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227 State, Nationality and Political Elites: The Politics of Nationalism in Myanmar Abu Salah Md. Yousuf D. Purushothaman

249 Changing Nature and the Role of Actors in Confronting Terrorism Md. Jahan Shoieb Lam-ya Mostaque

269 Maritime Security Challenges for Bangladesh: Response Options Moutusi Islam

291 Sub-regional Cooperation in South Asia: Issues, Challenges and Policy Implications Saddam Hosen

311 The United States, Iran and the New Conundrum in the Middle East A.K.M. Anisur Rahman

Volume 40 Number 3 2019 I BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

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CONTENTS

VOLUME 40 NUMBER 3 JULY 2019

Abu Salah Md. Yousuf D. Purushothaman State, Nationality and Political Elites: The Politics of Nationalism in Myanmar 227

Md. Jahan Shoieb Lam-ya Mostaque Changing Nature and the Role of Actors in Confronting Terrorism 249

Moutusi Islam Maritime Security Challenges for Bangladesh: Response Options 269

Saddam Hosen Sub-regional Cooperation in South Asia: Issues, Challenges and Policy Implications 291

A.K.M. Anisur Rahman The United States, Iran and the New Conundrum in the Middle East 311 CONTENTS

VOLUME 40 NUMBER 3 JULY 2019

Abu Salah Md. Yousuf D. Purushothaman State, Nationality and Political Elites: The Politics of Nationalism in Myanmar 227

Md. Jahan Shoieb Lam-ya Mostaque Changing Nature and the Role of Actors in Confronting Terrorism 249

Moutusi Islam Maritime Security Challenges for Bangladesh: Response Options 269

Saddam Hosen Sub-regional Cooperation in South Asia: Issues, Challenges and Policy Implications 291

A.K.M. Anisur Rahman The United States, Iran and the New Conundrum in the Middle East 311

BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019: 227-248

Abu Salah Md. Yousuf D. Purushothaman state, Nationality and Political Elites: The Politics of Nationalism in Myanmar Abstract

The unresolved tension between the state and nationality prevented resolution of nationalism debate in Myanmar since its independence and it embroiled the country into a long-term conflict between the dominant Bamar people and ethnic minorities. Theoretically, the state identity is based on a geographical boundary whereas national identity is a conscience of commonness on certain issues among the inhabitants of a state. Historically, in the post-colonial countries, political elites play a pivotal role to resolve the tension between these two identities for the formation of nationalism. In the context of Myanmar, as a multi-ethnic country, it was a challenge for political elites to accommodate all ethnic communities in same national identity, because the ‘divide and rule’ policy of the British colonials instigated tension between different races. However, under the leadership of General Aung San, almost all the ethnic communities signed the Panglong Agreement in 1947, where the right of ethnic minorities was recognised. But, following the assassination of Aung San, the initiative to accommodate minorities was reversed and the military takeover of 1962 led the country towards a long-term ethnic conflict. In this backdrop, present paper argues that instead of resolving tension between the state and nationality, the power elites of Myanmar have instigated tension between the two for securing dominant position in the country in different phases of the political history of independent Myanmar. The policies of power elites affected the formation of nationalism of Myanmar and still remains a challenge for the integration of the country.

Keywords: Myanmar, The State, Nationality, Power Elites, Nationalism

1. Introduction

The tension between the state and nationality is intrinsically connected with the formation of nationalism of a country. The state is a sovereign identity within a geographical territory and nationality is membership of an individual in a state. The nationality is developed based on a feeling of commonness among the people

Abu Salah Md. Yousuf is Senior Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). His e-mail address is: [email protected]; D. Purushothaman, PhD is Associate Professor, Centre for South Asian Studies, Pondicherry University, India. His e-mail address is: purushothaman.sas@ pondiuni.edu.in ©Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2019 227 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 of a state. The formation of nationalism is inherently coupled with the convergence of identity between the state and nationality. If a state cannot accommodate all the inhabitants of its territory within the same nationality, the identity of the state will be threatened. The state has legitimacy to apply coercive power to eliminate actors who challenge its authority within a defined territory and nationality accommodates different communities and cultural values by a feeling of commonality to determine the future of the people of a state. On the other hand, when the state and nationality fail to accommodate them within a defined territorial identity, conflict escalates and the formation of nationalism becomes difficult. In the context of post-colonial countries, political territory of many states was defined by the colonial rulers who were not always sensitive about the nuances of nationality of the people of a state. In such cases, political elites were the main architect of the formation of nationalism of these states and many post-colonial countries failed to resolve the tension between the state and nationality within its territory. Such tensions escalated conflicts in the formation of nationalism of many countries.

Like many other post-colonial countries of Asia, the tension between the state and nationality of Myanmar remains unresolved. The British started occupying Burma in 1824 and included it as part of India. The territorial identity of Burman state was first defined by the British colonial rulers in the Government of Burma Act 1935.1 But, when the independence movement of Myanmar began, the Bamar people promulgated an idea of Burmese state and ethnic minorities were finding it as a threat to their identity. Because the relations between Bamar people and ethnic minorities were not peaceful during the British rule. In fact, the colonial rulers instigated tension between them to prevent any united movement against colonialism. Burma’s unanimous leader, General Aung San dreamed of an integrated Burma and took initiatives for negotiation with ethnic minorities to accommodate them in the state of Burma by giving space for their ethnic identity. Under his leadership, the ethnic communities agreed on an integrated Burma by signing the Panglong Agreement of 1947. The assassination of General Aung San in 1948 and subsequent military coup of 1962 reversed the trajectory of the country. The military rulers promoted supremacy of Burman identity over other ethnic groups and adopted different laws to marginalise minority communities. There are puzzles why military took the initiative to marginalise other ethnic communities. Some scholars argue that the “inventions of traditions” instigated military to initiate a nationalism process which was to regain the supremacy of Buddhist nationality.2 Others claim that the religious factors were always dominant in the formation of nationalism in Myanmar.3 Therefore, there was always an urge to ensure supremacy

1 Robert H. Tylor, The State of Myanmar, Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2009, p. 124. 2 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, London: Routledge, 1988, p. 130. 3 Matthew J. Walton, Buddhism, Politics and Political Thought in Myanmar, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 228 STATE, NATIONALITY AND POLITICAL ELITES of Buddhism. It is also argued that control over resources determined the destiny of the nationalism in Myanmar.4 As such, since 1948 the nationality issue of Myanmar remained unresolved. The state promoted identities were never accepted by the ethnic minorities and nationality of all the inhabitants of the country was not accommodated in the process of nationalism in Myanmar.

In this backdrop, this paper argues that the politics of nationalism of Myanmar is embedded with the interest of the political elites of Myanmar. The political elites of the country could not initiate necessary steps to accommodate ethnic minorities in the formation of nationalism and instigated ethnic division in the country to acquire legitimacy from the majoritarian Burmans by declaring the supremacy of Burman nationalism. By using Paul Brass’s elite theory5, the paper will highlight that how the interest of power elites polarised the state and nationalist identity of the country and how such policies escalated the tension between the state and nationality in different phases of the political history of independent Myanmar. The paper is divided into four sections including introduction and conclusion. Section two develops a theoretical framework to understand that how political elites contribute in the process of formation of nationalism of a country by resolving tensions between the state and nationality. Section three divides the political history of independent Myanmar in five phases to evaluate that how the political elites manufactured the nationality of the people of Myanmar and ethnic communities of the country to attain their political objectives. In every phase, the narratives of nationality promoted by the political elites are discussed and focused on how such narratives polarised the country along the line of ethnic identity and how it contributed to the escalation of conflict. Nevertheless, the new government of Myanmar under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi started a new negotiation with the ethnic communities. In the relevant section, the challenges for the ongoing negotiations are also highlighted.

2. theoretical Framework

The inherent tension between “the state” – a political organisation of a sovereign political authority over a defined territory and “nation” – a community of people conscious of sharing common future determines the formation of nationalism of a state.6 There are two dissimilar arguments to understand how

4 Li Chenyang, Chaw Chaw Sein, Zhu Xianghui, Myanmar: Reintegration in the International Community, New Jersey: World Scientific, 2016, p. 371. 5 Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991. 6 Richard Mansbach and Edward Rhodes, “The National The state and Identity Politics: The state Institutionalization and “Markers” of National Identity”, Geopolitics, Issue. 3, Vol. 12, 2007, pp. 426-458. 229 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 the state and nation are connected with the formation of nationalism.7 The first trajectory is that the existence of the state comes first and then the state takes the responsibility of “nation building”, where multi-ethnic and multi-cultural identities are accommodated. The formation of French nationalism after French Revolution of 1789 is referred to understand this type of nationalism, where the revolutionaries first established French state and then they developed nationality on the basis of “liberty, equality and fraternity”. On the other hand, some nations first occupy a territory and start the process of “the state building” and it promotes nationalism of the respective state. Such notions of nationalism are mostly relevant in the context of European nation states. From the perspective of these two trajectories, the notion of nationalism is divided into two categories: civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism refers to the formation of such nationalism which accommodates multi-ethnic and multi-cultural identities within a defined state territory. On the other hand, ethnic nationalism is based on similar ethnic and religious identity where the inhabitants of the state articulate their nationalism basing on same religious, ethnic and cultural identity.

How do the state and nationality non-violently get accommodated in the formation of nationalism? David Miller identified four questions which need to be addressed for resolving the tension between the state and nationality in the process of the formation of nationalism.8 First question is about the boundaries of the state and nationality. If a state can accommodate multi-nationals, the formation of nationalism is peaceful. But, if different nationality demands separate state, the tension between the state and nationality is inevitable. Second question is linked with the national sovereignty. If the right to self-determination is valued, every nationality should have the right to enjoy political autonomy, which means every nationality will get the opportunity for the formation of governing body. On the other hand, the state will never compromise its sovereignty. Therefore, the formation of nationalism should not confront the state sovereignty. Third question relates to internal policy of a the state. Many states promulgate nationality to protect and promote particular culture and identity. Liberal democracies may accept multi-ethnic and multi-cultural identity. But, when some authoritarian states enforce a particular culture and identity, many nationalities cannot accept it. Therefore, the settlement between the state and nationality depends on how the respective nationalities respond to the state policies. Fourth question is about the ethics of an individual regarding nationality. In a state, every individual should accept the co-nationals as part of the state. When the ethical value weakens and some of the groups cannot accept other groups as same national, it

7 Jan Penrose and Richard C. M. Mole, “Nation-The states and National Identity”, in Kevin R. Cox, Murray Low and Jennifer Robinson (eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Political Geography, Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2008, pp. 271-83. 8 David Miller, On Nationality, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, pp. 2-3. 230 STATE, NATIONALITY AND POLITICAL ELITES creates tension between the state and nationality and in turn, it ultimately challenges the formation of nationalism.

Richard Mansbach and Edward Rhodes identified three factors to determine the peaceful amalgamation between the state and nationality: historical timing, regime type and basis of national legitimacy.9 Historical timing refers the time when institutional networks evolved before the formation of nationality. In such states, institutions, norms and aspirations of the people grown in a way that all the inhabitants naturally accept commonality of their nationality and they determine their destination without any intervention. The state finds a legitimacy for ensuring co-existence of all inhabitants of a particular territory. The notion of nationality is developed on the basis of historical and emotional ties, the state institutions and symbols. For example, in the case of the United Kingdom, the dynasty still remains as a symbol of English nationality. The formation of nationalism evolved on the basis of historic ties and symbols. The second factor impacting the relations between the state and nationality is regime type. In the Western liberal democracies, society and the state institutions are framed in a way that the state accommodates different ethnic and religious groups where all of them feel secured and develop a common nationality to ensure their progress and development. Modern democratic states are based on the idea that the state should accommodate all the inhabitants of the country by protecting their racial and religious identity. They form a nationality desiring progress and development of all people. In liberal democracies, constitutional provisions and legal frameworks define the responsibility and right of every individual. The third factor which harmonise the tension between the state and nationality is institutional legitimacy. In such cases, the state does not politicise nationality. By depoliticising nationality, it integrates people with a particular ideological motivation. The racial and ethnic identity are not relevant in this case and state manufactured nationality is accepted by everyone in a legitimate way. The former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was considered as an example of such kind of state.

In all the three cases, political elites play important role in the formation of nationalism. Political elites are “individuals and small, relatively cohesive, and stable group with disproportionate power to affect national and supranational political outcomes on a continuing basis.”10 They hold the upper position in the policy making process and participate in the political institutions and social movements. They include the familiar “power elite”11 including top business people, government executive, and military leaders along with persons and groups holding key strategic

9 Richard Mansbach and Edward Rhodes, op. cit. 10 Heinrich Best and John Higley, “The Palgrave Handbook of Political Elites: Introduction”, in Heinrich Best and John Higley (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Political Elites, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p. 3. 11 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956. 231 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 positions within the political parties and parliaments, major interest organisations and professional associations, important media enterprises and trade unions, and religious and other hierarchically structured institutions powerful enough to affect political decisions.12 Thus, the narratives developed by the political elites influence the people of a state to determine their nationality. In all cases, when political elites cannot develop a narrative where all the inhabitants can feel secured in terms of their nationality, the formation of nationalism is challenged. In the context of post- colonial countries, the role of political elites is vital to form a nationalist identity.

A number of scholars elaborated that how political elites contribute in the formation of nationalism. Eric Hobsbawm argues that the political elites develop nationality by “invention of traditions”.13 This “invented traditions” mean “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly and tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms or behaviours by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.”14 By memorising such traditions, political elites motivate people to develop a nationality and influence the process of the formation of nationalism.

Lowell W. Barrington identified three approaches for the formation of nationalism: primordial, constructive and instrumental.15 Primordial approach holds that nationality is “deep rooted features such as race, language, religion, and other cultural features”.16 Such features lead towards formation of national boundary. On the other hand, constructivist approach “like other social identities, including those that primordialists point to as markers of national identity - is a social construction.”17 Comaroff developed several strands of constructivism like cultural constructivism and political constructivism and he summarises that all are based on the social identities that “product of human agency.”18 The instrumentalism implies that nationality is an instrument and manipulated by elites. Nevertheless, some scholars argue that primordialism and instrumentalism are connected. Young argues that primordialism “completed instrumentalism by explaining the power of the ‘affective

12 Heinrich Best and John Higley, op. cit. 13 Eric Hobsbawn, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions”, in Eric Hobsbawn and Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 1. 14 Ibid. 15 Lowell W. Barrington, “Nationalism and Independence”, in Lowell W. Barrington (ed.), After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2006, pp. 13-14. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 John L. Comaroff, “Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Politics of Difference in an Age of Revolution”, in Edwin N. Wilmsen and Patrick McAllister (eds.), The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996, p. 165. 232 STATE, NATIONALITY AND POLITICAL ELITES elite’ through which interest is pursued”19. Comaroff claims that primordialism and instrumentalism can be linked as hybrid neoprimordialism.20 On the other hand, many experts argue that instrumentalism is more connected with constructivism and even some use the terms interchangeably.21 However, Barrington argues that power elites contribute in the formation of nationality by “inducing...political mobilisation in the name of a particular nationalist ‘cause’ or against a particular ‘other’ that threatens the nations”22.

Paul Brass, a leading scholar of the instrumentalist approach for nationalism, in the context of post-colonial countries argues that “whether or not the culture of the group is ancient or is newly -fashioned, the study of ethnicity and nationality is…the study of the process by which elites and counter-elites within ethnic groups select aspects of the group’s culture, attach new value and meaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilise the group, to defend its interests, and to compete with other groups”.23 Brass holds the argument that ethnic identities are constructed and manipulated by elite competition. For Brass, there are four types of competition between elites that can lay the base of national consciousness to be emerged as a national identity: local aristocracy versus alien conqueror, inter-ethnic competition between religious elites, intra-ethnic competition between native aristocracies and religious elites, and finally competition between indigenous religious elites and alien aristocracies.24 The first type of competition starts in a preindustrial society where foreign intruders come and take the control of lands. When industrialisation starts, the local aristocracy strives to create a new consciousness of ethnic identity and promulgates the idea of nationality. The second type of competition starts when foreign intruders try to restrict local religious practices and impose or facilitate foreign religion on the local people. In such cases, local religious leaders encourage ethnic consciousness among the people that promotes the feeling of nationality among the locals. The third type of competition occurs when local ruling class embraces foreign invaders and accepts supporting foreign culture, then local religious groups start competition with local ruling class and local religious class creates consciousness among the people about their religious and ethnic identity. The fourth type of competition occurs between local religious elites and foreign aristocracies. The local religious leaders try to protect their culture from the ‘invasion’ of foreign aristocrats. The theory of Paul Brass suggests that in the post-colonial countries, the role of

19 Crawford Young, “Evolving Modes of Consciousness and Ideology: Nationalism and Ethnicity”, David E. Aptar and Carl G. Rosberg (eds.), Political Development and the New Realism in Sub-Saharan Africa, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994, p. 79. 20 John L. Comaroff, op. cit. 21 Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, p. 163. 22 Lowell W. Barrington, op. cit. p. 13. 23 Paul R. Brass, op. cit., p. 75. 24 Ibid. 233 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 elites is vital in the formation of nationalism. When colonialism started at the time of pre-industrialisation, the ideas of the state and nationality were not strong enough in these countries. The industrialisation under colonial rule started the formation of the state. The competition between elites and the state authority formulates the nationality of the post-colonial countries.

Before British occupation, Myanmar was divided into different autonomous kingdoms. As a feudalist society, the idea of the state was not developed within the country. The religious monks were very much influential in the society and the monarchs always tried to maintain a good relation with religious elites. British occupation started to unite the country under a central rule and it led the country towards formation of a state. During the independence movement of Myanmar, the formation of political elites was visible and the competition among the elites developed different narratives of the nationality in Myanmar. However, since independence, political elites of the country developed different motivations of nationality and it has affected the nationalism of Myanmar. The state of Myanmar was developed under the British rule, but the nationality debate was yet to be resolved. In this respect, this paper focuses that how political elites tried to resolve the tension between the state and nationality of Myanmar and how it affects the politics of nationalism.

3. Power Elites and the Politics of Nationalism in Myanmar

Before British colonialism in Myanmar, the country was loosely affiliated with kingdoms and there was no existence of the idea of Burmese nation or Burma the state. British occupation was a shock for Burma, both politically and economically. The main motivation of British rule in Burma was profit making. They were not concerned about the social developments in the country. In the pre-colonial Burma, the monarchs were always maintained good relations with monks. But colonial rulers withdrew all kinds of support for monasteries and rural economies. The British did not consider Burma as a separate the state, rather took it as part of the British India. Therefore, many of the government positions were filled up by the Indians. British rule instigated grievances in Burma and the people of Burma felt that their lives and religion were under threat. Moreover, the increasing immigration from India developed a fear among the Burmese that their country would soon be swamped by an alien group.25 British policies increased uncertainty in the society and it had rooted contradictions between British rulers and majority Bamar population of Myanmar.

25 Robert H. Taylor, “Perception of Ethnicity in the Politics of Burma”, Asian Journal of Social Science, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1982. 234 STATE, NATIONALITY AND POLITICAL ELITES

The growing mistrust between Bamar people and British rulers led the colonial rulers to adopt divide and rule policy. British recruited non-Burman ethnic minorities in the military and classified army battalions depending on ethnicity. Approximately, 87 per cent of the Burman Army in the colonial period was from non-Bamars.26 When the First World War ended, anti-colonial leaders of Burma formed Wunthanu (patriotic) organisations all over the country to mobilise people against the British rule.27 In 1919, a women movement organisation was formed with around 300 members, which had raised concern among the colonial rulers, because it had accelerated nationalist movements in Burma.28 By 1930s, the patriotic intellectuals, mostly student leaders started nationalist movements in the country. These movements can be divided into two groups: one group emphasised on the racial and religious integrity of Bamar people and another group focused on a multi- racial nationhood. These two lines of divisions continued till the independence of the country in 1948. Though the division was not so visible, because all of them were fighting against the British rule, but such divisions came into light after independence. The political elites were divided on the issue of nationalism in Myanmar. Though all the ethnic regions were included in the state of Burma, nationalist identity emerged as a major challenge for the country and the politics of nationalism started after independence.

3.1 The Formation Phase and Promulgation of Secular Nationalism

From 1930 onwards, the formation of nation state was visible encompassing Burma proper and the frontier areas. But, the process of uniting between the two areas was not clear. The Government of Burma Act, passed in 1935, came into effect on 1 April 1937 and Burma at last enjoyed a political identity separated from that of India.29 The formation of political elites in the period was also evident. Under the leadership of Aung San, a strong elite comprised by leftists and students agreed that British colony Burma would be a union where all the communities will get equal rights.30 On the other hand, religious groups subscribed to the idea that Burma would be a Buddhist state. There was always a fear among the ethnic minorities of the frontier areas that if Burma becomes as a nation state what would be their status in the country.

26 David I. Steinberg, Burma: The state of Myanmar, Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001, p. 183. 27 R. H. Taylor, “Wunthanu Athin”, in Ooi Keat Gin (ed.), Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopaedia from Angko Wat to East Timor, California: ABC-CLIO, 2004, p. 1429. 28 Mya Sein, “Towards Independence Burma: The Role of Women”, Asian Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1972, p. 294. 29 Ian Brown, Burma’s Economy in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 68. 30 Cecil Hobbs, “Nationalism in British Colonial Burma”, The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2, February 1947, pp. 113-121. 235 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

However, the nationalist movement in Burma was first started by the Buddhist monks.31 Throughout the Burman history, Buddhism acted as a force of integration. Historically, the Burman kings always took pride in promoting Buddhism by offering alms to the monks, building shrines, pagodas, temples and by protecting the purity of faith. The Sangha, an institution was formed to maintain relations between the king and the monks. When the first Burman dynasty was formed in 1044 AD, Buddhism was made as the state religion.32 The occupation by British destroyed established institutions of Burma. Moreover, public role of Buddhism was swiftly taken over by the missionaries and government schools. The function of monks declined. Instead of recruiting Bamars, British colonials appointed ethnic minorities in vital government posts.

Since Buddhism was always an important component of Burmese politics and society, therefore, when Buddhism came under threat, the resistance also first started by Buddhist monks. By citing H. Thirkell White, Secretary of upper Burma in 1886, Ni Ni Myint, a renowned Burman historian, recorded, “Wherever there was an appearance of organised resistance, Buddhist monks were among the chiefs. No political movement of importance has been without a monk as the leading spirit”.33 Therefore, the national independence movement was first started under the leadership of Buddhist monks. The Sangha, named Young Men’s Buddhist Association in 1920, started the first anti-colonial movement in Burma.34 Later, a number of renowned monks led nationalist movement named U Ottama and U Wisara. Resisting the British rule, Saya San, also mobilised his followers and faced down the British police with homemade shotguns, crossbows and sword of spears.35 In the formation phase of Myanmar’s nationalism, Buddhism was always an important factor. Therefore, Buddhist elites wanted to see Buddhism at the heart of the state and nationalism of Myanmar.

British rulers were suppressive towards religion based nationalist movements in Myanmar. Moreover, in the time, a western educated elite class was developed in Myanmar who was leading a secular nationalist movement in the country. General Aung San was the leading figure in the formation of multi-ethnic and multi-religious nationalism in Myanmar. In fact, this secularist and multi-ethnic group emerged as a

31 Pum Za Mang, “Religion, Ethnicity, and Nationalism in Burma”, Journal of Church and The state, Vol. 59, No. 4, 2016, pp. 626-648. 32 Melford E. Spiro, Buddhism and Society: A Great Tradition and Its Burmese Vicissitudes, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, p. 380. 33 Thant Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 205. 34 Paul Kratosk and Ben Batson, “Nationalism and Modernist Reform”, in Nicholas Tarling (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 286. 35 Pum Za Mang, “Religion, Ethnicity, and Nationalism in Burma”, op. cit., p. 635. 236 STATE, NATIONALITY AND POLITICAL ELITES political elite in the formation phase of nationalism of the country. General Aung San emerged as a unanimous leader of this movement. He wanted separation between the state and religion. In his words, “We must draw a clear line between politics and religion, because the two are not one and the same thing. If we mix religion and politics, then we offend the religion itself.”36 In a speech in 1946, Aung San again declared, “You are inheritors of a great religion. Purify it and broadcast it to all the world…of love and brotherhood, freedom of religious worship, freedom from fear, ignorance.”37 Aung San was a strong supporter to include ethnic minorities in the united Burma, even if it was in a framework of positive discrimination. General Aung San defined national identity, “a nation is collective term applied to a people irrespective of their ethnic origin, living in close contact with one another and having common interests and sharing joys and sorrows together for such historic periods as to have acquired a sense of oneness.”38 Aung San understood that without accommodating the concerns of the ethnic minorities, it would be difficult to form a united Myanmar. Therefore, he started negotiations with ethnic minorities.

But, the problem of nationality formation started when ethnic minority groups of Myanmar became vocal about their position in the independent Myanmar. While the Buddhist nationalists wanted to form the state of Burma as Buddhist state, the ethnic minorities were afraid of suppression and marginalisation. In such a milieu, General Aung San wanted to establish an integrated Myanmar. His vision was that Burma would be a state where nationality would be based on inclusive ideals without difference of race and ethnicity. To achieve this objective, Aung San reached in an agreement with major ethnic minorities, known as Panglong Agreement 1947, where he agreed to ensure and protect the identity of all the ethnic minorities without division of race and religion. The agreement is still referred as a basis of multi-ethnic nationality in Myanmar. The agreement proposed a federal state in the country, where all the frontier areas would enjoy autonomy and they would be able to ensure their self-determination. Though the agreement was appreciated by the majority of people, but the Buddhist nationalists did not agree with the agreement. They were dreaming of a Buddhist state in Burma.

In the formation phase, the idea of nationalism was viewed differently by three different groups. Buddhist nationalists wanted to see the supremacy of Buddhism in the independent Myanmar. Secularists envisioned Myanmar as an integrated one where all the religious and ethnic groups would enjoy the right to self-determination. On the other hand, ethnic groups were focusing on safety, security and position of dignity in

36 Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 118. 37 Mikael Gravers, Nationalism as Political Paranoia in Burma: An Essay on Historical Practice of Power, Richmond: Curzon Press, 1993, p. 41. 38 Donald Eugene Smith, op. cit., p. 115. 237 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 the state. General Aung San’s initiative for an integrated Myanmar convinced most of the people of the country that a secular nationality would help everyone to secure their position in the state. Accordingly, after independence in 1948, Aung San proposed a secular constitution for the country. Due to his uncontested popularity, the secular political elites established their stronghold in the political sphere of Myanmar. Their main vision was to protect the country from any kind of division.

3.2 The Induction of Polarisation and Buddhist Nationalism

The assassination of General Aung San in 1948 diluted the process of national integration in Myanmar. The first prime minister of the country U Nu turned the trajectory of the country from secular nationalism to Buddhist nationalism. His government took initiative to promote Buddhist nationality with democratic values in order to avoid external interference of communism and internal unrest of different ethnic groups.39 The first initiative he took was to change the original constitution which was developed by General Aung San. The idea of a secular constitution was altered to promote the supremacy of Buddhism. During 1954 to 1956, U Nu government organised the Sixth Great Buddhist council and decided to close non-Buddhist religious schools.40 Later, U Nu changed his policy due to resistance from non-Bamar groups.41 The Islamic council and the Burman Christian council demanded separation of religion and the state in Myanmar.42 However, the Catholic Christians remained silent on the issue.43 The resistance of minorities was challenged by the monks. They were asking for “only Buddhism” to be taught in the schools of Myanmar. Nevertheless, U Nu’s policies undermined the secularist principles of Aung San and instigated a conflict between Buddhist supremacy and secular ideals.

