Multi-Donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activity in Southern Sudan Since 2005
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Multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activity in Southern Sudan since 2005 ANNEX 5 SPLA transformation 1 Contents Sub-Annexes ............................................................................................................................. 2 Tables and Figures ................................................................................................................... 2 Section One: Introduction ....................................................................................................... 4 1.1. Links to Evaluation Hypotheses and Conflict Analysis ................................................. 4 1.2. Methodology ................................................................................................................... 5 Section Two: Context ............................................................................................................... 6 2.1. Background to Recent Violence ..................................................................................... 6 2.2. The CPA Provisions ........................................................................................................ 7 2.3. SPLA and South-South Security ..................................................................................... 8 2.4. Integrated Approach ...................................................................................................... 10 2.5. UNMIS .......................................................................................................................... 12 Section Three: SPLA Transformation and its Relationship to Disarmament ................. 15 3.1. SPLA Transformation: Strategic Focus ........................................................................ 15 3.2. The Importance of Civilian Disarmament .................................................................... 15 3.3. Donor Interventions ...................................................................................................... 16 3.4. Defence Budget and SPLA Payroll ............................................................................... 18 3.5. Defence Management Structures .................................................................................. 20 3.6. Civilian Disarmament – Results ................................................................................... 22 3.7. Security Sector Awareness ........................................................................................... 22 3.8. Donor Constraints ......................................................................................................... 23 3.9. Future Size of SPLA ..................................................................................................... 23 Section Four: Findings .......................................................................................................... 25 4.1. Findings: DDR .............................................................................................................. 25 4.2. Findings: UNMIS .......................................................................................................... 25 4.3. Findings: SPLA Transformation ................................................................................... 25 4.4. Findings Against Initial Evaluation Hypotheses ........................................................... 26 Sub-Annexes Sub-Annex 1: Acronyms.......................................................................................................... 28 Sub-Annex 2: References and Bibliography ............................................................................ 29 Sub-Annex 3: List of Interviewees .......................................................................................... 32 Sub-Annex 4: Project/Programme Information ....................................................................... 34 Tables and Figures Table 1: Conflict Factors relating to SPLA Transformation .................................................... 5 Figure 1: GoSS Spending on the SPLA, 2006-09 (USD) .......................................................... 9 2 Map 1: States of Southern Sudan Source: OCHA 3 Section One: Introduction 1.1. Links to Evaluation Hypotheses and Conflict Analysis 1. In the evaluation conflict analysis we identified several factors causing instability in Southern Sudan that relate directly to the security apparatus: At the national level, the remaining divisions between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), Sudan People‟s Liberation Army (SPLA) and Joint Integrated Units (JIUs); and the lack of progress towards establishing a rule of law. At State level, the arming of client groups and the fact that violence can be manipulated for political ends. At local levels, the inefficiency of the disarmament process and escalating violence in local cattle raiding and other disputes. 2. We further noted how difficult it is to discern the extent to which donor policies explicitly take into account security issues; if there is a causal link between development (state-building, basic services) and a reduction in violence, this has not yet been supported by evidence. In other words, peacebuilding may require more immediate interventions than those associated solely with the broader state-building agenda. 3. The transformation of the SPLA from a guerrilla army to a professional adjunct of the State is an urgent priority in several respects: first, because the almost certain vote for Southern secession will lead to the requirement of an independent standing army; second, that the legitimacy of that army will depend on ridding it of all independent or predatory elements; and third, that the financial burden of the current SPLA force is unsustainable. Related to these are other issues of equal importance: how to find alternative employment for those demobilised; how to ensure that no gap is left in civilian protection; and how to provide adequate oversight of the responsibilities and mandate of the SPLA. 4. In Southern Sudan the relationship between the SPLA and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) is complex, not least because historically the ruling SPLA/SPLM were one and the same, and many GoSS officials were drawn from senior SPLA ranks. Nevertheless, in accepting that a modern state depends on the clear separation of civil and military roles, GoSS has invited donors to assist in the SPLA reform process. This brief review looks at how the task has been undertaken and asks what lessons can be learned from the process. 5. The reform of security and justice institutions is a key element within the conflict prevention and peacebuilding CPPB „Utstein Palette‟, and the table below presents a schematic overview of the key factors causing instability in the security sector, based on our conflict analysis matrix. 4 Table 1: Conflict Factors relating to SPLA Transformation Security Political Economic Social National JIUs not Violations of CPA1, High proportion of Allegations of developed as including arms spending on destabilisation planned shipments and national security through the troop build-up but diminishing funding of SAF and SPLA still along strategic revenues as oil price Southern militias on standby for border areas not fully recovered – either by the war North or by SAF remain in oil Southern leaders fields, and SPLA in Abyei and Blue Nile State/Locality Disarmament is Disarmament SPLA often Risk of ethnic sporadic, with authority vested in grounded due to mobilisation opportunities for governors poor resources around political exploitation issues Ethnic preferences emerging Local Cattle rustling Former SPLA ‘big Unemployed/aliena Inadequate and revenge men’ command ted youths taking an judicial process skirmishes loyalty and retain active and for resolution of escalate violence arms independent role in disputes violence Ineffective police Women and Peacebuilding not children linked to increasingly development targeted in raids planning and inputs 1.2. Methodology 6. The team visited Juba twice: December 2009 and February/March 2010. All interviews were conducted with individuals (Sub-Annex 3), with the exception of (a) participation with the Governance Team in focus group discussions with NGOs, INGOs and UNDP; and (b) participation in the GoSS „dialogue‟ on state-building and peacebuilding (part of an international process involving seven countries). 7. Although the team visited the SPLA headquarters twice, interviewing international contractors and USAID/DFID personnel, the evaluation focal partner at Ministry of Finance was unable to obtain the requested (and formally required) appointment with senior officials of the SPLA, so GoSS opinions on the SPLA transformation programme were derived only from other GoSS ministries and State level officials. Although this was not entirely satisfactory, we feel confident that through triangulation of interviews and review of documents a reasonably complete picture emerges. 1 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 5 Section Two: Context 2.1. Background to Recent Violence 8. In Southern Sudan the notion of a linear progression from war to peace is challenged by the manifestation of new forms of violence that are often mutually reinforcing and can threaten conventional approaches to promoting peace and stability. Hierarchical, patronage and ethnicity-driven systems of security and governance persist. The question is whether conventional donor approaches to post-war „repair‟ – Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Security