The Role of Women in Violent Extremism

THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN VIOLENT EXTREMISM

A CASE STUDY OF THE PHILIPPINES AND INDONESIA

AUTHORS:

DAVID H. JIANG

KEVIN LIN

SANA MOJARRADI

JOSHUA RACINE

PETER ROTHPLETZ

HARRY SEAVEY

ALISSA WANG

PROJECT ADVISOR:

R EAR A DMIRAL J OHN F. W EIGOLD, IV. ( RET)

SENIOR CAPSTONE PROJECT FOR THE JACKSON INSITUTE FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS AND UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary 4 Introduction 5 UN Security Council Resolution 1325 5 The United States Executive Order 13595 6 The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security 6 Congressional Legislative History 8 Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 11 Congressional Intent 12 Assumptions 15 Push & Pull Factors 16 Examining the Causes of Radicalization 16 Moving Past “Push” & “Pull” 18 Case Studies 20 Philippines 20 Landscape of Violent Extremism 20 A Closer Look 27 Education and Activism 27 Government and Security 29 Indonesia 31 History of Violent Extremism in Indonesia 31 Women, Peace, Security, and CVE Approaches 33 I. Military, National Police, and Government Efforts 33 II. Civil Society Organizations and Education 36 III. Female Migrant Workers and Jihadist Prisoners 39 The Interagency 43 The United States Department of State 43 United States Agency for International Development 50 Department of State and USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism 56

2 Recommendations 60 1. Prioritizing Women’s Agency vs. Women’s Rights 60 2. Improving U.S. Engagement with Women through Islam 62 3. Leverage influence to promote gendered perspectives of partners 63 4. Interagency Alliances 64 5. Further Areas of Research 65 Case-Study Takeaways: 67 Philippines Takeaways 67 1. Female Perspectives in Peacemaking 67 2. Hijab Trooper Program 67 3. Women-led NGOs 68 4. Community Workshops 68 Indonesia Takeaways 68 1. Research needs 68 2. Issue prioritization 69 3. Political sensitivity 70 4. Technical assistance 70 5. Selective partnership with Indonesian government institutions 71 6. Men’s role in gender-based CVE 72 7. Engaging with non-violent extremists 74 Conclusions 76 Acknowledgements 79 Bibliography 80

3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Nation-states throughout the Indo-Pacific region face a myriad of challenges in formulating and executing effective policies to counter the growth of violent extremist groups. This mission is further complicated by the fact many governments have historically ignored the experiences, narratives, and influences of women when crafting said policies. In this brief, one will find an extensive review of past and present efforts to include the voices of women in the CVE process – both within individual countries and international coalitions.

In addition, the brief assesses the extant literature relating to the host of cultural, psychological, social, economic, and societal drivers that can push women down the path of radicalization. It goes on to examine specific case studies that contain notable intersections of women’s issues and violent extremism– namely, Indonesia and the Philippines. Finally, after considering dozens of interviews from policy experts and an extensive literature review, this paper recommends the formulation of a new framework that will optimize outcomes and minimize risks for women involved in every capacity of the CVE process. This new framework will predominantly center on the needs and wants of women, so INDOPACOM can be more efficient in building resilient communities throughout the Indo- Pacific region.

4 INTRODUCTION

UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325

In 2000, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), a landmark resolution recognizing the unique and important role of women in the promotion of peace and resolution of conflict. UNSCR 1325 broadly calls on member states to ensure the participation of women in peace processes, the protection of women and prevention of gender-based violence in conflict, and the mainstreaming of gender-based approaches in UN policy-making and programming. The first National Action Plan (NAP) adopted by a member state in response to UNSCR 1325 was implemented by Denmark in 2005, with mostly European and African nations following suit with their own NAPs in the subsequent few years. The first country in the Asia-Pacific to develop an NAP was the Philippines in 2010, followed by Nepal, Australia, and Indonesia. To date, South Korea, New Zealand, Japan, Timor-Leste, and the Solomon Islands are the only other countries in the region to have promulgated their own NAPs. While it is promising that countries dealing firsthand with conflict and violent extremism have adopted a legal framework for incorporating women into peacemaking and conflict resolution, the mere adoption of an NAP does not necessarily imply effective policy-making or implementation and is too often seen as an end in itself. All countries must commit to investing in a multifaceted, collaborative approach among government agencies, security forces, and civil society to take action while staying responsive to local needs and dynamics.1

1 Barbara Miller, Milad Pournik, & Aisling Swaine. Women in Peace and Security through United Nations Security Resolution 1325: Literature Review, Content Analysis of National Action Plans, and Implementation. Report. George Washington University. 5 THE UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE ORDER 13595

Although the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 1325 in 2000, the United States did not join the international community in publishing an NAP until 2011. President Barack Obama signed Executive Order 13595, which mandated the United States Government publish an NAP on WPS.2 The Executive Order recognized several key factors between women’s involvement and the security process. First, the promotion of women’s participation in conflict prevention, resolution, and future post-conflict and relief advances peace, security, development, and international cooperation.3 Second, the Executive Order recognized that every nation has the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, sexual violence, and other crimes against humanity. 4 The U.S. especially recognized that sexual violence against civilians could exacerbate armed conflict and delay the implementation of peace and security.5 The Executive Order also mandated that it is the responsibility of the executive departments and agencies to maintain an awareness of and implement U.S. policy regarding WPS.6

THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON WOMEN,

PEACE, AND SECURITY

As directed, the United States published its NAP on WPS in 2011. The NAP is guided by five principles. First, the engagement and protection of women as agents of peace and stability is key to preventing, responding to, and resolving conflicts and rebuilding societies.7 Second, the NAP seeks to complement and enhance existing U.S. initiatives to advance gender

2 Exec. Order. No. 13595, 76 Fed. Reg. 80205, (December 23, 2011) 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 7 The White House. The United States National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security. December 2011. 6 equality, human rights, and the needs of vulnerable populations in crisis areas.8 Third, the United States shall be guided by the principle of inclusion, and actively seek out the views and participation of various stakeholders, including marginalized groups, such as ethnic, racial, or religious minorities, persons with disabilities, displaced and indigenous persons, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals.9 Fourth, all departments and agencies of the U.S. government should be coordinated on all activities regarding WPS to maximize the impact of the NAP.10 And lastly, U.S. government agencies will be held accountable for the implementation of these policies.11 The NAP is both an inward-facing and outward-facing policy. The five principles guarantee that not only will the United States strive for gender equality internally, but it will also seek to follow these principles on a global stage.

In 2016, the White House published a comprehensive review and identified positive progress across all five of the principles. Since the Plan has been adopted, the United States military has opened all occupations and positions previously closed to female service members. The United States has also advanced the participation of more than 60,000 women in the peacebuilding process and has helped more than 4 million survivors of gender-based violence to provide services in more than 40 countries.12 The government has helped build grassroots networks to lessen the effects of conflict and launched new programs addressing the vulnerability of women and girls in humanitarian emergencies. 13 However, despite all the achievements, the NAP has several shortfalls. In the 2016 updated NAP, the government itself identified several points that need improvement. First, the

8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 The White House. The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security. June 2016 13 Ibid. 7 government must implement monitoring and evaluation plans that can help identify the best practices and assess the impact of WPS programs. 14 Second, the government must also develop programs to empower women to prevent and respond to specific challenges associated with violent extremism. 15 Lastly, the government will further seek strengthened coordination between all the departments with regard to gender policies.16 The NAP has also been criticized by peace advocates and journalists. American political advocate Jodie Evans and Washington Post journalist Amie Ferris-Rotman claimed in an article published in 2017 that while the intentions of the NAP are well and clear, there are still anecdotes of the NAP falling short.17 The article described how no women were present at a peace talk between the Pakistani and Afghan government representatives in July of 2017. Furthermore, the Afghanistan High Peace Council, which is tasked with negotiating peace with the Taliban, has nine women out of 70 members.18 Female members have objected that their participation in the process is “tokenistic,” and are not consulted for major peace discussions.19 The article concludes that even though the NAP is in place there is a huge difference between the political realities of Washington on paper and the circumstances on the ground.20

CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Since executive orders are not permanent, there have been talks of cementing the NAP into law. Drafts of legislation have been introduced in almost every Congress since the NAP was implemented. On March 22,

14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Evans, Jodie, and Amie Ferris-Rotman. "After Over a Decade of Occupation and $1.5 Billion in US Aid, the Reality Facing Women in Afghanistan Has Barely Changed." The Huffington Post. December 07, 2017. Accessed December 18, 2018. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jodie-evans/after-over-a-decade-of- oc_b_8254660.html. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 8 2016, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing entitled “Women Fighting for Peace: Lessons for Today’s Conflicts.”21 During the hearing, Members of Congress and expert witnesses discussed the diplomatic, cultural, and, most importantly, national security reasons for why women’s involvement is crucial in peacekeeping. Committee chairman Edward Royce (R-CA) cites researcher Laurel Stone’s statistical analysis that shows that a peace agreement is more likely to be reached, and 35% more likely to last at least 15 years when women are around the negotiating table.22 Inclusivity in peace negotiations also results in a more well-rounded treaty. Of the 600 treaties signed between 1990 and 2009, only 1% discussed violence against women. 23 Men who abuse women tend to negotiate with the same violent and uncompromising approach towards others, which results in an unstable treaty. Chairman Royce was keen to note that women sometimes do embrace extremist tendencies, but the vast majority of women “vehemently oppose such severe limitations on their education, on their work, on their movement, and on their public life.”24 25

The first witness, Monica McWilliams, specified three lessons learned during her work on the Good Friday Agreement. First, peace negotiations must be designed to create an inclusive and effective process so that major stakeholders, such as minorities, women, and civil society organizations have a voice. 26 Second, women bring a unique set of perspectives and issues to the table. Conflict affects men and women differently, and those differences must be discussed.27 Finally, a treaty in

21 United States House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Women Fighting for Peace: Lessons for Today’s Conflicts. Hearing. March 22, 2016. Serial No. 114–154. Published by the Government Printing Office. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 We will further expand on the push and pull factors of women and extremism in the following sections. 26 United States House of Representatives, Ibid. 27 Ibid. 9 practice does not look the same as a treaty on paper.28 Thus, it is important to keep in mind these realities and bring negotiators who are closer to what is happening on the ground. Dr. Hassan Abbas was the second witness, a professor of International Security Studies at Harvard and Columbia. Dr. Abbas gave five empirical studies and anecdotes to support women’s participation in the peacekeeping process and suggested five agenda items to be pursued by Congress: 1) Congress needs more women in advisory roles for state building missions; 2) The United States should promote mandatory gender training in police academies and joint training missions with other states; 3) Congress needs to invest more into academic and policy research on the impact of women in law enforcement; 4) The U.S. should support more women in foreign countries as national security professionals; and finally, 5) The U.S. need to recognize female leaders and the work they have done for the advancement of peace around the world.29 The final witness was Jacqueline O’Neill, who is the director of the Institute for Inclusive Security. She outlined five policy recommendations that Congress should enact to advance the participation of women. First, she urged Congress to pass to the Women, Peace, and Security Act. 30 Second, Congress should dedicate specific funding for the recruitment, retention, and professionalization of women working in the counter violent extremism and counterterrorism space.31 Third, Congressional delegation trips should meet with a balance of male and female leaders32. Fourth, Congress should ask questions at hearings and nominations that are pertinent to the principles outlined in the NAP.33 And finally, Congress should rely more on female experts for advice on topics of international security.34 All in all, the hearing and the subsequent question-and-answer section dramatically highlighted

28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 10 both the benefit of having women in peace and security and how America and the world are not up to par. Citing subsequent Congressional debates on the passage of the Women, Peace, and Security Act, this hearing was the turning point after which many members of Congress became overwhelmingly supportive of such an act.

