Democratization and Violence Interlinked?

DEMOCRATIZATION AND VIOLENCE INTERLINKED?

PRESENTING A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN MYANMAR AND THE CONFLICT IN RAKHINE STATE FROM 2011 TO 2018

Wetenschappelijke verhandeling Aantal woorden: 26.823

Anaïs Goos

Stamnummer: 01611354

Promotor: Prof. dr. Jeroen Adam Copromotor: Prof. dr. Koenraad Bogaert

Masterproef voorgelegd voor het behalen van de graad master in de richting Conflict en Development

Academiejaar: 2017-2018

Table of Contents

Table of Contents ...... 2 Abstract ...... 4 Chapter One: Introduction ...... 5 1.1 Introduction ...... 5 1.2 Problem statement ...... 6 1.3 Aim and objectives of the research ...... 8 1.4 Research question(s) ...... 10 1.5 Methodology ...... 10 Chapter Two: Theoretical framework ...... 12 2.1 The concept of democratization and internal instability ...... 12 2.2 Democratization, political mobilization and communal violence ...... 15 2.3 Democratization and active exclusion by the state ...... 17 2.4 Political exclusion: an incentive for violence ...... 19 2.5 Electoral violence ...... 20 2.6 Conclusion ...... 20 Chapter Three: Methodology ...... 23 3.1 Case selection ...... 23 Why Myanmar? ...... 23 Why Rakhine State? ...... 25 3.2 Working method ...... 27 Chapter Four: Myanmar’s political transition ...... 29 4.1 Historical background ...... 29 4.2 The start of the democratization process ...... 30 4.3 The opposition enters the political game ...... 32 4.4 First free and fair general parliamentary elections ...... 32 Chapter Five: Analysis of the increase in violence in Rakhine State ...... 35 5.1 Hate speech, extreme nationalism and political mobilization ...... 35 Political actors and their mobilization in Rakhine State ...... 37 Two extreme Buddhist nationalist groups: The 969 Movement and MaBaTha ...... 40

The military and Buddhist (Rakhine) Nationalists: allies in anti-Muslim violence ...... 45 5.2 Active discrimination of Rohingya by the Myanmar government ...... 46 Discriminatory laws and policies ...... 47 Disenfranchisement ...... 50 Violence aimed against Rohingya ...... 51 (Forced) Relocation to remote regions and IDP camps ...... 52 Incitement and encouragement of hatred ...... 54 5.3 The ARSA-attacks: The result of political exclusion? ...... 56 A new Muslim insurgency ...... 56 ARSA: a new actor in Rakhine’s political landscape ...... 57 Chapter Six: Conclusion ...... 60 Bibliography ...... 63

Abstract

Deze masterproef analyseert of er een link bestaat tussen het democratiseringsproces in Myanmar en de toename van geweld in Rakhine State, een deelstaat in het westen van het land. Hierbij wordt enerzijds onderzocht wat het belang is van identiteitsframes en de mobilisering ervan en anderzijds of de democratisering ook nieuwe types van geweld genereert. Myanmar is wereldwijd een van de jongste experimenten met democratie. Sinds de start van de democratisering wordt het land echter geconfronteerd met een stijging van geweld in bepaalde regio's. In Rakhine State lopen de spanningen hoog op tussen Rakhine boeddhisten en Rohingya moslims. Bovendien is er een toename in staatsgeweld en -discriminatie waarneembaar, daar het Birmese leger rechtstreeks deelneemt aan de vijandelijkheden en de overheid een beleid van actieve discriminatie tegen de Rohingya voert. Deze actieve (politieke) uitsluiting heeft gezorgd voor een gewelddadige reactie vanuit de Rohingya bevolking. Deze masterproef toont, aan de hand van een literatuurstudie, aan dat al deze dimensies van het conflict kunnen gelinkt worden aan het democratiseringsproces omwille van drie redenen. In de eerste plaats zorgt een toename in politieke competitie voor een politieke mobilisatie van verschillende groepen en identiteiten. Hierbij wordt beroep gedaan op etnisch nationalisme, moslimhaat en Rakhine grieven. Groepen worden zo tegen elkaar opgezet wat leidt tot een toename in communaal geweld. Ten tweede, wordt er gedurende het democratiseringsproces bepaald wie wel en niet tot de Burmese natie behoort. Dit leidt tot de actieve uitsluiting van bepaalde (minderheids)groepen door de staat, wat zich manifesteert in actieve discriminatie en zelfs genocidaal geweld. Tenslotte, kan worden aangetoond dat de uitgesloten groep overgaat tot geweld als een reactie op de (politieke) uitsluiting en met als doel te worden opgenomen in de natie.

Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Myanmar, the Southeast Asian country formerly known as Burma1, is one of the world’s youngest experiments with democracy. The country gained independence from British rule in 1948 and installed a democracy from that moment on. Fourteen years later however, this democracy got destroyed by a largely bloodless coup and turned into a dictatorship. For decades, the country was known for its military oppression. Visible reform in Myanmar dates from 2011, when the military junta succumbed to domestic and international pressure. In the space of no more than a few months overt military rule was dismantled, a quasi-civilian government took office and top political leaders made public commitments to gradual political change (Holliday, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2011).

When Myanmar’s military junta announced its democratization plans, the international community celebrated. After decades of civil war, authoritarianism and isolation, Burma was finally going to enter a process of democratization and development. All the international praise and optimism for Myanmar’s transition soon watered down, as the country became world news in 2012, when unexpected Buddhist pogroms arose against a Muslim minority in Rakhine State. This seriously strained intercommunal relations. It generated feelings of insecurity in Buddhist and Muslim communities but had the biggest impact on the latter. The conflict hardened anti-Muslim sentiment and led to an increase in Buddhist nationalism, spread by radical Buddhist nationalist groups, like the 969 movement and MaBaTha, and extremist monks. There were multiple cases of anti-Muslim violence across the country the following years, as well as nationalist lobbying for four “race and religion” laws widely seen as targeting Muslims (International Crisis Group, 2012, 2016a; M.J. Walton & Hayward, 2014).

After the first free and fair elections in Myanmar three years later, the whole world was holding its breath as it waited to see if the existing regime would accept a peaceful transfer of power to the National League

1 The ruling military junta changed the country's name from Burma to Myanmar, or, more specifically, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, in 1989, a year after thousands were killed in the suppression of a popular uprising. Rangoon, the capital, became Yangon. Some countries recognized this change, but others, such as the US and the UK, did not. As both names are used in the country – Burma is more popular, Myanmar is more literary – the decision was rooted more in a desire to show disapproval for the noxious regime. Because this research does not want to take a position in this, both terms will be used interchangeably.

for Democracy (NLD), and sighed with great relief as they did so. However, the question remained whether the ongoing democratization would also bring peace to Rakhine State and Myanmar as a whole. Only one year later, the answer appeared to be no, when Rakhine got confronted with a new phenomenon, the emergence of an armed Muslim group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). In reaction to attacks from this group, the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military, began a major counter-insurgency operation. Instead of attempting to bring the attackers to justice, the operation morphed into a large-scale brutal ethnic cleansing campaign against the Rohingya as a whole (HRW, 2018a; International Crisis Group, 2016a). Unlike the events of 2012, these operations are unambiguously a form of state violence (Cheesman, 2017a). They led to one of the most catastrophically fast refugee exoduses in modern times. Almost 700,000 of the estimated 1,1 million Rohingya have fled to neighboring Bangladesh to escape mass killings, sexual violence, arson, and other brutal violence amounting to crimes against humanity and more than 200,000 Rohingya are internally displaced (Amnesty International, 2018b; HRW, 2018a; OCHA, 2018; The World Bank, 2018; UN, 2018). Today, the exodus of Rohingya is still ongoing and the crisis is threatening Myanmar’s stability and that of Bangladesh and the region as a whole (International Crisis Group, 2017b).

1.2 Problem statement

As appears from the above, Myanmar’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy is notoriously difficult and violent. Since the start of the political transformation in 2011, Myanmar has been troubled by an upsurge in extreme Buddhist nationalism, anti-Muslim hate speech, deadly communal violence, Muslim insurgencies and Rohingya persecution by the Tatmadaw (International Crisis Group, 2013, 2016a, 2017a). While the country has struggled with a lot of socio-economic challenges related to its political transition, the increase in violence has taken center stage since 2012 (M.J. Walton & Hayward, 2014).

Tensions between Rakhine State’s (and mostly Buddhist) majority and the Rohingya (mostly Muslim) minority are far from novel, neither is the discrimination, persecution and oppression of Rohingya. Myanmar has a long history of communal tensions, which was allowed to simmer and was at times exploited, under military rule. But since the violent conflicts in 2012, the situation for both the Rohingya and the Rakhine has deteriorated sharply and today International Crisis Group describes the conflict as more violent and hopeless than ever (International Crisis Group, 2013, 2017b). Riots take place on a regular basis and a gigantic refugee crisis of Rohinya has arisen. Waves of violence have continued to break out, with a peak in October 2016 when attacks by ARSA on border posts in northern Rakhine State triggered a security clearance operation against the Muslim minority. The current violence is different from

anything in Burma’s history of communal conflicts because of its scale and level of atrocity and its involvement of the state. This has not happened before, or rather it has never impressed itself on the public awareness to this extent. The violence forms a serious threat for the prospects of stability and development in the region and has serious implications for Myanmar as a whole (International Crisis Group, 2016a; Wade, 2017).

This seems contradictory because Myanmar is undergoing a transition towards democracy and last year, marked the country’s first full year under a democratically elected civilian government (HRW, 2018a). According to a classic liberal representation, it is precisely democracy’s aim to canalise violence and therefore it is seen as a viable way towards achieving more security and peace within, as well as between states (Vorrath & Krebs, 2009).

Myanmar’s democratization did give rise to some positive developments, including the adoption of legislation concerning the organization of demonstrations, the abolishment of media censorship, the ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the engagement in some efforts to resolve past land confiscation cases and the enactment of minor reforms to laws regulating speech and assembly. But despite the hope and promise of recent years, it did not succeed in the canalization of violence. The government has shown an increasing indifference to human dignity and basic rights. It used repressive laws to prosecute activists, journalists and critics for peaceful expression considered critical of the government or military, which stayed, despite the emergence of civilian rule, the primary power-holder in Myanmar (HRW, 2018a, 2018b). Peace processes with different ethnic armed groups were no great success. Instead, the fighting intensified in some regions, resulting in an increase in human rights violations against civilians and forced displacement, primarily carried out by government forces (HRW, 2018a). The violence ranged from localized, fleeting, inter-group violence, to large-scale, apparently well-organized, state-supported killing and destruction of property of a targeted group (Cheesman, 2017b).

The democratization process in Myanmar has thus failed to banish violence, on the contrary, it seemed to have strengthened ethnic polarization between Muslim minorities and Buddhists. This has prompted domestic and international concern. The assumption that the move towards democracy would be the solution to the country’s problems has to be reconsidered, as it seems like the two processes, democratization and the increase of internal violence, are interlinked.

1.3 Aim and objectives of the research

Enthusiasm about the peaceful impact of democracy peaked at the end of the Cold War and with the ‘third wave’ of democratization in the late eighties and early nineties. However, the many unsuccessful attempts at establishing peace by democracy have recently raised a new discussion. Democratization turned out to be much more difficult than anticipated by its Western promoters. A series of articles have introduced a more cautionary note into the debate about the relationship between democracy, democratization, peace and conflict, pointing to the “dark side of democracy” as an example (Cederman, Hug, & Wenger, 2008; Mann, 2005). This dissertation places itself in the midst of this debate.

On the one side, democracy, and as a consequence any movement towards democracy is seen as conducive to peace. Findings show that democracies do not fight each other in interstate wars and have less frequent domestic armed conflicts (Hegre, 2014). On the other side, there are authors stating that democratization or regime change can have destabilizing consequences (Cederman et al., 2008; Hegre, 2014; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch, 2001; Horowitz, 1993; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995b). Much research suggests that democratization may affect the risk of conflict between states (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995b; Ward & Gleditsch, 1998) and more recent research examines how regime transitions and changes toward greater democracy affect the likelihood of instability and conflict within states (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 2013; Cederman, Hug, & Krebs, 2010). This research is a contribution to the latter.

Recent history indeed shows that democratic changes can lead to internal problems, such as warlike nationalism and violent internal conflict. Most literature in this area considers how the level and timing of democracy affects the outbreak of internal conflict (Mansfield & Snyder, 2007b). It tries to investigate if the necessary institutional framework is established to deal with the turbulence that inevitably comes with regime transition. This dissertation however focuses directly on the process of democratization itself and its conflict-inducing mechanisms. It does not focus on Myanmar’s state capacity and institutions and its link to internal violence. Neither is it going to answer the question whether or not Myanmar was ready for a democratization process. It examines whether the democratization process itself has created conditions for an increase in internal violence and discrimination of minorities in Myanmar, more specific in Rakhine State and, if so, why. This research focuses thus on the understanding of the destabilizing factors and mechanisms in democratic transitions.

In particular, it focuses on how the process of democratization entails a political mobilization of different groups on the basis of identity. The dissertation investigates how boundaries between groups have been drawn during the process of democratization and how this can provoke new types of violence. Moreover, it explores if and how the Burmese government tries to reconcile different communal groups peacefully to a national identity and to its nation-building project.

International organizations and media have perceived and tended to portray the situation in Rakhine State as a consequence of religious, racial and cultural differences, referred to in this research as communal differences. These communal differences are claimed to be at the root of many of the world’s conflicts within states. A number of eminent political scientists have seen diverse societies as disadvantaged when it comes to democratization. Regimes with deep ethnic or religious cleavages are unlikely to seek full democracy because of the mistrust that exists between the groups (Holliday, 2008; Horowitz, 1993; Lijphart, 1977; M.J. Walton & Hayward, 2014). Communal conflicts have indeed played a central role in many democratizing states (Piombo, 2009). At the same time, however, closer inspection reveals surprisingly scanty evidence for the notion that communal fractionalization destabilizes democracy and countervails open politics (Fish & Brooks, 2004; Houle, 2018). The mere presence of communal differences cannot possibly be a sufficient condition for the emergence of political or social strife. This research tries to contribute to this debate by showing that ethnic, or better, communal diversity is only associated with violence and internal instability when it plays an active role. It is not diversity per se that destabilizes and leads to violence, but the politicization of that diversity (Houle, 2018).

Most explanations of violence are based on clashes in mature democracies, and are therefore silent on the dynamics at work during democratic transition. The political mobilization of different identities is often missed by the literature on democratization and violence. However, like this dissertation will demonstrate democratization itself provides opportunities for mobilization and this can be at the root of internal instability. That is to say, mobilization possibly creates incentives to whether or not resort to violence. This way, this research tries to fill a gap in literature on political mobilization of identities during regime change.

1.4 Research question(s)

Based on the above objectives, the following questions guide the research:

Is there a link between the democratization process in Myanmar and the increase of violence in Rakhine State?

If yes, how and why is political mobilization of identity frames a strategy for different actors?

If yes, is there a link with the occurrence of new types of violence?

1.5 Methodology

This dissertation is a hypothesis-testing case study. It questions the link between democratization, violence and identity mobilization in the theoretical framework and puts it to the test using the democratization process in Myanmar, Rakhine State, as a case study. To this end, it will carefully analyze the processes involved in the democratic transition in Myanmar and the simultaneous development of the conflict in Rakhine State.

