The Electric Power Industry of Japan, Plant Reports

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Given By

TT. S. STJPT. OF DOCUMENTS 3^

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

The Electric Power Industry OF Japan

(Plant Reports)

Electric Power Division iT i rw

May 1947

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

The Electric Power Industry OF Japan

(Plant Reports)

Electric Power Division

Dates of Survey

9 October— 3 December 1945

Date of Publication:

May 1947 V-O-^l

JUL 19 1947

This report was written primarily for the use of the U. S. Strategic Bombinp;

Survej' in tlie jjrejjaration of further n^ports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to furth{M' interpretation in the lifiht of further studies conducted by the Survey.

II FOREWORD

The United S(;itos Strategic Boiuhiiifi; Survey was civilians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. 'i'lie established by tlie Secretary of War on 3 November military segment of the organization was drawn 1944, iiursuant to a directive from ffie late Presideiil from the Army to the extent of 60 percent, and from Roosevelt. Its mission was to conduct an impartial Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Both the Army and expert study of the effects of our ari'ial atiaek and the Navy gave the Survey all possible assistance on Oermany, to be used in connection with air in furnishing men, supplies, transport, and informa- attacks on Japan and to establish a basis for evalu- tion. The Svu'vey operated from headtiuarters ating the importance and potentialities of air power established in Tokyo early in September 1945, with as an instrument of military strategy for planning subheadquarters in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and the future development of the United States armed forces and for determining future economic policies Nagasaki, and with mobile teams operating in othcM- with resjiect to the national defense. A summary parts of Japan, the islands of the Pacific, and the report and some 200 supporting reports containing Asiatic mainland. the findings of the Survey in Germany have been It was possible to reconstruct nnich of wartime published. Japanese military planning and execution, engage- On 15 August 1945, President Truman requested ment by engagement, and campaign by campaign, that the Survey conduct a similar study of the and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on plaiit l)y jilaiit effects of all types of air attack in the war against Japan's economy and wai' production, , Japan, submitting reports in duplicate to the Secre- and industry by industi-y. In addition, studies were tary of War and to the Secretaiy of the Navy. The conducted on Japan's over-all strategic plans and officers of the Sm'vey during its Japanese phase were: the background of her enti-y into the war, the internal discussions and negotiations leading to her accept- Franklin D'Olier, Chairmnn. ance of unconditional surrender, the course of health Paul Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, Virr H. and morale among the civilian population, the effec- Chairmen. liveness of the Japanese civilian defens(> organiza- Harry L. Bowman, tion, and the effects of the atomic bombs. Separati- J. Kenneth Galbraith, reports will be issued covering each phas(> of the study. Rensis Likert, The Survey interrogated more than 700 Jajianese

Frank A. McNamee, Jr., military, government, and industrial officials. It also

Fred Searls, Jr., recovered and translates! many documents which not Monroe E. Spaght, only have been useful to the Survey, but also will furnish valuable for other studies. Arrange- Dr. Lewis R. Thompson, data ments have been made to turn over the Survey's Theodore P. Wright, Directors. files to the Central Intelligence Group, through Walter Wilds, Secretary. which they will be available for further examination The Survey's complement jirovided for 300 and distribution.

Ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Suiiuiiaiy uiid Cunclu.siuns 1

Outline of Reports 5

STEAM POWER PLANTS

Report No. KURE-HIROSHBL\ AREA:

1 Saka 7

Separate NAGASAKI AREA: Report Nagasaki Steam

(Classified) NAGOYA AREA:

2 Meiko 13 3 Nagoya 20

OSAIvA AREA:

4 Amagasaki No. 1 24 5 Amagasaki No. 2 33 6 Amagasaki East 45

7 Kasugade No. 1 48 8 Kasugade No. 2 51

TOKYO AREA:

9 Kawasaki 57 10 Senju 64 11 Tsurumi 67 12 Ushioda 78

HYDRO POWER PLANTS

13 Shimotaki 89

14 HIDA RIVER PLANTS 93 Imawaturi, Kaiiiiazo, Kawabe, Nagura, Ofunato, Osaka,

Seto, Shichi.so, Shiinohara

15 KISO RIVER PLANTS 103 Kaneyama, Kasagi, Miura, Momoyama, Nczanie, Okuwa,

01, Ontake, Ochiai, Shizumo, Sahara, Tokiwa, Yomikaki

16 SAKU 120 SUBSTATIONS

Page Separate HIROSHIMA AREA: Report Danibara (Secondary)

(Classified) Oteniaehi (Secondary)

Railway (Secondar\')

Separate NAGASAKI AREA: Repoi't Industrial (Secondarj-)

(Classified) Takekubo (Primary) Uragami (Primary)

Zeiiiza (Primary)

17 NAGOYA SUBSTATIONS 130 Inuyama (Primary), Iwakura (Primary), Nisshin (Primary), Rokugo (Seeondaiy), and Taiko (Secondary)

18 MIE (Primary) 151

19 OSAKA SUBSTATIONS (Secondary) 101 Nakamoto, Sakurajinia, Sakaigawa, Dofomliori,

Yamatogawa, antl Ishizugawa

20 YAO (Primary) 171

21 SIIK )JIRI (Primary) 179

22 KAWASAKI (Primary) 183

23 TOKYO (Primary) 188 Hauabata, Hatogaya, Kanieido, Keihoku, Kcinialsugawa, Wadabori

24 T( )K YO SUBSTATIONS (Secondary) 203 Chigasaki, Hachioji, Hongincho, Jukkengawa, Kojinuuhi, Nippon, Oshima, Ozaku, and Sugamo

VI : SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The inspections of .lapancsc elect ri(^ f!;i'"<''''tt'n}; The total government-licensed available capacity of

plants anil facilities were uudei'taken by the l']lectric the steam plants visited was 1 ,589,500 KW or 54 per- Power Division with the following objectives in view: cent of the capacity of puhhc utility steam generating

(I. To (letenniiie the general condition and charac- plants, including railways, in all .Japan. These steam teristics of the plants and their wartime operations I)lants generated 2.4 billion KWH in 1943 or 40 per- and difficulties. cent of all steam generation. The total government-

I). To study the effects of physical dainaije due to licensed available capacity of the hydro plants visited bombing where damage occurred anil the results on was 633,450 KW or 11 percent of the capacity of production. public utihty hydro generating plants, including rail-

c. To estimate tlu> results that might have l)een ways, in all .Japan. These hydro stations generated olitained if damage had been inflicteil. 2.7 billion KWH in 1943 or 9.5 percent of all hydro

(/. To ol)tain a measure of vidnerabilit>- and re- generation. All the generating plants (combined cuperability. steam and hydro) visited had a total capacity of

e. To secure data on actual bombing results and 2,224,650 KW or 25 per cent of the capacity of all correlate it wdth intelligence assessment reports, as plants and generated 5.1 billion KWH in 1943 or well as to evaluate intelligence information. 14.8 percent of all generation. Japan does not have

/. To secure such other facts as might be pertinent large hydro plants but a great number of smaller to the Survey. ones; therefore, though the number of hydro plants

In order that all the plant reports might be made in visited does iiot reflect a large percentage of the an orderly manner, with the essential suljject matter total, they are very representative of the type of covered, all reports followed a definite outline, which plant that is found thi-oughout the country. The sub- follows this summary. stations visited totaled 2,111,900 KVA in trans- 2. Japan's generating plants are, with only very former capacitj' or 11.9 percent of the total for all minor exceptions, of two types, namely, thermal Japan. However, the amount of transformer capacity (sti'am) and hydro. All the steam plants use coal as does not alwaj's reflect the true importance of a sub-

fuel. It is ol)tained principally from the islands of station, as often the switcliing and control effected Hokkaido and Kyushu and has heat values ranging are the real reason for its existence, and the amount from approximately 7,500 to 10,500 Btu. The hydro of transformed cuiient is only a fractional part of the plants are principally run-of-river type, as the recur- current that actually passes through the station. rence of earthquakes and the porous volcanic type of 5. A consolidated list of the plants visited together soil preclude the possibility of maintaining large con- with report number, size, generation, and a state- crete storage dams. There is, however, some storage. ment as to whether the station was damaged, follows