On May 16, 2017, Senators Jeanne Shaheen and Shelley Moore Capito reintroduced S.1141, the Women, Peace, and Security Act, and Representatives Janice Schakowsky, Eliot Engel, and Chairman Edward Royce reintroduced its House companion bill, H.2484, the next day.35 The Congressional Budget Office estimates that bill would incur a cost of less than $500,000 over the course of 5 years.36 The two bills were passed and marked up through committee and eventually both chambers via voice votes. No amendments were added, and no significant criticism of the bill was discussed. President Donald Trump signed the bill into Law on October 27, 2017, codified Public Law 115-68.37

WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY ACT OF 2017

The final version of the Women, Peace, and Security Act was relatively simple. §§2-4 will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent section. In §5, the WPS Act mandated that the President and the relevant heads of departments and agencies submit to Congress a WPS strategy.38 The WPS strategy will contain a specific implementation plan from the federal departments and agencies, and further dictates that the President should consult with international partners and stakeholders, “especially when direct involvement of the United States is not advised or appropriate.” 39 §6 mandates that the Secretary of State, Secretary of

35 “S.1141 - Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017.” Congress.gov. https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1141 36 Congressional Budget Office. S. 1141: Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017. May 25, 2017. 37 Women, Peace, and Security Act. Public Law 115-68. (2017) 38 Ibid. §5 39 Ibid. 11 Defense, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) train relevant personnel regarding the participation of women in conflict prevention and peace building. 40 §7 further tasks the aforementioned department and agency heads to ensure that the United States is consulting with appropriate stakeholders and personnel overseas for the purpose of women’s participation.41 This section also mandates that the Secretary of State work with international, regional, national, and local organizations to increase the participation of women in the peacebuilding process. §8 sets more deadlines for the relevant departments and agencies to brief the appropriate committees of Congress.42 §9 defines key terms and phrases.43

CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

The intent of Congress may be reflected through the wording of §§2- 4 of the WPS Act, and the language used by the Members of Congress and Senators when debating the bill both in committee and on the floors of the houses. The wording of these sections clearly indicates that Congress wants to reduce the inequity of women’s participation, and specifically, the meaningful participation, in conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict peace building efforts. Congress also has continued to note and cite studies that show women’s participation in conflicts have resulted in “significant success” in moderating violent extremism, countering terrorism, dispute resolution and mediation, and peacekeeping.44 In several press releases, Representative Kristi Noem (R-SD), a co-sponsor, called the WPS Act “a critical national security tool” and said that the world needed “proven peace-building tactics, such as involving women in conflict

40 Ibid. §6 41 Ibid. §7 42 Ibid. §8 43 Ibid. §9 44 United States Senate. Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017. Report 115-93. 12 prevention and resolution.”45 Both Chairman Edward Royce (R-CA) and Ranking Member Eliot Engel (D-NY) stated that they are pleased that this bill would allow Congress to exercise oversight powers to ensure that women are part of the negotiating process.46 The impact of women in the peace and security is two-fold. At the negotiation table, women not only increase the eventual effectiveness of treaties, but also bring in new perspectives and represent a broader set of viewpoints, which will allow for a more comprehensive document that will benefit civilian populations as a whole.47 Women also impact peace and security at the community level. When women are seen in leadership positions, not only do they empower young women and girls, they tend to bring their perspective on how to address issues that are particularly pertinent to women, such as gender- based violence, and unique insights into family and community dynamics. Women also tend to be a mediating and unifying force in the community. Thus, having women participate in peace and security both at the negotiating table and as leaders in the community could be and should be considered as a national security priority.

The participation of women could also both directly and indirectly aid in counterterrorism and counter violent extremism. Women could directly aid in CT and CVE as they may actively try to dissuade their family and community members to join radical/terrorist groups. In a speech delivered on the House floor moments before passage, Chairman Royce said that women around the world want to reclaim their community from the spread of radical ideologies.48 Women are much more in-tune with their family and communities and capable of gathering information and

45 United States House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. “Noem, Schakowsky, Royce, Engel Introduce Legislation to Ensure Women Have Role in Peace Negotiations.” May 17, 2017 46 Ibid. 47 As opposed to other treaties, where the fighters of the warring parties negotiate, which tend not to consider women’s issues and are myopic. It tends to focus on immediate gains, rather than long-term solutions. 48 163 Cong. Rec. H7447 (daily ed. September 25, 2017) (Statement of Rep. Royce) 13 intelligence that men cannot. However, these women’s voices are often ignored. 49 Women can also indirectly help CVE efforts as women’s involvement often results in longer-lasting peace treaties, and these treaties are much more comprehensive and includes long-term solutions. There has been a multitude of research articles written by academics that signify that “civil unrest” and an imbalance of women’s rights are critical factors in the causes of war and the rise of extremist and terrorist ideas.50

Given these pretexts, the Women, Peace, and Security Act states that it will be the policy of the United States to promote the meaningful participation of women in all aspects of peace and security efforts. 51 Particularly, the United States will complete this task in seven ways. First, the United States will seek the perspectives and interests of women and integrate them into peace and security activities and strategies.52 Second, the Government will support programs that encourage partner governments to adapt plans to improve Women, Peace, and Security.53 Third, the United States will protect and promote the physical safety, economic security and dignity of women across the globe.54 Fourth, the government will support the equal access of aid to women in its distribution and services.55 The government will also collect and analyze data on gender to develop and enhance early warning systems of conflict and violence. 56 Sixth, the Government will make and adjust policies and programs to improve gender

49 In the same floor speech, Chairman Royce described a story from Afghan women’s rights advocate Wazhma Frogh. She recalls “when women from a small Afghan village tried desperately to warn a government official that young men in their community were being recruited by Islamist militants at local weddings. The minister laughed them off and said, “The militants we’re fighting are much too sophisticated to recruit at a wedding!” A month later, those same men attacked a bus, killing 32 civilians.” 50 See works by Matthew Kocher, Nuno Monteiro. 51 Women, Peace, and Security Act, Ibid. §2 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 14 equality and the empowerment of women. 57 And finally, it is the responsibility of the government to monitor and analyze the effectiveness of the provisions provided in this bill.58

By passing the Women, Peace, and Security Act, the United States Congress made it the policy of the United States that the meaningful participation of women in peace and security is in the best national interest and a top national security priority.

ASSUMPTIONS

It should be noted that this brief – including its recommendations – assumes that steps taken to empower women and increase female agency have a significant, opposite effect on violent extremism. However, it may not be the case that increases in female agency necessarily inoculate a given society against radicalism. What constitutes an effective strategy against violent extremism is culture-dependent. While Americans may understand the empowerment of women as a potential counter to radicalism – and thus an effective response to violent extremism – this may not be the case broadly in all Southeast Asian and Pacific societies. However, it is important to note that a significant body of empirical research supports the inverse relationship between female agency and violent extremism; this paper recognizes the dynamic as an assumption only because there are a few case studies where the predicted effect was not observed – however this should not detract from what is otherwise an established and recognized interplay among CVE experts.

57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 15 PUSH & PULL FACTORS

EXAMINING THE CAUSES OF RADICALIZATION

To date, there is no standard explanation as to why a given person can be lured down the path of violent extremism. Indeed, experts in CVE studies continue to struggle to find consensus about even the most fundamental mechanisms of radicalization.59 Average men and women can be radicalized by a host of political, psychological, ethnic, ideological, societal, and economic factors.60 However, it is important to note that there are some patterns in the ways by which different populations have been drawn into extremism. These patterns are comprised of several separate and distinct drivers and incentives that make radicalization more alluring – and they are most often described as push and pull factors.

“Push factors” comprise the roots of extremism that drive marginalized people toward violence.61 A few examples include political repression, poverty, social inequality, and grievance. Meanwhile, “pull factors” refer to the “aspects that make extremist groups and lifestyles appealing.”62 Financial incentives, ideology, and increases in social capital are all prime examples of this half of the radicalization process.63

As discussed later in this paper, violent extremism in the Philippines is primarily associated with the enduring conflict in Mindanao, where a protracted peace process has farmed disillusionment and narratives of marginalization within the Muslim population. 64 Over time, these

59 Vergani, Matteo, Muhammad Iqbal, Ekin Ilbahar, and Greg Barton. "The Three Ps of Radicalization: Push, Pull and Personal. A Systematic Scoping Review of the Scientific Evidence about Radicalization Into Violent Extremism." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2018, 1-32.. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Youth vulnerability to violent extremist groups in the Indo-Pacific Iffat Idris September 2018 16 grievances have been targeted and exploited by violent, transnational extremist groups to secure support. However, evidence exists that individuals are also often motivated to radicalize by financial and personal incentives – as joining the ranks of ISIS or ISIS-affiliated groups can result in significant gains in both social connection and wealth. Thus, both push and pull factors exist within the context of the Philippines. Vulnerable people are driven toward violent extremism by both perceived and realized marginalization and are drawn in by the appeal of economic rewards and social ties.

In a similar fashion, in Indonesia, widespread disillusionment with the democratic government – due to perceptions of corruption and societal inequality – has pushed young people toward radicalism. “Inherited jihadism” is often identified as a significant phenomenon in Indonesia, whereby the involvement of parents, older siblings, and relatives in extremist groups drives young people to follow in their footsteps. Online radicalization is significant, particularly as ISIS has targeted Indonesia with its online propaganda campaigns. Prisons and returning foreign fighters also promote radicalization and recruitment. All of these factors will be explored in far greater detail later in this report; they are worth mentioning now, however, only to convey the myriad of drivers and incentives that exist in any society that struggles with violent extremism. Influences both foreign and domestic within Indonesia and the Philippines push and pull men and women toward extremism.

Accordingly, it is important to note a key contention of this paper: with regard to radicalization, women are vulnerable to the same processes as their male counterparts.

However, while men and women face the same drivers of radicalization, these drivers may manifest in different ways. For example, incidents of discrimination – a primary push factor – are far more common against female Muslims than male Muslims, according to a 2014 statistical

17 analysis conducted by Feldman and Littler.65 This is likely due to the fact that Muslim women are often more easily identified as Muslim simply because of their manner of dress.66 Another notable distinction can be found in research that suggests many women who travel to the Middle East to join Islamist extremist groups have no interest in engaging in violence of any kind.67 Instead, they are drawn to extremist groups by a desire to fulfill their role as wives and mothers. Pull factors – most notably social connection – are incredibly influential within the radicalization process of women, seemingly even more so than within the radicalization process of men. In recent years, government bodies in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, and Canada have invested significant capital into further identifying the nuances in certain drivers that may be sensitive to gender.68 Collaboration with these states may be fruitful – as would additional support for academic and state-sponsored research into the intersectionality of gender and violent extremism in the Indo-Pacific and around the world.

MOVING PAST “PUSH” & “PULL”

The incentive structures discussed above have been commonly categorized as the primary, root causes of violent extremism within academic circles. 69 In response, programs surrounding economic opportunity, education, and community empowerment have paved the landscape of CVE, as policymakers hoped addressing common socioeconomic grievances would curb radicalism. 70 However, these policies have seen limited success, and violent extremism continues to flare up

65 Feldman, Matthew and Mark Littler. “Tell MAMA Reporting 2013/14 Anti-Muslim Overview, Analysis and Cumulative Extremism.” Teesside University, 2014, 1-29. 66 Ibid. 67 Jacobsen, Annemette. “Pushes and Pulls of Radicalisation Into Violent Islamist Extremism And Prevention Measures Targeting There Comparing Men and Women.” Malmo University, 2017, 1-43. 68 Ibid. 69 Younis, Sara, Anne Aly, Peter Neumann, Hamed El Said, Martine Zeuthen, Peter Romaniuk, and Mariya Omelicheva. “Countering Violent Extremism: Developing an Evidence-base for Policy and Practice.” Australian Policy Online, 2015. 70 Ibid. 18 within pockets of almost every country on the planet. In recognition of these realities, academics have proceeded to re-examine the root causes of radicalization. Think tanks such as Brookings and Carnegie have published reports indicating the root causes may be deeper than once believed. Perhaps previously identified factors – like political repression, poverty, and social inequality – have been symptoms, not reflective of structural, political, and social issues.

Underlying investigations of root causes of women’s radicalization must engage deeply with local sentiments, and consider ideological push and pull factors as sources of conviction informed by legitimate grievances and circumstances. While radicalization cannot be simmered down to the familiar, new perspectives may be gained by investigating sentiments local populations harbor toward U.S. involvement. It may be fruitful, for example, to examine why suspicion of U.S. activities is prevalent among community organizers. What events or circumstances drive women to adopt anti-American views? By dismissing these viewpoints as adopted propaganda and combating them with PR campaigns, an opportunity for identifying root causes of extremism may be lost.

19 CASE STUDIES

PHILIPPINES

LANDSCAPE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM Violent extremism is taking an increasingly powerful hold on the Philippines. There are two main sources of extremist violence within the country: extremist Islamist groups and communist nationalist groups, the former considered to be the larger threat. However, while Islamist groups are largely present only in Mindanao, a large island in the southern Philippines on which one in five citizens is Muslim, communist extremist groups can be found throughout the Philippines. 71 Understanding both sources of extremism is essential to developing strategies to combat extremist violence, especially when incorporating a gendered perspective.

The Islamist extremist groups in the Philippines can be traced back to the Muslim Independence Movement, which began in the late 1960s and led to the creation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1972.72 The goals of the Muslim Independence Movement and the MNLF were to create an independent Muslim state that would separate from the Philippines.73 The MNLF initially used terrorist tactics to achieve their goal, but in 1976 accepted a peace deal with the Philippine government that would create semi-autonomous Muslim territories in exchange for cessation of MNLF attacks.74 In 1989, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) would be established.75 However, some members of the MNLF were dissatisfied with the 1976 peace deal, and in 1977 split off to form what would become known as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).76 The MILF has since been associated with a number of terrorist attacks, both

71 “The Philippines: Extremism & Counter-Extremism,” Counter Extremism Project. 72 “Moro Islamic Liberation Front,” Mapping Militant Organizations. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 20 against civilians and the government. In 2010, after extended negotiations with the government, the MILF amended their demands, requesting to be recognized as a sub-state within the Philippines, rather than an independent region.77 The MILF also resists linkages to more extreme Islamist groups, feeling that these groups delegitimize their cooperation with the government to reach a mutually acceptable solution.78 Nevertheless, the group continues to act as an aggressor against the Philippine government.