The research examines the timeline of events in Myanmar, Rakhine State from 2011 to 2018 as a period of democracy building in Myanmar. Yet, when trying to understand the conflict in Myanmar, it is important to understand the historical and social underpinnings of it. Therefore, it is necessary to briefly discuss the historical background of the political transition. The focus of the dissertation lies, however, directly on studying and understanding the democratization itself. The aim is therefore not to analyze the meaning or definition of a genuine democracy, nor to determine if Myanmar's democratization process is complete (which it is clearly not).

Rakhine State in Myanmar is used as a case study because of several reasons, which will be thoroughly explained in chapter three. The conflict in Rakhine State is very complex and can be approached from different angles. The conflict has a tripartite nature, meaning that there are three important actors participating in the conflict, namely the Buddhist Rakhine, the Rohingya Muslim and Myanmar’s government. The research analyzes in particular the reaction of these actors to the process of democracy building in Rakhine State. In addition, the conflict has three dimensions. In the first place, it is a communal

conflict between different (ethnic minority) groups within the country, namely the Rohingya Muslims and the Rakhine Buddhists. Both groups have a history of separatist movements in relation to the central government. Their grievances are similar – including longstanding discrimination by the state, a lack of political control over their own affairs, economic marginalization, human rights abuses and restrictions on language and cultural expression (International Crisis Group, 2014). In the second place, the violence has been accompanied by rising intolerance and anti-Muslim rhetoric, spread by radical Buddhist nationalist groups and extremist monks. The conflict can therefore be placed within a broader framework of increased fear and hatred against Muslims in Myanmar (International Crisis Group, 2013). At last, it is a conflict between the government, or more specifically the Tatmadaw, and a particular Muslim community, the Rohingya. The latter have always been persecuted by the state, but since October 2016, a part of the Muslim population is fighting back with the emergence of ARSA (International Crisis Group, 2016a).

This research tries to link these three dimensions of the conflict in Rakhine State to Myanmar's political transition, by drawing on a literature study. In the theoretical framework, the literature consists primarily of academic research articles and books. A large part of the theoretical discussion is built on political science literature of Mansfield & Snyder, Horowitz, Cederman, Gleditsch & Hug, Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug and Mann (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013; Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 2013; Horowitz, 1993; Mann, 2005; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995a, 1995b, 2007a). Although their reasoning is slightly different, it always comes down to the importance of mobilizing groups, and the in- or exclusion of those groups in the process of democratization. In the other chapters, a lot of grey literature is used, ranging from policy briefs, to reports and contemporary newspaper articles. Mainly reports from Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International and International Crisis Group were consulted. It has been important to stay updated on the current situation because this dissertation is about a contemporary phenomenon and changes may have been taken place during the time of writing. Therefore, there was a preference to work with reports of organizations working on the ground in this research. To avoid the risk of bias, reports and newspapers have been checked with multiple sources.

The research is divided into 6 chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research and presents the problem, aim and objectives, research questions and methodology. This work proceeds by demonstrating a theoretical framework in Chapter 2. This is followed by Chapter 3, where the case selection and working method will be further explained. Chapter 4 gives a literature review on Myanmar’s background and political transition. The analysis in Chapter 5 studies the increase in violence in Rakhine State during Myanmar’s political transition by applying the theoretical frameworks. The final section draws conclusions based on the preceding analysis.

Chapter Two: Theoretical framework

The following section introduces the theoretical framework that will be used to analyze the increase of violence in Rakhine State. This case transcending chapter explores what political science literature has to say about the risks of expanding democratic governance. Hereby the focus lies on some theoretical debates about the concepts of democratization, political mobilization, communal violence, political exclusion and electoral violence. This chapter only provides a selection of the literature on these concepts and does not intend to provide a complete overview. Different academic voices in this research field are set against and connected with each other. In the first part of this chapter a brief look is taken at the concept of democratization, followed by an overview of authors who state there is a link between democratization and internal instability. In the following sections of this chapter the dissertation focuses entirely on this hypothesis that democracy may trigger internal instability and it tries to provide four concrete reasons why democratization can lead to conflict. The chapter is concluded by a critical summary of the theoretical framework.

2.1 The concept of democratization and internal instability

Democracy is an elusive and contested term that lacks a universally accepted definition. As briefly mentioned in chapter one, the focus in this research lies directly on the process of democratization and not on the meaning of the concept of democracy itself. A glance at the vast literature on democratization reveals that there are many different ways of understanding the concept. Democratization has variously been defined as a discourse, a demand, a set of institutional changes, a form of elite domination, a political system dependent on popular control, an exercise in power politics and a demand for global solidarity. It has been conceptualized as a discrete set of sequential changes achieved in a few years, as a series of open- ended struggles and a transformation of deep structures, or as an unobtainable utopia (Grugel & Bishop, 2014). Several authors invoke the concept of political opening, referring to a varied set of processes that modify and expand access to power. Some of the processes constitute a simple liberalization of the political process, such as removing bans on political organization and civil associations, others constitute broad- based regime change and formal political transition, in which fundamental aspects of a state’s structure are renegotiated (Piombo, 2009). Also the "drivers" of democratization have been understood variously to be middle or working class, urban groups, certain local or sub-regional elites, excluded groups seeking a restructuring of power and voice, business groups, unions, et cetera (Grugel & Bishop, 2014). Unfortunately, democratization seems as essentially contested as democracy itself.

Studies of democratization from the 1970s until the early 1990s presumed that the meaning of democratization was self-evident: a shift from single party, personal or dynasty rule to an accountable and representative government (Grugel & Bishop, 2014). Also more recently, democratization is described as consisting of progress towards a more rule-based, consensual and participatory type of politics (Whitehead, 2002). Although some countries successfully made a transition to democracy, many democratization efforts failed to result in complete transitions. Using the term democratization or democratic transition can therefore be misleading because the transition does not necessarily lead to a genuine democracy. While enjoying more democratic freedoms than they used to, many recently transitioned countries have stagnated or even relapsed, returning to some form of semi-authoritarian or semi-democratic system (Hegre et al., 2001). Some transitions only lead to formal or procedural democracy where rights and freedoms only exist on paper. In other words, they do not end in a consolidation of a hypothetically perfect liberal democracy (Grugel & Bishop, 2014). Therefore, it is desirable to use a broad definition of democratization in this research. It is best understood as a complex, long-term, dynamic and open-ended process towards a (more) democratic state instead of a process that in any way leads to a substantive democracy.

But almost irrespective of the exact definition, democratization aims at the exclusion or canalization of violence and conflict. It is expected to create a more accountable, legitimate and transparent government. Theoretically, it should render violence unnecessary, since all groups and individuals are now consulted on a regular basis to express their views and interests, and checks and balances are now in place (Schwarzmantel, 2010; Vorrath & Krebs, 2009). The spread of democracy will therefore lead to a more peaceful world. Deriving from this Western liberal democratic peace thesis arose a wave of democratization efforts where democracy promotion became a major part of the peace-building missions in conflict areas around the world (Cederman et al., 2008; Hegre et al., 2001; Paris, 2004).

Although the hypothesis that democracies do not go to war against each other has frequently received empirical support (Russett, 1994), the processes of change from an authoritarian regime to a more democratic regime can show very different characteristics. Conflict, or as Tilly (Tilly, 2000) calls it occasional shocks like conquest, confrontation, colonization or revolution, can not only be the starting point for democratization, democratization itself can even be the very cause of instability and war (Vorrath & Krebs, 2009).

Two influential articles by Mansfield and Snyder adopted the idea that in the early stages of democratization the risk of interstate war increases. In these articles they stress that countries do not

become democracies overnight, they go through a rocky transition, where mass politics mixes with authoritarian elite politics in a volatile way. In this phase countries become more aggressive and war-prone than states that undergo no change in regime like strong autocracies and consolidated democracies (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995a, 1995b).

More recent research examines how regime transitions and changes toward greater democracy affect the likelihood of internal instability and conflict. While the work of Mansfield and Snyder focuses almost exclusively on interstate wars, the basic theoretical argument applies equally well to intrastate wars (Cederman et al., 2010; Snyder, 2000). There are many authors who have pointed out that democratization or regime change can produce internal instability (Cederman et al., 2008; Hegre, 2014; Hegre et al., 2001; Horowitz, 1993; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995b). Sometimes, advances in democratization threaten peace and the compromises necessary for peace can sometimes restrict or defer democratization (Jarstad & Sisk, 2008). Even ultimately successful democratization processes have triggered considerable amounts of violence (Mann, 2005). Thus, democracy does not always have a conflict-reducing effect and processes of democratization are often inherently violent.

According to Hegre, the reason could be the existence of inherent contradictions involved in being neither fully democratic nor autocratic. Semi democracies are partly open, yet somewhat repressive. They invite protests, rebellion and other forms of public unrest. Repression leads to grievances that induce groups to take action and the openness allows them to organize and engage in activities against the regime. These contradictions imply a level of political incoherence, which is related to civil conflict (Hegre et al., 2001).

A transition from an authoritarian to a more democratic regime suddenly gives a voice to different (oppressed) groups through channels they did not have before, like elections, press and organizations. Deep, pent-up societal division and hatred, which was repressed by authoritarian rule, is now flaring up thanks to the lifting of authoritarian control and the democratization process. This can deter other groups and start a social strife. Some authors state that changes of opportunity structure in the political environment provide incentives for collective action (Snyder, 2000). It is however misleadingly shortsighted to say that democratic liberties alone are responsible for an intensification in internal instability and conflict.

Some authors explain the internal instability as a result of the fact that a state was not prepared properly for a democratization process. Rustow argues that successful democratization is more likely if it follows a series of well-defined steps (Rustow, 1970). Democratic sequencing theory builds on similar ideas. Before

opening up to free political competition, certain preconditions must be established to ensure stability in the transition. In other words, democracy must be limited or put off until the necessary institutional framework is established to control or facilitate the transition, whether this refers to strong political institutions, a functioning state bureaucracy or the rule of law. Without this basis, democracy is said to be likely to fail (Vorrath & Krebs, 2009). In this respect, Collier argues that the rule of law must be guaranteed before elections will help ensure peaceful competition over political power (Collier, 2009). Mansfield and Snyder make similar arguments and recommend that elections should be postponed until countries have reached a sufficient level of internal stability and capacity for democracy (Mansfield & Snyder, 2007b). Others have challenged this view and argue that early democratically held elections actually tend to stabilize politics (Birnir, 2006).

In the following titles, this dissertation will give four reasons why democratization can lead to an increase of internal violence. These reasons circulate around conflict-inducing mechanisms inherent to the process of democratization, among which an increase in political competition and a shift in the basic relationships that govern society. These mechanisms possibly lead to an increase in (ethnic) nationalism, attempts by elites to make the nation and its people coincide with ethnicity, political exclusion and electoral competition. This in turn can lead to instability and conflict. All these destabilizers are related to the importance of group identity. During the process of democratization, a political mobilization of different identities will take place, leading to in-or exclusion in or from the political system. As will become clear, this in-or exclusion can be an incentive to resort to violence.

2.2 Democratization, political mobilization and communal violence

Under this title, the dissertation will examine if and how the democratization process can lead to an increase in communal violence. This research gives preference to use the term communal violence instead of ethnic or religious violence, simply because this term is broader and consequently covers more cases. In that way, the question is left open as to what ascriptive attributes of identity led to the violence, be they ethnic, religious, linguistic, racial or otherwise (Cheesman, 2017b). Basically, communal violence is described as collective violence between citizens over communal identity (van Klinken, 2007). This category does not include economic or class warfare, fought primarily for reasons other than those concerned with ascribed identity. Nor does it include armed resistance to the state, be it short-lived, informally organized rebellion or sustained, formally organized insurgency, even when declared and undertaken in the name of a community of a type that might also be associated with communal violence.

Whereas violence in authoritarian regimes had a more separatist character and was more directed against the state and contesting state sovereignty, it is now relying on the state and its sovereignty. In the immediacy of communal violence, one or more affected communities ask for security, calling for police or military intervention, and tacitly, for the state to intervene on one side or the other (Cheesman, 2017b).

According to many scholars, heterogeneity poses a risk for democratization. Ethnic, religious or racial divisions divide society and make compromise and consensus difficult because of the distrust between groups. The other way around, they argue that democratization carries with it the possibility to exacerbate communal conflict (Beissinger, 2008; Horowitz, 1993). Communal violence has indeed characterized the Balkans, Indonesia, post-Saddam Iraq, Russia and a multitude of other countries facing a political transition. However, not all multi-ethnic liberalizing states have experienced communal conflict (Fish & Brooks, 2004; Piombo, 2009). Thus, the question remains, when does democratization cause (an increase in) communal violence and when does it not.

Periods of institutional and structural change, such as those that occur during democratization, alter the basic relationships that govern societies. Democratization entails an increase in political competition. A contest over national self-determination takes place as the fortunes of both elites and mass groups are shifting. The elites from the old regime are seeking strategies that will prevent their fall, while rising elites are trying to muscle in. Both are scrambling for allies among the newly aroused masses (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 2013; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995b, 2007a).

Increasing competitiveness may provide incentives for political actors to start a political mobilization to gain political support. Political mobilization can be defined as the process whereby political actors encourage people to participate in some form of political action. This can take on many different shapes. Political mobilizers typically persuade people to vote, petition, protest, rally, or join a political party, trade union or a politically active civic organization (Vermeersch, 2011).

During this mobilization, political actors appeal to group identities and often invoke nationalism deepening ethnic, religious, racial or other cleavages. Or like Mansfield and Snyder argue: rising nationalism often goes hand in hand with rising democracy. Group identities are thus often reflected in the political system and strengthen collective self-esteem. Political parties based on group identity allow people to differentiate themselves from others with a different background. This creates a sense of belonging but it can also create more division and segregation in society because it often unconsciously determines who belongs and who does not (Wimmer, 2002). It helps to define the lines between "the people" and their external enemies, who

become scapegoats. This strategy is particularly attractive to military elites, economic protectionists and ethnic entrepreneurs (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 2013; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995b, 2007a).

In ethnically divided societies, the invoked nationalism often has an ethnic character. Elites are forced to find new bases of power and often locate those in the ethnic bond. The need to hold on to political power or the need to gain political support may lead certain political actors to play the ethnic card and incite hostility towards other ethnic groups. In their attempt to mobilize supporters to win elections, elites emphasize group differences. Opposition groups often engage in similar behavior. Consequently, there is a strong risk of ethnic outbidding in political mobilization. This can lead to an increase in hostility and distrust between different groups and, eventually, lead to communal violence. In this way, politicians function as intermediaries and instigate communal violence (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 2013; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995b, 2007a).

Democratization itself has thus a conflict-inducing mechanism. However, ethnic diversity does not necessarily lead to the politicization of ethnicity. It is only when ethnicity is activated as a vehicle of political mobilization that it can cause instability. It is thus not the diversity per se that destabilizes the democratization process, it is the politicization of the differences between groups during the process of democratization that potentially causes instability (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 2013; Houle, 2018; Vermeersch, 2011).

2.3 Democratization and active exclusion by the state

Mann (2005) also warns about the dangers of nationalism when it is politicized. He agrees on the fact that as soon as a democratization process starts, politicians begin to mobilize voters along religious and ethnic lines. According to him, this cannot only lead to communal violence between different groups, but also to state violence against certain groups. In his argumentation he states that ethnic cleansing and nepotism may arise when democratization forces leaders to be more dependent on securing popular support. In his view, these are the rare yet omnipresent risks of a democratization process. He explains this as follows: “Democracy means rule by the people. But in modern times the people has come to mean two things. The first is what the Greeks meant by their word demos. This means the ordinary people, the mass of the population. So democracy is rule by the ordinary people, the masses. But in our civilization the people also means “nation” or another Greek term, ethnos, an ethnic group – a people that shares a common culture and sense of heritage, distinct from other peoples. But if the people is to rule in its own nation-state, and if

the people is defined in ethnic terms, then its ethnic unity may outweigh the kind of citizen diversity that is central to democracy. If such a people is to rule, what is to happen to those of different ethnicity? Answers have often been unpleasant – especially when one ethnic group forms a majority, for then it can rule “democratically” but also tyrannically.” (Mann, 2005 p. 3).

