september 2012 . Vol 5 . Issue 9

Contents The Attack on the U.S.

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Attack on the U.S. Consulate: Consulate: Emerging Signs of Emerging Signs of Jihadist Sentiment in Libya By Geoff D. Porter Jihadist Sentiment in Libya By Geoff D. Porter Reports 5 Identifying Three Trends in Far Right Violence in the United States By Arie Perliger 7 Factors Responsible for Al-Shabab’s Losses in Somalia By Hussein Solomon and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens 10 Taliban Militants Striking Pakistan from Afghan Territory By Zia Ur Rehman 11 Reviewing Pakistan’s Peace Deals with the Taliban By Daud Khattak 14 The Micro-Level of Civil War: The Case of Central Helmand Province By Ryan Evans

18 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 20 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts The president of Libya’s General National Congress speaks near a portrait of the late U.S. Ambassador to Libya Chris Stevens. - Getty n september 11, 2012, armed Salafists had deemed un-Islamic.2 These militants attacked the U.S. incidents suggest that violence in Libya Consulate in Libya’s eastern is evolving from predictable militaristic city of Benghazi, resulting in violence characteristic of guerrilla Othe deaths of four U.S. Foreign Service warfare to now include Salafi-jihadi members, including U.S. Ambassador terrorism. to Libya Christopher Stevens.1 The Benghazi incident was preceded by other In contrast to the violence during the manifestations of extremist violence in revolution against the late Colonel About the CTC Sentinel Libya, such as earlier attacks on Western Mu`ammar Qadhafi’s regime, terrorism The Combating Terrorism Center is an diplomatic facilities and personnel, a presents a unique security problem independent educational and research violent assault on the Tunisian Consulate for Libya’s ruling General National institution based in the Department of Social in Benghazi in protest of an art exhibit Congress (GNC).3 It is motivated by a Sciences at the United States Military Academy, in Tunisia, and the destruction of Sufi West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses shrines throughout the country that the Center’s global network of scholars and 2 “Libya’s Salafists in Search of Relevance,” Daily Star, practitioners to understand and confront September 14, 2012; “Libya Sufi Shrines Attacked ‘By Is- contemporary threats posed by terrorism and lamist Hardliners,’” BBC, August 25, 2012. other forms of political violence. 1 Details on the attack are still emerging, but initial evi- 3 The General National Congress (GNC) is a result of a po- dence suggests that the attack was organized; however, in- litical process that was initiated in August 2011 by what formation remains contradictory at this point. See Osama was then known as the Transitional National Council The views expressed in this report are those of Alfitory, “Libyan Attacks Said to be 2-Part Militant- As (TNC). The TNC was a self-appointed body that had as- the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, sault,” Associated Press, September 13, 2012; Dina Tem- sumed governmental leadership functions for territory the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. ple-Raston, “U.S., Libyan Versions Of Consulate Attack within Libya that rebel forces had seized from Qadhafi’s Diverge,” National Public Radio, September 20, 2012. military. With the death of Mu`ammar Qadhafi in Octo-

1 september 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 9 different calculus from the previous realizable goal. When possible, solutions Political Violence and Revolutionary kinds of violence faced by the National were negotiated—often within hours. Aftershocks Transitional Council (NTC).4 With Libya has also witnessed more Salafi-jihadi terrorism, the demands of The Tripoli airport seizure in June conventional political violence. the perpetrators of the violence are more 2012 is perhaps the most high profile Beginning in late July 2012, there holistic and nihilistic. This evolution example of this trend. A militia from the have been a string of assassinations presents different problems for the town of Tarhouna seized the airport on in Benghazi. The assassinations GNC in its efforts to provide security June 4, 2012, because one of its leaders targeted former members of Qadhafi’s to Libya, and it poses new risks to the went missing.5 The militia believed that intelligence services, all of whom were United States. he was kidnapped by another militia, allegedly on a “hit list” that includes up or detained by the NTC.6 The Tarhouna to 1,000 names.9 Some of the attacks In the absence of an effective state militia said that it seized the airport involved car bombs, while in other security apparatus, violence in Libya to call attention to the problem and to instances victims were shot. It is not is pervasive and there are a range of compel the NTC to act more quickly to known who carried out the attacks, but violent actors and agendas. The new find the missing leader. The NTC then it is thought that possibly one or more Libyan state does not exert a monopoly sent an armed force, including members local militias with grievances against on force and the line between state and of the Zintan brigade, to contain the the Qadhafi regime were responsible. non-state actors is blurred. Within this Tarhouna militia, as well as a delegation morass of violence, certain trends can to begin negotiations regarding their On August 19, 2012, for example, three be discerned and it is important to parse demands.7 By the end of the day, the car bombs exploded in Tripoli. The car these groups, to distinguish among Tarhouna militia agreed to return the bombs targeted administrative offices them, and anticipate how and when airport to government authorities and of the Ministry of the Interior and a they will use violence. Some groups normal operations were restored. building used by the Defense Ministry have used violence to achieve a limited, to detain and interrogate Libyans tangible goal. Others have used violence The incident at Tripoli airport fits suspected of being supporters of the to settle scores or to demonstrate their into a pattern that emerged in Libya former Qadhafi regime.10 The bombings relevance to post-Qadhafi Libyan power since Qadhafi’s fall and is similar killed two Libyans.11 Local officials structures. Finally, and perhaps most to protests at the Arabian Gulf Oil attributed the attacks to a group of concerning, others are beginning to Company headquarters in Benghazi and men loyal to Qadhafi. After the attacks, use violence as an expression of their the attack on former Prime Minister security forces reportedly arrested 32 ideological commitment to Salafi-jihadi Abdelrahim al-Keib’s offices in Tripoli members of the group, which they said interpretations of Islam. This article in May.8 Different groups appealed is intent upon sowing discord in the will examine these three trends. to the interim government seeking country and determined to discredit the redress to a grievance or a complaint. GNC that was sworn in on August 8.12 Violence to Achieve a Tangible Goal The government was unresponsive, Violence that occurred in Libya during either due to lack of capacity or lack of Since then, doubts have emerged the last 10 months was generally interest, and the aggrieved party took about who was genuinely behind the motivated by complaints that could a bold gesture to seize or attack a high attacks. One theory postulates that be addressed—territory, the informal profile installation. The action attracted they were undertaken by militias that economy, release of “henchmen” from greater attention to the problem and the had heretofore been incorporated into detention, and revenge against former standoff persisted while negotiations the political decision-making process, members of the Qadhafi regime. In a were undertaken. Once a resolution but now risk being marginalized after certain sense it was utilitarian, with was negotiated, the aggrieved party the swearing in of the GNC. A second violence for the sake of achieving a withdrew. The goal has never appeared theory is a mutation of the first. It to be the permanent seizure of an claims that the bombings were an ber 2011, the TNC organized elections among its mem- installation, but rather to use the outward manifestation of competition bers to appoint a government, including a prime minister installation to amplify demands. among different security services such and a head of what was renamed the National Transi- as the Supreme Security Council, Libya tional Council (NTC). The NTC adhered to the political Shield, the High Security Council, roadmap laid out in August 2011, and after passing an the Tripoli Military Council, and the electoral law in February 2012 held national elections for militias that are embedded within them. a new congress on July 7, 2012. The new 200-member The interior minister, Fawzi Abdel Al, congress, known as the GNC, was sworn in on August is a former leader of the Misrata militia, 8, 2012. It immediately elected a leader for the congress, 5 “Libyan Militia Takes Control of Tripoli Airport,” Bos- Mohammed Magarief, and organized a process whereby ton Globe, June 5, 2012. 9 Information on this hitlist came from a personal con- a new prime minister would be selected by congress 6 “Flights Resume at Tripoli Airport After Seizure,” tact of the author who is based in Benghazi. members. The new prime minister, Mustafa Abushagur, BBC, June 5, 2012. 10 Kareem Fahim, “2 Die in Libya as Car Bombs Strike was elected on September 12. The GNC will function as 7 “Libyan Authorities Regain Control of Airport Seized Capital,” New York Times, August 19, 2012; “Libya Ar- Libya’s legislature until a constitution is drafted and rati- by Gunmen,” Agence France-Presse, June 5, 2012. rests Gaddafi Loyalists Over Car Bombings,” Guardian, fied and new national elections are held, currently sched- 8 “Libya Police Put End to Protest at Oil Firm Agoco,” August 19, 2012. uled for the first half of 2013. Reuters, May 9, 2012; “Libyan Rebels Storm Prime Min- 11 Ibid. 4 Ibid. ister’s Office,”Guardian , May 8, 2012. 12 Ibid.

2 september 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 9 while the defense minister, Osama al- assassinate Qadhafi, and in the wake of schooling, and government housing Juwaili, is the former leader of the the attempt’s failure Qadhafi launched are rundown and in short supply. Zintan brigade. The Misrata militia a campaign to eradicate the LIFG. Some The resentment in Benghazi toward and the Zintan brigade are the two members of the LIFG were killed, others western Libya is to such an extent that most powerful militias in Libya with were imprisoned, and still others fled earlier in 2012 a group in Benghazi the ability to deploy throughout the the country and joined forces with al- demanded that eastern Libya become an country. Both have vast arsenals at their Qa`ida in Afghanistan.13 By the 2000s, autonomous region within the sovereign disposal including tanks, war planes the LIFG had no active presence in Libya. state of Libya. Conditions progressively and helicopter gunships. The bombings During the Libyan revolution against the worsen toward far eastern Libya. A were possibly a warning to the incoming Qadhafi regime, former LIFG members common analogy used to underscore government not to push them to the side who had been released from prison in the deplorable conditions in such towns and to continue to include them in the 2009 following a “deradicalization” as Derna is “Benghazi is to Tripoli as political process. program unofficially restarted the LIFG Derna is to Benghazi.”17 and joined the rebellion. One former Elsewhere in the country, groups have LIFG leader in particular, Abdelhakim The links between al-Qa`ida’s Salafi- clashed for a variety of reasons. In Belhadj, formed his own militia, the jihadi ideology and Libya were further Kufra, political differences resulted in Tripoli Military Council. Although hard solidified by Abu Yahya al-Libi. Abu confrontations between the Tubu tribe figures are unavailable, Belhadj’s group Yahya, the brother of an LIFG leader, and supporters of the NTC. The latter was believed to have as many as 25,000 went to Afghanistan to fight in the jihad suspected that the Tubu were still loyal fighters at its peak during the final days against the Soviet Union, but then left to Qadhafi whereas the former viewed of the revolution.14 the country to study Islamic texts in the NTC supporters as carpetbaggers Mauritania. Upon his return, the Soviet intent on benefiting from the change In 2006, with the seizure of the Sinjar Union had abandoned its campaign in in leadership in Tripoli. In Bani Walid, Records in Iraq, it became clear that Afghanistan. The esteem in which he tribes have clashed with one another Salafi-jihadi ideology had grown popular was held was augmented by his escape over control of the lucrative black in some parts of the country even from U.S. custody in Afghanistan in market that has emerged in the region. though the LIFG was no longer active 2005. He eventually joined al-Qa`ida in Libya. The Sinjar Records indicated and rose to second-in-command of the Such violence is typical in a post- that Libyans were the second largest group following the killing of Usama revolutionary state as various factions nationality represented among foreign bin Laden in May 2011. seek to find their place in the emerging fighters joining al-Qa`ida in Iraq.15 power structures. Almost all of the Libyan fighters in Iraq In June 2012, a series of bombings hailed from eastern Libya, particularly and attacks on Western targets in The Emergence of Salafi-Jihadi Terrorism the town of Derna—approximately 180 Benghazi revealed Salafi-jihadi Although pervasive and persistent, miles east of Benghazi.16 Eastern Libya terrorism tendencies in Libya. On none of the aforementioned violence was deliberately and acutely neglected June 6, militants attacked the U.S. has been definitively terrorism. What during Qadhafi’s 42-year reign. While Consulate compound in Benghazi with has now become clear is that among Tripoli boasts the buildings and an improvised explosive device (IED).18 the range of violent non-state actors infrastructure of a state that produces The IED was ineffectual, damaging the in Libya, there are Salafi-jihadi groups upwards of a million barrels of oil per exterior walls of the compound. Four that harbor deep hostilities toward the day, including six-lane highways and days later on June 10, 2012, a convoy United States. The Salafi-jihadi use of high-rise commercial towers, eastern carrying Dominic Asquith, the British violence is different from other violence Libya is a patchwork of cities and towns ambassador to Libya, was ambushed.19 in Libya, as it is primarily ideological. linked by potholed roads, dilapidated A rocket-propelled grenade struck the The trends that led to the U.S. Consulate buildings, and failing infrastructure. convoy. The ambassador was unhurt but incident in Benghazi and the eventual Social services such as hospitals, two bodyguards were injured.20 During deaths of four members of the U.S. the same period there was an attack on diplomatic corps first began to emerge 13 Alison Pargeter, The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical the Tunisian Consulate in Benghazi in in post-Qadhafi Libya in June 2012, Islam in Europe (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsyl- response to a controversial art exhibit 21 but its antecedents stretch back to the vania Press, 2008). in Tunisia. The exhibit displayed a 1990s. 14 “Holding Libya Together: Security Challenges after panel with dead insects arranged to Qadhafi,” International Crisis Group, December 14, 2011; spell “God” in Arabic. The first manifestation of Salafist “Libyan Islamist Quits Militia to Enter Politics: Aide,” violence in Libya was not strictly Reuters, May 14, 2012. jihadist. The Libyan Islamic Fighting 15 Libyans formed the largest contingent of fighters per 17 Personal observation, Benghazi, Libya, March 2012. Group (LIFG) was formed in 1990 as capita, but Saudis comprised the largest overall group of 18 “Attack in Benghazi,” U.S. Embassy in Libya, June 11, an Islamist opposition to the Qadhafi foreign fighters. Additionally, the Sinjar Records do not 2012. regime. Unlike Salafi-jihadis, the represent the total number of foreign fighters in Iraq, but 19 “Libya Unrest: UK Envoy’s Convoy Attacked in Beng- LIFG accepted the notion of Libya as a a selection of approximately 600 foreign fighters. hazi,” BBC, June 11, 2012. nation-state but it wanted to overthrow 16 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qa`ida’s Foreign 20 Ibid. Qadhafi and establish Libya as an Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records (West 21 “Gunmen Storm Tunisian Consulate in Benghazi,” Islamic state. In 1996, it attempted to Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007). France24, June 18, 2012.

