ELECTION REPORT ✩ Observing Myanmar’s 2015 General Elections Final Report ELECTION REPORT ✩ Observing Myanmar’s 2015 General Elections Final Report One Copenhill 453 Freedom Parkway Atlanta, GA 30307 (404) 420-5100 www.cartercenter.org Contents Executive Summary . 4 Pre-election Political Space Background . 5 and the Campaign Period . 40 Constitutional and Legal Framework . 5 Political Space in the Pre-election Period . .. 40 Electoral System and Boundary Delimitation . 6 The Campaign Period . 42 Election Management . 6 Campaign Finance .. 48 Voter Eligibility and Registration . 6 Voting, Counting, and Tabulation . 50 Candidate Eligibility and Registration . 7 Advance Voting . 51 Political Space and the Campaign Period . 7 Election Day . 52 Campaign Finance .. 8 Tabulation of Results . 57 Voter Education . 8 Announcement of Results . 58 Election Day and Advance Voting . 8 Participation of Women in Tabulation and Announcement of Results . 10 the Electoral Process . 59 Election Observation . 10 Political Participation . 59 Election Dispute Resolution .. 11 Election Administration . 59 Participation of Women and Ethnic Groups . 11 Election Security . 61 Conclusions and Recommendations . .. 11 Election Observation . 62 The Carter Center in Myanmar . 12 Access for Civil Society Observer Groups . .. 62 Election Observation Methodology . 13 International Observation . 64 Criteria for Election Assessment . 14 Election Dispute Resolution . 65 Pre-election Observation and Police Complaints and the Role of Deployment of Long-Term Observers. 14 Mediation Committees .. 65 Deployment of Short-Term Observers . 15 Postelection Complaints .. 66 Leadership Delegation . 16 Postelection Consultations . 70 Postelection Day Observation . 16 Recommendations . 71 Historical and Political Background . 17 To the Government of Myanmar Demands for Reform and the 1990 Elections .17 and the Union Parliament . 71 The 2008 Constitution . 18 To the Union Election Commission . 73 The 2010 Elections and 2012 By-Elections .. 18 Appendices . 75 Ethnic Conflict and Cease-Fire Negotiations . 19 Appendix A: Acknowledgments . 75 Rakhine State and Communal Conflict . 21 Appendix B: The Carter Center Electoral Institutions and the Delegation and Staff . 76 Framework for the Elections . 23 Appendix C: Terms and Abbreviations . 78 Constitutional Framework . 23 Appendix D: Statements . 79 Legislative Framework .. 25 Electoral System . .. 25 Appendix E: Deployment Plan . 155 Constituency Boundary Delimitation .. 27 Appendix F: Checklists . 157 Election Management . 28 Appendix G: Invitation to Observe . 180 Voter Registration . 31 Candidate Registration Process . 35 Voter Education . .. 38 Executive Summary On Nov. 8, 2015, Myanmar held the first general democratic transition as a result of these elections. election under the 2008 constitution in which To maintain this trajectory, it is important for all main political parties, including those that all actors to engage in a dialogue and consensus- boycotted the election in 2010, chose to partici- seeking process to identify constructive steps pate. The Carter Center observed the election toward lasting peace and national reconciliation. process for over one year, from December 2014 The Carter Center encourages the government, through March 2016. Based on its in-depth obser- Parliament, electoral authorities, and civil society vation, the Center reaffirms its congratulations of Myanmar to prioritize political and electoral to the people of Myanmar, who exercised their reform based on internationally accepted demo- political rights with pride and enthusiasm. Their cratic standards and offers its continued support The Myanmar empowerment and commitment to the democratic for reform. Farmers process were not only remarkable but crucial The Carter Center has maintained a pres- Development to counterbalancing the considerable structural ence in Myanmar since opening an office in Party holds a impediments to fully democratic elections. Despite Yangon in October 2013. At the invitation of the campaign event flaws observed, the postelection period confirms Union Election Commission (UEC), the Center in Myaungmya township, the Carter Center’s view that Myanmar appears deployed long-term observers from December 2014 Ayeyarwady region. to be on a positive trajectory toward a peaceful, through July 2015 to gather information on the pre-election environment and the ongoing transition process. Following a formal invitation in March 2015 to observe the election — and Nolle . the announcement of the election date for Jana S Nov. 8, 2015 — the Center officially began its election observation mission on Aug. 1, with six long-term observers and four core team experts monitoring and reporting on election preparations, the campaign