Thus, according to Mann, the dark side of democracy comes out when two notions of democracy, demos and ethnos, fall into conflict. Democratization has always carried with it the possibility that the majority tyrannies the minority, and this possibility has more ominous consequences in multi-ethnic environments, especially when one ethnic group forms a majority. If the people are to rule the state and if "the people" are defined in ethnic terms, then the ethnic unity outbalances diversity as a democratic value. Amid multi- ethnic societies the ideal of rule by the people begins to entwine the demos with the dominant ethnos, generating organic conceptions of the nation and the state. Consequently, both will be defined in ethnic terms. This creates pressure to cleanse other "out-groups", groups with a different ethnic origin (Mann, 2005). Regimes newly embarked upon democratization are more likely to commit murderous ethnic cleansing than stable authoritarian regimes. Demos and ethnos are supposed to become entangled, when authoritarian regimes weaken in multi-ethnic environments. Stable authoritarian regimes tend to govern by divide-and-rule, what leads them to seek to balance the demands of powerful groups, including ethnic ones (Mann, 2005).

The democratization process often involves attempts by political actors to make the demos coincide with ethnicity. Political actors define demos in narrow terms resulting in the exclusion of other ethnic groups. That way, a creation of "out-groups" finds place. A particular group is constructed as alien, not belonging to the nation. Or like Wade describes it: “In the tumult of the transition, broader demarcations of “us” and “them,” outsiders and sons of the soil, were forming” (Wade, 2017). Belonging to this out-group means not belonging to the people. The state itself proceeds to active exclusion or manipulates others to do so. This typically manifests through ethnic cleansing and other forms of active discrimination, intimidation, and nepotism (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 2013; Mann, 2005).

The aim of these efforts is to produce an essentially mono-ethnic citizen body and to create more favorable circumstances for particular ethnic groups at the expense of others. Exclusion of out-groups with the intention to serve the interest of (a) particular ethnic group(s) (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 2013; Mann, 2005). The result of democratization will be some form of an ethnically exclusive regime (Horowitz, 1993).

2.4 Political exclusion: an incentive for violence

In the beginning of this chapter it is stated that democratization aims at the exclusion or canalization of violence and conflict. This rested on the assumption that all groups have equal access to those channels of democratic politics, which makes violence unnecessary. But given the above explanations, it is clear that this is a highly idealized picture of democratic society. In many cases there will be groups who are not heard and are marginalized by the procedures of democratic politics (Schwarzmantel, 2010). In other words, the process of democratization itself carries with it the possibility to create groups that can be in- or excluded in or from the established channels of democratic politics. It is about access to power, about privileges that go with inclusion and the penalties that accompany exclusion. For, as the previous debate has shown, ethnic identity provides clear lines to determine who will be included and who will be excluded (Horowitz, 1993).

For the latter, the access to the state's central decision-making authority is limited or even blocked. This possibly creates grievances, promotes conflict and reduces the prospects of further democratization. Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013) have pointed at a correlation between political exclusion and conflict. They call this phenomenon political horizontal inequality. Exclusion from politics increases the chance of conflict. In other words, violence can stem from the alienation and disaffection of certain groups who are excluded from effective participation in the institutions of democratic systems (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013; Cederman et al., 2010).

Or like Scharzmantel states, if a certain group cannot get into the system, or if it is always denied an equal hearing, it could constitute a temptation to resort to violence as a means of asserting its identity, or making some public statement that its interests were being overlooked (Schwarzmantel, 2010). If groups are excluded or feel themselves excluded from democratic channels of participation, violent action may be the most attractive means of political action open to them. This chance is especially high when there is a total exclusion from politics or when there is still a lot of repression in the country. In this case, there is no room for a democratic form of expressing grievances (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug, 2013; Schwarzmantel, 2010). The risk is that in turn this may provoke an "equal and opposite" reaction from those holding state power: they will use violence as a means of repressing the violence of protest. Once again the objective of democratic politics to exclude violence or to make it unnecessary has failed (Schwarzmantel, 2010).

2.5 Electoral violence

Organizing elections itself can also shape incentives to resort to violence. Competitive elections play a central role in almost all definitions of democracy. Consequently, elections must be held at some point in any case of a transition from an autocratic to a democratic regime (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 2013).

In particular, violence may arise because of the results of elections, because of actual or perceived irregularities or when contenders reject the official election outcome (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 2013). Collier highlights that the losing party may instigate violence after the elections (Collier, 2009). Obviously, this applies to both ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts, but ethnic affiliation of individuals is much easier to be manipulated than other political allegiances. This makes it in turn simpler to target opponents in the aftermath of contested elections. The losing party is often, but not always, linked to former combatants in previous civil wars or to the old regime (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 2013). Central here is the question how an existing apparatus of an extremely violent or repressive nature mutates during democratization. It revolves around the resilience of such institutions, which do not allow themselves to be cut off by the organization of elections. Taking up arms after electoral loss may reignite ethnic civil wars (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 2013; Collier, 2009; Höglund, Jarstad, & Kovacs, 2009).

This mechanism is only relevant in competitive settings, that is, in elections where multiple candidates run for the same elected position. Cederman et.al. agree that there is a genuine tendency for competitive elections to precede conflict outbreaks, but these are primarily limited to the first two elections. But as explained earlier, in both competitive and non-competitive elections, there may exist groups that have been excluded from the electoral competition and thus excluded from any meaningful potential access to political power. Such exclusion is especially dangerous when it is supported by categorical markers such as a membership in ethnic groups (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Hug, 2013).

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter began with an introduction to the contested concept of democratization. Several authors agree upon the fact that democratization does not always lead to a genuine democracy and that the process of democratization can cause internal instability. A number of authors attribute this instability to the political opening that is accompanied by democratization. Others take into account the timing of the democratization process as a variable for whether or not the process will succeed. Though democratization is a worldwide

phenomenon, it is neither universal nor uniform in places where it occurs. Therefore it is very difficult to stick to ideal conditions for democratization. Every situation is different and context-related. The discussion about conditions for success or failure of particular democracies is very strongly linked to the question of which political institutions are most appropriate to resolve potential societal conflicts. Since this research does not aim to make policy recommendations guaranteeing democracy’s success, studying these conditions seems less relevant in this paper. In this sense democratization should be viewed as an infinite process that cannot be pinned down on various conditions.

The core of this chapter consisted of the identification and understanding of destabilizing factors and mechanisms in democratic transitions. The research tried to explain how these mechanisms and destabilizers express themselves and gave four examples of why democratization can lead to an increase in violence.

In the first place, it was demonstrated that democratization is often accompanied by intergroup clashes and a strengthening of certain communal identities. This is the result of a political mobilization of different identities. Amongst other communal features, ethnicity, religion and race can serve as convenient platforms through which to mobilize electoral support, and their relevance is a factor that is manipulated by those who seek power.

Periods of political opening create seemingly irresistible opportunities to mobilize different communal groups into political blocks. Democratization entails an increase in political competition. Often political actors try to find political support by favoring one group over another based on ethnicity, religion, or another origin. By doing so, political leaders hope to reach a wider range of voters. In this strategy, they emphasize group differences and try to incite hostility towards other groups. This way, they instigate communal violence, collective violence between citizens over communal identity. Violence will take place between different groups in this competition, and less between those groups and the state.

Sometimes the state itself will proceed to the active exclusion of certain population groups in the democratization process, or at least, it will try to manipulate others to do so. Political actors define demos in narrow terms resulting in the exclusion of other ethnic groups. This invokes ethnic cleansing and other forms of active discrimination. In other words, there is a possible increase of state violence against certain, often minority, groups. Due to dependence on popular support, the state produces an essentially mono- ethnic nation and creates more favorable circumstances for a particular group at the expense of others. This will result in an ethnically exclusive regime.

Thirdly, the political exclusion of certain communal groups can create an incentive for those groups to use violence. In this way, a transition to democracy can thus lead to a conflict increase if a certain group feels (more) excluded because of this transition. They resort to violence as a means of asserting their identity, or making some public statement that their interests were being overlooked. Violence is the most attractive means of political action open to them.

Lastly, the potential of electoral violence was shortly discussed. Violence can arise over the results of elections, because of actual or perceived irregularities or when contenders reject the official election outcome. Also the exclusion from electoral competition can lead to violence.

What we see in all these four cases is that social identities are translated into political ones. The process of democratization causes an active process of identity construction. This construction of identities relies largely on the actions of political actors. The transitional period generates a need to compete in elections and create new coalitions and support bases. To this extend, political agents define and redefine groups. Identity thus becomes a means for elites to manipulate the masses so that they can pursue their personal interests.

Identity is however not only integrated in the strategy or the actions of the state and its political actors; it is also integrated in the actions of excluded (often minority) groups. In my view, the process of democratization can therefore not be considered separately from the process of formation of social groups. The political transition can be described as a period of struggle between social groups for power and inclusion, a process of inclusion and exclusion where boundaries between groups have been drawn, erased and redrawn. Inherent to democracy is the issue of exclusion and inclusion.

This research considers seeing democratization as an inclusive historical path of nation building. The issue is how inclusive this process really is and how social groups are integrated into it. Inclusion into what Mann calls the demos is crucial for the success of the process of democratization. During the process of democratization, a sort of national identity is shaped because it determines who does and does not belong to the nation. It is about inclusion in the national community. The dynamic interaction of different actors during this process leads to tension and conflict.

Chapter Three: Methodology

In the following chapters, Rakhine State in Myanmar will be used as a hypothesis-testing case study for the above-cited theoretical framework. This chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, it is explained why Rakhine State is chosen as a case study. In the second part, the working method will be elaborated.

3.1 Case selection

Why Myanmar?

Myanmar or Burma is a sovereign state in Southeast Asia, bordered by China to its north and northeast, Thailand and Laos to its east and India and Bangladesh to its west. Myanmar is a country with an inherent complex plural society. Its capital city is Naypyidaw, and its largest city and former capital is Yangon (Rangoon). The country has a notable ethnic diversity; It is home to 135 officially designated ethnic communities (M.J. Walton & Hayward, 2014). About one third of Myanmar’s population belongs to ethnic minorities (Gravers, 2007). The majority ethnic group is Barman, with approximately 68 percent of the population. This leads to strong majority-minority tensions. Other major ethnic groups include the Shan (9 percent), Karen (7 percent), Rakhine (4 percent), Mon (2 percent), and Kachin (1.5 percent) (Lindblom, Marsh, Motala, & Munyan, 2015; M.J. Walton & Hayward, 2014). This ethnic diversity does not entail religious heterogeneity. The majority of the population is Buddhist. Muslims only make up about four percent of the population (Lindblom et al., 2015). There are different Muslims groups, such as Muslims of Indian origin living around the city of Yangon, Muslims of Chinese origin living in the north of the country and Rohingya2, living in western Myanmar (Hofman, 2015).

The country has been characterized by ethnic conflict and civil war since achieving independence in 1948. Following independence, all major ethnic minorities have engaged in some form of violent or non-violent movement against the central government with the objective of achieving autonomy and equal rights, and to defend themselves against what they perceived as a threat to their ethnic identity (Buchanan, Kramer, & Woods, 2013; Kipgen, 2015). Conflicts between ethnic groups have played a part in the unification of the country since independence up until today. To a significant extent, this was generated by the British colonial practice. Ethnic differences have been consolidated by the way the British controlled their

2 A predominantly Muslim minority

colonies. Whether intentionally or not, this model of colonial administration recognized ethnic, religious and cultural differences and contributed to the differences between (and the forming of) identities of several ethnic groups in Myanmar nowadays (Holliday, 2010). The British ruler embodied ethnicity and made religion an issue in Myanmar’s politics (South, 2008). Successive administrative reforms represented the colonial administration and reinforced the division between ethnic groups (Gravers, 1999; Prager Nyein, 2009; Stanford Politics, 2018). Myanmar never succeeded to unify, the nation and state building process was never effectively or fully completed (Nilsen, 2013; Prager Nyein, 2009).

In the late 2000s, Myanmar, of all Asian countries, appeared to be the least likely candidate for a democratic transition: The country was under military rule until 2010, economically deeply impoverished and with weak diplomatic links to the rest of the world. But today Myanmar is in the middle of a political transition and one of the most recent democratizing countries in the world. The country is going from a highly authoritarian military regime to a more democratic regime, but not per se a genuine democracy. While the process of democratization in Myanmar remains tension wracked and far from complete, labor unions have been legalized, freedom of assembly laws have been implemented, internet and media censorship has been eased and a number of political prisoners have been freed (Diamond, 2015). Moreover, the country held free and fair general parliamentary elections for the first time. These are but a few indicators that the country is on a democratizing path.

However, Myanmar is a country in the midst of a troubled transition. At the same time that Myanmar is undergoing a democratization process, there is a serious flare-up of communal violence in certain regions of the country. They have most notably occurred in the states of Kachin and Rakhine, but there have been violent clashes reported in Shan and Kayin states too (Fricova, 2015).This is accompanied by an increase in anti-Muslim sentiment and Buddhist nationalism. Persecution of minority groups, especially the Rohingya, seems to be supported by Myanmar’s security forces, which directly participate in the violence. The scale of the killings indicates that these acts of violence by the army were part of a process intended to destroy the Rohingya people both as individuals and as a group (Zarni & Cowley, 2014). The government does not seem to intervene either and proceeds itself to active discrimination of certain minority groups. There are still certain population groups that are not recognized as Burmese citizens. Consequently, they lose all possible government protection and are more or less completely excluded from politics. This led to a serious aggravation of the situation and to one of the most catastrophic refugee crises these days.

As stated in the introduction, communal violence and persecution of minorities is not unprecedented. But it is taking place against a new backdrop, a context of democratization, that raises much greater concerns and

could have a much more serious impact. Today, Myanmar’s transition is facing major hindrances to further movement towards democracy. Myanmar is a fragile, high-risk environment, facing ongoing violent conflict since long before it gained independence, but the current violence is different from anything in recent decades because of its unprecedented intensity and scale, its frequency and its impact. But also because of its motives. Whereas in the past there was noticeably more separatist violence from ethnic groups towards the state, violence now takes place between different ethnic groups and against certain targeted ethnic minority groups with another intend. These unfortunate developments raise questions about the usefulness of implementing democracy to canalize violence on the one hand, and on the other hand about the link with the political transition. For these reasons Myanmar seems a relevant country to use as a case study.

Why Rakhine State?

Rakhine State, formerly known as Arakan, is a very diverse region, with around 3,2 million people of different ethnicities and religions. The population consists of several communities, or groups, who self- define in terms of ethnicity, religion or both. The vast majority is ethnic Rakhine, who are predominantly Buddhist, while the mainly Muslim Rohingya constitute the second largest group (Amnesty International, 2017a). The vast majority of Rohingya Muslims lives in the two northern townships of Maungdaw and Buthidaung. Besides, a small number of other minorities, including ethnic Kaman (another predominantly Muslim group), Chin, Mro and Maramagyi (who are Buddhist, Christian or Animist), live in the state. The state is also home to a small Hindu community (Amnesty International, 2017a).