It is principally natural, but there is also some artifi- Steam-Electric Generating Plants cial storage as the result of dams which are primarily Capacity used for diversion but act as storage as well. (1.000 KW) Report Name of 3. All types of plants and conditions were studied No. plant in order to secure a comprehensive cross section. EURE-HIROSHIMA AREA Steam plants in the Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kure Saka areas were surveyed. Hydro plants in a number of NAGOYA area: locations were visited, but, in particular, plants on Meiko Nagoya two complete river developments, namely, the Hida OSAKA area: River and the Kiso River, were studied. In addition, 4 AmagasakI No. 1 numerous key primary transformer and switching 5 Amagasaki No. 2 6 Amagasaki East stations and secondary substations, as well as other 7 Kasugade No. 1 vital equipment or strategic points, were thoroughly 8 Kasugade No. 2 covered. TOKYO area: a Kawasaki 4. total of 13 steam plants, 24 hydro plants, A 10 Senju.- 16 primary (or transmission) substations, and 21 u Tsurumi 12 Ushioda secondary (or distrilmtion) substations were \asited. Nagasaki Of these, 8 steam plants, 1 hydro plant, 9 primary (separate report) and 21 secondary substations had beeii damaged. Total steam Hydro-Electric Generating Plants Substations

Report No. of the w;ir, little iiicciili\(' tt) iiiaintiiiii any hij^li fore, liie most destructive effects an; secured when sttiiulards of inaintcnaiuH'; however, it is (leploial)lc delonation occuis sufficiently long after the bomb

tluit .so little effoit has l)een made to safeguai'd l)asses through the roof to reach the major e(iuipment. costly equipment from the deteriorating effects of the The destruction of, or serious damage to, such items elements. There was never any ac'tual shut down of as turbines, generators, boilers, and transformers l^lants because of a lack of coal, but the reserves rendered the plants inoperative for a year or more. became at times so low that there was grave concern The destruction of, or heavy damage to, associated

()\'er the situation. The steam plants were designed switching equipment, electrical, boiler, and steam to use coal of a certain heat value. During the war, controls, coal-handling eiiuipment, and water supjjly the plants had to use a poorer grade of coal with caused inoperative periods of months or weeks. Hydro resultant decreased capacity and higher maintenance. damage was not sufficient to permit a study of the

9. Hydro plants were in far bettc>r condition than physical damage effects, but with the substitution of the steam plants. By its nature, a hydro plant is penstocks for boilers, the same outline of possible easier to maintain and is not subject to a large amount production loss would exist as was fountl in the steam of deterioration or oV«olesccnce. In general, the de- jjlants. The damaged transformer and switching sta- sign of these plants was good. In two instances, a tions show that delayed action bombs are not essen- complete study was made of entire river develop- tial, as these stations are mostly of the open-air type ments, and the utilization of the natural resources of or are situated in low buildings; nor is as heavy a power supply was excellent. There were no serious bomb required as is desirable in generating plants. operating difficulties during the war. Transformers are not, in themselves, a producing unit, and so loss of production cannot 10. Transformer and switching stations were gen- be measuretl, but the transformation of current is erally of good construction, though excess capacity an essential in the delivery to the consumer of the seemed to prevail, as well as other factors not in end product of generating plants. keeping with usually accepted engineering practice. Over-all system operations are fully covered else- 13. Actual effects from various types of weapons where, but examination of this group of stations were found and studied for effectiveness. Of most revealed an unjustified multiplication of facilities, interest, perhaps, were the effects on the electric overcapacity, and poor operation. facilities of the atom bomb in Nagasaki and Hiro- shima. Reports on these 11. Engineering data given in the plant reports are two areas are made sepa- rately, reference is necessarily very brief and are only given in order to and made directly to those reports. In Japan, a large part of the describe more adequately the type of plant, its essen- bombing was done with incendiaries, and much opportunity tial components, or operation factors. Much addi- was given to olrtain first-hand tional engineering data and other information were information on what damage these caused electric secured. For practical reasons this information could to installations. The definite conclusion is that incendiaries produce no not be reproduced in the reports but is available in damage to power plants other than minor inconvenience the USSBS files. by the destruction 12. All types of physical damage were foiuid. In of wooden warehouses or employees' houses. Where substations of steam generating plants, the degree of damaged facil- were inflammable construction or where they were located in ities definitely varied in proportion to the number of the center of Inghly congested areas built of bomlj hits, but, in general, the size of bombs and the inflammable materials, they were destroyed along tj-pe of fuzing used were not such as would produce with the areas. This was mostly true of secondary substatioiLS. the l^est damage results. It is understandable that the There was only one instance, it bombs that did the damage were not selected for use and might be regarded as a freak, where incendiary on this type of industrial target, as the bombing in bombs were ever the direct cause of any each instance was merely incidental to attacks on equipment damage. Against this, are many instances adjacent targets or general area raids. However, it where they fell directly on substations and did no can be seen that the use of larger bombs with longer damage. Therefore, where substations were of mod- delay in the nose and tail fuzing (e. g., 1,000-lb. ern and fireproof construction and safeguards were bombs fuzed 1/25 sec. nose and tail) would have pro- taken against exposure to adjacent fire, incendiary duced much more serious damage. Power plants are Ijombs were not effective. Strafing produced con- in buildings usually 60 to 100 ft. in height, with the siderable damage, but since this method of attack is most vital ecjuipment located near floor level. There- only possible where air defense permits low-altitude attack, it is not coiLsidcrcd a practical means of that a large portion of the electrical equipment destruction. There is one case of damage from roclcets, manufacturing plants had been converted to the t)Ut tliis type of weapon is suliject to the same limita- manufacture of other products and that skilled labor tions as strafing. The liighost degree of damage, the had been drafted into the armed forces. longest recuperability cycle, and the greatest amount 16. In general, the intelligence data in the field of of weapons' effectiveness were found where damage pre-raid description were very accurate anil varied was caused by HE bombs. While power plants and from the actual only in minor details. However, it sulistations were never primarj- bombing objectives, tlid not e^'aluate the relative importance of various and, therefore, the HE bomb damage was done by installations, and there was little emphasis on the types intended for use on other kinds of targets, the r(>sults of any combined action against any group of damage was sufficient to show conclusively that the electric utility targets. In practically every instance, HE bomlj is by far the most effective weapon and data on actual bomliings could be correlated with produces the highest results with the least tonnage attacks on near-liy targets, and there was no instance per acre. Proper size HE bambs and appropriate in which the power plant or substation \-isited was fuzing would have caused much greater damage. the subject of a specific attack against it. In review-

14. These plant studies show emphatically the ing the damage assessment reports, a definite lack of vulnerability of power plants, substations, and kin- interpretation of damage to electric utility installa- tired installations. From the standpoint of location, tions was noted. steam plants are easily accessible, whereas hydro 17. It requires an over-all study to determine the plants are not, although both are equally susceptible results that would have been secured had the undam- to damage. Further, a study of plant acreage shows aged plants visited been the objectives of bomlting. that steam plants cover sufficiently large areas and However, in each plant study, the production of that are easily identified by their tall stacks or other easily l)lant and any peculiar significance surrounding its discernible markings. In the final industry report, particular position were viewed in order to determine tiie general vulneral)ility of power plants is thor- its intUvidual importance. In general, the bombing of oughly discussed. These plant studies verify, Ijy any steam plant would have been desirable in view actual instances of shut-downs caused by destruction of the small effort required, whereas the opposite was oi- damage to \'ital finks in the cycle of operation, the true of hydio plants. In the case of substations, there fact that power plants have a high degree of vulnera- was evidence that the destruction of any single suId- liiUty. They can be, and have been, put out of opera- station would have produced no effect since there