A number of Islamist groups have formed as splinter cells from the MNLF and the MILF, often breaking away when the MNLF and MILF have made concessions to the government or have appeared less radical in their Islamic ideology. In 1991, Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani gathered members of the MNLF who were unsatisfied with the ARMM and began another extremist group which remains active today, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).79 Since its inception, Abu Sayyaf has been involved in bombings, other terrorist attacks, and kidnappings, the ransom from which is the group’s main source of funding.80 The MILF and the MNLF have both distanced themselves from Abu Sayyaf, which has connections to Al-Qaeda and has pledged allegiance to ISIS.81 Abu Sayyaf remains small in comparison to other extremist groups in the Philippines, but is the most radical.82

In 2010, Ameril Umbra Kato left the MILF after finding it too moderate to establish the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF).83 The BIFF has attacked civilians and the Philippine government, but has also fought against the MILF to gain control of territory in Maguindanao and to prevent them from entering into successful peace talks with the government. 84 However, more recently the BIFF and the MILF have

77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 “Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),” Counter Extremism Project. 80 Ibid. 81 “The Philippines: Extremism & Counter-Extremism,” Counter Extremism Project. 82 Ibid. 83 “Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters,” Mapping Militant Organizations. 84 Ibid. 21 seemingly worked together against the Philippine Special Action Force (SAF) to attempt to prevent the capture of two prominent bomb-makers.85 Additionally, although the MILF deny any claims of connection between the two groups, the BIFF maintain a camp within their territory and have announced that they work together. 86 Like Abu Sayyaf, the BIFF has declared allegiance to ISIS.87

In 2012, Omar and Abdullah Maute, two brothers and ex-MILF members, formed the Maute group.88 The Maute group is based in Lanao del Sur on the island of Mindanao, where it claims to have established an Islamic State.89 The group’s headquarters is in Butig, a municipality with a strong MILF presence, and family ties between the two groups have been noted.90 In 2015, the Maute group pledged allegiance to ISIS, and has been seen carrying their flag.91 Regional security expert Sidney Jones has stated that the Maute group “has the smartest, best-educated and most sophisticated members of all of the pro-ISIS groups in the Philippines.”92 Jones specifically noted the Maute group’s skilled use of social media, through which it was able to recruit students and professors from Mindanao State University.93

The most recent major Islamic extremist group to emerge is Ansar Al-Khilafah Philippines (AKP), which gained recognition from officials in 2014 when it released a video pledging allegiance to ISIS.94 The group is

85 “Is BIFF the MILF’s BFF?,” Inquirer.net. 86 Ibid. 87 “The Philippines: Extremism & Counter-Extremism,” Counter Extremism Project. 88 Jonathan Head, “Maute Rebel Group: A Rising Threat to Philippines,” BBC News. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 Jonathan Cellona, “Butig: The Birthplace of the Mautes,” ABS-CBN News. 92 Manuel Mogato, “Little-known Maute Militants Becoming Formidable Force in Philippines,” Reuters. 93 Ibid. 94 “The Philippines: Extremism & Counter-Extremism,” Counter Extremism Project. 22 believed to have links to ISIS in Syria, and has also worked closely with Abu Sayyaf and the Maute group.95

While Islamist violent extremism in the Philippines is carried out by a number of disparate groups, extremist communist violence is perpetrated exclusively by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), which are often referred to in conjunction as the CPP-NPA.96 The CPP was established in 1968 by José María Sison after he was forced out of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, the existing communist party, because of his ideological differences with the leadership of the group.97 In 1969, Sison established the NPA with Bernabé Buscayno, who had commanded a militant group in the communist Huk Rebellion of the 1950s.98 The CPP-NPA began as a small group of militants in Capas, but gathered supporters through student uprisings in 1970 that were unpopularly suppressed by President Ferdinand Marcos.99 In 1970, Sison officially defined the CPP-NPA’s purpose, which was to incite a “war of the people” against the government to fight the evils of capitalism, feudalism, and American imperialism.100 In 1973, the CPP-NPA created the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDF), which began to act as the group’s political arm.101 The CPP-NPA was supported by the Chinese government early on, but when China-Philippines relations improved in 1976, China severed ties with the extremist group. 102 Domestically, however, the CPP-NPA continued to gain members and supporters during the mid-to-late 1970s because of President Marcos’ harsh crackdown on communists as well as all political opposition.103 The CPP-

95 Ibid. 96 “Communist Party of the Philippines- New People’s Army,” Mapping Militant Organizations. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 23 NPA acted as community builders in poor rural areas, which helped augment their popularity among the people.104

After failed peace talks in 1986, the Philippine government declared war on the CPP-NPA, and the resulting extremist attacks led to a decline in the group’s popularity and membership.105 In 1991, after the CPP-NPA had been significantly weakened by government capture of key leaders and years of internal disagreements over policy, Sison published a document called “Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors” under the pen name Armando Liwanag.106 Members within the CPP-NPA disagreed over some of the key points in the document, namely that the mission of the group was to maintain a war of rural communities against the government, rejecting any opportunity for negotiation.107 Many of the members who disagreed with this mission left the group to continue the communist cause in other less radical ways, further diminishing the size and capacity of the CPP-NPA. 108 However, throughout the 1990s the CPP-NPA began to regain its former strength, even becoming a registered political party after 1992, though the NDF remained the avenue through which the group most frequently engaged with the government.109 In 1995, these engagements between the NDF and the government produced the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG), which allowed members of CPP- NPA-NDF and the Philippine government involved in negotiations to move throughout the country without the threat of being captured, killed, or otherwise harmed.110 Since then, negotiations between the government and the CPP-NPA have continued to be sporadic and interrupted by periods of violence. 111 Sison, currently exiled in the Netherlands, continues to

104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid. 24 advocate for peace talks, while the leadership within the Philippines demonstrates an unwillingness to cooperate.112

The Philippines has displayed a mixed approach to CVE that varies depending on the administration, with some more receptive to negotiations with extremist groups, and others more reliant upon violent force. Recently, the Philippine government has taken advantage of strategic partnerships with powerful allies such as the United States and Australia, leveraging resources and relationships to increase pressure on violent groups. A major part of the Philippines’ recent CVE strategy has been to repress funding for violent extremist groups. In 2007, the country passed the Republic Act No. 9372, which explicitly defines terrorism and its legal consequences, while also implementing mechanisms to monitor and prevent the funding of terrorism. 113 Additionally, Republic Act No. 10365, passed in 2013, expands the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 to include the crime of financing terrorist groups.114

While the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have led violent action against extremist groups in the past, the Internal Peace and Security Plan of 2011 has allowed the AFP to focus primarily on external threats to the security of the Philippines, while placing the Philippine National Police (PNP) and its specialty group the Special Action Force (SAF) in a more prominent CVE role.115

In addition to negotiations with and violence against extremist groups, the Philippines combats extremism with a deradicalization program known as Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan (PAMANA).116 PAMANA launches development interventions and social programs to help vulnerable communities, namely former combatants, their friends and family, and

112 Ibid. 113 “The Philippines: Extremism & Counter-Extremism,” Counter Extremism Project. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. 25 marginalized groups.117 PAMANA both advocates for those without a voice and demonstrates to people who could otherwise become radicalized that the Philippine government is on their side. Separately, the government also conducts deradicalization programs within jails and prisons that contain high numbers of combatants, given that these are places where people have historically been radicalized by extremist ideology.118

In its war against violent extremism, the government of the Philippines has taken UNSCR 1325 on WPS seriously. The Philippines was the first country in Asia to release an NAP on WPS, doing so first in 2009 for the period of 2010-2016.119 The NAP was designed to help protect women and women’s rights in the face of violent conflict, as well as promote inclusion of women in the conflict prevention and peacemaking process.120 Importantly, the NAP also included an impetus to track and monitor the progress and results spurred by its own calls for change.121 The second NAP released for the period of 2017-2022 was designed to review the effects of the first NAP, allowing for the replication and improvement of policies that worked, while addressing existing gaps.122 Some of the most important points illuminated by the NAP are:

“the prioritisation of conflict prevention, framing women, peace and security from a human rights perspective, participation and leadership of women in all levels of the peace project, transitional justice, inclusive and participatory localisation efforts, combating extremism by supporting women peacebuilders, multi-level and multi-stakeholder approach to

117 Ibid. 118 Ibid. 119 “Philippines: The National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (NAPWPS),” Peace Women. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 122 “National Action Plan: Philippines,” Peace Women. 26 implementation, and financing initiatives aimed at materialising women, peace and security.”123

The Philippines, in publishing these two NAPs and actively seeking to improve the rights and security of women in the face of violence, has taken major steps toward addressing the concerns of UNSCR 1325, and should be looked to as a leader in the geographic region.

A CLOSER LOOK

EDUCATION AND ACTIVISM The Philippines hosts a rich network of women-lead NGOs working to empower women and combat violent extremism. Groups approach the challenge from a diverse set of angles, including indigenous women’s rights, Muslim women’s rights, and young women’s rights. Nisa Ul Haqq (“Women for Justice” in Arabic), a Bangsamoro women’s group, uses an Islamic framework to empower women to become civil rights advocates and encourage cooperation and reconciliation between the various tribes of the region.124 Campaigning against early marriage and for reproductive rights for women 125, the group advocates for a unique brand of Muslim feminism, attempting to build a natural bulwark against the lure of Islamic extremism in Mindanao. In addition, the group conducts women’s leadership workshops and has partnered with international organizations, like UN Women, in the past. 126

Women’s youth groups are doing additional work on the ground. United Youth of the Philippines Women (UnYPhil-Women) advocates for

123 Ibid. 124 Conciliation Resources (2017). Women’s meaningful participation in peace: Lessons from the Bangsamoro 125 Mendry-Ann A. Lim. (2016). The Dilemmas of Muslim Feminism in a non-Muslim country: The Case of Nisa-Ul Haqq Fi Bangsamoro in the Philippines. 126 Conciliation Resources (2017). Women’s meaningful participation in peace: Lessons from the Bangsamoro 27 women’s security and their active participation in peace negotiations in the Philippines. UnYPhil-Women monitors extremist action in Mindanao, provides assistance to women displaced by conflict, and organizes and runs community health programs. The Philippine government takes advantage of the country’s network of women-focused NGOs. In the implementation of its current National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, the Philippines has worked closely with grass roots organizations like Women Engaged in Action on 1325 (WE Act 1325), a national network of 39 women’s organizations designed to provide feedback and advice to the Philippine government. WE Act 1325 has already been the target of funding for foreign countries interested in supporting women in CVE in the Philippines, including by Norway and Australia.

Individual female activists have also been influential in working to counter violent extremism in the Philippines. Irene Santiago, a Filipina peace activist, created the “Women’s Peace Table” project in 2012 in Davao City, the largest city in Mindanao. 127 Women’s Peace Table brought together disparate female voices from across the Philippines to discuss and provide women’s perspective on the peace process in Mindanao, spawning a global conflict resolution campaign which hosted “Women’s Peace Tables” in numerous countries.

Takeaways:

1. A series of women’s groups exist in the Philippines dedicated to challenging extremism through women’s empowerment. 2. Women’s groups do not focus exclusively on extremism. Their work overlaps with women’s empowerment, health education, and other areas that traditional NGOs engage in.

127 Mindanao Times. (2012). Philippines: the women’s peace table: nothing about us without us 28 3. Women’s groups generally do not focus exclusively on a broadly defined idea of “women’s empowerment”. They have a narrow set of interests and approach their work as empowering women from specific communities, including the indigenous and Muslim communities in the Philippines.

GOVERNMENT AND SECURITY The Philippines’ most recent National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security highlighted the need to both integrate women into the military and security sectors in general, and place them in leadership positions in these areas. The Philippines has taken this commitment seriously, introducing a number of innovative approaches to the integration of women into the military and security sectors in both on-the-ground roles and leadership roles. The country created “hijab trooper” brigades, groups of hijab-wearing female soldiers, in August 2017, deploying them as part of a joint-initiative between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police.128 Sent to Mindanao after the Battle of Marawi to assist in internally displaced peoples camps, hijab troopers have been successful in changing attitudes and opinions of those they have interacted with. One trooper described how girls who had originally claimed to want to join ISIS when they grew up changed their attitudes over the course of the month, she interacted with them, wanting to become hijab troopers by the time she left. 129Women have not only played a role on the ground in Mindanao, but have also been instrumental in coordinating the Mindanao peace process itself. The head of the Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process is headed by a woman, Secretary Teresita Quintos Deles, and the first woman to sign a major peace deal with a rebel group in world history - the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro - was Ms. Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, a professor of political science at the University of

128 ChannelNews Asia (2018). One year after deadly siege, Philippine forces remain on red alert in Marawi 129 Ibid. 29 the Philippines and a well-known human rights advocate. Coronel-Ferrer led the peace negotiations in 2014. Additionally, almost most a third of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission are women, one of whom represents the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and women were active in lobbying and consulting with the Philippine government on the drafting of the Bangsamoro Basic Law. In total, women served as 33 percent of negotiators and represented 25 percent of the signatories to the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro.130

Women have, however, had difficulty impacting the peace process on the ground. Local tribal conflict resolution mechanisms in the Philippines and, in particular, in Mindanao are dominated by men. Village disputes are often handled extrajudicially by members of these local tribal organizations, which exclude women. 131 Ultimately, however, women have been instrumental in both creating a situation in which peace could be possible, and also in bringing it to fruition at the highest levels of government.