Rakhine State is situated in the west of Myanmar. It borders Bangladesh to its northwest, the Bay of Bengal to its west and a mountain range to its east, which isolates Rakhine State from the rest of Myanmar (Lindblom et al., 2015). It is one of the poorest regions in Myanmar despite its strategic location and a wealth of natural resources. The region is characterized by decades of chronic underdevelopment and economic marginalization. Most of the population live in rural areas where they work in agriculture (Amnesty International, 2017a).

Rakhine State represents a crucial case because it is one of the ethnic regions in Myanmar where the conflict level has dramatically increased since the initiation of the political transition in 2011. Only a few weeks after the elections of 2012, violence erupted between Rakhine Buddhists on the one hand, and Rohingya and other Muslims, on the other hand (Amnesty International, 2017a; Nilsen & Tonnesson,

2014). The conflict in Rakhine State is deeply rooted in ethnic tensions dating back to colonial times, but there is every reason to believe that the wave of violence in 2012 was related to an increase of competition for power since 2010. The violence was directed towards an ethnic group and echoed anti-Muslim sentiment (Nilsen & Tonnesson, 2014). Following the outbreak of these deadly intercommunal clashes, anti-Muslim violence has spread to other parts of Myanmar in 2013 and 2014. Although you would expect more equality from a democracy, the cleavages between different communal groups only seem to have increased. Besides, the conflict has occurred in the context of rising Burman-Buddhist nationalism. Within the framework of this research it is interesting to investigate if and how this increase in communal violence, Buddhist nationalism and Muslim hatred is related to the political transition that Myanmar is undergoing. As explained in the theoretical framework, it is not communal diversity per se that possibly leads to communal violence, but the politicization and mobilization of communal identities. In this regard, the case- study provides the opportunity to examines whether political actors have instigated communal violence by using the strategy of political mobilization of identities in Rakhine State.

As defended in the theoretical framework, political exclusion can be an incentive to resort to violence. Rakhine State is an interesting case to verify this hypothesis, housing the Rohingya Muslims, a minority group often described as the world’s most persecuted people. In Myanmar, ethnicity is still a primary determinant of citizenship. Even though Rohingya Muslims have been living in Rakhine State for generations, they are not included in the list of 135 national races and they are considered by the government and by far the majority of the Burmese population as illegal migrants from neighboring Bangladesh. They refer to them as “Bengalis” (Amnesty International, 2017a; International Crisis Group, 2013, 2017a; South, 2008). The vast majority of the Rohingya population has no legal status. They have been deprived of a nationality as a result of discriminatory laws, policies and practices, most significantly the Citizenship Law of 1982 and its application (Amnesty International, 2017a). They do not enjoy any rights and they are confronted with restrictions in almost every aspect of their lives (Hofman, 2017). In addition, the Rohingya have been subjected to waves of violence at the hands of the state, often forcing many to flee Myanmar and seek refuge in neighboring countries (Amnesty International, 2017a). In the first phase, the military seemed guilty not of causing the violence but only of not doing enough to stop it. Later, the military actively took part in the violence. It seems that the military wants to make northern Rakhine State unlivable for the Rohingya population. Some argue that Myanmar’s military is even behind the extremist movement of the MaBaTha monks, the rise of anti-Muslim hatred and communal violence (Zin, 2015). The army would incite Rakhine Buddhists to exterminate Rohingya (Reuters, 2018a).

These atrocities not only represent a moral puzzle, they raise serious questions about democracy and citizenship in Myanmar. The Burmese government seems to actively discriminate the Rohinya minority. The question is whether this is a deliberate government strategy and whether this is related to or even strengthened by the process of democratization. This can possibly be linked to Mann’s dark side of democracy. In addition, it creates opportunities to test the theory on political exclusion. In 2016, Rakhine State got confronted with attacks from ARSA, a Muslim insurgency group. The discrimination against Rohingya and their political exclusion may explain the violent reaction from the Muslim population and declare why Rohingya resort to violence against the state or against other communal groups.

The construction of identities and the context in which this occurs seems essential to contain the conflict in Rakhine State. Based on who you are, you belong to a certain group that may or may not be included in the political system. On the one hand, the process of in- and exclusion can cause communal tensions that lead to an increase in communal violence. On the other hand, this can result in violence from the state directed against a particular group. Finally, it can be an incentive for excluded groups to resort to violence. This case therefore seems extremely well placed to examine the assumptions set out in the theoretical framework.

3.2 Working method

In the following chapters, the dissertation will work with the case study explained above. Chapter four starts with a brief historical background on Myanmar’s political transition. After that, the political transition itself is discussed. This chapter tries to provide a concise overview of the most important facts from this democratization process. The overview is therefore not complete, but forms a selection. An attempt has been made to provide only the necessary background information for the analysis to be carried out. In that way, chapter four forms an introduction to the analysis that will take place in chapter five.

In chapter five, the dissertation places the timeline of violent events occurring in Rakhine State next to the timeline of Myanmar’s transition. The increase in violence that runs parallel with the democratization in Myanmar will be discussed and explained on the basis of the theoretical framework of chapter two. Chapter five consists of three major parts and it analyzes in particular the reaction of three actors, the Rakhine Buddhists, the Rohingya and the state (including the army), to the process of democracy building in Rakhine State.

In the first part it looks mainly to the reaction of political actors in Rakhine State and Buddhist nationalist groups to the process of democratization. In this part of the analysis, the theory about political mobilization takes center stage. This theory is used in an attempt to declare the influence of anti-Muslimism sentiment and Buddhist nationalism on politics on the one hand, and to examine the increase in communal violence on the other hand.

In the second part of the chapter, the research works with the theory of Mann in an attempt to understand the scapegoating of Rohingya and Myanmar’s active exclusion of this minority group. The research explores if and how the process of democratization has caused an increase and even an institutionalization of state discrimination and violence.

In the last part of the chapter, the dissertation looks at the Rohingya population itself and tries to comprehend why this population decided to resort to violence at the moment it did. The dissertation will use the theory of Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug in an attempt to link the Rohingya’s political exclusion to its decision to join an armed group. Besides, it will consult the work of Cederman, Gleditsch and Hug to determine whether the ARSA violence can be defined as electoral violence.

Chapter Four: Myanmar’s political transition

The process of building a democracy in Myanmar is long and complicated. Based on literature about the political transition in Myanmar, the chapter delineates Myanmar’s political landscape in its broad outlines and it studies the process of democratization in Myanmar. To this end, the chapter provides a timeline of key events. The first title gives an overview of the historical background of Myanmar. In the remaining titles, the research takes a deeper look into the democratic transition in Myanmar from 2011 up until today.

4.1 Historical background

The democracy of Myanmar was founded in 1948 after gaining independence from Britain. It was first suspended for 18 months from 1958 to 1960, and then overthrown by General Ne Win’s military coup in 1962. This inaugurated a half-century of military rule, during which the country descended into desperate poverty and isolation. The concept of democracy only returned to the political agenda in 1988 when mass street protests broke out. The 8888 Nationwide Popular Pro-Democracy Protests, also known as the People Power Uprising, the Peoples Democracy Movement and the 8888 uprisings, were a series of nationwide protests, marches and civil unrest in Burma (Myanmar) that peaked in August 1988. Hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets demanding an end to military rule, the restoration of democracy and multi- party elections (Buchanan et al., 2013). This prompted the military junta, that ultimately crushed the popular uprising, to issue a promise of free and fair elections (Simpson, Holliday, & Farrelly, 2018).

In order to placate international opinion, the military regime organized national elections in 1990. These were won by the opposition party, the NLD, led by democracy icon and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. The NLD garnered 58.7% of the popular vote and won 392 of the 492 legislative seats contested. The junta, however, completely ignored this outcome, put democracy activists in prisons or under house arrest, and continued its dictatorship as if nothing had happened. In fact, after the 1990 elections it decided to defer political change for as long as possible (Barany, 2016; Hlaing, 2012).

Pro-democracy groups did not sit idly by waiting for change to appear in the regime. Ever since the 8888- uprisings, some of them had engaged in armed struggle and organized protests in order to bring down the government (Hlaing, 2012). However, the first small step towards democratization was only initiated in 2003 when the military regime launched its "seven-step roadmap to a discipline-flourishing democracy", which, in essence, was a blueprint for political reforms. It should have helped to gradually introduce a

democratic system in seven steps. These steps were the following: Reconvening the National Convention (1) in order to gradually introduce a "genuine and disciplined" democratic system (2) by drafting a new Constitution (3), which should be adopted in a national referendum (4). This should lead to free and fair elections for the formation of the required national legislative bodies or Hluttaws (5), where elected representatives should assemble in accordance with the new Constitution (6), so a "modern, developed and democratic" nation could be built (7) (Nilsen, 2013).

The 2008 constitution created newly decentralized political structures, giving a measure of legislative and executive authority to the different states within Myanmar. This led to new competition for political power (International Crisis Group, 2014). The constitution was however a result of a highly fraudulent and undemocratic referendum and it clearly failed to create a basis for a fair and democratic representation in the country. Under this deeply flawed constitution, 25% of seats in Parliament are reserved for serving military officials, giving it an effective veto over key constitutional changes. Moreover, the military is authorized to assume power in a national state of emergency. The military also remains independent of civilian oversight, including courts, and retains control of the key ministries of Defense, Border Affairs and Home Affairs, the latter oversees the Myanmar Police Force, the Border Guard Police and General Administration Department (Amnesty International, 2017a; HRW, 2008, 2017).

4.2 The start of the democratization process

In 2010, the military dictatorship announced the desire to become a democracy. This obviously sparked hope for the potential end of military dictatorship, civil war and persistent underdevelopment. The junta officially started the democratic transition by holding the first multi-party elections since 1990 in November 2010, though both in Myanmar and abroad these were seen as deeply flawed (Simpson et al., 2018). The electoral process was neither free nor open: Unverified early votes in favor of the regime’s own party influenced the results and opportunities for popular involvement in the election were restricted by the authorities (Skidmore & Wilson, 2012). The elections were clearly controlled by the military, making many political parties, among which the opposition NLD, try to boycott them. This boycott resulted in a massive victory of the junta’s own Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) (Barany, 2016; Nilsen & Tonnesson, 2014).

On 30 March 2011, Myanmar’s ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), handed power to a new government led by former military General and newly elected president Thein Sein. He

formed the new quasi-civilian government, which existed almost completely out of former generals. Because all administrative and legislative bodies — both at the central and local levels — were now controlled by the ruling, military-dominant USDP party, Myanmar watchers and political activists did not expect more than superficial changes under the new government (Hlaing, 2012).

Surprisingly, one of the first things done under the government of the former General was the introduction of a line of liberal reforms and policy changes, giving media and political activities more freedom, releasing hundreds of political prisoners (including Aung San Suu Kyi, current leader of the NLD) and liberalizing the economy. Some key developments included the adoption of legislation about the organization of demonstrations and the announcement to abolish media censorship. Previously, newspapers, periodicals and all other printed works needed to be pre-approved by the censorship board and faced strict controls on the subjects they were allowed to cover. Local private news journals and magazines were now granted permission to publish political articles that denounce authoritarian rule. The Thein Sein administration also managed to hold mediation meetings with leaders of various ethnic groups to end the years of war in the country. Since the new government took power in 2011, the citizens of Myanmar have enjoyed a greater degree of freedom than at any time since the military seized power in 1962 (Barany, 2016; Hofman, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2017a; Skidmore & Wilson, 2012) (Hlaing, 2012; International Crisis Group, 2012).

In a few years the country evolved from an extremely closed military dictatorship, where dissidents were tortured and murdered, thousands of activists were imprisoned for political reasons, villages were attacked and burned and leaders had nuclear ambitions, into a welcoming friend of the world and an interesting trading partner. The international community responded by lifting trade boycotts and reestablishing normal diplomatic relations. The country forms a counterweight to temper the dominance of China and India in the region and as such, it offers numerous investment opportunities for foreign investors. There is a lot of fertile agricultural land available and there are gemstones and natural gas in the soil, which have been barely touched due to years of boycott. Heads of states even started visiting the country to meet the new regime. This shift in international relations provided the country and its citizens with increased opportunities (Hofman, 2014; Nilsen & Tonnesson, 2014).

The start of the democratization process in Myanmar was a state-controlled and top-down affair. The elections were manipulated and all Myanmar’s reforms were under the firm control of the military regime. In addition, the military’s liberalization program did not fundamentally change Myanmar's political power- balance (Nilsen, 2013). Some authors even argue that the military only intervened out of fear for political

unrest and ethnic-minority separatist insurgencies, which would destroy Myanmar’s always-fragile territorial integrity and sovereignty (Jones, 2014). In spite of all these factors, the elections marked a new time period by ending the one-party system and by restoring a degree of representative government. It enabled a transition to constitutional rule to take place in 2011 (Skidmore & Wilson, 2012).

4.3 The opposition enters the political game

After talks between Aung San Suu Kyi and Thein Sein, the government amended the Political Party Registration Law and the election law in order to make it possible for the NLD to re-register as a political party to contest future elections. Two weeks later, NLD leaders decided to register the party with the election commission. In April, the NLD contested and won a landslide victory in the 2012 by-elections (Buchanan et al., 2013; Hlaing, 2012).

These elections held a higher standard of credibility than the elections of 2010. The NLD decided to field candidates and won 43 of the 45 seats it contested. Aung San Suu Kyi and some of her colleagues were no longer mere anti-government activists, they were now parliamentarians. Aung San Suu Kyi won the seat for Kahmu Township, Yangon Region, and was subsequently appointed to chair a parliamentary committee on the Rule of Law and Stability. This represented a significant change in the relationship between the government and the NLD. It was the first time in history that the main opposition party was represented in the legislature. From that moment, the NLD did its utmost to become an alternative legislative force and to not let its voice be drowned out by regime stalwarts (Barany, 2016; Buchanan et al., 2013; Nilsen & Tonnesson, 2014). The NLD’s parliamentary presence is however still largely symbolic since the USDP holds most seats (Buchanan et al., 2013).

4.4 First free and fair general parliamentary elections

The elections on November 8 in 2015 were a major waypoint in Myanmar’s transition away from authoritarian rule. The country held free and fair general parliamentary elections for the first time since its ruling junta began a cautious transition away from a long military dictatorship (Barany, 2016). Organizing a peaceful and orderly vote in Myanmar's context of little experience with electoral democracy, deep political bursts and ongoing-armed conflicts was an important realization for all political actors, the election commission and the country as a whole. 91 parties and hundreds of independent candidates were

contesting over 1,100 seats. This election led to the country’s first democratically elected, civilian-led government since 1962 (International Crisis Group, 2015).

The main opposition party, the NLD, won an overwhelming victory, not only in central regions, but also in many ethnic minority states. Its victory, with almost 80 per cent of the elected seats, meant that Aung San Suu Kyi’s party had an outright majority in both legislative chambers, even after the 25 per cent of unelected seats held by the armed forces is taken into account. In other words, it was a victory in both national house of parliament and in regional and state assemblies. The incumbent USDP had only 8 per cent of elected seats (6 per cent of the total national legislature). This was exactly the number of seats the NLD had following the 2012 by-elections. The USDP had obtained its own 79 per cent landslide of elected seats in the deeply flawed 2010 elections boycotted by the NLD. The roles of both the NLD and USDP were reversed in the 2015 elections. This meant a gigantic political shift in the division of political power, creating a clear winner but also an important and powerful loser. It gave the NLD control of law making and the power to choose the president – a position that the constitution bars Suu Kyi from taking herself. Though the USDP is still the second-largest party, it has only minor influence in legislative affairs (Freedom House, 2017; HRW, 2016a; International Crisis Group, 2015).

