 above, the following points may economic and political situation of the country. have to be raised:

b. The reasons given by the rebels for their attempted a. The military has a very serious and demanding coup include, among others, a perception that the obligation-the defense of the state. management of the government is deteriorating due to the widespread inefficiency, corruption, nepotism b. As such, their role is that of service to the people not and grail. of lording It Over the people. ' 88 89

It is thus suggested that: 1. Measures be taken to improve the condnions of employ. ment of the milnary personnel. 2. Steps be taken to truly rpofessionalize the AFP ~uc~ that people who may inniate coups for personal gain will not ILANG MGA REKOMENDASYON prevail. Both scenarios are to be considered together. Any atte'!1pt TUNGKOL SA KUDETA to bring about change that will improve the lot of the Fllrplno people must not be merely cosmetic, but must go deep Into the heart of the problems facing our society. I Dg Departamento ng Sosyolohiya Yet when both points have already been examined, there UP Diliman remains a third and no less vnal point-the Intervention ofthe I UnUed States in what is essentially an internal struggle. The credibility of the present government, having already been damaged by the successive coup attempts, Is further era ansamantalang nananahimik ang ating kapaligiran mula force is asked to intervene in matters that are essentIally g P sa dagundong ng mga eroplano at putok ng mga baril. internal to the nation: I Ano ba ang magagawa ng pamahalaan upang ang ganUong a. There is violation of our internal sovereignty; kaguluhan at ang pananakn at pagpatay ng mga inosenteng Pilipino ay tuluyan nang matlgil? b. The credibilily ofthe governme~t in handling the C?UP attempts will be weakened. ThIS has senous Implrca­ • Oahil ang pamahalaan ay pamahalaan ng mamamayan, tions regarding Us future capabilily to handle future kaUangang makinig ang mga nanunungkulan sa puna at uprisings, and I suhestiyon ng sambayanan. Ang posisyon ng hindi aka lumatanggap ng unsolicited advice ay posisyon ng c. The bargaining posilion of the government regarding isang aroganteng tao na hindi kumikilala sa maaaring the negotiations of the future of the US bases In the i kontribusyon ng nakararami. country is also weakened, Inasmuch as the govern­ ment now has a debt to the Unned States, which the • Mag-aapat na taon nang nanunungkulan ang pamaha­ latter can call in at any time. By far, this is the most t laang Aquino subalil sa paningin ng milyon-milyong serious blunder of the government. ; Pilipino, ang kanilang kapakanan ay isinasawalang­ bahala ng Gabinete. Kailangang pain an ang Gabinete ng In addnion to the need for change as noted In the first two mga taong tapat a! sensnibo sa pangangailangan ng ma­ points, the third point, that of the US intervention, must be mamayan. Mahalagang sagutan ang mga krisis ng trans· condemned in the strongest terms p<;>ssible. In the Iulu.re, !he portasyon, elektrlsidad, sobrang taas ng bilihin at napa­ government must not allow the repetillon of such a humllralong kababang sahod ng marami. Sa usapin ng badyet ng experience. pamahalaan, tuunan ng pansin ang Salary Stand­ ardization Law na kung saan Iibo-Iibong kawani ng pa­ mahalaan ang hindi nakinabang. Sa laha! ng 110, kaila­ ngang ang Gabinete na tumningin na pangunahin ang interes ng Pilipino, lalong-Iao na ang mga nangangaila­ ngang masa. • Tigilan na ang korapsyon sa pamahalaan, hindi lang sa sama kundl sa kongkretong gawa. Bilang modelo, kaila­ ngang pangunahan no ng Pangulo at ng Kanyang pamilya a1 mga kamag-anak. Paalisin ang mga kamag­ anal< ng mga opiSyaJ sa kanilang posisyon a! tUligsa'r. a-g """93 i,-fi