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A group called the Brigade of the Ansar al-Shari`a in Libya may share but also refuse to recognize the notion Imprisoned Shaykh `Umar `Abd al- some of al-Qa`ida’s ideology, until of a nation-state, the very institution Rahman claimed responsibility for the recently there did not appear to be that the GNC is trying to reconstruct June 6 attack on the U.S. Consulate clear links between Ansar al-Shari`a in the aftermath of the Qadhafi regime. compound in Benghazi.22 The attack in Libya and al-Qa`ida. Ansar al- Although a popular backlash, followed was allegedly in retaliation for the U.S. Shari`a in Libya denies that it was by security force action, swept Ansar assassination of al-Qa`ida member involved in the deadly attack on the al-Shari`a and related groups from Abu Yahya al-Libi in Pakistan on June U.S. Consulate, although witnesses their bases on September 21-22, these 4.23 The group recorded a video of the have said that the gunmen who militants are likely to regroup despite the attack in typical jihadist style.24 Both attacked the consulate facility—armed more hostile operating environment. the rationale behind the attack and with grenades and rockets—carried the the name of the group are clear al- Ansar al-Shari`a flag.28 There are no readily available statistics Qa`ida references, but there may not regarding how many troops the GNC be a direct affiliation with al-Qa`ida Investigations into the recent consulate has under its command. Weapons as of yet. As with the case of al-Qa`ida attack also suggest that AQIM may have collection programs that the NTC had in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), its been involved in the attacks. Multiple discussed at the beginning of its tenure affiliation with al-Qa`ida only came newspapers have interviewed U.S. to reduce the threat posed by militias after months of negotiations between officials saying that they intercepted and to reassert the state’s monopoly AQIM’s predecessor, the Salafist Group communications between Ansar al- on force have evaporated. The GNC for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and Shari`a and AQIM on September 11.29 is unable to reliably deploy forces to al-Qa`ida’s central leadership. Some Other U.S. officials have denied such halt violence, whether it is of the more analysts suggest that al-Qa`ida finally assertions.30 It is premature to assume pragmatic nature that was endemic allowed the GSPC to become an al- AQIM played a role in the incident. during the first 11 months following Qa`ida affiliate after the GSPC attacked Qadhafi’s death or the Salafist violence a vehicle belonging to a U.S. company in Implications for Libya’s New Government that has appeared more recently. When front of a U.S.-owned hotel in Algiers.25 The presence of Salafi-jihadi groups Salafist groups destroyed a Sufi shrine It is possible that the Brigade of the in Libya places the GNC in a difficult in downtown Tripoli on August 25, Imprisoned Shaykh `Umar `Abd al- position. Like the NTC before it, the security services under the control of Rahman is following a similar trajectory. GNC does not have an effective military the Interior Ministry were unable or that can be reliably deployed, but unlike unwilling to stop them.31 The other attacks—against the UK the NTC it cannot negotiate with Salafi- ambassador, the Tunisian Consulate, jihadis—since they are absolutists and Salafi-jihadi ideology has roots in and ultimately the U.S. Consulate on reject negotiation—in the same way Libya that reach back two decades September 11, 2012—are suspected of that the NTC was generally able to and correspond to the rise of al- being carried out by a group called resolve conflicts with regional groups, Qa`ida as the preeminent Salafi-jihadi Ansar al-Shari`a (Supporters of militias and tribes. Salafi-jihadis not organization. The lawlessness in Libya Islamic Law).26 Ansar al-Shari`a is a only want to rid Libya of non-Muslim and the impotence of the GNC has loose appellation for hardline Salafists influence like the United States and the allowed Salafi-jihadi violence to emerge throughout the Middle East, with United Kingdom—as well as Muslim once again. The GNC has no choice groups in Libya, Tunisia and Yemen. practices that do not conform to their but to confront Salafi-jihadi sentiment It not clear whether, or to what extent, strict interpretation of Islam, such as directly. Without a functioning, the groups are connected. Even in Libya the Sufism followed by many Libyans— effective military, however, it will be itself, Ansar al-Shari`a has different difficult to do so. branches in Benghazi and Derna. ington Institute for Near East Policy, September 12, The degree of cooperation among the 2012. Dr. Geoff D. Porter is the founder and 27 branches is uncertain. Likewise, while 28 Ahmed Maher, “Meeting Mohammad Ali al-Zahawi managing director of North Africa of Libyan Ansar al-Sharia,” BBC, September 18, 2012; Risk Consulting, Inc., a consulting firm 22 `Umar `Abd al-Rahman was found guilty in U.S. Mel Frykberg, “Ansar al Shariah, Linked to Diplomat’s specializing in political and security risk in courts for having masterminded the 1993 World Trade Death, Sets Benghazi Rally to Counter Calls for Modera- North Africa. Dr. Porter was the Director Center attack. See “Attacks on Western Targets in Libya tion,” McClatchy Newspapers, September 20, 2012. for Middle East and Africa at a political risk Sow Fears of Islamist Extremists,” Washington Post, June 29 According to the Wall Street Journal, “The [U.S.] of- consulting firm. Earlier in his career, Dr. 15, 2012. ficials said the AQIM leaders were communicating with Porter was a professor of Middle East and 23 “Sources: U.S. Mission in Benghazi Attacked to members of Ansar al-Shari`a, a local group of Libyan North Africa History. He is fluent in Arabic Avenge al Qaeda,” CNN, June 6, 2012. militants, after seeing violent anti-U.S. protests breaking (including Modern Standard Arabic and 24 The video can be viewed at www.youtube.com/ out in Cairo.” See Siobhan Gorman and Adam Entous, North African dialect) and French. watch?v=vhhyGB-ttMU. “U.S. Probing al Qaeda Link in Libya,” Wall Street Jour- 25 Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: nal, September 14, 2012; Chris Stephen, “Libyan Parlia- Algerian Challenge or Global Threat?” Carnegie Papers, mentary Speaker Hints at Military Strike after Consulate October 2009. Attack,” Guardian, September 16, 2012; Temple-Raston. 26 Robin Benejri, “Did Ansar al-Sharia Carry Out Libya 30 Josh Lederman, “UN Ambassador Says Libya At- Attack?” BBC, September 12, 2012. tack was Spontaneous,” Associated Press, September 16, 31 Taha Zargoun, “Fighters Bulldoze Sufi Mosque in 27 Aaron Zelin, “Jihadism’s Foothold in Libya,” Wash- 2012. Central Tripoli,” Reuters, August 25, 2012.

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Identifying Three Trends in Typology of the American Violent Far Right or organizations affiliated with a Three major ideological trends can specific minority ethnic group, or non- Far Right Violence in the be identified within the American Aryan facilities (mosques, synagogues, United States violent far right: racist, anti-federalist or schools affiliated with minority and fundamentalist. The ideological communities). While the KKK is heavily By Arie Perliger characteristics of the various groups involved in acts of vandalism, the impact their operations in terms of skinheads and the neo-Nazi groups are in the morning hours of August 5, tactics used and target selection. more engaged in attacks against human 2012, the Sikh temple at Oak Creek, targets and show a higher affinity for Wisconsin, was crowded with children Racist Trend mass casualty attacks. and mothers engaged in preparations The ideological trend most familiar to for the Langar, a traditional Sikh Americans is the racist one, which is Anti-Federalist Trend communal meal scheduled to be held comprised of white supremacy groups The anti-federalist trend (which is later that day. At around 10:00 AM, such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), neo- usually identified in the literature as Wade Michael Page, a 40-year-old from Nazis such as the National Alliance, the “militia” or “patriot” movement) nearby Cudahy, Wisconsin, arrived in and skinhead groups such as the appeared in full force only in the early to the temple parking lot and started firing Hammerskin Nation. The racist groups mid-1990s with the emergence of groups at the temple’s inhabitants using a pistol are interested in preserving or restoring such as the Militia of Montana and the purchased several days earlier. He then what they perceive as the appropriate Michigan Militia. Anti-federalist and entered the temple and continued his and natural racial and cultural hierarchy anti-government sentiments existed killing spree until he was gunned down by enforcing social and political control in U.S. society before the 1990s via by police forces that arrived to the site. over non-whites—such as African diverse movements and ideological At that point, he had already killed six Americans, Jews and various immigrant associations promoting anti-taxation, worshippers and a police officer.1 communities. Their ideological gun rights, and a “survivalist” lifestyle. foundations are based mainly on ideas Yet most scholars concur that the While details from the investigation of nativism (rejection of foreign norms “farm crises” of the 1980s combined have not yet been officially released, and practices), racism, segregation and with the implications of rapid cultural, a growing body of evidence links xenophobia. Other popular components technological and normative changes in Page to various far right elements, of the far-right ideology—including American society, as well as attempts to mainly the skinheads subculture and strong affinity for order and social revise gun control and environmental the white power music scene. As a control, traditional values and anti- legislation, facilitated the emergence result, policymakers and intellectuals democratic dispositions—are manifested of a fairly ideologically cohesive expressed concerns about a potential by some of these groups, but are usually movement, as well as its rapid revival of far right violence in the United secondary. growth.2 States. Many of their responses also reflected common misconceptions and Since the mid-1980s, many of the Ideologically, anti-federalists are deficiencies that dominate the popular racist groups framed their ideas in interested in undermining the influence, discourse about the American far right, a defensive context and started to legitimacy and practical sovereignty of such as the inability to distinguish utilize “civil rights” rhetoric, usually the federal government and its proxy between its different components, lack presenting themselves as dedicated organizations, such as the U.S. military of understanding of its ideological to the promotion or protection of or Federal Bureau of Investigation.3 This tenets as well as the tendency to ignore the white race, and preserving their rationale is multifaceted, and includes the fact that American far right violence heritage and culture. Other groups, was never really absent; if anything, the however, intensified their usage of 2 Richard Abens, American Militias (Downers Grove, IL: level of far right violence has been rising Nazi heritage, symbols, rituals and Intervarsity Press, 1996), pp. 7-20; Joel Dyer, Harvest of steadily for the last two decades. ideological foundations to justify and Rage (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 24-44; promote anti-Semitic, racist and nativist Kathlyn Gay, Militias: Armed and Dangerous (Springfield, This article provides clarity on the ideas, as well as exclusionism. More NJ: Enslow Publishers Inc., 1997), pp. 36-52. various components of the American specifically, since some of these groups 3 A development that may be responsible for the growing far right. It also offers a basic analytical believe that territorial and racial purity concern and awareness of a militia movement revival is model to better understand its current is a condition for the survival of the the popularity of the Sovereign Citizen movement. Sim- violent trends. The article’s findings— “white race,” they developed the idea of ply put, the Sovereign Citizen movement opposes formal which are based on a dataset of more enforced segregation, including concrete governmental regulations of their “basic rights” such than 4,400 cases of violent attacks “programs” to eliminate inferior races, as “driving the land” (thus, Sovereign Citizen members by far right elements during a 22- expel others or divide the United States will refuse to apply for, or to have, a driver’s license and year period—will be expanded in a into racially homogeneous geographical car registration) or working for a living (thus refusing more detailed study that will soon be areas. to pay taxes). Several violent incidents involving Sover- published by the Combating Terrorism eign Citizen members, including the killing of two West Center at West Point. In terms of target selection, and in line Memphis, Arkansas, police officers during a traffic stop with the trend’s ideology, the great in May 2010, provided an indication that some members 1 Page was shot in the abdomen during a firefight with majority of attacks perpetrated by these of the movement were indeed willing to use violence to police. He then shot himself in the head. groups are aimed against individuals protect and follow their principles.