Takeaways:

1. The Philippines has taken seriously its 2017 National Action Plan, and has incorporated women both on the ground in security roles and in the highest levels of the decision-making process in the Mindanao peace process. 2. The Philippines is significantly ahead of its regional counterparts in implementing its National Action Plan.

130 Council on Foreign Relations (2014). The Philippines: Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro 131 Conciliation Resources (2017). Women’s meaningful participation in peace: Lessons from the Bangsamoro 30 INDONESIA

HISTORY OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN INDONESIA Indonesia has grappled with violent extremism for decades, starting with the emergence of the Darul Islam (DI) movement in the 1940s. DI actively committed violence against civilians in its efforts to establish an Islamic state of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII); it was severely weakened by government offensives in the late 1950s and early 1960s, though was briefly revived in 1973. In the 1980s, DI began actively recruiting women in a non-violent capacity, for their critical roles as mothers and educators in instilling the values of the Islamic revolution in their families as well as greater society.132 They found the most success in reaching out through universities and study circles (usroh), eventually creating women-only dakwah groups for the proselytization of their teaching of Islam. Usroh run by DI taught participants to conform to strict rules of dress and trained them to run households and indoctrinate others, producing female activists who began infiltrating other Islamic study groups at universities.133 DI has maintained a loose network throughout the country, and in 1993 led to the offshoot group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which embraced salafi jihadism (distinct from salafism) and subjected women to much stricter rules on dress, gender segregation, and participation in organizational matters. Women’s major roles were mainly as teachers in the JI schools that existed at the time, as well as forgers of regional alliances through marriage.134 JI, thought to be associated with al-Qaeda in its earlier years, has been responsible for most of the terrorist attacks that Indonesia has suffered starting in the 2000s, including the Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005, in which hundreds of people were killed or injured in bombing attacks

132 Nava Nuraniyah. Not Just Brainwashed: Understanding the Radicalization of Indone- sian Female Supporters of the Islamic State. July 6, 2018. 133 Mothers to Bombers: The Evolution of Indonesian Women Extremists. Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict. January 31, 2017. 134 Nuraniyah, Ibid. 31 on tourist and commercial areas. Throughout this period, women’s participation in JI and other extremist groups evolved as the Internet began to serve an increasingly important role in communication, organization, and recruitment. They became more active as blog writers, forum administrators, and graphic designers on jihadi websites, though many operated under male pseudonyms as female participation in the organization of jihad was still taboo.

The advent of ISIS brought a new wave of violent extremism to the country as Indonesian extremist groups declared allegiance and individuals began to carry out operations both at home and abroad in Iraq and Syria. According to USAID estimates, 1,000-2,000 Indonesians had pledged allegiance as of 2016;135 many pre-existing extremist groups, including Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) and Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), also devoted themselves to the ISIS cause.136 One major group that formed after the emergence of ISIS is Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) in 2015, which has been responsible for recent high-profile attacks that are associated with ISIS either through inspiration or the sympathies of the attackers.137 JI co-founder Abu Bakar Bashir pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2014, and the group continues to provide resources and manpower to ISIS and other terror networks.138 Today, the primary threat of violent extremism in Indonesia comes from these ISIS-affiliated groups; those who support al- Qaeda operate through political activism and do not pose threats of violence for the time being.139

135 Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State (Final Report). USAID. Janu- ary 6, 2016. 136 Kristen Schulze. "The Surabaya Bombings and the Evolution of the Jihadi Threat in Indonesia." CTC Sentinel 11, no. 6 (June/July 2018). 137 “Why We Still Know So Little About JAD, the Terrorist Group Behind the Surabaya Attacks.” Interview by Adi Renaldi. Vice News. May 16, 2018. 138 Indonesia: Extremism & Counter-Extremism. Counter-Extremism Project. 2018. 139 Nava Nuraniyah. Interviewed by Alissa Wang. Phone nterview. November 28, 2018.

32 ISIS both capitalized on and further promoted women’s critical role in the online realm. Its ultimate goal of a caliphate relies, in part, on recruiting women to lay the social foundation for an Islamic society and prepare the next generation for jihad. Indonesia is generally seen by ISIS as fertile recruiting ground given the relatively large number of Indonesians that have traveled to Syria to join the cause;140 Indonesian women have also long stood out among both south Asian and Middle Eastern countries for their active involvement in armed conflict and activism, with female nationalist heroes from colonial-era resistance groups and high-profile leaders in Islamist nationalist groups dating back to the 1920s as well as modern-day mainstream Islamic groups. 141 Now, female Indonesian supporters of ISIS have taken up important roles as organizers, facilitators, and recruiters in the digital space, publishing viral written pieces, sharing information and contacts for others to travel to Syria, and running public and private chat groups on the encrypted messaging service Telegram for hundreds of ISIS members around the world. 142 The democratic, non- hierarchical nature of the Internet has created a space of opportunity for women to directly promote and contribute to the cause of jihad despite formal gender restrictions originally promulgated by those groups.

WOMEN, PEACE, SECURITY, AND CVE APPROACHES

I. MILITARY, NATIONAL POLICE, AND GOVERNMENT EFFORTS The Indonesian military and National Police first took an active role in acting against radical Islamist groups following the 2002 Bali bombings, after a long period of hesitation under President Megawati, who rarely spoke out against Islamist groups and refused to acknowledge the existence of domestic terrorists. 143 The deaths of 204 people in the 2002 Bali

140 Indonesia, Ibid. 141 Mothers, Ibid. 142 Not Just…, Ibid. 143 Aglionby and Fickling, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/oct/15/indonesia.davidfickling 33 bombings, however, demonstrated the grave threat that radical Islamist groups posed to Indonesia, particularly that of JI, the group largely responsible for the Bali bombings. A police investigation revealed the gravity of the situation; it appeared that JI had a total of 2,000 members and a wider support network of about 5,000 people. Discovering JI’s strong ties with al-Qaeda, it became clear that Indonesia had a home-grown transnational terrorist group with cells in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen that was rapidly expanding.144

Following international pressure to act decisively against extremist groups, the Indonesian government under Megawati allocated a significant amount of its resources to act against terrorism. In response to the Bali bombings, the Indonesian government passed two anti-terrorism laws. Law No. 15/2003 gives the authority for police to detain terrorist suspects for up to six months before an indictment, and also allows prosecutors and judges to block bank accounts believed to belong to terrorists or terrorist organizations. Law No. 16/2003 made Law No. 15 retroactively applicable to the suspects in the Bali bombings.

Since 2010, the leading national government agency to address violent extremism and terrorism has been the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT). 145 Established through the Presidential Decree 46/2010 following the 2009 hotel bombings in Jakarta, the BNPT is divided into three units: (1) Prevention, Protection, and Deradicalization; (2) Operations and Enforcement; and (3) International Cooperation. The BNPT coordinates with stakeholders to address Indone- sia’s fight against violent extremism. The agency has seen four leaders since its inception in 2010, and by the end of 2016, it comprised of a staff of

144 Noorhaidi 145 Sumpter p1 34 roughly 300 people with an annual operating budget of $54 million dol- lars.146 Criticism exists that the BNPT has largely taken an independent, top-down approach to CVE initiatives, rarely collaborating with CSOs that have specific local context-specific cultural understanding.147

Important to Indonesia’s fight against violent extremism has been the creation in 2003 of Special Detachment 88, an Indonesian Special Forces counterterrorism squad part of the National Police.148 Special De- tachment 88 has been highly effective in dismantling jihadi terrorist cells, particularly those linked to JI. Special Detachment 88 is assisted by foreign agencies, including the Australian Federal Police, and also receives funding by the U.S. government through the Department of State’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program.149 For example, the unit is trained by instruc- tors who were formerly U.S. special forces personnel and also receives technical support and equipment.150 This signals existing momentum in the collaboration between U.S. forces and the Indonesian National Police, though opportunities exist for this type of partnership to be expanded specifically to engage the roles of women.

In the early 2000s, Indonesian police officers pursued a strategy known as “cultural interrogation,” in which officers sought cooperation from detained jihadist militants by developing personal relationships. The objective was to gather terrorist intelligence, but through treating detainees with respect and attempting to build trust: for instance, through assistance for detained militants’ family members and sentence negotiations with pros-

146 Ibid. 147 Ibid. 148 Ibid., 8. 149 Davies, Ed, and Olivia Rondonuwu. "U.S.-funded Detachment 88, Elite of Indonesia Security." Reuters. March 18, 2010. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-usa- security/u-s-funded-detachment-88-elite-of-indonesia-security- idUSTRE62H13F20100318. 150 Ibid. 35 ecutors. These militants became invaluable interlocutors to the National Po- lice by revealing their understanding of the jihadist operations.151 However, a problem emerged with this initiative when detainees were released to the Indonesian prison system, which is characterized by deeply ingrained corruption and loose enforcement of rules that allows imprisoned terrorists to receive jihadist information from the outside.152

II. CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS AND EDUCATION There are a number of civil society organizations conducting programs with Indonesian women in an effort to teach principles of peace and train women as leaders to disseminate those ideas to their families and communities. Many of these programs are not specific to countering violent extremism, but to preventing violence and promoting peace in general. The Asian Muslim Action Network (AMAN), for example, launched 30 (now independent) Women’s Schools for Peace (WSP) across Indonesia, engaging with over 1,000 women of different faiths to incubate their leadership in promoting peace and gender justice as well as social cohesion within their communities. Classes are held on a regular basis with groups of around 20 women, with varying content based on the needs of the local community, ranging from dialogue on peace and interfaith tolerance to skills training for economic empowerment.

Although these programs are not necessarily geared towards countering violent extremism in particular, their work on conflict transformation and rebuilding community unity target some of the underlying factors that lay the groundwork for violent extremist recruitment. These include enmity, mistrust, and mutual misconceptions between Muslims and Christians, as well as among Muslims following different branches of Islam. The major city of Poso, for example, has

151 Osman, S. (2014). Convicted terrorists and Indonesian prisons. In A. Silke (Ed.), Pris- ons, Terrorism and Extremism (pp. 214-229). New York: Routledge. 152 Ibid. 36 experienced a rift between Muslims and Christians following the rise in influence of violent extremist groups, leading to mutual fears, intensified ethnic identities based on religious symbols, and even religious segregation. 153 These WSP community resilience programs compose a natural counteractive force to the divisions that facilitate recruitment for violent extremist Islamist groups, and instead seek to rebuild peace and trust between these communities.

Other organizations running similar peace programs for women include the Mosintuwu Institute, Sekolah Perempuan (Women’s Solidarity), and ‘Aisyiyah, the women’s wing of the large moderate Muslim movement Muhammadiyah. The Mosintuwu Institute works to counter violence committed in the name of religion, bringing together women of different faiths from various villages for discussion and community organizing, as well as courses on public speaking, political rights, and economic solidarity. It includes a Women Reformers Village for women in Poso villages to take an active role in the economic, social, cultural and political sphere, as well as active campaigns through radio, print magazine, and social media to spread the influence of its mission to the public.154 Sekolah Perempuan is an organization that operates on the premise that growing religious fundamentalism is a threat to the Indonesian feminist movement. To that end, it teaches women about tolerance, religious pluralism, and critical thinking about Islamic law,155 in addition to training them on speaking and negotiation skills in preparation for engagement with government administrations.156

153 Success Stories and Best Practices of Women-Led Peacebuilding. Asian Muslim Ac- tion Network. 2018. 154 “About Us.” Mosintuwu.com. http://www.mosintuwu.com/tentang-kami/ 155 Jacqui True & Sri Eddyono. Preventing Violent Extremism: Gender Perspectives and Women’s Roles. Monash Centre for Gender, Peace and Security, Monash University. 2017. 156 Sekolah Perempuan. http://sekolahperempuan.com/ 37 ‘Aisyiyah, as part of the greater Muhammadiyah movement, aims to integrate Islamic education and general education, and leverage the social facet of worship at the mosque for women to gather and plan humanitarian activities. Importantly, its mission promotes the idea that women can preach and be politically active while staying entirely devoted to God and maintaining unity, integrity, and welfare within their families. This is a key narrative that directly responds to the narrative often promoted by violent extremists that growing urbanization, industrialization, and the “high-free life” are threatening family unity and serve as an imperative to return to more fundamentalist Islam.157

Lastly, an organization worth noting is Rahima, also known as the Centre for Education and Information on Islam and Women’s Rights. This organization was heavily focused on countering fundamentalism with values of tolerance and strengthening women’s rights through Islam, including advocating for women ulamas’ ability to promote gender equity in religious and community contexts. Rahima contributed Islamic school curricula, promoting ideas of rahmatanlilalamin, “Islam for all, not only for those who are Islam”, and rahmat, “spreading kindness”.158 Encouraging women’s leadership through the framework of Islamic practice creates a critical and high-impact opportunity for advocacy of non-violence in spaces where they can compete with the narratives of violent extremist groups. Although this program contributed significantly to women’s empowerment, it was discontinued due to lack of funding.