In 1950, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was established to monitor religious laws and a bill naming, “The Buddha Sasana Council” was passed in the parliament for promoting Buddhist education in the country.44 The Buddhist days were designed and many Pagodas were constructed in the country. A constitutional process was going on, where a clause was included, “the state recognises the special position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the great majority of the citizen of the

39 Fred Von Der Mehden, “Buddhism and Politics in Burma”, The Antioch Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1961, pp. 166-175. 40 Niklas Foxeus, “Contemporary Burmese Buddhism”, in Michael Jerryson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Buddhism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 216. 41 Donald Eugene Smith, op. cit., p. 117. 42 Ibid., pp. 247-249. 43 Ibid. 44 David I. Steinberg, Burma: A Socialist Nation of Southeast Asia, Boulder: Westview Press, 1982, p. 63. 238 STATE, NATIONALITY AND POLITICAL ELITES

Union.”45 Prime Minister U Nu confirmed a landslide victory in 1960 declaring to recognise Buddhism as the state religion. After the election, the same article of the constitution proposed for amendment, “Buddhism being the religion professed by the great majority of the citizen of the union shall be the state religion.”46 However, U Nu did not go for amending the constitution fearing that it would create tension between Buddhist and non-Buddhist people of Myanmar.47 In fact, there were riots in different places during U Nu regime.

U Nu’s policy of changing the principles of Panglong agreement aggravated ethnic tension in the country. In 1961, when U Nu promulgated Buddhism as the state religion, which was a sharp violation of Panglong agreement, generated ethnic tension in Myanmar. There were two types of reaction in the country. First, the ethnic groups vehemently negated this initiative and claimed that it is the evidence of Burmanisation of the country. Second reaction came from more moderate groups, who claimed that such kind of change is against the spirit of independence movement. The group was led by the first president of the Union of Burma, Sao Shew Thaik. He invited leaders of not only the Chen, Kachin and Shan, but also other non-Burmese nationalities-the Karen, Kayan, Mon and Rakhine. He organised Taunggyi Conference where all the delegates argued, “we must set up a union with properly regulated provisions to safeguard the right of national minorities”48. But the attempt failed due to military coup of General Ne Win.

Under the U Nu’s leadership, the debate on nationalism resurfaced again. While the ruling class wanted to transform Burma into a Buddhist state, the secular political elites found it a threat to national integration. U Nu’s policy was popularised in the country. The instigation of religious supremacy and the ‘invention of traditions’ helped U Nu to expand his influence and to reorganise religious groups in the political sphere of Myanmar. However, the protest from the secular and minority forces influenced U Nu to rethink his policies. At the end, the military coup of General Ne Win ended the era of U Nu and the country entered in a new era where the tension between the state and nationality deepened and led the country towards a long-term conflict.

3.3 The Socialist Wave and Linguistic Nationalism

The military takeover of 1962 by General Ne Win changed the pathway of Myanmar towards a long-term military rule. While U Nu wanted to mix nationalism

45 Saittawut Yutthaworakool, “The Politics of Buddhist Nationalism in Myanmar: History, Legitimacy and Democratic Transitions”, Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2017, pp. 137. 46 Ibid. 47 Donald Eugene Smith, op. cit., p. 117. 48 Shelby Tucker, Burma: Curse of Independence, London: Pluto Press, 2001, p. 152. 239 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 and Buddhism, General Ne Win took the initiative to mix Burmanisation and socialism. For both of them nationalism was simply based on “one ethnicity, one language and one religion”49. But their approaches to ethnicity and religion were different. Both of them were promoting “forced assimilation” of ethnic minorities. The difference was that U Nu opted for cultural and religious assimilation into Buddhism and Ne Win’s policies were to promote Burmanisation and socialism by eradicating ethnic and religious diversity. Ne Win adopted a single language policy to assimilate the whole country.

General Ne Win’s first initiative was the adoption of the 1962 Printers and Publishers Regulation Law and 1965 Censor Law. These laws were imposed on the other non-Bamar minorities to compel everyone to learn Burmese language. The promotion of Burmese language reached in a peak when the 1974 constitution declared Burmese language as official language. He also adopted “four cuts” strategies: to cut food supply to the insurgents; to cut protection money from villagers to the insurgents; to cut contacts between people and the insurgents; and to make the people cut off the insurgent’s head. He declared “peoples war doctrine” with the motto of “one voice, one blood and one nation”. Though General Ne Win wanted to establish a homogenous country, but his draconian rule intensified the division between the state and society.

By the time, a number of ethnic insurgent groups grew in the country, most notably, the Karen National Union (KNU), the Kachin Independent Organisation (KIO), the Shan State Army (SSA), the New Mon The state Party (NMSP), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) and the Chin Democracy Party (CDP). As a reaction to the 1974 constitution, the non- Bamar ethnic communities formed Federal Democratic Front in 1975. It was latter transformed into the National Democratic Front (NDF) in 1976. Though the four-cut strategy of General Ne Win was successful against communist insurgency, but the NDF members of the ethnic communities were capable of controlling vast areas in the respective regions as “liberated areas”. Martin Smith observes, “they were well armed and trained and capable of out-fighting the Tatmadaw in the conventional and guerrilla warfare”, and “each could put several hundred troops into battle, if occasion demanded, before they retreating back into safe mounting strongholds.”50 He continues,

“Buoyed by the booming black market and anti-government dissatisfaction, many ethnic forces grew markedly in strength. Armed opposition controlled virtually the entire eastern borders of Burma, from the Tenasserim division

49 Lian H. Sakhang, “Ethnic Conflicts: Burma”, in V. R. Raghavan (ed.), Internal Conflicts-A Four State Analysis: India-Nepal-Sri Lanka-Myanmar, New Delhi: Vij Books India Pvt. Ltd., 2013, p. 250. 50 Martin Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma, Washington, D. C.: The East-West Center, 2007, p. 36. 240 STATE, NATIONALITY AND POLITICAL ELITES

in the South of Kachin state in the north. The three strongest ethnic forces, the KNU, KIO, and SSA, each maintained over 5,000 troops in the field and, like the CPB’s People’s Army, were capable of fighting the Tatmadaw in the fixed positions of conventional war, which was vital for the defence of border strongholds and trading posts.”51

Due to rising insurgency in the country, General Ne Win took initiative to reform the constitution of the country in 1974. The new constitution proposed for the first time under Ne Win to accommodate ethnic equality for all the major ethnic minorities. It demarcated seven divisions where most of the Burman majority live and seven ethnic states: Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon, Rakhine and Shan. But the draconian laws and ruthless military operations failed to develop a constitutional rule in the country. Moreover, in 1982, General Ne Win adopted a new citizenship law, where he categorised citizens of the country in three classes: full citizen, associate citizen and naturalised citizen. This law again instigated the debate between the state and nationality in the country. However, General Ne Win built an army state and eradicated divisions among the state, army and the party. Military emerged as part of the state and policy of forced assimilation divided the country severely. A long-term conflict between the military and ethnic resurgent groups weakened the state and the Buddhist nationality was challenged by the ethnic minorities.

Under the General Ne Win’s military rule, the national integration of Myanmar was affected severely. The military emerged as parallel to the state. Military elites consolidated all the power and imposition of Burman language deeply undermined the identity of ethnic minorities. Military rulers thought that forceful integration of language and religion would strengthen their position in the power. But, ultimately, the ethnic minorities found no other option without resistance. General Ne Win’s policy of force assimilation intensified the tension between the state and nationality and the nationalism in the country became more debated and controversial.

3.4 The Violent ‘Pacification’, Purification and Harmonisation

General Ne Win’s draconian counter-insurgency measures affected rural areas of Myanmar and collapsed the economic condition. Therefore, people’s uprising started and a military coup occurred in 1988. The military announced four immediate goals of the coup: (a) restoring law and order, peace and tranquillity; (b) provide secure and smooth transportation; (b) easing the people’s food, clothing and shelter needs; and (c) holding multi-party democratic elections.52 The military

51 Ibid. 52 James F. Guyot, “Myanmar in 1990: The Unconsummated Election”, Asian Survey, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, February, 1991, p. 205. 241 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 abolished the state institutions and created The state Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The army dropped existing ethnic names of its military, which erased original federal structure of the country. Moreover, military suspended the constitution of 1974 and abolished the Presidency, The State Council, Council of Ministers and People’s Assembly. However, though military claimed that they were making change in the country, but in practice they were following the principles of General Ne Win, which was maintaining the supremacy of the military. The identity between military and the state was amalgamated and the hope of national integration became more blurred.

On the other hand, political and economic changes in the country enhanced the popularity of the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Since General Aung San was a unanimous leader of the country, her daughter Aung San Suu Kyi became more popular leader considering that she might lead the country towards integration and development. Her leadership transcended the line of religion, race, ethnicity, class and even military of the country. Her vision, charisma, and leadership led her party to win the general election of 1990.53 After long period of military rule, the people were expecting a leader who can change pathways of the country and stop the long-standing ethnic conflict between the military and ethnic insurgent groups. But military crackdown in the country destroyed the hope for the country’s transition towards democracy. The vision of the formation of an integrated and secular nationality by General Aung San and his daughter again found a setback and the conflict between ethnic groups and military remained unresolved. A new era of ethnic conflict escalated in the country and military also took strong measures against armed groups.

The military responded to the emerging conflicts in the ethnic areas in two ways.54 First, military took an initiative to modernise its capacity and started collecting new weapons to face new challenges. Second, military wedged a drive against National League for Democracy (NLD) in the proper Burma and in the frontier areas. The military tried to achieve a violent ‘pacification’ process in the country.55 Therefore, the military urged all the ethnic communities for a cease-fire agreement with SLORC. These cease-fire agreements allowed some groups to keep arms in their hand to police their own territory. But, in reality, the trust between military and ethnic groups were not in a level where military and Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) can reach

53 Mary P. Callahan, “Language Policy in Modern Burma”, in Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly (eds.), Fighting Words: Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Asia, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2003, p. 165. 54 Mary P. Callahan, “Language Policy in Modern Burma”, op. cit., p. 166. 55 Lee Jones, “Explaining Myanmar’s Regime Transition: The Periphery is Central”, Democratization, Vol. 21, No. 5, p. 785. 242 STATE, NATIONALITY AND POLITICAL ELITES an agreement. The government categorised ethnic minorities in 135 races by reinvigorating colonial categorisation.56 The objective of this categorisation was to divide the opposition, but it generated new challenge that all the ethnic groups started demanding autonomy which emerged as a challenge for the military.57

On the issue of nationality, SLORC took a policy of purification and homogenisation.58 At first, the military renamed the country from Burma to Myanmar in 1989. The name of some major cities was also renamed allegedly to eliminate vestiges of imperialism. English-language books were republished with all references to “Burma” whited out and replaced with “Myanmar”. The government also took initiative to rewrite the history of a singular national race the “Myanmar”. The junta assigned responsibility to government bodies, such as the Committee for the Compilation of Authentic Data of Myanmar history (later succeeded by the Historical Commission) and the office of Strategic Studies. One of the interesting campaigns was the 1997-98 Pondaung Primate Fossil Exploration archaeological project. Without sufficient archaeological knowledge, the army-led dig produced spacious claims that fossils found in the Pondaung region of the country proved that human civilisation began in Myanmar.59 They have also claimed the ethnic groups in Burma co-existed harmoniously as far back as the Neolithic period.60

The government sponsored a dual process in dealing with ethnic minority issues. In the one hand, it adopted a policy of purification and harmonisation by promoting the idea that ethnic groups and Burmese were living together for thousands of years. On the other hand, it instigated differences among the ethnic groups by categorising them on the basis of racial identity. In the 1990s, science, cultural and local history museums sprang up around the country. Built by various ministries, regional commands, and armed forces directorates, these museums revered the “Myanmar” race as the sacred core of their narrative in history. The government took language issue at the centre of campaign and declared a policy of establishing a monolingual state. It formed Burmese Language Commission and declared three causes of language policy: (a) non-disintegration of the union, (b) non-disintegration of the solidarity, and (c) perpetuation of national sovereignty.61 At the same time,

56 Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional and Global Issues, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, p. 31. 57 Mary P. Callahan, “Language Policy in Modern Burma”, op. cit., p. 166. 58 Mary P. Callahan, Making Myanmars Language, “Territory, and Belonging in Post-Socialist Burma”, in Joel S. Migdal (ed.), Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 99-120. 59 Mary P. Callahan, “Language Policy in Modern Burma”, op. cit., p. 167. 60 Ibid. 61 Mary P. Callahan, “Language Policy in Modern Burma”, op. cit., p. 168. 243 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 government adopted a set of assimilationist policies toward minorities. Government invested in the areas of building roads, Burmese language schools, hospitals, power plants, telecommunications relay station, and other institutions and facilities aimed at both modernising and subjugating inhabitants of the former rebel-held territory.62

The policies of the government were not effective to accommodate and counter ethnic insurgency. In 1993, government invited peace talks by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), but the process could not be sustained. Due to increasing criticism from the international community and escalation of violence in Myanmar, the military declared a seven-step road map to democracy in 2003. By this declaration, a new process started in the country, where military offered a new system of governance. The process though declared for a democratic framework, but in reality, it was a process to ensure the dominance of military in a different framework. However, this period of violent ‘pacification’ was a process to purify and harmonise the country. In fact, it was a continuation of General Ne Win’s policies. The military enforced its supremacy and denied ethnic identity for frontier people. The ethnic groups denied to accept this process and the formation of nationality emerged as more problematic.

3.5 Transition towards Democracy

The declaration of democratic roadmap in Myanmar indicated that the country is going towards a new transition. A number of issues influenced military to approve such kinds of changes. Firstly, increasing international pressure on the human rights violation was isolating Myanmar from the international community. Due to rising development necessity, military could not remain isolated. Therefore, military took measures to enhance international connections. Secondly, internal economic mismanagement and ethnic conflicts weaken the position of the government. Therefore, military government thought that transition towards democracy would help them to remain protected from the rising movements of the country. Nevertheless, this initiative was appreciated internationally, expecting that at least it would have some changes of the long military rule in the country.

The transition process started by the initiation of 2008 constitution. The constitution was an effort to address some of the demands of ethnic minorities and to start a new democratic process. Since 1948, ethnic communities demanded five-point amendments to the constitution: (a) establishing a state, (b) assignment of equal powers to both chambers of the union parliament, (c) each state shall be represented by an equal number of representatives in the chambers of nationalities, (d) the following departments shall be vested in central union, and all other powers,

62 Ibid. 244 STATE, NATIONALITY AND POLITICAL ELITES rights and entitlements shall be transferred to the state-foreign relations, union defence, union finance, coinage and currency, post and telecommunication, rail, air and water transport, union judiciary, collection of custom duties and seaports etc., (e) union revenue shall be distributed equally.63 The 2008 constitution partially fulfilled first three demands, but military vehemently denied to fulfil next three demands. However, the question of self-determination of the ethnic minorities remained unresolved. Under 2008 constitution, military arranged an election in 2010. But, the main opposition, NLD boycotted the election. Though it was an elected government, the ultimate control of power remained in the hand of military.

The government again initiated a nation-wide ceasefire agreement in 2011. There were a number of differences between the peace process from 1989 to 2010 and post-2011. Firstly, earlier peace process was negotiated between the military and EAOs, but in 2011, peace process engaged multiple institutions to co-ordinate from decision making level to implementation level. Secondly, there was a lack of coordination among the ethnic groups in the earlier negotiations, but 2011 ethnic groups started coordinating among themselves. Thirdly, earlier military enforced ceasefire, but in 2011, military initiated political dialogue for resolving differences. Fourthly, there was no representation from the international community, but in 2011, the UN and China were engaged as representatives in the negotiation process. However, some days before the elections of 2015, military and ethnic groups reached in a peace deal. Nevertheless, the demands of the ethnic minorities were not fulfilled.

The election of 2015 made a remarkable change in the political history of Myanmar. The triumph of Aung San Suu Kyi raised new hope among the ethnic minorities of the country. The Suu Kyi government initiated a new peace process, known as 21st Century Panglong peace process. Suu Kyi government took initiatives to form new institutions like National Reconciliation and Peace Restoration (NRPC). From 2016, the government organised a number of peace conferences in the country as initiation of new peace process. But the process is challenged by a number of longstanding issues. The deep-rooted mistrust between military and ethnic groups prevents confidence building among the stakeholders of negotiation. The ethnic groups want to uphold the principles of 1947 Panglong agreement by adopting federal structure in the country, but military is committed to maintain a unitary system in the country. The ethnic groups want to preserve their identity within a federal framework. However, the constitution of 2008 is based on a unitary system. Without consent of military, any change of the constitution is not possible, because the military controls 25 per cent of seats in the parliament constitutionally.

63 Sai Aung Tun, History of the Shan State: From Its Origins to 1962, Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm, 2009, p. 381. 245 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

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At present, the debate between the state and nationality is revolving in three ways. The military elites want to maintain supremacy of Burmese identity and consider military as the sole representative of nationality. On the contrary, ethnic minorities think that their national identity should be preserved and they should get right to self-determination. The Aung San Suu Kyi government declared their election manifesto of 2015 that they would uphold the spirit of the Panglong Agreement 1947. Therefore, the debate on the issue of nationalism still remains problematic and there is no indication of the resolution of politics of nationalism in Myanmar.

4. Conclusion

The formation of nationalism depends on the effective harmonisation between the state identity and nationality of a country. When the state can create strong bondage among the people of its boundary by developing a feeling of same nationality, the formation of nationalism becomes easy and strong. In contrary, when the state fails to unite all people of its boundary, the formation of nationalism is difficult and sometimes conflicting. In the post-colonial countries, political elites play significant role in the formation of nationalism of a state. Due to colonial experience, these countries bear a number of divisions in the society, which were mostly instigated by the colonials for consolidating their domination. Such divisions emerged as a challenge for post-colonial political elites, when they dream for an integrated country. In such cases, while political elites take initiative to develop a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society for the formation of nationality, the issue of nationalism becomes settled. On the other hand, when political elites fail to accommodate all groups in the same nationality, it ultimately leads to conflict and violence. Paul Brass argues that the nationalism in the post- colonial countries are evolved in a process of competition between and among different political elites of a country.

In case of Myanmar, in the formation phase of nationalism, secular political elites under the leadership of General Aung San dreamt secular nationality and agreed to recognise all the ethnic communities in the formation of nationalism of Myanmar. They signed Panglong Agreement in 1947 with the frontier communities by recognising unique and separate identity of ethnic communities. They also tried to eradicate the tension between ethnic minorities and Bamar community, which was instigated by British rulers. But, after the assassination of General Aung San in 1948, the Buddhist nationalism emerged rigorously. The political elites in the period focused on Buddhist nationalism, which helped them to continue their dominance in the society. The ethnic minorities felt alienated and launched arms struggle by undermining the state identity of Myanmar. By the time, General Ne Win intervened in the politics of Myanmar. Military emerged as the main political

246 STATE, NATIONALITY AND POLITICAL ELITES elite in the country. To ensure military’s dominance, Ne Win took an initiative of force assimilation of the language of all the people of Myanmar. Ne Win’s policies failed to eradicate tension between the state and nationality, rather the country entered into a long-term conflict and a number of insurgent groups organised them in the frontier areas to challenge the state identity of Myanmar.

Ne Win’s regime weakened the country politically and economically. Therefore, he was compelled to leave power to another military regime in 1988. The new regime, known as SLORC, promised for democratic transition. But they adopted two pronged policies to deal with the political uncertainty of the country. In the one hand, they took initiative to recognise ethnic identities. On the other hand, by categorising ethnic communities, they divided the country again on the basis of ethnic lines. Following the election of 1990, they suppressed NLD and retained the supremacy of military. It ultimately prevented to resolve the existing tension between the military and ethnic minorities.

Due to increasing international pressure and internal instability, the military elites declared a road map to democracy in 2003. Accordingly, military formed a constitution in 2008. They also started a negotiation process in 2011, which was different from the earlier negotiations in terms of participation and engagement. They allowed political leaders in the negotiation and engaged the UN and China in the negotiation process. The 2015 election was a landmark event in the political history of Myanmar. The winning of the NLD and arrival of power of Aung San Suu Kyi as the state counsellor of the country raised new hope for reconciliation between the military and ethnic groups. Suu Kyi established new institutions and started 21st Century Panglong negotiation to resolve longstanding violence between the military and ethnic communities. But, the deep-rooted mistrust among the stakeholders and military’s dominance in the constitutional process raised concerns about the success of the ongoing negotiation.

The unresolved tension between the state and nationality, which was escalated after the assassination of General Aung San still remains unsettled. During U Nu, General Ne Win and SLORC, the political elites could not accommodate the nationality of frontier areas in the formation of nationalism of Myanmar, rather their policy of force assimilation instigated ethnic insurgent groups to choose violent activities. The failure of force assimilation compelled the political elites to reorganise the necessity of negotiation with the ethnic minorities. Aung San Suu Kyi’s government initiated new negotiation and invited all the stakeholders in the process. However, there is a strong demand for the ethnic communities to reform the constitution and citizenship laws of the country, which is very much difficult without the consent from military. The success of present negotiation process

247 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 depends on the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi. Therefore, it remains a challenge for the present political elites that how far they can accommodate the demands of all the stakeholders of the country to eradicate the longstanding tension between the state and nationality in the process of the formation of nationalism of Myanmar.

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Md. Jahan Shoieb Lam-ya Mostaque Changing Nature and the Role of Actors in Confronting Terrorism

Abstract

The September 11, 2001 terrorist incidents shocked the global community and changed the perspectives on both the threat of terrorism and the tools or preparedness required to prevent it. Over the years, approaches towards confronting terrorism have changed. Along with the state actors, the world is also witnessing an increased involvement of non-state actors in this area. The paper takes an endeavour in reviewing the changing nature of confronting terrorism by state and non-state apparatus. It also attempts to view the interplay of the actors in this particular area. The findings suggest that the global community is witnessing a major transformation in the nature of confronting terrorism. It is also viewed that while the states are still playing the leading role in confronting terrorism, the non-state actors are complementing states’ efforts in various ways.

Keywords: Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Al-Qaeda, Islamic State (IS), State Actors, Non-state Actors.

1. Introduction

The September 11, 2001 (popularly known as 9/11) terrorist attacks brought a massive breakthrough in the post-Cold War global politics. Never before had the world witnessed the capacity of a networked terrorist organisation to carry out such coordinated and sophisticated attacks.1 The new terrorist groups are global and seem to have no negotiable targets and no goal other than hurting their adversaries.2 Since the 9/11 attacks, there has also been a sharp increase in the number of terrorist attacks in Muslim majority countries, with regions such as South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa.3

Md. Jahan Shoieb is Research Fellow at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). His e-mail address is [email protected]; Lam-ya Mostaque is Research Officer at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). Her e-mail address is: [email protected] ©Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2019

1 Chiran Jung Thapa, “Counter-terrorism and Regional Cooperation in South Asia” in Anand Kumar (ed.), The Terror Challenge in South Asia and Prospect of Regional Cooperation, New Delhi: Pentagon Security International, 2012, p. 130. 2 Jonathan Stevenson, “Pragmatic Counter Terrorism”, Survival, Vol. 43, No. 4, 2001, p. 35. 3 Meagan Smith and Sean M. Zeigler, “Terrorism Before And After 9/11 – A More Dangerous World?”, Research and Politics, Vol.8, October-December, 2017, p. 2. 249 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

Mainly after the end of the Cold War, the emergence of terrorist groups has changed the global security discourse, forcing analysts to rethink warfare. When George W. Bush declared global “War on Terrorism” in 2001, it was the first war declared against the non-state entity. George W. Bush’s counter-terrorism strategy was to pre-emptively attack the countries where terrorists had a strong foothold.4 However, the attacks on Iraq and Afghanistan were criticised by many, even it has been said that those attacks helped in the rise of further terrorism.5 Countering terrorism is different than any other kind of warfare; because unlike traditional warfare, enemies are not as defined as a state. Nor can it be separated by state boundaries. Even when terrorism is characterized as domestic terrorism it may still have transnational character (as exemplified, by Boston Bombing in 2013 and its link with 6Chechnya). The new terrorists are extremely motivated and proficient in using information technology. The rise of the lone wolf terrorists made it evident that without fighting the ideology/root causes that fuel the violence, terrorism cannot be defeated completely. As terrorism continued to evolve, so did the ways of countering terrorism. Although it is extremely importnat to use military approches, it is not possible to combat terrorism by simply using hard military power. Approaches in fighting terrorism have also changed as new ideas such as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) have emerged. Thus, in the current world, the roles of the non-state actors are deemed as just as important as the state actors.

Although quite a good number of scholarly works have shed lights on the causes and consequences of terrorism, less effort has been given to assess how the state and non-state actors respond to incidents of terrorism. Therefore, it is critical to study the effectiveness of counter-terrorism; knowing how the state and non-state actors react, under what conditions they act strongly (militarily or coercively) and in which circumstance they act softly (diplomatically or with economic incentives or persuasion). Such a study will help in reviewing the changing pattern of counter-terrorism strategies, carefully understanding the relative role each of actors tends to play. With the changing pattern of terrorism, the counter-terrorism strategies by state and non-state actors are also taking a new shape in contemporary international relations. After about two decades of 9/11 incident, the nature of cross-border terrorism shows no sign of abating, and the changing nature of the threat from terrorism calls for new counter-terrorism approaches.

The objective of this paper is to review the changing nature of countering terrorism and also view the role of state and non-state actors in combating terrorism.

4 Chiran Jung Thapa, op. cit. 5 Patrick Wintour, “Intelligence files support claims Iraq invasion helped spawn ISIS”, The Guardian, 06 July 2016. 6 “After Boston Bombing, A New Focus on Chechnya”, National Public Radio, available at https://www.npr. org/2013/04/22/178411752/after-boston-bombing-a-new-focus-on-chechnya, accessed on 20 April 2018. 250 CHANGING NATURE AND THE ROLE OF ACTORS

To that end, this paper seeks to answer some questions: has there been any change in combating terrorism from the past to present? what are the various concepts of confronting terrorism? and how the dominant actors (state and non-state) play a role in combating terrorism?

Since counter-terrorism is a broad issue, the article focuses primarily on the counter-terrorism approaches since 9/11 in order to keep the discussion focused and consolidated. In this article, the roles of state and non-state actors in countering terrorism have been discussed. As the Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) play a major role in combating terrorism and since they are working with states, the role of IGOs has also been discussed briefly along with the role of states. The non- state actors’ role in confronting terrorism will be limited to the actions taken by the academia, civil society, and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO)s.

The paper employs data collected from several primary and secondary sources. As a primary source, selected experts on the issue were interviewed. The paper also benefits from secondary data sources such as books, journal articles, newspaper reports and online reports. Including the introduction and conclusion, the paper is divided into five different sections. The second section deals with the conceptual understanding of the paper. The third section discusses the changing nature of combating terrorism. The fourth section is on the interplay between state and non-state actors in combating terrorism.

2. conceptual Understanding

No discussion on countering/combating terrorism can be comprehensive or holistic without properly defining terrorism. However, it is to note that there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. The challenge in assigning a comprehensive definition of terrorism lies in the fact that it is a difficult taskto be specific when targets, motives, and methods differ so broadly from caseto case. Hence, the broader concept is the probability of different definitions and interpretation of the term increases. Ihekwoaba Onwudiwe states that different studies on terrorism focus on different sub concerns. Thus, each identifies a different problem as the most important one.7 Although it is commonly believed that terrorism is a kind of political violence, Alex Peter Schmid identifies that there are different types, manifestations, and forms of political violence. He identified twenty types of categories of political violence other than terrorism. He, therefore, suggests that it would be easier to restrict the term terrorism to a particular type of political violence which targets non-combatants and civilians

7 Ihekwoaba D. Onwudiwe, The Globalization of Terrorism, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2001, p. 30. 251 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 rather than using it indiscriminately ignoring the issue who or what is the target.8 Over the years, many scholars have defined terrorism in different ways. Friedlander defines terrorism as the “use of force, violence or threats of violence to attain political goals through fear, intimidation, or coercion”.9 On the other hand, Walter Enders and Todd Sandler defined terrorism as, “premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through intimidation of large audience beyond that of immediate victims”.10

Other than scholars, the states and agencies also have various definitions of terrorism. The United Nations Security Council defines terrorism as, “criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitutes offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature”.11 Despite the wide variation of the definition, there are some key characteristics of terrorism:

a) It aims to generate fear and intimidate the population through symbolic violence. It is often noted that terrorism is the weapon of weak against the strong. Terror as a means is used to overcome seemingly insuperable odds by terrorists if they aim to pursue their cause with conventional military means.12

b) Terrorists usually tend to target non-combatants. They tend to deliberately attack the non-combatants. Usually, non-combatants do not use lethal weapons and, therefore, are innocents. In this regard, terrorism is distinguished from other modes of organized political violence in that it targets the non-combatant.13

8 Alex Peter Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, New York: Routledge , 2011, pp. 6-7. 9 Walter Endersw and Todd Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 3. 10 Ibid 11 United Nations Security Council, “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566”, 2004, available at https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/n0454282.pdf, accessed on 05 March 2018. 12 Matthew J. Littleton, “Information Age Terrorism: Toward Cyberterror”, US Naval Postgraduate School, December 1995, available at https://fas.org/irp/threat/cyber/docs/npgs/ch3.htm#Chap3, accessed on 02 February 2020. 13 “The Problem of Defining Terrorism”, Counterterrorism Ethics, available at http://counterterrorismethics. com/the-problem-of-defining-terrorism-part-1/, accessed on 05 February 2020. 252 CHANGING NATURE AND THE ROLE OF ACTORS

c) They often aim at manipulating government policies. Often they try to compel a government or an international organisation to abstain from doing particular tasks.

d) They are ideologically motivated (political, religious or otherwise). Often ideology is used to attract and retain recruits as supporters, members and sympathizers. Contemporary terrorist groups recruit followers from a cross-section of the society, the poor, the rich, the educated and the less educated. Ideology is disseminated to the larger audience in the form of propaganda or information using speeches, lectures, writings, pronouncements etc.

e) Terrorists tend to generate fear in the population. To generate widespread fear, terrorist groups engage in violent, dramatic and high-profile attacks. They also tend to engage in different other methods to penetrate fear among mass including kidnapping, hijacking, car bombings and even suicide bombings.