tion foi- long periods of time with a relatively small were adjacent substations and intercomiectiou faciU- con- t onnage of bombs. Substations, 'as a rule, do not cover ties whereby alternate means of preserving nmch acreage, but they are highly susceptible to tinuity of service could have quickly lieen put in boml) damage, and their vulnerability is limited only operation. Only by elimination of these alternate in respect to the accessibiUty of their location. means, accomplished by simultaneous destruction of a number of substations, could results have lieen 15. At no place in Japan had there been any con- achieved which would have effectively interrupted certed effort on repairs; therefore, the degree of the flow of energy. I'ecuperability must be based on assumptions founded on a knowledge of normal expectancy. Such recuper- 18. It was interesting to learn from the plant operation as had been accomplished shows that the ators that the Japanese Government had, during the Japanese lacked abihty to recover from the effects of early part of the war, assured them so convincingly sustained damage or to devise any particularly in- that it was unpossible for them to l)e boml)ed, and genious methods of substitution. This can be dem- then, later on, that plants would be given first priority onstrated by instances in which minor repairs, which in defense against attacks, and that no consideration would be handled elsewhere with speed, dispatch, had been given to plant protection or any plan for and efficiency, required many hours because of their lecuperation until very late in the war. It was only slowness and lack of organization. Where no repairs then that some bomb barriers and shelters for work- had been made and the period required for recupera- men were built, but the results acliieved were negli- to disperse tion had to be estimated, this estimate was based on gible. There was some attempt made normal availability of eciuipment and labor. The excess ecjuipment to points of safety or central loca- carrying estimated time is certainly less than it would have tions, but lack of transportation prevented taken in Japan during the war because of the fact out this program to any appreciable degree. At a :

miiiil)!'!' (if subsUitioiis, (.'xcess o(iuii)nu'ut. had lircn Detailed Report. disiniintlcd l)iit, iK'VtT even removed from the stiition Tin: plaid and its Junction in enemy economy. urea; therefore, the spares were d('stroyed along witli 1. Product of plant and importance in enemy the l)ahinee of the station, and thus, any possibihty ec^onomy. was preekided. of (luiek reeuperation 2. Physical description of plant. 19. It was proven that eleetric power fueihties are a. Location, lay-out, shajie, and acreage of i)!aiil \-eiy vuhierable. The generation, transmission, and area, principal buildings, special id('ntifiai)le mark- electric energy to the ultimate con- distribution of ings, general comments on design, construction, and processes, interruption of any svuner is a series of the engineering features. one of which renders the whole inoperative. Electi'ic b. Sources of fuel or any other vital factors in and consump- energy cannot be stored. Its production operation. tion nmst l)e simultaneous and continuous. The 3. Ownershij) and management with names and damage done to the plants and substations, while in positions of persons from whom infoiination \\as its(>lf of a paralyzing nature and producing produc- secured. tion losses that would have had a most disastrous 4. Number of employees, shifts worked, seasonal effect on the power industry, came at a time when conditions, or other particulars on labor. severe losses were being sustained by industry, and Attacks. therefore, the production loss caused by the damage Number of raids, air force involved, name of did not have a disturbing economic effect. primary target, date and hour of attack, number, 20. The Electric Power Division arrived in Japan type, and fuzing of bomljs dropped, number of air- early in October 1945 and spent approximately 2 craft, altitude, weather, and any other pertinent facts months there. Many field trips were made to secure as obtained from target data. Number of bomb hits the infoi'mation contained in these reports. Th(! fol- in area and on buildings or vital equipment as found lowing mend:)ers carried the major responsiliility from actual inspection. Mr. W. E. Mitchell, Chief, bonibiny. Maj. Robert L. Norton, A. C, Executive Effects of Officer, 1. Physical damage.

Capt. Wiley W. Wolfe, A. C, Administrative a. Damage done to buildings, equipment, or facili- Officer, ties, giving cause, such as blast, shock, fragmenta-

Col. James F. Davenport, tion, falling debris, fire, or weather, with information

Lt. (jg) Herbert A. Deane, USNR, as to whether damage was due to direct hits, near Mr. Karl Enz, misses, or indirect causes, such as exposure to adja- Mr. William K. Fowler, cent fire. Comparison between the number and tj'pe Mr. George Grimm, of bombs hitting in the plant area, with the damage Mr. Clarence A. Johnson, done, from which conclusions may be olitained on

Lt. (jg) WilUam A. W. Krebs, Jr., USNR, weapons' effectiveness. Brief description of protec- Mr. Fred W. Utz, tive measures and installations made and results uf S/Sgt. Joe C. Ashby, A.C., Chief Clerk. their use. With the able assistance of other personnel b. Bomb plot as an exhibit, reconstructed from as stenographers, photographers, interpreters, actual facts and conditions seen or from information draftsmen, guides and drivers. considered reliable obtained locally, where possible to produce. OUTLINE OF PLANT REPORTS 2. Production loss.

Summary. a. Production—actual at time of damage or past

1. Name of plant, location, size, principal features, wartime average, together with future planned, com- yearly output, and function in enemy economy. pared with actual attained after damage. Where 2. Attacks, dates, air force involved, tonnage recuperation was not made, production loss based on dropped, and number of hits. estimated period required for recovery, wth consider-

3. Principal physical damage, production loss, ation given to any partial production that has been recuperability, and vulnerability. or could be reattained.

4. Check on inteUigence data. 6. Anj' substitution or modification possible.

5. Significant evaluations or impressions. c. Causes for loss of production. liy (1) Physical damage to particular vital portions of installation as shown actual damage, together plant. with weak linlcs, bottlenecks, or other pertinent fac-

(2) Diversion of labor, materials, or other facilities. tors, such as location, surroundings, or conditions

(3) Loss caused bj* emphasis on protective meas- affecting probable ability to infhct damage. ures. Iiilelliycnce check.

(4) Loss of production through absenteeism or 1. Information and source, importance of plant, unusual inefficiency. identification and location, essential buildings or

(5) Loss caused by shortage of essentials, such as other data, and correctness thereof. fuel, transportation, inability to chstribute, or other 2. Damage assessment and photo interpretation causes, and whether this loss was caused by bombing made, as compared with actual conditions. or other factors. 3. Photo interpretation of recuperation or dis- 3. Recuperability cycle. persal as compared wth actual conditions. a. Time reciuired to restore proiluction either from Data relevant to other studies. actual repairs made or estimates of time that will be information pertinent to or aflV'cting any recjuired. Any other division of the Survey. 6. Level of production rcattained. Evaluations and impressio7is. c. Abihty to utihze undamaged portion of plant.

.4. Vulnerabihty. Any important or interesting facts or impressions

(/. Peculiar vulneratiility of the phj'sical plant gained from the study of the actual conditions. PLANT REPORT NUMBER 1 SAKA STEAM POWER PLANT NEAR HIROSHIMA, JAPAN

DATE INSPECTED 3 NOVEMBER 1945

Summary. ing the wai-, hydioelectrie energy from Central Japan never sufHcient to supply the requii'ements of 1. The Stika steam electric generating plant, lo- was cated on Kaito Jiay 4 miles SE of Hiroshima, had this region, even duiing the p(>riods of ample water at the hydro stations. Therefore, the entire energy pro- 73,750 KW installed generator capacity. It is located in two large reinfoi'cf'd concrete buildings with coal duction of this plant was utilized in the very impor- it located and was a handling and storage eciuipment on one .side. Its tant military area in which was yearly output averaged approximately 188 million vitally essential necessity. KWH during the 3 war years. It was the largest The importanc(> of this plant is cleaiiy shown 1)v plant in the Kure-Hiroshima highly industrialized the fact that it operated 7,692 hours in 1943 and

naval, arsenal and aiinament manufacturing ai-ea. 7,685 hours in 1944, both being out of a possible total The requirements of this district for electric energy of 8,784 hours per year. This is a very high percentage were too great to be supplied by hydro power, even of operating hours in steam plants. The plant gener- during the periods of ample water, and therefore this ated 207,169,308 KWH in 1943 and 185,237,422 plant operated throughout the year and was very KWH in 1944 with a peak of 54,9.30 KW in August important. 1943 and 55,484 in October 1944. The lowest monthly

