The Indonesia– Philippines–Malaysia Border Region

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The Indonesia– Philippines–Malaysia Border Region 5. Rice & ransoms: the Indonesia– Philippines–Malaysia border region ‘So long as the seas have no fence, it will not stop’, an interviewee prophesised, referring to smuggling in the border region of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, where all the borders are in the sea. The area is large and includes many small islands, which makes it difficult to patrol. The region also has its share of non-state armed actors. In Mindanao, in the south of the Philippines, organised non-state armed groups fight for more regional autonomy for the Moro people. In Indonesia, more extremist networks, some linked to the Islamic State, conduct attacks that are often directed against civilians. The region also has groups like the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) that are nominally political but, as Gutierrez writes, ‘better understood as a network of dangerous criminal entrepreneurs, similar to an armed mob’ (2016, p.184) than a non-state armed group with political motives. As the border region is large, this chapter uses two case studies (Figure 5.1): in the east, the route connecting Mindanao in the Philippines, Sabah in Malaysia and North Kalimantan in Indonesia; in the west, the route connecting Mindanao in the Philippines and North Sulawesi in Indonesia. I conducted research in Indonesia’s North Kalimantan (Nunukan) and North Sulawesi (Manado, Tahuna, Bitung) and in Mindanao (Davao, Zamboanga, Cotabato) in the Philippines, in April 2018 and in May–June 2018. In the east, between Mindanao and North Sulawesi, local people from the Philippines and Indonesia cross the border on a regular basis, particularly for fishing. Both licit and illicit goods are smuggled between the countries on the same route. The illicit goods smuggled include the weapons that are used for some of the attacks in Indonesia and are imported from the Philippines. However, less people smuggling happens on this route, because the distance between Indonesia and the Philippines is comparatively far, and because there are few pull factors for migrant workers, who tend to consider Malaysia to be a more attractive destina- tion for work. 102 Florian Weigand - 9781789905205 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 10/06/2021 12:22:49PM via free access Rice & ransoms 103 Indonesia–Philippines–Malaysia border region Figure 5.1 Florian Weigand - 9781789905205 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 10/06/2021 12:22:49PM via free access 104 Conflict and transnational crime In the west, between North Kalimantan, Sabah and Sulu, where small islands are close together and boats can easily make stops on the way, the smuggling activities are more diverse. Daily consumption goods such as rice are smuggled from Malaysia to the Philippines as well as to Indonesia. Migrant workers cross from Indonesia into Malaysia to work on the palm oil plantations. In addition, there are more irregular border crossings from and into the Philippines in this border area and non-state armed groups that do not control territory use it to smuggle fighters. The Philippines has proven a safe haven and space for training for members of armed groups from both Indonesia and Malaysia. BACKGROUND: A BRIEF HISTORY OF ARMED CONFLICT IN THE REGION Armed Conflict in Mindanao The south of the Philippines, particularly Mindanao, the country’s second biggest island, has been a hotspot for conflict since the late 1960s. While Christians dominate the country, comprising more than 90% of Filipinos, a third of Mindanao’s population is Muslim, commonly termed Moro people. Islam arrived in the Philippines in the thirteenth or fourteenth century, several hundred years before the arrival of Spanish Catholics, and sultanates such as Sulu and Maguindanao were estab- lished. A number of these sultanates remained independent until the USA colonised the Philippines. The colonial government offered free land to Christian Filipinos who would resettle in Mindanao beginning in 1912, creating the intended effect of establishing a Christian majority (Hernandez, 2017). For example, the independent sultanate Sulu (Figure 5.2) only became part of the then US colony of the Philippines in 1915. By 1878, the Sulu Sultanate had handed over a part of its territory, Sabah, to the British for an annual amount of 5,000 Malayan dollars (an amount that was raised to 5,300 in 1903). Sabah has become a flashpoint because of its particular history, and the question of whether the deal was a lease or the territory was ceded remains controversial to this day. While the territory was ‘ceded’ according to the British version of the contract, it was only leased according to the Sulu version. Sabah gained independence from the British in 1963 and became a part of Malaysia. However, the Philippines, after gaining independence from the USA, claimed that Sabah was part of the Philippines as the legal successor of the Sulu Sultanate (e.g. Republic Florian Weigand - 9781789905205 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 10/06/2021 12:22:49PM via free access Rice & ransoms 