5 september 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 9 the belief that the U.S. political system as portrayed in the Bible, will be (or has To begin with, the American far right and its proxies have been hijacked by already been) manifested via racial war is characterized by a large base of external forces interested in promoting between the white Anglo-Saxon nation supporters (the base of the “iceberg”) a New World Order (NWO),4 in which and various non-Anglo-Saxon ethnic who are usually engaged in low level the United States will be absorbed groups such as the “Children of Satan” violence (usually minor incidents into the United Nations or another (Jews) and “mud people” (non-whites). of vandalism or low sophisticated version of global government; strong The identity groups tend to utilize attacks against individuals) and are not convictions regarding the corrupted religious heritage, symbols, rituals and affiliated with any formal organizational and tyrannical nature of the federal norms to instill and spread these ideas, frameworks (for example, just one government and its related natural as well as to provide moral justification percent of the attacks by unaffiliated tendency to intrude on individuals’ for, and encouragement to, political members includes the use of firearms civilian lives and constitutional rights; activism against elements that are or explosives, well below what could and finally, perceptions supporting threatening the materialization of the be observed in any of the other trends). civilian activism, individual freedoms, appropriate sociopolitical order. Based on the body of literature developed and self governing the way they were in the last few years regarding political manifested in the frontier culture in Operationally, identity violence focuses radicalization, it is possible to carefully U.S. history, especially during the on minorities and has a higher tendency assume that the perpetrators of these Revolutionary War and the expansion to involve mass casualty attacks (in attacks are the future recruitment to the American west. Hence, anti- comparison to the other two trends).5 potential of the more institutionalized federalist groups see themselves as part organizations. In other words, after of a struggle to restore or preserve the The Iceberg Model and American Far Right crossing the line and performing some United States’ “true” identity, values Violence minor attacks on their own initiative, and “way of life” and as the successors In the early 1980s, the Israeli political at some point these individuals may of the country’s founding fathers. scientist Ehud Sprinzak published look for more organized, systematic a paper on the irredentist Israeli mechanisms to express their ideas for Recent research conducted by this religio-political movement Gush political activism, and thus will join one author shows that in the case of the anti- Emunim (The Bloc of the Faithful) of the other, more formal, streams of the federalist trend there is compatibility entitled “The Iceberg Model of American far right toward the top of the between ideological tenets and Political Extremism.”6 He argued that iceberg. operational characteristics. Two-thirds the Gush is best understood not as of the attacks by anti-federalist groups a classical protest movement, but as If this perspective is indeed a reflection were directed against the government the extremist tip of a large social and of the movement’s structure and and its proxies, such as law enforcement cultural “iceberg,” in effect a religious dynamics, then the United States may (65.8%); while attacks against minorities subculture, which supports and nurtures be facing a continuous rise in the level (11%) and infrastructure (6.1%, which the Gush. Pyramidal in structure, this of violence, especially since the last could also be seen as attacks against the iceberg—Gush’s social and political six years have been characterized by government) comprise most of the rest. bases of support—broadens as one an overall increase in the “base” of the moves from the politically extremist iceberg (i.e., there has been an increase Fundamentalist Trend tip to the less extremist base. Based in the number of low sophisticated, The fundamentalist trend, which on analysis of 4,400 cases of violent unaffiliated and spontaneous attacks, includes mainly Christian identity attacks by far-right elements in a 22- which have been followed by an increase groups such as the Aryan Nations, year period, the iceberg model could in the number of mass casualty attacks). merges religious fundamentalism with be applicable for understanding some It should be noted that most of these traditional white supremacy and racist of the characteristics of the American low sophisticated/spontaneous attacks tendencies. It promotes ideas of nativism, violent far right as well. have received relatively little attention exclusionism, and racial superiority from the media, political authorities via a unique interpretation of religious 5 There are two reasons for this. First, some scholars and law enforcement, while the few texts that focus on division of humanity have suggested that the more the group’s agenda is mass casualty attacks attracted most of according to primordial attributes. More framed in religious and totalistic ideas, the more it will be the attention. specifically, these groups maintain that willing or determined to use exceptionally lethal tactics. a correct interpretation of the holy Second, while the skinheads and KKK members are in Which groups contribute most to the tip texts reveals that it is not the people of many cases a part of the social fabric of a specific com- of the iceberg, and which are closer to its Israel but the Anglo-Saxons who are munity, this is not the case with many members of iden- base? The findings show that the KKK the chosen people. Moreover, the war tity groups. This isolation, which creates a social distance (and on some level anti-abortionists), between the forces of light and darkness, between members of the group and mainstream society, with its current informal and may serve not just as a breeding ground for radicaliza- fragmented structure and low level of 4 They believe in the existence of a conspiratorial orga- tion, but may facilitate a stronger sense of alienation to- operational sophistication, is the formal nization allegedly masterminding events and controlling ward the mainstream culture and willingness to engage movement that is closest to the base of world affairs through governments and corporations to in extreme, harmful activities. the iceberg (and may be the first station establish a New World Order (see, for example, the Illu- 6 Ehud Sprinzak, “Gush Emunim: The Iceberg Model for those joining the “formal” American minati movement, which originated initially in 18th cen- of Political Extremism,” Jerusalem Quarterly 21 (1981): pp. far right). The higher one “climbs” to tury Germany). 28-47. the top of the iceberg, the more lethal

6 september 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 9 the group’s attacks and the smaller they A turning point for AMISOM was are in volume. Therefore, following the Factors Responsible for Al- in August 2011 when African troops KKK, the order can be ranked as follows Shabab’s Losses in Somalia together with TFG forces pushed al- from least to most lethal: skinheads, Shabab out of the capital Mogadishu. militias, neo-Nazi groups and finally By Hussein Solomon and Alexander Meleagrou- A number of reasons account for this attacks perpetrated by individuals or Hitchens turnaround, including more troop groups affiliated with the Christian contributions from member states, identity movement. To illustrate, while in somalia, the al-Shabab militant greater coordination between AMISOM Christian identity elements perpetrated group is suffering setback after and TFG forces, and reported training “just” 66 attacks in the last 22 years, their setback. The African Union Mission of Somali intelligence operatives by attacks generated close to three victims in Somalia’s (AMISOM) forces have the Central Intelligence Agency.3 Since per attack on average. The skinheads, pushed the group out of Mogadishu then, AMISOM remains on the offensive which are part of the racist trend, were as well as other territory throughout and its numbers have been augmented responsible for more than 200 attacks, but southern Somalia. Its last significant by troops from Djibouti and Kenya. averaged close to one victim per attack. stronghold is in Kismayo, a strategic The involvement of the Kenyan Defense port city. As AMISOM forces converge Forces (KDF), which is well equipped While the model is not perfect,7 overall on al-Shabab’s key refuge, the militant and includes a relatively large navy it seems that the iceberg model fits the group has transformed from a Shari`a- and air force, has greatly contributed to findings, as there is a clear base which is enforcing body to a weakened band of recent achievements against al-Shabab. wider in terms of the number of attacks insurgents. In addition, Ethiopia, which is not part but is less “sharp” (in lethality), while of AMISOM, has redeployed troops the narrower parts of the iceberg are Based on recent fieldwork in Nairobi, into Somalia, capturing Beledwyne, indeed sharper and more lethal. Kenya,1 this article examines the three and has moved rapidly into the central primary factors behind al-Shabab’s regions of Hiraan and Galgadud and Conclusion recent setbacks: the successful model further still into the Shabelle River Conventional wisdom suggests that the provided by AMISOM; clan rivalries Valley. The KDF has liberated Gedo and most damaging and dangerous mass of within al-Shabab; and al-Shabab’s Juba while AMISOM forces spearheaded an iceberg is actually the section that is mishandling of the regional drought by the Ugandans have pushed al-Shabab underwater. Indeed, the high volume of in 2011. The article also identifies the more than 100 miles from the capital, far right violence reflected in vandalism challenges facing the Somali government Mogadishu. and attacks against individuals is as it begins to strengthen its position probably a better indication of the against what has until recently been an Several countries concerned with the growing threat from the far right than intractable foe. growing al-Qa`ida presence in the the small number of mass casualty Horn of Africa have welcomed the attacks. A group or individual will AMISOM: A Model for Success AMISOM mission. “What we’ve seen rarely engage in mass casualty attacks Formed by the African Union (AU) in here is a marked increase in African without first moving through the lower February 2007, AMISOM is currently countries’ capacities and willingness base of the iceberg by engaging in low mandated until January 16, 2013, by the to successfully address challenges,” profile attacks. A rise in the number of low United Nations as a peacekeeping force affirmed Matt Goshko, an official at profile attacks should eventually result in and to assist the Somali Transitional the Somali Affairs Unit in the U.S. an increase in mass casualty attacks. Federal Government (TFG) and its Embassy in Nairobi.4 While it is successor, the National Constituent undoubtedly receiving foreign (and In more specific terms, the findings Assembly (NCA),2 in efforts to fight especially U.S.) assistance, AMISOM is reflect a steady rise in the level of far al-Shabab. AMISOM has operated in a body made up of African troops who right violence in the United States the country since March 2007, and have responded to an African crisis during the last two decades. While some it consists primarily of troops from at the direction of an African political far right groups are clearly in decline, Uganda, Kenya, Burundi, Djibouti and organization. The AU members have such as the KKK and anti-abortionists, Sierra Leone. shown a willingness and desire to act others such as the skinheads, neo- swiftly and largely independently to Nazis and militias are still active and ensure their own national security and represent a growing threat. protect lucrative tourism industries. In addition, the Burundian and Ugandan 1 The authors conducted fieldwork in Nairobi, Kenya, Dr. Arie Perliger is the Class of 1977 soldiers who have pushed al-Shabab between July 1-8, 2012. Director of Terrorism Studies at the out of Mogadishu have gained valuable 2 The TFG’s United Nations mandate officially expired Combating Terrorism Center and Assistant on August 20, 2012, and it has been replaced by the Na- Professor at the Department of Social tional Constituent Assembly (NCA). In early September, 3 Personal interview, senior AMISOM counterterror- Sciences, U.S. Military Academy at West the NCA elected Somalia’s new president, Hassan Sheik ism official, Nairobi, Kenya, July 2012; Jeffrey Gettleman, Point. Mohamud. For more, see M.L. Roach, “Somalia’s Gov- Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Relies on Con- ernment Transition Maintains the Status Quo,” Heritage tractors in Somalia Conflict,”New York Times, August 10, 7 For example, excluding the Oklahoma City bombing in Foundation, August 20, 2012; “Inauguration of Soma- 2011. 1995, militias generated fewer victims than the neo-Nazi lia’s New President Begins,” Associated Press, Septem- 4 Personal interview, Matt Goshko, U.S. Embassy, Nai- groups, despite engaging in a lower number of attacks. ber 16, 2012. robi, Kenya, July 2, 2012.

7 september 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 9 experience in urban warfare, which he is opportunistic and willing to back The 2011 Regional Drought may pay dividends in other areas in the the stronger horse as the situation Al-Shabab’s mismanagement of a regional Horn of Africa. changes on the ground. Not only did he drought in mid-2011—which was among cut a deal with al-Shabab when he was the worst for a generation—may later be Today, al-Shabab has consolidated head of Hisbul Islamiyya—albeit from seen as the heaviest blow to the group. influence in the strategic port city of a position of weakness—but in 2006 Although the drought affected the entire Kismayo, and AMISOM forces have he resigned from the leadership of the region, it was only in the southern surrounded the city in preparation for a Islamic Courts Union (ICU) when it Bakool and Lower Shabelle areas major offensive. Kismayo holds strategic began losing control of Mogadishu.10 controlled by al-Shabab where it also importance as the financial lifeblood Rumors abound that he is now seeking led to a famine. According to the United of the jihadist militia. For months, al- to sit down with the Somali government Nations, around three million people in Shabab has generated revenue by taxing as it begins to strengthen and his own al-Shabab-controlled areas of Somalia the production, transport and export of allies lose ground.11 Aweys may be were without enough food.14 This was in charcoal produced in the region. Kismayo opposed to the al-Qa`ida elements in large part due to the militia’s refusal of is home to the country’s main port from al-Shabab, but he is far more concerned foreign aid, which it saw as an attempt which coal is exported to Saudi Arabia, with staying alive and in power. to undermine its authority and help Oman and the United Arab Emirates.5 spread Western influence. Al-Shabab Shutting down this significant stream of Clan loyalties, which reign supreme spokesman Shaykh Ali Mohamud Rage income by capturing the city is therefore in the region, cannot be ignored when even suggested that “the declaration one of the primary military objectives of looking at splits within the group. For of famine is political and is a lie with AMISOM before its mandate expires. example, after a 2010 battle known as hidden agendas,” asserting that Somalia the First Ramadan Offensive, when was only suffering from “a shortgage of After preparing their offensive for al-Shabab tried, and failed, to wrest rain.”15 From this time on, al-Shabab has weeks, reports surfaced in mid- control of Mogadishu from AMISOM struggled to convincingly present itself September that Kenyan troops were and TFG troops, cracks began to as the provider of order and justice, pushing into Kismayo.6 Voice of America emerge. Shaykh Mukhtar Robow—a which was a big factor in the ICU’s interviewed residents who witnessed senior al-Shabab leader and member successful bid for power in 2006. al-Shabab fighters fleeing the city after of the Rahanweyn clan that reportedly suffering losses from Kenyan troops.7 comprises a majority of the group’s The mishandling of the drought and foot soldiers—supposedly became famine also likely contributed to clan Internal Clan Divisions incensed that his clan bore the brunt divisions among the leadership.16 Al-Shabab also appears weakened by of the casualties.12 “Robow was said Godane, a member of the Isaaq tribe internal divisions among the group’s to be livid that his troops were being based in Somaliland—which was hardly leadership. Most analysis suggests used as cannon fodder,” said Matt affected by the famine—publicly refused that this disagreement is centered on Goshko of the Somali Affairs Unit in Western aid while Robow’s Rahanweyn the group’s merger with al-Qa`ida. In the U.S. Embassy, Nairobi. “His guys clan starved. Robow’s request to accept February 2012, Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr were reportedly being pushed to the the aid was ignored, and he is unlikely to (also known as Godane), one of the more front lines while foreign fighters were have forgiven Godane and his allies.17 ideologically committed jihadists in al- at the back. There was no medical Shabab’s leadership, oficially announced help and several sources claimed that Al-Shabab Still Dangerous this new partnership.8 The courting of wounded fighters were killed after the While al-Shabab is no longer in control al-Qa`ida is believed by some to be the defeat.”13 of southern Somalia, the group is still reason for a rift between Godane and dangerous. It has ceased to be a viable another leader, Hassan Dahir Aweys, who political alternative to the Somali does not appear as devoted as Godane to government and is moving back to its the global jihadist appeal. roots as a local insurgency.18 AMISOM will have to adapt its tactics to respond