The common thread in the programming run by all of these organizations is the focus on women’s agency and their empowerment in the public sphere, whether it be through religious roles, engagement with the government, or simply influence in their community. This highlights the importance of women’s empowerment in the effort to counter violent

157 True. Ibid. 158 Ibid. 38 extremism. Women are willing and eager to take active roles or leadership positions to promote peace and counter extremism, but they must achieve empowered roles in society in order to so. In an evaluation of its own ‘Empowered Women, Peaceful Communities’ program for PVE in Indonesia and Bangladesh, UN Women and researchers at Monash University argue the link between economic empowerment and P/CVE is an untapped source of potential impact in which women can gain “entry points” to engagement with other women, increased participation in family decision-making, and work within the community in general.159 This is an imperative point that suggests a broad scope of women’s empowerment programs can prime them and their communities for more influential advocacy by female leaders for tolerance and non-violence.

III. FEMALE MIGRANT WORKERS AND JIHADIST PRISONERS Indonesia faces two particularly important issues with respect to women joining violent extremist groups: women working abroad as migrant workers, and women who have been convicted and imprisoned for acts of terrorism. The former is a relatively better-documented issue that has been occurring over several years; the latter is a newly growing problem with little research or documentation but potentially significant near-term consequences.

Hundreds of thousands of migrant workers travel from Indonesia to neighboring locations in East Asia, most commonly Hong Kong and Taiwan. The vast majority of these workers are women, who often go abroad as domestic workers. Hong Kong census data shows that out of 159,901 Indonesians in the country in 2015, a mere 231 were men; the vast majority (95%) of Indonesians in the country worked informally as caretakers and domestic helpers. The work can be grueling, with very little opportunity for socialization and often harsh working conditions.

159 Ibid. 39 Indonesian employment agencies sell the services of domestic workers at cheap rates, often leading to workers being paid below minimum wage. Women are given handbooks on their rights by the Hong Kong government upon arrival, but report having them taken away by employment agencies, which seek to promote an image of the workers as docile and easily submissive in order to attract employers. These conditions contribute to a hostile environment for women workers, who seek support and improvements to their livelihoods through different channels. Some are positive, focusing on advocacy and education on migrant workers’ rights; a large number of Islamic religious outreach circles have provided social support for women. However, demand for these resources is extremely high, and charitable organizations like the Islamic Union of Hong Kong struggle to meet it.

This lays the ground for more radical preachers and extremist groups to take advantage of the workers’ plight for exploitation and recruitment, both through in-person contact and online platforms. Starting in 2006, ultra- conservative Salafism began to attract an increasing number of Indonesian women who shared concerns about the threats of “Christianisation” by missionaries, as well as dilution of Islamic principles through the spread of mysticism by religious figures and “paranormals” spreading superstitions. Disillusioned women began actively seeking out a purer form of Islam. Many were drawn in through social media, where they met friends and, often, boyfriends and husbands who were engaged in violent extremism.

These personal relationships became major factors driving women to pro-ISIS groups, exhibiting a critical link to the social connections that drive women to violent extremism. Migrant women were themselves sought after by men engaged in violent extremism in Indonesia and elsewhere as sources of financing and international links, often with foreign language skills as well - these were all assets to violent extremist groups working to expand their reach and acquire resources from a wider international

40 network. Indeed, women workers often facilitate the activities of violent extremist groups online by transferring funds, disseminating information about traveling to Syria, and connecting men across Syria, Turkey, and Europe.

It is also important to note the ideological driving factors for women, mainly the fight for justice for Muslims who are suffering around the world. Often, the deciding line for women curious about violent extremist groups is the question of whether ISIS is actually an immoral terrorist group or a “champion for persecuted Sunnis.” Many see moderate Islamic movements as complacent in the suffering of other Muslims, and find that the only way to actively seek justice is to get involved with violent extremist groups whose members are engaging with the situation on the ground in Syria. This is made all the more compelling by the dissemination of photos of victims in Syria by ISIS across social media platforms, as well as their promotion of hijra (pilgrimage) to Syria and martyrdom as pathways to paradise or being saved on the day of judgment.160

The proportion of female migrant workers who eventually become active in pro-ISIS activities is nominally small: in Hong Kong, only an estimated 45 out of the more than 150,000 Indonesians working there are thought to be actively pro-ISIS. However, there is a significant threat posed by the few who do become involved. In December 2016, two female former migrant workers were arrested for planned suicide bombing attacks, one who volunteered after the expiration of her visa prevented her from continuing the work necessary to support jihadist activities through funding (“financial jihad”).161 A terrorist cell uncovered in Indonesia in 2016 was found to have been mostly funded by women, including migrant workers from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia. 162 Women’s

160 The Radicalisation of Indonesian Women Workers in Hong Kong. Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict. July 26, 2017. 161 Ibid. 162 Mothers, Ibid. 41 increased activity in violent extremist groups therefore carry both the potential of deadly attacks and the sustained financing of organized terrorist cells in Indonesia.

This leads to perhaps the most pressing issue of women in violent extremism in Indonesia: female jihadist prisoners. The Indonesian prison system is overburdened to begin with, and incarcerations of convicted terrorists far outnumbers releases each year. From January 2017 to August 2018, around 400 Indonesians convicted of terrorist activities were arrested, while only 70 were released. This affects the capacity of prisons to carry out effective disengagement and deradicalization programs.

42 THE INTERAGENCY

Countering violent extremism and counterterrorism are different from anti-violent extremism and antiterrorism. Whereas the latter implies fighting already existing sentiments of extremism and terrorism, the former implies an effort of preventing these ideas from arising in the first place.163 Even though INDOPACOM and the Department of Defense may be quite adept at anti-violent extremism and antiterrorism, they would need the strong partnership and support from other U.S. government departments and agencies to accomplish CVE and CT. This section highlights two interagency partners fighting violent extremism: The Department of State (DOS) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Following the direction of the Executive Order and National Action Plan put into place by the Obama Administration, the State Department published its implementation plan in which the department committed to continue to promote Women, Peace, and Security by advancing diplomatic relationships through diplomatic assistance programs. These programs include bilateral, multilateral, humanitarian, military, and law enforcement assistance programs.

The DOS started its implementation of the NAP by identifying a set of Focus Country Embassies to advance its initial efforts.164 These countries were selected based on the following criteria:

• The country is currently in, or has recently emerged from, an active conflict. • The country is in political transition.

163 Isaiah, Wilson. Interviewed by David Jiang. Phone Interview. 164 United States Department of State. United States Department of State Implementation Plan of the National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security. August 2012. 43 • The country has active peace negotiations. • The country is at high risk of instability or fragility. • The country has high levels of human insecurity. • The country is impacted by regional security concerns. • The country is the site of an international peacekeeping mission or significant U.S. military engagement. • The country has a National Action Plan or Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security of its own • The department may be able to have a positive impact on the status of women and girls in the country.165

These criteria were selected because the Department believe signs of such factors places the country at risk of conflict and insecurity, possible deterioration of women’s rights, and a potential break down of the rule of law. Within INDOPACOM’s area of responsibility, these Focus Country Embassy likely included the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Australia, Japan, Korea, Nepal, New Zealand, and the Solomon Islands.166 Within Asia and the Pacific, the Department of State cites economic injustice, political repression, loss of natural resources, food insecurity, human trafficking, and gender-based violence as crucial issues that can contribute to instability in the region.167,168 The DOS is focusing on engaging and protecting women by developing inventive and pragmatic programs tailored to the needs of local countries at the grass-roots level.169 Specifically, the Department supports and promotes the participation of women in local

165 Ibid. 166 Most of countries are listed because they already have passed a National Action Plan according to UNSC Resolution #1325. 167 United States Department of State, Ibid. 168 The Department of State divides Asia and the Pacific into two smaller components: East Asia and the Pacific, and South and Central Asia. For the purposes of this project, the Department listed the exact same factors that may contribute to instability in both regions, and therefore, we didn’t specify the differentiation. However, it is noted that South and Central Asia includes Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are not within INDOPACOM’s area of responsibility. 169 Ibid. 44 peace councils and encourages the development of warning mechanisms.170 The Department also supports non-governmental organizations by providing political leadership and awareness training to young women, and building local government’s capacity to deliver water, healthcare, and educational services in conflict affected areas. 171 To curb the violence against women and gender-based violence, the Department of State works directly with legal aid to help survivors, and with the justice sectors of partner countries to ensure laws are properly enforced and adjudicated.172 The Department also uses diplomatic assistance to work with local and national governments to assist in writing and passing laws relevant to the protection of women.

Since the implementation of the National Action Plan, the Department of State has completed some measurable accomplishment in every objective laid out by the NAP. To support integration and institutionalization of women, peace, and security, the Department developed training for Foreign Service Officers, and led the integration and review of gender objectives in the interagency, agency, and sub-agency levels.173 The Department also expanded the number of embassy working groups to implement strategy, policy, programming, and other initiatives.174 Most importantly in this area, the Department developed and increased the number of requirements for including gender analysis in outside organizations’ bids for foreign assistance funding. 175 This requirement effectively ensured that any non-governmental organization, nonprofits, or contractors would be required to maintain the same level of gender- inclusivity, training, and programming as programs run by the Department itself.

170 Ibid. 171 Ibid. 172 Ibid. 173 Ibid. 174 Ibid. 175 Ibid. 45 The Department of State also increased women’s participation in the peace process and decision making.176 The Department engaged women by matching diplomatic leadership with corresponding investments in foreign assistance and public diplomacy, which raised public awareness and changed public opinion around women’s political and civic roles. The Department also worked to include women and conversations on gendered perspectives in security dialogues, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding, especially in Afghanistan and Myanmar. 177 Enhancement of women’s leadership in the security and judicial sectors across the globe has also been a DOS priority.

The Department increased steps to protect and empower women from situations of violence. Specifically, the Department implemented the U.S. Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-based Violence Globally, which is a government-wide initiative that identifies, coordinates, and leverages existing efforts and resources to address gender-based violence.178 The U.S. Strategy was developed as a result of the Obama Administration’s Executive Order 13623. 179 The effort, led in the Department of State by the Office of Global Women’s Issues, identifies objectives that must be met to reduce gender-based violence. The Strategy consisted of four objectives. First, the government must increase the coordination of gender-based violence prevention and response among the departments and agencies.180 Second, the government will integrate the prevention and response against gender-based violence into existing programs.181 Third, the government will collect, research, and analyze data to enhance current knowledge on gender-based violence and its prevention

176 Ibid. 177 Ibid. 178 United States Department of State. United States Agency for International Development. United States Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-based Violence Globally. 2016 179 Exec. Order. No. 13623. 77 Fed. Reg. 54779. (September 5, 2012) 180 United States Strategy to Prevent…, Ibid. 181 Ibid. 46 efforts. 182 And finally, the government will expand programming that address gender-based violence.183

The Department of State has put into place global initiatives and public diplomacy programming that would prevent and respond to gender- based violence. Specifically, Safe from the Start program, launched in 2013, is a joint program by USAID and the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance that aims to increase dedicated interventions for gender-based violence in emergencies, integrate risk mitigation across all humanitarian assistance sectors, and prioritize accountability.184 By 2014, USAID/DOS had committed $22 million for this program. 185 The Department has also launched the Gender-based Violence Response and Protection Initiative, which is designed to address extreme gender-based violence and other “harmful practices based on gender,” which includes early and forced marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting, and honor killings.186 Since 2014, the program has provided humanitarian assistance in more than 125 emergency cases in 14 countries.187 The Department of State has also started several public diplomacy programs. For instance, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs runs a professional exchange program that annually brings thousands of emerging leaders to the United States to work on group projects to solve policy issues on gender-based violence.188

The Department of State has provided diplomatic support and capacity building for women to play a major role in conflict prevention as peacebuilders. The Department made major investments in building the capacity of women to prevent and mediate conflict, created networks of

182 Ibid. 183 Ibid. 184 Ibid. 185 Ibid. 186 Ibid. 187 Ibid. 188 Ibid. 47 women to counter terrorism especially by speaking out against violent extremism.189 The Department also engaged other women and religious leaders to recognize signs of radicalization to violence. The Department worked to strengthen women’s economic security and improve access to markets, healthcare, and education through trade, diplomacy, exchange programs, and partnerships with private companies and organizations.190

Lastly, the Department of State has promoted women’s equal access to relief and recovery resources in post-natural disaster areas, by preventing sexual violence and abuse perpetrated by humanitarian and UN peacekeeping forces, especially through training, vetting, and expansion of accountability mechanisms.191 The Department also made sure to finance solutions for the return and reintegration of women refugees to their communities after disasters.192