• Hindi lang ang executiva branch eng kallangang bagu­ hin. Kallangang mag-rebyu rln ang Sanado at Kongreso ng kanilang nagawa. Itong nakaraang laon, Iinadtad ng iskandalo ang mga 110 suballl hanggang ngayon ay walang makllang kongkralong solusyon ang mama­ ISULONG ANG mayan. Sar/wa pa sa mga lao ang gun-smuggling na hanggang ngayon ay hindi pa naaaksyunan. DEMOKRASYA AT KASARINLAN • Panlndlgan.ang atlng kalayuan bllang lsang malaya, nag­ sasariling bansa sa pamamagnan ng paglutol sa pakl­ kialam ng mga Amerlkano. Hindi papayag ang mga ma­ By the College orSocial Work and Community Development mamayang Pilipino na manatiling sunud-sunuran layo sa UP Diliman kagustuhan ng pamahalaang Eslados Un/dos at /ba pang bansang may interes sa Pilip/nas. • Hign sa lahat, magsagawa ng batayang reporma sa ating bansa. Ipatupad ang tunay na repormang agraryo, pam· bansang Industriyalisasyon, isaalang·alang ang kapa· a harap ng matinding krisis na iblnunga ng huling kudeta kanan ng manggagawa sa pamamagilan ng pagtaas ng Slaban sa pamahalaan, kami sa College 01 Social Work and suweldo. Patibayin ang awtoridad ng pamahalaang sibil· C~mmunity Developmenl (CSWCD) ng Unibersidad ng van sa ating bansa. I

• Bi~yan n!l karapatang. parus~. ang mga nagrerebeldeng militar b,lang pagb,blgay dun sa pangangailangang maging tapal ang lahal sa Saligang Batas; • Iwasan ang paggamn ng mga kapangyarihang pam· pamahalaan na makalalabag sa mga demokratikong karapalan ng mga mamamayan tulad ng pagdedeklara ng batas militar at pagsuspindi sa writ ofhabeas corpus. ,1, •

92 r; ,~ 93 • Ireorganlsa ang gobyerno, lalo na ang gabinete, at mag­ lagay ng mga opisyal na may napatunayang Integrldad, kakayahan, at katapalan sa panunungkulan sa bayan. • Tugunan ang mga pangunahing pangangailangan. ng mga mamamayan, ibaba ang presyo. ng .mga blllhln, iayos ang mga serbisyong I?ampubllko, Is~katupar~n SIYAM NA MGA MUNGKAHI ang demokratlkong pagpapasrya,. at tanggahn ang d,s· krimlnasyon, nepotismo at pabornlsmo laic na sa pa· suweldo at promosyon sa hanay ng mga emplyeado ng gobyerno, kasama na ang mililar. By tbelostitute orUbrary Scieoce UP Dillmao • Ilaguyod ang tunay na kasarinlang pangkabuhayan sa pamamagllan ng pagpapatupad ng tunay na repormang agraryo al pambansang Industriyafisasyon. • Magkaroon ng malawakang paglilinis ng pamahalaan 81 masinop, demokraliko at bukas (transpare~l) na panga­ ng naganap na kudeta sa atlng bansa at ang pagnanais ngasiwa ng kaban ng bayan. Kaugnay n~o, dapal.na Ana makuha ang goblerno sa pamamagllan ng dahas ay mas bigyan ng prayoridad ang panloob na pangangalla­ Isang palantandaan na maramlng bagay sa atlng gobierno ngan ng bansa kaysa sa pagbabayad ng utang pan­ ang ~a~at paillan 0 baguhin. Ang ating pangarap na kalayaan '!f hond, maglgong ganap kung ang ating mamamayan ay labas. hllld' nagkakaisa at hindi mafigaya. Ang kalayaan ay hindi • Pag-ibayuhin ang mga programa. al mga palakarang madallng langkilikin. Ito ay nangangailangan ng sakripisyo magbibigay buhay sa aling pansa,,11 at pagpapallbay sa buhat sa mamamayan upang 110 ay mamalagi sa atin. Kaila· ating pambansang kasarinlan. Labanan .nalin ang dayu­ ngan ding Ipagtanggol 110 kahll magbuwis ng buhay upang 110 hang pakikialam laic na ng Estados Un,dos, at kumllos ay hindi mawala. tungo sa pagtatanggal ng mga base mililar ng Estados Buh~t nang maibafik ang aling kalayaan al ang demokrasya Unidos sa Pihpinas. sa Plhponas, ay nagkaroon ng maraming sufiranln ang atlng b~n~~ Nananawagan kami na magkaisa at kumilos ang mga na kung tutuusin ay nagmula pa sa dating rehlmen, mamamayan sa loob at labas ng Unibersidad ng Piliplnas h,ndl no napuksa bagkus ay plnaglbayo pa ng mga maruruml upang ipaklla ang pagtanggi sa kudeta at pagkalig sa mga ang budhl na walang inaafigta kung hindi ang kanilang sariling prosesong demokratiko na nakapaloob sa Konsl~usyon. kapakanan. Ang Isang malaklng sufiranin ng ating bansa ay a~g patuloy na pagsasamantala ng lIan nating kaOObayan sa !!',ng bayan-ang graft at corruption na para bang naglng ,sang pang· araw·araw na pangyayan. Hindi uunlad ang bayan dahll 110, sa harrp na sa bayan mapunta ang kiniklla 0 ang maga Inuutang, ay sa mga bulsa lang ng mapagsaman­ tala napupunta, laic na doonsa may matataas na katungkulan sa pamahalaan. Ang lahat yala ng sakll na panlipunan ay nag-uugat dllo dahil ang plnakabuod ng graft/corrupt/on ay ang pagpapayaman ng i1an nating kaOObayan, samantalang ang nakararaml (85%) ay mahlhirap at umaasa lamang sa kakarampot na suweld~lsang kayed /sang tuka, wika nga. Hindi la~ang a!1g mga tao sa gobierno ang nagsasaman­ tala, kundo magong ang mga ganid na mangangalak~ slnasamantala nila ang krisls--IIinataas nila ang presyo ng mga pangunahlng bllihln. Sa halip na tulungan ang bayan ay laic pa nilang plnahlhirapan. ' Ang Filipino ay mabutlng tao, mapagtlis, malulungin at may magandang k.alooban. at takot sa Poong Maykapal. Ngunil. slya ay naglQlng skeptic81 kung sa parrgld-Iigid nlya ay 100 ang kanlyang naklkila, nadarama at nararanasan. 94 95

