FROM THE HISTORY OF THE BELARUSIAN REVOLUTION — SPECIAL REPORT — 11/19/2020 FROM THE HISTORY OF THE BELARUSIAN REVOLUTION Publisher: Warsaw Institute Wilcza St. 9 00-538 Warsaw, Poland +48 22 417 63 15 www.warsawinstitute.org [email protected] Authors: Grzegorz Kuczyński – Director of Eurasia Program, Warsaw Institute Jędrzej Duszyński – Executive Assistant, Warsaw Institute Editor: Maciej Śmigiel Translation and proofreading: Paweł Andrejczuk Typesetting and formatting: Dariusz Ligęza –L.STUDIO Front page photo: Pexels/Artem Podrez The opinions and positions presented in this publication reflect the views of the authors only. © Warsaw Institute 2020 2 Special Report www.warsawinstitute.org FROM THE HISTORY OF THE BELARUSIAN REVOLUTION TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 4 THE BELARUSIAN REVOLUTION: THE BEGINNING AND THE END (?) 5 ROUND TABLE ON BELARUS: REPORT ON THE DEBATE 13 #BelarusAlert REVOLUTION DAY BY DAY 16 AUTHORS 59 www.warsawinstitute.org Special Report 3 FROM THE HISTORY OF THE BELARUSIAN REVOLUTION INTRODUCTION On August 9, 2020, Belarus held a fraudulent presidential election, which was officially won by Alexander Lukashenko, who has been ruling the country since 1994. Even taking into account the whole spectrum of anti-democratic actions characterizing the regime in Minsk, it could be said that it was a kind of a break- through moment, after which the Belarusian society has said “enough.” This was additionally influenced by the economic situation of the country and disappoint- ment with the actions of the authorities against the coronavirus pandemic. The Belarusian people decided to express their dissatisfaction by protesting on a scale which was unprecedented in the history of this country, at the same time attracting the attention of the whole world. The Warsaw Institute Foundation, taking into account the historical and cultural heritage of Poland as well as the Central and Eastern Europe, actively supports all democratic movements in our part of the world. Guided by the spirit of solidarity with the Belarusian people, on August 24, 2020, i.e. after 15 days of protests, we launched a special program #BelarusAlert, which followed and described the situation in this country day by day. For the next 63 days we monitored current events, protests, reactions of the authorities and the international community up until October 27, 2020, the 78th day of the crisis and the failure to comply with the “ultimatum” issued by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya – Lukashenko’s opponent in the presidential election. Furthermore, we devoted numerous events and debates to the Belarusian cause, the most important of which was the “Round Table on Belarus” organized on September 30, 2020 along with leading Polish think tanks. This Report is the outcome and conclusion of our activities to date. In addition to all the texts in the #BelarusAlert series and the report on the aforementioned debate, it also presents our assessment of the protests, the circumstances that led to them, Belarusian democratic changes as well as the future of Alexander Lukashenko and the whole country. 4 Special Report www.warsawinstitute.org FROM THE HISTORY OF THE BELARUSIAN REVOLUTION SOURCE: PEXELS/ARTEM PODREZ www.warsawinstitute.org Special Report 5 FROM THE HISTORY OF THE BELARUSIAN REVOLUTION THE BELARUSIAN REVOLUTION: THE BEGINNING AND THE END (?) Grzegorz Kuczyński ass protests following the rigged presidential type of regime that Lukashenko had been building M election turned out to be the largest opposi- since the mid-1990s. This model based on tacit ac- tion movement against the authorities in the history ceptance for his rule by the majority in exchange of independent Belarus. Although Alexander Luka- for a relatively low but stable standard of living and shenko continues to hold the reins of government, social security. Yet, it was the increasingly visible he lost legitimization and the majority of Belaru- inefficiency of the economic model (the so-called sians are against him. He is in power only thanks Lukanomics) as well as the catalysts – the coronavi- to the loyalty of the law enforcement as well as the rus pandemic and the government’s policy towards political and economic support of Russia. The post- this problem that caused social discontent. In fact, -election protests mark the definitive end of this the political crisis began even before the election. SOURCE: PEXELS/LINA KIVAKA 6 Special Report www.warsawinstitute.org FROM THE HISTORY OF THE BELARUSIAN REVOLUTION The beginning of the election campaign coincided use their presence and make accusations of prepara- with the spring wave of coronavirus. Lukashenko tions for the coup, indirectly indicating that Moscow absolutely ignored the pandemic. The policy of pre- was behind it. The president went all-in to force the tending that the virus does not exist did not mean Kremlin to determine the actual attitude towards that people did not contract it. As a result, the Bela- the events in Belarus. A