Aside from running programs targeted at Women, Peace, and Security, the Department of State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (CT) also runs a myriad of programs that helps strengthen civilian capacity, partnership, and information sharing to help counter the continuously changing terrorist threat across the globe.193 CT plans, designs, and implements foreign assistance programs targeted at building non-military capabilities of partner nations. 194 These foreign assistance programs build law enforcement and strengthen judicial mechanisms to mitigate and disrupt attacks, and ensure terrorists are arrested, prosecuted, and incarcerated in accordance with the rule of law.195 CT runs CVE programming targeted at disrupting the entire life cycle of radicalization and violent extremism, which includes the pre-radicalization

189 United States Department of State, Ibid. 190 Ibid. 191 Ibid. 192 Ibid. 193 "Antiterrorism Assistance Program." U.S. Department of State. Accessed December 18, 2018. https://www.state.gov/m/ds/protection/terrorism/c8583.htm. 194 Ibid. 195 Ibid. 48 stages.196 The Bureau, through a number of diplomatic engagement and assistance programs, helps expand international political will and partnerships to better understand the drivers and possible interventions of extremism, then uses foreign assistance to reduce these social and economic factors and drivers of extremism. 197 CT also assists partner nations in adopting policies and laws to curb the expansion of terrorism and violent extremism, including building strong partnerships with local and municipal governments. Most importantly, the Bureau empowers and amplifies locally credible voices that can change the perception of extremist propaganda among key sectors of the demographic. These voices include those of youth, women, and religious leaders, and the Bureau is dedicated to enhancing their role in CVE efforts.198

One of the most successful programs that CT runs is the Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA). 199 While the ATA is implemented and administered by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, CT is responsible for planning, strategy formulation, and oversight of the program. 200 The ATA is the primary provider of U.S. training and equipment to law enforcement agencies of partner nations. The ATA trains partner law enforcement to prevent, respond to, and mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks through a series of courses, seminars, and consultations.201 The ATA trainings emphasize the importance of the rule of law, human rights, and the participation of women in security spaces. In 2017, the ATA provided 431 courses and technical workshops, training more than 8,200

196 Ibid. 197 Ibid. 198 Ibid. 199 "Antiterrorism Assistance Program." U.S. Department of State. Accessed December 18, 2018. https://www.state.gov/m/ds/protection/terrorism/c8583.htm. 200 Ibid. 201 Ibid. 49 participants across 47 countries with a budget of $135.9 million.202 203The Philippines is one of the top recipients of ATA programing in S.E. Asia; the island nation received $25 million last year. 204 ATA has aided the Philippines in foiling several terrorist plots, and also helped in responding to several suspected bomb threat incidents. The ATA also provides cyber- related training and assistance to the Philippines. Two days before President Donald J. Trump arrived in the Philippines for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in November 2017, the Philippine National Police used their training and U.S. technology to foil a terrorist plot to bomb the ASEAN Summit.205

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has a unique and critical role in America’s fight against violent extremism. USAID utilizes its development expertise in democratic governance, health, education, economic growth, and agriculture among others to mitigate the push and pull factors of violent extremism and insurgency.206 Furthermore, a vast number of USAID staff have served, or are serving, in countries where violent extremism and insurgency are prevalent.207 These staff have also establish a field presence and, along with local partners, can aid in contextualizing on-the-ground situations. USAID also has a number of research, assessment, and programming tools that can help develop

202 United States Department of State. Antiterrorism Assistance Report 2017. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/274112.pdf 203 United States Government Accountability Office. ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE: State Department Should Improve Data Collection and Participant Oversight. GAO- 17-704. September 2017. 204 Linnea Duvall (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, USDOS). Interview with Linnea Duvall. October 1, 2018. 205 Antiterrorism Assistance Report, Ibid. 206 United States Agency for International Development.The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency. September 2011. 207 Ibid. 50 frameworks and guides that are applicable to violent extremism and insurgency environments.208

USAID laid out relevant definitions and a broad knowledge base in The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency Policy, published in 2011.209 The policy acknowledged the difficulty in defining complex terminology in this arena, but recognized a necessity for a consistent framework as well. Thus, USAID defined the following terms:

Violent Extremism refers to advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic, and political objectives.210

Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. It is primarily a political and territorial struggle, in which both sides use armed force to create space for their political, economic, and influence activities to be effective. Insurgency is not always conducted by a single group with a centralized, military-style command structure, but may involve different actors with various aims, loosely connected in networks.211

Along with these definitions, USAID also set out to identify possible drivers of violent extremism and insurgency. 212 Again, the Agency recognized that identifying and then defining USAID’s role in violent extremism and insurgency is difficult due to the variety of local contexts and the lack of evidence and data. Multiple push and pull factors work together to entice individuals to radicalize, and there are multiple pathways by which violent extremism can emerge.213 USAID defines push factors as

208 Ibid. 209 Ibid. 210 Ibid. 211 Ibid. 212 For deeper discussion and implications of push and pull factors of violent extremism, please see section above. 213 Ibid. 51 factors that are important in creating the conditions that favor the rise or spread in appeal of violent extremism or insurgency.214 These push factors are often socioeconomic, political, and cultural in nature. Some examples of push factors are: high levels of social marginalization and fragmentation, poor or lack of proper governance, government repression and human rights violations, endemic corruption and elite impunity,215 and cultural threat perceptions.

All of these factors marginalize and force populations to seek identity or reparations from grievances by the government.216 Furthermore, USAID has identified that “unmet socioeconomic needs may be significant not because of material deprivation, but because of the related perception of those marginalized populations that state and society have abandoned them and left a governance gap.”217 USAID defines pull factors as factors that provide personal rewards that individuals receive from being associated with a group or participation in the group’s activity.218 These rewards and benefits may include: material resources, status, and respect; a sense of belonging, adventure, and self-esteem that these deprived and marginalized groups can have a sense that they are making history; and the appearance of achieving glory and fame.219

In understanding push and pull factors, USAID has also explored the role of gender in violent extremism.220 Women may act as a driver of, as well as potentially a brake on, violent extremism.221 Familial ties and cultural roles may make women a psychological barrier for their husbands, sons, and other male relatives. However, they may also serve as motivators

214 Ibid. 215 Elite impunity is situations when the elite is “above the law” and is not punished for crimes. 216 Ibid. 217 Ibid. 218 Ibid. 219 Ibid. 220 Ibid. 221 Ibid. 52 for their husbands to join these groups to seek glory and reputation. Thus, USAID is very careful on its programming to always consider the advice of local, customary authorities who have a deeper and broader knowledge of the area, its people, and its cultures. Furthermore, although USAID is less able to affect and influence culture, USAID believes that cultural drivers should not be ignored.222 These drivers can be addressed by engaging with local faith leaders or other groups with voices in the community and by respecting indigenous and religious customs.223

USAID strategy is to place emphasis on the prevention of violent extremism, which is more effective than actual mitigation of active drivers. Finding actors, institutions, and communities that are resilient against the narratives of violent extremism can provide a positive outlook and become a potential source of stability. Most importantly, USAID believes that push and pull factors can be addressed through development assistance programs. Push factors, such as marginalization and unmet basic needs, can be addressed by programs and initiatives that provide such needs. 224 Pull factors can also be addressed through development assistance by enhancing the voice of marginalized populations and offering integrated programming to advance vocational and technical training, life skills, and other civic engagement efforts, especially among youth.225 Although to a lesser extent, political drivers can also be affected by development assistance. 226 USAID’s democracy and governance interventions target at-risk communities that curtail the effects of poor governance and empower politically marginalized groups.227 Democracy and governance programs can also help build confidence between local communities and the

222 Ibid. 223 Ibid. 224 Ibid. 225 Ibid. 226 Ibid. 227 Ibid. 53 government specially where the influences of the government may be weak or nonexistent.228

Before USAID implements any programs or initiatives on the ground, it utilizes the following engagement criteria.229 These criteria are designed to be used in the planning, designing, implementing, and post- implementation phases to evaluate the effectiveness of its programming and to ensure that the Agency’s actions are not counterproductive. These criteria are:

• Assessment of the drivers of violent extremism and insurgency and identification of potential development responses • Consideration of host country’s (government and population) commitment and capacity to address the drivers • Determination that there is an appropriate and critical role for developmental assistance in preventing or mitigating drivers of violent extremism or insurgency • Determination that an adequate level of security exists to permit implementing partners to operate, monitor programs, and communicate with USAID • Identification of risks to the Agency, its partners, and the development investment (i.e. that it can be undermined by destabilizing elements), and determination that reasonable steps can be taken to mitigate those risks • Consideration of programs, resources, and management plans required for implementation230

As observed, USAID works to ensure that its actions are beneficial to local populations and do not further fuel violent extremism narratives or cause any other adverse effects. Even though the USAID has these systems

228 Ibid. 229 Ibid. 230 Ibid. 54 in place, it cannot be made certain that its actions are completely adverse free.

Since the installation of the NAP, USAID has done a lot to advance gender equality and female empowerment within the agency itself and across the world through its programming. USAID has advanced all five of NAP objectives and adopted a series of reinforcing, comprehensive policies to close the gender gap, combat gender-based violence, human trafficking, and enable women and girls to realize their rights and agency.231 In an effort to institutionalize a gender-responsive approach to peace and security, USAID focused on three primary vehicles: integration in USAID program cycle, enhanced staff capacity, and strengthened coordination and learning.232 USAID issued the Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy, which provides the Agency with guidance on pursuing evidence- based investments in gender equality and female empowerment. 233 The policy requires the Agency conduct country and project-level gender analysis, and mandates all Agency staff receive basic gender training. USAID has included over $100 million in 2012 for programming for NAP in more than 30 countries. USAID has also designed programs to promote women’s participation in peace processes and decision-making.234 USAID launched the Global Women’s Leadership Fund to support women’s participation in negotiations, political dialogues, and political transitions.235 The Agency also initiatives research to examine the impact of these programs and explore new, more comprehensive models for measuring

231 United States Agency for International Development. Implementation of the United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security. August 2012. 232 Ibid. 233 Other NAP-related policies and strategies USAID include: U.S. Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender Based Violence Globally; USAID Vision for Ending Child Marriage; USAID Counter-Trafficking in Persons Policy; USAID Strategy on Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis; and U.S. Government Action Plan on Children in Adversity. 234 United States Agency for International Development. Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy. March 2012. 235 United States Agency for International Development. Implementation…, Ibid. 55 women’s impact and power in these negotiations. 236 The Agency empowered local women and local youths in the civic arena, and improved the retention and recruitment of women in government for political office, law enforcement officers, and judges. USAID expanded the protection of women and girls from violence, exploitation, and abuse by implementing the Counter-Trafficking in Persons (C-TIP) policy, and trained over 500 USAID staff on C-TIP.237 The Agency also implemented procedures that would hold all U.S. personnel, including contractors, sub-contractors, and grantees, accountable to the highest ethical standards. 238 USAID also helped to engage women in conflict prevention by: implementing early warning and crisis planning to reduce disaster risks; investing in microfinance and assistance to expand women’s access and leadership in the market; increasing women’s access to education through girl’s enrollment programs; and promoting access of women and girls to health care services.239 Finally, USAID worked to ensure safe, equitable access to relief and recovery programs for women and girls by issuing new guidelines that included new requirements for gender and protection, and new training requirements for assistance response personnel. 240 Across all five objectives, USAID committed resources to initiate and conduct research on the best and most effective policies and programs that improve women’s participation and empowerment, and also continues to reassess and reevaluate existing programs to make sure the effect is maximized for every dollar spent.241

DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND USAID JOINT STRATEGY ON COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

236 Ibid. 237 Ibid. 238 Ibid. 239 Ibid. 240 Ibid. 241 Ibid. 56 USAID and DOS published its Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism in 2016 with the end goals of preventing or mitigating the ability of violent extremist groups to recruit and garner support, as well as to empower governments, multilateral organizations, and communities to have the collective capacity to prevent individuals from becoming radicalized.242 The strategy contained five main objectives:

• Expand international political will, partnerships, and expertise to better understand the drivers of violent extremism and mobilize effective interventions. • Encourage and assist partner governments to adopt more effective policies and approaches to prevent and counter the spread of violent extremism, including changing unhelpful practices where necessary. • Employ foreign assistance tools and approaches including development, to reduce specific political or social and economic factors that contribute to community support for violent extremism in identifiable areas or put particular segments of populations at high risk of violent extremist radicalization and recruitment to violence. • Empower and amplify locally credible voices that can change the perception of violent extremist groups and their ideology among key demographic segments. • Strengthen the capabilities of government and non-government actors to isolate, intervene with, and promote the rehabilitation and reintegration of individuals caught in the cycle of radicalization to violence.243

To advance these five objectives, the United States will recognize CVE as a major component of its broader foreign policy. Both DOS and