Figure 1: Few Key Characteristics of Terrorism

Source: Compiled by the authors.

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This paper views terrorism as a tactic or method which is deployed against the non-combatants or indiscriminately targeted against the civilians. There are groups who aim to fulfil certain political objectives, but if they use violence or targets the civilians, then their acts will be considered as terrorist activities.14 However, based on the nature of the terrorist acts those are happening around the world, it is evident that if a terrorist incident occurrs in any part of the globe, has international ramifications. Similarly, any terrorist incident occurring outside the state boundary has implications at the local level. It has to be noted that in today’s interconnected world, the line between what is international and what is local is very much blurred and the distinction between the two categories may be false.15 Even in the case of homegrown or lone-wolf terrorism, the inspiration for radicalisation may come from outside of the country of origin through social media. Therefore, terrorism is viewed as a global incident carrying implications at the local level. With the same token, counter-terrorism effort must be undertaken in an international venture because of the transnational character of the terrorist groups regarding their ideological and political support, financial funding, and armaments and strategies.

Though the definition of terrorism is broad, the concept of counter- terrorism has more or less a general understanding. Oxford dictionary defines counter-terrorism as, “political or military activities designed to prevent or thwart terrorism”.16 The US Armed forces defined counter-terrorism as “activities and operations are taken to neutralise terrorists, their organisations, and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instil fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.”17 In a nutshell, counter-terrorism refers to the practices, tactics, techniques, and strategies that governments, militaries, police departments and corporations adopt in responding to terrorist threats and acts, both real and imputed. Countering terrorism has to follow the identification-location and elimination strategy.18 Much of the counter-terrorism strategy was focused on the security aspects of the problem, such as choosing to combat and control terrorists through means of violence. Thus, the states and the various organisations that work with the armed forces were the primary focus of the counter-terrorism.

14 US Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations”, available at https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/ des/123085.htm, accessed on 01 March 2018. 15 James M. Lutz and Brenda Lutz, Global Terrorism, London: Routledge, 2008, pp. 10-14. 16 “Counter-terrorism”, UK dictionary, available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/counterterrorism, accessed on 01 March 2018. 17 “Counterterrorism”, Joint Publications of the US’ Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, Department of the Air Force and United States Coast Guard , 24 October 2014, available at http://www.jcs. mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_26.pdf, accessed on 12 April 2018. 18 Interview with Professor Dr. Rasheduzzaman, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Interview taken on 03 March 2018. 254 CHANGING NATURE AND THE ROLE OF ACTORS

Over time, it is increasingly being acknowledged that terrorism and other forms of violent extremism are social issues rather than simple matters of security. Therefore, there has been a transition from solely focusing on counter-terrorism to CVE. Compared to counter-terrorism, CVE provides a more holistic approach towards tackling terrorism, focuses on multi-dimensional issues and targets the social aspects that give way to various kinds of violent extremism.19 CVE is a realm of policy, programmes, and interventions designed to prevent individuals from engaging in violence associated with radical political, social, cultural, and religious ideologies and groups.20 This is the approach that involves issues that have to involve multiple actors, including states, IGOs, civil society, NGOs, the private sector and media.

The PVE has emerged as a new approach to fighting terrorism. Unlike the CVE approach, which focuses on the radicalisation process after the incident happens and often targets vulnerable societies, the PVE approach aims to prevent radicalisation from happening before it starts. The government of Switzerland describes PVE as “depriving violent extremism of its breeding ground by enhancing the capacity of individuals and communities to resist it”.21 On the other hand, The UN defines PVE as “systematic preventive measures which directly address the drivers of violent extremism” in its 2015 “plan of action to Prevent Violent Extremism”.22 In general, the PVE is the approach which aims to address the root causes without using coercive methods.

A recent development in the field of confronting violent extremism methods is bringing together the ideas of PVE and CVE to the single banner of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE).23 Overall, the focus is not only on identifying a set of tools and approaches that prevent those dynamics from giving rise to violent extremism but also on ensuring that responses taken by the actors to prevent terrorism do not create an effect that aggravates further radicalisation.24 It has been understood that violent extremism is a problem that can not be solved by a

19 Anne-Marie Balbi, “The Influence of Non-State Actors on Global Politics”, Australian Institute of International Affairs, available at http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-influence-of- non-state-actors-on-global-politics/, accessed on 01 March 2018. 20 Georgia Holmer, “Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective”, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 336, September 2013. 21 Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, “Switzerland’s Foreign Policy Action Plan on Preventing Violent Extremism”, Berne: Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2016, p.6. 22 United Nations General Assembly, “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism”, 2015, available at http:// www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/675, accessed on 11 February 2019. 23 European Commission, “Operational Guidelines on the Preparation and Implementation of EU Financed Actions Specific to Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Third Countries”, Luxembourg, 2017. 24 Lena Slachmuijlder, Transforming Violent Extremism: A peace builder’s guide, Washington, DC.: Search for Common Ground, 2017, pp. 4-6. 255 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

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single approach of the counter-terrorism, CVE or PVE. Thus, the attempt is to ensure that the problem is approached from a diverse point of action.

The nature of contemporary terrorism is different than previous conflicts. During the previous conflicts, particularly during the Cold War period, the West knew the nature of the threat and could draw an appropriate response. On the contrary, contemporary terrorism is easy to spread and is international in scope. It crosses national boundaries and also can create new boundaries like the Islamic State (IS) aims to do. Therefore, the state-centric theories of international relations like realism and liberalism face difficulties in explaining contemporary terrorism. Even realist scholar John Mearsheimer has noted that realism has very little to say about terrorism as relations among states remain the main subject area of realism.25 However, critical theory fills the gap to a great extent. The critical theory approach to terrorism studies does not reject the state as a legitimate entity for providing security. The difference of the critical theory with the traditional theories is that in critical theory, state is not automatically taken as the natural unit to provide security and thus to secure, and rather it is judged how well it provides security to citizens. A critical approach to terrorism similarly scrutinizes the role of non-state actors in terms of their contribution in providing security of humans. To be specific, the central task of the critical theory in terrorism studies is to ‘denaturalize’ both the state and non-state actors and to explore how both can combinely respond to the threat of terrorism.26 For this paper, the critical approach to terrorism and counter-terrorism studies helped in constructing the arguments and analysis.

3. changing Nature of Combating Terrorism

The fight against terrorism has changed significantly over the lastfew decades. Before the event of 9/11, the nature of fighting terrorism was completely different than what the global community sees right now. Just as 9/11 is seen as a point for the changing nature of terrorism, it is also a point of turn for the changing nature of combating terrorism. Before that time, terrorism was countered depending on the nature of it. Traditional terrorist organisations such as the separationist movements were handled by the law enforcing agencies and the intelligence community. Sometimes if the situation required it, the military was also involved. But the use of the military in the counter-terrorism was fairly limited in nature.27 Examples of such

25 Amenah Khalid and Mohamed Sofwan, “A Constructivist Response to Islamophobia and Counter Terrorism”, 2018, available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327361460_A_constructivist_response_to_ Islamophobia_and_counter_terrorism, accessed on 20 February 2020. 26 Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, London and New York : Routledge, 2009, p. 94. 27 Timothy Naftali, “US Counterterrorism before Bin Laden”, International Journal, Vol. 60, No. 1, 2005, p. 27. 256 CHANGING NATURE AND THE ROLE OF ACTORS tactics in fighting terrorism can be seen in the handling of domestic terrorist attacks. Here, it should be noted that this type of terrorism was usually done as a tactic to gain a goal, which is, comparing to the terrorism that the world is facing currently, straight forward in nature.

However, the 9/11 event gave rise to a new type of terrorism. A major change in this type of terrorism is that this kind of terrorism is not negotiable, unlike the previous terrorist groups, Al-Qaeda does not make any amenable political demand. Naturally, the way to address them was changed significantly. Another major change is how terrorism was being viewed by governments. US president Gorge W. Bush, by declaring that the global ‘war on terror’ changed the nature of fighting terrorism. The world entered into an era for the first time in history when a state declared war against a non-state entity. The military became the main fighting force against terrorism. At the same time, maintaining coherence between domestic and efforts in fighting terrorism became more important than ever. Coordination between multiple agencies of a state was given priority, while international cooperation of counter- terrorism got prevalence as well. However, following the trend of pre-9/11 period, the fight against terrorism was seen as government only affair; the role of the NGOs or the academia was fairly limited; even though counter-terrorism became a hot topic of discussion in the academia.

On the contrary, a major change was felt by the NGOs, especially the INGOs. Following the attack, a number of counter-terrorism legislation and regulations came into place to control legal identities, permitted activities, and access to resources of the NGOs. These regulations made it harder for NGOs to work. Some NGOs chose to oppose the government while others worked with the political institution to change the regulations.28 At the same time, NGOs and human rights groups started protesting against counter-terrorism activities that were deemed violating human rights and privacy rights. Especially the “PATRIOT act” by the US and the treatment of prisoners in the Guantanamo Bay prison sparked controversy all over the world.

It was only in 2006, in the ‘UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy’, that the role of civil society and non-governmental organisations were mentioned formally. This led to increased involvement of the non-state actors in the counter-terrorism process. Security Council’s counter-terrorism related subsidiary bodies and expert groups became more willing to draw on the analysis provided by think tanks and cooperate with them. Even in the Afghan war, the role of civil society became more prominent once the countries went to rebuild Iraq as intense fighting subsidised.

28 Elizabeth A. Bloodgood and Joannie Tremblay-Boire, “NGO Responses to Counterterrorism Regulations After September 11th”, The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, Vol.12, No. 4, November 2010. 257 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

During the Obama period, the US had a clear understanding that civil society had an important role to play in facilitating that engagement and helping the government “win hearts and minds.” of people.29 The NGOs were used in the US’ CVE efforts including to stop the spreading of the extremist messages. As early as in 2015, the US policymakers were asking themselves why there was a failure in combating the violent extremist ideology. They realized that it was important to combat not only the homegrown terrorirsm but foreign ideologies that were influencing them. The solution according to many scholars was to look at the foreign influence on the ideology of the youths, in which NGOs would play a huge role. This focus on the root causes of terrorism marks the transition from traditional counter-terrorism approaches to more broader CVE approach. As the focus was on ideology and counter messages, the role of NGOs, civil society and academia in producing and spreading that counter-message became more prominent.

However, the CVE approach had its own criticism as well. It came into the forefront by various scholars who claimed that the approaches to CVE had extended the security-agenda into the realms of care, social work, and education.30 There were also criticisms that the CVE was focused on the Muslim community thus alienating them further.31 Mainly because of these criticisms, the PVE approach arrived.

As a broader approach, the PVE aims to stop violent extremism before it can take place. As a result, the initiatives by the PVE incorporates more actors than the law enforcing agencies and military. The role played by local authorities, local NGOs and even school teachers and religious figures are considered more important than ever. A major part of the process is de-radicalization where similarly, the role of the NGOs has been considered to be necessary. Most of the new strategies for preventing and countering violent extremism now talk about the partnership with other actors, including the NGOs.32 After the adoption of the UN Secretary-General’s 2016 Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, the UN has encounraged its

29 Diana Medaglia, “Civil Society and Fighting Terrorism Through the UN”, Global Policy Forum, available at https://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/ngos-and-the-un/48562-civil-society-and-fighting-terrorism-through-the- un.html, accessed on 23 November 2019. 30 Charlotte Heath-Kelly, “Counter-Terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing the ‘Radicalisation’ Discourse and the UK Prevent Strategy,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 15, No. 3, 201, p. 394–415; Arun Kundani, Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism, London, London: Institute of Race Relations, 2009; Bob McDonald and Yaser Mir, “Al-Qaida Influenced Violent Extremism, UK Government Prevention Policy and Community Engagement,” Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research 3, No. 1, 2011, pp. 32–44, available at 10.5042/jacpr.2011.0020, accessed on 10 October 2019. 31 Sahar F. Aziz, “Losing the ‘War of Ideas’: A Critique of Countering Violent Extremism Programs”, Research Paper No.17-22, Texas A&M University School of Law Legal Studies, 2017. 32 The Danish Government, “Prevention of radicalisation and extremism Action Plan”, September 2014, available at https://www.justitsministeriet.dk/sites/default/files/media/Pressemeddelelser/pdf/2015/SJ20150422125507430%20 %5BDOR1545530%5D.PDF, accessed on 24 November 2019. 258 CHANGING NATURE AND THE ROLE OF ACTORS agencies along with the member states to excercise a more comprehensive approach in fighting terrorism, one that will engage both the drivers of violent extremism and its consequences.33

In recent times, however, the nature of combating terrorism is changing again. This is largely due to two factors. One is the rise of the IS, which is different from the kind of religious terrorism that has been witnessed in the past. IS aimed at controlling their own territory and starting a new civilization of their own. Despite being a terrorist organisation, their aim of taking control over territories made them more suitable for combating through traditional military forces; which has been successfully done.34 However, the other factor, the large number of foreign nationals who left their country to join IS, remains a bigger challenge. At the same time, the rise of lone wolf terrorism and self-radicalised youths has raised the question of how those can be prevented. While they pose a challenge for the law enforcement and intelligence agencies, it can not be denied that the societal factors play a role in the radicalisation process and thus the need to fight them through non- military means is also required.

Due to various factors including globalisation, the rapid growth of information and communication technologies, global agenda of different extremist groups, and presence of international financial institutions, terrorism has penetrated many countries which previously were not affected by it before. As such, the efforts in fighting terrorism has become more vigilant and take approaches that help countries prepare for the risk of terrorism. The introduction of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has created new paradoxical opportunities as well as challenges of its own. It has been noted that new technologies and computer algorithms are not only being used to thwart terrorist plots on a quantitative basis (by gathering more data than before) but they also provide new qualitative ways to analyse the intelligence data available. One such example is systematically monitoring Facebook and other social media platforms for ‘high risk individuals’ to anticipate potential lone wolf attackers. Although this might give the state some ability to thwart some attacks, it also raises that question of falsely labelling certain persons as “potential attackers”.35 The debate of privacy and human rights vs protection and security is still very much relevant in today’s world.

33 International Peace Institute, “Preventing Violent Extremism While Promoting Human Rights: Toward a Clarified UN Approach”, July 2019, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/ resources/1907_PVE-While-Promoting-Human-Rights.pdf, accessed on 12 Februaruy 2020. 34 “Islamic State group defeated as final territory lost, US-backed forces say”, BBC, 23 March 2019, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47678157, accessed on 05 October 2019. 35 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “The future of AI in warfare and counterterrorism”, The Jerusalem Post, available at https://www.jpost.com/Jpost-Tech/The-future-of-AI-in-warfare-and-counterterrorism-615112, accessed on 20 December 2019. 259 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

On the side of the spectrum, combating terrorism is also being viewed as an essential part of the overall development process that helps build a peaceful society. The new global development goals, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) include “Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions,” which includes combating terrorism in one of its targets.36 It becomes clear that combating terrorism is no longer limited to the law enforcing agencies as it was in the past, rather, it has become an overarching issue that needs to be handled by various actors, institutions and means. A violent extremist is seen as the product and often a symptom of deeper-seated issues, the idea is to strengthen cohesion in society and help local actors reinforce their resilience to conflict and division.37 This has led to a renewed importance being on the role that can be played by the international and regional organisations in fighting terrorism, who are incorporating peacebuilding, PVE and overall development in a new transformative and comprehensive approach towards fighting terrorism.

4. the Interplay of State and Non-state Actors in Confronting Terrorism

In order to understand the changing nature of confronting terrorism, it is important to understand how the actors both state and non-state, have been working to prevent terrorism. Generally, countering terrorism has been an area of the state actors. Several state actors like the US and the UK have actively spearheaded in counter-terrorism campaigns after 9/11, but the importance of involving NGOs and civil society in a comprehensive and multi-dimensional response to the threat of terrorism has been stressed over time. The paper evaluates the role of the various actors in confronting terrorism, which dividing their actions into four main areas: law enforcement; military efforts; diplomacy and coalition; prevention and containment. It should be mentioned that none of the actions can confront terrorism alone, rather the mix of all approaches is required for that purpose. Often the actions can also overlap with one another.

4.1 Law Enforcement

Law enforcement is one of the fundamental tenets of fighting terrorism. Domestically, it is the police and other law enforcing agencies that are in charge of providing security of the citizens and preventing any terrorist attacks taking place within its territory. They are also responsible for capturing the terrorists and ensuring their trial and punishment. Tasks such as surveillance, intelligence gathering, capture

36 United Nations in India, “SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions”, available at https://in.one.un.org/ page/sustainable-development-goals/sdg-16/, accessed on 02 October 2019. 37 Mohammed Abu-Nimer, “A Way Forward in Transforming Violent Extremism: De-Islamisation, De- Securitisation, and De-Religionisation”, Berghof Foundation, 2018. 260 CHANGING NATURE AND THE ROLE OF ACTORS and conviction of the terrorists and terrorist groups are handled by state actors. Thus, it is state actors who have a key role in the law enforcement part of fighting terrorism. However, when it comes to intelligence sharing among the states, International Organisations (IOs) play an important role. For example, the Interpol has an import role to play beside the UN office of counter terrorism.

The non-state actors such as civil society and NGOs, on the other hand, have the responsibility to explain to the state actors that human rights are useful framework for developing effective counter-terrorism strategies rather than an impediment. Civil society and NGOs may enter into partnerships with law enforcement bodies to develop targeted programmes of co-operation, focusing on increasing awareness and understanding of issues such as human rights, the diversity of communities and the internal working of a society where terrorists are active. An interesting example of good practice in this respect is a project in the US where the Arab-American Anti- Discrimination Committee co-operated with the Office for Civil Liberties of the US Department of Homeland Security in developing a training DVD for federal law enforcement officials.38

4.2 Military Efforts

Use of military means as a counter-terrorism strategy is a common phenomenon. Since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US, the military response gained unprecedented public prominence. Soon after the 9/11 incident, the US deployed its energy towards disrupting and eliminating the terrorists who were believed to be responsible for the 2001 attack. The US war in Iraq and Afghanistan are the biggest examples of military campaigns in the post 9/11 era. The US has been at war in Afghanistan for eighteen years and been fighting another one in Iraq for sixteen years. Chapter VII, Article 51 of the UN Charter provides the mandate to the US and other countries to take military actions against terrorist groups. It asserts that “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”39

38 Christopher Michaelsen, “The Role of Civil Society in Preventing and Combating Terrorism”, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at University of Hamburg (eds.), Organization for Security and Co- operation in Europe (OSCE) Yearbook 2007, Buden-Badan: Nomos, 2008, pp. 341-42. 39 United Nations, “Chapter VII-Action with Respect to Threats to The Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”, available at http://legal.un.org/repertory/art51.shtml, accessed on 24 September 2019. 261 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

Although the US’s “War on Terror” received some sort of support during the early days, over the years it faced several criticisms. Despite that, it is still one of the effective ways of fighting terrorism. The recent ongoing military intervention against the IS has shown that war is still a necessary means to combat terrorism. As is expected, the state actors are the main actors in war. However, international organisations and military alliances also can play a role in this aspect. Recently, the US has declared that it will seek help from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to prevent the resurgence of IS.40 On the other hand, the UN peacekeeping forces are also often faced with terrorist groups in their missions, which adds another dimension in the involvement of international organisations in war. For example, the UN stabilisation mission in Mali (MINUSMA), has been the target of terrorist attacks from a number of different groups.41 This has prompted the UN to mandate the UN Security Council to take “direct action” to mitigate and respond to the asymmetric threats that the terrorist groups represent.42

4.3 Diplomacy and Coalition

The transnational character of the terrorist groups makes it difficult for states to fight and defeat them. Such a character necessitates coordination of diplomatic efforts of key global actors in the fight against terrorism. Diplomacy and cooperation between state actors in bilateral, regional and international level in combating terrorism have been at key features of it. Even before 9/11, diplomatic efforts and cooperation existed in various forms including exchange of intelligence and training facilities, mutual and legal assistance for investigation and prosecution of terrorism-related cases, etc. However, often those were in a discreet and half-hearted manner.43 But following the event of 9/11, the importance of such cooperation has increased and this was reflected in the UN Security Council Resolution No. 1373 and in the individual and collective actions of the states to confront invisible opponents through coordinated efforts in matters such as collecting and sharing intelligence and the identification of the terrorists, denial of their funding, arrest and prosecution. This is the section where international organisations and state actors have worked hand in hand.

40 Robert Burns, “US to seek more help from NATO to counter Islamic State”, The Associated Press, 11 February 2020, available at https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2020/02/12/us-to-seek-more- help-from-nato-to-counter-islamic-state/, accessed on 18 February 2020. 41 John Karlsrud, “UN Peace Operations, Terrorism, and Violent Extremism”, in Cedric de Coning Mateja Peter (eds.), United Nations Peace Operations in a Changing Global Order, Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 153-166. 42 United Nations, “United Nations Security Council Resolution 2295”, New York: United Nations, 2016. 43 B Rahman, “Counter-Terrorism: India-China-Russia Cooperation”, China Report, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2004, p. 155. 262 CHANGING NATURE AND THE ROLE OF ACTORS

Economic support or financing is like a lifeline for the terrorist groups. So, dismantling this lifeline is perceived as one of the key counter-terrorism activities of the US and other global actors. Diplomacy had a major role to play in this regard. In the Middle East, in response to the appeal of the US and the European Union (EU), several Middle East governments have frozen alleged financial assets of the terrorist groups.44 IOs also can play a major role. For example, to prevent the financing of terrorists, the UN enacted an international convention in 1999. The convention requires nations to prevent the financing of terrorist groups and bring those people and organisations under the jurisdiction that provide such financing. Through this convention the UN wanted to exert that terrorist financing is a crime and simultaneously it declared that terrorism is a universal problem and it needs universal jurisdiction to eradicate terrorism from this world.45 Along with the “International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism”, the resolution has influenced a great extent in counter-terrorism law and practice at the national level. Non-state actors can also play an important role in controlling terrorist financing. Formon argues that the private sectors can be brought into the first line of defence against the terrorist organisation that seeks to earn, move or store illicit funds and information can be gathered from the private sector companies, which is important for acting against terrorism.46 Effective Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in this area can combat terrorist financing.

4.4 Prevention and Containment

It is understood that the terrorist groups use ethical and cultural factors to spread their propaganda to build a closer network with mass people and increase their legitimacy and soft power over people. Thus, it is important to understand those ethical and cultural factors that provide terrorism with its appeal that of the state. There are some issues that can lead to the rise of terrorism, such as ideology, beliefs and values, political grievances, sociological motivations etc.47 If the state actors fail to connect with people and develop a force of attraction, it can lead to further spread of terrorist ideologies. Terrorism is increasingly being seen as a problem that has to be solved through perseverance and addressing its social context in which it evolves. Thus, states have started searching for new methods and tools to combat the threat and containment has become a major part of the PVE.

44 Muhammad Zamir, “Fighting the tentacles of terrorism”, Dhaka Courier, 03 October 2003. 45 Michael Lawless, “Terrorism: An International Crime”, International Journal, 2008, p. 143. 46 Marcy M. Forman, “Combating Terrorist Financing and Other Financial Crimes through Private Sector Partnerships”, Journal of Money laundering Control, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2006, pp. 112-118. 47 Lena Slachmuijlder, Transforming Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilder’s Guide,Washington, DC.: Search for Common Ground, 2017, pp. 4-6. 263 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

Civil society and NGOs can help in the prevention of the root causes of terrorism, thus changing the enabling environment in which terrorism breeds. They can combat terrorism by undertaking various activities such as teaching the mass population about the demerits of terrorism, providing training to the religious and community leaders regarding this issue etc. On the other hand, undertaking various development activities can also help in improving the living condition of the population, thus helping to reduce the grievances those give rise to terrorism. In addition to creating counter-narratives, the civil society and the media have a critical part to play in terms of its value in creating awareness in the public minds against terrorists. In many cases, civil society plays a crucial role in a whole-of-society approach to countering and preventing radicalisation and violent extremism that lead to terrorism. On the other hand, to strengthen their cooperation with governments, civil society and NGOs can also acknowledge positive steps or measures taken by law enforcement officials and government where they occur,48 helping the government in consolidating the legitimacy of the steps taken in the minds of the people.

Another important area where the non-state actors can contribute heavily in counter-terrorism research. Civil society and NGOs have the capacity of engaging with the mass population at a level that most state actors cannot do. Thus, civil society and NGOs may try to engage in dialogue with individuals and groups involved in perpetrating acts of violence and terrorism. They also have the ability to conduct high-quality research in the areas of terrorism, political violence, and the conditions which aid in the spread of terrorism. Active participation of the government and non-governmental organisations can make a real synergy in an effective counter-terrorism strategy.

Non-state actors also provide policy suggestions to the government/state actors. The non-state actors can help the government by providing useful policy suggestions based on their research. Importantly, civil society experts and NGOs may provide alternative appropriate language and terminology to public officials in addressing issues related to terrorism and security.49 They can also suggest the government ways to develop an effective counter-terrorism narrative. Thus, civil society has a major role to play by facilitating dialogue, expressing views on security policy, monitoring the activities of the security forces, as well as providing policy advice.

Although over the years, states and international non-state actors are combating terrorism, it is still difficult to conclude that they have become successful in their efforts. Often asymmetric or divergent interests of the states were reflected in scattered responses in global counter-terrorism strategies. The US and other NATO member states are combating terrorism, there is scepticism behind the motives of those actors. Some

48 Christopher Michaelsen, op. cit. 49 Ibid. 264 CHANGING NATURE AND THE ROLE OF ACTORS scholars argue that the US has a different interest in the Middle East which worked behind the US intervention in Iraq. Similarly, Russia and other actors who are fighting against the IS terrorist group are motivated by their respective national interests.50 Thus, since the 9/11, a comprehensive approach has been absent in combating terrorism.

