Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses ISSN 2382-6444 | Volume 9, Issue 10 | October 2017

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Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses ISSN 2382-6444 | Volume 9, Issue 10 | October 2017 Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses www.rsis.edu.sg ISSN 2382-6444 | Volume 9, Issue 10 | October 2017 A JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH (CTR) Ending the Fight in Marawi Rohan Gunaratna The Significance of Megat Shahdan as a Singaporean IS Foreign Fighter Jasminder Singh and Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani Extremism beyond Nusa Kambangan Prisons Muh Taufiqurrohman, Muhammad Ali Usman and Ardi Putra Prasetya Radicalisation: Examining a Concept, its Use and Abuse Paul Hedges Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Volume 9, Issue 4 | April 2017 1 Building a Global Network for Security Editorial Note The Defeat of IS & the Southeast Asian Terrorist Threat October 2017 has been a fateful month for the Philippines, security forces have successfully Islamic State (IS) terrorist group. In Syria, its managed to contain, isolate and eliminate the de facto ‘capital’ Raqqa has fallen to an IS threat in Marawi. Although the battle is alliance of Kurdish and Arab fighters backed almost over with the deaths of IS Philippines by the US-led coalition. Earlier in Hawija, the leaders Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute, the last remaining IS stronghold in northern Iraq, threat of terrorism in the region is far from about 1,000 IS fighters surrendered to Iraqi over. Rohan Gunaratna discusses the forces rather than fighting for ‘martyrdom’. situation in Marawi, the activities of the Over in Southeast Asia, the Philippines militants, the government’s response and authorities announced the liberation of Marawi future trends. Despite the elimination of top Wafter a five -month battle and the killing of IS leaders and fighters in Marawi, IS will prevail in top leaders, Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute. Southern Philippines and pose a security The string of losses suffered by IS since 2016 threat to Southeast Asian countries as the nullifies and invalidates the IS slogan of leadership outside Mindanao remains intact. In ‘remaining and expanding’ and constitutes a addition, other militant groups are joining IS’ huge symbolic blow to its standing as leader of East Asia Division, indicating efforts to expand the global ‘jihadist’ movement. from the Philippines to Northeast and Southeast Asia. It is likely that the fall of Raqqa was expected by the top leadership of IS and that plans have While IS has failed to hold territory, it has been been made well in advance for al-Baghdadi successful in cyberspace, with regular online and his senior commanders to go into hiding, publications of battle news, ‘religious’ articles, and for the ‘jihadi’ struggle to persist in some showing exploits of IS fighters and propaganda form in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. This is videos. In this connection, Jasminder Singh already evident from IS’ decentralisation of its and Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani discuss the ‘jihad’ and ‘virtualisation’ of its so-called unprecedented appearance of a Singaporean caliphate (from a territory-based entity). The national in an IS-propaganda video last month ‘decentralisation of jihad’ through its various and its possible implications. In the midst of IS wilayats and online presence (including videos decline in the Levant, the video attempts to and publications), is similar to Al-Qaeda’s post- rally the ‘jihadists’, boost their morale, and 9/11 franchising strategy. IS has been urging gives the false impression that IS will prevail. its affiliates in different parts of the world to The video underlines the need for continued continue the so-called ‘caliphate’ project by high-level vigilance against extremist teachings granting them more autonomy and freedom to and ‘jihadist’ propaganda and radicalisation in mount operations. Against this backdrop, the real world and the murky cyber world. Southeast Asia has to contend with the threat of IS and other terrorist groups engaging in Muh Taufiqurrohman et al. examine the recruitment and proselytisation, and planning issue of jihadist radicalisation and activities in attacks through the online domain. Indonesia’s prisons at Nusa Kambangan. They observe that lax security measures, This context necessitates close monitoring of understaffed prison facilities, low budgetary hotspots in Southeast Asia, including Marawi provisions and overworked prison guards have in the Philippines, Rakhine in Myanmar and enabled high-profile jihadists such as Aman the southern provinces in Thailand. In the Abdurrahman, Iwan Darmawan, Abdullah ADVISORY BOARD Editor Sara Mahmood Dr. Rohan Gunaratna Dr. Fernando Reinares Associate Editor Abdul Basit Professor of Security Studies Director, Program on Global Terrorism, Head of International