Countering Violent Extremism in the Philippines

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Countering Violent Extremism in the Philippines RAND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IMPACT EVALUATION C O R P O R A T I O N ASHLEY L. RHOADES, TODD C. HELMUS Countering Violent Extremism in the Philippines A Snapshot of Current Challenges and Responses For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA233-2 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0572-2 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2020 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover image: acrylic / Getty Images Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface In this report, we aim to provide policymakers and program imple- menters with helpful information on the threat landscape in the Philippines (in terms of active terrorist groups and drivers of radical- ization) and raise awareness of Philippine government and nongovern- mental programs in the countering violent extremism (CVE) space to inform the design and execution of such programming. This report is based on a review of open-source literature, not original research or fieldwork, and therefore should be read as an overview of existing chal- lenges and responses rather than as an exhaustive examination of all CVE-related programming in the Philippines. This research was sponsored by the Global Engagement Center at the U.S. Department of State and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD), which operates the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and develop- ment center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense intelligence enterprise. For more information on the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/isdp or contact the director (contact information provided on the webpage). iii Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures .............................................................................vii Summary .......................................................................... ix Acknowledgments ............................................................... xi Abbreviations ....................................................................xiii CHAPTER ONE Nature and Magnitude of the Threat ......................................... 1 Nature of the Threat ............................................................... 2 Magnitude of the Threat .........................................................11 CHAPTER TWO Drivers of Radicalization .......................................................19 Push Factors .......................................................................19 Pull Factors ........................................................................25 Push Versus Pull Factors .........................................................31 CHAPTER THREE Countering Violent Extremism Programs and Initiatives ...............33 Types of CVE Programs and Initiatives ........................................33 Lessons for CVE Efforts in the Philippines ....................................45 Conclusion ........................................................................ 50 References .........................................................................51 v Figures 1.1. Terrorist Attacks in the Philippines by Perpetrator, 2001–2018 ............................................................13 1.2. Casualties from Terrorist Attacks in the Philippines by Perpetrator, 2001–2018 .............................................14 1.3. Marawi After the 2017 Conflict ...................................17 vii Summary The threat of terrorism and violent extremism in the Philippines— especially in Mindanao, the country’s second-largest island—is severe and persistent. In this report, we provide a snapshot of the terrorist and extremist threats facing the Philippines and the countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts that the Philippine government and nongov- ernmental agencies have undertaken in response.1 We summarize the results of our review of these topics. In Chapter One, we provide an overview of the various terrorist and extremist groups active within the Philippines and their histories, primary targets, operational methods, and geographic reach. In Chapter Two, we document the push factors and pull factors that contribute to the radicalization process. Push factors include illit- eracy, poverty, weak rule of law, inadequate social services, and limited economic opportunity. Pull factors, which play a particularly strong role in radicalization, include financial incentives, online propaganda, 1 CVE focuses on preventing or diverting individuals from radicalizing to violence. Gov- ernments and implementing agencies use a variety of terms to refer to this concept, includ- ing preventing violent extremism, countering radicalization, and terrorism prevention. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security defines CVE as “proactive actions to counter efforts by extremists to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize followers to violence,” noting that “funda- mentally, CVE actions intend to address the conditions and reduce the factors that most likely contribute to recruitment and radicalization by violent extremists” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Countering Violent Extremism Task Force—What Is CVE?” web- page, undated). The U.S. Department of State similarly describes CVE as being “a pillar of the Administration’s strategic approach to counterterrorism, and . an increasingly criti- cal component of a comprehensive and sustainable counterterrorism strategy that seeks to address the entire life cycle of radicalization to violent extremism” (U.S. Department of State, “Programs and Initiatives,” webpage, undated). ix x Countering Violent Extremism in the Philippines and in-person recruitment networks. In addition, joining a militant group can provide power, camaraderie, and a sense of purpose. We cover the grievances that can prompt radicalization to violence, the vulnerable populations susceptible to radicalization, and terrorist and extremist organizations’ recruitment tactics. In Chapter Three, we document the main types of CVE efforts underway in the Philippines. The Philippine government focuses on military and counterterrorism operations; however, it also runs the Resilient Communities in Conflict-Affected Communities program. This program aims to improve local and national governance, reduce poverty, and improve the delivery of social services. In addition, the government runs counterradicalization programs in certain prison facilities. Regional and international cooperation efforts include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum Work Plan for Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime. Community engagement programs aim to promote dialogue and cooperation between Muslim and Christian communities and educate the general public on CVE issues. Finally, local and international organizations conduct various countermessaging campaigns. We conclude this chapter by address- ing the policy implications of these programs and highlighting some potential approaches and focuses for future CVE programming. We emphasize that CVE efforts should make a concerted effort to monitor and evaluate implementation so that other programming can benefit from lessons learned. Acknowledgments We are grateful to the numerous individuals and entities that sup- ported the conduct of this research. In particular, we are grateful to the staff at Equal Access International, especially Exan Sharief and Ahmed Harris Pangcoga, who were our critical partners throughout the course of this research. We also thank Timothy Andrews and Jill Moss at the U.S. Department of State’s Global Engagement Center for trusting the RAND Corporation with this work. Finally, we would like to thank Colin Clarke of Carnegie Mellon University and Jennifer Moroney of RAND for their helpful and insightful comments that improved the quality of this report. Any errors in this report are the sole responsibil- ity of the authors. xi Abbreviations ABB Alex Boncayao Brigade AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines AFP-CMO Armed Forces of the Philippines–Civil Military Operations Group AKP Ansar al-Khilafah ARMM Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASG Abu Sayyaf Group ATC Anti-Terrorism
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