242 United States Department of State. United States Agency for International Development. Department of State & USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism. May 2016 243 Ibid. 57 USAID will advance bilateral, multilateral, and public diplomacy to accomplish its goals. 244 DOS and USAID will focus on expanding diplomatic efforts with all partner governments, non-governmental actors, and local communities to build public support and the political will to counter violent extremism. 245 Furthermore, State and USAID will undertake strategic communication efforts to synchronize U.S. government communications directed toward foreign audiences to develop CVE narratives. State and USAID will also expand the Rule of Law and development programs to advance CVE. This strategy is grouped into criminal justice reforms and development/civil society strengthening efforts.246 Within criminal justice reforms, DOS and USAID will focus on law enforcement programs to help officials develop a positive, trusting relationship with the community, and will also seek the participation of a diverse group, including women and minorities.247 DOS and USAID will also develop programs within the justice sector to ensure women’s rights are protected and the Rule of Law is upheld in trials.248 State Department will also help countries address prisons, which are breeding grounds for extremist radicalization, 249 and seek opportunities for rehabilitation and reintegration.250 State and USAID will work with local partners including religious, legal, and community actors to provide an outlet for inmates who would otherwise turn to extremism.251 Within economic development and civil society strengthening, USAID will bolster efforts to build relationships with local governments and communities to ensure that they are resilient against violent extremism and radicalization. USAID and State will work with partner organizations to enhance education and service providers to

244 Ibid. 245 Ibid. 246 Ibid. 247 Ibid. 248 Ibid. 249 See our previous discussion on prisons in Indonesia and their effects on radicalization thereof. 250 Ibid. 251 Ibid. 58 address gaps and ensure equitable access to these resources.252 State and USAID will also empower civil society, promote community engagement, and support the private sector in the fight against CVE.253 Specifically, USAID will work with youth, women, community faith leaders, and the victims of violent extremism. Both USAID and State will engage youth and women through programs aimed at community building and empowerment. They will also identify and recognize the role youth and women play in countering violent extremism. 254 Furthermore, the Department and the Agency will conduct research to seek and identify key drivers, program effectiveness, and new initiatives to be undertaken to counter violent extremism.255

252 Ibid. 253 Ibid. 254 Ibid. 255 Ibid. 59 RECOMMENDATIONS

Effectively integrating the experiences, narratives, and influences of women in countering violent extremism requires the emergence of a new framework that will optimize outcomes and minimize risks for women involved. Optimization is driven by deep understanding of the needs and wants of women, so that programming can meet appropriate demands in building resilient communities. Emphasis on risk minimization intends to prevent the expansion of recruitment grounds for violent extremist groups that appeal to women. INDOPACOM’s capacity to include gender- perspectives to this space can be framed in a multi-faceted strategy, including five core elements:

1. PRIORITIZING WOMEN’S AGENCY VS. WOMEN’S RIGHTS

WPS is advocated on the basis that inclusion of women in peace processes will promote women’s rights, benefit and empower women, and as a result increase peace and stability in society. In other words, it asserts that meeting the demands of women in a society will decrease grievances, and minimize the need to join extremist groups. However, women’s demands can be complex, and are not always favorable towards American perceptions of liberation; women do not always prevent violent extremism. Conversely, the drivers of radicalization observed among women who engage in violent extremism suggest a greater pull towards narratives of global justice, versus prioritization of the self and women’s rights. 256 Therefore, the assumption that women are more likely to prevent violent extremism is flawed and needs to be addressed.

Additionally, aversion to Western impositions of social frameworks and women’s rights creates inertia in gaining support for WPS-led programs. Although this does not necessarily mean that perceptions of

256 Conversation with East-West center international fellows. 60 rights are different, the idea of foreign influence, such as WPS, brings about an “allergic reaction.”257 In order to optimize the impact of programming and minimize the risks associated, different facets of female agency should be recognized and accounted for. The following approaches may mitigate these effects:

I. People & Culture: Understand and take seriously local perceptions of female agency, and what elements and rights are of priority to local women. Shape programming from a bottom-up approach, integrating these preferences and investing in programs that will yield a high response rate, instead of adopting a top-down approach. II. Mil-to-Mil: Adopt sustained practice of gender inclusivity, ensuring the environment for female participation is amenable to and representative of the needs of all women. For example, women may desire availability of female-only spaces for their comfort and to comply with Islamic religious norms of piety. These demands can be acted upon by ensuring that, in addition to mixed programs, there exist female-only training modules, as well as availability of appropriate and functional attire for Muslim female officers. III. PR: Promote female empowerment through a local, cultural, and religious traditional lens, and avoid branding motifs as driven by Western values or WPS. If the target population is Muslim, draw from examples of female inclusion and empowerment in Islamic tradition, and avoid painting the tradition as diametrically opposed to women’s rights and Western values. Examples can include Nusayba bint Ka’ab, a skilled warrior renowned for her saving Prophet Muhammad’s life in the battlefield, to Khadijah, the wife of Muhammad, who was the wealthiest businesswoman of the time and deeply involved with social issues.

257 Conversation with APCSS experts on South East Asia. 61 2. IMPROVING U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH WOMEN THROUGH

ISLAM

Throughout the years, leading agencies in CVE strategy have been refining the positionality of Islam in relation to radicalization. At times, Islam is viewed as an outdated set of principles inherently against freedom, equality, and democracy, and its adherents are categorized to be more prone to violent acts than the average person258. Warning signs for PVE and CVE point to factors that may be merely everyday choices and realities of women, such as choosing to wear the Hijab, the Islamic head covering.259 More recently, engagement with Islam has shifted from its rejection to its tolerance. For women who adopt Islam as a way of life, however, engagement with their ideology needs to go beyond tolerance, and be accepting of the choices they choose to make.

The current atmosphere creates superficial categories of “Islam” vs. the “West” that polarize alliances instead of creating opportunities for partnership and cooperation built on mutual respect. As described in the previous parts of the report, women who engage in violent extremism may do so out of a desire to serve their religion with piety and defend it against its enemies. Widening the gap between Islam and its perceived enemies legitimizes extremist narratives that target those with such grievances. To improve interactions with Islam as an ideology and Muslim women as a people, the following approaches may be useful to adopt:

I. Interlocutors: Advocate for trusted community members on the front lines of discussion on religious education and women’s rights. Support knowledge production and dissemination in Islamic

258 "How the U.S. General Public Views Muslims And Islam." Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project. N. p., 2017. Web. 17 Dec. 2018. 259 “Preventing Violent Extremism: Gender Perspectives and Women’s Roles” by Jacqui True and Sri Eddyono. 62 humanities, Quranic studies, and Islamic law on topics of Women in Islam. II. Language: Limit and nuance the usage of words such as “Jihadi violence”, “Jihadi wives”, and the miscategorization of “Moderate” vs. “Extreme” forms of Islam. Recognize the depth these terms hold for communities; for example, the term Jihad primarily indicates an inner struggle towards the truth, and its villainization by those engaging in CVE grassroots work strengthens extremism narratives. Avoid over usage that may paint terms such as “Jihad” as synonymous with “violent extremism”. III. Controlled Collision: Engage in dialogue with “extremist” thought by instigating a controlled collision of viewpoints, led by trusted community leaders. Take in good faith that grievances have legitimate roots and are not always sources of propaganda; controlled collision, dialogue and engagement provide a necessary avenue to curb sentiments away from violent means.

3. LEVERAGE INFLUENCE TO PROMOTE GENDERED PERSPECTIVES

OF PARTNERS

U.S. INDOPACOM’s operational role in capacity building of local governments can influence adoption of gendered perspectives by way of example. The U.S. Military has taken notable steps in creating an atmosphere of gender equality for its personnel, and although more can be done on this front, U.S. INDOPACOM can leverage its influence on its partners to adopt gender-informed perspectives. Three areas deserving of attention are:

I. Isolation of Women’s Issues: Ensure that women’s issues are not slated for a specific individual in the office. It tends to be that “women’s issues” are the portfolio of a female staffer, and other leaders in the office simply disengage.

63 II. Tokenization: Avoid instances of “token female” or having women in a position of power just to say that the group is represented by women III. Partnerships: Ensure all U.S. personnel, including partners on the ground receive proper training regarding the meaningful participation of women, women’s issues, violent towards women, and sexual violence.

4. INTERAGENCY ALLIANCES

Over the past several years, INDOPACOM has started to change from a leading role to a supportive role on CVE aspects. We would like to commend that effort and emphasize that it is very important to not only hearing the opinions of interagencies, INDOPACOM should allow the interagency to fully become lead agencies and develop the U.S. CVE strategies. Thus, we would recommend the following actions:

I. Continued Support: INDOPACOM should provide USAID/DOS with the support capabilities that are requested as they further take the lead on CVE strategy. II. Work with USAID to Build Community Relationships: Work with USAID to identify, seek out, and build relationships with leaders in the community. We must ensure that this group of leaders reflects the community in its diversity, which would include women and girls, ethnic minority groups, and persons with disabilities, etc., are all represented in this group of leaders. These groups can work with INDOPACOM on a number of issues, including any potential peace negotiations, but also any U.S. actions that USAID/DOS/INDOPACOM may take. Not only should they be represented, their voices and opinions should be acknowledged. III. Know the Turf: USAID and the DOS have a whole slate of resources, including but not limited to, diplomatic relationships, 64 staff on the ground, cultural connections, etc. These resources are crucial to help INDOPACOM, know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion and culture. 260 Before any operation, INDOPACOM should know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader and ancient grievance, and any push and pull factors that may be specific to the local area.261 This essential to make sure that actions taken by INDOPACOM do not adversely exacerbate any underlying grievances.

5. FURTHER AREAS OF RESEARCH

The prevention model that drives WPS does not account for female participation in VE. Additionally, within the past 18 months, academics have started to re-examine root causes of radicalization, believing that perhaps previously known factors such as economic incentive, sense of purpose, and various other grievances are at best symptoms of a deeper root. A new area of research focuses on structural social and political issues beyond the individual level to understand the dynamics of this landscape better.

Participation in this area with a gendered lens would be beneficial in identifying correlations present in the role of women in violent extremism. This can be done through supporting the data collection through continued partnerships with academia, think tanks, and NGOs, and through exploring:

I. Root Causes: Support surveys of disengaged women to understand structural social and political factors that may have pushed or pulled them towards violent extremism. Incorporate the voices of these women in CVE strategy.

260 David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency.” Military Review LXXXVI, 3 (May-June 2006), pp. 103-108. 261 Ibid. 65 II. Existing Programs: Support impact evaluations of existing CVE initiatives to measure not just the efficacy of these programs, but to investigate their counter-effects on communities and ways in which such projects may be harming communities by infringing on civil liberties and legitimizing military violence against civilians. III. Information Dissemination: Actively share findings with partner organizations to drive evidence-based operations in cohesion.

66 CASE-STUDY TAKEAWAYS:

PHILIPPINES TAKEAWAYS

1. FEMALE PERSPECTIVES IN PEACEMAKING The literature on women in conflict resolution demonstrates clearly that peace lasts longer when women and female perspectives are included in the peace process. The Philippines provides an excellent example of a country seriously incorporating women into conflict resolution: Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, a political science professor at the University of the Philippines and peace advocate, led the negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front that resulted in the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro and a tentative resolution to a conflict that has dominated Mindanao for decades. The Indo-Pacific can learn from the example of the Philippines, and INDOPACOM, as the most important and influential military organization in the region, can help. INDOPACOM should push heavily for the involvement of women in resolving ongoing conflicts in the region, providing the Philippines a model example of a country that has done so effectively.

2. HIJAB TROOPER PROGRAM The Philippines’ hijab trooper program, instituted in August of 2017, has been a remarkable way to integrate Muslim women into positions of power in the Philippine police and military. By providing examples for young Muslim girls in Mindanao of Muslim Filipino women seriously involved in conflict resolution on the ground, the Philippines has provided them with the understanding that there is an alternative to joining extremist organizations. As one hijab trooper reported, girls she had worked with that had previously wanted join ISIS instead wanted to become hijab troopers themselves by the time they had left. The Indo-Pacific region at-large would do well to incorporate a similar model as has been tested in the Philippines, and INDOPACOM, by advocating for similar programs in other countries, can help the region achieve this. 67 3. WOMEN-LED NGOS The Philippines hosts a rich network of women-led NGOs that, given the ethnically and religiously fractured nature of the country, approach the dual issues of women’s empowerment and countering violent extremism from narrow angles. Groups focus on Muslim women’s rights, indigenous women’s rights, and young women’s rights, among various other group interests. Given the nature of the landscape of women-led NGOs in the Philippines, INDOPACOM should tread carefully, making sure to include a broad coalition of civil society organizations in outreach and funding campaigns to avoid the image of prioritizing one group’s interests over those of others.

4. COMMUNITY WORKSHOPS Community workshops that focus on promoting alternatives to extremist ideology are essential to countering violent extremism, something that has been noted by USSOCOM. We recommend the continued support of these types of projects, but also a careful consideration of who leads them. We want to ensure that local populations, and women in particular, lead the charge when it comes to focus groups and seminars. This recommendation ensures that those who attend the workshop feels that guidance is coming from those they can best identify with, and also ensures that there is a gender perspective to any intervention.