105 of the Philippines, 1968). Meanwhile, Malaysia continued to pay an annual fee of MYR 5,300, which they called ‘cession money’, to the heirs of the Sulu Sultan, a practice that continues to this day (Lee Brago, 2015). Figure 5.2 Sabah and the Sultanate of Sulu1 In 1968, a group of Moro from Sulu were recruited into a paramilitary unit and received military training, financed by the government of the Philippines, as part of a secret operation called ‘Merdeka’, later renamed ‘Jabidah’, to destabilise Sabah and justify a Filipino military intervention. For much discussed but unknown reasons, however, the army killed at least ten and possibly as many as 68 of the Moro recruits and no one was held accountable (see e.g. Asani, 1985; Rodell, 2015). What became known as the ‘Jabidah Massacre’ led to the creation of the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM; later renamed the Mindanao Independence Movement), which sought to establish ‘Bangsamoro’, a nation of Moro. The MIM was a predominantly non-violent movement Florian Weigand - 9781789905205 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 10/06/2021 12:22:49PM via free access 106 Conflict and transnational crime and disbanded when its leader joined the government through negoti- ations with President Ferdinand Marcos in 1970 (Stanford University, 2015a). However, Malaysia then started to provide arms to Moros and, in 1972, former members of the MIM’s youth division established the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) (ibid.). In September 1972, Marcos established martial law, which weakened the influence of non-violent Moro groups and empowered armed groups, including the MNLF (ibid.). Due to the conflict, by 1976, 120,000 people had been killed, 100,000 people had fled to Malaysia and another one million people had been internally displaced (USIP, 2005, p.4). Backed by Libya, the MNLF quickly became the dominant armed group, fighting for a separate state on the basis of nationalist (rather than religious) claims (Stanford University, 2015a). The group was funded through foreign actors, including Libya, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, and demanded ‘zakat’, a religious obligation to share wealth, as a form of tax locally in the areas it influenced (ibid.). In 1976, Libya mediated the so-called ‘Tripoli Agreement’ between the MNLF and the government of the Philippines, in which Marcos committed to creating an autonomous area for the Moro people within the country (ibid.). However, the government did not implement the agree- ment directly, and instead held a referendum in the affected provinces (ibid.). Because the Moro people only constituted a majority in a few provinces, it resulted in two small disconnected semi-autonomous areas, that became the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 1989. Dissatisfied, the MNLF took up arms again in 1977 (ibid.). Also dissatisfied with the result, a group later termed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) split off from the MNLF the same year, demanding a stronger focus on Islam. MILF’s popular support grew steadily as it provided effective governance in the areas it controlled, while its armed wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), conducted bombings infrequently to illustrate its strength to the outside world. The MILF continued to collect zakat and applied rigid Islamic principles, governed in a participatory manner and provided government services (Adam, 2018; Stanford University, 2015b). It gained legitimacy through its religious ideology that reflected the ideal of socioeconomic equality, positioning the MILF in opposition to a government and elites that were perceived as corrupt (Adam, 2018, p.20). In 1996 the MNLF signed a peace agreement with the government that expanded the territory of ARMM, promised development and investments, and integrated MNLF fighters into the Filipino police force. Florian Weigand - 9781789905205 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 10/06/2021 12:22:49PM via free access Rice & ransoms 107 However, ARMM and its administration were widely seen as corrupt and inefficient. Interviewees described ARMM as a ‘kingdom in the clouds’, with little control over local governance, dependent on funds allocated by the central government.2 The MILF became the dominant armed group that channelled continued discontent. In the years that followed, the government pursued varying strategies towards MILF, resulting in more violent and more peaceful phases. Four in ten households in Central Mindanao were displaced between 2000 and 2010 (Vinck & Bell, 2011). Most displacement was internal but it did spur emigration, primarily to Malaysia. In 2012 and 2014, the MILF and the government signed agreements to establish a new region with more autonomy called ‘Bangsamoro’ to replace ARMM.3 The agreements gave the government of Bangsamoro the right to tax its citizens directly and to retain 75% of tax revenue, passing the rest on to the central government. But the passage of the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), which would have implemented the agreements, was delayed.
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