Aweys is the former head of Hisbul The Long War Journal, December 19, 2010; Mary Harper, to this new change in battle-space, Islamiyya, a militia that fought against Getting Somalia Wrong: Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered and it will have to be more effective at and then merged with al-Shabab in late State (London: Zed Books, 2012). 2010 once it became clear that victory 10 Bill Roggio, “The Fall of the Islamic Courts Union,” 14 “Somalia: Humanitarian Access Analysis,” United 9 was unattainable. Aweys’ past suggests The Long War Journal, December 27, 2010. Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Af- 11 “One of the leaders, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, fairs, March 2012. 5 “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and has reportedly sought to defect to the government side, 15 “Al-Shabab Reasserts Foreign Aid Ban,” al-Jazira, July Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1916 together with Sheik al-Amriki, and Sheikh Mukhtar 22, 2011. (2010),” United Nations Security Council, July 18, 2011. Robow,” in “Kenya: Al Shabaab Chiefs Defect After Rout 16 “Al-Shabaab Leadership Rift Widens,” Somalia Re- 6 “Witnesses: Al-Shabab Pulling Out of Major Somali by KDF Forces,” The Star [Nairobi], September 7, 2012. port, July 14, 2011. Port,” Voice of America, September 16, 2012. 12 Harper. 17 Personal interview, senior AMISOM counterterrorism 7 Ibid. 13 Ibid.; personal interview, Matt Goshko, U.S. Embassy, official, Nairobi, Kenya, July 2012; “Could Somali Famine 8 Nelly Lahoud, “The Merger of al-Shabab and Qa`idat Nairobi, Kenya, July 2012. For more, see Valentina Soria, Deal a Fatal Blow to al-Shabab?” BBC, August 9, 2011. al-Jihad,” CTC Sentinel 5:2 (2012). “Global Jihad Sustained Through Africa,” Royal United 18 Personal interview, senior AMISOM counterterror- 9 Bill Roggio, “Hizbul Islam Joins Shabaab in Somalia,” Services Institute, April 2012. ism official, Nairobi, Kenya, July 2012.

8 september 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 9 protecting crucial trade routes from for stealing development aid, and it coincidence, therefore, that many of kidnappers and bandits. appears to be snatching defeat from al-Shabab’s foot soldiers belong to the jaws of victory. According to one the Rahanweyn; membership in al- Instead of engaging in conventional senior AMISOM counterterrorism Shabab affords them more money, warfare with AMISOM, al-Shabab official, the TFG has failed to provide power and status. By stressing a radical fighters are melting back into their basic services to areas liberated from Islamist identity as opposed to a clan clan militias.19 This makes it almost al-Shabab control. There have also been identity, weaker clans can also merge impossible for AMISOM to identify reports that Somalis are unhappy that with other clans to check the power of the enemy. Moreover, given the fierce local leaders who have replaced former their main rivals. The jihadist identity bonds of clan loyalty, there is little al-Shabab leaders often do not come developed by al-Shabab has in the past information being shared between from the majority clan in the area and are successfully provided minority clans clan elders and the AMISOM forces.20 put in place by the central authority.24 with an alternative vehicle through Safely ensconced in these militias, al- Thus, the TFG has struggled to gain which to access power. Shabab has increasingly embraced an legitimacy, while AMISOM is perceived asymmetric warfare strategy against by many as a foreign occupying force. Conclusion both AMISOM and the TFG. Under the circumstances, the AMISOM Al-Shabab is now at its weakest. It official lamented that “we are winning is facing internal divisions, possible In addition, al-Shabab has shown its the battles and losing the war.”25 defections and the most sustained and ability to strike in the countries that well coordinated military challenge to are fighting them in Somalia. One of To win the fight against al-Shabab, the its authority since its rise to power. The the initial motivations for Uganda’s international community must lean on desire and determination of AMISOM— involvement in an aggressive military the TFG and NCA to be more responsive in particular its Ugandan and Kenyan engagement with al-Shabab was a July to Somali needs, and increase its contingents—to rid Somalia of jihadists 2010 dual bomb attack in Kampala that capacity to do so where appropriate.26 shows no sign of abating, and it killed 76 and threatened the country’s It is also important to develop a closer continues to enjoy the support of the tourism industry.21 Since then, the interface between the military strategy United Nations. group has also executed grenade and and the political vision post-Kismayo. gun attacks in Kenya. The most recent of It is premature, however, to assume these was a massacre of 17 congregants What would a new, more inclusive that the group is close to defeat, and at a church in Garissa, a town on the political vision entail? To understand al-Shabab is likely to maintain a lethal Kenyan border with Somalia.22 the central problem in the current presence as an insurgency in the political order one cannot ignore the country. It also has a proven ability Ahmed Iman Ali, a Kenyan former 2002-2004 Somali peace conference to respond by attacking neighboring preacher who has recently emerged as a that proposed a clan quota for the countries involved with AMISOM. senior al-Shabab commander in charge distribution of power, and which Nonetheless, AMISOM has cleared the of non-Somali militia members, has persists to this day. This clan quota way for yet another attempt to bring threatened further attacks on Kenya is more commonly known as “the 4.5 long-term stability to a population that in reprisal for their encroachment into formula” where the four refers to the has never experienced it. It is now up what he sees as “Muslim lands.”23 These majority clans of the Darood, Hawiye, to Somalis, with the help of the African threats are not empty, and Kenyan Dir, and Rahanweyn, and the 0.5 refers Union and the West, to determine the officials are concerned about his ability to all the minority clans.27 Under this future of their country. to coordinate attacks in Nairobi and formula, if one belongs to a minority Mombasa that are likely to be carried clan, it means that they likely have to Dr. Hussein Solomon is Senior Professor out by a new breed of homegrown resign themselves to occupying junior in the Department of Political Studies and Kenyan jihadists. positions in government. Governance at the University of the Free State, South Africa, and Visiting Fellow at The TFG and the Future of Somalia Even among the four main clans, the London School of Economics (LSE). As the military challenges confronting rivalries are strong. The weakest among AMISOM ease, the complexities of them is reportedly the Rahanweyn, Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens is a Research Somali politics are likely to take who some look disparagingly upon Fellow at the International Centre for the center stage. The notoriously corrupt as farmers and peasants.28 It is not a Study of Radicalisation and Political TFG has earned the ire of Somalis Violence (ICSR), King’s College, London. 24 Personal interview, senior AMISOM counterterror- He is also an investigator for the University ism official, Nairobi, Kenya, July 2012. of Maryland’s START consortium. His 19 Ibid. 25 Ibid. latest publication is the forthcoming, 20 Ibid. 26 For a critical assessment of the NCA, see Roach. “Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab’s 21 “Why is Uganda Fighting in ‘Hellish’ Somalia?” BBC, 27 Nastasya Tay and David Smith, “Somalia’s First Par- Western Media Strategy” (ICSR, 2012). March 15, 2012. liament Since 1991 Inaugurated in Mogadishu,” Guard- 22 “Red Cross: Kenya Church Attacks Kill 17 Near So- ian, August 20, 2012. mali Border,” CNN, July 1, 2012. 28 Kenneth Menkhaus, “Somalia: A Situation Analysis 23 Ahmed Iman Ali, video lecture, April 2012, copy in and Trend Assessment,” United Nations High Commis- authors’ possession. sioner for Refugees, August 2003.

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Taliban Militants Striking Cross-Border Attacks Also on August 24, hundreds of In 2011, security in the border areas Pakistani Taliban militants crossed Pakistan from Afghan remained volatile, with 69 reported into Pakistan from Kunar Province and Territory clashes and cross-border attacks that attacked security personnel as well killed 225 people.3 Pakistani military as a local tribal militia known as the By Zia Ur Rehman commander Major General Ghulam Salarzai Qaumi lashkar in the Batwar Qamar asserted that since February area of Bajaur Agency.11 Security forces since the start of the current Taliban 2012, there have been 17 major cross- responded, which led to heavy fighting insurgency in Afghanistan, U.S.-led border incursions where Pakistani that resulted in the deaths of 30 NATO forces and the Afghan government Taliban fighters entered Pakistan militants and an estimated six members have blamed much of the violence on from Afghanistan to attack Pakistani of the security forces.12 Fifteen members militants based in Pakistan’s tribal interests.4 The incursions have mainly of the security forces, however, went areas. Insurgents from groups such as occurred in Bajaur and Mohmand missing.13 On August 31, TTP militants the Haqqani network are able to plan agencies in FATA and Dir and Chitral released a video showing the severed operations from their bases located in districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa heads of the 15 soldiers.14 Pakistan’s tribal areas, cross the border Province. into Afghanistan, execute attacks, and Taliban Hideouts in Afghanistan then retreat back into the relative safety On June 24, 2012, for example, an Pakistani security officials and local of Pakistan. estimated 100 militants belonging tribal elders assert that these cross- to Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) border attacks into Pakistani territory Yet in the last two years, the issue of entered Pakistan’s Upper Dir District have been executed by militants cross-border attacks has become even from Afghanistan’s Kunar Province belonging to the Bajaur, Swat and Dir more complicated. Pakistan itself is now and killed 17 Pakistani soldiers.5 A chapters of the TTP, with help from victim to Pakistani Taliban militants who few days later, the militants released Afghan Taliban militants. Following the are sheltering in Afghanistan, crossing a video showing the severed heads of Pakistan military’s operations in Swat, the border into Pakistan to conduct the 17 soldiers.6 The video included a Dir and Bajaur in 2009, militants led by attacks, and then retreating back across statement from Hakimullah Mehsud, the Maulana Fazlullah were pushed out of the Afghan border.1 Pakistani officials TTP’s leader, and Maulana Fazlullah, Pakistani territory, and they reportedly assert that these militants are part of head of the TTP’s Swat chapter. fled into Kunar and Nuristan provinces the Pakistani Taliban factions that once in Afghanistan. From Afghanistan, pressed for power in the Swat Valley, On July 12, dozens of Pakistani Taliban they prepared for cross-border attacks but were forced to flee into Afghanistan militants crossed from Afghanistan’s on Pakistani security forces.15 With during a successful Pakistani military Kunar Province into Pakistan and took NATO troops largely withdrawing operation in 2009. Pakistan believes scores of villagers hostage, including from Kunar and Nuristan throughout that these militants have regrouped in members of an anti-Taliban militia 2011, Pakistani analysts suspect that the border region and are now confident in the Katkot area of Bajaur Agency.7 the operating environment has become enough to carry out large-scale, cross- Pakistani forces quickly surrounded more conducive to Pakistani Taliban border attacks on Pakistani targets. the village, killing eight militants.8 fighters.

Seventeen large-scale, cross-border More recently, Pakistani Taliban The TTP itself has admitted that they incursions of militants from Afghanistan militants sheltering in Afghanistan use Afghan soil as a springboard to to Pakistan have occurred in the last six attacked security checkpoints at Inkle launch attacks on Pakistani security months.2 Most of the attacks were carried Sar and Miskini Darra areas of Samar forces—even though the Afghan Taliban out in Bajaur Agency of the Federally Bagh Tehsil in Lower Dir District deny it.16 Sirajuddin, a spokesperson Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), an on August 24.9 The militants were for the TTP’s Malakand chapter, said important agency for the Taliban and reportedly members of the TTP’s Dir that Maulana Fazlullah is leading al-Qa`ida because it shares a border chapter led by Hafizullah.10 militant attacks and remains in contact with Kunar Province in Afghanistan—a with Pakistani Taliban fighters based strategic province from which NATO in Pakistan’s Malakand division. forces have largely withdrawn. 3 “Pakistan Security Report 2011,” Pakistan Institute for 11 BBC Urdu, August 27, 2012; personal interview, mem- This article examines the trend of Peace Studies, January 2012. ber of Salarzai Qaumi Lashkar, September 3, 2012; “At Pakistani Taliban militants using 4 Daily Azadi [Swat], September 7, 2012. Least 28 Militants Killed in Bajaur Agency,” Dawn, Au- Afghanistan as a staging ground for 5 “Taliban Release Video of Beheaded Pakistani Sol- gust 25, 2012. attacks in Pakistan. It reviews a few diers,” Agence France-Presse, June 27, 2012. 12 Ibid. key cross-border attacks and speculates 6 Ibid. 13 Anwarullah Khan, “Militants Release Video of Be- whether these operations are part of a 7 “Militants Take Villagers Hostage in Bajaur,” Dawn, headed Soldiers,” Dawn, September 1, 2012. larger Taliban strategy. July 12, 2012. 14 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 15 Personal interviews, elders of Salarzai Qaumi Lashkar, 1 “Pakistan Accuses Afghanistan of Backing Taliban En- 9 “Taliban Attack Security Posts in Lower Dir,” Express Khar town, Bajaur Agency, Pakistan, March 25, 2012. emy,” Reuters, August 5, 2012. Tribune, August 24, 2012. 16 Tahir Khan, “Cross-Border Cooperation: Ties That 2 Daily Azadi [Swat], September 7, 2012. 10 Ibid. Bind Militants Persist,” Express Tribune, July 8, 2011.