Narho pa ang mga mungkahlng napagkalsahan ng "'!ga guro sa ILS na inihahain bilang tugon sa mga sullranlng nabanggh. • Puksain ang graft and corruption sa pamahalaan. no ang ugat ng maraming sakh na panlipunan. PERILOUS PEACE* • Dapat lang na ibalik ang hatol na kamatayan 0 capital punishment, maging ang mga grafters ay matakot. Idag­ dag pa rin sa capital punishment ang mga sumusunod na karumal- dumal na krimen: pagbibili ng bawaJ na Ruben Carranza, Jr. gamot (drug trafficking); panggagahasa (rape); peg­ Editor, Philippine Collegian bebenta ng mga babae 0 batang babae sa prostitution; pagpatay (murder); pangungulimbat (hold-up, rObbety); profiteering at iba pa.

• Imiendahan ang Saligang Batas. Pag-aralang mabuti ang n less troubled times, there would be cause for celebration nasasaed doon. Idagdcg dho ang hatol na kamatayan. I and hope. • Pag-aralang mabuti ang National Language Policy. Imbls We are entering a new decade,ten years closer to the next na pagkaisahin ang bansa ay tila nagiging "divisive" pa millennium. But here In this tragic land of old, belhgerent ho. Gringos, the celebrations are muted. We can only ho~ against hope that the forces of fascism have been sllenced-ff • langat ang kabuhayan ng mga mahlhlrap. Magtatag ng I not forever, at least for time enough for us to catch a breath of mga industriya para may mapasukan ang mga tao. Idag· peace. dag dho ang manpower training. Ang nangyayarl ay umaalis ang mga skilled workers at professionals upang , That, however, is wishful thinking. kumha ng malaki sa Ibang bansa, dahil wala silang opor. tunidad dito sa atin. The peace that now reigns is uneasy. It is a soldier's truce, I nothing permanent, always fragile, ready to be.Shattered • Ibalik ang "Kadiwa" para sa mahihirap. Itaguyod ang again and again by the brute force of polhical ambnlon. Why tunay diwa ng kooperatiba sa mga kanayunan at do these unfformed tyrants persist? What gives them the right siyudad. to seil- righteously call themselves the Soldiers of the Filipino People? What makes them think we can forget the blood they • Bagur,ln ang Istraktura ng milhar upang mailayo sa have extracted from the known and nameless martyrs they sobrang pulitika. Gawing Citizen Army. Baguhin din ang have tortured, maimed and salvaged in the name of their istraktura ng PMA. Magtayo ng isang akademiya para sa dubious cause? ROTC. But tyranny is not the monopoly of fascists. • Limhahin and pagbibiyahe sa ibang bansa ng mga Our peace has been broken, too, by warlords and flOlhicians kongresman, senador, Presidente, Bise Presidente, mga who find h only too tempting to resist the opportunity to use miyembro ng gabinete upang makatlpld. the threat from the extreme right to dIsmantle the gaIns of the • Pagbhiwin ang lahat ng mlembro ng gabinete. Huwag legal left. What is in real Emergency here is the State of our ibalik ang mga walang silbi sa bayan. harried lives, harassed aswe are by crammed buses and long brownouts, low wages and rising prices. Ang Isang tao, kung may bahay, kahh malih lang, may No Presidential Proclamation will solve those problems. trabaho 0 pinagkikhaan, at kumakain siVa ng tallong beses sa isang araw ay hindi mahihikayat na magalsa laban sa bayan. Phantom jets will not scare them away. They can fill up EDSA Ang Filipino ay matiisin, kaya't kailangang siVa ay tulungan ng from Baclaran to Monumento with a desperate mass fed by ating pamahalaan at ng mga mayayaman sa atlng bansa. Ang social justice nl Pangulong Quezon ay dapat haguyod. • Philippine Collegian Special Issue edhorial of December 1989. 96 97