2. The plant was never a primarj- tai-get and was peak load during these 2 years was 35,900 KW occur- never directly damaged, though a surge on the line ing in April 1944. This high rate of production con- during a raid on Kure caused minor damage to a tinued thru January and Feliruary 1945 when loss of transformer bushing, and the atomic bomb on Hiro- load due to war damage caused its generation to fall shima caused slight building damage. off rapidly. Further statistics on plant operation are

3. There was not any loss of production due to shown in Exhibit A. damage, as it was quickly repaired. This plant was 2. Physical description of plant. very vulnerable. Besides being susceptil^le to easy a . The plant is located on Kaito Bay approximate!}^ l:)omb damage as are all generating stations, this 4 miles SE of Hiroshima and 6 miles N of Kure. plant was easily located as it had a number of tall (Exhibit B). The plant area is an irregular triangle in stacks, had no natural protection, and was situated shape covering approximately 15 acres. The main on the edge of the bay. plant is in 2 reinforced concrete buildings each ap- 4. The location of this plant was shown correctly proximately 250 ft. square and 4 to 5 stories in in intelligence data, Init its size and importance was height. One building has three concrete stacks about not pioperly evaluated. 200 feet in heighth and 4 short steel stacks while the 5. The ease with which serious damage could have other building has 3 short steel stacks. Both buildings been done to this plant seems very apparant, and the and stacks are camouflaged with black and white resultant effects would have had a serious effect on paint. One building, known as Station No. 1, is in this industrial area. 2 sections. Section No. 1 was completed 17 December 1927 and contains four 330-psi, traveling-grate type The Plant and Its Function In B&W boilers each with maximum capacity of 90,000 Enemy Economy. Ibs/hr and with individual steel stack. There are 2 1. Product of plant and importance in enemy Brown Boveri turbogenerator units each 12,500-KW, economy. 60-cycle, 3-phase, 11,000-volt, 3,600-rpm. In addi- The Saka steam electric generating plant is one of tion, there is a separate Brown Boveri house turbo- the important generating stations in the Kure-Hiro- generator of 1,550-KW capacity. Section 2 was com- shima district which is a naval base, arsenal and pleted 4 August 1935 and contains three 490-psi, armament manufacturing area. The energjf was sup- pulverized coal B&W boilers each with maximum plied to the integrated system of the Japan Electric capacity of 160,000 Ibs/hr and with individual con-

Generation and Transmission Co. Prior to, and dur- crete stacks. There is 1 Mitsubishi turbogenerator unit rated 25,000-KW, 60-cycle, 3-phase, 1 1,000-volts, Effects of Bombing.

3,600-rpm and wdth a direct connected house genera- 1. Physical Damage. tor rated 1,200-KW, 60-cyclcs, 3,300-volt, 3,600- a. None directly and very minor damage indirectly. rpm. The other l)iulding kno'mi as Station No. 2 was 2. Production Loss. completed 1 June 1941 and contains three 265-psi, None traveling-grate type B&W boilei's each with maxi- 3. Recuperability Cycle. mum capacity of 78,000 Ibs/hi- and with intlividiial Repairs were made immediately as spare bushings steel .stacks. There are 3 Ljungstrum type turbo- were on hand. Building damage required no repairs geneiators each rated 7.000-KW, 60-cycle, 3-phase, for plant operation. 11,000-volts, 3,600 rpm. Two of these units are 4. Vulnerability. Mitsubislii make and were transfericd from the Situated on the bay with no surrounding construc- Yahagi generating station. The other unit was made tion of importance, the plant could be easily detected

Ijy the Osaka Iron Works and was installed new. in that it has no natural protection and offers all the Both the Iniildings have an enclosed electrical bay weaknesses common to electiic generating stations. containing transformers, bussing, switching, etc., but Intelligence Check. with an additional outdoor ST\itching station. Adja- 1. a. OSS reports listed the plant correctly as to cent to the plant is a coal storage and handling yard the location with good photographic coverage. How- nith wharf on the bay and unloading facilities for ever, the increase in capacity completed in 1941 was handling coal from boats. The total name plate not included. capacity of the plant is 73,750 KW, which includes b. Air Objective Folder 90.30 correctly listed this 2,750-KW in house generators. The plant is listed by plant and assigned target No. 796, although the 1941 the government and the owners as 64,200 KW capac- extension was not mentioned. ity, and the peak load attained was 55,484 KW. 2. This plant was never a primary target. h. Coal is obtained from Kjaishu normally liy boat Data Relevant To Other Studies. but can be brought in by rail. Heating value is 10,000 None Btu, however, from 1942 to the quality of the 1945, Evaluations and Impressions. coal had declined to 9,500 Btu. Although the plant This plant was very important, and its importance did not shut down at any time during the war ft)r lack was not evaluated in any intelligence I'eports. It of coal, there was considerable concern over their fuel could have been damaged very easily. supply especially after the flooding of the Kyushu mines. Conditions of their coal storage are reflected EXHIBIT A in Exhibit A, and it can be seen that the reserve stor- Statistics on Plant Operation age reached a low of only slightly over one day's normal consumption.

3. The plant is owned by the Japan Electric Gen- eration and Transmission Co. Information was obtained from M. Shintani, the .superintendent who had been in charge only since April 1945 and was not too familiar with statistical details. 4. Normally, the plant uses 150 employees working in two shifts.

Attacks.

There was never any specific attack on the plant although there was slight damage indirectly attriliut- able to attacks elsewhere. On 19 April 1945, during

an attack on Kure, a surge caused destruction of 1 oil circuit breakei- bushing. On 6 August 1945 the atomic bomb blast over Hiroshima destroyed 2 transformer Inishings and damgcd slightly some sheet iron Ijuild- ing walls. (Exliibit C, photo no. 1). The plant is 2 and M miles from the point of the atomic bomb explosion and was in operation at the time. 90 lOO METERS

O IOC Wharf

Conveybf Belts

Unloading'iS.ranes

Coal Vard Kaito &4y

PLOT PLAN

^ SAKA STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT HIROSHIMA-KEN

[XHIbitB EXHIBIT C

Photo 1—SAKA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION

ICnd wall on NE end of section 2, station 1 (25,000 KW extension) sliowing bhist from atomic bomb in Hiroshima, 2 and ?4 miles away.

10 2

Photo 2—SAKA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION

7,000 KW Ljungstrum Turbogenerator

('i97713—47—

11 Photo 3—SAKA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION

Station Xo. 1, looking from smith switchyard siilc, sliowing stacks of sections 1 and 2.

12 :