Centre for Political Elcano Royal Institute Professor of Security Copywriters Jennifer Dhanaraj Studies, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Violence and Terrorism Research Teertha Samal Madrid, Spain Sylvene See Dr. John Harrison Associate Editor Journal of Transportation Design and Layout Okkie Tanupradja Dr. Stephen Sloan Security Professor Emeritus, The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and Dr. Kumar Ramakrishna The University of Oklahoma not of ICPVTR, RSIS, NTU or the organisations to which the Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses authors are affiliated.Volume Articles 9, may Issue not be4 |reproduced April 2017 without prior Associate Professor Lawrence J. Chastang, permission. Please contact the editors for more information at Head of Policy Studies & Coordinator of Distinguished Professor of Terrorism Studies, [email protected]. The editorial team also welcomes any feedback National Security Studies Programme The University of Central Florida2 or comments. Editorial Note The Defeat of IS & the Southeast Asian Terrorist Threat Sonata and Abu Hanifah to recruit, preach, communicate, plan and execute attacks without hindrance. They recommend placing terrorist inmates in special prisons or solitary confinement, employing full-time religious counsellors, recruiting more qualified prison guards and increasing the prisons’ operational budget. WOn the issue of radicalisation, a better conceptual understanding of the subject is required. Paul Hedges explores and clarifies key issues associated with the term radicalisation. He argues that radicalisation is largely linked to socialisation and that there is no commonly accepted personality profile nor a linear pathway to radicalisation; basically, the landscape and trajectory of terrorism in terms of recruitment and evolution are both changing and fluid. In order to counter the booming youth ‘jihadist’ cultural milieu, he argues that it is necessary to have credible moderate role models and voices messages that are packaged to appeal to the youth. He added that any response to address the issue of trajectories into violence needs to be measured, targeted, evidence-based, and empathetic to the communities involved. ADVISORY BOARD Editor Sara Mahmood Dr. Rohan Gunaratna Dr. Fernando Reinares Associate Editor Abdul Basit Professor of Security Studies Director, Program on Global Terrorism, Head of International Centre for Political Elcano Royal Institute Professor of Security Copywriters Jennifer Dhanaraj Studies, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Violence and Terrorism Research Teertha Samal Madrid, Spain Sylvene See Dr. John Harrison Associate Editor Journal of Transportation Design and Layout Okkie Tanupradja Dr. Stephen Sloan Security Professor Emeritus, The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and Dr. Kumar Ramakrishna The University of Oklahoma not of ICPVTR, RSIS, NTU or the organisations to which the Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses authors are affiliated.Volume Articles 9, may Issue not be4 |reproduced April 2017 without prior Associate Professor Lawrence J. Chastang, permission. Please contact the editors for more information at Head of Policy Studies & Coordinator of Distinguished Professor of Terrorism Studies, [email protected]. The editorial team also welcomes any feedback National Security Studies Programme The University of Central Florida3 or comments. Ending the Fight in Marawi – Rohan Gunaratna Ending the Fight in Marawi Rohan Gunaratna Synopsis females, 7 children and 1 infant) were rescued.2 The Philippines security forces with timely international military and intelligence The IS fighters in Marawi, guided by IS assistance successfully managed to contain, central, adopted policies implemented by the isolate and eliminate the threat posed by the group in Iraq and Syria. Some of the violent Islamic State (IS) terrorist group in Marawi activities that IS fighters engaged in included City. With the Battle of Marawi drawing to a burning a police station and the city jail to close in October, after the deaths of key free the inmates and executing the chief of leaders, such as Isnilon Hapilon and intelligence of Marawi. In addition, IS also Omarkhayam Maute, IS will lose control in occupied homes and raided shops, Marawi. However, ideologically IS will remain considering them as war booty to replenish a threat to the Philippines through its their supplies. IS members took control of the followers and local affiliates. A continual St Mary's Cathedral and Dansalan college, regional response is necessary to prevent and took Christian leaders, staff members the spread and spillover effects of IS and students hostage. Subsequently, in order presence. to replicate IS execution methods and styles, the fighters made videos of members Overview executing Christians wearing orange uniforms. IS fighters in the Philippines also The conflict that began on 23 May, with IS- engaged
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