illusions of change. But our country will never find its peace for as lo.ng as its government remains in the hands of the few ANNEX I who believe that salvation can only come from elsewhere but never from the people themselves. ' There ~i11 be no peace this year and in the years to come, CHRONOLOGY OF KUDETA !'I0 respne fr:>m the brutalhy of Incessant coup plotters and ,nept governance, nthings remain as they are: a country that (COUP ATTEMPT) Is a neo-colony, a people who remain powerless a democracy of the few who violently fight for power. For'as long as these remain, ours will remain a perilous peace. November 29 - December 8, 1990

November 29

10:45 p.m. Scout Rangers of the 14th Scout Ranger Co., 1st Scout Ranger Regiment stationed at Tagaytay Chy sabotage AFP communication system near abandoned construction of Palace in the Sky; proceed to Fort Bonnacio.

November 30

Morning 13 rebel Scout Rangers in civilian clothes going back to Tagaytay apprehended by Capital Regional Command (Capcom) troops.

5 p.m. Entire Armed Forces placed on nationwide red alert.

10 p.m. Gen. De Villa announces discovery of a grand design by forces led by dismissed Lt. Col. Gregorio Honasan "to disturb the peace, tranquillhy, 'and well-being of the people."

11-12 p.m. Troop movement sightjngs reported.

December 1

12:15 a.m. Three V-l50 light commando tanks with rebels on board sighted at Villamor Air Base by Air Force Intelligence. Rebels seize con­ trol of the Manila Domestic Airport and the NAIA, closing air trallic to and from Manila. 98 99 1 a.m. Troops at Sangley Point loin ranks or rebel soldiers. 12:05 p.m. 2nd Army Division based at Camp Caplnpln, Taney reinforce Camp AgUinaldo. Rebel 1:21 a.m. Maj. Gen. Jose de Leon under siege by two SikOrsky helicopter retreats. Marine companies wnh 200 soldiers· Inside Villamor Air Base. 12:10· Two rebel Tara-Tara planes bomb Camp 12:15 p.m. Aguinaldo; hit dispensary, quarters or Gen. 1:30 a.m. Defense Secretary Fidei V. Ramos reports In De Villa, and Injure two doctors and a soldier. a radio broadcast that rebel soldiers had taken over Villamor Air Base. 12:30 p.m. Soldiers In two armored personnel carriers near Nlnoy Aquino Park, Q.C. surrender to 2 a.m. Two ten-wheeler trucks sighted at Cubeo, rebels. Q.C., heading toward TImog Avenue. Rebel soldiers at Bohol Ave. and Mother Ignacla St. 1 p.m. PAF F-S jets destroy two Tora-Tora planes put Channels 2 and 4 on siege. and Sikorsky gunship and a Norman Britten Islander of rebels In "retaliatory air anacks" at 2:30a.m. Gunshots heard In vicinity or TV Channels 2 Sangley Point Air Station in Cavite. and 4. 1:45 p.m. Rebel troops fight Capeom soldiers along 2:40a.m. Big explosion heard Inside Fort BonWacio' Coastal Road leading to Cavne. rebel forces guard all entrances to the camp. ' 2 p.m. Rebels take control of Quezon Bridge; Cap­ 3:45 a.m. Firefights break Olrt Inside Vlllamor Air Base; com troops guarding Ayala Bridge leave. fire breaks out near HQ of 205th PAF helicop­ ter Wing. 2:50p.m. President Corezon Aquino announces re­ quest by Defense Secretary Ramos and Gen. 6 a.m. Wnh bazooka an~ automatic weapons, De Villa for US "persuasion" flights In sup­ government soldiers assaun rebels port or government forces. entrenched in Channels 2 and 4. 5:25 p.m. President Aquino announces on T.Y. "we 6:45a.m. Three Tora-Tora planes bomb Malacanang. have gonen American fighter (planes) to join us in the fight for freedom." Government for­ 10 a.m. Re~el troops hn Channel 9 tower, temporarily ces retake Sangley Air Station. cuttmg off broadcast. December 2 10 a.m. UP President Jose Y. Abueva calls by telephone from Cebu City deploring the coup anempt and expressing support for the Rebel forces calling themselves Reformisfs claim victory Aquino government. over Aquino government; announce establishment or a provisional government-composed of three cashiered midmorning Commodore Domingo Calajate leads military officers and four civilians-and of a mill/ary chain of takeover of The Logistics Command (Log­ command with HQ at Fort BonWaclo. Com) in Camp Aguinaldo. whole Second bloody dey of fighting at Blue Ridge 11:10 a.m. Rebels anack Camps Crame and Aguinaldo. , morning to and Whl/e Plains, L1bis area in Q. C. where Rebel aircraft bomb Camp Crame, senlng PC ; noon rebel troops converge for the high push into headquarters on fire. A Sikorsky helicopter ;;;, Camp AguinaldO. strafes Camp Aguinaldo. noontime President Aquino In a press conference morning Rebo!s seize the Mactan Airbase in Cebu and rejects Idea or negotiation with rebels, calls Legezpi CI/y airport. them "treacherous cowards;" threatens to hunt down rebels and bring them to justice, as well as "root out those who have given aid and comfort to these tral/ors: 100 101 Some 500 rebel soldiers move out of FOrt II to cushion impaet of heavy wllhdrawals touched off by Bonnaclo to the Makatl Commercial center I putsch. across EDSA through McKinley Road, For­ bes Park. They take pasilions In high-rise t buildings Including the Twin Towers which December 6 seIVed as their HQ. I I• President Aquino forms Commission to look Into the cir­ December 3 cumstances surrounding the latest kUdela, especially the Involvement of mililary and civilian officials and private In­ I, dividuals. Mililary officials express "optimism" for smooth Mililary announces launching of "mopping up" operations return to mililary control of about 400 mutinous soldiers holed against pockets of resistance In Fort Bonnaclo, Makatl's com­ out In Makatl after ceaselire Is forged. mercial and financial distrlets, and Maetan Air Base In cebu. President AqUino declares national emergency to 12:308.m. The RAM-SFP launch their offensive "suicide strengthen government's hand in dealing with rebellious sol­ attack on (Gate 1 of) Camp Aguinaldo"; are diers and skyrocketing prices of prime commodllies caused repulsed. Failure of pre-dawn attack and sub­ by hoarding and proflleering. sequent surrender of Gen. Marcelo Blando, 7th Infantry Division chief based at Fort Mag­ More than 1,000 foreigners marooned for four days In high­ saysay In Laur, Nueva Ecija, deals fatal blow rise hotels and apartments In Makatl's "war zone" evacuated to coup attempt. to safety.