The new NLD administration will however not control all levels of power. The military retain considerable executive power under the current 2008 constitution, with control of the defense, home affairs and border affairs ministries. The cooperation of the armed forces is therefore very important for the success in everything from the peace process to police reform and further political liberalization (International Crisis Group, 2015).

Apart from some isolated incidents, the campaign and election procedure was entirely peaceful. Nevertheless, there are some important shortcomings to note: The jailing of peaceful activists and restrictions on free speech undermined the 2015 elections in Myanmar (Amnesty International, 2015a). In addition, there were some serious problems with inclusivity, given the deprivation of electoral rights of approximately half a million Rohingya Muslims and the non-transparent annulment of polling in some ethnic areas on security grounds (International Crisis Group, 2015).

Following the NLD’s victory, the ruling USDP and military representatives accepted the results, setting the stage for a peaceful transfer of political power in the four-month transitional period. The opening session of the NLD-led parliament was held in February 2016 and the new president, Htin Kyaw (meanwhile replaced by Win Myint), was elected in March 2016 when the new NLD-led government took office (Freedom

House, 2017). The victory of the NLD came with high expectations that it will deliver the needed political and economic changes. This was anything but an easy task, since it inherited deep-rooted challenges, including constitutional empowerment of the military, repressive legislation, weak rule of law, and a corrupt judiciary (HRW, 2017). Though, the NLD-led government took some positive initiatives, including ratifying the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, engaging in some efforts to resolve past land confiscation cases, and enacting minor reforms to laws regulating speech and assembly (HRW, 2018a).

However, there are still many work points. The government increasingly used repressive laws to prosecute journalists, activists, and critics for peaceful expression deemed critical of the government or the military. Peace processes with armed groups are characterized by an impasse. The fighting intensified in different regions in the country, resulting in an increase in forced displacement and other abuses against civilians, primarily by government forces (HRW, 2018a).

Chapter Five: Analysis of the increase in violence in Rakhine State

This chapter consists of three parts. In the first part, it is discussed how hate speech, extreme Buddhist nationalism and political mobilization has led to communal clashes and how it has influenced laws and policies in Myanmar. In the second part, it is questioned how discrimination against Rohingya has intensified since Myanmar’s political transition and also, what the state’s role in this matter was or still is. In the last part, the dissertation tries to answer the question why a violent reaction from the Muslim population of Rakhine State has emerged the moment that it did.

5.1 Hate speech, extreme nationalism and political mobilization

Only a few weeks after the by-elections of 2012 and while Myanmar was experiencing unprecedented economic, social and political reforms under the quasi-civilian administration of President Thein Sein, violence erupted in Rakhine State between Rakhine Buddhists on the one hand, and Rohingya and other Muslim groups on the other hand (Amnesty International, 2017a; Nilsen & Tonnesson, 2014).

This started after the rape and murder on May 28 of a Buddhist Rakhine woman by three Rohingya men, and the subsequent revenge killing of 10 Muslim men. The incident resulted in the outburst of long- simmering tensions between the two groups the following month. Most violence took place in the northern part of the state and around the provincial capital of Sittwe. The violence intensified, with troops on both sides committing arson and killings. More than five thousand homes, mostly of Rohingya, were destroyed, and some 75 000 people, again mostly Rohingya, were displaced (Amnesty International, 2017a; HRW, 2013a; International Crisis Group, 2013).

Rioting quickly spread to townships across the state, and sporadic incidents of violence continued in the following months until a major escalation occurred in October 2012, leaving almost two hundred people dead. Rakhine Buddhists armed with machetes, swords, Molotov cocktails and other weapons attacked Muslim villages. Hundreds of homes and buildings were destroyed. Tens of thousands of people, mainly Rohingya Muslims, but also ethnic Rakhine, Maramagyi and Kaman, were displaced. While the deadly violence that erupted between ethnic Arakanese Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in early June 2012 began as sectarian clashes in four townships, it engulfed nine more townships in October (Amnesty

International, 2017a; HRW, 2013a; International Crisis Group, 2013).

The Myanmar government at the time portrayed the violence as spontaneous in nature, but in this second wave of violence, the attacks appeared to be well coordinated and organized, and directed toward Muslims in general and not just Rohingya. Muslims were attacked in parts of the country that previously never experienced sectarian tensions, with security forces playing an active role in the violence in some areas and failing to protect Rohingya in others. Because of the systematic nature of some of the attacks, it is likely that they were at least partly planned in advance in reaction to the violence in June (Amnesty International, 2017a; Hofman, 2015; HRW, 2013a; International Crisis Group, 2013).

The level of atrocity in this recent anti-Muslim violence has never been seen before in Burma’s history of communal conflicts. International Crisis Group suggests that this was possible because of the political reforms at that time. Authoritarian control was lifted after years of repression and the newly gained freedom of expression created the opportunity for subnational groups to give voice to deep-seated grievances in ways that were not possible before. Groups were suddenly able to organize themselves, also for long-suppressed nationalist causes, and to issue a call to arms without moderation or censorship. Access to social media and newly available telecommunication accelerated the spread of rumors, hate speech and divisive nationalist narratives (International Crisis Group, 2012, 2017a).

These reforms are indeed one of the causes to explain the extreme wave of anti-Muslim violence of 2012. But, as stated in the theoretical framework, the opening of the political space itself does not provide a sufficient explanation for the increase in communal violence. During the process of democratization, political competition increases. Underlying suspicions and latent enmity towards other groups can be easily exploited by political actors in order to win political support. In this phase, nationalism is often invoked deepening existing cleavages. In ethnically divided societies, this nationalism often has an ethnic character. In their attempt to mobilize support, political actors play the ethnic card and incite hostility between different ethnic groups. Sole difference is thus not enough to generate much conflict. It is not Buddhists against Muslims that causes problems, but rather contexts in which Muslims feel oppressed by Buddhists (or vice versa) (Mann, 2005).

There is every reason to believe that the surge of violence in 2012 was the culmination of heightened jockeying for power since 2010. Not only was the violence directed towards an ethnic group – the Rohingya – but it also echoed anti-Muslim undertones widespread in Myanmar. Next to that, it was accompanied by an upsurge in extreme Buddhist nationalism. Rising anti-Muslim sentiment and Buddhist nationalism are without doubt also related to the 2015 elections (Amnesty International, 2015a;

International Crisis Group, 2015).

Political actors and their mobilization in Rakhine State

On the regional level of Rakhine State, it is very likely that there were political aims behind the riots of October 2012. The violence during that time was organized and planned and it took place amid rising local political tensions. In Rakhine State, some Rakhine Buddhist political actors have fierce anti-Rohingya and anti-Muslim agendas and may have instigated or even been involved in acts of violence (International Crisis Group, 2013). For months, local political party officials and senior Buddhist monks publicly offended the Rohingya population and labeled them as a threat to Rakhine State spreading the idea that they wanted to abuse the political opening to seize power. So there were influential political persons who were consciously feeding the unrest (Hofman, 2015; HRW, 2013a; International Crisis Group, 2013).

This phenomenon is much less present in the Rohingya community as their ability to participate in public life have been severely restricted. Restrictions of movement and policies of segregation make it almost impossible for them to assemble, mobilize and advocate collectively for their rights. Consequently, there are no Muslim civil society organizations in Rakhine and applicants for registration have been rejected by the government (Amnesty International, 2017a).

Since the political transition to the new government, many Rakhine have felt that the most immediate and obvious threat that they face in rebuilding their communities and reasserting their ethnic identity is not the government or Naypyitaw (the capital), but the Muslim population of their state. In the lead-up to the 2010 elections, the start of the political transition, the USDP sought to attract Muslim voters. Tens of thousands of otherwise poorly documented minorities, including Rohingya, were registered to vote for the 2010 election in an effort to diminish local ethnic parties. They were granted Temporary Registration Cards (TRC’s), also known as white cards, enabling them to vote. Hopes were raised in the Rohingya communities that their undocumented status might soon end. This was the first time the Rohinya were involved in the state and received a vote and a voice. This only stoked paranoia among the Rakhine living in Rakhine State fearing marginalization in their own state. This fear may have fueled Rakhine militancy (International Crisis Group, 2012; Nilsen & Tonnesson, 2014). However, as this dissertation will demonstrate, the promise of citizenship for the Rohingya was never fulfilled.

The threat of marginalization felt by the Rakhine is threefold: demographic, socio-cultural and economic. In the first place, they fear that the demographic balance of Rakhine State is shifting and that the Rakhine could soon become a minority in their own state. These concerns are compounded by the fact that the two

communities have very different social, cultural and religious traditions. Rakhine fear that their culture could become dominated by a Muslim culture, that does not only feel uncomfortable to them but is also perceived as incompatible with their lives. At last, they fear for their economic opportunities in the state now that the country has opened up (International Crisis Group, 2014). As will be shown, political actors spread these fears and invoke ethnic nationalism to mobilize political support and to incite hostility and distrust towards Muslim communities in Rakhine State. Rakhine militancy can therefore be seen as a reaction out of fear, fear instilled by political actors, to be not included into the nation.

Prior to the October violence, local authorities took various measures that appeared to promote anti- Rohingya hatred. A great deal of this local mobilizing supported October’s violence. The two actors most influential in spreading this fear and organizing anti-Rohingya activities were the local order of Buddhist monks (the sangha) and the regionally powerful Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP)3, which was founded in 2010 by Arakanese nationalists. Between June and October, these groups issued numerous anti-Rohingya pamphlets and public statements. Most of them explicitly or implicitly denied the existence of the Rohingya, demonizing them, and calling for their removal from the country, even sometimes using the phrase “ethnic cleansing.” The statements frequently were released in organized meetings in full view of local, state, and national authorities, who raised no concerns. Local government officials even participated in the meetings to press Rohingya to leave the area (HRW, 2013a).

After the incident in June 2012, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) signed a memorandum of understanding with the Burmese government to open liaison offices for humanitarian purposes in Rangoon and Sittwe. This with the intention to distribute humanitarian aid to victims from both the Rakhine Buddhist and Muslim Rohingya community without discrimination. Monks, women’s groups and youth organisations organised demonstrations in Sittwe against this proposed OIC mission (International Crisis Group, 2012). In late September 2012, around 2,000 people throughout Rakhine State gathered in Sittwe in what was described as the biggest public meeting of ethnic Rakhine ever. The participants, representatives of seventeen townships in Rakhine State and some representatives of political and social organizations, laid out an extreme nationalist and anti-Muslim manifesto, approving, among other things, resolutions supporting the formation of armed local militias, enforcement of citizenship laws, removal of Rohingya villages, and the reclamation of land that had been “lost” to them. The conference objected to the plans to reunite communities, issue national identity cards to Rohingya, and the establishment of the liaison office of the OIC (International Crisis Group, 2012; Zin, 2015). At this time, there was also a belief that Sittwe

3 The Rakhine Nationalities Development Party merged with the Arakan League for Democracy in March 2014 to form the Arakan National Party

itself was close to having a Muslim majority. This fueled the concerns of the political elite in the state capital and raised the “alarming prospects” that the city might return a Muslim representative in a future election (International Crisis Group, 2014).

This manifesto was clearly an action-oriented hate speech. Local nor central government intervened and unsurprisingly, within weeks coordinated attacks against Muslims occurred almost simultaneously in nine townships throughout Rakhine state and continued unimpeded for several days. This has probably also been reinforced by a meeting in Sittwe, the All-Arakanese Monks’ Solidarity Conference, on October 18 just before the outbreak of violence. The monks, who hold very high moral authority among the Arakanese Buddhist population, issued a virulently anti-Rohingya statement that urged townships to band together to “help solve” the “problem” (HRW, 2013a; International Crisis Group, 2014).

The attacks appeared to involve many Arakanese who were not from the immediate area and they were not only aimed at Rohingya but also at other Muslim minorities like the Kamman, one of the 135 officially recognized ethnic groups in Burma (HRW, 2013a). Hate speech had thus a serious impact and was followed by coordinated attacks against the Muslim community as a whole. Obviously, this has had a profound effect in terms of creating more societal divisiveness and distrust between the two different groups, Rakhine Buddhist and Rohingya Muslims.

After the violent eruption of October and to add fuel to the fire, the RNDP wrote in its news bulletin that some inhumane actions, such as the Holocaust or the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, could be justified by imperatives of racial survival and national sovereignty (Zin, 2015).

This anti-Muslim hate speech no longer seems a random attempt to inflict pain or damage to the Muslim community, instead it seems politically and strategically targeted. It is a well thought out and planned frame for gaining political support. It is more organized than it was in the past and it has the ability to influence politics. The anti-Muslim lobby and the spread of (Rakhine) Buddhist nationalism did pay off in Rakhine State. It translated itself into a victory of the Arakan National Party (ANP), the successor of the RNDP, in the elections of 2015. This party is known for threatening the Rohingya Muslims. Rakhine State became one of the few states where the party of Suu Kyi did not win. The ANP also enjoys a lot of support from the local police and the military, which de facto hold the power in Rakhine State, where they control the border with Bangladesh (Hofman, 2017; International Crisis Group, 2015). From that moment on, the ANP adopted an even more radical position to place itself in opposition, or confrontation, with the NLD- led government (International Crisis Group, 2016b).

Two extreme Buddhist nationalist groups: The 969 Movement and MaBaTha

Myanmar’s transition is thus characterized by rising religious and ethnic nationalism. This is however not unique to Myanmar, it is a global phenomenon. It can be seen in many democratic and democratizing countries, including Myanmar’s neighboring Buddhist countries like Thailand and Sri Lanka (International Crisis Group, 2017a). Two new religious groups have emerged in Myanmar in the aftermath of political transition in 2011. The 969 Movement became active in 2012 and is led by prominent monks including Ashin Wirathu, once jailed by the former military junta for anti-Muslim violence, and Ashin Wimala. The number 969 is a stenography for the special attributes of Buddha and his teachings and a riposte to the number “786”, a folk Islam representation of the Basmala4 long used by Muslims in Myanmar and elsewhere to identify halal restaurants and Muslim-owned shops. The broader and more organized Committee for the Protection of Nationality and Religion, in short MaBaTha, was founded in June 2013 and eventually had over 200 township branches throughout the country (International Crisis Group, 2017a).

The first group was one of the main instigators of the 2012 violence. It was particularly known because of its extremist rhetoric, making claims of a Muslim plot to take over the country and of schemes to pay Muslims for marrying and converting Buddhist women. According to 969, Buddhists must stand up to “save” their way of life. Its messages were spread widely in the country through DVDs and stickers. During public sermons, the movement stated that Muslims are "foreigners" for whom there is no place in Burma. Every time riots broke out in 2012 in Rakhine State, it was involved in spreading rumors on the Internet and in public meetings (Hofman, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2017a; Reuters, 2013). The 969 movement also succeeded in mobilizing Rakhine Buddhist by anticipating and proclaiming their grievances.

At the same time, the fear of Islam was increased due to developments in the Middle East. Wirathu actively spread the message that this violence would come to Burma. His warning was eagerly heard by many Burmese Buddhists. They claim that their religion in its current form will not be able to protect themselves from this “threat”. That Buddhism normally preaches non-violence and usually does not want to actively convert, is now being seen as a weakness (Hofman, 2015).