Arguably, the role of the non-state actors in counter-terrorism is relatively a new phenomenon. In the classical approach of counter-terrorism, the focus was on simply containing the terrorist activity through violent means. And as states are the only legitimate actor to propagate violence, the role of the non-state actors was limited. However, the current approach views terrorism as a challenge of ideology and propaganda.51 The states are now developing ‘containment strategies’ that aims at managing and marginalising the terrorism and it is an area where the NGOs have distinct advantages.52 That there is a need of having more than just the state actor in the confronting terrorism has been accepted by the states and international organisations. There are a number of reasons where civil society can play a complementary role vis-à-vis the state actors in preventing and countering violent extremism:

Civil society has the experience and capacity in working on various programmes which foster inclusive and peaceful societies and also mitigate the structural conditions which lead to the spread of violent extremism. NGOs and civil society have extensive knowledge of the local trends, dynamics and drivers of violent extremism, and also present the best “early warning” mechanisms for new and emerging threats. In most cases, civil society is locally rooted, has legitimacy, access and influence and also is driven by pragmatic concern for their communities’ wellbeing, safety and security. Non-state actors can be locally and internationally connected with a larger community of civil society actors and practitioners who work in relevant disciplines. They usually work with the marginalized segment of the society, promote their political participation and try to provide platforms for addressing their demand and grievances.53

In fact, it has been demonstrated that the various actors have individual advantages and disadvantages when it comes to fighting terrorism. States are the key

50 Interview with Professor Dr. Delwar Hossain, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Interview taken on 06 March 2018. 51 Nick Sitter and Tom Parker, “Fighting Fire with Water: NGOs and Counterterrorism Policy Tools”, Global Policy, Vol. 5, Issue 2, 2014, pp. 159-160. 52 Nick Sitter and Tom Parker, “NGOs and the Containment Approach to Counter-Terrorism”, The Big View, May 2013, available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259657045_NGOs_and_the_Containment_ Approach_to_Counter-_Terrorism_FP7_Global_Re-ordering_Evolution_through_European_Networks_The_ Big_View-May_2013_NGOs_and_the_Containment_Approach_to_Counter-Terrorism, accessed on 17 April 2018. 53 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “The Role of Civil Society in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism”, available at https://www.osce.org/ secretariat/400241?download=true, accessed on 24 September 2019. 265 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 actors in fighting the war against terrorists and International Organisations (IOs) are important players of diplomacy. On the other hand, Non-state actors such as NGOs and civil society has a major role in the containment of terrorism, but can not play any major role in millitary efforts. Table 1 below shows how the different actors have a comparative advantage in different components of fighting terrorism.

Table 1: Comparative Advantages of States, IOs and NGOs in Terms of Approaches to Counter-terrorism and Policy Tools Approaches States IOs NGOs Law Legislate, monitor, Harmonise law, exchange Support victims, monitor enforcement prosecute, disrupt information, extradition law enforcement Intelligence, combat operations, covert Coordination, War Limited role operations, foreign legitimation, use of force intervention Arenas for negotiation, Negotiations, political Supporting role: public Diplomacy mediation, monitor change, amnesties policy implementation agreements Policy coordination, EU Local government, law, direct expenditure, Ideational role: hard targets, crisis crisis management dominant discourse, use Containment management, Ideational role: of language, credible undermine support, dominant discourse, use information propaganda of language, credible information

Source: Adopted from Nick Sitter and Tom Parker, “Fighting Fire with Water: NGOs and Counterterrorism Policy Tools”, Global Policy, Volume 5, Issue 2, 2014, p. 163. However, the role played by actors in countering or preventing terrorism and violent extremism is not without challenges. It is alleged that in several countries, counter-terrorism strategies have eroded the rule of law, peeled away judicial controls, hampered individual freedom of expression and also exposed all citizens to unchecked surveillance from the respective governments.54 The counter-terrorism campaign of the states face questions due to some debated incidents like torture or attacking the civilians. Example of such an incident can be drawn from the incident of torture in Abu Ghraib High-Security Prison.

Although various measures to stop terrorist financing have become successful on a larger scale, the countries could not totally halt the process. In recent years,

54 “EU: Orwellian counter-terrorism laws stripping rights under guise of defending them”, Amnesty International, available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/01/eu-orwellian-counter-terrorism- laws-stripping-rights-under-guise-of-defending-them/, accessed on 05 March 2018. 266 CHANGING NATURE AND THE ROLE OF ACTORS although Al Qaeda and other terrorist group’s ability to raise and move funds has been significantly diminished, terrorist groups still have access to various financial resources and that fact constitutes an ongoing threat to the global community.55 States are yet to gain absolute success in defeating them through ideological means or culturally. Global and regional politics are mainly responsible for the state’s failure in this regard. Because of a particular country’s national and strategic interest, states are acting in a subjective manner in terrorism.56

Finally, civil society institutions and NGOs face significant challenges in engaging and mobilising public opinion. These include a massive information gap in the area of terrorism and counter-terrorism, with large parts of the community lacking both an understanding of and access to relevant information.57 It should also be noted that since there are no tools that can directly evaluate how a person’s ideological leaning change, there are always questions raised on how effective the role of the non-states actor led advocacy campaigns are in combating terrorism.

6. conclusion

The issue ‘terrorism’ received unprecedented global attention since 9/11 as a result of terrorist attacks in the US. Since then, the human civilisation is witnessing multiple actions related to terrorism and counter-terrorism. In fact, how the global key actors confront terrorism will determine the future course of international relations to a great extent. The war on terrorism has already changed the post-Cold War geopolitical setting. The boundary between local and global terrorism has been blurred with the rapid expansion of transnational terrorism.

The paper reveals that the mode of confronting terrorism has transformed a lot in the last two decades. While post 9/11 period mostly focused on fighting terrorism on military means and waging the global war on terrorism, it soon became clear that simply military means were not enough, and concepts of CVE and PVE emerged over time to find more comprehensive ways to fight terrorism. At present, the focus is on building societies that will be resilient against terrorism through the incorporation of development paradigm. At the same time, new technologies are being used to nullify terrorist attacks before they can happen.

55 Maurice R. Greenberg and Mallory Factor, “Update on the Global Campaign Against Terrorist Financing”, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 June 2004, available at https://backend-live.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_ pdf/Terrorist%20Financing%20TFR%206-17-04.pdf, accessed on 18 September 2019. 56 Interview with Professor Dr. Delwar Hossain, op.cit. 57 Christopher Michaelsen, op. cit. 267 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

It is also evident that there are some key characteristics of counter-terrorism campaigns. First of all, there is an absence of concerted or comprehensive global effort in combating terrorism. Secondly, multilateral efforts suffer from inadequate compliance and legal mechanisms as well as a lack of enforcement instruments. Thirdly, there is an adherence of international legal regimes in combating terrorism. The non-state actors can play a major role in countering violent extremist ideology. However, due to some hindrances, they could not perform their expected role. Regardless, it has been noted that the role of non-state actors in combating terrorism is a complementary one and primarily effective with the help of state actors since they cannot tackle the terrorist groups through violence. Non-state actors cannot substitute the role of the states, rather they can play a supplementary role beside the states’ initiatives in the counter-terrorism studies.

The paper reveals that terrorism cannot be completely contained by the actions of the state or the non-state actors only. Violent terrorist attacks are still a reality and when it comes to fighting with the truly global opponent like the IS, there is no alternative to use strong military actions which can only be done by the state actors. On the other hand, the non-state actors are better suited for creating counter- narratives against propaganda used by the terrorist groups. Furthermore, there is a rise in the idea of countering terrorism through development and governance. Since youth are the main targets of the terrorist organisation, projects are being undertaken to ensure that their grievances are addressed. There is little room for doubting that the transnational terrorist groups are not the same as traditional adversaries. Therefore, it is not possible to eradicate the threat with traditional wisdom. In the combat against terrorism, states are still main actors, but in order for the state policies to reach the local and grassroots level and to understand the ground realities better, they need to have the support of the non-state actors. So, an effective partnership between the state and the non-state actors and their complementary role can help to eradicate threats emanated from terrorism.

268 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019: 269-290

Moutusi Islam MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR BANGLADESH: RESPONSE OPTIONS

Abstract

The paper is an attempt to identify and analyze the maritime security challenges that are faced by Bangladesh and the possible response options. Maritime security is a vital issue in the contemporary world. It has become multipronged as against the earlier narrow view of defence against military attacks and the protection of a nation’s sovereignty at sea. Bangladesh faces many maritime security challenges that have both traditional and non-traditional characteristics such as great power rivalry; piracy and armed robbery; trafficking of arms, drugs and people; illegal fishing and poaching; marine pollution; natural disasters and climate change; and finally, resource management. Therefore, Bangladesh needs to focus on developing effective capacity building in areas i.e., regulatory frameworks, institutional structures, human resource, technology and infrastructure, maritime diplomacy, with a view to ensuring its maritime security.

Keywords: Maritime Security, Traditional Maritime Security, Non-traditional Maritime Security, Capacity Building

1. introduction

Today oceans and seas have transformed into critical areas for security, trade, environment and maritime geopolitics resulting into the shifting of political centre of gravity from land to oceans. Consequently, maritime security has become a major concern for a significant number of states and other international actors. Traditionally, maritime security has been theorized and interpreted from a conservative viewpoint, excluding non-traditional security issues, focusing on themes such as great power politics, geostrategy or international regime-building.1 However, Sam Bateman points out, “maritime security is a basic requirement of all coastal and island states which involves policies and operations to deal with threats both of a traditional military nature, as well as the ones of a non-traditional nature”.2

Moutusi Islam is Research Officer at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). Her e-mail address is: [email protected]

© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2019.

1 Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, “Beyond Seablindness: A New Agenda for Maritime Security Studies” , International Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 6, 2017, p. 1293. 2 Sam Bateman, “Maritime Security Governance in the Indian Ocean Region”, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2016, p. 9. 269 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

Hence, the contemporary understanding of maritime security debate incorporates both conventional and non-conventional issues.

Despite being a maritime state, maritime security of Bangladesh is relatively an unexplored phenomenon. As Abul Kalam observes, “Bangladesh does not carry an enduring maritime legacy in its strategic formulations or in policymaking but the Bengalis have significant historical legacies as seafarers, boat-makers, traders and shipbuilders”.3 An Indian Ocean littoral state, Bangladesh has 710 km long coastline along the ocean via the Bay of Bengal. The country’s prolonged disputes over maritime claims with neighbouring Myanmar and India were resolved through the respective judgments given by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). A new maritime-centric Bangladesh has emerged following the verdicts. Its current maritime geography is 1,18,813 sq km.4 The country’s rights over 200 nautical miles of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) have also been established. Its continental shelf now extends up to 354 nautical miles; it has sovereign rights there on all living and non-living resources. This opening in the south is a crucial point for the country’s international trade and commerce, as well as for the extraction and exploration of marine resources. At the same time, it has been exposed to a number of threats both traditional and non- traditional in nature to its maritime domain. Therefore, how these challenges can be tackled has become a prime concern for Bangladesh.

Given this backdrop, this paper is an endeavour to understand maritime security challenges for Bangladesh. It also evaluates response options to deal with these challenges. The paper uses qualitative method. It examines existing literature that come from varieties of sources e.g., books, journal articles, government and non-government policy papers and documents, newspapers and internet- based articles. In addition, data and ideas have been collected through expert interviews. For the convenience of the discussion, the paper is organized into five sections including introduction and conclusion. Section two explores the concept of maritime security in a comprehensive manner. Section three highlights the contemporary maritime security challenges for Bangladesh. Section four analyzes the response options to ensure maritime security of Bangladesh. The fifth section concludes the paper.

3 Abul Kalam, “Maritime Destiny of Bangladesh: Legacies and Prospects”, BIISS Journal, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2015, p. 293. 4 M. Gulam Hussain, Pierre Failler, A. Al Karim and M. Khurshed Alam, “Major Opportunities of Blue Economy Development in Bangladesh”, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2018, p. 2. 270 MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR BANGLADESH

2. understanding Maritime Security

The concept of maritime security is elusive and open to different interpretations. Initially coined in the 1990s, the concept has received growing attention due to the intensification of concerns over maritime terrorism since 2000, the rise of modern piracy off the coast of Somalia and elsewhere, maritime crimes such as human trafficking, and the increasing significance in recent years of the so- called ‘blue economy’ and issues relating to maritime environmental protection and resource management.5

The root of maritime security, on the other hand, is as old as the use of the oceans, with nations devising their own customs and practices to safeguard their multifarious marine related interests in the seas and oceans.6 Inspired by the philosophy of Mare Liberum (1618) of Hugo Grotius, few maritime powers of the past aspired to possess influence over the use of oceanic resources.7 Later on, Alfred T. Mahan’s argument that ‘one who controls the seas holds the decisive factor in modern politics and warfare’ provided the powerful maritime powers of the time with a body of ideas, views and thoughts on maritime strategy with immense practical and operational values.8 Subsequently, the international community felt the need for change in the general outlook towards the ocean. The UN initiative in creating a new ocean regime to ensure that all nations benefit from the uses of the oceans and extraction of their resources was a remarkable event. This implied a series of negotiations starting from the Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea (1958-60) to 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on various important facets of ocean regime. Following the end of the Cold War, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 of the Rio Summit, an important international ‘soft law’, placed the entire oceanic affairs in a newer perspective dealing with the protection of the oceans and the sustainable use of their living resources. The era is also marked by the emergence of various sources of non-traditional maritime security threats. The contemporary maritime security complex consists of four domains, each of which incorporates a series of variously cross-cutting security concerns9: i) national security, which is the traditional use of naval military power to defend commercial shipping lanes and the national territory; ii) marine environment concerning environmental and safety regulations regarding marine pollution and health protection; iii) economic development which includes trade by sea, the exploitation of oil and other non-living

5 Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, op. cit., p. 1293. 6 Abul Kalam Azad, “Maritime Security of Bangladesh”, in Mufleh R Osmani and Muzaffer Ahmad (eds.), Security in the Twenty First Century: A Bangladesh Perspective, Dhaka: BIISS, 2003, p. 165. 7 Ibid, p. 166. 8 See, Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, Boston: Dover Publications, 1987. 9 Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, op. cit., p. 1299. 271 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

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resources, as well as fisheries; and iv) human security which implies the absence of security (insecurity) of individuals, people in communities, or citizens of states. So, the complex and cross-cutting nature of maritime security makes it difficult to provide a concrete definition.

Perhaps one universally agreed aspect of maritime security is that it is a fluid concept which has no definite meaning and varies depending on the actor whois defining it. However, it can be defined as comprising those issues pertaining to the sea which have a critical bearing on a country’s security.10 In Thean Potgieter’s view, “maritime security deals with the prevention of illicit activities in the maritime domain which could be linked directly to the national security efforts of a specific country, or it could cover regional and international efforts to enforce maritime security”.11 Christopher Rahman notes, “the concept of maritime security focuses on five inter- related areas: security of the sea itself; ocean governance; maritime border protection; military activities at sea; and security regulation of the maritime transportation system”.12 Therefore, maritime security can be regarded as addressing a range of traditional and non-traditional issues with a view to securing the maritime space.

The majority of international actors define the concept in terms of threats and illicit activities those pose a risk to peace and order.13 The United States (US) Naval Operations Concept (2010), listed ensuring the freedom of navigation, the flow of commerce and the protection of ocean resources, as well as securing the maritime domain from nation-state threats, terrorism, drug trafficking and other forms of transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction and illegal seaborne immigration.14 The 2008 UN Secretary General’s Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea identifies, illicit trafficking of arms and weapons of mass destruction, illicit traffic of narcotics and psychotropic substances, and smuggling and trafficking of persons by sea as threats to shipping companies, militaries, and law enforcement.15 The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security (2014) listed terrorism, disruption to trade or freedom of navigation, cyber attack against UK’s maritime infrastructure, arms proliferation, drugs and people smuggling as maritime security risk.16 The

10 Rahul Roy Chaudhury, India’s Maritime Security, New Delhi: IDSA and Knowledge World, 2000, p. 1. 11 Thean Potgieter, “Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: Strategic Setting and Features”, Institute of Security Studies Paper, No. 236, 2012, p. 1. 12 Christopher Rahman, Concepts of Maritime Security: A Strategic perspective on Alternative Visions for Good Order and Security at Sea, with Policy Implications for New Zealand, New Zealand: Centre for Strategic Studies, 2009. 13 Christian Bueger, “What is Maritime Security?”, Marine Policy, Vol. 53, 2015, p. 162. 14 “Naval Operations Concept 2010: Implementing the Maritime Strategy”, 2010, available at https://fas.org/ irp/doddir/navy/noc2010, accessed on 10 October 2019. 15 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, New York: United Nations General Assembly, 2015. 16 UK Government, The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security, London: UK Government, 2014, p. 17. 272 MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR BANGLADESH

European Union (EU) Maritime Security Strategy (2014) included nine threats which are mostly similar to UK’s. However, it also added “external aggression and armed conflict between states related to maritime dispute, potential security impacts of natural disasters, extreme events and climate change on the maritime transport system and in particular on the maritime infrastructure, environmental risks and illegal archeological research” as maritime security risks and threats.17 This approach of ‘listing threats’ by the international actors, however, creates a dilemma in regards to the threats and illicit activities that should be included or excluded.

Although maritime security has become a core concern for major international actors, the study is still scattered in International Relations. Hence, theorizing maritime security is rather difficult. However, three schools of thought in regards to the study of maritime security can be identified. Maritime security is mainly regarded as a matter of ‘sea power’ in the realist school of thought.18 The concept of ‘sea power’ aims at laying out the role of naval forces and elaborating strategies for their use. According to Geoffrey Till, “in peacetime, sea power is associated with countries securing the ability to conduct transport and trade via the sea. In wartime, sea power describes the agency of navies to attack other navies or other countries sea transportation means”.19 Natalie Klein sees maritime security as “the protection of a state’s land and maritime territory, infrastructure, economy, environment and society from certain harmful acts occurring at sea”.20 This school of thought has tended to prioritize ‘top-down’ or structural influences on international order at sea, including global power shifts, changing threat perceptions, naval modernization and changes in naval capabilities.21 Conversely, liberal school emphasizes on the role of various international regimes governing activities at sea.22 The promotion of a “stable maritime regime” based on UNCLOS principles is the main concern. Therefore, upholding and implementing the Convention is a central consideration. In the absence of world government, the creation of such a regime requires that states consent to these rules and practices through negotiation.23 This perspective has been further

17 European Union, European Union Maritime Security Strategy, Brussels: European Union, 2014, p. 7-8. 18 Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power, London: Routledge, 1990; Alfred T. Mahan, op. cit.; K. M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd; Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, London: Frank Cass, 2004. 19 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for Twenty-First Century, Milto: Routledge, 2018, p. 10. 20 Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 11. 21 Jo Inge Bekkevold and Geoffrey Till, International Order at Sea, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 7. 22 Michael Leifer, “The Maritime Regime and Regional Security in East Asia”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1991; Sam Bateman, “Building Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia: The Promise of International Regimes”, in Kwa Chong Guan and John K. Skogan (eds.), Maritime Security in Southeast Asia, London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 97-116. 23 Robert L. Freidheim, “A Proper Order for the Oceans: An Agenda for the New Century”, in Davor Vidas and Willy Ostreng (eds.), Order for the Oceans at the Turn of the Century, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999, p. 538. 273 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

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advanced by the maritime legal scholars like James Kraska and Raul A. Pedrozo who have defined maritime security as a “stable order of the oceans subject to the rule of law at sea”.24 On the other hand, the constructivist school of thought focuses on how the concept of maritime security comes to be through actions, interactions and perceptions. They are against the idea of accepting maritime security as a given list of threats. Very few constructivists have influenced the debate on maritime security with few exceptions.25 According to Christian Bueger, “the mapping of the concept of maritime security is based on the converging frameworks that must adhere to the general traditional concepts and at the same time, identify commonalities that will allow for a gradual incorporation of wider issues”.26 He has identified three frameworks for how to deconstruct concepts of maritime security by various actors: first, the matrix framework, incorporating the concepts of marine safety, sea power, blue economy and resilience; second, the securitization framework, examining the inter-relationship between the maritime threats and divergent political interests and ideologies; and third, the practice theory that examines the true intentions and actions of actors involved in the maritime security arena.

There are four characteristics of maritime security27: first, maritime security challenges are interconnected; second, most maritime security issues cannot be understood as problems of the marine environment alone rather they are invariably interlinked with challenges on land as well; third, maritime security issues often transcend clear boundaries of governmental responsibility or state competence. Finally, maritime security is inherently cross-jurisdictional.

3. contemporary Maritime Security Challenges for Bangladesh

Adopting a comprehensive approach to maritime security, exploring the trends in both traditional and non-traditional maritime security issues facing Bangladesh is emphasized by many scholars that offer one to get a better understanding of how various states, non-state actors, and transnational forces have put enormous challenges to maritime security of Bangladesh.28 So, from a comprehensive maritime security

24 James Kraska and Raul A. Pedrozo, International Maritime Security Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013, p. 1. 25 See, Barry J. Ryan, “Security Spheres: A Phenomenology of Maritime Spatial Practices”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 46, No. 6, 2015, pp. 568-584; James A. Malcolm, “Responding to International Terrorism: the Securitization of the United Kingdom’s Ports”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2016, pp. 443-462; Christian Bueger, op. cit., pp. 159-164. 26 Christian Bueger, Ibid. 27 Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, op. cit., pp. 1300-1301. 28 See, Abul Kalam Azad, op. cit., pp. 159-229; Lailufar Yasmin and Md. Rezwanul Haque Masud, “Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region: Bangladesh Cognition”, in ASM Ali Ashraf (ed.), Intelligence, National Security and Foreign Policy, Dhaka: BILIA, 2016, pp. 169-182. 274 MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR BANGLADESH perspective, a number of maritime security challenges dominate the maritime area of Bangladesh. These include great power rivalry, maritime piracy and armed robbery, trafficking and smuggling, illegal fishing and poaching, marine pollution, natural disasters and climate change and resource management. The discussion below will further illustrate these challenges.

3.1 Great Power Rivalry

The growing economic and strategic significance of the Bay of Bengal has led to the unprecedented jostle for influence by the major powers, including China, India, US and Japan. China’s economic and security interests have resulted in a greater Chinese presence and engagement in the Bay of Bengal. With its Maritime Silk Route (MSR), China has initiated a new era of maritime connectivity and cooperation.29 As a part of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it has established economic relations with the Bay of Bengal countries through infrastructure projects such as port development, power plant construction, railway and road building in the littoral countries. However, MSR is perceived as a strategy to establish its own maritime and naval influence across the breadth of the Indian Ocean.30 Indian strategic planners worry that Chinese influence in these Indian Ocean outposts could turn them into military bases that would enable China to “encircle” India.31 China’s activities in the Bay have been one of the most decisive factors influencing India’s interest in the Bay.32 At present, India is undertaking a major modernization drive for its navy and is increasing bilateral and multilateral naval ties in the Bay of Bengal. Most importantly, India is increasingly aligning with the US-Japanese coalition in the Bay of Bengal.

The US has appeared to be the principal actor in the emerging strategic dynamics in the Indian Ocean region in general and the Bay of Bengal in particular. The US is keenly interested to check the rise of any peer competitor capable to threaten US vital interests or her allies in the region.33 The primary concern for the US in Asia is mainly China’s growing military capabilities and assertiveness. It is

29 David Brewster, “The Bay of Bengal: The Maritime Silk Route and China’s Naval Ambitions”, The Diplomat, 14 December 2014, available at https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-bay-of-bengal-the-maritime-silk-route- and-chinas-naval-ambitions/, accessed on 30 November 2019. 30 Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury and Pratnashree Basu, “Meeting with China in the Bay of Bengal”, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2016, p. 148. 31 Nilanthi Samarnayake, The Long Littoral Project: Bay of Bengal A Maritime Perspective on Indo Pacific Security, Washington, D.C.: CNA Corporation, 2012, p. 5. 32 David Brewster, “China and India at Sea: A Contest of Status and Legitimacy in the Indian Ocean”, Australia India Institute, 2015, p. 16. 33 Md. Jahan Shoieb and Md. Muhibbur Rahman, “Emerging Strategic Landscape in the Bay of Bengal and Maritime Capability Building of Bangladesh”, BIISS Journal, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2014, p. 31. 275 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

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pursuing partnership building with the littoral countries. The growing involvement with India in the Bay of Bengal security matters shows that the country prioritizes the Bay of Bengal as a significant outpost in its Indo-Pacific strategic calculation. On the other hand, some recent developments indicate that Japan also intends to become an important security player in the region. Due to maritime disputes with China and remilitarization drive, the country has started to modernize the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) by surpassing JCG budget to the self-imposed 1 per cent of GDP limit. Thereby strengthening overall Japanese maritime capability is at the frontlines of Japan’s diplomacy and strategy for the Indo-Pacific.34 Besides, it has taken up various infrastructure projects in the littorals (i.e. India, Myanmar and Bangladesh) that are now being complimented by a maritime security programme that will make Japan an important security player.

Such power rivalry often makes smaller neighbours vulnerable. Bangladesh is not an exception. The safety of both seaborne trade and energy transportation are fundamental for Bangladesh’s economy, since almost 90 per cent of the export depends on sea trade as well as 100 per cent of its energy requirements travels by sea.35 So, any possible unrest among the major powers in this region would severely affect its maritime interest. Besides, experts argue that the geo-political rivalry of the major states has led to the lack of support for the Chinese-funded deep sea port project in Sonadia.36 Therefore, the glimpses of the consequences of power rivalry have already been seen by the country with the politics around building deep sea ports. So, great power rivalry poses threat to maritime security of the country.

3.2 Maritime Piracy and Armed Robbery

Illicit activities like armed robbery, petty theft and piracy remain major concern for Bangladesh. The sea robbers of the country are in some way different from worldwide maritime piracy as they are not like Somalian pirates in their modus operandi. Bangladeshi pirates do not have the capacity to venture into deep sea and commit piracy; they are often limited to armed robbery, minor theft and banditry in ships, both foreign and domestic. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), most of the reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ship of Bangladesh are at Chattogram anchorages and approaches, and the robbers continue

34 Jay Tristan Tarriela, “How Abe Remade the Japan Coast Guard”, The Diplomat, 24 January 2019, available at https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/how-abe-remade-the-japan-coast-guard/, accessed on 20 November 2019. 35 “Bangladesh Free to Explore Resources in Bay: PM”, The Daily Star, 11 December 2012. 36 Wade Shepard, “Bangladesh’s Deep Sea Port Problem”, The Diplomat, 07 June 2016, available at https:// thediplomat.com/2016/06/bangladeshs-deep-sea-port-problem, accessed on 05 November 2019; Muinul Islam, “The Deeper Politics of Deep Sea Ports”, The Daily Star, 04 November 2019. 276 MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR BANGLADESH to target ships at anchor.37 Thousands of Bangladeshi fishermen have been attacked, killed, or taken hostage off the coast of the port of Chattogram. Cox’s Bazar District Fishing Trawler Owner Association (DFTOA) estimated that from 2010 to 2014 pirates killed at least 411 fishermen and wounded at least 1,000.38 The statistic shows the number of total ship piracy and armed robbery incidents in Bangladesh from 2009 to 2018 (see Table 1). The number of actual and attempted attacks decreased significantly in 2016 due to the efforts by the Bangladesh government. However, since 2017 piracy attacks have jumped three-fold to 11 which is a major concern. Table 1: Piracy and Armed Robbery in Bangladesh Year Actual and Attempted Attacks 2009 19 2010 24 2011 14 2012 11 2013 6 2014 16 2015 10 2016 2 2017 11 2018 11

Source: Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), Annual Report 2018- Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, Singapore: Information Sharing Centre, 2018.

3.3 Trafficking of Arms, Drugs and People

The sea is the main medium for the illegal movement of people and goods and the Bay of Bengal is not an exception. Illegal trafficking of arms, drugs and people is evident in Bangladesh’s maritime waters. Trafficking of arms in Bangladesh is no longer confined to air and land spaces as sea routes are being used for the purpose. Cox’s Bazar, Chattogram port and some of the offshore areas are the most convenient transit points

37 ICC International Maritime Bureau, ICC-IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report 2018, London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2018, p. 19. 38 “Non-Conventional Maritime Threats for Bangladesh Security”, Banglanews24, 09 October 2016, avail- able at https://www.banglanews24.com/open-forum/article/56143/Non-Conventional-Maritime-Threats-for- Bangladesh-Security, accessed on 30 October 2019. 277 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

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from which the illegal arms find their way to the local market.39 From 2012 to 2019, Bangladesh Navy and Coast Guard have seized several fishing crafts loaded with arms in Cox’s Bazar’s coastal area.40 Trafficking of consumer goods, narcotics and drugs like Yaba coming from the neighbourhood is another threat to social stability affecting proper growth and sound development of the youth in Bangladesh. The smugglers are using the Bay of Bengal and its adjacent rivers as a route for smuggling Yaba and other narcotic drugs from Myanmar to Bangladesh. Besides, the trend to move in South-East Asia and Europe among the people of Bangladesh is high, due to which Prevention and Suppression of Human Trafficking Act was formulated in 2012.41 The discovery of mass graves of smuggled victims in 2015 in Malaysia and Thailand brought the issue in limelight. Simultaneously, the illegal migration of Rohingya people via sea routes in Bangladesh has become a daunting challenge for the country.