PLANT REPORT NUMBER 2 MEIKO STEAM POWER PLANT NAGOYA, JAPAN DATE INSPECTED 29 OCTOBER 1945

Summary. The Meiko steam electric generating plant is the

1. The Mciko Steam Pdwor Plant, locatod at the most important g(>nera1ing jilant in the Nagoya area estuary of a liranch canal of the Shonai Hiv(>r towards and a very impoi-tant i)lant in the power industry, tJK" Nagoya Harbor, has 159,000 KW installed ranking 4th in size in all Japan. It is primaiily used gcnei-ating capacity. It is in a large steel reinforeeil as a base-load plant during the dry season, but it concri'te building with coal storage and handling operates to some extent throughout the year supple- ('(luipinent on one side and outdoor transformer and menting the hydro plants and furnishing peak load switching station on the other. Its yearly output requirements. The plant averaged 276 million KWH averaged approximately 27G million KWH during the per year for the war yeais of 1942, 43 and 44, and the 3 war years. It was the largest steam plant in the actual output fiom 19159 thru March 194.") is as highly industrialized area of the Tokai (Nagoya) dis- follows tiict and was very important especially during th(> KWH dry season when hydro power was insufficient. 1939 168,965,460 primary target but was 2. This plant was never a 1940 285,109,140 damaged in three raids on adjacent targets by the 1941 166,579,560 Twentieth AF. On 17 May 1945, 3,598 tons of IBs 1942 297,217,300 were dropped in the entire raid of which a number of bombs (quantity unknown) fell within the effec- 1943 286,079,100 tive area of this plant. On 26 June 1945, 346 tons of 1944 245,640,200 2,000-lb. HE were dropped in the entire raid of *1945 89,331,800 which 22 bombs fell in this plant area. On. 24 July •plant has not operated since March 1945. 1945, 451 tons of 2,000-lb. HE bombs were dropped The peak load during this period occured in Janu- in the entire raitl of which 4 l)ombs fell in this plant ary 1944 when a maximiun generation of 150,900 area. KW was reached, and the plant operated 716 hours 3. All of the damage was very shght, and although out of a possible 744 hours in this month. the plant was not in operation at the time of the The plant's output was supplied to the trans- raids, the damage was insufficient to have caused any mission lines of the Nippon Hassoden KK for general appreciable loss of production and was quickly re- distribution, l)ut the majority was utilized in the paired. Howe\'er, the principal reason of slight dam- area with some transmitted to Osaka and age and quick recuperation was because no Ixnnl^s Nagoya vicinity. fell in any vital area, and the vulnerability of power 2. Physical description of plant. plants existed since the entire plant would have been a. The plant is located on Nagoya Bay on re- inoperative for a long period had any single vital claimed land .at the mouth of a canal of the Shonai place been hit. River. The plant area is practically rectangular being 4. The size, importance, and location had lieen approximately 1640 by 1200 ft with a total acreage correctly evaluated in intelligence data, but damage of about 45 acres. (Exhibit A) The main plant had not been stated in the damage assessment report. (Exhibit B, photos 1 and 2j is in a steel and reinforced 5. It is significant that during the raid of 17 May concrete building approximately 350 by 200 ft with a 1945 many incendiary liombs fell in the plant area three stacks about 100 ft which were extinguished without causing any dam- concrete roof. There are high made of heavy sheet iron. Both the building and age. Power plants are constructed of noncombustible stacks are camouflaged with black and white paint. materials, and incendiary bombs have littleornoeffect. On one side of the main building is located a coal The Plant and Its Function in Enemy Economy. handling storage area (Exlribit B, photo 2) covering 1. Product of plant and importance in enemy about 16 acres. The rest of the area is occupied by an economv. outdoor substation, many warehouses, and em- 1o O :

ployees' residences. Adjacent to the power house is I'aid against southern Nagoya I^rl^an Area, mission. sufficient space reserved for an extension to doulile 176 of the Twentieth AF. In this raid 457 A'C of the the present capacity. Two sides border along a canal 58th, 73rd, 313th, and 314th Wings dropped 3,598

with facilities for barge anchoi-age. The total name tons of incendiary bombs from 8,000 to 16,000 ft

plate capacity is 159,000 KW in three main genera- with 3/10-9/10 weather. A number (quantity un- tors of 50,000-KW each and 9,000 KW in three house known) of IB bombs dropped within the plant com- generators of 3,000-KW each. Two units, installed pound but were extinguished before doing any damage. in 1939, are Mitsubishi make, and each has a house The second damage occurred on 26 June 1945 generator on the same shaft. The third unit is Hitachi during a daylight raid against Aichi Aircraft Works, and was installed in 1940. There is the separate Eitoku plant, mission 229 of the Twentieth AF. 3,000 KW house turbogenerator. All units are im- Fifty A/C of the 313th Wing dropped 346 tons of pulse type with Curtis blading and utilize steam at 2,000-lb C>P bombs fused I'lOO sec nose no delay tail approximately 600 lbs pressure at 720 degrees F. The in 10/10 weathei- from a height of approximately boiler house contains 6 Ijoilers each 150-t/hr based 20,000 ft. In this raid, 22 bombs fell in this plant ai-ea on coal of 11,500 Btu. Each boiler was designed to of which none fell on Iniildings. Four workmen were produce 25,000 KAV and 2 boilers are connected in killed and 2 injured. common feed to each turbine; however, the maxi- The third damage was on 24 July 1945 during a mum obtainable power was never over 40,000 KW. daylight laid against Aichi Airciaft ^^'()l•ks, Eitoku Feed and make-up water is obtained from wells and plant, mission 287 of the Twentieth AF. 8ixty-six city mains and cooling water from the bay. A/C of the 313th Wing dropped 451 tons of 2,000-lb

b. The plant normally used coal from NE Japan ( iP lionibs fused 1/100 sec delay nose no delay tail in shipped in by barge. During the war, water ship- 10 10 weather from a height of approximatel.y 22,000 ments became imdependable, and much coal was ft. Four bombs fell in this plant area of which none received by rail especially Kyushu coal that was con- fell on the Ijuilding. A dud was found (Exhibit B siderably poorer in quality. They did not have to photo 4.) The bomb had the following marking: shut down at any time during the war because of lack GP Lot. Eop-6-5 Eop-8-44 of fuel, despite the poor quality, since steam power 2000-lb Explosive 2154 BLS plants received first priority on fuel supply. AN-M66 Bomlj 33 Co Ft

3. The plant is owned by the Japan Generating TNT and Transmission Co. Information was obtained SIHIA from Eflfects of Bombing. Mr. Shataro Yoneda—Asst District Mgr 1. Physical damage. Nippon Hassoden for n. In the first raid, the plant sustained no Tokai District. (1). damage. All boiubs were IB types and were extin- Mr. Shinoda —Supt of Meiko plant. guished immediately. Mr. Sumino •—Head of steam plant (2). The damage on 26 June 1945 was as follows: in district. Foiu- liomlis destroyed two complete and one-half Mr. Seifi Takenchi —District operating en- of two more operator houses. Four persons were gineer for steam plants. killed and two injured. Mr. Shiro Sawa —Chief Electric Engr Two near misses near substation damaged the for Meiko plant, cooling fins of the three 63,000-KVA, 3-phase trans- 4. The plant normally uses approximate!J' 230 formei's; heavy damage was done to the aluminum employees, but during the war had cut down to 170. cell lightning arrestors and fragmentation Ijroke They operate two shifts. Although operation of the many insulators. (Exhibit B, photos 3 and 5) plant is normally seasonal, their employees are used One bomli hit the grounding bed and also damaged continuously with nonoperating periods being de- cables between generators and tiansformer. voted to maintenance. (3). The damage on 24 July 1945 was as follows: Attacks. One near miss close to substation did some addi-

There were no specific attacks on this plant ; how- tional damage to the lightning arrestors.

ever, it received some slight damage duiing three The protective measures in the outdoor substation raids directed against adjacent targets. consisted of blast barriers around the transformers The first attack was 17 May 1945 during a night made of timber walls with earth fill coie alj(nit 15 ft 14 ',»().2() liifili iind 4 to 5 ft wUU' on the l>()ltoiii. (I'^xliil)!! H, b. The Air Objective Folder No. for Nagoya photo 8) These hlaist walls were fairly elfectivi' and Area issued by the Office of the Assistant Chief of definitely saved one (W,()00-KVA, ;j-i)hase trans- Air Staff, Intelligence, listed this plant as target No. foinier from Ix'iiig tlainaged. Theic were blast hairiei's 1598 and correctly located it on the map. However, betweon the units in the generator hall that had been the size of the plant both in KW and dimensions and removed at the time of our inspection. number of stacks was given incorrectly.

h. From information supplied by local officials and c. JTG. information was coirect, and aerial photo- by peist)nal inspection, a bomb plot has been \nv- graphic coverage was (excellent. l)ared (Exhibit A). 2. Records of the raids in which this plant was is covered in reports in raids 176, 229 and 2. Production loss. damaged 287 on targets 197 and 1729. a. No actual production loss occured. This plant covering had been out of operation since March 1945 as it was a. Damage Assessment Report No 77, not needed. The load was rapidly declining duo to raid of 17 May 1945 does not list any damage to this industrial load losses, and sufficient hydro power was plant, and none occurred. available to take care of the daily tleniand. The dam- b. Damage Assessment Report No 124, covering age caused by the raids was only minor, and in every raid of 26 June 1945 does not list any damage, and instance immediate repairs could have been made. aerial photographs do not show this plant although there were 22 strikes in the plant area. b. No substitution oi' modification nei'cssary. c. Damage Assessment Report No 177, covering c. No loss of production from physical damage to plant. Some production loss due to poor grade of coal. raid of 24 July 1945 docs not list any damage, and aerial photographs do not show this plant although 3. Hecuperability cycle. there were four stiikes in plant area. a. Y^U damage caused by the raids was of minor 3. No mention was made in anj' damage assess- nature, and in every instance repairs were made ments of recuperation or dispersal. immediately.