In late-2013, the 969 movement was banned by the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, a body of monks appointed by the government that oversees and regulates the Buddhist clergy. This ban was not an

4 Name of the Islamic phrase ‘In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful’

open and direct dismissal of the group’s ideology, nor was it a reprimand for the possible link between the movement’s inflammatory anti-Muslim rhetoric and subsequent outbreaks of deadly violence. The committee only referred to the movement’s unauthorized use of Buddhist symbolism in the context of lobbying for the enactment of the “race and religion” laws against the perceived “Islamization” of Myanmar. The protection and promotion of religion comes under the remit of the Committee and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and does not lie within the competence of the 969 movement (International Crisis Group, 2017a; Reuters, 2013).

The ban against the 969 movement prompted it to evolve into the somewhat more formal structure of MaBaTha in June 2013. The organization was not particularly prominent until January 2014, when its upper Myanmar branch was established in Mandalay. The organization immediately picked up where the 969 movement had left off, rallying for the adoption of the “race and religion” laws and extending awareness of nationalist ideology and the MaBaTha brand, far into rural and remote parts of the country (International Crisis Group, 2017a).

Political mobilization by those two Buddhist nationalist organizations has to a considerable extent succeeded in changing norms, laws and practices in Myanmar. The political effects of their hate speech and related coordinated actions and lobbying were weightier than ever before.

After the by-elections in 2012, Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters called for the amendment of article 59 (f) of the constitution. Stating that the president or vice president cannot have a spouse or children with a foreign nationality, this article impedes Suu Kyi from becoming president or vice president because her sons are British. After thousands of monks attended meetings held in Rangoon and Mandalay in 2013 and 2014, some MaBaTha leaders indicated that they would not support this amendment, fearing it might make Burma vulnerable to the threat of a Muslim or non-Buddhist president in the near future. They also urged their followers to support Thein Sein rather than Aung San Suu Kyi, arguing that she is too weak in defending nationalism and Buddhism. In the aftermath of the 2014 Buddhist clergy conference in Mandalay, Suu Kyi was shocked to learn that radical monks had spearheaded a campaign against her and she decided to stop rallying for amendments of this article in the NLD’s 2015 election campaign (Zin, 2015).

In 2014, MaBaTha monks successfully campaigned to force the government to deny the Rohingya minority to register their ethnic identity in the first national census in three decades. Shortly before the population count, the government reneged on the promise to allow Rohingya to self-identify in the data collections

forms. Instead, Rohingya were required to register as "Bengali". Most Rohingya refused to register under this name and were, as a result, not included in the count (Amnesty International, 2017a).

During the campaign of the 2015 elections, there were repeated efforts to use Buddhist nationalist narratives for party-political ends. Hate-speech, discrimination and threats against the Rohingya and other Muslim communities intensified in general with the increasing prominence and political power of the MaBaTha. This was particularly focused around four laws, aimed at the protection of race and religion, championed by the association (International Crisis Group, 2015).

In May and August 2015, MaBaTha successfully urged the Hluttaw (Myanmar parliament) and President U Thein Sein to accept and implement four "race and religion protection laws": The Population Control Law, the Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage Law, the Religious Conversion Law and the Monogamy Law (HRW, 2016a). The first law gives the government the power to implement population control in areas designated by the president with high population density, growth, maternal and child mortality, poverty or food security. No such areas have been designated, but these provisions would appear to apply in particular to the Muslim-majority northern Rakhine State. Local orders that limited Muslim couples to have two children had already been put in place in the past. Furthermore, the laws make marriage between people of different religions more difficult, oblige people who want to convert to seek permission from the government and prohibit polygamy. In their ambition to protect Buddhism, the authors of these laws are endangering other religious minorities, including Christians, Hindus, and especially Burma’s persecuted Muslim minority. The laws target certain Muslim religious and cultural practices, including polygamy and they are generally seen as an attempt to curb the growth of Islam in the country. They drew considerable international attention, as they are extremely discriminatory and violate religious freedom. The laws entrench already widespread discrimination and, by consequence, risk fueling further communal tensions and violence against religious minorities (Amnesty International, 2015b; Hofman, 2015; HRW, 2015, 2016a; International Crisis Group, 2016a, 2017a; Nilsen & Tonnesson, 2014).

Some political parties, among which the NLD, were clearly against the laws, but other political figures promoted the laws as protecting Burma from Muslim threats. President Thein Sein even took credit for the laws on social media when the election campaign began in September. It seems that he used the package of national race protection bills as a political weapon to maximize votes in the 2015 elections. MaBaTha marked its growing involvement in politics by holding a series of victory rallies about the importance of the laws for the protection of Buddhism against an Islamic "invasion". During these rallies, the movement declared its support for the USDP, “the party which can ensure the protection of the nation from this

threat”, and criticized those who had not supported them, including sometimes explicitly the NLD (HRW, 2016a; International Crisis Group, 2015).

In the run-up to the 2015 elections, MaBaTha leaders encouraged followers to vote for candidates who would “protect” the race and religion laws and to avoid those who would “destroy” them, implying that they should not vote for the NLD. Others, like the militant monk Wirathu, were even more direct declaring that the USDP was more supportive of the MaBaTha agenda and stronger in the protection of race and religion than the NLD (International Crisis Group, 2017a; Myanmar Times, 2015). MaBaTha hoped to pressure the NLD to take a stronger nationalist stance once in office. The organization issued a strong warning that attempts to roll back the race and religion laws would be met with opposition. MaBaTha appeared to have a clear preference for the USDP and expressed great skepticism about the NLD's credibility (International Crisis Group, 2017a).

The NLD filed complaints of misuse of religion for electoral purpose, which is prohibited by law, when a senior monk called the party a "political party supported and backed by Islamists" (The Irrawaddy, 2015a). More such complaints were filed, relating to comments made at a MaBaTha rally in Ayeyarwady region and to pamphlets distributed urging people not to vote NLD (International Crisis Group, 2015). Faced with doubts about its nationalist credibility and claims that it was pro-Muslim or anti-Buddhist, the NLD decided to field no Muslim candidate in the election (International Crisis Group, 2017a; The Irrawaddy, 2015b). The NLD was not the only party doing so. Due to the political climate created by Buddhist nationalism and anti-Muslim hate speech, there was no major party that fielded a single Muslim candidate, though Muslims are at least four per cent of the total population, probably more. Candidates were rejected on the basis of their faith because of pressure from the increasingly powerful ultranationalist Buddhist movement, MaBaTha, or because they failed to meet citizenship requirements (International Crisis Group, 2015; The Guardian, 2015). The fact that the NLD, widely considered as a champion of democratic values, chose not to nominate a single Muslim candidate for fear of backlash from Buddhist hardliners is significant. This is again evidence of the gigantic political impact of Buddhist nationalist narratives. Even the most democratic party sets aside its democratic ideals. This action of the NLD strengthened on its turn narratives of Muslims as a threat and it consolidated their exclusion. Whichever way you look at it, religion and politics got seriously mixed up, even though law forbids this.

Also in the period leading up to the 2015 elections, MaBaTha insisted that the government revoked all TRCs, the white cards, from nearly all Muslims in Rakhine State, except from some Kaman. The revocation left the majority of Rohingya without any form of identity document and prevented them from

voting in the upcoming national elections. Even those without citizenship cards had been allowed to cast ballots during the elections in 2010 and 2012. This decision effectively stripped Myanmar’s Rohingya of their last political right. Though the parliament voted to grant TRC-holders the right to vote in a possible constitutional referendum by acknowledging the rights the cardholders always had enjoyed in previous elections even under one-party rule, the government announced it would revoke the white cards in response to anti-white card protests organized by MaBaTha nationalists. As a result, Rohingya were almost completely excluded from the 2015 election, as most of them were unable to either vote or stand for office (Amnesty International, 2015a, 2017a; International Crisis Group, 2016a).

The foregoing demonstrates how hate speech and Buddhist nationalism in Burma set political agendas. Therefore, it can be concluded that the new round of anti-Muslim violence has had the political leverage to reshape Burmese society. Instead of taking legal measures against hate speech and identifiable hatemongers, the government appeared to tolerate it or even encourage it by adapting its policy to Buddhist nationalist demands. In doing so, the government threw more oil on the fire.

Given the pre-existing climate of anti-Muslim sentiment and the common perception that the NLD was soft on the issue, many observers had expected an impact on the election results of November 2015. The results came thus as a complete surprise to many nationalists. During the campaign, there were repeated efforts to use Buddhist nationalist narratives for party-political ends, but parties and candidates standing on a Buddhist nationalist platform won no seats or significant numbers of votes. The NLD’s support was similar to that achieved in 1990, when this issue of extreme Buddhist nationalism was not present. The USDP’s relatively strong 28 per cent of the popular vote may have been partly due to its strong nationalist credentials (International Crisis Group, 2015, 2016b).

It was clear that while MaBaTha had a lot of popular support and its leading monks commanded considerable respect, its invasion into electoral politics was unsuccessful. Widespread adoration for Aung San Suu Kyi and hatred of the former military regime, with which the USDP was closely associated, surpassed nationalist concerns at the ballot box. However, the continuing broad popular support for Buddhist nationalist narratives suggested that the NLD’s landslide victory was not a rejection of MaBaTha’s ideology (International Crisis Group, 2017a). As Walton, a prominent scholar of Myanmar Buddhism, noted, voting for the NLD is not per se inconsistent with Buddhist nationalist sentiments (M. J. Walton, 2015). The party’s success cannot be seen as an explicit vote against MaBaTha. However, the attempt by some MaBaTha monks to influence the results of the election were unsuccessful (International Crisis Group, 2015)

Once the new NLD administration was in power, nationalists began to reassert themselves, though they have started to face more resistance from the government than they did under its forerunner (International Crisis Group, 2016b). The government took increasing action against Buddhist monks and organizations that used extremist and ultranationalist rhetoric. Besides, it banned the use of the name and logos of the MaBaTha in May 2017. Some but not all branches of the organization complied. Wirathu was banned from public speaking for one year, but he has on occasion violated the order without consequences (HRW, 2018a).

The military and Buddhist (Rakhine) Nationalists: allies in anti-Muslim violence

The military also appealed to ethnic nationalism, but there are no signs that it does so to reverse its absolute power. The military-dominant USDP peacefully transferred its power to the NLD in March 2016. However, it has managed to maintain their hold on power as guardians of Myanmar’s constitution. It included various provisions in the 2008 Constitution to secure its power and monopoly in some governance matters. These clauses are still in force today and make a major democratic deficit, giving the army the power to block further democratic progress. The military also retains sole authority to investigate itself, and military courts have jurisdiction over its personnel. The military’s impunity severely undermines the rule of law in Myanmar (HRW, 2018a; The New York Times, 2018).

The Tatmadaw’s ranks are dominated by the same Bamar ethnic group that makes up about two-thirds of Myanmar’s population and it has kept nationalism as its central value. In all flares of violence it fought on the side of the Rakhine Buddhists. It seems as if there is some sort of alliance between them. When there is unrest and violence, Rakhine Buddhists will appeal to the army and the latter can intervene and present itself as "necessary" to bring back the peace and rest. Though it holds itself up as the protector of Myanmar’s people, the military has a long history of murdering civilians, torturing and executing prisoners, committing rape and conscripting child soldiers (The New York Times, 2018).

The other way around, the army appeals to Rakhine Buddhists. This was very clear in the conflict that followed the ARSA attacks in October 2016. There is evidence that shows that the military recruited Buddhist civilians to participate in their counter-insurgency operation and to commit violence against the Rohingya. The army literally equipped and supported Rakhine vigilante groups following the 25 August

ARSA attacks (International Crisis Group, 2017b). Besides, the military is encouraging, if not inciting Rakhine Buddhist into a genocidal mindset, resulting in violence against and killing of the Rohingya because of who they are and possibly with the intent to permanently eradicate them (Reuters, 2018a). The army is able to mobilize Rakhine Buddhists and to deploy them into their military operation because it relies on extreme nationalism and because it uses the grievances of the Rakhine, depicting Muslims as a threat to Myanmar. The army is thus also inciting hostility towards Muslims. This is a very dangerous development in the current context, because arming Buddhist villagers could lead the Muslim armed group ARSA, which has voided attacking Buddhist civilians, to view them as combatant targets (International Crisis Group, 2016a). Then, the conflict once more obtains a communal character.

This also has political consequences. The army has its straw men in the USDP. By mobilizing (Rakhine) nationalist Buddhists, the army mobilizes political support for the nationalist USDP. Consequently, it is not surprising that nationalist Buddhists groups in turn call their members to vote for the USDP.

5.2 Active discrimination of Rohingya by the Myanmar government

As discussed in the theoretical framework, democratization forces leaders to be more dependent on securing popular support. This often involves attempts by political actors to make the demos coincide with ethnicity. According to Mann, ethnic cleansing and other forms of active discrimination, intimidation and nepotism may arise (Mann, 2005).

In Myanmar it is very clear that the demos is defined in narrow and even ethnic terms. As the previous title (5.1) has shown, ethnic nationalism is a powerful factor in Myanmar’s political transition. The two main political parties, the military-aligned USDP and Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD, rely heavily on and are politically indebted to extreme Buddhist nationalist groups in shoring up and enlarging their political (voter) base (Wade, 2017). To keep this political voter base content, the Burmese government defines the Burmese nation as a Buddhist nation where Burmans are more or less sitting in the driver’s seat. The people and the nation are defined in ethnic and religious terms in Myanmar to favor the majority or the dominant ethnic and religious group. According to the theory of Mann, this could possibly result in the exclusion of other ethnic groups with different religions.

The Rakhine Buddhists are such an ethnic (minority) group. Yet they are not completely excluded. Rakhine Buddhists roughly fit into the image of the nation created by anti-Muslim lobby and Buddhist nationalist groups. As explained in the previous title (5.1), important figures in this community spread hate messages

about Muslim communities themselves and take part in anti-Muslim violence. Besides, they are included in the list of 135 official national races (Embassy of Myanmar, 1990).

Now that Myanmar is seeing liberalization and greater democracy, as well as a peace process aimed at addressing ethnic minority concerns, the central government is no longer seeking to marginalize the Rakhine, but rather to bring them into discussion on the country’s future. While Rakhine are being courted by the Burman elite as allies, the Muslim population, especially the Rohingya, is left more politically marginalized than ever before (International Crisis Group, 2014). Rohingya Muslims do not belong to the people ruling the nation, they belong to the out-group. There is no political profit in promoting citizenship and constitutional rights for them and, as a consequence, they are actively excluded from the Burmese nation. The research will show that the government itself plays a crucial and active role in this exclusion.

Rohingya have faced discrimination, and racially based restrictions in law, policy and practice for decades. But this only has intensified since Myanmar has entered a process of democratization. And this to the extent that human rights organizations and the United Nations are labeling the active exclusion and persecution as crimes against humanity, a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing”, and as an institutionalized system of segregation and discrimination (Amnesty International, 2017a, 2018a, 2018b; HRW, 2018a).

The government of Myanmar uses laws and policies, which discriminate Rohingya, and restricts their daily life, completely disenfranchising them. It uses violence against them, forcing them to displace whether or not to IDP camps or isolated villages and incites and encourages hate against them. This title will deal with some examples of active state discrimination and violence and will show how both increased during Myanmar’s political transition. Some points have already been covered under the previous title (5.1) and are therefore only touched briefly under this title.

Discriminatory laws and policies

Up until today there are barriers in place, which prevent Rohingya Muslims to obtain full citizenship. Most Rohingya are deprived of Burmese nationality by the country’s discriminatory 1982 Citizenship Law and its application. As will be explained, the law still prevents Rohingya from obtaining equal access to full Myanmar citizenship since it is still in force (Amnesty International, 2017a; Lindblom et al., 2015).