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Sirajuddin claimed that Fazlullah increasing mutual distrust. Former Reviewing Pakistan’s commands more than 1,000 fighters Afghan Defense Minister Shahnawaz who move regularly across the porous Tanai explained that Taliban elements in Peace Deals with the border between Afghanistan and both countries helped each other during Taliban Pakistan.17 The exact number of TTP the fight against the Soviet Union, and militants in Afghanistan is not known, this same cooperation extends today.24 By Daud Khattak but Pakistani Major General Athar The TTP’s use of so-called “safehavens” Abbas said that 200 to 300 militants in Afghanistan mirrors the Afghan by the end of 2014, normal U.S. combat have been mounting cross-border Taliban’s successful use of safehavens forces are scheduled to withdraw from attacks in Dir, Chitral and Bajaur.18 in Pakistan. Afghanistan. As this departure date approaches, Afghanistan and its U.S.- Firm evidence of the TTP’s use of Kunar Other experts argue that the recent led allies continue to explore potential Province came to light when the head rise in cross-border attacks is part of peace deals with the Afghan Taliban. At of the TTP’s Bajaur chapter, Mullah a coordinated strategy to prevent a the same time, the Pakistani government Dadullah, was killed in a U.S. airstrike Pakistani military operation against is reportedly considering its own peace in Shigal district of Kunar Province the Haqqani network.25 Karachi-based talks with factions of the Pakistani on August 24, 2012.19 Dadullah, whose security expert Raees Ahmed believes Taliban—the conglomerate responsible real name was Jamal Said, had a close that the TTP has escalated attacks in for daily small-arms and suicide bomb association with senior members of al- Bajaur in response to an impending attacks in Pakistani territory.1 Qa`ida from 2003 to 2007, according army operation in North Waziristan, to tribal sources. He was the chief of which would coincide with U.S. or Since the emergence of the Pakistani the TTP’s moral police and head of the Afghan military action against TTP Taliban, Islamabad has entered into Taliban’s treasury.20 bases in Afghanistan.26 Militants may be a handful of peace deals with factions seeking to carve out territory in Bajaur belonging to the group—both written Media reports suggest that Qari Ziaur so that they can threaten violence in and unwritten—in attempts to placate Rehman, a key al-Qa`ida commander the settled areas of Malakand division the militants. Most of these peace who is from Kunar, as well as Shaykh in case Pakistan and the United States deals, however, resulted in the further Dost Muhammad, a Nuristan-based coordinate a military offensive.27 strengthening of the Pakistani Taliban, Afghan Taliban leader, are hosting the and only a few of the agreements lasted Pakistani Taliban militants.21 Rehman Conclusion beyond a few months. Violence flared is thought to have once been a close The recent cross-border incursions on not long after the agreements became confidante of Usama bin Ladin and both sides of the border clearly show effective, and the Pakistani Taliban then hosted him temporarily after his escape that Pakistan, Afghanistan and NATO demanded even further concessions from the Tora Bora Mountains in 2001.22 have all failed to clear the strategically from the government. The only Rehman was sheltered by the Pakistani important border areas of militants, exception was the situation in the Swat Taliban in Bajaur Agency for years, permitting previously dispersed Valley, where the government launched and he is now reportedly returning the extremist organizations to regroup and an aggressive military operation against favor.23 prepare new, large-scale attacks in both the Pakistani Taliban after the peace countries. Although security forces deal failed to render any results. In that Broader Strategic Plan? have begun operations to repel further case, the Mullah Fazlullah-led Pakistani Some analysts believe that violence on attacks, they are unlikely to be successful Taliban faction was forced to flee the both sides of the border is a coordinated until they deal collectively with the issue Swat Valley, and that region remains in strategy of al-Qa`ida, the TTP and the of cross-border militancy—a problem to control of the government today. Afghan Taliban to damage ties among which there are no easy solutions. Islamabad, Kabul and Washington by This article reviews the key peace Zia Ur Rehman is a journalist and agreements reached between 17 Tahir Khan, “TTP Admits to Having Safe Haven in researcher who covers militancy in Islamabad and various Pakistani Afghanistan,” Express Tribune, June 26, 2012. Pakistan. He has written for The Friday Taliban factions, and it assesses 18 Zia Khan and Naveed Hussain, “Border Incursions: Times, The Jamestown Foundation, whether the deals achieved their Suspicions Grow about Afghan Support for TTP,” Ex- Herald and The News International, and objectives. press Tribune, September 11, 2011. contributed to the New York Times. 19 Declan Walsh, “Pakistani Militant Leader Dies in The Shakai Peace Agreement, April 2004 Airstrike, NATO Says,” New York Times, August 25, In April 2004, the Shakai agreement 2012; Javed Hamim Kakar and Khan Wali Salarzai, “Key was reached between Nek Muhammad Haqqani, TTP Leaders Killed in Drone Strikes,” Pajhwok Wazir of the Pakistani Taliban and 2 Afghan News, August 25, 2012. 24 Khan, “Cross-Border Cooperation: Ties that Bind the Pakistani government. The peace 20 Zia Ur Rehman, “On the Borderline,” Friday Times, Militants Persist.” deal was the first of its kind since the September 7-13, 2012. 25 “Understanding with US on Joint Action Against 21 Khan, “Cross-Border Cooperation: Ties that Bind Mili- Haqqanis,” Dawn, August 6, 2012. 1 Tahir Khan, “Talks With Govt Suspended: TTP Lead- tants Persist.” 26 Ibid. er,” Express Tribune, September 1, 2012. 22 Khan and Hussain. 27 Personal interview, Raees Ahmed, security analyst, 2 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Profile: Nek Mohammed,” BBC, 23 Ibid. Karachi, Pakistan, September 4, 2012. June 18, 2004.

11 september 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 9 emergence of the Taliban in Pakistan, The Shakai agreement proved to be a The Swat Agreement, May 2008 and it would become the cornerstone failure, and what eventually stopped Since 2001, the Swat Valley suffered of future such agreements between the Nek Muhammad was a missile fired growing unrest after a cleric, Maulana government and militants in the tribal from a U.S. drone, which killed him in Fazlullah, established a religious areas. June 2004.6 seminary and later delivered radical sermons to the local population through The deal came after the government Srarogha Peace Agreement, February 2005 an illegal FM radio station. Fazlullah’s launched a military operation in March In February 2005, the Pakistani followers pursued a number of extremist 2004 to pressure Nek Muhammad to government reached a peace agreement policies, such as preventing girls cease supporting foreign militants, with Baitullah Mehsud of the Pakistani from attending school and demanding such as Arabs, Chechens and Uzbeks Taliban in the Srarogha area of South that women not visit markets unless in South Waziristan Agency of the Waziristan Agency.7 The government wearing burqas, or full body veils. After Federally Administered Tribal Areas entered into peace negotiations with Pakistani security forces raided the (FATA). After the military operation Baitullah after it recognized that Lal Masjid mosque in Islamabad in July was ineffective, and Pakistan sustained Taliban attacks were spreading from 2007—an event that has had lasting heavy casualties, the government the Ahmadzai Wazir areas to the contributory effects on militancy in entered into the Shakai agreement Mehsud areas of South Waziristan. The Pakistan—Fazlullah’s struggle for the with Nek Muhammad.3 As part of the government hoped to contain further implementation of Shari`a took a more peace deal, the Pakistani government Taliban expansion. violent form.9 agreed to release Taliban prisoners, pay compensation to tribesmen for property The deal reportedly specified that the The violence continued until the newly- damage as a result of its military government would compensate militants elected government in Pakistan’s Khyber operations, and provide money to the for homes razed or damaged during Pakhtunkhwa Province came to power militants so that they could repay their military operations.8 The government in 2008.10 The coalition government debt to al-Qa`ida.4 For his part, Nek also agreed not to target Baitullah consisted of two secular parties—the Muhammad agreed to register foreign Mehsud or his supporters. In response, Awami National Party and Pakistan militants and stop cross-border attacks the Mehsud militants did not have to lay People’s Party—and it hastily extended into Afghanistan. down their weapons, nor did they have the offer of peace talks to the Taliban in to surrender foreign militants in their Swat, hoping that their disagreements At the time of the signing, Nek ranks. The agreement only stipulated could be resolved through negotiations. Muhammad was a relatively obscure that they cease attacking Pakistani militant. When Pakistan’s military targets and refuse to give shelter to Following a series of meetings leaders sat down with Nek Muhammad, foreign militants. Similar to the case of and discussions between Taliban who was only in his 20s, it provided Nek Muhammad, the military’s deal with representatives and the Khyber him stature he previously did not have, Baitullah conveyed the message to all Pakhtunkhwa government both in the and it also reduced the importance of tribal leaders in South Waziristan that Swat Valley and in Peshawar, on May 21, the area’s tribal elders as well as the Baitullah was now the area’s strongman, 2008, the two sides reached a 16-point centuries-old tribal system that had providing him a new level of stature. agreement to bring an end to violence always been the method for resolving and restore peace to the valley.11 disputes. Clashes between the military and Taliban militants in South Waziristan increased Within days of inking the peace Immediately after the signing of the in the subsequent months. The violence deal, disagreements arose. The agreement, Nek Muhammad refused continued for years, proving that the Taliban refused to surrender their to surrender foreign militants to the peace deal served no purpose other than arms as stipulated in the agreement, government, and his faction began to prolong and spread militancy. demanding that the government first to assassinate tribal elders who withdraw troops from the valley. They helped negotiate the agreement.5 By July 2007, Pakistani security forces also demanded the release of Taliban The government then revoked Nek killed notorious militant leader Abdullah prisoners held by Pakistan. Within a Muhammad’s amnesty deal, and Mehsud, and Baitullah Mehsud himself month, the militants began attacking launched another military operation was eventually killed by a U.S. drone strike government officials and installations, against his faction in June 2004. in August 2009. Yet the organization he as well as destroying electronics shops founded remains strong today, now led and schools. This caused the government by Hakimullah Mehsud. to launch the military operation Rah-e- Haq.12 6 David Rohde and Mohammed Khan, “Ex-Fighter for 3 Personal interview, Brigadier (retired) Mahmood Shah, Taliban Dies in Strike in Pakistan,” New York Times, June 9 Griff Witte, “Raid at Islamabad Mosque Turns Long former secretary of security for FATA, September 3, 19, 2004. and Deadly,” Washington Post, July 11, 2007. 2012. Shah was the key figure in the negotiation process 7 Personal interview, Brigadier (retired) Mahmood Shah, 10 Zakir Hassnain, “NWFP Cabinet Takes Oath,” Daily with the tribal elders and drafting the agreement. Also former secretary of security for FATA, September 3, Times, April 3, 2008. see “Nek Mohammed,” PBS Frontline, undated. 2012. 11 Daud Khattak, “Text of Govt’s Agreement with Tali- 4 “Nek Mohammed.” 8 Amir Mir, “War and Peace in Waziristan,” Asia Times ban,” Daily Times, May 22, 2008. 5 Ibid. Online, May 4, 2005. 12 “Militants Pull Out of Talks in Swat,” Dawn, June 30,