3.4 Illegal Fishing and Poaching

Illegal fishing and poaching is also a major concern. The fisheries sector plays a very important role in the national economy, contributing 2.73 per cent to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).42 Fish supplements about 60 per cent of Bangladeshi people’s daily animal protein intake.43 More than 17 million people, including about 1.4 million women depend on fisheries sector for their livelihoods through fishing, farming, fish handling and processing.44 A survey of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) stated that, “of the estimated annual sustainable yield of 3,89,000 metric tons of fish and shrimp, only about 1,18,000 metric tons are successfully harvested.”45 It ranked 47th among 152 countries in the Illegal Fishing Index 2019,46 which is resulting to the increase in the number of critically endangered, threatened and vulnerable fish species.47 Since 2014, 43 Indian

39 Abul Kalam Azad, “Maritime Security of Bangladesh: Facing the Challenges of Non-Traditional Threats”, BIISS Journal, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2009, p. 9. 40 Syed Munir Khasru and Raisat Noor, “Maritime Security in Bay of Bengal: Potential Challenges and opportunities”, IPAG, 31 October 2019, available at https://www.ipag.org/maritime-security-in-bay-of-bengal- potential-challenges-and-opportunitie/, accessed on 16 December 2019. 41 Reaz Ahmad and Jamil Mahmud, “Human Trafficking from Bangladesh: Kingpins remain unpunished”,The Daily Star, 30 July 2017. 42 Parimal Chadra Paul, Md. Shaheed Reza, Md. Nazrul Islam and Md. Kamal, “A Review on Dried Fish Processing and Marketing”, Research in Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2018, p. 381. 43 Md. Mostafa Shamsuzzaman et al., “Fisheries Resources of Bangladesh: Present Status and Future Direction”, Aquaculture and Fisheries, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2017, p. 145; National Fish Week, Compendium, Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock, Government of Bangladesh, 2016. 44 Bangladesh Foreign Trade Institute, Study on Sector Based Need Assessment of Business Promotion Council- Fisheries Products, Dhaka: BFTI, 2016, p. 1215. 45 Nahela Nowshin, “Bangladesh’s maritime security needs beefing up”,The Daily Star, 08 March 2015. 46 “Bangladesh 47th in illegal fishing index”,The Financial Express, 06 March 2019. 47 Abu Siddique, “Increase in catching fish threatens the existence of many species”, Dhaka Tribune, 23 July 2018. 278 MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR BANGLADESH fishing vessels, 4 Sri Lankan vessels, 8 Myanmar and 1 Thai fishing trawler were captured by Bangladesh Navy while fishing illegally in Bangladesh sea area and handed over to the appropriate authority.48 Bangladesh Navy and Coast Guard from time to time apprehend foreign fishing vessels of different origins. Nevertheless, their capability is constrained by the lack of surveillance and monitoring vessels.

3.5 Marine Pollution

Another notable maritime security challenge for Bangladesh is marine pollution. Marine pollution can be simply defined as affecting the quality of the marine environment by releasing waste into the sea. Bangladesh was listed among the top polluters of the world’s oceans ranking 10th in polluting the oceans in 2010.49 It experiences marine pollution originating from both land- and sea-based sources. Oil/ chemical spills from transportation of oil and accidents in the sea is a major marine based source of pollution. Repeated oil spills from foreign and local ships in the Port of Mongla are creating a severe threat to the world’s largest tidal halophytic mangrove forest, the Sundarbans.50 The other sea-based sources of marine pollution include shipping, fishing activities, legal and illegal dumping at sea. On the other hand, a major land-based source of pollution is ship-breaking and repairing activities which pose a threat to both terrestrial and marine environment as well as to public health. The World Bank has estimated that within 2030 large amount of hazardous materials are likely to accumulate in Bangladesh.51 A number of the present scrapping facilities are located in the direct vicinity of significant fisheries. It has been reported that the fish stocks have seriously deteriorated following the establishment of scrapping activities.52 In addition, Bangladesh faces the worst case scenario of sea pollution due to plastic. According to a report titled “Plastic Waste Inputs from Land into the Ocean”, Bangladesh dumped 0.79 million metric tons of plastic waste into the oceans in 2010.53 A survey conducted by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change found that plastic waste constitutes more than 60 per cent of the litter found in the beaches of Bangladesh.54

48 “Blue Economy- Perspective Bangladesh Navy”, Bangladesh Navy Website, 2018, available at https://www. navy.mil.bd/BLUE-ECONOMY-PERSPECTIVE-BANGLADESH-NAVY, accessed on 21 October 2019. 49 “Study: Bangladesh a major polluter of the world’s oceans”, Dhaka Tribune, 15 September 2018. 50 Upal Aditya Oikya, “Marine Environment Pollution: A Landscape and Legal Framework”, Daily Asian Age, 26 December 2016. 51 Maria Sarraf, Frank Stuer-Lauridsen, Milen Dyolgerov, Robin Bloch, Susan Wingfild and Roy Watkinson, The Ship Breaking and Recycling Industry in Bangladesh and Pakistan, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2010, P. 5. 52 Md. M. Hossain and M. M. Islam, Ship Breaking Activities and Its Impact on the Coastal Zone of Chattogram Bangladesh: Towards Sustainable Management, YPSA: Chattogram, Bangladesh, 2006, p. 31. 53 Jenna R. Jambeck, Roland Geyer, Chris Wilcox and Theodore R. Siegler, “Plastic Waste Inputs from Land into the Oceans”, Science, Vol. 347, No. 6223, 2015, p. 769. 54 Department of Environment, National Status including Database, Proposed Recycling Enterprise and Interventions on Marine Litter, Dhaka: Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, 2018. 279 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

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The land-based sources of pollution also include industrial waste from production facilities in coastal areas, pesticides and fertilizers from agriculture, municipal waste and sewage disposal. All these have resulted in local pollution affecting the marine environment and associated organism. Experts points out that currently Bangladesh has no ocean governance or policy to protect the marine resources from pollution.55 Besides, scientific studies on marine pollution are rare in Bangladesh andmore research and monitoring activities are necessary to make a realistic assessment of the current situation.

3.6 Natural Disasters and Climate Change

The Bay of Bengal is prone to some of the world’s worst natural disasters. Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to cyclones and floods, particularly in the country’s coastal areas. Cyclones and associated storm surges and floods have led to almost all the nearly 520,000 natural disaster deaths recorded over the past 40 years.56 These events also have the potential to cause significant economic damage. Cyclone Sidr in 2007 cost an estimated US$1.7 billion in damages and losses.57 The country’s extreme vulnerability to hydro- meteorological hazards, including storm-induced tidal flooding, is likely to increase due to climate change.

Climate change or sea level rise is also one of the major crises which will highly affect littorals like Bangladesh. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that global sea-level rise as a result of climate change will be 0.6 meters or more by 2100.58 According to IPCC, “almost 60% of the projected increase in the annual number of people flooded in coastal populations will occur in South Asia, along the coasts from Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh through to Myanmar”.59 A report of the Climate Change Cell reveals that the range of sea level rise on Bangladesh’s coast over the past 30 years is 6-21mm/year which is much higher than the global average.60 Climate change affects natural systems, which in turn has negative impacts on human systems, which can engender, or contribute to engender, the occurrence of maritime crimes which is applicable for Bangladesh as well.

55 Md. Wahidul Alam and Xu Xiagmin, “Marine Pollution Prevention in Bangladesh: A way Forward for Implement Comprehensive National Legal Framework”, Thalassas: An International Journal of Marine Sciences, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2019, p. 17. 56 Kazi Amdadul Hoque, “Reducing the impact of disaster”, The Daily Star, 13 October 2019. 57 “Bangladesh gets $95 mln W.Bank loan for post-cyclone aid”, Reuters, 06 July 2006. 58 Intergovermental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007- Impact, Adaptation and Vulnerability, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 59 Ibid. 60 Ministry of Environment and Forests, Assessment of Sea Level Rise on Bangladesh Coast through Trend Analysis, Dhaka: Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2016, p. 53. 280 MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR BANGLADESH

3.7 Resource Management

Natural resources such as petroleum, carbon and marine fisheries in the Bay of Bengal are significant components of future economic development of Bangladesh. In terms of fisheries, there are about 475 species of fish in the coastal areas of Bangladesh,61 accounting for about 2.73 per cent of the country’s GDP and about 4.9 per cent of its total export earnings.62 However, majority of these fishermen lack the resources and capital to explore the huge potential of aquatic resources. Besides, Bangladesh has the potential to become one of the biggest sources of offshore hydrocarbon reserves. The discovery of the Krishna Godavari and Mahanandi Basins of India with potential reserve of 100 trillion cubic feet of gas (200 trillion cubic feet according to unofficial estimates) indicates that the prospect of hydrocarbon reserve in Bangladesh’s part is probably high.63 These enormous potential has driven the country to pursue ‘Blue Economy’ outlook for its economic development. However, the country is normally dependent on foreign technologies for exploring the natural resources specially exploring the petroleum and natural gas in the Bay of Bengal. It requires comprehensive technological and technical knowhow for effectively exploring, drilling and extracting marine resources. So, effectively managing these vast marine resources is one of the maritime security issues for Bangladesh.

4. response Options for Bangladesh

Discussions of responses to maritime security outline a rather broad and incongruent mix of diverse policy proposals. However, the majority of the existing literature put emphasis on varied level of capacity building.64 Bangladesh should also put emphasis on capacity building with a view to ensuring maritime security. Maritime security capacity building can be defined as “activities which are directed at the empowerment of governments and coastal communities to efficiently and efficaciously govern and sustainably exploit the maritime domain”.65 Hence, maritime capacity building implies a holistic agenda of change and reform in institutions, governance, procedures and management across a wide range of different policy

61 Department of Fisheries, Yearbook of Fisheries Statistics of Bangladesh 2017-18, Bangladesh: Ministry of Fisheries, Vol. 35, 2018, p. 129. 62 Parimal Chadra Paul, Md. Shaheed Reza, Md. Nazrul Islam and Md. Kamal, op. cit., pp. 381-390. 63 Jack Detsche, “Bangladesh: Asia’s New Energy Superpower?”, The Diplomat, 14 November 2014. 64 See, Andrew Forbes, Maritime Capacity Building in the Asia-Pacific Region, Australia: Sea Power Centre, 2010; Christian Bueger, Timothy Edmunds and Robert McCabe, “Into the Sea: Capacity-building Innovations and the Maritime Security Challenge”, Third World Quarterly, 2019; Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, Mastering Maritime security: Reflexive Capacity Building and the Western Indian Ocean Experience, UK: Safeseas, 2018. 65 Christian Bueger, Timothy Edmunds and Robert McCabe, op. cit., p. 1. 281 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

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sectors.66 According to Chapter 37 of Agenda 21, “capacity building encompasses the country’s human, scientific, technological, organisational, institutional and resource capabilities”.67 Sam Bateman points out three elements of capacity: human resources, institutions and enabling environment.68 The paper identifies five main elements of maritime capacity, which are illustrated in table 2. The remainder of this section presents the findings of Bangladesh’s current maritime capacity elements along with considerations how the particular capacity could be developed.

Table 2: Elements of Maritime Capacity and Relevant Definitions69 Regulatory Frame- Regulatory frameworks are the relevant laws, regulations, plans, proce- works dures and guidelines necessary to perform assigned tasks and achieve desired objectives. Organizational Struc- Organizational structures are individual teams, units, departments, tures overall organisational structure and leadership with specific responsi- bilities to perform or support assigned tasks and achieve desired objec- tives. Human Factors This includes assets like personnel, education, research, training, intel- ligence, skills. Technology and Infra- T&I include major items of equipment, supplies, facilities and systems structure (T & I) that comply with relevant standards necessary to perform assigned ob- jectives and tasks. Maritime Diplomacy Maritime diplomacy encompasses a spectrum of activities, from co- operative measures such as port visits, exercises and humanitarian as- sistance to persuasive deployment and coercion.70

4.1 Regulatory Frameworks

Bangladesh first needs to formulate a national Maritime Security Policy (MSP). The implementation of such a policy will eventually lead to the development of a much-needed maritime strategy for the country. National maritime strategies are a relatively new tool for organizing maritime security. Nevertheless, several countries and organisations i.e., Indonesia, Seychelles, US, EU, African Union

66 Christian Bueger and Timothy Edmunds, op. cit., 2018, p. 8. 67 Although this description relates to capacity for managing and protecting the marine environment and its resources, it can be usefully extended to capacity building for maritime security. See, UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), “Chapter 37: National Mechanisms and International Cooperation for Capacity Building in Developing Countries”, Agenda 21, Rio de Janeiro, 1992. 68 Sam Bateman, “Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation: What are We Thinking About?”, in Andrew Forbes (ed.), Maritime Capacity Building in the Asia-Pacific Region, Australia: Sea Power Centre, 2010, p. 11. 69 Most of the definitions are inspired by Department of Homeland Security,National Preparedness Guidelines, Washington, DC: US Department of Homeland Security, 2007. 70 Christian Le Miere, Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Drivers and Challenges, London and New York: Routledge, 2014, p. 6. 282 MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR BANGLADESH

(AU) have drafted their own maritime policies and strategies. For example, “Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) of Indonesia, “Comprehensive Maritime Plan of Action” of Seychelles, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Sea Power” of the US, “European Union Maritime Security Strategy” of EU, “Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy” of the AU provide a comprehensive maritime policy and strategy framework of the respective countries.

.Besides, it is necessary to formulate and strengthen legal frameworks to better integrate maritime security considerations. According to Sam Bateman, “in the field of maritime security and safety, the articulation and enactment of sound and effective legislation is extremely important”.71 Bangladesh currently possesses few laws governing maritime affairs.72 There are many areas where there are no laws at all, e.g., marine pollution, collision, maritime crimes, marine insurance. Besides, the whole maritime sector has been struggling with age-old unenforced laws which are inherently vague. With a view to reducing the existing gap, the government is going to enact the Bangladesh Marine Zone Act, 2019 to declare and determine maritime zones and suppress piracy, armed robbery and theft and make provisions for punishment. It will be a full-fledged law and would also help protect rights on the maritime resources.73 The new law has been made after reviewing the old one enacted in 1974 to safeguard resources and interests in the maritime areas.

At the international level, Bangladesh has become a party to a number of maritime treaties that have enhanced its standing in maritime law protocols, such as UNCLOS (ratified in 2001),74 the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (ratified in July 2011),75 the International Labour Organization Maritime Labour Convention (ILO-MLC, ratified in November 2014),76 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS, accession in November 1981).77 However, the Bangladesh government needs to take necessary measures to implement the conventions at national level.

71 Sam Bateman, “Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation: What are We Thinking About?”, op. cit., p. 17. 72 S. M. Mohiuddin Hasan, “State of Maritime Laws in Bangladesh”, The Daily Star, 31 December 2011. 73 Rear Admiral M Khurshed Alam, cited in Deepak Acharjee, “New ocean governance law soon”, The Independent, 24 January 2019. 74 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), United Nations Treaty Collection, available at https://treaties.un.org/pages, accessed on 10 November 2019. 75 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, United Nations Treaty Collection, available at https://treaties.un.org/pages, accessed on 10 November 2019. 76 International Labour Organization (ILO), “Ratifications of Maritime Labour Convention (MLC), 2006”, available at https://www.ilo.org, accessed on 06 November 2019. 77 “List of SOLAS Signatory Nations”, available at http://www.cruiselaws.com, accessed on 06 November 2019. 283 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

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4.2 Organisational Structures

Establishing new institutions and strengthening existing organizational structures are essential element of maritime capacity building. Bangladesh does not have a single body which is tasked with monitoring the execution of policies related to maritime security issues across agencies. There are many state actors that play a key role in assessing maritime security priorities and addressing maritime threats to Bangladesh (see Table 3). The list should not be regarded as comprehensive; it is rather a selection of some agencies identified as important actors in implementing and executing maritime policies and regulations in Bangladesh.

Table 3: Ministries and Agencies and their Key Functions Ministry/Agency Key Functions Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mari- Earlier Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a Unit called time Affairs Unit) “UNCLOS” which dealt with the issues of Law of the Sea. But the scope of the unit became larger after the creation of Maritime Affairs Unit (MAU) in 2012 which has the responsibility of establishing the country’s maritime rights and coordinating programmes on the maritime boundary.78 Ministry of Power, Energy and A small administrative cell, Blue Economy Cell (BEC), was Mineral Resources created in 2017 under the Energy and Mineral Resources Division of the Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources which is acting like an adviser and coordinator and tasked with multi-disciplinary works such as collecting ocean fisheries resources, hydrocarbon resources and explo- ration of tourism opportunities.79 Ministry of Fisheries and Live- The main objectives are: increasing fishery resources and stock production; enhancing export of fish, fishery and livestock products; maintaining ecological balance, conserving bio- diversity.80 Ministry of Shipping The mission is: modernization of sea ports, river ports and land ports, conservation of navigability of waterways, cre- ation of efficient workforce in the maritime sector, safe and affordable transportation of passengers and goods and fa- cilitation of international trade.81

78 Deepak Acharjee, “Maritime Affairs Unit on the Cards”, The Independent, 21 August 2016. 79 Aminur Rahman Rasel, “Blue Economy Cell Starts its Journey”, Dhaka Tribune, 06 January 2017. 80 “Aims and Objects”, Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, available at https://mofl.gov.bd/site/page/80def8e3-21f4-4e54-8dc3-9f7619db8658/Aims-and- Objectives, accessed on 17 November 2019. 81 “Vision and Mission of the Ministry of Shipping”, Ministry of Shipping, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, available at https://mos.gov.bd/site/page/e554cf3c-a3a7-45a0-9818-028ed42c9eb1/ Vision-and-Mission-, accessed on 17 November 2019. 284 MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR BANGLADESH

Bangladesh Navy Bangladesh Navy is primarily tasked to defend the country from threats emanating on, above and under the sea; promote and pro- tect our maritime interest, assisting in maritime governance and contribute to the diplomatic objective of our nation.82 Special Warfare Diving and Sal- It was formally created in 2009 with 150 commandos and vage (SWADS) 200 divers recruited from Bangladesh Navy, primarily tasked with special reconnaissance, anti-piracy, counter- insurgency, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, covert in- sertions/extractions, hostage rescue and personnel recovery, hydro-graphic reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, raid and underwater demolition.83 Bangladesh Coast Guard The role of the Coast Guard is to preserve the country’s interests at sea, protect fisheries, prevent illegal immigration through the sea, control pollution, control piracy, prevent smuggling, traf- ficking of illegal arms, drugs and narcotics, carry out disaster relief, search and rescue operations, preserve forests and conduct surveillance over the country’s maritime areas.84 Bangladesh River Police Headed by a Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of police, a unit of Bangladesh Police comprising 747 policemen start- ed working as a separate river police unit on November 13, 2013 with the main goal to provide safety and security in all inland waterways and ensure the maximum environmental standards on these routes.85 Source: Compiled by the Author.

The plethora of agencies and governing bodies in the case of Bangladesh creates disintegration of responsibilities and increase governance costs of effectively monitoring Bangladesh’s maritime space. Therefore, for integrated policy planning and coordination, a National Maritime Commission/Council (NMC) seems to be crucial as a unifying interagency/ministerial body with monitoring cells. Like the Planning Commission, the Prime Minister herself ought to chair NMC, authorize conceptual labeling and affix dynamism to maritime policy coordination/integration.86 So, the necessity of an organisation is a must to bring together policy and operational agencies, to ensure the proper outcome from the overall activities.

82 “Vision and Mission of Bangladesh Navy”, Bangladesh Navy Website, available at https://www.navy.mil.bd/ VISION-AND-MISSION, accessed on 10 November 2019. 83 Eric Sof, “Bangladesh SWADS”, Spec Ops Magazine, 20 October 2012, available at pecial-ops.org/864/ bangladesh-swads-special-warfare-diving-salvage/, accessed on 18 November 2019. 84 “Aim and Purpose of Bangladesh Coast Guard”, Bangladesh Coast Guard Website, available at http:// coastguard.gov.bd/site/page/e47f5581-c68f-4584-8867-970e1a34a0f6/-, accessed on 10 November 2019. 85 “Vision of River Police”, River Police Website, available at http://www.riverpolice.gov.bd/vision.php, accessed on 02 October 2019. 86 Abul Kalam, 2016, op. cit., p. 41. 285 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

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4.3 Human Factors

Human resource remains one of the most important dimensions of effective maritime governance. The same holds true for the bureaucracies in charge of Bangladesh’s maritime security. The officers of the Bangladesh Navy are trained at the Bangladesh Naval Academy in Chattogram. It has initiated numerous joint training exercises (see Table 5) which enhance professionalism and readiness within the Bangladesh Navy for joint military environments and contingencies. Research and education are important to raise public awareness on maritime issues. Maritime education in Bangladesh started in 1952 through the establishment of National Maritime Institute (NMI). Besides, since inception, the Bangladesh Marine Academy (BMA) has trained over 3,000 professionals who excelled in sea careers worldwide, and remitted a significant amount of foreign currency home.87 The Marine Fisheries Academy has produced 1,300 graduates which is operated by the Fisheries Ministry for the sole purpose of educating cadets to serve the expanding fishing fleets88 In addition, in recent times, the government has taken various initiatives as it opts to build a sea-based scientific community. For instance, establishment of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Maritime University (BSMRMU)89, Bangladesh Oceanographic Research Institute (BORI)90 and Bangladesh Institute of Maritime Research and Development (BIMRAD)91 are welcoming steps to the creation of marine scientific community. Such institutions for maritime learning and marine resources development are in service show significant accomplishment. However, there is a lack of required dedication, visible productivity and monitoring mechanism which is needed to overcome.

4.4 Technology and Infrastructure

The merit of utilizing technologies and infrastructures for maritime security is undeniable. Table 4 highlights, in broad numbers, the total number of existing assets at Bangladesh’s disposal for maritime security by agency. Bangladesh’s defence spending as a percentage of its GDP is around 1 per cent. In 2009, the Bangladesh government adopted a long-term modernization plan for its armed forces

87 Ghulam Suhrawardi, “Why we need a maritime policy”, The Daily Star, 07 March 2016. 88 Ibid. 89 Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Maritime University (BSMRMU) was established in 2013, the 37th public university of the country. It is the first maritime University in Bangladesh, the 3rd maritime university in South Asia and the 12th maritime university in the world. 90 Bangladesh Oceanographic Research Institute (BORI) in Cox’s Bazar under the Ministry of Science and Technology, is the country’s first and only national institution on maritime science and oceanography. 91 Bangladesh Institute of Maritime Research and Development (BIMRAD) was established in 2018 which is patronized by Bangladesh Navy. 286 MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR BANGLADESH called Forces Goal 2030.92 The plan includes the modernization and expansion of all equipment and infrastructures and providing enhanced training with a view to building Bangladesh Navy as a deterrent, three-dimensional force.93 Several programmes have been taken to turn the navy into a balanced and strong force by 2030.

Table 4: Information on Existing Assets Actor Assets Bangladesh Navy 110 vessels in active service94 and 21,281 active personnel95 Bangladesh Coast Guard 47 surface ships and craft and 3,339 personnel96 Bangladesh River Police 747 policemen97 Source: Compiled by the Author. As of 2019, the Bangladeshi Navy has hundred and ten surface ships, craft and boats, including six guided missile frigates, two patrol frigates, six guided missile corvettes, thirty-eight minor surface combatants of various types (including offshore patrol vessels, coastal patrol boats, missile boats and minesweepers), thirty auxiliaries and amphibious landing craft and thirty-two small response boats as surface assets.98 Submarine branch is equipped with two diesel-electric attack submarines.99 The naval aviation wing operates both fixed-wing aircraft and rotorcraft. The promising modernization scheme of the navy is a pragmatic and timely initiative which requires further strengthening in the coming years. However, the positive scenario is not reflected in other maritime forces. Bangladesh Coast Guard lacks adequate resources particularly high powered ships and other vehicles. At the same time, the river police cannot perform its duty due to lack of adequate number of modern water vessels, sophisticated arms and other equipment.

92 Shakil Bin Mustaq, “Bangladesh’s Ambitious Military Modernization Drive”, The Diplomat, 09 January 2018, available at https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/bangladeshs-ambitious-military-modernization-drive/, accessed on 30 October 2019. 93 “Navy to be developed as 3-dimensional force: PM”, The Daily Star, 12 April 2010. 94 “Bangladesh Navy Ships”, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20190225223925/http://www.navy.mil. bd/ships.php, accessed on 20 November 2019. 95 Anisul Huq, Minister for Law, Cited in “Bangladesh Armed Forces Total Personnel 2,04,596”, Bangladesh Protidin, available at https://www.bd-pratidin.com/national/2017/06/07/238265, accessed on 20 November 2019. 96 “Bangladesh Coast Guard to be doubled in size”, available at https://www.bdmilitary.com/border-security/ bangladesh-coast-guard-to-be-doubled-in-size/, accessed on 30 November 2019. 97 Md Esraf Hossain, “River Police to be Modernized”, The Daily Sun, 04 January 2018. 98 “Bangladesh Navy Ships”, op. cit. 99 “Bangladesh first 2 submarines commissioned”,The Daily Star, 13 March 2017.

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Strengthening maritime infrastructure should be given priority as well. To address the existing infrastructure gap, Bangladesh Navy is setting up a new base at Rabanabad in Patuakhali named BNS Sher-e-Bangla, which will be the largest naval base of the country. The base will have submarine berthing and aviation facilities.100 Another full-fledged base, named BNS Sheikh Mujib, is under construction in Khilkhet of Dhaka.101 Besides, the government has taken initiative to upgrade Chattagram and Mongla ports and construct deep sea ports. The construction of two deep-sea ports in Payra and Matarbari is underway. It is believed that the deep sea ports will not only enhance geo-economic position of Bangladesh, it will also serve as the major strategic outpost for the country’s maritime security102 In addition, an underwater expressway tunnel namely Karnaphully tunnel is under construction in Chattagram.103

4.5 Maritime Diplomacy

There is no alternative to pursuing maritime diplomacy vigorously as tangible international cooperation is essential for ensuring maritime security. It is an activity no longer confined to just navies, but in the modern era, it is pursued by coast guards, civilian vessels and non-state groups.104 Cooperation with neighbouring countries and international community is needed to maintain good order at the sea. Therefore, Bangladesh should actively engage with the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in developing regional maritime security shared vision. Besides, Bangladesh Navy regularly exercises with various foreign navies at bilateral and multilateral levels. These exercises help to project Bangladesh’s military capabilities and increase interoperability between the participating navies which is part of maritime diplomacy.

100 Deepak Acherjee, “Patuakhali to get biggest naval base with aviation facilities”, The Independent, 16 February 2017. 101 “Prime Minister Hasina commissions naval base BNS Sheikh Mujib”, The Daily Sun, 06 November 2018. 102 Riasat Noor, “Bangladesh in the bay”, Dhaka Tribune, 29 January 2019. 103 “PM launches mining work of Karnaphuli Tunnel in Chattogram”, Dhaka Tribune, 24 February 2019. 104 Christian Le Miere, Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Drivers and Challenges, London and New York: Routledge, 2014, p. 6.

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Table 5: Selected Bilateral and Multilateral Maritime Diplomacy by Bangladesh Navy Type Description Bilateral Bangladesh-US: Bangladesh Navy and the US Marine Corps engage in regular bilateral exercise. The largest of these are CARAT and Ex Tiger Shark.105 Bangladesh-India: Bangladeshi and Indian Navy jointly launched a six- day coordinated anti crime patrol of the two navies called CORPAT in specified areas of their maritime boundaries in June 2018 which is the first of such joint patrol by the two navies.106 Multilateral Milan: biennial multinational exercise, ‘Milan’ involving navies from the Indian Ocean Region, Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia, aims to enhance interoperability and standard operating procedures for disaster manage- ment. Bangladesh Navy has sent an Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) to every MILAN multinational naval exercise since 2010.107

Ferocious Falcon: BNS Bangabandhu participated in Exercise Ferocious Falcon, a Multinational Crisis Management Exercise, held at Doha, Qatar in November 2012, while BNS Somudra Joy participated in the same ex- ercise in 2015.108

IMMSAREX: Bangladesh arranged the international exercise to increase regional cooperation between the 23 member states and nine observer na- tions of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in November 2017 known as the IONS Multilateral Maritime Search and Rescue Exercise 2017 (IMMSAREX 17).109 Source: Compiled by the Author.