The law distinguishes between three categories of citizenship: full citizenship, associate citizenship, and naturalized citizenship, each of which affords different rights and entitlements5. Importantly, the law provides that all persons who were citizens on the day it came into force will continue to be citizens. The law makes belonging to one of the officially recognized national races the primary, though not only, criterion for full citizenship. People belonging to ethnic groups that are considered to have settled in the country prior to 18236 are also entitled the status of full citizenship. There are eight official national races listed in the law: the Burman majority plus seven minorities, the Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Mon, Rakhine and Shan. Aside from these eight, the government issued a list of 135 official national races (Embassy of Myanmar, 1990). There is only one Muslim community in Rakhine State – the Kaman – that is recognized as an indigenous ethnic group, and therefore acquires citizenship by birth, although they sometimes face difficulties in practice. All others, including the Rohingya, are despite generations of residence in Myanmar not considered to be amongst the official races and are therefore denied the possibility of acquiring full citizenship. Their only option is to settle for the two lesser forms of citizenship, associate or naturalized citizenship, which do not guarantee the right to stand for election or to own property, and can be arbitrarily revoked by the state (Amnesty International, 2017a; Republic of the Union of Myanmar). The first is only available to people who had applied for citizenship before the 1982 law came into effect, while those applying for the second must provide conclusive evidence that they or their parents entered or resided in Myanmar prior to 1948 or were born to at least one parent who holds some form of Myanmar citizenship. Stringent language requirements and other vaguely worded criteria constitute additional obstacles. Applicants that have reached the age of 18 must be able to speak one of the “national languages” and be of good character and sound mind (1982 Citizenship Law Section 44). Few Rohingya are in possession of the necessary documents that would satisfy the requisite criteria. Many lack records of their family’s historical residence. Besides, they speak the Rohingya dialect and, with limited access to education, they have little opportunity to learn a nationally recognized language (Amnesty International, 2017a; International Crisis Group, 2014; Lindblom et al., 2015).

Even though, the 1982 law contains a provision that all people who were citizens on the day it came into force remain so, the way in which this provision was implemented led many Muslims to be de facto deprived of citizenship. Most Muslims who had the old form of identification (the NRCs) did not receive

5 The law also explains complex provisions governing citizenship by descent. These can be briefly summarized as: (i) children acquire citizenship if one parent is a citizen and the other parent either a citizen, associate citizen or naturalized citizen; or (ii) children acquire citizenship if their parents are associate or naturalized citizens, provided that at least one set of grandparents are also associate or naturalized citizens – which means the second generation of offspring of people with these other forms of citizenship become full citizens by descent (International Crisis Group, 2014). 6 This year marks the beginning of British occupation of Rakhine State

new citizenship cards (CRCs). Instead, they were issued with temporary registration certificates (TRCs), which contain far fewer rights. Many of those who had no documentation and whose citizenship status was unclear, have also received TRCs over the years. Therefore, the majority held such cards. The citizenship status of these cardholders was unclear and required further verification. The white cards contain some limited rights such as the right to vote, but they are not taken as evidence of citizenship. Therefore, many of the rights conferred on citizens are denied to those cardholders, and several serious additional restrictions are imposed. Examples of these restrictions are the mandatory government permission to marry, the order to limit couples to two children, the severe restrictions for TRC holders on freedom of movement outside the village-tract or between townships and the limiting work opportunities and access to government services like education (Amnesty International, 2017a; International Crisis Group, 2014).

These TRC cards served as the Rohingya’s primary form of documentation until March 2015. As a consequence, the Thein Sein government has continued to enforce the restrictions that go hand in hand with it. Policies to control the Rohingya population, including restrictions on the freedom of movement, marriage, childbirth, and other aspects of daily life were implemented after the start of Myanmar’s political transition in Rakhine in Maungdaw and Buthidaung Townships, where most Rohingya live (Lindblom et al., 2015). Although initially developed under military governance, these policies continued to exist under Myanmar’s more democratic regime.

In March 2015, Thein Sein decided to revoke the TRCs and replace them by a Temporary Approval Card. Only a few months later, he accepted and implemented four "race and religion protection laws". These laws enshrine a large number of the discriminatory policies cited above into national law. These laws impose restrictions on the basis of religion and not on the basis of having full citizenship, but since these two are closely related in Myanmar, the result is more or less the same.

Many of the early regulations on Rohingya marriages and births were local. For instance, many Rohingya- populated areas in Rakhine State have a two-child policy they apply exclusively to Rohingya families that have been reaffirmed in recent years. But in 2015, the government extended these regulations to the country as a whole with the enactment of the four laws. These laws do not explicitly mention the Rohingya but they target certain Muslim religious and cultural practices, including polygamy. The Population Control Law state that local authorities can enforce this law selectively, taking into account a high number of migrants in the area, a high population growth rate and a high birth rate. These are all descriptions that politicians and activists have applied to the Rohingya (Lindblom et al., 2015). The four laws are generally seen as an attempt to curb the growth and influence of Islam in the country (Amnesty International, 2015b;

Hofman, 2015; HRW, 2015, 2016a; International Crisis Group, 2016a, 2017a; Nilsen & Tonnesson, 2014).

In an attempt to register Muslims holding TRCs, Thein Sein’s former administration began implementing a pilot “citizenship verification process”. Individuals were invited to apply for another temporary identity card valid for two years, while authorities would determine what, if any, type of citizenship each individual was entitled to. During this process, Rohingya were required to identify as “Bengali” on the application forms. This denial to use the name Rohingya have chosen for themselves is undoubtedly part of the persecution they have suffered for decades. This denial also happened in the national census in 2014. Nevertheless, the verification process itself would use the discriminatory 1982 Citizenship Law to assess and verify citizenship claims. The process was suspended in October 2014, but stalled completely by the end of 2015. Efforts to restart the verification began soon after the NLD-led government assumed office in April 2016. The process was slightly revised: the new cards no longer include information on the holder’s ethnicity or religion and are not limited to a two year period. However, the card itself only enables the holder to apply for citizenship through a formal process on the basis of the 1982 Citizenship Law at a later date (Amnesty International, 2017a; Zarni & Cowley, 2014).

To make a long (and very complex) story short, up until today, the process for applying for citizenship is based on the 1982 Citizenship Law, which means that it remains inherently discriminatory. The government can invent as many different (temporary) identity documents and procedures as they like, but as long as they do not adjust the 1982 law itself, Rohingya and other minorities that are not included in the list of national races remain excluded from acquiring full citizenship. Burma’s discriminatory citizenship law not only deprives Rohingya of citizenship. Restrictive local policies for Rohingya's without full citizenship have persisted, including travel restrictions, restrictions on marriages and cohabitation, and restrictions on access to education and healthcare (Zarni & Cowley, 2014).

Disenfranchisement

In September 2014, President Thein Sein signed an amendment to the Political Parties Registration Law that bans people with TRCs from forming or joining political parties (Nilsen & Tonnesson, 2014). While ethnicities such as the Shan, Karen, and Rakhine have developed regional parties to advance their own interests, Rohingya have been denied this possibility due to a lack of identity documents. Even if they meet the citizenship requirements, (Rohingya) Muslim candidates are often rejected on the basis of their religion (see 5.1). Later in 2015, Thein Sein revoked all TRCs from nearly all Muslims in Rakhine State. This

revocation effectively prevented the Rohingya from voting in the 2015 elections. For the Rohingya, this was their last remaining connection to politics and their last remaining means of influence (Amnesty International, 2017a).

Violence aimed against Rohingya

After Myanmar’s transition to a more democratic system, there were three major incidents that involved state violence aimed against Rohingya. In the first place, there were the violent attacks in Rakhine State in June and, especially in October. The police did very little to stop the violence aimed at Rohingya. The police in Rakhine State is overwhelmingly made up of Rakhine Buddhist who are at best unsympathetic to Muslim and at worst may have been complicit in the violence against them. Although, the army, recruited nationally and rotated into the region, might had been better at maintaining the security – preventing or deterring attacks against Muslim villages, and guarding the last Muslim-majority neighborhood in Sittwe – it failed to intervene properly and even participated in the violence (HRW, 2013a).

Human Rights Watch stated in a report that Burmese authorities and members of Rakhine groups have committed crimes against humanity in a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State since June 2012. Government authorities destroyed mosques, conducted violent mass arrests, and blocked aid to displace Muslims. All of the state security forces operating in Arakan State are involved in failing to prevent atrocities. Riot police, local police, and army soldiers assisted in the killings by disarming Rohingya of their sticks and other rudimentary weapons they carried to defend themselves. Sometimes they even directly participated in the killings (HRW, 2013a).

In the second place, there was the army’s counter-insurgency operation in 2016. This operation was even more harmful. It was a response to Rohingya militants attacking police posts and killing members of the security forces. The military responded violently and not proportionate by carrying out what they have described as “clearance operations” in sealed-off regions (Amnesty International, 2017a). It appeared that the army was using something akin to its standard counter-insurgency “four cuts” strategy developed in the 1960s to cut off rebel forces from their four main support sources (food, funds, intelligence, recruits). The strategy involved cordoning off territory for concentrated operations, a “calculated policy of terror” to force populations to move, destruction of villages in sensitive areas and confiscation or destruction of food stocks that could support insurgents. After the October 9 attacks, there were multiple reports of suspects shot on sight, burning of many houses, looting of property and seizure or destruction of food stocks, but also of

rape of women and girls (HRW, 2016b; International Crisis Group, 2016a). Much arson took place during the military operation. Some villages were systematically destroyed, rather than isolated. The counter- operation was marked by widespread and systematic human rights violations (Amnesty International, 2017a; IOM, 2017).

Further escalation on November 12 made clear that a month of intensive military operations was not enough to stop the armed group and that the attacks on security forces were not a one-off. Following these clashes, the military considerably stepped up its operations, using attack helicopters in areas with many civilian non-combatants and deploying aggressive ground troops. Helicopters fired indiscriminately at villagers and many villages were partially or completely destroyed by arson. The impact of the military operation was enormous: many of the most significantly affected areas in Maungdaw were sealed to humanitarian assessment teams and human rights groups (HRW, 2016b; International Crisis Group, 2016a).

Less than a year later, on August 25, there were new attacks. A third brutal military response followed, targeting the Rohingya Muslims of northern Rakhine State as a whole making no distinction between militants and the general population. The military operation has morphed into a collective punishment of the entire Rohingya community in northern Rakhine. Rohingya villages in the area have been systematically reduced to ashes by both military troops and Rakhine vigilante groups. This military and local vigilante campaign is described by the UN as “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing” and by human rights groups as crimes against humanity. These groups documented widespread, unlawful killings by the security forces and vigilantes, including several massacres, but also rape and other forms of sexual violence against woman and children (Amnesty International, 2017a; HRW, 2018c; International Crisis Group, 2017b, 2017d). Since there is no reason to believe that the army lack the capability to prevent or stop communal violence, it is very likely the army is acting with the intend to wipe out or expel the whole Rohingya population.

(Forced) Relocation to remote regions and IDP camps

Today, as a consequence of the violent conflicts described above, most Rohingya still live in guarded and unsanitary camps or in isolated villages. The army and government restricted the access of humanitarian workers to these camps and villages (Amnesty International, 2017a).

In an attempt to contain the 2012 violence, the Burmese government and local authorities separated communities, and forcibly displaced Rohingya and other Muslim communities to camps on the outskirts of town where their movement was restricted. Curfews were imposed in several townships. These were however lifted by September 2014 in all areas except for the Rohingya-majority townships of Maungdaw and Buthidaung (Amnesty International, 2017a; International Crisis Group, 2012). A smaller number of other ethnic groups, like ethnic Rakhine and Maramagyi communities, were also displaced, but they were able to move freely and eventually leave the camps while Rohingya and other Muslims were not. The latter have not been allowed to return to their homes since and up till now an estimated 120,000 people, mostly Rohingya, remain in displacement camps and unofficial temporary shelters in squalid conditions without sustained access to adequate food, medical care and other essential humanitarian assistance (Danish Refugee Council, European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, CCCM Cluster, & Joint IDP Profiling Service, 2017; IRC, 2017; OCHA, 2017).

Existing tense communal relations are being addressed through segregation by the government. While this may be unavoidable to ensure security and stability in the short term, it is not viable, even counterproductive, in the longer term. The displacement of the Rohingya was formalized by government policies: Muslims whose homes were destroyed in the violence should only live in IDP camps. Human Rights Watch argued that the wave of violence became a coordinated campaign for the government to forcibly relocate or remove the state’s Muslims. Amnesty International agrees by stating that the response of the authorities was aimed at the separations of communities, essentially segregating Muslims from the rest of Rakhine State society (Amnesty International, 2017a; HRW, 2013a).

In 2014, official documents leaked to the media in which the Myanmar government outlined a plan to relocate Rohingya to permanent camps instead of back to their homes. Human Rights Watch called this plan “a blueprint for permanent segregation and statelessness that appears designed to force them to flee the country”(HRW, 2014).

In both military operations in 2016 and 2017, Rohingya villages were systematically burned down to the ground. Amnesty International speaks of a mass-scale scorched-earth campaign across northern Rakhine State, where Myanmar security forces and vigilante mobs are burning down entire Rohingya villages and shooting people at random as they try to flee. This led to a forced major Rohingya exodus. Forced, because Rohingya had no other choice than fleeing their houses. The first violent response forced around 87,000

Rohingya to flee to neighboring Bangladesh, the second more than 624,000 (Amnesty International, 2017b; HRW, 2018a).

Now, Rakhine State is being militarized, as authorities are building security force bases and bulldozing land where Rohingya villages were burned to the ground during the recent military operations. Plans to repatriate the Rohingya are therefore threatened (Amnesty International, 2018c).

Incitement and encouragement of hatred

The government uses discriminatory language regarding the Rohingya that echoes the incendiary language of Buddhist monks and local Rakhine. It openly considers the Rohingya to be illegal immigrants from what is now Bangladesh and not a distinct “national race” of Burma, denying them consideration for full citizenship. Official government statements refer to them as “Bengali,” “so-called Rohingya,” or the pejorative “kalar” (HRW, 2013b). Until very recently, the proliferation of hate speech has not been stopped or even challenged by the government. The government even exacerbated the situation by both allowing and directly producing hate speech inciting discrimination and violence in print and online. State media published derogatory anti-Rohingya articles and government officials published inflammatory posts on social media (Amnesty International, 2018a).

The Burmese government of President Thein Sein took no serious steps to hold accountable those responsible for the violence in 2012 or to prevent future outbreaks of violence. In response to the first wave of violence, the president installed an investigation commission to look into the situation in Rakhine State. It submitted a final and public report in April 2013, which was particularly controversial because it declined to use the term “Rohingya”. Instead it adopted the government usage “Bengali” and noted that use of the former term is highly controversial in Myanmar (International Crisis Group, 2013). While Aung San Suu Kyi has taken steps towards including ethnic minorities in the political process, such as naming an ethnic Chin as a vice president, she also has remained silent on the ever deteriorating plight of the Rohingya (Schreiner, 2017).

The government uses state media to deny any evidence of violence used by the military and police against Rohingya. At the same time, it refuses journalists access to IDP camps. After the incident in October 2016, the Myanmar government published an investigation report of the attacks in which it denied the commission of genocide, or any human rights abuses against the Rohingya. It denies killing any Rohingya

people, burning their villages, raping women and girls, and stealing possessions. The report instead accuses the Rohingya of burning down their own houses and committing conspiratorial terrorist attacks (Investigation Commission on Maungtaw, 2017). The government formally declared ARSA to be a terrorist group under national law on August the 25th, presenting the conflict of 2016 as a fight against transnational terrorism rather than domestic insurgency (International Crisis Group, 2017c).