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This was followed by some of the for multiple attacks on Pakistani Conclusion worst violence to hit Swat, as schools targets from his mountain redoubt in By reviewing Pakistan’s various peace were destroyed, police stations and Afghanistan.18 agreements with Taliban militants, army convoys attacked, and civilians a number of commonalities become kidnapped and beheaded. The violence Other Peace Deals/Understandings evident. All of the agreements were only stopped when the Khyber Apart from the three major peace signed from a position of government Pakhtunkhwa provincial government agreements in Shakai, Srarogha and weakness, and thus the militants agreed to implement the Shari`a- Swat, Pakistan entered into unwritten were able to achieve significant based Nizam-e-Adl regulation in Swat peace deals with various militant groups concessions. The government never on February 15, 2009.13 This led to in the tribal areas. One controversial enforced its demands of disarmament Fazlullah declaring a cease-fire. agreement is with the North Waziristan- or the surrendering of foreign based commander Hafiz Gul Bahadar, militants. In the majority of cases, Even that agreement, however, failed who is mainly involved in cross-border the government provided significant in a month, and Swat suffered another attacks into Afghanistan. The Pakistani financial compensation to the militants bout of violence. Emboldened by government and Bahadar’s faction on the pretext of property damage. This the government’s concessions, the have basically agreed that in exchange money likely exceeded the actual cost of Fazlullah-led Taliban overran Mingora for not attacking Pakistani interests, damages, in effect providing militants in May 2009, the commercial center Islamabad will not target Bahadur.19 funding for future operations.23 of the Swat Valley, paralyzing the Bahadur’s fighters move around freely Moreover, the agreements had the government.14 The Taliban then pushed in North Waziristan today. effect of adding prominence to militant into neighboring Buner and Shangla leaders. districts, only 60 miles from Pakistan’s A similar, but more covert deal was capital city.15 The Taliban advance reportedly reached with militant None of the agreements with Taliban toward Islamabad rang alarm bells commander Faqir Muhammad in factions involved in attacks in Pakistan among the government and the military, Bajaur Agency after Operation Sherdil lasted for more than a few months, and and caused Pakistan to launch a decisive in August 2008.20 Once the military the breaking of each agreement resulted military operation against Maulana operation concluded, there were in severe bouts of violence including Fazlullah and his fighters.16 Within two various reports that Pakistani security attacks on government installations, months of the major military operation, forces had reached a non-aggression security forces and civilians. Maulana Fazlullah fled the Swat Valley, pact with the Bajaur militants.21 Based and many of his commanders were on conversations with stakeholders in From the Taliban’s perspective, by either arrested or killed.17 Bajaur, this secret agreement stipulates leveling demands at the government that Faqir Muhammad’s Taliban faction and then entering into negotiations, it In the final analysis, the Swat agreement will not target Pakistani security forces demonstrates to civilians in the tribal proved counterproductive, and merely nor kill civilian targets in areas where areas that militant leaders are strong allowed the Taliban to grow in strength the security forces operate; in exchange, enough to sit at the same table as the during “peace” times. Once the Taliban Pakistani security forces will not target country’s top military officials. This were in a strong enough position Faqir Muhammad’s militants. solidifies support for the Taliban among to challenge Pakistan’s writ even their followers, and suppresses the voices further, they took that opportunity by Authorities also entered into an of resistance from civilian populations moving into Mingora, and then Buner unwritten agreement with Lashkar-i- living under their authority. and Shangla districts. Moreover, the Islam in Khyber Agency after Operation government’s failure to arrest or kill Sirat-e-Mustaqeem in June 2008.22 Daud Khattak is Senior Editor with RFE/ Maulana Fazlullah has come back to Similar to the two agreements in RL’s Mashaal Radio in Prague, Czech hurt the Pakistani state, as in the last Waziristan, Khyber authorities agreed Republic. Besides working in Afghanistan few months he has been responsible to compensate the militants for property as Editor at Pajhwok Afghan News from damage during the operation, as well 2005-2008, he worked with Pakistani 2008. as release several individuals held on English newspapers covering the situation 13 Daud Khattak, “Govt, TNSM Agree on Nizam-e-Adl charges of having ties to militants. Yet in KP and FATA. He also worked for Sunday in Malakand,” Daily Times, February 16, 2009. the agreement was quickly violated, and Times London and contributed articles to 14 “Taliban Take Over Mingora,” Daily Times, May 5, troops remain present in Khyber where the Christian Science Monitor. In 2010, his 2009. they continue to conduct operations. paper on the situation in Swat, “The Battle 15 Pamela Constable, “Defiant Taliban Forces Advance for Pakistan: Swat Valley,” was published to Within 60 Miles of Islamabad,” Washington Post, April 18 Zia Ur Rehman, “Taliban Militants Striking Pakistan by the New America Foundation. 24, 2009. from Afghan Territory,” CTC Sentinel 5:9 (2012). 16 Bill Roggio, “Pakistan Launches Operation against 19 “Anti-US Rant: ‘Peace Treaty to Stay Intact Despite the Taliban in Buner,” The Long War Journal, April 28, Polio Drive Ban,’” Express Tribune, June 20, 2012. 2009. 20 “Bajaur Mission Fulfilled,”Dawn , September 1, 2008. 17 In this case, however, although Fazlullah was forced 21 “Peace-Making Denials Expose Taliban Divisions,” out of Pakistan’s settled areas, he now is reportedly at- Express Tribune, December 12, 2011. 23 The author has viewed first-hand damage to property tacking Pakistan repeatedly from Afghanistan’s Kunar 22 Daud Khattak, “Mangal Bagh to Abide by Bara Peace in the tribal areas, and government compensation to mili- Province. Agreement,” Daily Times, July 12, 2008. tants has far exceeded the actual property damage.

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The Micro-Level of Civil In Afghanistan, Western senior on where their enemies sit, their own military leaders and decision-makers family loyalties, and where they believe War: The Case of Central have focused on dispositional macro- they can best access resources to prevail Helmand Province level accounts as if larger events were against their local opponents. The case disconnected from the micro-level.4 of central Helmand Province illustrates By Ryan Evans This article is intended to serve as a this dynamic. small corrective measure.5 the official aim of the war in Factionalism: U.S. Development, the Soviet- Afghanistan is to deny al-Qa`ida a safe Micro-Conflicts Afghan War, and the Mujahidin Civil War haven.1 The conventional narrative of Afghans engage in violent and non- From the 1950s to the early 1970s, the this war, however, places the U.S.-led violent politics for predominantly United States funded a large-scale International Security Assistance Force local reasons that often have little to agricultural development project, (ISAF) and the Afghan government do with any national or transnational the Helmand-Arghandab Valley against the Taliban and the Haqqani cause. Conflict in Afghanistan is Authority.7 Modeled on the Tennessee network in a war over the political driven by a confusing aggregation Valley Authority, the project aimed to future of the country.2 This narrative is of “micro-conflicts”—the localized, improve and expand irrigation systems deceptive and ignores the overwhelming enduring conflicts and rivalries driving in the Helmand river valley to increase localism of the conflict. politics within the government and the province’s arable land. From 1952 to the larger insurgency. A large-scale 1973, successive waves of migrants from This article will assess the history of counterinsurgency campaign has not across Afghanistan settled on these new central Helmand Province’s “micro- resolved or substantively addressed these lands, disrupting traditional patterns of conflicts,” which revolve around micro-conflicts; it has only aggravated land ownership and inter-tribal relations.8 factionalism, land and water, and the them. Moreover, this argument implies The arrival of these tribally diverse opium industry. It argues that the war that a national reconciliation process migrants had a long-term destabilizing in Afghanistan and civil wars more between the Afghan government—itself effect that upset the balance of power generally are best understood by a two- a house divided many times over—and among Helmand’s “indigenous” Pashtun fold approach that examines alterations the leadership of the loosely structured tribes, originally granted land there by in social relations over time. This Taliban movement will not mitigate Ahmad Shah Durrani in the 1700s.9 approach: 1) assesses local conflicts these micro-conflicts and lead to peace. at the micro-level and understands Still, Helmand’s traditional power- how these aggregate into larger-scale More often than not, these micro- brokers—the khans of the province’s conflict and effects; and 2) shows how conflicts are decades old, each with “original” tribes—managed to maintain macro-level political shifts destabilize unique histories at the provincial, a modicum of stability. Khans were existing social relations at the micro- district, and village levels. The constant (and, in far fewer cases, remain) elite level.3 Without using both avenues of recurrence of conflict in Afghanistan landholders who served as arbiters of analysis, understanding of any civil war during the last 30 years can be traced disputes, landlords, providers of “social will be incomplete. to these micro-conflicts. Indeed, their credit,” political and social leaders, constancy is one of several reasons to and patrons of mullahs and religious understand the last three decades of scholars. They connected the state conflict in Afghanistan as a civil war to the community, interacting with with multiple phases.6 People choose government officials, and serving as 10 1 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address sides (factions within the government, proxy officials. to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and factions within the insurgency, narcotics Pakistan,” U.S. White House, December 1, 2009. cartels, or a mixture of all three) based When the Communist People’s 2 ISAF’s official mission: “In support of the Government Democratic Party of Afghanistan of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts 4 In public statements, senior military and ISAF leaders (PDPA) overthrew the regime of operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and discuss the insurgency as a macro-level phenomenon Mohammad Daud Khan in 1978, 11 will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity rather than as an aggregation of local conflicts. See, for the party’s radical Khalq faction and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces, example, Michael O’Hanlon, “O’Hanlon: My Interview and facilitate improvements in governance and socio- with General John Allen,” CNN, March 26, 2012; “Mar- 7 Richard B. Scott, Tribal & Ethnic Groups in the Helmand economic development in order to provide a secure envi- tha Raddatz Interviews Gen. John Allen in an Exclusive Valley, Occasional Paper #21 (New York: The Asia Society ronment for sustainable stability that is observable to the from Afghanistan,” ABC News, March 5, 2012; Bob Afghanistan Council, 1980). population.” See www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html. Also Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon & Schus- 8 Ibid. see “Talking About Talks: Toward a Political Settlement ter, 2010). 9 Ibid. in Afghanistan,” International Crisis Group, March 26, 5 Modified segments of this article will also appear in the 10 For more on khans, see: John W. Anderson, “There 2012; Richard Barrett, “Talking to the Taliban,” Foreign forthcoming co-authored report: Talking to the Taliban: are no Khans Anymore: Economic Development and So- Policy, August 20, 2012; Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, Ending the Chaos of Good Intentions (London and Wash- cial Change in Tribal Afghanistan,” Middle East Journal Thwarting Afghanistan’s Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach ington, D.C.: The International Centre for the Study of 32:2 (1978); John W. Anderson, “Khan and Khel: Dialects toward Peace and Reconciliation (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Radicalisation and Political Violence, the Center for Na- of Pakhtun Tribalism,” in Richard Tapper ed., The Con- Institute of Peace, 2008). tional Policy, forthcoming). flict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan (New York: 3 Charles Tilly, Identities, Boundaries & Social Ties (Lon- 6 Ryan Evans, “The Once and Future Civil War in Af- St. Martin’s Press, 1983). don: Paradigm, 2005), pp. 23-44. ghanistan,” The AfPak Channel, July 26, 2012. 11 The Afghan communist party, the People’s Democratic

14 september 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 9 instituted a series of land, economic, conflict, while existing social groups Hizb-i-Islami was the most popular and debt reforms that attacked the khan were transformed by it. Communities anti-Soviet mujahidin party in the system in Helmand and elsewhere. To everywhere armed themselves to protect Barakzai-dominated river valley the Khalqis, the khans were oppressive against roaming bandits and rogue between Gereshk and Lashkar Gah.18 feudal overlords who kept Afghan insurgents.”14 The Barakzai were the old rural elite peasants mired in backwardness. While of Helmand Province who had the most there is some truth to this assessment, As rebellion spread and Helmand’s to lose to Khalqi reforms and usurpers. it ignores the benefits the khan system “moral economy”15 fragmented, The Akhundzadas joined the anti-Soviet provided for both state and society— families, tribes, and sub-tribes split Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami mujahidin namely stability.12 along the lines of competing national- group. Rivals in other Alizai sub-tribes level mujahidin parties with provincial joined other mujahidin parties, out Taking advantage of the disruption franchises. of opposition to the Akhundzadas.19 caused by these reforms, opportunistic Yet Helmandis did not reliably choose “climbers,” like the infamous Membership in these parties was not their faction solely based on tribal or Akhundzada family of a lesser branch primarily based on preference for one sub-tribal membership. Other factors of the Alizai tribe, the Hasanzai, began ideology or the other, but rather on included inter- and intra-family feuds, which party would best serve local local village disputes, and land disputes. “Land disputes have interests for local conflicts and as a For the most part, the Hizbis in Helmand reaction to the Soviet intervention cared little for the revolutionary Islamist determined on which side in 1979. For example, Helmand had doctrine of the party’s national leader, of the fence people stand: one of the largest Khalqi membership Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.20 For them, his bases in the country,16 as the relatively group served as a convenient provider with the government or impoverished and disenfranchised of weapons, materiel, and logistics for with the insurgents. It is migrants had the least to lose and the local conflicts as well as anti-Soviet and most to gain politically, socially, and anti-government resistance.21 not uncommon for multiple economically from Khalqi reforms at families to have a legal the expense of the traditional elites and Upon the withdrawal of Soviet forces earlier migrants who had been allotted and the later collapse of the Najibullah title to the same land from more land.17 regime, the province endured a different regimes.” confusing civil war between mujahidin parties and various state-sponsored militias. This war ended shortly after 14 Antonio Giustozzi and Niamatulah Ibrahimi, Thirty the Akhundzadas’ Harakat-i-Inqilab-i- Years of Conflict: Drivers of Anti-Government Mobilisation to launch attacks against the khans and Islami consolidated control over most in Afghanistan, 1978-2011 (Kabul: Afghanistan Research their supporters, as well as the Afghan of the province.22 The Taliban swept and Evaluation Unit, 2012). state and Soviet troops who intervened in through the province in late 1994 and 15 The moral economy approach begins with the asser- 1979.13 As Antonio Giustozzi explained, early 1995. Many mujahidin fled to tion that human interchange and economic activity are this phenomenon was not exclusive to Pakistan and Iran, while others joined “submerged” in social relations and that “historically, Helmand: “new social groups emerged the Taliban.23 the provisioning of humans—the securing of their live- with a vested interest in prolonging the lihood—was located in, or integrated through, noneco- During the U.S.-led invasion in 2001, nomic institutions (e.g., kinship, religion, and politics).” the Taliban in Helmand were mainly Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), split into two factions in Economic relations are thus an integral part of social overthrown by militias led by Sher 1967, two years after it was founded. The Khalq faction, relations and while they are variable across cultures Mohammad Akhundzada and his allies. led by Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, and geography, “they are molded, in their ends and in- Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, who had was more radical than the Parcham faction and also struments, by non-economic forces.” See William James married into the Karzai family, became more predominantly Pashtun—Afghanistan’s largest Booth, “On the Idea of the Moral Economy,” The Ameri- Helmand’s first post-Taliban governor ethnic group which is concentrated in the south and east can Political Science Review 88:3 (1994): p. 653; Samuel of the country. While the Parcham faction was content to Popkin, “The Rational Peasant,” Theory and Society 9:3 pursue a communist state more patiently, the more radi- (1980): pp. 411-471; Jeremy M. Paige, “Social Theory and 18 Personal interviews, Gereshk and Babaji, Afghani- cal Khalq faction launched the Saur Revolution in 1978, Peasant Revolution in Vietnam and Guatemala,” Theory stan, January and March 2011. overthrowing the regime of Mohammad Daud Khan. See and Society 12:6 (1982): pp. 699-736. 19 Putting it Together in Southern Afghanistan; Antonio Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan (New 16 Personal interviews, Gereshk, Parschow, and Lashkar Giustozzi and Noor Ulla, “‘Tribes’ and Warlords in South- Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 82, 92-95, Gah, Afghanistan, January, May and August 2011. All in- ern Afghanistan, 1980–2005 (London: Crisis States Re- 111-121. terviews cited were conducted in the author’s capacity as search Centre, 2010), pp. 9-13. 12 Rubin, pp. 111-121, 142-145; Scott. a Human Terrain Team Social Scientist between Novem- 20 Ibid; personal interviews, Gereshk and Parschow, Af- 13 Mad Mullahs, Opportunists, and Family Connections: The ber 2010 and August 2011. The interview subjects were ghanistan, January, March and April 2011. Violent Pashtun Cycle (Williamsburg, VA: Tribal Analysis all Afghan nationals and included farmers, merchants, 21 Giustozzi and Ullah. Center, 2008); Putting it Together in Southern Afghanistan security force officials, elders, and militia leaders. Also 22 Ibid.; Anthony Davis, “How the Taliban Became a (Williamsburg, VA: Tribal Analysis Center, 2009); Af- see Antonio Giustozzi, Empires of Mud: War and Warlords Military Force,” in William Maley ed., Fundamentalism ghanistan: Helmand’s Deadly Provincial Politics - Competi- in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press, Reborn? Afghanistan Under the Taliban (New York: New tion and Corruption (Arlington, VA: Courage Services, 2009), pp. 64-65. York University Press, 1998); Rubin, pp. 245-264. 2009). 17 Scott; Giustozzi and Ibrahimi. 23 Ibid.