5. conclusion

A comprehensive approach towards maritime security shows that Bangladesh’s maritime security challenges cover the entire range from piracy, illegal fishing and poaching, all the way to major power strategic contest. The emerging economic and strategic significance of the Bay of Bengal has resulted into the competition for regional influence by major powers. Such power competition creates vulnerability and hampers Bangladesh’s maritime interest. On the other hand, the country faces a number of non-traditional security threats. Piracy and armed robbery remains a major concern and demonstrate an increasing trend in the number of

105 “Joint exercise by US, Bangladesh navies begins”, The Daily Star, 06 November 2018, 106 “Bangladesh, Indian navies launch joint maritime patrol”, Dhaka Tribune, 27 June 2018. 107 “Warship BNS Dhaleshwari leaves for India”, The Independent, 05 March 2018. 108 Nurul Islam Hasib, “Bangladesh displays military capabilities in Qatar ‘Ferocious Falcon’ drills”, bdnews24. com, 13 May 205, available at https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2015/05/13/bangladesh-displays-military- capabilities-in-qatar-ferocious-falcon-drills, accessed on 11 November 2019. 109 Tarek Mahmud, “President inaugurates 32- nation naval exercise”, Dhaka Tribune, 28 November 2017.

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attacks in recent years. Besides, Bangladesh faces challenges in protecting marine environment from marine pollution. Without appropriate control measures, coastal and marine ecosystem are largely unprotected due to land-based and sea-based sources of pollution. In addition, Bangladesh is highly susceptible to natural disasters and will be among the countries of the world that might be dramatically affected by the consequences of climate change, including rising sea levels and warming ocean temperatures. Management of the potential marine resources has also entered into the list of maritime security concerns.

There can be little doubt that Bangladesh should give greater attention to ensuring its maritime security. And the key to such endeavour lies in developing credible capacities. The process of capacity building is complex and has many dimensions. However, the paper identified five elements of Bangladesh’s maritime capacity building. Bangladesh needs to formulate policies and necessary laws that will help to curb maritime security challenges. The monitoring mechanism is essential to govern and in doing so it is suggested to create a National Maritime Commission/Council which shall be central to every action initiated, promulgated, implemented and monitored. Besides, there is no alternative to developing maritime human resource. In this regard, personnel with appropriate education and training are essential. Substantial importance should be given to modern equipment, technologies and maritime infrastructures. Moreover, lacking indigenous expertise, Bangladesh has to seek partnership with foreign countries and continue pursuing maritime diplomacy. Bangladesh will be able to face the emerging maritime security challenges with effective maritime capacity building.

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Saddam Hosen SUB-REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA: ISSUES, CHALLENGES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Abstract

Sub-regional cooperation is a nascent phenomenon in South Asia. Significant sub-regional cooperation frameworks in South Asia include the South Asia Sub- regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC), the Bay of Bengal Initive for Multi- Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the South Asian Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ) initiative and the Bangladesh, Bhutan, Inida, Nepal (BBIN) initiative. The objective of sub-regional cooperation is to ensure proper institutional mechanism in order to boost the quality of development particularly in sectors such as economic and connectivity among the member countries. The current trend of sub-regional cooperation proves that state’s political will and efforts have increased regarding sub-regional cooperation in South Asia. Although, most of the goals and targets remain on paper as they are facing crucial challenges such as bilateral disputes, leadership crisis, lack of good governance, implementation problem, etc. Given this context, the paper will investigate two key questions. First, why sub-regional process of cooperation has not been effective in South Asia? Second, what are the factors that can boost the sustainability of sub-regional cooperation in South Asia and how? The paper advocates that the member states of sub-regional groups should act as soon as possible to implement the plans, programmes and activities that they have adopted and undertake concerted efforts toward sustainable solution.

Keywords: Sub-regionalism, BIMSTEC, BBIN, SAGQ, SASEC

1. introduction

Sub-regional cooperation is a new phenomenon in international relations. After the end of the Cold War, globalization has become a catchword in international relations and the waves of globalization exhibit a variety of challenges to state as well as to ordinary people. Sub-regional integration assists states to cope up with the challenges of globalization for development, growth, and security. Borzel said that “sub-regional groupings appeared to gain momentum as the way in which countries cooperate and should cooperate to pursue peace, stability, wealth and social justice.”1In the age of globalization, sub-regional cooperation is vital for South Asia

Saddam Hosen is Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Science and Technology University, Gopalganj. His e-mail address is: [email protected] ©Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2019. 1 Tanja Borzel, “Comparative Regionalism: A New Research Agenda”, KFG Working Paper, No. 28, Berlin, 2011, p. 3. 291 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 like other regions. Sub-regionalism among South Asian countries will harness the economic growth and development. It will also augment the geo-political, economic and strategic cooperation among South Asian countries if states follow cooperative engagement system.

Hence, in South Asia, a number of initiatives regarding sub-regional cooperation have been undertaken by the states. For instance, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) was established in 1997 under the Bangkok declaration. It was formed with the idea of developing socio-economic cooperation among the member states.2 The member states selected fourteen areas for cooperation within the framework. The member states also agreed to widen the status of trade partners to include Japan, Singapore and the United States (US). On the other hand, the South Asia Sub-regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) initiative started in 2001. The member states of this programme are Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Nepal. The member states have set some key areas under SASEC programme such as trade facilitation, developments of transport and energy cooperation. Moreover, the proposal of South Asian Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ) was undertaken at the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) council of ministers in 1996 which came into practice in 1997.3 The aim of this initiative was to run the regional projects and to avoid the conflict between major powers within the framework of SAARC.

Another important sub-regional initiative is the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar forum for sub-regional cooperation (BCIM) consisting of four vital countries for accelerating economic growth through greater integration of trade and investment among the member states. Significantly, the notion of the BCIM started as a non-governmental Track II initiative.4 China proposed to promote BCIM sub- regional initiative for ensuring connectivity and economic development in 1999. Generally the Kunming initiative is known as the BCIM sub-regional initiative.5 BCIM as a sub-regional economic cooperation initiative identifies some specific areas for connectivity such as transport, railway,water transport and tourism. The member countries bequeathed much importance on the physical connectivity of BCIM forum for enhancing development.6

2 Nilanjan Banik,“How Promising is BIMSTEC”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.41, 2006, p. 1. 3 Delwar Hossain, Globalization and New Regionalism in South Asia: Issues and Dynamics, Dhaka: AH Development Publishing House, 2010, p. 143. 4 SM Rashed Ahmed, “A Historic Vision for Peace and Development”, The Daily Star, 08 March 2015. 5 Zaara Zain Hussain, “Initiative for ‘Southern Silk Route ‘Linking Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar ”, Institute of South Asian Studies, No.192, 2014, p. 3. 6 Rupak Bhattacharjee, “BCIM-EC: Problems and prospects,” The Daily Star, 08 March 2015. 292 SUB-REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA

The last important sub-regional initiative is Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal (BBIN) initiative which formed formally in 30 January, 2015. By taking the excellent support from India, the member countries are working for enhancing connectivity and development among the member states. The priority areas of this initiative are water management, hydropower and transit facilitation among the member states.7 Thus, the countries within South Asia are trying to develop connectivity and cooperation as much as possible.

But it is evident that states face enormous problems and challenges regarding sub-regional cooperation. There are a number of factors behind such challenges confronted by the states. For instance, bilateral disputes, intra-state conflict and mistrust are the main factors behind it. However, now a days, states are more conscious about the continuation of sub-regional cooperation in South Asia. States are taking many positive steps. But in the process of integration, unresolved political issues are very much important because political settlements improve bilateral relations. So, states require to focus on political issues regarding sub-regional cooperation.

There is a limitation on published research regarding the trends, dynamics and challenges of sub-regional groups in South Asia. Delwar Hossain argues that the endorsement of SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) and South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) endangered sanguinity for regional cooperation due to mistrust and power politics under the SAARC which brings BIMSTEC, SAGQ and SASEC at the forefront as sub-regional cooperation for development.8 Sandeep Chakravorty explains that BIMSTEC and BCIM-Economic Corridor (EC) initiatives are shaping ahead and SASEC has been working for economic cooperation but without amplified sub-regional cooperation among Bangladesh, India and Myanmar (BIM), BIMSTEC cooperation will not prosper, along with focusing on BBIN as new dynamic sub-regional cooperation.9 Abul Kalam illuminates that sub-regionalism in South Asia is a positive view of development process and argues that due to SAARC’s slow process, sub-regionalism has been taking place where SAGQ emerged only a state sponsored planning.10 Nilanjan Banik focuses on the opportunity of BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement (FTA) among the member of BIMSTEC sub-regional groups and argues that BIMSTEC countries have lots of characteristics to form a desired FTA and believes that negotiation under BIMSTEC umbrella will be easier.11 K. Bhattacharya and N. Bhattacharya describe about the prospects for strengthening

7Amit Kumar, “BBIN: Sub-regionalism in the SAARC,” Indian Council of World Affairs, 2015, p. 1. 8Delwar Hossain, op. cit., p.7. 9Sandeep Chakravorty, “India-Bangladesh-Myanmar: Energising Sub-regional Cooperation,” BIISS Journal, Vol.36, No. 5, 2015, p.19. 10Abul Kalam, “Sub-regionalism in ASIA: ASEAN and SAARC Experiences,” New Delhi: UBS Publishers, 2002, p.158. 11 Nilanjan Banik, op.cit. 293 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

BIMSTEC cooperation and suggest that BIMSTEC cooperation will increase trade but not for all countries.12 Mahfuz Kabir argues that states among South Asia are still facing numerous non-tariff barriers regarding trade and investment which reduce trade volume.13 Jayanta Roy argues that the lack of connectivity is one of the major impediments for the development of economy of South Asian countries.14 Niloy Ranjan Biswas tries to understand the headway of Bangladesh under BIMSTEC sub-regional cooperation based on analyzing numerous development sectors such as trade, energy, investment, counter-terrorism etc. and identifies some crucial challenges such as operational and monitoring problem, Asian power interest etc.15 After analyzing existing literature, the paper finds that there is lack of comprehensive study and analysis regarding the effectiveness of sub-regional cooperation in South Asia.

The trends and dynamics of sub-regional cooperation in South Asia depends on various factors such as economic, social, cultural and connectivity etc. But, states need to rethink about the integration processes and the issues of concern for accelerating sustainable integration among the sub-regional groups in South Asia. It is necessary to identify the factors regarding the ineffectiveness of sub-regional cooperation and find possible mechanisms to make sub-regional cooperation more effective in South Asia. Given the contexts, the paper intends to investigate two key questions. Why sub-regional process of cooperation has not been ineffective in South Asia? Second, what are the factors that make sub-regional cooperation more effective in South Asia and how? This paper addresses these questions based on secondary data such as articles, books, newspaper articles, etc. The paper argues that sub regional cooperation remains ineffective in South Asia due to lack of enough efforts and implementation of targeted programmes.

The paper is organized as follows. In section two, the paper analyzes the theoretical framework for making the philosophical grounding based on the notion of neo-liberalism focusing on the idea of commercial liberalism, republican liberalism, sociological liberalism and neo-liberal institutionalism. In section three, the paper addresses the development of sub-regional cooperation processes in promoting cooperation. Section four and section five discuss key challenges of sub-regional

12 Swapan K. Bhattacharya and Biswa N. Bhattacharya, “Prospects of Regional Cooperation in Trade, Investment and Finance in Asia: An empirical Analysis on BIMSTEC and Japan,” Cesifo working paper no, 1725, 2006, p.1. 13 Mahfuz Kabir, “Regional Trade Liberalization and Non-tariff Barriers: The case of Bangladesh’s Trade with South Asia,” BIISS Journal, Vol.35, No.2, 2014, p.126. 14 Jayanta Roy, “Connecting South Asians: The Centrality of Trade Facilitation for Regional Economic Integration,”Paper presented at the 1st South Asia Economic Summit 28 - 30 August, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 2008, p.2. 15 Niloy Ranjan Biswas, “Bangladesh beyond Borders: Its Trans-Regional Experience in BIMSTEC,” Vivekananda International Foundation, Vol. III (1), 2020, pp. 52-76. 294 SUB-REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA cooperation in South Asia and options to address the challenges for enhancing cooperation respectively. Finally, section six concludes the paper.

2. a Theoretical Explanation of Sub-regionalism

The term ‘sub-regionalism’ has been “adopted in order to distinguish from the higher levels of regionalism like the EU and from the lower levels of micro- regionalism promoted by national and subnational actors.”16 Sub-regionalism refers to a common pattern of identity with some specific aims and goals for accelerating development at micro level. At present, sub-regionalism is a pervasive phenomenon in international relations. Sub regionalism has an “underpinning thrust on peace, security and development through exploration, identification and gradual intensification of trade, economic and cultural ties among the geographically contiguous areas.”17 So, it can be said that sub-regionalism is a process where some states make a formal agreements regarding economic, social, political or cultural development based on mutual trust and cooperation without following hegemony. According to Panagoita Mamoli, sub-regionalism is better understood “as a coordination of policies among states in a circumscribed space vis-à-vis larger regional political project. It cannot be conceived as an independent process but it takes place within a larger regional context, aiming at the inclusion of its members in a broader integration process.”18 In South Asia, some states especially, the small states like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Nepal are working to promote sub-regional cooperation.

The conceptual framework of sub-regionalism can be explained by various theories of international relations. Sub-regionalism can be explained by realism/ neo-realism. It can also be explained by liberalism/neoliberalism or constructivism. Theories set forth a set of predictive assumptions that analyze the behaviour of actors in practice. After the end of the Cold War and the emergence of globalization, neo- liberalism has become a dominant theory in international relations. Neo-liberalism works on the basis of economic factors. Generally, it provokes commercial liberalism which advocates free trade and capitalist economy. Within neoliberalism, arguments are based on economic factors and also the notion of neo-liberal institutionalism.19 A good number of states want to ensure institutional mechanism within South Asia especially for the small states. Hence, this paper adopts neo-liberalism as a

16 Charalambos Tsardanidis, “Inter-regionalism, Regionalism/Sub-regionalism and Global governance,” IDSA Online Papers, 2012, p. 8. 17 Artatrana Gochhayat, “Regionalism and Sub-regionalism: A Theoretical Framework with Special Reference to India,” African Journals of Political Science and International Relations, Vol. 08, Issue. 01, 2014, p. 10. 18 Panagoita Mamoli, “The Dynamics of Black Sea Sub-regionalism”, Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 12, Issue. 04, 2012. 19 Delwar Hossain, op.cit., p. 321. 295 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 theoretical framework of analysis for understanding theoretical explanations of sub- regionalism in South Asia.

2.1 A Neo-liberal Explanation of Sub-regionalism

Alexander Rustow, a German sociologist and economist coined the term neoliberalism in 1938.20 Generally, neo-liberalism puts forward the concept of economic liberalism centered on free market or open market economy and private ownership etc. David Baldwin identified four characteristics of neo-liberalism based on economic, social and sociological factors such as commercial liberalism, republican liberalism, sociological liberalism and neo-liberal institutionalism.21 The first poses the economic liberalism based on free market and capitalist economy. On the other hand, the second advocates the democratic form of political system, where in mass, people participation will be ensured by the political parties and government. In the perspective of sociological liberalism, it may be said that it proposes interdependence between governments and the notion of community development is the main feature of sociological liberalism. Neo-liberal institutionalism emphasizes on the importance of institution for enhancing cooperation among countries. For instance, European Union (EU) creates numerous institutions to enhance the cooperation process within the member states.

In South Asia, states are very much interested to boost cooperation at the sub-regional level because they think thatstates require to maintain good cooperative relations with the neighbours especially the neighbours with whom they share borders for sustainable development. So, states are giving priorities to maintain cooperation and enhance connectivity. As a result, states are following economic liberalism for enhancing free market economy based on regional trade.Trade facilitation has become the key area of sub-regional cooperation in South Asia. Neo-liberals suggest that states require ensuring free flow of goods and services to enhance the level of cooperation especially economic cooperation.

Moreover, in South Asia, the states who are small in size and power want to develop institution because they want to circumvent the supremacy of major powers for accelerating cooperation without interferences. Similarly, the smaller states like Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal emphasize on institutionalism to generate cooperation without hegemony.22 Thus, neo-liberal institutionalism has been considered as a

20 Oliver Marc Hartwich, “Neoliberalism: The Genesis of a Political Swearword,” The Center for Independent Studies, Paper no. 114, 2009, p. 6. 21 Jhon Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 85. 22 Delwar Hossain, op.cit., p. 321. 296 SUB-REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA notion of promoting cooperation at the sub-regional level. The small states of South Asia are very much interested to form sub-regional cooperation process based on mutual trust and interdependence. Meanwhile, transnational activities are increasing alarmingly due to the rise of globalization and capitalist system. As transnational activities increase, people are being interconnected accross the border and their governments become more interdependent. So, the notion of interdependency necessitates states to ensure cooperation with the neighbours at sub-regional level as the experiences of states are not very good at regional level due to various limitations. As a result, states have already taken initiatives for enhancing cooperation at sub- regional level in South Asia. For instance, BBIN is the most recent initiatives among the four countries of South Asia. Discussion henceforth, substantiates the neo- liberal explanations of sub-regionalism in South Asia. However, it is important to understand why sub-regional cooperation is significant for the states of SouthAsia.

2.2 Sub-regionalism: Why It Matters?

The second half of the last century saw the emergence of a number of regional and sub-regional economic cooperative arrangements among countries across the globe.23Sub-regionalcooperation has become significant for the development of economy, infrastructure, connectivity etc. After the establishment of SAARC in 1985, the member states started their journey to promote regional cooperation with lots of expectation. The SAARC continues to exist throughout the last two decades and makes people feel its presence as a principle regional organisation in South Asia.24 During the time of 17th SAARC summit, the theme was ‘Building Bridges’ that aimed at physical connectivity and figurative political dialogue but there was no result at all.25 After 30 years, if one looks at the overall mechanisms of SAARC, then one will be disheartened. Because, SAARC has not achieved its targets almost in all sectors. There are many reasons behind the slow process of SAARC such as mistrust, leadership crisis, major powers’ rivalry, bilateral dispute, power politics etc. As a result, many people think SAARC as a futile organisation regarding regional cooperation in South Asia. Therefore, states require to adopt a new form of process called sub-regional process of cooperation in South Asia for ensuring development and connectivity.

Moreover, within the framework of regionalism in South Asia, states do not get a viable platform which is very much significant for accelerating economic growth and infrastructure development. On the other hand, the opportunity to get

23 Mohhamad Rahmatullah, “Regional Transport Connectivity: Its Current State,” The Daily Star, 20 March 2013. 24 Delwar Hossain,op.cit., p. 7. 25 Smruti S. Pattanaik, “Building Bridges but Mind the Gap”, The Daily Star, 10 November 2011. 297 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 viable platform within micro level of sub-regionalism is better than macro level of regionalism. Meanwhile, it is observed that historically, there is lot of animosity and contradiction between India and Pakistan. Many think that India-Pakistan animosity is the prime reason for the failure of SAARC. Small states want to avoid this problem so that they can run their development process effectively. So, states need to rethink their integration process. As a result, states have already taken initiatives regarding sub-regional process of cooperation in South Asia. In this context, it is imperative to analyze the trends and dynamics of sub-regional cooperation process in South Asia.

3. development of Sub-Regional Cooperation in South Asia: Issues and Dynamics

The road to sub-regional integration process in South Asia is not so long. Some attempts have been made to join with the framework of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by two South Asian countries such as India and Sri Lanka but they were not successful. In 1993, India and Pakistan became the dialogue partner. After that, BIMSTEC was established in 1997 through Bangkok declaration. This sub-regional group was initiated to combine the look east policy of India and the look west policy of Thailand.26 The idea of BIMSTEC was mooted by Thailand during the financial crisis of South East Asia in the year of 1997. The initial name of this sub-regional group was BIST-EC.27

According to the Bangkok declaration on the establishment of BIST-EC, the aims and goal of this initiative are to generate an enabling environment for rapid economic environment, accelerate the economic growth and social progress in the sub-region, promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest, promote assistance in the form of training and research facilities and supporting and complementing national development plans in the member states. It is believed that the negotiation under BIMSTEC will be good than other organisations.28 The BIMSTEC Permanent Secretariat has been established in Dhaka where India has agreed to contribute 32 per cent of the cost reflecting its strong commitment to BIMSTEC process. It takes fourteen areas for fulfilling its targets regarding sub-regional cooperation process.They are trade and investment, energy, transport, tourism, fisheries, agriculture, cultural cooperation, environment, disasters management, public health, people to people contact, poverty, and terrorism. The

26 Sharif M. Hossain, “Impacts of BIMSTEC Free Trade Area: A CGE Analysis,” Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, Vol. 4, No. 13, 2013, p. 16. 27 Harunur Rashid, “Bimstec Summit: Ushering in Economic Integration between Two Regions”, The Daily Star, 5 March 2014. 28 Nilanjan Banik, “The BIMSTEC FTA and Its Relevance,” Centre for Studies in International Relations and Development, Discussion Paper, 36, 2007, p. 2. 298 SUB-REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA framework agreement on BIMSTEC FTA was signed in 2004, but is yet to be fully operational.

Unlike many FTA agreements, the framework agreement on BIMSTEC FTA provides more scopes for cooperation, going beyond trade in goods to bring trade in services and promote investment cooperation.29 In 2006, initiatives were taken to implement free trade area but it was delayed for the political and non- cooperative reasons of member states. Later, Japan, Singapore, and the US gained the status of BIMSTEC trade partner with the support of Asian Development Bank (ADB) and United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific(UNESCAP). Every possible steps were taken by the BIMSTEC members for advancing economic development. The first summit was held on 31 July, 2004 at Bangkok. The second summit took place on November 13, 2008 in New Delhi. The member states realized the notion of globalization and its influences on social and economic development during the second summit. As the challenges increased with the rise of globalization, they realized that they require more efforts to response. They also focus on terrorism and transnational crime which can affect the development of the states severely. They agreed to increase the level of energy cooperation as much as possible. They decided that the process of energy cooperation will be continued during the time of second BIMSTEC energy conference in 2014.The member states decided to establish a BIMSTEC Poverty Alleviation Centre in Bangladesh. Moreover, they also decided to support the establishment of the BIMSTEC Cultural Industries Commission and BIMSTEC Cultural Industries Observatory in Bhutan. For ensuring leadership criteria, they decided that India will take the lead to establish a BIMSTEC Network of Policy Think Tanks. Later, it was established and so far four meetings have been held.

During the 3rd summit, member states reaffirmed the notion of first and second summit based on Bangkok declaration. They decided some goals regarding trade with agreed general rules of origin and focused on the custom related matters under FTA. With the assistance of ADB, BIMSTEC sub-regional cooperations designed was to enhance the free flows of goods and services.30 The fourth summit emphasized on enhancing institutional capacity to accelerate progress in the major areas of cooperation acknowledging the significance of developing visibility of BIMSTEC and blue economy. The fourth meeting of the BIMSTEC Network of Policy Think Tanks was held on August, 2018 where member states agreed to increase efforts in priority areas and to produce innovative ideas. The third meeting of National Security Chiefs of BIMSTEC in 2019 reaffirmed to increase capacities through training,

29 Ibid. 30 Jayanta Roy and Pritam Banerjee, “Connecting South Asians: The Centrality of Trade Facilitation for Regional Economic Integration”, Semantic Scholar, 2008, p.20. 299 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 equipment and sharing of experiences by making better use of collective resources. The first BIMSTEC Permanent Working Committee meeting in 2019 focused on enhancing determination for administrative and financial management. The second meeting of BIMSTEC Track 1.5 Security Dialogue Forum was held in July, 2019 where member countries agreed to enhance security cooperation on traditional and non-traditional security threats. They also expressed their commitments regarding cross-border connectivity of BIMSTEC member states. The progress regarding the targets of BIMSTEC sub-regional cooperation is not very satisfactory because of some barriers. The lack of strong leadership and non-tariff barriers can be traced as two vital reasons behind it.

The proposal for SAGQ came into preparation in 1996 during the time of SAARC council of ministers.31 The purpose of this framework was to ensure the economic development of the member states based on cooperation and mutual interest. In the beginning of this declaration, states sought to build SAGQ as an independent organisation for economic development. But due to the opposition from Pakistan, Srilanka and Maldives, this organisation was edged within the notion of SAARC.32 However, the SAGQ came into practice in 1997. According to Sonu Jain, “the South Asian Growth Quadrangle was launched in 1997 involving four countries of the region, namely Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, and Nepal, primarily aimed at creating an enabling environment for rapid economic development through the identification and implementation of specific projects.”33 As Isher Judge Ahluwalia said, “the relative slowness in the promotion and implementation of regional investment projects within the framework of SAARC, and the remarkable success achieved by relatively smaller but compact regions in the growth triangles of South East and East Asia prompted some of the South Asian countries to think in terms of an alternative regional hub”34.

It can be said that due to the slow process of SAARC, some countries of South Asia wanted to establish a better platform for social and economic development. As a result, they established SAGQ within the framework of SAARC. The SAGQ was seen as a practical solution of socio-economic problems faced by the member of SAARC within South Asia.35It is evident that this kind of sub-regional platform will enhance economic and social development. This kind of sub-regional platform has two dimensions. One is that, it is geographically meaningful and the other is that

31 Delwar Hossain, op.cit., p. 143. 32 Ibid. 33 Sonu Jain, “Regional Cooperation in South Asia: Indian Perspective,” in Sadiq Ahmed, Saman Kelegama and Ejaz Ghani (eds.),Promoting Economic Cooperation in South Asia: Beyond SAFTA, 2010, p. 6. 34 Isher Judge Ahluwalia, “Economic Cooperation in South Asia”, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, p. 321. 35 Ibid. 300 SUB-REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA it would harness economic development that means economically beneficial. Like other growth triangles, SAGQ reinforced the sub-regional cooperation process in South Asia.36 The aim of this sub-regional group was to promote the local economy for efficient use of manpower, trade and infrastructure development.37It was seen as a jovial organisation for accelerating economic development of the millions of people in South Asia. The common insight of this sub-regional cooperation process is the geographical proximity, traditions, life style and attitudes of the member states.38

SAGQ has not taken any major changes in the development and growth process in South Asia. As a result, gradually ADB and other financial organisations have withdrawn their support to SAGQ. The view of Pakistan to SAGQ is not so good because the country thinks that SAGQ is working for fulfilling the interest of India. Thus, the non-cooperation and hostility at its formative stage have made SAGQ a failed case.39

Another important sub-regional cooperation process is SASEC which started its journey in 2001 to accelerate economic development within the member states. The ADB helped to establish this kind of sub-regional group because the member states of SAGQ requested ADB to establish this for enhancing the economic condition of the member states. According to Delwar Hossain, “the ADB launched the SASEC project apparently at the request of the governments of SAGQ.”40 The main purpose of SASEC was to ensure the trade facilitation for all member states by eliminating trade barriers. It included some areas of target such as transport and infrastructure development, energy cooperation and institutional development, tourism, environmental development and information communication technology. So “the ADB initiative of SASEC with emphasis on private-public partnership with a more project driven approach was a step in the right direction.”41 At the beginning of this sub-regional group, India was not so interested to form this group. ADB decided to work for SASEC without the active participation of India.42 Within the working group meeting, ADB wanted to solve the misunderstandings which haze the economic relations among the member states.43 It is evident that this sub-regional group is vital for its member states. For instance, it is significant for Bangladesh in accessing new market and for the development of port and energy sector. For Bhutan,

36 Sridhar Ramaswamy, “Indian and its Eastern Neighbors: Prospects for Sub-regional Cooperation,” Observer Research Foundation, Issue Brief. 94, 2015, p. 3. 37 Isher Judge Ahluwalia, op. cit. p. 322. 38 Delwar Hossain, op.cit., p.144. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. p. 146. 41 Sridhar Ramaswamy, op.cit., p. 4. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 301 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 this initiative is so much momentous for accessing ports and exporting energy. For India, this sub-regional initiative poses enormous importance for getting transit and it is needed for Nepal to export their commodities. SASEC could be a channel for enhancing trade and investment. The trade facilitation programme of SASEC was initiated in the year of 2012, supported by ADB. The purpose of this project was to ensure better custom related administrations, ensure the flow of information and develop the notion of services. In 2013, ADB approved four projects for technical assistance of the project. Moreover, ADB declared a trade facility strategy for the period of 2014 to 2018 and the purpose of this strategy was to promote the prosperity of this sub-region by enhancing trade across the borders.44

SASEC also works for the development of energy sector. It has already made some stronger decisions for accelerating energy cooperation for the development process.45 It needs more comprehensive steps to fulfill the dearth of energy. A large portion of this region has energy deficit according to their needs. So, it is high time to take essential measures and to implement it as soon as possible. SASEC Energy Working Group arranged a meeting in November, 2014 at Kathmandu for discussing the progress and future directions of SASEC energy cooperation, and agreed on the development of regional transmission and generation projects, as well as energy efficiency initiatives. Moreover, SASEC is also working for the development of transport sector within the member states. They have proposed the concept of economic corridor development and twin bridgehead connectivity concept for accelerating transport facilitation.46 They also focus on developing transport facilitation to Bangladesh, North-east India and improving road connectivity with Thailand and Myanmar and starting Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) system for improving transport and communication networks.