Journalists questioning the official narratives have been accused in the state media of working very close with the attackers. The government has responded with blanket denials to allegations that the military has committed abuses. These repeated denials, widely disseminated in the state media, reinforce a climate of impunity for the army and Rakhine vigilantes. Besides, it is particularly dangerous in a context of widespread negative Muslim sentiments at all levels of the military and in society as a whole (HRW, 2016b; International Crisis Group, 2016a). The framing of the conflict by the government in the media only strengthened the anti-Muslim sentiment in the country. The State’s refusal to address the issues of impunity created conditions within which the central state allows the serious bodily and mental harm inflicted on the Rohingya to continue and to spread (Zarni & Cowley, 2014).

Recent developments in this area seem to go in another direction. Like mentioned earlier, the NLD-led government took increasing action against Buddhist monks and organizations that used extremist and ultranationalist rhetoric in 2017 (HRW, 2018a).

In April 2018, seven Myanmar soldiers have been sentenced to “10 years in prison with hard labor in a remote area” for participating in a massacre of 10 Rohingya Muslim men last September. These sentences followed an internal investigation carried out by the country's military (Reuters, 2018b). It is the first time that people in Burma have been convicted of the murder of the Rohingya. It is a small step but a good one, and above all it is a step in the right direction. Until now, the Burmese government has always denied that the military have committed abuses against the Rohingya. However, Myanmar still denies the accusation of genocide or ethnic cleansing.

5.3 The ARSA-attacks: The result of political exclusion?

A new Muslim insurgency

On October 9, 2016 an armed group Harakat Al-Yaqin ( HaY or Faith Movement), now known as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), launched attacks on three security posts in Maungdaw and Rathedaung township in the north of Rakhine State, leaving nine police officers death (Amnesty International, 2017a). The attackers, several hundred local Muslim men, eight of whom were killed and two captured, made off with 62 firearms and more than 10,000 rounds of ammunition. Several further clashes occurred in October whereby four soldiers were killed (HRW, 2017; International Crisis Group, 2016a). These attacks showed a major escalation of violence in Rakhine State and reflected an unknown level of planning in a conflict that has seen little organized violent resistance from the Muslim population. International Crisis Group (2016) marked these events as the emergence of a new Muslim insurgency, a new form of organized violent resistance, in the Muslim majority northern parts of Rakhine State. This caused widespread anxiety in both communities, but particularly amongst Buddhist Rakhine villagers who are the minority in that part of the state. Some 3, 000 Rakhine fled. In reaction to the ARSA attacks, the military and Border Guard Police launched a major operation aimed at recovering the looted weapons, capturing those involved and arresting their helpers (see 5.2). Further escalation on the 12th of November led to an extremely violent reaction from the army and a collective punishment of the entire Rohingya community in northern Rakhine (International Crisis Group, 2016a).

Less than a year later, on August 25, new attacks were executed by HaY (ARSA) on 30 police posts and an army base in the north of Myanmar’s Rakhine State, in the townships of Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung. This second wave of larger, coordinated attacks was undoubtedly intended as a provocation. A small number of further clashes occurred over the next several days. The attacks were initiated via a WhatsApp message, instructing cell leaders to mobilize all male villagers over the age of fifteen, assemble in pre-planned locations with whatever sharp objects were available and attack designated targets. Many ordinary villagers reacted to this call. In one of the messages one of the ARSA leaders, Ata Ullah, instructed to burn down Rakhine Budhist villages. This was in direct contradiction to the group’s stated policy to refrain from attacking non-security targets. Probably, the reason for his was that non-Rohingya vigilantes from nearby villages were helping the military burn Rohingya villages during clearance operations(International Crisis Group, 2017b).

ARSA: a new actor in Rakhine’s political landscape

As demonstrated in the previous title (5.2), Muslim communities in Rakhine State, particularly the Rohingya, have over the years been progressively marginalized from social and political life. They have seen a dramatical decrease of their rights. As explained before, Muslim communities in Rakhine State, particularly the Rohingya, face significant restrictions on their access to citizenship and this has a serious impact on other rights and the ability to obtain government services. They are not heard and are marginalized by the procedures of democratic politics.

The systematic suppression of the Rohingya became particularly acute during the 2012 wave of anti- Muslim violence. In the wake of that violence, and seeing no likelihood of improvement, some Rohingya in northern Rakhine State and the diaspora began considering taking up arms for the community to live as Myanmar citizens with rights respected by the state. It is in that context, that the ARSA was formed. At that time the group identified itself as the Harakat Al-Yakin (Faith Movement). The group was established and is overseen by a committee of some twenty senior leaders headquartered in Mecca, with at least one member based in Medina. All members are Rohingya migrants or have Rohingya heritage. The group is well organized, well funded and well connected in Bangladesh, Pakistan and possibly India. Some or all have visited Bangladesh and northern Rakhine State at different times. They recruited leaders and trained hundreds of villages in 2013 and 2014. In October 2016 they started spreading YouTube videos, showing their continued actions in north Maungdaw and stating their demands. On March 2017, the group announced that it had changed its name to ARSA (Amnesty International, 2017a; International Crisis Group, 2016a).

Previous armed militant groups in Rakhine State had been based in the hills (the Arakan mujahidin in the 1950s), or launched hit-and-run attacks from across the border in Bangladesh (the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation in the 1990s). In contrast, ARSA operates from within Rohingya villages. Some are thought to have experience from other conflicts, like Afghanistan and Pakistan. They are leading operations on the ground. Others returned from refugee camps in Bangladesh before October 9th to join the group. The main fighting force, however, is made up of Muslim villagers in northern Rakhine State. They have been given basic training and are organized into village-level cells to limit risks of compromise, mostly led by young Islamic clerics of scholars (International Crisis Group, 2016a, 2017b).

Though it does not appear to have religious motivations, HaY has sought religious legitimacy for its attacks: Given the persecution Muslim communities face in Rakhine State, the campaign against the

security forces is legal in Islam, and anyone opposing it is in opposition to Islam. The movement has only attacked security forces, not religious targets, Buddhist villagers or civilians. There are no indications that their objectives are transnational jihadist terrorism. Their aim is to stop persecution of Rohingya and secure their rights and greater autonomy as Myanmar citizens (International Crisis Group, 2016a). Their objective was thus not separatist, nor anti-Buddhist or transnational jihadist (International Crisis Group, 2016a).

To answer the question why a violent reaction from some in the Muslim population of Rakhine State has emerged now, the dissertation builds on the theory of political horizontal inequality.

Particularly there are a few key developments that are likely to have strengthened the group’s decision to launch an insurgency and that created a much more fertile recruiting ground for it. The disenfranchisement of Muslim voters in 2015 was probably an instigator. One million people in Rakhine State lost their right to vote by a decision to cancel their identification documents. The Rohingya saw their ability to vote as their last remaining connection to politics and means of influence. This political disenfranchisement was further cemented when all Rohingya candidates applying to contest the 2015 general election were disqualified either on the basis of their citizenship status or the status of their parents. According to election monitors and other sources, election commissions at all levels rejected candidates solely on the basis of their physical appearance, names or religion, thus discriminating on racial and religious grounds. As a consequence, there are no longer Rohingya representatives in the legislature and thus no more reasons for any party to take in to account their views, even not peripherally (Amnesty International, 2017a; International Crisis Group, 2014).

Similar to other ethnic communities in Myanmar, the Rohingya were hopeful about a political resolution with the formation of a much-hoped-for democratic government in Myanmar. But now, the Rohingya community feels like politics have failed them and they lack hope of any political solution. Increasing despair due to this exclusion has driven the Muslim population in Rakhine State to consider violence. However, this does not mean that this population is radicalized. They just want a place in the nation’s life. The resort to violence stems from their alienation from an effective participation in the democratic system. According to the theory of Cederman, Gleditsch and Hug, the ARSA violence can also be qualified as electoral violence. Rohingya are excluded from the electoral competition and thus excluded from any meaningful potential access to political power and this because of their membership to an ethnic group.

In this specific case of the Rohingya, political exclusion is not the only problem. They face an extreme discrimination by Myanmar’s society and state. The majority lacks basic rights and cannot freely move

from their villages or from camps for internally displaced people. They must request permission to marry and are prohibited from having more than two children. They face daily abuses by government authorities. A flawed citizenship law explicitly prevents them from ever gaining full rights. On top of that, the Myanmar Parliament passed four bills pushed by Buddhist hardliners claiming to protect Buddhism in 2015. These laws discriminate against religious minorities, placing restrictions on interfaith marriage and religious conversion, and allowing the government to limit birthrates in specific regions. The climate of fear that these discriminations produce, combined with the complete political exclusion, persecution and poverty, is driving many Rohingya to flee or to resort to violence. In other words, the population is alienated, desperate and dispossessed. Rohingya are hunted by the country they claim as their home and therefore they believe that they have little to lose if they would resort to violence (International Crisis Group, 2017d). Therefore, ARSA finds a lot of support among the ordinary Muslim population in Rakhine State. This is also apparent from the massive upswing of male villagers following an explicit call of the group. The Rohingya population is clearly ripe for exploitation by such groups as ARSA. The risks to those who live in Myanmar, the country’s transition and regional stability are considerable. An aggressive and grossly disproportionate military response, like we have seen in 2016 and 2017, that is not part of a broader political strategy and policy framework will only worsen the situation. Heavy-handed security measures will only create more despair and animosity among local Muslims, increase support for ARSA and provoke a deepening cycle of violence (International Crisis Group, 2016a).

These attacks from ARSA gave new oxygen to nationalist groups. It brought the perceived threat of violent Islam to the forefront and anti-Muslim sentiment peaked again. The attacks inevitably became part of the Buddhist nationalist narrative, further complicating the social and political dynamics of religion and ethnicity in Rakhine State (International Crisis Group, 2017a). Understanding and addressing how these dynamics fuel fear, nationalist rhetoric and militant behavior within Myanmar’s different communities has taken on even greater urgency (Amnesty International, 2017a).

Chapter Six: Conclusion

As seen over the years in Myanmar, democratization can be a highly unstable process. This research has shown a possible link between Myanmar's political transition and an increase in violence in Rakhine State. However, it is important to note that not every incident or violent upsurge in Myanmar, or even in Rakhine State, can be linked to the country’s democratization process. It is therefore advised to be very cautious with generalizations.

This study provides three major reasons for the increase in violence in Rakhine State related to the political transition in Myanmar. In the first place, it stated that through democratization an increase in political competition took place. This has provided incentives for political actors and elites to set in motion a political mobilization to gain political support. In this search for political support, political actors invoked ethnic nationalism. This was one of the most powerful factors in Myanmar’s political transition. Both at national and at regional level of Rakhine State, it influenced politics.

On a regional level, political mobilization mainly took place on the side of the Rakhine Buddhists, simply because the Rohingya did not have the political opportunity to do so. Rakhine had the political space to organize themselves and to establish political parties. During mobilization, political actors appealed to Rakhine’s grievances and fears. Political actors and Buddhist nationalist groups have been active in promoting anti-Muslim sentiment and by doing so they have created more hostility and distrust between the Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhist than ever before. As explained, this has translated itself into waves of communal violence in 2012. This research argued that the Rakhine militancy could be seen as a reaction out of fear instilled by political actors to not be included into the nation.

On a national level, there has also been resurgence in Buddhist nationalism accompanied by anti-Muslim sentiment. In particular, two religious nationalist groups, the 969 and MaBaTha, are spearheading campaigns to protect Buddhism against perceived Muslim threats. Those groups have had considerable public support, though they ultimately did not succeed in influencing electoral politics. Parties and candidates standing on a Buddhist nationalist platform won no seats or significant numbers of votes. The widespread adoration for Aung San Suu Kyi and hatred of the former military regime, with which the USDP was closely associated, surpassed nationalist concerns at the ballot box. However, their influence on politics was enormous. Political mobilization by those two Buddhist nationalist organizations has to a considerable extent succeeded in changing norms, laws and practices in Myanmar. Countrywide anti-

Muslim sentiment made it politically difficult for both the USDP and the NLD to take steps seen as supportive of Muslim rights. This was perhaps most evident when Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD refused to run any Muslim candidates in the 2015 election. These decisions by the NLD and the USDP were made to avoid losing support of their voter base. In doing so they confirmed and even reinforced the image of Muslims as a threat. These policy decisions consolidated the exclusion of Rohingya. This leaves Muslim communities in Rakhine State more marginalized than ever, locally and nationally.

In the second place, the research showed that the exclusion of Rohingya only worsened since Myanmar’s political transition. The country’s state policy became one of institutionalized discrimination and segregation. In order to favor the Buddhist Burmese majority, the government defined Myanmar’s nation in narrow ethnic terms, to which the Rohingya not belong. There is no political profit in promoting citizenship and constitutional rights for them and, as a consequence, the government itself started to proceed to active exclusion of this minority. This manifested itself through discriminatory laws and policies and a complete disenfranchisement of the Rohingya, but also through the use of brutal violence from Myanmar’s army. This resulted in a massive refugee crisis.

Lastly, the research has demonstrated that the denial of the right for Rohingya people to participate in civil and political life based on their ethnicity has had negative and violent implications. The Rohingya saw their ability to vote as their last remaining connection to politics and means of influence. After elections in 2015, they feel like politics have failed them and they lack hope of any political solution. Increasing despair has driven the Muslim population in Rakhine State to consider violence and to join ARSA. This dissertation argued that the emergence of the armed group ARSA and its violent attacks is part of the Rohingya’s struggle to be included in the electoral system, but above all in the Burmese nation.

In these three reasons, identity takes center stage. Social identities are translated into political ones. Therefore, this research concludes that the process of democratization in Myanmar has caused an active process of identity construction. As explained, this construction relied largely on the actions of political actors in Rakhine State and nationalist movements like the 969 and MaBaTha, mobilizing different identities by appealing to shared grievances and fears. However, identity is also integrated in the actions of the state and the army. During the process of democratization, they have created a narrow image of the nation. Membership to this nation is depending on (ethnic) identity. This in-or exclusion in or from the nation draws boundaries between groups and can be an incentive to resort to violence. The Rakhine Buddhists were included in the nation and used violence against those excluded, because they were instilled

that they are a threat. Rohingya were excluded from the nation and resorted to violence against the state with the demand to become included.

Democratization has thus not only generated an increase in violence in Rakhine State, it has also generated new types of violence. Or better, the motivation to resort to violence is completely different from that before Myanmar's transition. On the one hand, there is more violence between groups. Communal violence is instigated by influential political actors in their search for more political support. On the other hand, there is an increase in violence from the state against certain excluded groups. Those groups do not belong to the narrow image of the nation that is created by the state under the pressure of the majority. In the context of Myanmar, this violence can even be called genocidal because of its gravity. Finally, there is an increase of excluded groups resorting to violence. This violence is neither separatist, nor anti-Buddhist, it is a cry for recognition and inclusion in the nation.

Recent developments in Myanmar’s political landscape seem to move more in the direction of such a recognition, but certainly not yet towards inclusion. The NLD-led government took increasing action against Buddhist monks and organizations that use extreme nationalist narratives. Besides, the military very recently sentenced seven Myanmar soldiers for participating in violence aimed at Rohingya. Nevertheless, both the government and the army continue to deny most of the atrocities. The latest events in the region of Kachin also raise new questions and concerns. After expelling the Rohingya, the government of Myanmar seems now to have started an offensive against the Kachin, a Christian minority.

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