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Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses www.rsis.edu.sg ISSN 2382-6444 | Volume 10, Issue 9 | September 2018 A JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH (CTR) The Lamitan Bombing and Terrorist Threat in the Philippines Rommel C. Banlaoi Crime-Terror Nexus in Southeast Asia Bilveer Singh India and the Crime-Terrorism Nexus Ramesh Balakrishnan Crime -Terror Nexus in Pakistan Farhan Zahid Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Volume 9, Issue 4 | April 2017 1 Building a Global Network for Security Editorial Note Terrorist Threat in the Philippines and the Crime-Terror Nexus In light of the recent Lamitan bombing in the detailing the Siege of Marawi. The Lamitan Southern Philippines in July 2018, this issue bombing symbolises the continued ideological highlights the changing terrorist threat in the and physical threat of IS to the Philippines, Philippines. This issue then focuses, on the despite the group’s physical defeat in Marawi crime-terror nexus as a key factor facilitating in 2017. The author contends that the counter- and promoting financial sources for terrorist terrorism bodies can defeat IS only through groups, while observing case studies in accepting the group’s presence and hold in the Southeast Asia (Philippines) and South Asia southern region of the country. (India and Pakistan). The symbiotic Wrelationship and cooperation between terrorist Bilveer Singh broadly observes the nature groups and criminal organisations is critical to of the crime-terror nexus in Southeast Asia, the existence and functioning of the former, and analyses the Abu Sayyaf Group’s (ASG) despite different ideological goals and sources of finance in the Philippines. The motivations for both entities. While at times, author posits that three modalities of terrorist terrorist groups cooperate with criminal gangs, financing in Southeast Asia are criminal they also develop their own criminal networks activities, use of charities and partaking in as a source of funding. Broadly, some of the legal commercial activities. This article looks at manifestations of the crime-terror nexus in how criminal activities have been a major Asia include, arms and human trafficking, source of funding for ASG to advance its illegal drugs and artefacts trade, extortion, financial status and organisational, ideological targeted assassinations and kidnapping for and political positions – especially in ransom. With the advent of globalisation, Mindanao. Through its criminal activities, ASG increased foreign linkages between terrorist is also able to acquire important skills and groups and criminal organisations have also knowledge that can enhance the group’s been witnessed, particularly through illicit trade operational capabilities. To counter the crime- and activities on the dark web. Overall, it is terror nexus, it is crucial that the state argued that central to countering terrorism, is practices good governance and engages in the necessary weakening of the crime-terror intelligence sharing and related cooperation nexus through identifying and curtailing the with bordering states. It is also important to sources of finance for local terrorist groups. It harden the maritime space in the tri-border is proposed that countries need to move region of south Philippines, east Malaysia and beyond neglecting the crime-terror nexus, to Sulawesi, Indonesia. help enhance existing legislation and engage in training and capacity building to effectively Next, Ramesh Balakrishnan analyses the counter terrorism at both the national and crime-terror nexus in different parts of India regional levels. arguing that it occurs in four different forms: alliances, operational motivations, First, Rommel C. Banlaoi discusses the 31 convergence and the black hole. According to July Lamitan bombing in Basilan province in the author, India’s proximity to heroin Southern Philippines by the so-called Islamic producers and exporters and the regional drug State (IS) against the background of the trade through overland routes and sea has terrorism threat in the region. The authorities facilitated the crime-terror nexus in the country. initially denied IS presence in the first terrorist India is countering the challenge of the crime- attack in which an alleged Moroccan national terror nexus through a combination of policing weaponised a van in Southern Philippines. and prosecution as well as military force, Overall, the article traces IS networks in the counter -insurgency (COIN) operations and Philippines, links to the Abu Sayyaf Group legal mechanisms. The author suggests that (ASG) and efforts to create a wilayah through India can further improve and enhance its associated groups and affiliates, specifically responses to the crime-terror nexus through Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Volume 