/). No production luul been reattained at the time Data Relevant To Other Studies. of this inspection. The shortage of coal and necessity of using poor c. All of the plant could have l)een operuteil as grade coal was due to limited transportation facilities only minoi' damage had occurred. that became more difficult as the war went on, espe- 4. \'ulnerabilit>'. cially the curtailment of barge transportation of coal. The vulnerability of all steam powei' [plants is fully Evaluations and Impressions. covered in the final report which is applicable to this plant. Tliis plant is the latest addition to the Japan Generating and Transmission Co. It is considered the Intelligence Check. most efficient steam plant in Japan. The plant design

1. a. 0S8 report in general correctly identified is considered good, and maintenance was found fair. this plant; however, the size and details were given The entire plant is kept in readiness for immediate

incorrectly. operation if necessary.

(i EXHIBIT B

Photo 1 —General view from northwest

Photo 2—General view from northeast 17 Photo 3 —Damaged liglitniiig^arrestors and^blast'wall

Photo 4—2,000_lb. unexploded bomb (12-iucli stick on left) 18 Photo 5 —Damage U) arrestois and substation

19 PLANT REPORT NUMBER 3 NAGOYA STEAM POWER PLANT NAGOYA, JAPAN

DATE INSPECTED 30 OCTOBER 1945

Summary. 5. This plant is a significant example of the ease

1. The Nagoya Steam Power Plant, located on an with which steam power plants can lie rendered estuary of the Yamasaki River in Nagoya, has inoperative and the small tonnage per acre required 144,000 KW in nominal (name plate) capacity. The to do this. main plant is in a large steel reinforced concrete The Plant and Its Function In liuilding, with an indoor transformer and electrical Enemy Economy. l)ay and an outdoor switching station. A large coal 1. The Nagoya Steam Power Plant is the second storage and handling equipment installation is on most important steam plant in the Tokai district one side. Its yearly output was approximately 85 (Nagoya) antl ranks 6th in all Japan. While it was million KWH during the three war years. It was an principally used during the dry season. December important plant in the highly industrialized area of thru Fel)ruary, it also supplemented hydro jiower Nagoya, lieing one of only two large steam plants at other times of the year. Its output was approxi- there, and was especially important during the dry mately as follows: winter season when h.ydro power was scarce.

2. This plant was never a primary target, bvit was 1942-81,000,000 KWH. damaged in three raids on adjacent targets by the 1943—115,797,000 KWH. Twentieth AF. On 18 Decemi)er 1944, 154 tons of 1944—68,000,000 KWH. 1945*— IB and HE Ijonibs were droppetl in the entire raid. 2,092,000 KWH. Nine HlC and an unknown ((uantity of incendiary *For Juii. and Feb. only—no apprec'iiihlc production since then.

fell in the effective area of the plant. bombs On 11/12 The energy was supplied to the transmission net- tons of IB were dropped in the March 1945, 1,790 work for general distribution and was utilized princi- entire raitl of which a numtier of (quantity bombs pally in the Nagoya area, both for base and peak fell within the effective area of the plant. unknown) loads of particular importance during the dry season. On 17 1945, tons of IB were May 3,598 bombs It also supplii'd lai-ge cpiantities of energy at genera- in the entire raid of of dropped which a number tor voltag(> of 11-K\'. direct to the Mitsubishi Air- b(jmbs (quantity unknown) fell within the elfective craft Works and Daido Iron Works locatetl nearby. area of this plant. 2. a. The plant is located on the bank of the 3. Destruction of portions of the coal conveyor Yamasaki River at the juncture with Nagoya Bay. system, the coal Inuiker, the boiler operating controls The plant area is tii angular jn shape with a total buildings and wiring, and minor made up the princi- acreage of approximately 30 acres. (Exhibit A) The pal damage. Also one main genei'ator, one house main building is of steel with reinforced concrete cov- generator, other eciuipment damaged. Due and was ering approximately 115,000 sq ft. It is built in an to previous severe earthquake damage, the plant was "L" shape with the generator hall and electrical bay not in operation, but it was estimated that 35,000 in the long leg and the boiler house in the other. The in capacity Ijy KW was undamaged bombing and oi-iginal plant was built in 1925-26 with the size being been immediately utilized. minor could have Some doubletl in 1934 to 1937. There is a total of 8 boilers, started, is recuperation had been and it estimated of which 4 were installed in 1925 each using 86-t/hr, that complete rejjairs could have been made in 3 1 installed in 1934, and 3 in 1935 each using 90-t/hr. months. The vulnerability of steam power plants is All l)oilers are B&W type CTM and are 350-lb psi at fully shown due to the lai'ge damage and production 400 degrees C. The 4 older boilers used 2 concrete loss comparatively small nunil)ei' of l)oml)s. from a stacks about 200 ft in height, and the 4 newer boilers 4. The size, importance, and location had been each had an individual short steel stack. (E.xliibit B, correctly evaluated in the intelligence data, but no photo No 1.) There are 4 main turbogenerators of damages had been reported in damage a.s.sessment 35,000-KW each; 2 are GE make installed in 1926, reports. 1 is an AEG installed in 1935, and 1 is a Mitsubishi 20 : :

nstallcd in 1937. In adiliti(jn, there lire 2 separate A/Cof the 58th, 73rd, 313th and 311th Wings dropped house turbogenerators, 1 (_!E of 1,()()()-KW and 1 3,598 tons of IB from a height, of 8,000 to Ki.OOO ft

AEG of 3,000-KW. Total name plate capacity is with 3/10—9/10 weather. In this laid .i number of

144,000 K\\'. The plant is easily identifiable by its 2 11^ drojjpcd within the plant .n'c.'i, bill wiii; extin- tall stacks and its location directly next to the large guished before doing any damage. Mitsubishi Aircraft Works (Target No 194) and Effects of Bombing. across the river from Nagoya Harbor piers (Target 1. Physical damage. No 251). a. (1) The damage on 18 December 1944 was as b. The plant was designed for coal of approxi- follows mately U.riOO Btu that was received from Hokkaido One bomb .struck near the side of the gcnei-ator hall and Kyushu by barge. During the war, due to non- doing slight building damage and damaging a nearby dependability of water shipments, coal of poorer oil storage warehouse. quality from Honshu was substituted. This pooi'cr Two bombs hit the boiler house damaging one coal coal was only t),5t)0 to 10,000 Btu, and thus, genera- bunker and conveyor and boiler control wiring. tion was reduced, and the maximum peak was 90,700 One bomb hit on the generator hall detonating KW. There were no actual shut downs from the lack near the roof and doing small damage to crane rail, of fuel as power stations were given first priority in one main generator, and one house generator. obtaining their supply. One bomb struck and damaged part of the cooling 3. The plant is owned by the Japan Electric Gen- water tunnel. eration and Transmission Co. Information was ob- One bomb damaged a steel transmission tower. tained from Two bombs hit the coal storage area destroying Mr. S. Saito—Nagoya District Mgr. of Tokai part of coal conveyor and controls. Branch Nippon Hassoden. the One bomb struck in the center of employees houses Mr. Yoneda—Assistant District Mgr. destroying five houses. Mr. S. Nakamura—Director of the plant. Incendiary bombs })urned two warehouses. 10 4. The plant normally uses approximately ItiO employees were killed in this raid. employees, which has been reduced to 122 at present. (2) The damage on 11/12 March 1945 was the They operated two shifts and made no reduction in burning of two warehouses and several employees employees during the seasons. houses. Attacks. (3) The damage on 17 May 1945 was the destruc- There were no specific attacks on this plant; liow- tion by fire of six employees houses, 1 warehouse, ever, it received some damage during three raids second floor of main office, part of the laboratory, directed against adjacent targets. and damage to coal-handling crane rails and controls. The first damage was on 18 December 1944 during Bomb protection barriers made of concrete were a daylight attack against the jNIitsubishi A/C Plant, placed between the turbogenerators, and concrete Nagoya, mission 13 of the Twentieth AF. Sixty- pill-boxes for employees were placed throughout the three A/C of the 73rd Wing di'oppcd 154 tons of HE plant.