Meanwhile, SASEC Power System Expansion Project was included in the ADB Country Partnership Strategy 2010-2012 for Nepal, and the Country Operations Business Plan 2013-2015.47 These proposed plans have some aims and goals such as expansion of transmission and distribution system and the expansion of renewable energy for the remote villages. These are also linked with the environment. As a result, the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was prepared on behalf of the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA), the Executing Agency (EA) for the Project,

44 Asian Development Bank, “SASEC Trade Facilitation Strategic Framework 2014-2018,” 2014, p. 3. 45 Leena Srivastavaa, Neha Misra and Shahid Hasan, “Promoting Regional Energy Cooperation in South Asia”, Energy Policy, vol. 35, 2007, pp. 3360-3368. 46 Kavita Iyengar, “ADB’s Initiatives on Promoting Transport Connectivity in South Asia,” paper presented at the Regional Policy Dialogue on Strenthening Connectivity in Southern Asia, at Le Meridien Hotel, New Delhi, on 19-20 Novenmber 2014. 47 Nepal Electricity Authority for the Asian Development Bank, “NEP: South Asia Sub-regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) Power System Expansion Project (SPEP),” ADB TA 8272-NEP. 302 SUB-REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA by consultants retained under ADB. Under the Nepal environmental regulatory framework, the proposed transmission lines require an Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) except for lines in protected areas, which require an EIA. Moreover, SASEC group is also working for the development of tourism sector by following eco-tourism concept and creating SASEC railway connectivity with the assistance from ADB.48 Thus, this sub-regional group is trying to ensure the development process within the member states but again most of the targets remain ineffective and unrealized.

The latest sub-regional initiative is the BBIN initiative in South Asia for enhancing cooperation and development among India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. The BBIN first meeting of joint working group was held in 2013 but Nepal did not join in the meeting. Later, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and India have agreed to form a sub- regional group to enhance connectivity among the member states. In January 2015, India held a meeting of joint working group of BBIN and the member states agreed to ensure cooperation in some sectors such as water management, hydropower and connectivity development. It is said that BBIN initiative reflects Indian strategy to connect South Asian economy. India also wants to bring Sri Lanka and Maldives within this framework to ensure overall economic development and connectivity. There are some specific reasons behind BBIN initiative. For instance, the first reason is to implement India’s policy regarding neighbours, where India wants to develop its relations with its neighbouring countries to enhance economic growth and development. The second reason is that Bhutan and Nepal have huge potential regarding hydropower electricity. If BBIN countries are able to work together with Nepal and Bhutan for the development of hydropower electricity, it can also be fruitful for the neighbouring countries like India and Bangladesh. The third reason is that Bangladesh and India have huge potential for the development of energy sector and both countries have huge market for electricity. As a result, Nepal and Bhutan can be beneficiary through accessing the markets as Nepal and Bhutan have huge hydropower potentiality. Thus, BBIN member states can get mutual benefit by implementing this kind of sub-regional cooperation in South Asia.

At the 18th SAARC summit, India proposed motor vehicles and regional railway agreement for enhancing development and connectivity but Pakistan blocked the initiative due to its confrontational relations with India. At the end, India put Pakistan out of consideration and signed Motor Vehicles Agreement (MVA) with BBIN countries for reducing the costs of overland connectivity. All other member states avoided the big brother problem by eliminating Pakistan because they need India to ensure their development.49

48 “ADB gives $505m loans for Rail Links”, The Daily Star, 29 June 2015. 49 Rezaul Karim, “Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal likely to Ink Motor Vehicle Deal in June,” The Daily Star, 04 April 2015. 303 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

The MVA was signed by the transport ministers of BBIN countries in Thimpu in June, 2015 focusing on insurance, permits, visa, and applicability of local laws. The protocols regarding the MVA have been made in July 2015 and the BBIN member states agreed to implement this agreement by August 2015. After that the preparatory work has been completed by the member states. Member states have agreed to transform transport routes into economic corridors that could enhance economic development of member states.50 The BBIN MVA has put in place a good effort for facilitating transport and transit among the member states. 51BBIN has now agreed to work out for the development of power trade, inter gird connectivity and multimodal transport facilities.52 The agreement of motor vehicles facilitation can enhance the connectivity of BBIN member states. But, the empirical evidence shows that numerous facts of concern remain regarding the effectiveness of BBIN initiative. The member countries are yet to implement the application of various procedures, plans and programmes based on long term approach.53 The Joint Working Group (JWG) has yet to meet since January 2016 to develop inter-grid connectivity and water resource management under BBIN mechanism.

4. challenges in Implementing Sub-regional Cooperation in South Asia

Although, the SAGQ initiative was failed for the non-cooperation policy by the member states, it opened the door of sub-regional groups within the framework of SAARC. After that, South Asian countries made two other initiatives named BIMSTEC in 1997 and SASEC in 2001. It is evident that numerous initiatives have been taken by the South Asian countries but most of the initiatives are not so effective at all. There are many reasons behind this phenomenon such as tariff and non-tariff barriers, bilateral disputes, trust deficits, trade deficits, lack of good governance, leadership crisis, lack of implementation problem, lack of liberal mentality and lack of long term approach. However, all these challenges can be categorized as economic, political and implementation challenges for achieving sub-regionalism in South Asia.

4.1 Economic Challenges

Tariff and non-tariff barriers regarding trade and investment are critical impediments of sub-regional cooperation in South Asia. Although tariff barriers have been reduced by some of the major member states, huge non-tariff barriers

50 Harun Ur Rashid, “Where Does Bangladesh Stand?”, July 9 2015, The Daily Star. 51 Pritam Banerjee, “Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal Motor Vehicles Agreement: Unlocking the Potential for Vibrant Regional Road Freight Connectivity,” CUTS International Discussion paper, 2015, p. 2. 52 Amit Kumar, “BBIN: Sub-Regionalism in the SAARC,” Indian Council for World Affairs, p. 1. 53 Tariq Karim and Madhumita Srivastava Balaji, “BBIN: Paradigm Change in South Asia,” 2016, P. 14. 304 SUB-REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA remain crucial impediments for trade and investment. For example, India granted duty free quota free access to all traded Bangladeshi goods but Bangladeshis export is not increasing at all.54 The possible reason is that overwhelming presence of non- tariff barriers has reduced the flow of trade. For example, 428 products of India at 8 digit HS code level cannot be imported without license. In Nepal, six categories of products such as narcotics, beef, and plastic materials are banned for import on religious and public health basis. There are also some non-tariff barriers in other South Asian countries such as Bhutan and Bangladesh. Thus, non-tariff barriers are reducing the flow of trade and investment within South Asian countries. As a result, the economic growth of sub-regional groups such as SASEC, BIMSTEC and BBIN is not good according to country’s expectations.

Trade deficit is another vital problem regarding sub-regional cooperation in South Asia. It is perceived that huge trade deficit between India and other countries resulted in one sided trade. For example, “Bangladesh has been suffering from historical trade deficit with India since its independence. The trade deficit has been increasing exponentially since the recent past. Official data show that compared to 1983, trade deficit in 2003 was more than 46 times higher.”55 Although the trade deficit between Bangladesh and India has decreased but still Bangladesh faces trade deficit with India. Bangladesh’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has increased into 7.9 per cent in 2018, which is very good for reducing trade deficit with other countries. Moreover, the Nepalese trade deficit is increasing each year in terms of GDP. Mahesh said that “if we scrutinize minutely, Nepalese trade with India has been characterized by a persistent and widening deficit.”56 India’s GDP is increasing day by day and India has become one of the major economic powers around the world. After all, the rate of trade deficit among the South Asian countries still remains a major concern.

4.2 Political Challenges

Bilateral disputes among states are crucial political challenges for the ineffectiveness of sub-regional cooperation process in South Asia because bilateral disputes hamper the economic and development process. Due to bilateral dispute, states focus more on their own interest rather than collective interest. For instance, when India thinks about their trans-boundary river water conflict with Nepal, India gives much importance on national interest although Nepal is a vital actor of sub-

54 Mahfuz Kabir, op.cit., p. 126. 55 Mafizur Rahman, “Bangladesh-India Bilateral Trade: Causes of Imbalance and Measures for Improvement,” 2004, p. 1. 56 Mahesh K. Chaulagai, “Indo-Nepal Trade Relation: The Phenomenon of Black Hole Effect,” NRB Working Paper, 2013, p. 2. 305 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 regional cooperation in South Asia. Mafizur Rahman says that “river flow freely but state-centric theories such as realism, neo-realism have trapped them within a specific territorial boundary.”57 As a result, this water crisis leads to conflicts and disputes among sub-regional groups which hamper the sub-regional cooperation in South Asia. Trust deficit due to historical animosity is another major challenge regarding sub-regional cooperation in South Asia. South Asian countries face the problem of trust deficit although they have already undertaken the sub-regional initiatives. But historical animosity forces them into non-cooperation and mistrust.

Meanwhile, the notion of good governance has become a key concept in international relations. There are differences between good governance and governance. Governance refers to the process of decision making and the implementation of decisions. On the other hand, “good governance is the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development.”58 Good governance is significant for ensuring economic growth, human development and resource management regarding sub-regional cooperation. It is also important to ensure institutional framework of sub-regional cooperation process. Without ensuring institutional framework, the goals of sub-regional groups cannot be achieved. Small states always want to ensure institutional mechanism for ensuring economic development of sub-regional cooperation in South Asia based on cooperation without hegemony. But it is observed that the members of sub-regional groups face the problem of lack of good governance in South Asia. For example, the notion of good governance is not good in Myanmar or Nepal. It can be said that the lack of accountability and transparency is increasing day by day in some of the South Asian countries. As a result, the rate of corruption is increasing rapidly which affects the process of economic growth, resources development and human development. It is also said that “political considerations reportedly influence the distribution of contracts, relief goods, schools, roads, and health facilities.”59 Although India is considered one of the major democratic countries, the notion of corruption and lack of institutional mechanisms remain present in India. These phenomena directly affect the sub-regional cooperation processes in South Asia.

Moreover, dynamic leadership is one of the pre-conditions to achieve the targets of any sub-regional initiatives. For example, EU regional integration process has become the model of other regional forums due to its effective leadership.

57 Mafizur Rahman, op.cit. 58 Council of the European Union, “The European Consensus, Joint Statement on the European Union Development Policy,” 2005. 59 “The State of Governance in Bangladesh: Knowledge, Perceptions, Reality,” Centre for Governance Studies, BRAC University and BRAC Research and Evaluation Division, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2006, p. 6. 306 SUB-REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA

Leadership is a process where an individual or a group of people influence others to achieve common goals. It is a process by which a person influences others to accomplish an objective and directs the organisation in a way that makes it more cohesive and coherent.60 There is a close link between leadership and management which is crucial for the development of sub-regional groups in South Asia. Without ensuring proper management, it is not possible to achieve all the goals of sub-regional groups. So, “today’s groups, organisations, and teams need both effective leaders and effective managers to run a successful operation.”61 Effective and dynamic leadership help to enhance creativity and long term approach which are important for effective mechanism of sub-regional groups. But, there is lack of effective leaders among the members of the sub-regional cooperation groups in South Asia resulting in ineffectiveness of sub-regionalism in South Asia.

4.3 The Problem of Implementation

Sub-regional groups are choosing many possible areas of cooperation but they are not following the process of implementation at all. For example, members of the BIMSTEC signed BIMSTEC FTAs for accelerating economic growth, trade and investment. But still, member states face trade barriers including tariff and non-tariff barriers. Meanwhile, there is no body regarding the implementation of targets. As a result, the lack of implementation has become a key challenge regarding sub-regional cooperation in South Asia. As Atiur Rahman argued, “sub- regional initiatives in South Asia have raised large questions, concerns and political passion rather than providing proper answers or creating growth mechanisms and cooperative understanding.”62 This is because of the problem of implementation among sub-regional groups.

4.4 Lack of Liberal Mentality

Sub-regional cooperation is working among the sub-regional groups in South Asia for accelerating economic development, trade and connectivity. States have already developed sub-regional initiatives like BIMSTEC and BBIN which speak on the liberal efforts of the states. But, states do not follow enough liberal policy when they think their national interests in terms of economic and political activities. The state centric approaches promote states’ own interests rather than

60 Manoj Kumar Sharma and Shilpa Jain, “Leadership Management: Principles, Models and Theories,” Global Journal of Management and Business Studies, Vol.3, No.3, 2013, p.310. 61 Kristina G. Ricketts, “Leadership vs. Management,” 2008, available at http://docplayer.net/284538-Leadership- vs-management-kristina-g-ricketts-community-and-leadership-development.html, accessed on 20 June 2019. 62 Atiur Rahman, “SAARC: not yet a Community,” 2003, available at https://apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20 Volumes/RegionalFinal%20chapters/Chapter9Rahman.pdf, accessed on 20 May 2019. 307 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 group’s interest. As a result, it is perceived that among the states of sub-regional groups, there is lack of open mindedness almost in everywhere which poses serious challenges regarding sub-regional integration process in South Asia. The challenges discussed above should be addressed as soon as possible to develop sub-regionalism in South Asia.

5. strengthening Sub-regionalism in South Asia: Policy Implications

Under the notion of sub-regional cooperation process in South Asia, it is no doubt that states must require to ensure crucial mechanisms in order to augment institutional integration, connectivity and development among the member countries. Firstly, effective leadership is one of the significant elements to ensure the sub-regional cooperation in South Asia. The evidence shows that due to the crisis of effective leader, the sub-regional groups face a variety of problems when they want to fulfill their targets. Without ensuring proper management and monitoring, it is not possible to ensure effective sub-regional cooperation in South Asia. An effective leader can ensure effective management of the targets and projects which helps to enhance the sustainable development of sub-regional groups.

Secondly, Good governance is another vital factor behind the effectiveness of sub-regional cooperation process in South Asia. Good governance helps to ensure institutional mechanism which poses the notion of cooperation without hegemony. It also focuses on the notion of rule of law and accountability which can be helpful to reduce the illegitimacy among the member states of sub-regional cooperation in South Asia. Moreover, without ensuring institutional mechanism, states among sub-regional groups cannot ensure the notion of equal opportunity for all member countries. Thirdly, when states think about the national interest based on realist theory, they focus more on state-centric decisions rather than liberal mechanisms. South Asian states do not have enough liberal mentality to enhance the sub-regional cooperation process in South Asia. As a result, sub-regional groups are not so effective in South Asia.

Fourth, the problem of implementation regarding sub-regional cooperation in South Asia remains a key challenge behind the effectiveness of sub-regional groups. Sub-regional groups like BIMSTEC in South Asia have taken enormous initiatives such as BIMSTEC FTA but the member states could not implement the programme. Still now, there are non-tariff barriers among the BIMSTEC member countries in South Asia. So, it is mandatory for sub-regional groups in South Asia to implement the targets, plans and programmes for achieving possible outcomes.

308 SUB-REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA

Fifth, the persistence of huge trade deficit creates impediments for the collective economic development of the member states where all countries are not getting the same benefit from the sub-regional cooperation process. Some countries are getting more and some are getting less. For example, among the BBIN member states, it is evident that there exists huge trade deficit between India and Nepal. So, if states want to ensure the effectiveness of sub-regional cooperation in south Asia, they need to reduce trade deficit for ensuring equal economic development and opportunity among the countries. Moreover, tariff barriers among the sub-regional groups in South Asia have been reduced, still member states face huge non-tariff barriers regarding trade and investment which affect the economic development of sub-regional groups. As a result, the flow of trade and investment is declining which is detrimental for economic development. Reducing non-tariff barriers for accelerating economic growth and development among the member countries of sub-regional cooperation in South Asia could be fruitful for diminishing trade deficit.

6. conclusion

The advancement of sub-regional cooperation requires institutional mechanisms for accelerating economic growth, infrastructure development, people to people contact and connectivity among the sub-regional groups in South Asia. In recent years, it is evident that the sub-regional cooperation groups in South Asia are engaging together to promote rapid economic development which can be called a positive approach. Tariff and non- tariff barriers seriously hinder the economic development process of sub-regional cooperation in South Asia. Non-tariff barriers impede the flow of trade and investment among the sub-regional groups. Another significant challenge for enhancing sub-regional cooperation is the huge trade deficit among the member states. It is evident that Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan are facing huge trade deficits with India. Moreover, bilateral disputes among the different members of sub-regional forum hinder the cooperation process. States always think about their national interest rather than sub-regional cooperation which promotes the policy of non-cooperation. As a result, this creates the notion of mistrust among the sub-regional member countries which impede the achievements of targets and goals of the sub-regional mechanisms. The member states are not implementing the targets, plans and programmes of sub-regional cooperation and no active leader comes to properly address the challenges because of the absence of liberal mentality. But, it is important to note that the efforts of states have increased than before regarding the advancement of sub-regional cooperation through BIMSTEC and BBIN. BIMSTEC and BBIN member states are working to promote economic development and connectivity through transportation. The political will of the sub- regional groups like BIMSTEC and BBIN groups has increased in recent years. But, to promote sub-regional cooperation process in South Asia, states require addressing

309 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 the challenges of sub-regional integration process such as leadership crisis, lack of good governance, non-tariff barriers, trade deficit, lack of open mindedness, trust deficit and the implementation problem only then, countries of South Asiacan harness economic growth, infrastructure development and connectivity effectively through sub-regional cooperation.

310 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019: 311-325

A.K.M. Anisur Rahman THE UNITED STATES, IRAN AND THE NEW CONUNDRUM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Abstract

Tensions are rising progressively over the last couple of years in the Middle East as the acrimony in the relationship between the United States (US) and Iran is mounting. The US pulled itself out of the nuclear deal last year, imposed economic sanctions and took initiatives to cut off Iran’s oil exports. In the rejoinder against the moves by the US, Iran has threatened to end compliance with its obligations under the 2015 nuclear deal with six world powers. With this backdrop, this paper attempts to discuss how the regimes in the US and Iran contributed to build-up the current tension. It also analyses the current negotiations between the two countries in details and explores the opportunities of utilizing Track II diplomacy to aid the regular diplomatic efforts. It comes up with the recommendation that diplomatic efforts are to be wielded to reintegrate Iran into the international community so that it becomes more subject to international norms, regulations and laws. This paper concludes that the Iranian government is to be convinced to open up to create an environment where the Iranian people would be able to flourish and socialize across the world.

Keywords: US-Iran Relations, Middle East, Nuclear Programme, New Conundrum

1. Introduction

The United States (US) — pointing to information about an imminent threat of an Iranian attack in the Middle East — swiftly moved an aircraft carrier group into the region in early May, 20191. In quick succession, it then shored up defenses and evacuated personnel from the embassy in Baghdad, the Iraqi capital. But the Trump administration has not provided specific details about the supposed threat from Iran. Therefore, US allies in Europe and the gulf region are quite skeptical given the history of faulty intelligence that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, led by the US2.

A.K.M. Anisur Rahman, PhD is Senior Assistant Chief, Ministry of Finance, Government of Bangladesh. His e-mail address is [email protected] ©Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2019. 1 Sarah Aziza, “The Saudi Government’s Global Campaign to Silence Its Critics”, The New Yorker, available at https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-saudi-governments-global-campaign-to-silence-its-critics, accessed on 15 September 2019. 2 S. Legrenzi, “Recent Crisis in the Middle East”, available at https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/ comment/ 2018/ gcc-crisis/?f_n=43081, accessed on 18 September 2019. 311 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

In response to the initial moves by the US mentioned earlier, Iran said it would end compliance with its obligations under the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and six world powers3. The deal with the US, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom was intended to curb Tehran’s nuclear ambitions in exchange for relief from economic sanctions.

Tensions have risen steadily since the beginning of the Trump administration. President Trump pulled the US out of the nuclear deal last year, imposed oppressive sanctions, moved to cut off Iran’s oil exports and designated an Iranian military unit as a terror organisation.

The deterioration in U.S.- Iran relations takes place against the backdrop of a battle for regional influence between Iran and Saudi Arabia, including proxy wars in Yemen and Syria, as well as strategic competition in Lebanon and more recently in Iraq. Amidst the situation, the Iranian population is increasingly caught between the pressure of sanctions from Washington and the authoritarian repression of the regime in Tehran. In this context, the development of current tension between the US and Iran is anticipated to upsurge the existing turmoil in the Middle East.

This paper focuses on the main argument that an apparent lack of admiration and recognition for the numerous diplomatic efforts of Iran over the years has armored the anti-American sentiment within the Islamic Republic’s government. But it should be kept in mind that the US has less at stake as relations between the two countries rally. If Iran had been reintegrated into the international arena, it would be more subject to international norms and laws to curb its uranium enrichment.

To substantiate the major argument mentioned above, this paper extensively reviews the existing literatures and elaborately discusses the role of the regimes of both the USA and Iran to result into current turmoil. It then explains the different aspects of current negotiations between the two countries and justifies the utilisation of Track II diplomacy to strengthen the conventional diplomatic efforts. Keeping the different features of current negotiations in mind, this paper comes up with key recommendations to ease the recent entanglement. Finally this paper concludes that all the variables involved in the current imbroglio must be thoroughly and carefully examined to ensure a viable and sustainable solution.

3 “Regional Powers from a Historical Perspective”, Human Rights Watch, available at https://www.hrw. org / node/?jd_5180, accessed on 14 September 2019. 312 THE UNITED STATES, IRAN AND THE NEW CONUNDRUM

2. literature Review

2.1 Obama’s Assumption of Power

In 2008, Barack Obama was elected president of the US, campaigning on a platform of change. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had decimated American image and credibility abroad, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, and Obama was eager to prove that his administration would not repeat Bush’s mistakes4. In his first year as president, Obama embarked on a tour of the Middle East and North Africa, attempting to stimulate open dialogue. In a Cairo speech addressed to the Muslim world, Obama emphasised the dignity and accomplishments of the Middle East and North Africa, accomplishments that paved the way for the European enlightenment. He emphasised on his personal relationship with Islam, and acknowledged that, while no single speech can eradicate years of distrust, he was anxious to create a new relationship based on mutual respect5.

One of Obama’s main points in the speech was the Iranian nuclear programme. He acknowledged the tumultuous relationship shared by the US and the Islamic Republic, the 1953 Iranian coup d’état of Mohammad Mosaddegh and the Iranian Hostage Crisis spanning from November 1979 to January 1981, and the inescapable fact that the Islamic Republic defines itself, in part, in opposition to America6. Obama became the first American president since 1979 to officially recognise the Islamic Republic as such, stating his willingness to move forward, and overcome the decades of mistrust that had built up between the nations.

Obama continued to shift the rhetoric of the US towards the Islamic Republic in 2009 with his Nowruz statement7. Speaking directly to the Iranian people, Obama recognised the achievements and historical clout of the Persian Empire, and its contributions to civilization. He cited the respect that the US has for the Islamic Republic, and his administration’s commitment to diplomacy. True to his word, the Obama administration began full participation in the nuclear negotiations. Additionally, the Obama administration moved away from demanding complete cessation of uranium enrichment, which was crucial to the

4 Robert Jankowski, “The Practice and Culture of Arab Nationalism”, International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 4, 2018, pp. 297-315. 5 Efraim Katzir, “Nuclear Deal: Does It Make a Difference for the Middle East?”, Review of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2018, pp. 251-271. 6 Rami G. Khouri, , “The Implications of the Syrian War for New Regional Orders in the Middle East”, MENARA Working Papers, No. 12, September 2018. 7 Bahgat Korany, “The Middle East since the Cold War”, in Louise Fawcett (ed.), International Relations of the Middle East , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. 313 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 success of the negotiations. Iran viewed its right to peaceful nuclear power as inalienable, and was not willing to cease all enrichment8.

In addition to the Obama administration’s recognition of Iran’s right to uranium enrichment, secret talks began between the governments of the US and the Islamic Republic. Mediated, for the most part, by Oman, the talks began in 2009 with the Islamic Republic testing Obama’s commitment to diplomacy. Among other things, the Iranian government asked for the release of multiple Iranian prisoners and an increased number of visas for Iranian students. The Obama administration acceded on many demands, facilitating the release of four prisoners, and doubling the number of Iranian students in the US9. All of these events, however, happened during Obama’s first term, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was still president of Iran, which meant that there was little change in relations between the two governments.

The importance of Obama’s shift in rhetoric, however, must be understood. In the history of US-Iran relations there had been little direct confrontation between the two countries10. For the US, there was the Hostage Crisis and attacks made by an Iran-affiliated terrorist group on the US embassy and military barracks in Lebanon in 1983. For Iran, there was the coup of Mossadegh in 1953 and the imposed war from 1981 to 1989. For the most part, however, threat perceptions of the two governments were based in rhetoric and perceived intention. When Obama came to office there were few concrete measures that he could take to amend relations with Iran—there was no war, there was no occupation to end. Shifting rhetoric was one of the few and one of the most effective ways to improve relations with the Islamic Republic. The Obama administration made it more difficult for the Iranian government to claim that the American government still aspired to regime change, and had no respect for Iranian sovereignty11. When this argument lost value, Iran was forced to restructure its threat perception of the US.

2.2 Rouhani’s Election

In 2013, the political situation in Iran shifted with the election of Hassan Rouhani. The election of Rouhani, who was the only moderate among the six candidates approved by the Guardian Council, surprised the international community as well as Iranian citizens, who had expected Ayatollah Khamenei

8 Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, London: Routledge, 2004. 9 Christian Reus-Smit, “The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions”, International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4, 1997. 10 Lawrence P. Rubin, Islam in the Balance: Ideational Threats in Arab Politics, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014. 11 Christa Salamandra, “Sectarianism in Syria: Anthropological Reflections”, Middle East Critique, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2012, pp. 303-306. 314 THE UNITED STATES, IRAN AND THE NEW CONUNDRUM to rig the election in favour of a conservative candidate. The controversy around Ahmadinejad’s re-election may have alerted Khamenei to the dangers of disregarding the wishes of the Iranian people. The wish to retain what little amount of legitimacy the regime still held was more powerful than the need for a conservative president12. Hassan Rouhani campaigned on a platform of reform, promising to work with the international community to relieve sanctions that were crippling the Iranian economy. Rouhani promised to regain Iran’s dignity, which had been deeply diminished by the unpredictable and irrational Ahmadinejad.

A testament for the Iranian people’s yearning for reform and moderation, Rouhani won the election in a landslide, receiving more than three times the number of votes than any other candidate. Three days after his inauguration, Rouhani called for the nuclear negotiations to be resumed, and offered to be more transparent regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. The Obama administration reacted enthusiastically, and a phone call between Obama and Rouhani became the first direct contact between the American and Iranian presidents since the 1979 revolution.

2.3 Turmoil during President Trump’s Era

While Donald Trump’s administration has maintained Obama’s policy toward Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), it has differed widely in its approach to Iran. The stark reality of this difference becomes prominent when it comes to the Iran nuclear agreement. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in April 2015 by Iran, the US, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany (the so-called “P5 + 1”). The agreement put substantial limits on Iran’s nuclear programme—particularly on the enrichment of uranium—for periods ranging from 10 to 15 years. In return, Iran received relief from US, EU and U.N. sanctions.