15 september 2012 . Vol 5. Issue 9 in 2001. He worked to sideline mujahidin Conor Foley, “if the root cause of the Occasionally, corrupt or indignant and former Khalq rivals until he was conflicts that wreaked such devastation Afghan officials will take a hard line fired in 2006 for heroin trafficking.24 in Afghanistan could be summarized on “squatters”—a term that can be When he left the governor’s office, he in a single word, it would probably applied to a farmer whose family has was appointed to the upper house of the be ‘land.’”28 Since Helmand has a been working the same land for 20 Afghan parliament and, remarkably, predominantly agricultural economy, years. For example, the former mayor claimed to send 3,000 of his own men land is the foundation of all wealth in of Lashkar Gah and the police longed to fight on the side of the Taliban, the province. The alternative is poverty. after the village of Muhktar north of his former enemy.25 Sher Mohammad In the case of Helmand, there are three the provincial capital overlooking Akhundzada was not taking up the important land-related problems driving the Helmand River, which began as a Taliban’s cause, but rather ensuring conflict: competing claims, state refusal refugee settlement over a decade ago that the men in his patronage network to recognize land claims, and land usage. and has since matured into a sizable would still be paid, thus maintaining village. The mayor occasionally directed his powerbase in Helmand. Competing claims to land are common his allies in the police to foray into the causes of tension between brothers, village and allegedly destroy homes, During Sher Mohammad Akhundzada’s families, villages, and tribes. Land sometimes killing civilians.31 These rule and since, factional disputes disputes have determined on which actions incentivize cooperation with have defined violent and non-violent side of the fence people stand: with the the insurgency, if only for protection politics in Helmand. It is one of the few government (or a faction therein) or with against the state.32 provinces where former Khalqis are the insurgents (or a faction therein). It politically ascendant, occupying key is not uncommon for multiple families Disputes over land usage typically district governor and senior police slots to have a legal title to the same land relate to poppy cultivation. The size as well as the provincial governor’s from different regimes. of a plot, land quality and water office. More often than not, these former availability can determine what crop Khalqis enjoy antagonistic relationships The state’s refusal to recognize land is economically feasible for a farmer to with former mujahidin counterparts claims is at a crisis point. The Afghan grow. As such, growing poppy is—for and especially former Hizb-i-Islami government currently only recognizes these reasons and others—often not commanders. These former mujahidin land claims for which they have issued a matter of choice, but a question of are often also in the Afghan National deeds as well as for “customary” deeds survival. The costs of agriculture are Security Forces (ANSF), but others— dating before 1975.29 This has left considerable, requiring an investment and their children—have joined the those who received land in the Daud or insurgency. Just as people joined various PDPA reforms without a legal claim. It mujahidin parties or the government to also alienates those granted land from “If conflict in Helmand can gain allies and resources to pursue their the Taliban in the 1990s, such as the be primarily attributed to local interests, people join the Taliban Ishaqzai in Sangin. The end result is movement for the same reasons.26 the vast majority of rural landholdings land tenure, the narcotics in Helmand are not recognized as legal trade is a close second.” At the Root: Land and Water by the Afghan government. This is part The Khalqi land reforms represented of the reason why the Ishaqzai, for one of several land tenure regimes example, are seen as a “troublesome” that have been in place in Helmand tribe affiliated with the Taliban. of cash or credit in fertilizer, fuel for since the end of the reign of King Zahir Affiliation with the Taliban provides diesel-powered water pumps, labor, Shah (1933-1973). Land reforms were them some measure of protection and transport to bring crops to market. enacted by Mohammad Daud Khan, against the government’s predatory After all of this money is spent by the PDPA regime, various mujahidin tendencies.30 farmers—particularly tenant farmers parties in the early 1990s, the Taliban, and those with small landholdings— 27 and the current regime. As noted by 28 Conor Foley, “Housing, Land, and Property Restitu- and the bulk of their licit crops are set tion Rights in Afghanistan,” in Scott Leckie ed., Housing, aside for self-consumption, it becomes 24 Personal interviews, Gereshk, Afghanistan, Janu- Land, and Property Rights in Post-Conflict United Nations difficult for them to turn even a modest ary 2011; Damien McElroy, “Afghan Governor Turned and Other Peace Operations: A Comparative Survey and profit. These factors, combined with the 3,000 Men Over to Taliban,” Telegraph, November 20, Proposal for Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University family expenses mentioned above, make 2009. Press, 2009). poppy a more appealing crop due to its 25 McElroy. 29 In 1975, the first of a series of land distribution laws higher value. 26 Personal interviews, Gereshk, Afghanistan, January- in Afghanistan began. The Afghan government’s current February 2011. position is designed to restore landholdings to the “gold- 27 Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins, Afghanistan en era’” of King Zahir Shah, before the Daud and PDPA Country Study (Washington, D.C.: American University, land reforms. See Liz Alden Wily, Rural Land Relations Tilly, “War and State Making as Organized Crime,” in 1986), pp. 183-189; Land Tenure and Property Rights in Af- in Conflict: A Way Forward (Kabul: Afghan Research and Peter Evans et al. eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cam- ghanistan (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2010); Liz Alden Evaluation Unit, 2004). bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 169-191. Wily, Land Rights in Crisis: Restoring Tenure Security in Af- 30 The Afghan state tends to adhere rather strictly to 31 Personal interviews, Mukhtar village, Helmand Prov- ghanistan (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Tilly’s observation that war-making and state-building ince, Afghanistan, December 2010. Unit, 2003), pp. 42-50. are, in essence, large-scale organized crime. See Charles 32 Ibid.

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This is especially the case in areas poppy profits barely get them and their The Afghan state implemented political, with lower quality agricultural land in families through the year, the utility economic, and social reforms that Helmand.33 In these areas, the water of this counternarcotics program is attacked the prevailing system of social level in irrigation ditches is so low questionable at best.39 arrangements and hierarchy on the and the ditches so deep that farmers micro-level in Helmand in the mid- and must subsist on water pumped up from In Helmand, there is a “Gray Nexus” late-1970s and 1980s. These reforms these ditches and wells using diesel- among the Afghan government, destabilized this system, broke its “moral powered pumps.34 This makes their narcotics cartels, the insurgency, and the economy,” and created incentives for yearly expenditure in fuel enormous.35 population based on a common interest cross-boundary opportunism. Different The necessity of growing poppy to in poppy cultivation, processing, and social groups that lived side by side for compensate for such costs brings them trafficking. The insurgency serves as decades, despite longstanding tensions, into conflict with ISAF and parts of a protection and transportation racket began to engage in violent attacks the state. When poppy is eradicated, for the cartels. It also plays a role in against each other, politicizing pre- enduring hatreds arise that drive people surging migrant farmers to help with the existing social identities and forming to support the Taliban. harvest in the spring and, in some areas, coalitions and alliances with macro- the insurgents offer farmers protection level organizations—including the If conflict in Helmand can be primarily against eradication efforts. Poppy Khalq faction of the PDPA, Hizb-i- attributed to land tenure, the narcotics cultivation and narcotics trafficking Islami, Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami, and trade is a close second.36 represent the most important source other mujahidin and militia groups. of revenue for the Taliban in southern Poppy and the Opium Industry: Afghanistan.40 Government officials At the same time, Pakistan likely seeks The Renewable Resource of Conflict profit by allowing and facilitating to prevent a strong Afghan government Although poppy had long been grown trafficking. It is not uncommon for from emerging, as Islamabad prefers on a smaller scale in Helmand, the government officials in Helmand to be a weak buffer state to maintain Akhundzadas legitimized its broader more directly involved in cultivation, strategic depth against India and avoid cultivation in the 1980s and turned processing, trafficking and facilitation. encirclement. To achieve this, and it into a province-wide industry. Poppy profits, which are modest for to keep a modicum of stability in its Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami controlled farmers, provide enough cash for a own restive Pashtun regions, Pakistan the supply of poppy and Hizb-i-Islami family to meet its costs of living. These must also blunt Pashtun nationalism. ran the processing centers in an uneasy, profits also serve as a form of insurance Exploitation of these micro-level often disrupted, balance of power.37 for family illnesses, failed crops, conflicts through and with limited Poppy cultivation was briefly banned drought, and any needed repairs.41 support for the Haqqani network and by the Taliban in the late 1990s, but the Taliban allow them to accomplish experienced a resurgence following their Conclusion all of these goals. overthrow.38 Poppy is the renewable It is vital to use two avenues of resource of conflict in Helmand. analysis to understand the conflict Focusing solely or mostly on either the Conflicts between various factions in Helmand Province and civil wars micro- or macro-level of analysis will within the government and between the more generally: 1) assessing local provide an incomplete understanding government and the insurgency are often conflicts at the micro-level and of a conflict, leading to poorly gauged driven by competition over access to and understanding how these aggregate policy and strategic prescriptions control over the narcotics industry. into larger-scale conflict and effects; in the case of military intervention, and 2) understanding how macro-level development aid, covert assistance to Helmand has been the largest poppy- political shifts destabilize existing one or more parties, or even “moral producing province in Afghanistan social relations at the micro-level. support.” by a considerable margin. With the eradication program in Helmand The complex micro-conflicts that drive Ryan Evans is a Research Fellow at the wiping out only three percent of the conflict in this part of Afghanistan are Center for National Policy and a Ph.D. yearly crop, at the cost of alienating unique to Helmand, but equally complex Candidate at the King’s College London struggling farmers whose meager local issues are at play in every province War Studies Department. He previously and every district in Afghanistan. These served on a U.S. Army Human Terrain 33 This information is based on the author’s work with micro-level developments are linked to Team with the British-led Task Force the Human Terrain Team from the Task Force Helmand important shifts at the macro-level. Two Helmand. Area of Operations, which encompassed Nahr-e-Saraj important findings can be observed. district, eastern Nad-e-Ali district, and Lashkar Gah Mu- nicipality, from November 2010 to August 2011. 39 This information is based on the author’s work with 34 Ibid. the Human Terrain Team at main operating base Lash- 35 Ibid. kar Gah, Helmand Province, from November 2010 to 36 Ibid; Giustozzi and Ibrahimi, p. 45. August 2011. 37 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency 40 Michelle Nichols, “Taliban Raked in $400 Million and the War on Drugs (Washington, D.C.: Brookings In- from Diverse Sources: U.N.,” Reuters, September 11, stitution, 2009). 2012. 38 Ibid. 41 Ibid.