and IB from 28,000 to 32,000 ft with 5/10 weather. b. From information supplied by local officials and In this raid 9 HE bombs fell in this plant area besides by personal inspection, a bomb plot has been pre- an unknown quantity of IBs. pared. (Exhibit A). The second attack was on 11/12 March 1945 dur- 2. Production loss. ing a night raid on the Nagoya Urban Area, mission a. No actual production loss occurred because of 41 of the Twentieth AF. Two hundred and eighty- bombing since the plant was out of operation due to five AC of the 73rd, 313th and 314th Bombardment previous earthquake damage. However, the produc- Wings dropped 1,790 tons of IB bombs from 5,100 to tion loss, had the plant been in running condition at 8,500 ft with 2/10 weather. In this raid a number the time of bombing, would have been 75 percent of (quantity unknown) of IB bombs dropped within the its average output for the period required for recuper- plant area Ijut were extinguished before doing any ation, or approximately 51 million KWH.

damage. 6. No substitution or modification was possible.

The third attack was 17 Maj' 1945 during a night c. (1) Seventy-five per cent of the plant was ren- raid on the southern Nagoya Urban Area, mission dered inoperative due to damage to coal conveyor 17(3 of the Twentieth AF. Four hundred fifty-seven system, boiler controls, and one generator unit. 21 (2) No production was lost thru tlivorsion of laVjor, Air Staff, Intelligenc(>, listed this plant as target material, or machine facilities. No 195 and correctly located it on the map.

(3) No loss of pi-oductiou was caused thru protec- c. JTG. information was correct, and aerial photo- tive measures. graphic coverage was excellent. 2. Records of the raids in which this plant was (4) No loss was caused thru absenteeism or unusual inefficiency. damaged are covered in the reports on raids 13, 41, and 176 on the target in the Nagoj'a Urban .\rea (5) A loss of production was caused throughout the war because of a poor grade of coal used due to (194). a. Damage Assessment Report 1, covering lack of transportation for the better coal. No raids of 17/18 Dec 1944, target 194, does not list any 3. Recuperability cycle. ilamages to the plant, although damage had occurred. a. Based on the ability to secure materials and Page 2 of JTG, sheet 90:20-195-Tl, mentions that at skilled labor, it is estimated repairs could be made least 2 hits were made on the plant in this raid, but within 90 days from the damage of 18 December did not estimate any damage. 1944. No recuperability to damages from other raids b. Damage Assessment Report No 18, covering is estimated as they were not vital to plant operation. raids of 12 March 1945, target Nagoya area, does not b. None of the lost production had been reattained list any damage to tliis plant. at time of the inspection. c. Damage Assessment Report No 77, co\'ering f. A portion of the plant could be ulilizetl and has laids of 17/18 May 1945 does not list any damage to a eapacity of 35,000 KW. this plant. 4. Vulnerability. 3. No mention was made in any damage assess- The vulnerability of all steam plants is fully cov- ment of recuperation or dispersal. i-red in the final report which is applicable to this Data Relevant To Other Studies. ])lant . In particular, the vulnerability of steam plants The shortage of coal and the necessity of using is shown here due to the stoppage of production thru poor grade coal was due to limited transportation relatively small damage. facilities that Ijccame more difficult as the war went Intelligence Check. on.

1. a. OSS. report in general correctly identified Evaluations and Impressions. and evaluated this plant. However, the accompany- On 7 December 1944 an earthc}uake damaged the ing cuts and photograph show the oiiginal plant of plant which made it completely inoperable and was 1926. more severe than the damage Ijy the bombing. Most

b. The Air ()bjecti\-e Folder No 90.20 for the Na- of the damage occurred in the boiler room, and repairs goja Area issued l)j' the Office of Assistant Chief of were not completed until February 1945.

22 OIL WAREHOUSE WERE DAMAGED - FOUNDATION AND ROOF OF , PART or BUILDING A """ -- wmEs'oPERr^C fSr BOILERS WERE DAMAGED I ^J^'CH3«RS a™" ,' *"° « »«»' "'"= "^^^ ""«=" - no^JmaN MACHrE N.2'h0USE GENERATOR. "^^ WATER WAS DAMAGEDJ 5 - A PART OF OUTLET CANAL OF COOLING 6 • A PART OF IRON TOWER WAS DAMAGED 7 - A PART OF COAL »R0 WAS DESTROYED ROOM WERE DAMAGED 8 - A PART OF CONVEYOR AND MOTOR - EMPLOYERS HOUSES 9 I 1 SHOWS DAMAGED

EXHIBIT B

Photo 1 —General view from southeast

23 :

PLANT REPORT NUMBER 4

AMAGASAKI STEAM POWER PLANT NO. 1 AMAGASAKI (NEAR OSAKA) JAPAN DATE INSPECTED 30 OCTOBER 1945

Summary. prime importance to the highly industrialized area in

1. The Amagasaki Steam Power Plant No 1, lo- which they were located and to the war industry as cated on the NE side of Amagasaki Harbor in Osaka a whole. Target information issued by the Joint

Bay, has a name plate rating of 318,000 KW. It is in Target Group had correctly summarized this situa- a 2 hay, large concrete Iniilding with coal storage and tion but had not fully exploited the real significance handling etiuipnient on one side and outdoor trans- or ease with which these plants could have been de-

former and switching station on the other. It is the stroyed. It is very apparant that a splendid oppor- largest steam plant in Japan and very important to tunity existed here to ajjply a relatively small expend- the highly intlustriulized area of Osaka-Araagasaki- iture of strategic bombing and achieve a remarkably Kobe, especially during the dry season. destructive result. 2. This plant was never a primary target but was The Plant and Its Function In damaged in a raid on the adjacent Nippon Oil Re- Enemy Economy. finery by the Twentieth AF on 9/10 August 1945. A 1. Product of total of 944.3 tons of bombs were dropped on this the plant and importance in enemy raid, and plant personnel estimate between 500 and economy. The Amagasaki 1 was one of 600 bombs fell on Amagasaki No 1 and the adjacent No the most impor- Amagasaki No 2 plant. tant in Japan as well as largest in size. While it was principally used during the dry season between 3. The principal physical damage was complete November and March, it also supplemented hydro destruction of sections of coal conveyors, moderate power at other times of the year. damage to Ijoilei-s The annual 2 and 1 stack, and damage to H of generation in KW^H was exceeded by only one other the main transformer banks and outdoor switching steam plant in Japan, namely the adjacent Amaga- structure. One-half of the plant was rendered com- saki No 2 plant. Its annual output, maximum peak pletely inoperal)le foi- a long period of time even had month and peak KW load, tluring the war years was materials been available for repairs. The actual pro- as follows duction loss can not be accurately estimated as the power demand was down at the time of the damage, but based on the average output of 448 million KWH per annum and a 50 percent plant loss for 1 year, at least 224 million KWH loss was caused. Practically no attempt at recuperation has been made. The vulnerability of power plants is clearly shown for destiuction of certain parts renders complete units inoperative.

4. The size, importance, and location had l)een correctly evaluated in intelligence data, but damage had not been reported in the damage assessment report.

5. This plant was one of the group composed of

Amagasaki No 1, Amagasaki No 2, and Amagasaki East, all of which wei-e located very close together. This combined group was by far the largest generator of electric energy in all .Japan. Their output was approximately } 4 billion KWH in 1943 or 4 percent of all generation and almost 40 percent of the total generation of Ihei-mal plants. This was a facto i- f)f : areii is nearly rt'ctangular in shape, appioxiiualely Attacks.