12 Bassel F. Salloukh and Rex Brynen, “Pondering Permeability: Some Introductory Explorations”,in Bassel F. Salloukh and Rex Brynen (eds.), Persistent Permeability?: Regionalism, Localism, and Globalizationin the Middle East, London: Routledge, 2004. 315 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

Table 1 given below depicts the constraints that the JCPOA accord places on Iran’s uranium route to a bomb, its plutonium route to a bomb, and the timeframe Iran has agreed to observe the constraints13. Table 1: Restrictions on uranium route, plutonium route and the stipulated timeframe Uranium Route Plutonium Route Stipulated Timeframe . No enrichment above low en- . No construction of 15 years riched uranium level additional heavy water . Stockpile of low-enriched reactors uranium reduced to less than 1 bombs-worth . No new facilities . Fordow: No uranium enrichment . 6,000 centrifuges at Natanz 10 years . One year breakout . No enrichment using advanced centrifuges (some Research & Development permitted) . No reprocessing of spent Permanent fuel for weapon . All spent fuel from Arak shipped out of country for lifetime of reactor . Destruction or removal Unspecified Duration of Arak core . No production of weap- ons-grade plutonium Source: Compiled by the Author.

Table 2 as below illustrates the comparison between Iran’s nuclear capability after the accord is implemented and its programme before the interim agreement14.

Table 2: A comparison between Iran’s nuclear capability after and before the imple- mentation of the accord Specific Nuclear Capability After JCPOA Before JCPOA Uranium Route First generation centrifuges installed 6,104 18,472 Advanced centrifuges installed 0 1,008

13 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “The Exclusionary Turn in GCC Politics”, Arab Center, available at http:// arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/the-exclusionary-turn-in-gcc-politics/, accessed on 21 August 2019. 14 Ian S. Lustick, “The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political Backwardness in Historical Perspective”, International Organisation, Vol. 51 , No. 4, 1997. 316 THE UNITED STATES, IRAN AND THE NEW CONUNDRUM

Breakout time for weapon 1 year 1-2 months Research & Development of new centri- Constrained Unconstrained fuge technology Stockpile of low-enriched uranium 660 lbs 15,770 lbs Stockpile of medium enriched uranium 0 lbs 430 lbs (close to bomb grade) Plutonium Route Arak reactor Core dismantled and re- Under construction to actor reconfigured produce 1-2 bombs- worth of plutonium annually Verification and Monitoring Previous research on nuclear weapons Iran to address IAEA No cooperation concerns Unknown nuclear sites IAEA access to suspi- No mechanism cious nuclear facilities anywhere Inspection regime Strictest IAEA protocols Not implemented implemented Source: Compiled by the Author.

The Obama administration expended a substantial diplomatic effort in negotiating the JCPOA. It also invested significant political capital in fighting back congressional efforts to kill the agreement15. The JCPOA is clearly one of the signature foreign policy achievements of the Obama administration. But it was and remains highly controversial. Congressional support for the deal largely fell along partisan lines with Republicans opposing it. In the 2016 Republican primary, then-candidate Donald Trump was not the only contender who opposed the JCPOA; indeed, most of the major Republican candidates announced their opposition to the deal. The agreement was also controversial in Middle East, with Israel publicly opposing it and Saudi Arabia’s uneasiness, at the very least, with what it viewed as a weakening US commitment to the kingdom’s security16. President Trump remains hostile to the JCPOA. He has twice decertified Iranian compliance under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015. But he has refrained from pulling the US out of the JCPOA by re-imposing sanctions.

15 Marc Lynch, “The New Arab Order”, Foreign Affairs, (September/October), 2018. 16 Nabeel A. Khoury, “The Arab Cold War Revisited: The Regional Impact of the Arab Uprising”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2013. 317 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

President Trump has apparently been persuaded by senior figures in his administration such as former Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, and National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster that simply walking away from the JCPOA would be counterproductive. Iran would oppose any such effort, and all the other parties to the agreement are generally satisfied with it. Moreover, the unilateral re-imposition of sanctions could create a rift with US allies in Europe17. The administration may push for additional sanctions—by the US and perhaps the EU—related to Iran’s ballistic missile programme and its support for groups like Hezbollah. The Europeans, however reluctently, appear prepared to at least discuss additional measures against Iran. China and Russia—the other P5 + 1 signatories of the agreementare, however, are less likely to accommodate US desires. President Trump’s nomination of CIA director Mike Pompeo to replace Rex Tillerson as secretary of state further clouds the JCPOA’s future, as Pompeo is widely considered to be a hawk when it comes to Iran and has been a harsh critic of the nuclear deal.

The Trump administration’s hostility to the JCPOA is merely part of a broader policy of confronting and rolling back Iran’s influence throughout the region. Once in office, Trump moved quickly to consolidate the US relationship with both Israel and Saudi Arabia, two of Iran’s most bitter enemies18. He clearly sees Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as key partners in his strategy of confronting Iran. The Trump administration has announced major arms sales to both countries, given a major concession to the Israeli government by announcing the US would recognise Jerusalem as the country’s capital, and continued to support the Saudi intervention in Yemen.

Early on in the dispute that broke out among the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) last summer, President Trump appeared to be aligning the US with Saudi Arabia and its allies against Qatar, but with time, the administration has taken a more even-handed approach. US policy in Syria appears to be driven in part by an attempt to constrain Iranian and Russian influence within that country19. The Trump administration also supported Israel’s February 2019 airstrikes against targets in Syria in the wake of an Iranian drone entering Israeli airspace. Despite its harsh line against Tehran, however, some critics have argued that the current administration has not gone far enough—as of yet—in countering Iran in the region.

17 Raymond Hinnebusch , “The Sectarian Revolution in the Middle East”, Revolutions: Global Trends and Regional Issues, issue. 4, 2012, pp. 120-152. 18 Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015. 19 Mark L. Hass, “Ideological Polarity and Balancing in Great Power Politics”, Security Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2014, pp. 715-753. 318 THE UNITED STATES, IRAN AND THE NEW CONUNDRUM

3. analysis of Current Negotiations

The negotiations began again, but Iran’s red line remained the same. Iran refused to concede to complete cessation of uranium enrichment. Iran’s nuclear programme began under the supervision and guidance of the US government, but the programme was shut down after the 1979 revolution. The programme was resumed in the mid 1980’s due to the Iran-Iraq War. Saddam Hussein was seen as a direct threat to the Islamic Republic, and Iran wanted to remain a step ahead20. After the American government toppled the Iraqi regime, the Islamic Republic stopped their military nuclear programme. Many of the inconsistencies and setbacks in prior negotiations were caused by the Islamic Republic attempting to cover up their past attempts to achieve a nuclear threshold state, rather than current, on-going attempts to create a nuclear bomb. By 2003, Iran’s nuclear programme had been opened up to intense international scrutiny, their primary security concern, Saddam, had been taken care of, inadvertently, by the US, and the Islamic Republic did not want to test the international community’s willingness to engage in direct military confrontation21.

For these reasons, experts believe that the Islamic Republic has ended its military nuclear programme22. However, the Islamic Republic has always maintained its right to peaceful nuclear power. The Iranian government is proud, and unwilling to be treated differently or talked down to; pursuit of peaceful nuclear power is a right of all Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories, and Iran is not prepared for Western powers to take away that right. The Obama administration realised this, and moved away from requesting complete cessation of uranium enrichment. The new red line drawn by the Americans was Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon. It was from these two stances that the governments of the US and the Islamic Republic attempted to reach a compromise.

When viewed as a necessary compromise that releases steam from a region in turmoil, the deal is a successful starting point. JCPOA, concluded in July of 2015, requires the neutralisation or dilution of half of Iran’s twenty percent enriched uranium, and the cessation of enrichment above five per cent. There is to be no further development of enrichment plants or the heavy-water reactor at Arak, no new enrichment locations, no reprocessing or development of a reprocessing facility, no new centrifuges, and a reduction by two-thirds of its current centrifuges. The

20 Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 21 Deniela Huber, “Arab Regionalism: A Post-Structural Perspective”, Global Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2015. 22 Mohamed M El-Doufani, “Regional Revisionist Client States under Unipolarity”, Third World Quaterly, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1992, pp. 255-265. 319 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is allowed to inspect both declared and undeclared facilities, has access to Iran’s nuclear supply chain, and all uranium mines and mills23.

The JCPOA features a detailed and thorough inspection and verification system, due to the history of cheating, dissimulation, reneging on past agreements or procrastination by Iran. The US government estimates that these provisions move Iran’s breakout timeline—the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon—from where it rests now, at two or three months, to one year. In return for these concessions, Iran is receiving sanctions relief. After verifiable proof that Iran has fulfilled the commitments outlined in the JCPOA, all UN Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue will be lifted, as well as nuclear-related sanctions by the US and European Union (EU). If, at any time, Iran fails to comply with its commitments, the sanctions can be immediately put back in place In keeping with the mistrustful relationship between America and Iran, the US has taken a hesitant approach to relieving sanctions. The US has kept its trade embargo on Iran, as well as all sanctions relating to human rights abuses, terrorism, and ballistic missiles. Distrust for the Islamic Republic can be clearly seen in the domestic backlash against the deal in the US.

In arguments against the deal, opponents often used tired rhetoric, accusing the Islamic Republic of being irrational and untrustworthy. The argument that the US cannot trust Iran is a simple attempt at explaining a complex regime: the Islamic Republic is not crazy or irrational simply because it is different. In many ways, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his fanatical rhetoric was a gift to those who would call Iran crazy and irrational, but this argument, already weak during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, does not hold up against Rouhani’s pragmatism24. In the US Senate, a Republican effort to block the deal failed to reach the necessary number of votes. All 54 Senate Republicans as well as four Democrats voted to block the deal, with 42 Democrats opposing. Tired rhetoric aside, Senators in opposition to the deal did voice valid criticism25.

Many Senators in opposition believed that the US should kill the current deal and start over again, enacting tougher sanctions and pushing the Islamic Republic to accept more invasive provisions. Opponents of the deal need to consider, however, the history of US-Iran relations, and the impact of the US

23 Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016. 24 Leon Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. 25 Rasmus Alenius Boserup and Silvia Colombo, “Hybridization of Domestic Order-Making in the Contemporary MENA Region”, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, No. 6 , 2017. 320 THE UNITED STATES, IRAN AND THE NEW CONUNDRUM backing out on the deal. International negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme began in 2003. The JCPOA, twelve years later, is the first comprehensive deal struck between Iran and Western powers. The Obama administration enacted crippling sanctions that helped devalue Iranian currency by 300 per cent. Iran was forced to the negotiating table in a way that it previously had not been, but the continuation and augmentation of sanctions would have been both inhumane and ineffective26.

As markets and economic relationships develop between Iran, China, Russia and India, sanctions become increasingly less effective and the efficacy of future sanctions, if threatened by countries in the West, could have very little impact on the Iranian economy, which remains the eighteenth largest in the world even with international sanctions. Aside from the danger of inefficacy, the political implications of backing out on the deal would have manifold consequences on US-Iran relations.

The election of Rouhani and the negotiations have resulted in the highest, most robust level of communication between the two governments in the history of the Islamic Republic. If the US had backed out on the deal, it would have been another example of the Great Satan’s disregard for Iranian efforts at diplomacy, akin to the Grand Bargain or Iran’s aid in the fight against the Taliban27. This time, however, the disregard would have been incredibly public, sending a message of disrespect not only to the Iranian government but also to the Iranian people. The US proving its untrustworthiness, once again, would have strengthened the positions of the most conservative, hard line parts of the Iranian government, and weakened the legitimacy of moderates like Rouhani.

Hard line conservatives, most notably Khamenei, have maintained anti American rhetoric throughout the negotiations. The Ayatollah’s Twitter feed was a stream of anti-American commentary, returning over and over to the dangers of trusting the US. Two examples are the Ayatollah’s tweets on 21 October 2015, including “US deceptive involvement in nuclear talks has been intended to advance their hostile policies towards Iran” and “POTUS (the President of the US) claims in his 2 letters to me that he is not after regime change in Iran soon proved as a lie with him backing internal conspiracies”28. Tweets and rhetoric illustrate a fundamental

26 Pinar Bilgin,, “Region, Security, Regional Security: Whose Middle East? Revisited”, in Elizabeth Monier (ed.), Regional Insecurity after the Arab Uprising: Narratives of Security Threat, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 27 Charles T. Call, “Beyond the ‘Failed State’: Toward Conceptual Alternatives”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2011. 28 Galip Dalay, “Break-up of the Middle East: Will We See a New Regional Order?”, Middle East Eye, 14 September 2017, available at https://www.middleeasteye.net/big-story/break-middle-east-will-we-see-new- regional-order, accessed on 20 September 2019. 321 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 aspect of the Iranian regime. Founded in opposition to America, letting go of this fundamental definition would hurt the regime’s legitimacy. Distrusting America and Western powers was not a transitional aspect of the Islamic Republic; it was founded in a deep rejection of imperialism and imposed Western values. As relations between Iran and the US move towards normalization, the rhetoric of the Iranian regime will be the hardest to change.

4. a Case for Track II Diplomacy

In light of these dilemmas, one could suggest cultural diplomacy as an excellent tool in reestablishing relations. Cultural diplomacy revolves around the themes of dialogue, understanding and trust, all lacking elements in Iran-US relations. However, between the citizens of each nation, feelings are far less belligerent. It would appear then that the political leaders and diplomats have too far entrenched themselves in their respective positions to allow for the flexibility required. Athletes, artists and students do not have these limitations and would represent the ideal cultural ambassadors29.

In this regard, the cultural exchanges initiated under the Clinton-Khatami administrations have borne fruit. The case of Hamed Ehadadi can be a good example. Ehadadi is an Iranian basketball player who visited the US on a State Department sponsored athletic exchange. This was noticed by National Basketball Association (NBA) talent scouts and offered a position on the Memphis Grizzlies Basketball team30. Doing so was not easy as entering into contracts with Iranian nationals is prohibited under US sanctions regime, an example of the ability of private citizens to achieve where politicians cannot. Since joining the NBA, Ehadadi has served as a cultural ambassador.

Another example is the frequent Greco-wrestling exchanges between Iran and the US that were also begun during the Clinton-Khatami period. These exchanges have gone a long way in establishing a dialogue and fostering understanding31. During the exchanges, both Iranians and Americans take advantage of the off-mat time to meet their foreign counterparts and learn more about each other’s respective cultures. After a recent competition in 2007, member of the Iranian Junior Wrestling delegation, Abbas Ali Genii mentioned, “This programme has changed my outlook on the US. I really felt the spirit of cooperation and friendship”.

29 Raffaellaa Del Sarto, Israel under Siege: The Politics of Insecurity and the Rise of the Israeli Neo-Revisionist Right, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2017. 30 “Saudi Crown Prince: Iran’s Supreme Leader Makes Hitler Look Good”, Axios, available at https://www. axios.com/saudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-iran-supreme-leader-c699f834-7a10-4306-b020- dcf8e3593b29.html, accessed on 15 September 2019. 31 Rima Majed, “Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East”, Global Change, Peace and Security, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2019. 322 THE UNITED STATES, IRAN AND THE NEW CONUNDRUM

Yet athletics are not the only thing that can unite Iranians and Americans. In March 2010, an American film delegation of actors and producers visited their Iranian counterparts. The visit was not without controversy, as Ahmadinejad’s cultural advisor demanded the delegation first apologize for negative depictions on Iran in American movies32. Regardless, Hollywood Producer Sidney Ganis described the focus of his trip to Iran this way, “To communicate with our fellow filmmakers.... to meet, talk, express, visit and understand the problems of Iranian filmmakers, and express to them universal problems of filmmaking and just generally exchange ideas.” When asked about future possibilities of cooperation Ganis replied, “Well, we’re ready to go, filmmakers to filmmakers. That’s why we’re here. We’re open; the Iranian filmmakers are also open, to even more mutual dialogue.”

In closing, few nations have maintained their mutual animosity as Iran and the US have. Simply having conflicts is not a good enough explanation for thirty years of bitterness33. Russia and Germany have cordial if not good relations; two of America’s strongest allies, Japan and Germany were at one time mortal enemies of the US. Something lies at the heart of the US-Iran issue. Internal Iranian politics have combined to create a dynamic where re-establishing US relations amounts to political suicide as leader after leader use an anti-American slant to slander opponents. Additionally, the regime in Iran uses the threat of American intervention to maintain its control over many of its people. At the same time, the US perpetuates the conflict simply because it can. As the world’s last superpower, there is little that Iran can do to compel the US’s behaviour. Leadership in the US seems to take the position that the responsibility to make the first move rests solely on Iran; Obama’s ‘unclenched fist’ statement being a good example of this policy. In either case, governments have only succeeded to institutionalise disagreements34. All of this works counter to what the people of each nation desire. Both sides have expressed a desire to conduct talks.

5. Key Recommendations

The next US presidential team has to assume that the American question will become even more partisan in Iran as moderates and hardliners gear up to contest the succession process for supreme leader. In many ways, the American question is merely a pawn in an intra-regime fight, but this reality bodes for added Iranian

32 Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal ’abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals, London: Oxford University Press, 1975. 33 David A. Lake, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. 34 Helle Malmvig, “Power, Identity and Securitization in the Middle East: Regional Order after the Arab Uprisings”, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2013. 323 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019 policy inconsistencies toward the US and beyond. This needs to be factored in as Washington formulates its post Obama approach to Tehran.

The ability of any US president to shape the outcome of the decision making process in Tehran is finite. Still, Washington has to acknowledge the basic fact that the moderates in Iran see détente with the US as a source of domestic and international empowerment, while hardliners see it as a direct challenge to their narrow domestic and foreign interests. Empowering the moderates in Iran through continued engagement with the Rouhani government may result in greater flexibility in Iran’s regional policies that are causing much angst to America’s allies. The opposite effect is equally plausible. Many in Washington do not consider Rouhani a moderate, but, in the context of Iranian politics, he does promise alternatives to some of the policy orthodoxies that the Islamic Republic has maintained since 1979.35 The next US president needs to quickly decide whether the political distance between Rouhani and his hard line rivals is worth banking on.

While Rouhani comes from a camp in the Iranian regime that has a long and mixed track record in seeking ways to reduce tensions with the US, Khamenei will remain decidedly suspicious of overtures to Washington. For Khamenei, the process of negotiations with the US was aimed at one thing: the removal of international sanctions36. He has made it clear that unilateral American diplomatic and economic action against Iran does not deter him. Khamenei’s reading is that the US no longer has the capacity to mobilise the international community against Iran as it did between 2006-2013 — whether on the nuclear issue or other matters — and he will, therefore, be more reluctant to go along with Rouhani’s agenda of broadening the US-Iran conversation to include non-nuclear disagreements. To shape Khamenei’s calculations, the next US president has to identify additional leverage points that will be harder for Khamenei to ignore.

6. Conclusion

The US government must remember not only recent events, like the failure of the Grand Bargain, but ancient history, like Cyrus the Great and the vast Persian Empire. Iran has a long, venerable history, forming a strong collective identity and culture. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries cemented a deeply anti-imperialist sentiment into the Iranian identity, and the US cannot forget the role that it played in disrespecting the values and wishes of a sovereign nation.

35 László Póti, “Russian Policies towards the MENA Region”, MENARA Working Papers, No. 9, 2018. 36 Bassel F. Salloukh,, “The Arab Uprisings and the Geopolitics of the Middle East”, The International Spectator, Vol. 48, No. 2, June 2013, pp. 32-46. 324 THE UNITED STATES, IRAN AND THE NEW CONUNDRUM

The neo-imperialism of the US combined with a perceived lack of respect and recognition for the multiple diplomatic endeavours of the Islamic Republic over the past decades has reinforced the anti-American foundation of the Islamic Republic’s government37. The negotiations were able to succeed in spite of this fundamental lack of trust, primarily due to the efforts of the Obama administration in reforming the aggressive rhetoric of previous American presidents.

There has still been, however, a major backlash against both the negotiations and the JCPOA in the US. Iran has behaved questionably in past negotiations, and this has augmented the lack of trust for the Iranian government in the US. It is understandable that, after thirty six years of antagonistic rhetoric and little to no direct communication with the Iranian government, many perceive it as untrustworthy and thus view the JCPOA as a dangerous concession.38

The JCPOA is not destined for success no matter what: that is to say, it is vital that the US government continues to promote positive relations with Iran and hold up its end of the agreement. However, because so much of the antagonistic relationship between the US and Iran is based in rhetoric, a Republican president like Trump, who reverses the positive steps taken by Obama in this regard could do heavy damage to the US-Iran relations.

On the other hand, if relations between the US and Iran can get better in the future, Iran will be reintegrated into the international community, and will be more subject to international norms and laws. The Iranian government will be forced, to some extent, to open up, creating an environment where the Iranian people will be able to thrive and make connections across the world. This deal could be a starting point for substantial diplomatic relations between the US and Iran, but it requires continued effort and cooperation by both governments.

As of now, there are too many variables to accurately predict the future of the US-Iran relations. In such a tumultuous region, the progression of Iran towards reintegration will have manifold ramifications, the importance of which cannot be understated. The future of the Islamic Republic must continue to be thoroughly studied as it unfolds, with a complete and nuanced understanding of the past.

37 Anthony Shadid, “Turkey Predicts Alliance with Egypt as Regional Anchors”, The New Yrok Times, 18 September 2011, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/world/middleeast/turkey-predicts-partnership-with-egypt- as-regional-anchors.html, accessed on 22 September 2019. 38 Matthew D. Stephen, “Rising Regional Powers and International Institutions: The Foreign Policy Orientations of India, Brazil, and South Africa, Global Society, Vol. 26, No. 3, July, 2012, pp. 289-309. 325 BIISS Publications

• BIISS Journal (Quarterly) • Bangladesh Foreign Policy Survey (Quarterly) • BIISS Papers (Monograph series) The Assam Tangle: Outlook for the Future (1984) The Crisis in Lebanon: Multi-dimensional Aspects and Outlook for the Future (1985) India's Policy Fundamentals, Neighbours and Post-Indira Developments (1985) Strategic Aspects of Indo-Sri Lanka Relations (1986) Indo-Bangladesh Common Rivers and Water Diplomacy (1986) Gulf War: The Issues Revisited (1987) The SAARC in Progress: A Hesitant Course of South Asian Transition (1988) Post-Brezhnev Soviet Policy Towards the Third World (1988) Changing Faces of Socialism (1989) Sino-Indian Quest for Rapprochement: Implications for South Asia (1989) Intifada: The New Dimension to Palestinian Struggle (1990) Bangladesh: Towards National Consensus (in Bangla, 1990) Environmental Challenges to Bangladesh (1991) The Gulf War and the New World Order: Implication for the Third World (1992) Challenges of Governance in India: Fundamentals under Threat (1995) Bangladesh in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1998) Nuclearisation of South Asia: Challenges and Options for Bangladesh (1998) The Middle East Peace Process and the Palestinian Statehood (2000) Pakistan and Bangladesh: From Conflict to Cooperation (2003) Integrated Coastal Zone Management in Bangladesh: A Case for People's Management (2003) WTO Dispute Settlement System and Developing Countries: A Neorealist Critique (2004) State Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention: Does One Negate the Other? (2006) Unipolarity and Weak States: The Case of Bangladesh (2009) Japan's Strategic Rise (2010) The Fallacy of Fragile States Indices: Is There a 'Fragility Trap'? (2017) • BIISS Seminar Proceedings Contemporary Development Debate: Bangladesh in the Global Context Moving from MDGs to SDGs: Bangladesh Experience and Expectation SAARC at 30: Achievements, Potentials and Challenges Bangladesh’s Relations with Latin American Countries: Unlocking Potentials Civil-Military Relations in Democracy: An Effective Framework Recent Extremist Violence in Bangladesh: Response Options 25 March – Gonohottya Dibosh (Genocide Day) Reconciling Divided Societies, Building Democracy and Good Governance: Lessons from Sri Lanka Promoting Cultural Diversity of Small Ethnic Groups in Bangladesh Upcoming 45th Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of OIC, Dhaka: Revisiting A Shared Journey †ivwn½v msKUt evsjv‡`k KZ©…K M„nxZ c`‡¶c I ch©v‡jvPbv (Rohingya Crisis: Measures Taken by Bangladesh and An Appraisal) Bangladesh Delta Plan 2100 Bangladesh in International Peacebuilding: Experience from Japan Bangladesh Delta Plan 2100: Implementation, Challenges and Way Forward 1971 Genocide in Bangladesh Bangladesh-India Cooperation: In the Changing Regional and Global Context International Day of Peace 2019 and Launching of Book Titled “Bangladesh in Interna tional Peacebuilding: Discourses from Japan and Beyond” Commemorating the Silver Jubilee of Diplomatic Relation Between South Africa and Bangladesh • BIISS Country Lecture Series BIISS Country Lecture Series: Part- 1 BIISS Country Lecture Series: Part- 2 Books South Asian Regional Cooperation: A Socio–economic Approach to Peace and Stability Nation Building in Bangladesh: Retrospect and Prospect The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace The Security of Small States ASEAN Experiences of Regional and Inter-regional Cooperation: Relevance for SAARC Development, Politics and Security: Third World Context Bangladesh and SAARC: Issues, Perspectives and Outlook Bangladesh: Society Polity and Economy South Asia’s Security: Primacy of Internal Dimension Chandabaji Versus Entrepreneurship: Youth Force in Bangladesh Development Cooperation at the Dawn of the Twenty First Century: Bangladesh-German Partnership in Perspective Conflict Management and Sub-regional Co-operation in ASEAN: Relevance of SAARC National Security of Bangladesh in the 21st Century Civil Society and Democracy in Bangladesh Regional Co-operation in South Asia: New Dimensions and Perspectives Confidence Building Measures and Security Cooperation in South Asia: Challenges in the New Century Bangladesh-Southeast Asia Relations: Some Insights Security in the Twenty First Century: A Bangladesh Perspective 25 Years of BIISS: An Anthology Politics and Security in South Asia: Salience of Religion and Culture Small States and Regional Stability in South Asia Religious Militancy and Security in South Asia Global War on Terror: Bangladesh Perspective Towards BIMSTEC-Japan Comprehensive Economic Cooperation: Bangladesh Perspective Democracy, Governance and Security Reforms: Bangladesh Context Whither National Security Bangladesh 2007 National Security Bangladesh 2008 Human Security Approach to Counter Extremism in South Asia: Relevance of Japanese Culture National Security Bangladesh 2009 Energy Security in South Asia Plus: Relevance of Japanese Experience Changing Global Dynamics: Bangladesh Foreign Policy Bangladesh in International Peacebuilding: Discourses from Japan and Beyond South Asia Human Security Series: Nepali State, Society and Human Security: An infinite Discourse Evolving Security Discourse in Sri Lanka: From National Security to Human Security Violence, Terrorism and Human Security in South Asia Women and Human Security in South Asia: The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan Human Security in India: Health, Shelter and Marginalisation Pakistan: Haunting Shadows of Human Security Human Security in India: Discourse, Practices and Policy Implications Human Security Index for South Asia: Exploring Relevant Issues Ethnicity and Human Security in Bangladesh and Pakistan BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 3, JULY 2019

The Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) is a statutory institution established in 1978 under the administrative control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Bangladesh, for undertaking and promoting research and deliberation on international affairs, security and developmental issues. The priority areas of the Institute's research activities are: foreign policy, security and strategic issues with specific relevance for Bangladesh; regional, inter-regional and international cooperation, sustainable development with focus on resource management and environmental issues; conflict studies, peace keeping, disarmament, non-proliferation and area studies. Contemporary issues of South Asian politics, security and development are the focus of research activities of the Institute. Ethno-religious issues, regional and sub-regional cooperation, globalisation and environmental issues are of special research interests. Problems of institutionalisation of democracy, economic liberalisation, trade and investment links, challenges of governance and strengthening the civil society receive significant scholarly attention. The general guidance and superintendence of the Institute affairs are vested upon the Board of Governors, headed by a Chairman and consisting of representatives of ministries, armed forces, academics and professionals. The Director General is the Member-Secretary of the Board and Chief Executive of the Institute. The main activities of the Institute are carried out by the Research Faculty consisting of a team of full-time researchers with varied social sciences background.

Mailing Address

1/46, Old Elephant Road (West of Ramna Police Station), Dhaka-1000, Bangladesh. Fax: 88-02-48312625, [email protected], website: www.biiss.org 328