9, Issue 4 | April 2017 2 Editorial Note Terrorist Threat in the Philippines and the Crime-Terror Nexus restructuring and provision of better training facilities for its state police forces. Finally, Farhan Zahid discusses the structural and functional relationship between criminal and terrorist groups in Pakistan and the country’s response to the strong nexus. The author opines that Pakistan’s India-centric Wsecurity policies, promotion of militant groups to fight proxy wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir during the 1990s, political patronage of criminal groups in places like Karachi, Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) presently part of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province contributed to the growth of the crime-terror nexus in Pakistan. To tackle the challenge of the crime- terror nexus, the Pakistani state has adopted a number of law-enforcement, legal and administrative measures at the federal and provincial level. These measures focus on countering smuggling, illegal cross border movements, banking crimes, narcotics, illegal financial transactions, and intelligence collection. The author recommends that strengthening the law enforcement forces and raising their training standards could also weaken the crime-terror nexus in Pakistan. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Volume 9, Issue 4 | April 2017 3 ADVISORY BOARD Dr. Rohan Gunaratna Dr. Kumar Ramakrishna Professor of Security Studies Associate Professor Head of International Centre for Political Head of Policy Studies & Coordinator of Violence and Terrorism Research National Security Studies Programme Dr. Jolene Jerard Dr. Fernando Reinares Research Fellow Director, Program on Global Terrorism, Deputy Head of Elcano Royal Institute Professor of Security International Centre for Political Studies, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Violence and Terrorism Research Madrid, Spain W Dr. Stephen Sloan Professor Emeritus, Dr. John Harrison The University of Oklahoma Associate Editor Lawrence J. Chastang, Journal of Transportation Security Distinguished Professor of Terrorism Stud- ies, The University of Central Florida EDITORIAL BOARD Editor-in-Chief Sara Mahmood Associate Editor Abdul Basit Editor Vijayalakshmi Menon Copy Editors Jennifer Dhanaraj Sylvene See Design and Layout Okkie Tanupradja The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and not of ICPVTR, RSIS, NTU or the organisations to which the authors are affiliated. Articles may not be reproduced without prior permission. Please contact the editors for more information at [email protected]. The editorial team also welcomes any feedback or comments. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Volume 9, Issue 4 | April 2017 4 The Lamitan Bombing and Terrorist Threat in the Philippines The Lamitan Bombing and Terrorist Threat in the Philippines Rommel C. Banlaoi The 2018 Lamitan van bombing that occurred While IS claimed responsibility for the in Basilan province marked a turning point in bombing through an official statement by the counterterrorism in Southern Philippines. The Amaq News Agency, the AFP was quick to Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have state that no credible evidence points to IS’ since confirmed with ‘an 80% chance’ that the involvement in the attack. The AFP argued 31 July blast was carried out by a Moroccan that IS only took the credit for propaganda national.1 The attack also marked the first ever purposes.3 AFP has identified the Abu Sayyaf utilisation of a van with explosives in Southern Group (ASG), under the leadership of Puruji Philippines in a suicide terrorist attack. It Indama, as the mastermind of the attack.4 further highlights that the threat of the so- However, in a later statement the AFP did not called Islamic State (IS) persists despite the discount IS’ involvement in the bombing.5 The liberation of Marawi City from pro-IS AFP’s ambiguous statements on the Lamitan elements. If the IS threat is not sufficiently bombing reflect a lack of clarity in dealing with recognised, counter-terrorism measures will the situation or its lack of transparency. This not be as effective. only serves to undermine the threat that IS poses to the Philippines. Introduction The Link Between IS and ASG On 31 July, a van exploded at a military checkpoint in Lamitan City of Basilan AFP’s dismissal of IS’ involvement indicates province. Occurring eight months after the an absence of a holistic understanding government declared the defeat of IS in regarding the attack. It ignores the fact that Marawi City, the terrorist attack killed ten and ASG in Basilan and IS have been working injured five others. The van carried an closely together. Since 2014, the ASG in improvised explosive device (IED) made of Basilan has been operating
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