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Lindsay Cross Resurrection River 1 Lindsay Cross Resurrection River 1 Lindsay Cross Resurrection River 2 INTRODUCTION Praise for the Men of Mercy Series “Lindsay Cross delivers high-powered action, alpha heroes and an exciting conclusion!” - ELLE JAMES New York Times and USA Today bestselling author "This is one of those books that the phrase sit down, shut up and hang on would be used because it’s a wild ride from page one to the end.” - 5 Star Goodreads Review, Redemption River "This book was wall to wall action. Once the danger hit, it never slowed down. I was late leaving my house because there was no way I could stop reading." - 5 Star NetGalley Review, Redemption River Lindsay Cross Resurrection River 3 DOSSIER TASK FORCE SCORPION (TF-S) A branch of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) Ft. Grenada, MS MACK GREY: Detachment Commander, Captain ♣ Recruited from the 75th Ranger Regiment, Ft. Benning, GA ♣ Specialized Skills: direct action, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, interrogations specialist, psychological warfare ♣ First in Command. Responsible for ensuring and maintaining operational readiness. ♣ Height: 6’ ♣ Weight: 195lbs ♣ Combat Experience: Operation Gothic Serpent, Somalia. Operation Desert Storm, OIF, Operation Crescent Wind, Operation Rhino, Operation Anaconda, Operation Jacana, Operation Mountain Viper, Operation Eagle Fury, Operation Condor, Operation Summit, Operation Volcano, Operation Achilles Lindsay Cross Resurrection River 4 HUNTER JAMES: Warrant Officer, Detachment Commander ♣ Recruited from the 75th Ranger Regiment, Ft. Benning, GA ♣ Specialized Skills: direct action, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, psychological warfare ♣ Responsible for overseeing all Team ops. Commands in absence of detachment commander. ♣ Height: 6’3” ♣ Weight: 230lbs ♣ Combat Experience: Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Crescent Wind, Operation Anaconda, Operation Jacana, Operation Mountain Viper RANGER JAMES: Team Daddy/Team Sergeant, Master Sgt. ♣ Recruited from the 75th Ranger Regiment, Ft. Benning, GA ♣ Specialized Skills: direct action, unconventional warfare, special recon ♣ Plans, coordinates & directs Team intelligence, analysis and dissemination. ♣ Height: 6’4” ♣ Weight: 225lbs ♣ Combat Experience: Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Crescent Wind, Operation Anaconda, Operation Jacana, Operation Mountain Viper, Operation Eagle Fury Lindsay Cross Resurrection River 5 JARED CROWE: Weapons Sergeant, Sgt. 1st Class ♣ Recruited from Delta Force, Ft. Bragg, NC ♣ Specialized Skills: direct action, unconventional warfare, special recon, Sniper ♣ Weapons expert. Capable of firing and employing all small arm and crew served weapons ♣ Height: 6’0” ♣ Weight: 220lbs ♣ Combat Experience: Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Crescent Wind, Operation Anaconda, Operation Jacana, Operation Condor, Operation Summit, Operation Volcano, Operation Achilles HOYT CROWE: Asst. Weapons Sergeant, Staff Sgt. ♣ Recruited from Delta Force, Ft. Bragg, NC ♣ Specialized Skills: direct action, unconventional warfare, special recon, Sniper ♣ Weapons expert. Capable of firing and employing all small arm and crew served weapons ♣ Height: 6’0” ♣ Weight: 210lbs ♣ Combat Experience: Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Crescent Wind, Operation Anaconda, Operation Jacana, Operation Condor, Operation Lindsay Cross Resurrection River 6 Summit, Operation Volcano, Operation Achilles AARON SPEIRS: Medical Sergeant, Sgt. 1st Class ♣ Recruited from Delta Force, Ft. Bragg, NC ♣ Specialized Skills: direct action, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, medic ♣ The life-saver. Employs the latest field medical technology and limited surgical procedures ♣ Height: 6’1” ♣ Weight: 195lbs ♣ Combat Experience: Operation Anaconda, Operation Jacana, Operation Condor, Operation Summit, Operation Volcano, Operation Achilles RISER MALLON: Asst. Medical Sergeant, Staff Sgt. ♣ Recruited from Delta Force, Ft. Bragg, NC ♣ Specialized Skills: direct action, unconventional warfare, special recon, medic ♣ The life-saver. Employs the latest field medical technology and limited surgical procedures ♣ Height: 6’2” ♣ Weight: 215lbs ♣ Combat Experience: Operation Anaconda, Operation Jacana, Lindsay Cross Resurrection River 7 Operation Condor, Operation Summit, Operation Volcano, Operation Achilles, Operation Mountain Viper, Operation Eagle Fury MERC: Engineer Sergeant, Sgt. 1st Class ♣ Recruited from Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) ♣ Specialized Skills: direct action, unconventional warfare, special recon, Demolitions, psychological operations ♣ Demolition expert. Trained in psychological warfare, conducts field interrogations. ♣ Height: 6’5” ♣ Weight: 250lbs ♣ Combat Experience: Classified ETHAN SLADE: Communications Sergeant/Commo Guy, Sgt. 1st Class ♣ Recruited from the 75th Ranger Regiment, Ft. Benning, GA ♣ Specialized Skills: direct action, unconventional warfare, special recon, communications ♣ Communications expert. Employ latest FM, multi-channel, and satellite communication devices. ♣ Height: 6’0” ♣ Weight: 200lbs ♣ Combat Experience: Operation Condor, Operation Summit, Operation Volcano, Operation Achilles Lindsay Cross Resurrection River 8 CORD CARTER: Weapons Sergeant, Staff Sgt. ♣ Recruited from the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), Camp Lejeune, NC ♣ Specialized Skills: direct action, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, weapons expert/sniper ♣ Weapons expert. Capable of firing and employing all small arm and crew served weapons ♣ Height: 6’1” ♣ Weight: 210lbs ♣ Combat Experience: Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Condor, Operation Summit, Operation Volcano, Operation Achilles Lindsay Cross Resurrection River 9 CHAPTER ONE Amy’s day started at sunrise and ended after midnight. Feed the chickens. Feed the cows. Feed herself. Then, after five, feed the alcoholics. The rest of the time she spent pretending her husband hadn’t left for deployment with a good-bye fight instead of a good-bye kiss. Six months was a little long for a stand-off between husband and wife. And if Shane were home, that time would shrink to hours. But the damn man hadn’t called. Hadn’t written. She’d gotten nothing but a cold shoulder from a third world country. And Shane should have been home from deployment two-weeks ago. She paused painting the new nursery pink and put a hand to her aching back. She’d been on her feet for five hours straight trying to finish painting before her shift at the bar. Over three hours ago her feet had swollen past the confines of her tennis shoes and she’d switched to flip- flops. Now she just had to make it through the night without some drunk stepping on her feet Lindsay Cross Resurrection River 10 and mashing her bare toes. Amy probably should have taken a break, but she was determined to make a place for her daughter. Someone knocked on her front door. Eight o’clock. Who would be knocking on her door this late? Most of the residents of Mercy, Mississippi considered this bedtime. Her hand immediately went to her belly, covering her unborn child. Amy was seven months along, only finding out about her condition the week after Shane left. If he were regular military, she could tell him. Let him know he was going to be a father. But when Task Force Scorpion, TF-S, an elite branch of Special Forces deployed, they went off grid. Nothing and no one could contact them. They knocked again. Amy carefully balanced her wet paintbrush on the open bucket at her feet and headed to the front door, stopping for a quick peek in the mirror. A few smudges of paint dotted her cheek and her ponytail sagged a little. They knocked again. This time more forceful. Two-weeks late. Could be someone needed help or her best friends wanting to drag her out of the house and Lindsay Cross Resurrection River 11 make her pretend to be happy. Could be an all-together different reason. One she never wanted to know. Don’t answer it. Don’t answer it. Don’t answer it. “Amy, it’s me.” Ranger James. The man she should have married. Why was he on her front porch and not her husband? They were both in the same unit. If Ranger was home and not Shane… Her unborn daughter, Chloe, shoved an elbow into her ribs and Amy rubbed soothing circles over the skin. She took a calming breath. Her doctor told her no undue stress. It’s okay. He’s just letting me know Shane had to stay in the country longer than expected... She pasted on her I’m-sure-it’s-nothing- important smile and opened the door. The roar of the battering rain immediately surrounded her. A drenched and dripping Ranger stood on her front porch, his truck headlights shining through the downpour. His Lindsay Cross Resurrection River 12 blond hair plastered to his head. His t-shirt plastered to his chest. Do not look at his chest. “Amy.” Ranger’s voice still had that edge, the one that always managed to scrape across her nerves. But right now his voice had something else. Something frightening. She stepped onto the porch. Lighting flashed, highlighting his expression, and she jerked like she’d been struck in the chest. The raw pain in Ranger’s gaze made her tremble. “No.” “Shane.” His voice slammed through her with the force of an eighteen-wheeler. Her heart stopped. “Shane. He’s...” Ranger’s words faded under the roaring in her ears. Her hands went numb. He kept talking, but she couldn’t hear. Couldn’t process anything but the oxygen seeping from her lungs in horror. Just because she hadn’t talked to Shane recently didn’t mean something had happened to him. Didn’t mean he
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