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in Turkey in July 2010 and extradited to August 6, 2012 (RUSSIA): A suicide Recent Highlights in Germany in early 2012. – AP, August 3 bomber killed four people in Chechnya, Terrorist Activity including two officers and a soldier. – al- August 3, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): Jazira, August 6 August 1, 2012 (IRAQ): The Iraqi Interior Hundreds of suspected Taliban militants Ministry said that violence in Iraq hit a launched simultaneous attacks in Kunar August 7, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A nearly two-year high during the month Province, killing an Afghan soldier and suicide bomber in a truck rammed into the of July. A total of 325 people were killed female civilian. The attacks struck five gate of a NATO base in Logar Province. in July, although 123 people were killed districts, including Watapur, Manogay, No deaths were reported. The Taliban on a single day—July 23—when a series Marawara, Shigal and Dangam. – RFE/RL, claimed responsibility. – AP, August 7 of coordinated attacks tore through the August 3 country. – CNN, August 1 August 7, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A August 3, 2012 (KENYA): A suspected remote-detonated bomb exploded along a August 1, 2012 (YEMEN): Purported al- suicide bomber wounded nine people road outside Kabul, killing at least eight Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) near a military airbase in Nairobi. The people in a minibus. According to the militants attacked a security headquarters bomber, who detonated a grenade, was New York Times, “The target may have in Jaar, killing four soldiers. AQAP likely trying to target a group of soldiers been another vehicle carrying workers controlled the town of Jaar until the in a Somali-dominated area of the capital. to their jobs at the Defense Ministry, military recaptured it in June 2012. – AP, – Reuters, August 3 some of them in military uniforms. The August 1 ministry vehicle was traveling behind August 3, 2012 (NIGERIA): A suicide the minibus carrying civilians…and the August 1, 2012 (SOMALIA): A suicide bomber tried to kill the emir of Fika, bomber may have gotten the timing wrong bomber attempted to attack a national who is also the chairman of the Yobe when setting off the explosives.” – New conference on a draft constitution, but State Council of Chiefs, at a mosque. A York Times, August 7 was shot to death before he could detonate policeman noticed that the bomber was his explosives. A second suicide bomber trying to get near the emir, and confronted August 7, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): Two blew himself up near the perimeter of the him. The bomber then detonated his men wearing Afghan army uniforms facility, injuring six police officers. Both explosives, injuring four people. – Daily killed a U.S. soldier in Paktia Province. bombers wore government uniforms. The Times Nigeria, August 3; AFP, August 3 – AP, August 10 new draft constitution was approved by Somalia’s constituent assembly. – Reuters, August 4, 2012 (YEMEN): A suicide August 7, 2012 (YEMEN): A U.S. drone August 1; Voice of America, August 1 bomber attacked a gathering in Jaar targeted a vehicle in Hadramawt Province, organized by an anti-al-Qa`ida leader, killing three suspected militants. – AP, August 2, 2012 (SPAIN): Spanish killing at least 45 people. Ansar al-Shari`a August 7 authorities arrested three suspected al- claimed responsibility for the attack. Qa`ida militants who were allegedly – Bloomberg, August 5; Reuters, August 5 August 8, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A plotting to attack in “Spain and/or other suicide bomber killed three NATO troops European countries.” The suspects—a August 4, 2012 (YEMEN): A suspected and one civilian in Kunar Province. – AP, Russian, a Russian of Chechen descent, U.S. drone killed three suspected militants August 8 and a Turk—were in possession of in Hadramawt Province. – Reuters, August 5 explosives. Spain’s interior minister said August 9, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): Two that the men had been in Spain for about August 5, 2012 (NIGERIA): A suicide Afghan soldiers tried to kill a group of two months, and were under surveillance bomber in a vehicle attacked a military NATO troops outside a military base for several weeks. He also said that the checkpoint in Damaturu, Yobe State, in eastern Afghanistan. There were suspects were “clearly not acting as lone killing six soldiers and two civilians. no NATO casualties, and one of the wolves.” Authorities suggested that the Authorities blamed Boko Haram. – Reuters, assailants was shot to death by return men may have been planning to attack August 5 fire. – AP, August 10 a shopping mall in Gibraltar. – Christian Science Monitor, August 2; New York Times, August 6, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): August 9, 2012 (YEMEN): A senior Yemeni August 2; CNN, August 6 Eleven Afghan policemen reportedly military officer was killed after a bomb defected to the Taliban in Musa Qala planted in his car exploded in Mukalla, August 3, 2012 (GERMANY): Prosecutors district of Helmand Province. According Hadramawt Province. Authorities blamed charged a 26-year-old German man with to the BBC, “It is the second such defection the incident on al-Qa`ida in the Arabian membership in an Islamist terrorist in recent weeks—a police commander Peninsula. – Reuters, August 10 organization and helping to prepare and 13 junior officers joined the Taliban attacks in Afghanistan. The suspect in western Farah Province in late July.” August 10, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): An is accused of traveling to the Afghan- – BBC, August 6 Afghan police officer killed three U.S. Pakistan border area in 2009 to be Marines in Sangin district, Helmand trained in weapons and explosives. He is August 6, 2012 (YEMEN): A U.S. drone Province. – CNN, August 10; AP, August 10 also accused of participating in an attack killed seven suspected militants in two on a joint U.S.-Afghan military base in vehicles in Rada, Bayda Province. – AP, Afghanistan in 2009. He was arrested August 7

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August 10, 2012 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber August 18, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A Hammadi, was arrested in May 2011 and in a truck attacked a Shi`a mosque in NATO airstrike killed at least 20 Taliban admitted to targeting U.S. forces in Iraq. Mosul, Ninawa Province, killing at least insurgents who gathered to oversee a His accomplice, Waad Ramadan Alwan, five people. – Reuters, August 10 public execution in Chapa Dara district, pleaded guilty to a number of terrorism Kunar Province. – New York Times, August charges in December 2011. – CNN, August August 10, 2012 (IRAQ): Gunmen killed 18 21 four anti-al-Qa`ida fighters near Dujail, 50 miles north of Baghdad. – AP, August 10 August 18, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A suicide August 21, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. bomber in a vehicle killed five people, drone reportedly killed Badruddin August 10, 2012 (SYRIA): The Associated including members of the Frontier Corps, Haqqani in North Waziristan Agency of Press quoted U.S. intelligence officials at a checkpoint in a Quetta suburb. – AP, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. as saying that al-Qa`ida is expanding in August 18; AFP, August 18 The Taliban refused to officially confirm Syria, and is now building a network of Badruddin’s death, although Afghan and well-organized cells. – AP, August 10 August 18, 2012 (YEMEN): Suspected Pakistani officials, as well as a senior members of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Taliban leader, said that Badruddin died August 11, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A Peninsula attacked Yemen’s intelligence in the strike. Badruddin is considered the suspected Taliban infiltrator shot to services headquarters in Aden, killing operations commander in the Haqqani death 11 Afghan policemen in Delaram at least 14 Yemeni soldiers and security network, and is the son of the network’s district of western Nimroz Province. guards. The BBC reported that “the founder, Jalaluddin Haqqani. – Wall Street – AAP, August 12 militants attacked the building from Journal, August 26 two sides, firing rocket-propelled August 14, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): grenades and automatic weapons inside.” August 23, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Tehrik-i- Three suicide bombers killed at least – Washington Post, August 18; BBC, August 18 Taliban Pakistan (TTP) e-mailed Pakistani 20 people in Zaranj, Nimroz Province. media outlets, claiming that the group had – AP, August 14 August 18, 2012 (RUSSIA): Masked established a “suicide bombers squad” to gunmen wounded eight worshippers at a attack Pakistani troops if an offensive is August 15, 2012 (ALGERIA): Authorities mosque in Dagestan. – al-Jazira, August 18 launched in North Waziristan Agency of arrested three armed Islamists in Berriane, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. located in southern Algeria. One of the August 19, 2012 (IRAQ): A car bomb – PakTribune, August 23 men was identified as Abderrahmane exploded next to the convoy of a prominent Abou Ishak Essoufi, a senior member of Iraqi Sunni cleric, critically wounding him August 24, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb. The and killing four of his bodyguards. The NATO airstrike killed senior Pakistani men were apprehended while traveling cleric, Mehdi al-Sumaidai, recently urged Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah, toward the Sahel border. – AFP, August 20 Islamist militant groups in the country along with 12 other militants, at a to end their insurgency. The incident compound in Kunar Province. Dadullah August 16, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A occurred in Baghdad. – Reuters, August 19 was the leader of the Pakistani Taliban NATO helicopter crashed in Kandahar faction in Bajaur Agency of the Federally Province, killing 11 people, including August 19, 2012 (YEMEN): A suicide Administered Tribal Areas. According seven NATO troops. The Taliban said bomber killed the leader of a pro-army to the New York Times, “Mullah Dadullah, they shot down the aircraft, although militia in Mudiya, Abyan Province. also the name of an Afghan commander of NATO would not confirm that claim. Authorities blamed al-Qa`ida in the the Taliban who was killed in 2007, was – AP, August 16 Arabian Peninsula. – AFP, August 19 the nom de guerre of Jamal Said, a prayer leader from the village of Damadola, August 16, 2012 (IRAQ): A series of August 19, 2012 (RUSSIA): A suicide in Bajaur. He rose through the ranks bombings tore through Iraq, killing more bomber detonated his explosives as of the Pakistani Taliban and in 2008, than 70 people. – Reuters, August 16 policemen in southern Russia gathered headed its vice and virtue department, at the funeral of a colleague. The blast, enforcing strict edicts based on a narrow August 16, 2012 (PAKISTAN): At least which occurred in Ingushetia, killed at interpretation of Islamic texts.” Dadullah nine Taliban fighters attacked Pakistani least seven policemen. – AP, August 19 became the leader of the Pakistani Air Force Base Minhas in Kamra, Taliban faction in Bajaur after the Taliban killing one security official. According August 21, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): An leadership fired his predecessor, Faqir to Fox News, “the militants scaled a insurgent rocket attack damaged the plane Muhammad, for participating in peace wall surrounding the air base following of U.S. General Martin E. Dempsey as it sat talks with Islamabad. – New York Times, the intense rocket barrage and a two parked on a runway in Bagram. “Indirect August 25 hour-plus gunfight ensued. … Security fire at Bagram is not unusual, so we don’t forces were able to retake the base, but believe his aircraft was targeted,” said a August 24, 2012 (PAKISTAN): U.S. drones one soldier and the nine militants were Pentagon spokesperson. – AP, August 21 fired missiles at three militant hideouts in killed.” Some experts believe that the North Waziristan Agency of the Federally base in Kamra may be linked to Pakistan’s August 21, 2012 (IRAQ): An Iraqi man Administered Tribal Areas, killing 18 nuclear weapons arsenal. – Fox News, living in Kentucky pleaded guilty in suspected insurgents. – AP, August 24 August 16 federal court to plotting to assist al-Qa`ida in Iraq. The man, Mohanad Shareef

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August 26, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): August 28, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani CTC Sentinel Staff Insurgents attacked a checkpoint in Taliban militants based in neighboring Washir district, Helmand Province, Afghanistan’s Kunar Province crossed Editor-in-Chief killing 10 Afghan soldiers. Five other into Pakistan and attacked Pakistani Erich Marquardt soldiers were either kidnapped or joined troops in Bajaur Agency of the Federally Senior Editor, CTC the assailants. – AP, August 26 Administered Tribal Areas. After the attack, 15 soldiers were missing. On Editorial Board August 26, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): August 31, the Pakistani Taliban released COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. Suspected Taliban militants beheaded 17 a video showing the severed heads of a Department Head Afghan civilians, including two women, dozen Pakistani soldiers. – New York Daily Department of Social Sciences (West Point) in Kajaki district of Helmand Province. News, August 31; Voice of America, August 31 – Voice of America, August 27 COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. August 28, 2012 (RUSSIA): A female Deputy Department Head August 26, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Dozens suicide bomber killed Said Atsayev, a Department of Social Sciences (West Point) of insurgents from Afghanistan crossed leader of Sufi Muslims in the region, in into Pakistan and attacked an anti- Dagestan. The blast also killed six of MAJ Bryan Price Taliban militia post in Bajaur Agency of Atsayev’s followers. The bomber was later Director, CTC the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. identified as Aminat Saprykina, an ethnic One soldier and 20 militants were killed. Russian woman who lost two husbands— – AP, August 26 both militants—in the North Caucasus conflict. At the time of her death, she was August 27, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): An married to another wanted militant. – AP, Afghan soldier shot to death two U.S. August 28; Reuters, August 28; RFE/RL, August troops in Laghman Province. – Wall Street 29 Journal, August 27 Contact August 28, 2012 (RUSSIA): A border Combating Terrorism Center August 27, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A guard shot and killed seven servicemen U.S. Military Academy suicide bomber in a vehicle exploded at a frontier post in Dagestan. The guard 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall in Kandahar, killing four civilians. The was killed by return fire. – Reuters, August West Point, NY 10996 bomb appeared to target Abdul Raziq, 28 Phone: (845) 667-6383 Kandahar’s police chief, but he was Email: [email protected] not injured. Raziq is leading a strong August 29, 2012 (IRAQ): Gunmen killed Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ campaign against insurgents in Kandahar, Iraqi Brigadier General Nadhim Tayih the Taliban’s former stronghold. – Voice of in Baghdad. The general was the head * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 America, August 27; New York Times, August 28 of police emergency responders in west Baghdad. – AFP, August 30 August 27, 2012 (SOMALIA): African Union and Somali troops captured the August 29, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani port of Marka from al-Shabab. Somalia’s Taliban fighters killed at least eight al-Shabab militant group has suffered a Pakistani soldiers in South Waziristan support string of losses recently, and it now only Agency of the Federally Administered The Combating Terrorism Center would controls two other ports: Barawe and Tribal Areas. – New York Times, August 29 like to express its gratitude to its financial Kismayo. – AFP, August 27 supporters, for without their support and August 31, 2012 (THAILAND): Suspected shared vision of the Center products like the August 27, 2012 (KENYA): Unidentified Malay-Muslim separatists executed a CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you militants shot to death a Muslim cleric in wave of bombings in southern Thailand, are interested in learning more about how Mombasa. The cleric had been previously wounding two soldiers. The “bomb- to support the Combating Terrorism Center, accused by the United States of helping like” devices were planted in at least please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call Islamist militants in Somalia. The killing 60 locations in Narathiwat and Pattani Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association sparked large protests, with angry rioters provinces, although most of the devices of Graduates at 845-446-1561. smashing vehicles and setting churches were fake. – Reuters, August 31 on fire. –Reuters, August 27

August 28, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A roadside bomb hit an Afghan army convoy in Kunar Province. When soldiers exited their vehicle, a suicide bomber on foot The views expressed in this report are those of detonated explosives, killing five Afghan the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, troops. – Dawn, August 29 the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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