short-term crisis ended with rusians, accustomed to the social model of the state, a telephone conversation between Lukashenko and suddenly felt abandoned by their country. Therefore, Putin, during which the Belarusian leader probably mass protests took on a different approach than heard that he does not have to fear Russia. It turned those following the previous election. The protesters out, however, that the elimination of Tikhanovsky of different political views, even those who were and Babaryka was not enough, although Luka- not interested in politics at all, were united by the shenko ignored the candidacy of the blogger’s wife, vision of Lukashenko’s departure. Unfortunately Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. Meanwhile, more than for the president, this great discontent found its way 60,000 people attended her rally in Minsk on July out on the street – precisely because of the election 30. The turnout at the meetings of the opposition campaign that had started. The first wake-up call for candidates must have deepened the concerns of the Lukashenko should have been the shockingly large regime because even before the election Lukashenko attendance at the rallies of people intending to run reshuffled cabinet and the heads of some law enfor- in the election, where signatures were collected on cement agencies – clearly preparing for the possible candidate endorsement lists. However, the regime large post-election protests. decided that it would be possible to neutralize this by using the methods that have worked in the past, i.e. not allowing some people to run at all and putting some people in jail on various charges. The latter In fact, the political crisis began affected three activists whom Lukashenko may even before the election. have considered the most dangerous rivals: Viktar Babaryka, Valery Tsepkalo and Sergei Tikhano- vsky. He saw all three of them, not without a reason, Of course, the way the election was conducted as potential candidates who certainly have good allowed for the falsification of its results – votes contacts in Moscow or could even be supported by it. could be cast from August 4 to August 8. On August It should be noted that another novelty of this year’s 7, the Central Election Commission announced that protests, besides their mass scale, was the positive the turnout had already exceeded 30 percent. The attitude of the activists, and especially their leaders, main election day was August 9. Five candidates towards Russia. Unlike in the previous years, the op- run for the office, but from the very beginning it position did not have a national character, which was was clear that only two of them matter: Lukashen- close to Belarusian nationalism, or a clear geopoliti- ko and Tsikhanouskaya. Officially, Lukashenko cal orientation (closer to the West, further away from received about 80 percent of the votes whilst Tsi- Russia). No wonder that almost until the end of the khanouskaya about 10 percent (with 84 percent campaign Lukashenko opted for the alleged Russian turnout). This meant that there was no need for the threat, not the Western one. The most significant second round of the election. Of course, everyone event was the detention of several dozen Russian expected the results to be rigged, but the scale of mercenaries in a sanatorium near Minsk on July support that Lukashenko allegedly received was 29, 2020. Presumably they were travelling through astonishingly large, it even looked like a provocation Belarus to one of the countries where the Wagner and only strengthened the protest. The regime was Group operates and the Belarusian services knew prepared for the demonstrations and in the first two about it very well. However, Lukashenko decided to days after the vote it tried to brutally suppress the www.warsawinstitute.org Special Report 7 FROM THE HISTORY OF THE BELARUSIAN REVOLUTION SOURCE: FLICKR/NATALLIA RAK (CC BY-NC 2.0) protests. The scenario was supposed to be similar to the previous election when the authorities effec- The regime was prepared for the tively pacified protests in the largest cities, mainly in Minsk. However, this time it did not work. The demonstrations and in the first brutality of the militia mobilized people even two days after the vote it tried to more and after just a few days it turned out that the militia did not have the capability to disperse the brutally suppress the protests. crowds of thousands. What is more, the protests have proved to be widespread also in geographical terms. People took to the streets in small towns, phone calls between Lukashenko and Putin (August not only in western Belarus, but likewise in the 15-16) were crucial for the case. After them Russia regions adjacent to Russia, up to now perceived by declared its full support for the Belarusian regime, the regime as “safe.” It turned out that Lukashenko including the possibility of sending the forces of did not have enough forces to control the protests the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs to Belarus.