afternoon Gen. De Villa extends "grace period" for settlement of Mac-' tan takeover by rebels. Air, sea and ground offens" e by In a press conference at Intercontinental Hotel In Makatl, government troops to recapture Maetan Air Base temporarily Nacionalista Party leaders Including opposilionist Sen. Juan , called off as Cebu Archbishop Ricardo J. Cardinal Vidal asks Ponce Emile ask the President to step down and give way to , for a last chance to settle matter peacefUlly. "a government of national unity."

Fighting continues well into the night as remnants of the December 7 estimated 2,000 troopers who participated in the putsch make their last stand in Makat!. 7 a.m. Rebel soldiers, chanting "no surrender, the I fight goes on," return to barracks from their December 4 Makatl stronghold.

Brig. Gen. Jose Comendador, leader of rebel troops at DecemberS Mactan refuse to surrender and threaten to blow up all aircraft on the island, Including five F-5 jet fighters, n they are attack· Mililary moves for "final assaull" on some 400 rebel soldiers ed. In Maetan Air Base in Cebu following failed negotiations be­ tween civic/religious leaders and rebel leador Air Force Gen. Three foreigners die; hundreds more are trapped In luxury Comendador. hotels and restaurants. Entrenched in 22 high-rise buildings In the country's financial center, rebels shoot II out wllh Last pocket of rebel resistance against government collap­ government forces. ses as 300 mutineers return to their unlls from Mactan alter one week underthe same "return to barracks" terms extended December 5 to putschists who occupied Makatl buildings. Comendador, leader of rebels who occupied Maetan Air Government troops "liberate" 12 Makatl buildings held by Base, surrenders to Armed Forces Visayas Command chief rebel soldiers; negotiations for evacuation of thousands d Brig. Gen. Renato Palma. tourists trapped in luxury hotels fail; Central Bank pumps 0VfI( a billion pesos into the banking system in two banking days