INDONESIA TAKEAWAYS

1. RESEARCH NEEDS There are a number of pressing issues with respect to women in CVE in Indonesia that face a critical lack of research. The recent incarceration of female jihadist prisoners is a particularly important issue that arose in 2016 and is likely to worsen as women become more active in planning and participating in attacks within violent extremist groups. However, there does not exist any published research on approaches to de-radicalization of Indonesian jihadist women in prison, nor on post-release monitoring,

68 rehabilitation, or reintegration for women. Moreover, impact evaluations are a needed in order to confirm the positive or negative impacts of programs that approach women in CVE in different ways, and under particular assumptions. For example, economic empowerment programs such as business training skills and loan programs could have differing impacts in across localities based on the local economy, women’s financial literacy, or the time frame of the program. The causal pathway between economic empowerment and reduction in violent extremism either among women participants themselves or from their CVE activities in their communities also needs to be identified.

These are just a few examples of the research questions that are critical to planning and, if necessary, reforming CVE programming by all actors on the ground. USINDOPACOM should seek to support the expansion of research however it can, while ensuring that research studies are answering questions that are actively being asked by the organizations that plan and implement programs themselves. It is also crucial that Indonesian social science research institutions are given the lead; they can contribute experts on survey research who also have the cultural understanding to appropriately design surveys with potentially sensitive questions that get at the heart of CVE problems.262

2. ISSUE PRIORITIZATION Given the breadth of challenges in the problem set of women in CVE in Indonesia, it may be necessary to prioritize certain issues in order to better allocate resources for the greatest impact. One subject matter interviewed for this study opined that the focus of both CSOs and U.S civilian agencies is too heavily proportioned on responding to radicalized migrant workers and returnees from Turkey and Syria, which are small in number and often come with gray areas in the degree of the women’s radicalization (returnees from Syria, for example, do not necessarily intend to directly join violent

262 Kipp Efinger. Interviewed by Alissa Wang. Phone interview. December 3, 2018 69 extremist groups, but sometimes only intend to join charity groups). Moreover, returnees are not likely to be willing to participate in follow-up programs, especially if it implies monitoring of their activities. The disengagement and release of convicted female terrorist prisoners, on the other hand, may pose a more immediate threat, given that the women are already convicted of terrorism-related offenses.263 Considering that there is also a dire lack of research on how to disengage female terrorist prisoners in Indonesia, or what needs to be addressed in their post-release period, it is necessary for USINDOPACOM to take some time to assess which problem area is the most pressing and where it could make the greatest positive impact with its efforts.

3. POLITICAL SENSITIVITY The current polarized political environment in Indonesia suggests that any programming that outwardly promotes countering religious extremism should exercise caution in choosing language. One subject matter expert advised that the use of certain terms like ‘radicalism’ have come to be associated with government attempts to repress opposition groups ahead of the 2019 elections. Any public counter-narrative campaigns would have to tread very lightly on rhetoric (and perhaps even wait until after the upcoming elections), as would public statements from CVE programs and organizations. 264 A more comprehensive analysis of the rhetorical implications of using particular words related to CVE are out of the scope of this report, but it would be prudent to gain a more thorough understanding before implementing programs on the ground.

4. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE The U.S. military can specifically leverage its technical capabilities in cyberspace to provide needed assistance to other U.S. agencies as well as Indonesian government agencies and CSOs working in the space of women

263 Nava Nuraniyah. Interviewed by Alissa Wang. Phone interview, November 28, 2018. 264 Ibid. 70 in CVE. One member of USAID on the ground specified that social media analytics is a key tool that would be helpful for organizations that seek more information to better target their programming, but do not have the technical capacity to do so themselves. Women-related CVE programs such as interfaith education, building family awareness on VE, and dispelling misconceptions spread by violent extremist groups are, of course, only effective if they are targeted towards neighborhoods where women are becoming sympathetic or involved in violent extremist groups, and community attitudes towards extremist violence are more accepting. Beyond targeting, social media data could also provide more much-needed data on the modalities of recruitment for women: are more women joining as wives of terrorist fighters, or are more becoming radicalized through study groups? How do these dynamics interact with each other? Data from social media can provide this type of insight, but only with sophisticated tools. If the U.S. military can help provide technical assistance with these tools, it could do a great deal in improving the efficacy of CVE programming.

5. SELECTIVE PARTNERSHIP WITH INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS As U.S. military entities seek to expand engagement with Indonesian government partners in CVE, it is important to note that some government actors in Indonesia may be more open than others to cooperation with the U.S. military due for optical reasons. Certain ministries, such as the Ministry of Education, may be averse to working with a foreign military and having their area of responsibility potentially securitized. Other ministries may be open to partnership with USINDOPACOM operating in a specific capacity of support; for example, the Ministry of Social Affairs might be open to working with USINDOPACOM to develop tools for recognizing whether individuals have been radicalized based on information from social media websites and messaging apps, or even deradicalization approaches to talk down

71 individuals identified as vulnerable to recruitment through those mediums.265

USINDOPACOM would most certainly be effective in working with the police and military forces through training and advising. While the Indonesian police have extensive experience in dismantling violent extremist groups by force,266 the country’s security and defense forces still have a ways to go in terms of P/CVE practices and internalizing a gender perspective as an organization. Both the military and police forces in certain areas still use and defend the practice of conducting ‘virginity tests’ on new female recruits - a humiliating experience that has been condemned by Human Rights Watch as a human rights violation, and deters women from joining the military and police forces to begin with.267 The U.S. military could have an important role to play in influencing the policies of its Indonesian counterparts to improve its gender-related policies and ensure a truly gender-inclusive space. In addition, USINDOPACOM could work constructively with Indonesian police on recognizing and protecting civilians from violent discrimination and intolerance.

6. MEN’S ROLE IN GENDER-BASED CVE Gender-based CVE programs generally focus narrowly on women’s unique roles in VE and CVE. However, there are complementary roles for men to fulfill as well; without them, a disproportionate burden of responsibility is placed on women’s roles in their families and communities. First, the involvement of men in women’s empowerment programs is imperative to ensure their support of transformative roles for women in their communities. Organizations like the Asian Muslim Action Network have

265 Efinger, Ibid. 266 Ali Muhammad. “Indonesia’s Way to Counter Terrorism 2002-2009: Lesson Learned”. Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta. 2014. 267 Amanda Siddharta. “Virginity tests put Indonesian women off military service; often performed by men, they are seen as degrading.” South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/article/2160023/virginity-tests-put-indonesian- women-military-service-often-performed-men 72 found that their Women’s School for Peace program incited backlash from husbands who felt threatened by their wives’ increasingly vocal roles in the family and community, and discouraged them from participation - a major challenge to the growth of the program.268 It is critical not to ignore the potential repercussions that might come from encouraging women to take up more visible and vocal roles in areas where that may run against the norm. WSP has considered developing Men’s Schools for Peace to parallel the Women’s Schools and ensure that both men and women are on board for the increased agency of women in both the public and private spheres.

One interesting note is that Indonesian men who do support gender equality and the elevation of women’s voices are themselves actively involved in organizations and forums on gender issues - and are often surprised at the female-dominated discussions and organizations for gender equality in Western societies. In this way, Indonesia may actually be ahead of Western countries in the discussion of and activism around gender issues, in they are not only seen as a ‘women’s issue.’ This means that there is a lot of potential to capitalize on by actively bringing men into the fold of gender- based CVE programming in Indonesia, such as through collaboration on critical discourse of fundamentalist ideology and its consequences for women, or through joint efforts on peace- and tolerance-building community programs.269

Lastly, the engagement of men in family-centric P/CVE programs are crucial for ensuring families can identify and prevent radicalization among their own members. The role of women as mothers in countering violent extremist influence among their children has already been an area

268 Success Stories and Best Practices of Women-Led Peacebuilding. Asian Muslim Ac- tion Network. 2018.

269 Jacqui True & Sri Eddyono. Preventing Violent Extremism: Gender Perspectives and Women’s Roles. Monash Centre for Gender, Peace and Security, Monash University. 2017. 73 of focus in academic literature and existing CVE programs; however, fathers play equivalently important roles as parents, and could only enhance the capacity of parents’ education programs to successfully inoculate families against the ideological reach of extremism.

7. ENGAGING WITH NON-VIOLENT EXTREMISTS Non-moderate but non-violent Islamic movements are at the frontlines of where individuals who share the values of extremist ideology choose to act on that ideology through violence. It is at this defining line where violent extremism could be reduced by engaging with non-violent extremists, such as salafists, who have greater standing among Indonesians who are more vulnerable to being drawn to violent extremist groups in the first place. Salafism is distinct from salafi jihadism in that the former promulgates the belief that revolution against Muslim rulers violates Islamic principles, while the latter holds that armed revolution is an imperative. Indonesian women who are disappointed by mainstream Islamic movements find security in extremist groups that reach out as guides in navigating the complexities of Islam; they are curious and experimental in their religious seeking to begin with, and become interested in violent extremism when salafi preachers use demonizing rhetoric against ISIS. They are further pushed to learn more when the salafist community begins to ostracize them for entertaining the ideas of violent extremist groups. Given that salafists are at a critical juncture in the radicalization pathway to violence, it could be beneficial to engage in dialogue about the best approaches to discouraging followers against joining ISIS and its Indonesian affiliates, other than blanket condemnation. The Indonesian government has previously partnered with salafi clerics to engage with terrorist convicts, and therefore may have the appropriate entry points to initiate these discussions.270

270 Nava Nuraniyah. Not Just Brainwashed: Understanding the Radicalization of Indone- sian Female Supporters of the Islamic State. July 6, 2018. 74

75 CONCLUSIONS

Restatement of the problem

Women play a unique role in the space of preventing, countering, and participating in violent extremism. The degree to which they have been accounted for in policy-making and programming is still limited, and actors within the VE space have a great deal to learn in order to develop and implement actions that are impactful yet sensitive to the social and cultural contexts in which they operate. This research study aimed to fill these gaps of knowledge by consolidating available information and expertise from literature, existing field research, and experts on the ground. How can women’s experiences be integrated to counter the growing forces of violent extremism in the Indo-Pacific?

Case studies: Philippines and Indonesia grand takeaways

The case of Indonesia highlights several areas where outside military actors such as USINDOPACOM should exert caution in CVE programming in a relatively new country context. A great degree of political sensitivity, both in civilian attitudes towards the government and on the part of government institutions themselves, suggests that the USINDOPACOM should tread lightly and invest in the resources and expertise necessary to ensure that it does not initiate or facilitate programs that may inflame existing issues of polarization that are used by violent extremist narratives for recruitment. At the same time, the majority of Indonesian women are known to be progressive relative to others in the region; there is certainly an opportunity to make great strides in countering violent extremist groups by elevating the voices of those who advocate for peace and tolerance.

The Philippines serves as an example of a country where the United States is able to leverage a strong relationship built upon past cooperation to ensure that the most important principles of WPS are being considered when making decisions to counter violent extremism. Furthermore, the

76 Philippines, simply for existing cultural reasons, is a country in which women exercise greater influence and autonomy than their peers in neighboring countries. We are able to see that in the Philippines, the value of women’s agency is not only present in the private sphere, but has permeated through public life as well, allowing for women to be involved in governmental positions and roles of peace negotiation, to great positive effect.

Takeaways:

• Beyond what we perceive to be the needs of women, every strategy that seeks to empower women against violent extremism needs to be centered around the wants of local women; o Recognize and desire among women to be pious and morally righteous, o Accommodate for female-only training spaces. • Repercussions of interventions in the CVE space can expand the recruiting ground for violent extremism. Some of these factors include; o Undue acts of violence by local military and law enforcement forces trained by U.S., which perpetuate negative perceptions of U.S. activities, o Backlash from men who may feel disempowered as a result of a potentially widening gap of opportunities available to women through WPS programming. • Deeper engagement with extremist ideology appealing to women through a collision of viewpoints; o Recognizing women’s desire to be part of the fight for justice for Muslims globally, o Avoid villainizing ISIS affiliated groups without offering alternative solutions to mitigate grievances.

77 At its core, CVE strategy is a grassroots endeavor. Evident in this paper are the various risks associated with U.S. military in this space, and what its relationships could mean for local partners. For example, INDOPACOM’s support for community organizations and individuals may jeopardize their credibility, as the risk stands that they may be seen as conspirators acting in alignment with foreign interests. Numerous examples of associations gone wrong have indicated as well that once this association is revealed to the public, there is inadequate protection for local partners. The case of Iraqi interpreters for the U.S. military stands out as a relevant precedent; in the case of many, once their identity was revealed, their lives were endangered, and it was difficult to seek protection and asylum.

The short time frame of this project and the lack of quantitative data presented a few limitations on our research. The inability to perform surveys of local populations and impact evaluations of current CVE programs limited the ability to make evidence-based judgments. Although the qualitative information gathered is of crucial importance in understanding the landscape of violent extremism vis-à-vis the positionality of women, more specific recommendations could not be synthesized with high confidence.

Moving forward, focusing on a few areas of information gathering would benefit the question at hand. An emerging body of research is currently re-examining the root causes of radicalization by investigating structural social and political realities. In the case of U.S. activity abroad, it would be beneficial to examine the reasons underlying the significant levels of suspicion harbored against the U.S. by locals. Dismissing these sentiments as mere influences of propaganda may be a missed opportunity to explore deeper roots of radicalization pushing and pulling women to the brinks of violence.

78 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank the following individuals and organizations for their support, time, and energy in helping us make this project possible.

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