Extensions of Remarks
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September 12, 1978 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS 29057 EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS BALANCE($) OF POWER SERIES was intended as another magnum opus, di Soviet body that a foreign state had gone BOOK IV<E)-SOVIET APPROACH rected this time to the specific problem of out of its way to be nice to the Soviet Union Soviet-American relations. It was never fin and deserved credit for it would risk-at the TO NEGOTIATIONS ished. Being unfinished, my recollection is least-his job. Everyone in the Soviet govern that it was never used in any way. I include ment must assume that foreign governments ... an excerpt from it, on the subject of the act only in their own interests, and that HON. JOHN B. BRECKINRIDGE technique of dealing with Russia, which gratitude and appreciation are unknown OF KENTUCKY represents a crude attempt, but one of the qualities 1n foreign affairs. first of its kind (the first in my recollection, In this way, the machinery by which So IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES at any rate), to draw up a useful set of rules viet foreign affairs are conducted is capable Monday, September 11, 1978 !or dealing with the Stalin regime .... (I of recognizing, and reacting to, only consid reiterate) the Stalin regime. (This was, after erations of concrete Soviet interest. No one e Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Mr. Speaker, all, the only Russian regime with which I can argue any proposition in the councils of today's article in Book IV of the Bal had then had personal experience.) the Soviet government unless he can show ance(s) of Power Series, which sets forth The student of Soviet-American relations concretely how the interests of the Soviet Soviet Intentions and Doctrine, is con who reads these rules today will have, no Union stand to gain if it is accepted or to cerned with the Soviet approach to nego doubt, two questions in his mind as he com suffer if it is rejected. This principle is ap tiation. Entitled, "The Technique for pletes the reading of them. One is whether plied with the most serene objectivity. In Dealing With Russia," and written in they have been observed in the subsequent examining a. position taken by a foreign years and continue to be observed today. The state, the Russians make no effort to look 1946 by one of America's foremost dip other is whether they are stm applicable now at it from the standpoint of the foreign state lomats, George F. Kennan, this issue sets that Stalin is dead and the world situation in question or from any fancied community forth a set of rules for dealing with the has changed in important ways. My answer of aims on the part of themselves and the Stalin regime. While Kennan argues that to both these questions would be: only state involved. They assume it is dictated by these principles can only partly apply in partly.... purposes which are not theirs, and they ex the post-Stalin era, he does insist that The Soviet approach to negotiation amine it only from the standpoint of its Russian historical experience has pro effect on them. If the effect is favorable, they (Excerpt from the United States and Russia accept it without gratitude; 1f it is unfavor vided the Russian mind with no concept (Winter 1946)] able, they reject it without resentment. We of permanent friendly relations between Historically, the foreign affairs of Russia could make it much easier for them and for states, and that it is within this milieu have developed along lines entirely different ourselves if we would face these facts. that present negotiations must be from those of the United States. Our most In the light of the above, I would like to viewed. Nothing in the post-Stalin ex important foreign relations, historically suggest the following rules to govern our perience significantly alters this historic speaking, have been along the lines of peace dealings with the Russians: view, as noted by the author in 1967. able overseas trade. These have set the pat A. Don't act chummy with them. tern of our thinking on foreign affairs. The This only embarrasses them individually, The article fallows: Russians, throughout their history, have and deepens their suspicions. Russian offi THE SOVIET APPROACH TO NEGOTIATION dealt principally with fierce hostile neigh cials abhor the thought of appearing before SELECTED WRITINGS bors. Lacking natural geographical barriers, their own people as one who has become (Compiled by the Subcommittee on National they have had to develop, in order to deal buddies with a foreigner. This is not their Security and International Operations with these neighbors, a peculiar technique idea of good relations. (Pursuant to S. Res. 24, 9lst Cong.) of the (now become traditional and almost auto B. Don't assume a community of aims with Committee on Government Operations U.S. matic) of elastic advance and retreat, of them which does not really exist. Senate) defense in depth, of secretiveness, of wari There is no use trying to swing Russians [From Memoirs 1925-1950. Copyright 1967 by ness, of deceit. Their history has known into line by referring to common purposes George F. Kennan. Little, Brown and Com many armistices between hostile forces; but to which we may both have done lip service pany in association with Atlantic Monthly it has never known an example of the per at one time or another, such as the Sltrength Press. Reprinted by permission.] manent peaceful coexistence of two neigh ening of world peace, or democracy, or what boring states with established borders ac you will. They had their own purposes when THE TECHNIQUE FOR DEALING WITH RUSSIA cepted without question by both peoples. The they did Up service to these purposes. They (1946) Russians therefore have no conception of think we had ours. For them it's all a game. (By George F. Kennan, Member American permanent friendly relations between states. And when we try to come at them with argu Embassy Staff in Moscow, 1944-46; Later For them, all foreigners are potential ene ments based on such common professions, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR and to Yugo mies. The technique of Russian diplomacy, they become doubly wary. slavia; Now Member, Institute !or Ad like that of the Orient in general, is con C. Don't make fatuous gestures of good vanced Studies, Princeton) centrated on impressing an adversary with will. It ls axiomatic in the world of diplomacy the terrifying strength of Russian power, Few of us have any idea how much per that methodology and tactics assume an im while keeping him uncertain and confused plexity and suspicion has been caused in the portance by no means inferior to concept and as to the exact channels and means of its Soviet mind by gestures and concessions strategy. Over the eighteen months I had application and thus inducing him to treat granted by well-meaning Americans with a now spent on this assignment in Moscow, I all Russian wishes and views with particular view to convincing the Russians of their had experienced unhappiness not only about respect and consideration. It has nothing to friendly sentiments. Such acts upset all their the naivete ,of our underlying ideas as to do with the cultivation of friendly relations calculations and throw them way off balance. what it was we were hoping to achieve in our as we conceive them. They immediately begin to expect that they relations with the Soviet government but We would find it much easier to deal with have overestimated our strength, that they also about the methods and devices with Russia if we would recognize frankly in our have been remiss in their obligations to the which we went about achieving it. The two own minds the fact that its leaders are, by Soviet state, that they should have been aspects of our diplomacy were, of course, their own choice, the enemies of all that demanding more from us all along. Fre closely related. Methodology was itself in part of the world they do not control, and quently, this has exactly the opposite effect large measure a reflection of the image we that this ls a recognized principle of thought from that which we are seeking. had formed of the Soviet leadership and of and action for the entire Soviet machine. D. Make no requests of the Russians unless the manner in which it could be expected to Let us also remember that in the Soviet we are prepared to make them feel our dis react to various stimuli. But methodology Union decisions are rarely ta.ken by individ pleasure in a practical way in case the re was nevertheless a subject that deserved at uals. They are taken by collective bodies. quest is not granted. tention in its own right. Perhaps it was the These collective bodies are required to pro We should be prepared as a matter of prin visit of Secretary Byrnes to Moscow that ceed on the theory that the outside world ciple to accompany every expression of our caused the pot of my patience to boll over 1s hostile to Russia and would be incapable wishes by some action on our part proving with relation to this area of our diplomacy, of a generous or unselfish act toward the that Russian interests suffer if our wishes as it had bolled over with respect to so many Russian state or people. It follows from this are not observed. Thj8,,..requires imagination, others. My reaction to this bo111ng over was, that no act of a foreign government could firmness, and coordfnation of policy.