period, and other aspects of the elec- tion process. On election day, the Center deployed a total of 62 observers from 25 countries to observe voting and counting in 245 polling stations in all states and regions. The mission was co-led by Jason Carter, chairman of the board of trustees of The Carter Center; Mary Robinson, former president of Ireland; and Bhojraj Pokharel, former chairman of Nepal’s election commission. The 4 Center continued its field observation in the post- displaced Rohingya in camps and imposing heavy election period, including during the tabulation of travel and other restrictions on the Muslim popu- results and election dispute resolution. The Carter lation as a whole. Center’s observation mission was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Principles for Constitutional and Legal Framework International Election Observation. Elections were held for the Union Parliament — which has a lower House (Pyithu Background Hluttaw) and an upper House (Amyotha The Nov. 8, 2015, general election was a mile- Hluttaw) — as well as for the unicameral assem- stone in the transition process launched in 2011. blies in each of the 14 states and regions. The The transition toward democracy was highly 2008 constitution provides the overall framework controlled, with the military and the nominally for these elections. Many weaknesses in the elec- civilian government — largely composed of toral law and its implementation can be traced to former senior army officers — setting the pace provisions of the military-drafted constitution that and the direction. Nonetheless, the transition structurally impact the democratic character of led to an opening of political space. Political the electoral and political processes. In particular, parties expanded their activities, and the formerly the military appoints 25 percent of the members suppressed opposition party National League for of each house of Parliament, giving it a de facto Democracy (NLD) gained parliamentary represen- veto over constitutional reform. The military also tation following the 2012 by-elections in which it appoints the ministers of defense, home affairs, won all but one seat that it contested. and border affairs and appoints 25 percent of In parallel to the political transition, steps state and regional assemblies. These provisions were undertaken to resolve longstanding ethnic are a fundamental violation of democratic norms conflict. By August 2013, the government had and should be amended in order for Myanmar to reached bilateral cease-fire agreements with become fully democratic. 14 ethnic armed groups and began working toward a nationwide cease-fire agreement. However, only eight groups signed the accord in October 2015, Many weaknesses in the electoral law and its and some major groups did not participate. Cease- fire signatories were removed from the list of implementation can be traced to provisions of the “unlawful associations,” creating space for these military-drafted constitution that structurally impact groups to play a role in democratic politics in the future. the democratic character of the electoral and In addition to ethnic conflict, anti-Muslim sentiment and Buddhist nationalism have emerged political processes. as a critical feature of politics in Myanmar, particularly in Rakhine state, where about one- Other issues of concern with regard to the third of the population are Muslim, many of whom constitutional framework include the equality self-identify as Rohingya. The government does of the vote, which is not guaranteed under the not recognize the Rohingya as an ethnic group. current election system; an election manage- Relations between the ethnic Rakhine Buddhist ment body that enjoys broad authority but lacks majority and Muslim minority deteriorated to guarantees of independence and impartiality and their worst level beginning in June 2012, when whose decisions are not subject to judicial appeal; intercommunal violence across Rakhine state left unreasonably restrictive provisions on voter and hundreds dead or injured and tens of thousands candidate eligibility; and unreasonable restrictions displaced. To quell violence, the government on eligibility for the presidency, which appear to separated the communities, isolating some 130,000 be directed at a particular individual. Observing Myanmar’s 2015 General Elections 5 Apart from constitutional constraints, the a significant deficit in human and material election laws generally provide for an acceptable resources. Although the election administration electoral process when implemented reason- lacked legal and structural independence, the ably, as they were in this election. However, UEC appeared to exercise its authority without the election legislation contains gaps,