930 1)>- 1030 ft with a total acreage- of 22 acres. (Ex- First Raid. 1000 unde- hibit A—coal yard and plant huildings, and l']xlii])it On 15 June 1045 between 0000 and an B—outdoor switch and tiansfornicr yard.) I'hc main termined nunibei' of fire bombs were drojiped on the plant is housed in a reinforced concrete and steel jilant and buined one warehouse. No record of this building ai)pi'oxiniately 720 ft by IQf) ft with a new I'aid is in the mission n'])ort file. gi'inder building under construction at the wesiern Second Raid. end. (Exhibit C, photos 1 and 2.) The building is box This plant was damaged during a raid directed shai>e with a flat concrete roof and 6 steel stacks against the Nippon Oil Refinery and Tank Farm, which aie readily visible. On the north of the main Target 1203, Mission 322 of the Twentieth AF on building is a large coal storage and handling yard, 9/10 Augu.st 1945. One hundred and seven A/C of and (in the south is a large switch and transformer the 315th Wing di'opped 944.3 tons of .500-11). C,P yard with a transmission line leaving towards the boml)s, fused 110 second nose and 1/40 second tail west. On the south side of the plant area is located from a height of 15,2t)() to 17,300 ft with 0/10—8 10 Amagasaki Plant No 2, west of which, across a rather weather. In this raid the numbei- of bombs diTipped wide canal, is located the Nippon Oil Refinery and falling in the plant area cannot be accurately deter- Tank Farm, and directly across the canal to the west mined, but it was estimated by plant personnel that and north is the Amagasaki Steel Works I^td. from 500 to 600 bomlis fell in th(> Amagasaki No 1 The Ijoiler room contains G B&W boilers and 6 antl No 2 plant aiea. No bomb plot coidd he made Mitsubishi boilers of 160-t/hr rating with pulverized because with this number of bombs droppetl, hits coal firing. The generator room contains (1, tandem, were so close together that they could not l>e indi- compound, turbogenerator units, each rated 50,000 vidually idcntifieil. On the main buildings there were KW and each with a direct, connected, house genera- 10 hits, and a large numl)er were made in the switch tor rated 3,000 KW making a total of 318,000 KW and transformer yard. name plate capacity. Three of these units arc Mitsu- Effects of Bombing. bishi, 1 is Metropolitan Vickers, and 2 are Ishikawa- 1. Physical damage. Jima manufactured. The plant is operated on a unit a. The damage was as follows basis, two boilers per turbogenerator unit. Adjacent On(> b(5ml) hit north the coal conveyor, completely to the plant is a large switch and transformer yard destroying a considerable section. (Exhil)it C, stepping up to 77 KV, with six 77-KV outgoing over- photo 3) head lines (3 lines per tower) and 3 incoming 77-KV One bomli entered through the skylight over the underground lines from Amagasaki No 2. To supple- space between boilers No 1 and 2, tlenotating near ment house generators, there are also installed three the base of boiler No 1, causing distortion of lighter 5,000-KVA and one 9,000-KVA 3-phase transformers metal parts, housings of all heaters, super heaters, stepping down from 77 KV. etc., as well as causing fi'agmentation damage all b. The plant uses coal from Kyushu and Hokkaido around, and blasting the covering of water wall of approximately 11,520 Btu shipped by boat. There piping, Init did not damage the heavier parts of the was no power shut down due to lack of coal. boiler. 3. The plant is owned and operated by the Japan One boml) hit the light metal support of the sky- Electric Generation and Transmission Co. Infoi-ma- light between boilers No 1 and 2, causing only minor tion was obtained from the following: damage. (Exhiliit C, photo 4) Mr. S. Kadono—Chief Engr Kinki Branch. One bomb hit a stack seiving lioilers No 1 and No S. Mr. Kaku—Generating and Transforma- 2, detonating inside the stack. (Exhibit C, photo 4 tion Engr, Kinki Branch. and Exhibit C, photo 2) Mr. N. Tsuchiyama—Steam Power Engr, Four bombs hit on the ceiling of the turbogenerator Kinki Branch. room, detonating just below the concrete ceiling.

4. For operation during the war, approximately Turbines No 1 and 2 were damageil by fragmenta- 200 employees were used, but at present have been tion, and minor damage was done to roof and walls. reduced to about 75 working in two shifts. Although (Exhil)it C, photo 5) operati(jn of the plant is normally seasonal, the em- Several hits close to the sides of the new grinder ployees are used continuously and during non- house, damaging the builduig slightly. operating periods perform plant maintenance. Several bomb hits on the switch and transformer 25 put Diit of commission a large section of the steel a. The onlj' repairs that had been made were to structure support, disconnecting swatches, oil circuit one of the 5,000-KVA auxiliary transformers, which breakeis, transformers, and did other general frag- was found not damaged internally. In the case of mentation damage. Transformer oil fires were started other damaged transformers, complete inspection which Ijurned for two days, causing additional dam- had not been made to see whether the core and coils age particularly to transformers and distortion to had been damaged beyond repair. The damage to the steel structure. The totallj' damaged and partially roof, skylights, or window frames had not been re- damaged sections are indicated on Exhibit B and paired, and not even window panes had been replaced Exhibit C, photos 7 to 12. to protect equipment from the weather. It was esti-

Several bombs had evidently hit the transmission mated, if material were availal)le, that the damaged line conductors between the switch and transformer portion of the plant could be put back into complete yard take off and the first tower as well as between operation in one year. the first and second towers, as several of the lower 6. No production had l:>een reattained in the tlain- condvictors were broken. aged portion at the time of inspection.

Protective measures taken consisted of the placing c. The damaged poi'tion could carry a load of a 6 to 7 ft high concrete blast wall in the space 150,000 KW. between the turbogenerators, extending about % of 4. ^'ulnerability. the width of the I)ay (Exhibit C, photo fi), and plac- The vulnerability of this power plant is clearly ing a1 various points thi'oughout the plant and plant shown and is moie fully covered in the industry final area concrete shelters of different sizes for the work- report applicable to all steam powei- plants. men. Intelligence Check. b. According to plant personnel 500 to 600 bombs 1. a. OSS repc)rt in general correctly identified fell in the plant area and open spaces around the and evaluated this plant. Amagasaki No 1 and No 2 plants. It was impossible b. The Air Objective Folder, 90.25 for Osaka Area to olitain a Iwmb plot, nor could an accurate liomb issued by the Office of Assistant Chief of Aii- Staff, plot be made as exact points of the hits were obliter- Intelligence, listed this plant bj^ target 540 A, cor- ated. (Exhibit B of repoi't on Amagasaki No 2) rectly located it on maps, evaluated its importance, 2. Production loss. and gave a reasonably correct plot plan. Photographic a. This plant was in opeiation throughout the war information was practically correct, except that it did years, although production declined considerably in not show the partially completed grinder house. the latter pai't of 1044, and theic was negligible pro- c. ,ITG information was essentially correct. Aerial duction after Mai'ch 1945. This was due to loss of photographic cover was excellent and locations of hiad demands because of destruction of industry' thru buildings were correct in all except one minor point lionibing and/or to the incompleted pi'ogram of in not identifying the partially completed grinder iudustiy dispei'sion. Therefore, it is not possible to house. accurately estimate the actual loss. Based on the 2. a. Record of the raid in which this plant was average production of 448 million KWH during the damaged is covered in the report of raid 322 cm target

'A war years and the fact that }-2 of ihv plant^ was 1203. icndered inoperative by the bombing, the potential b. Strike Attack Report No 138 mentions the fact loss amounted to 224 million KWH. that, "possible misidentification of the peninsula to

b. No substitution or modification was possible. the right of the target as the target itself may have side," c. (1) The loss of production was directly caused caused the tendency in general towards that by liombing and in particular to the limiting factor but no estimate was made of the damage. of transformer capacity. Data Relevant To Other Studies. No production was lost through diversion of (2) None labor, material, or machine facilities. and Impressions. (3) No loss of production was caused through Evaluations protective measures. The importance of this plant, together with its two

(4) No loss of production was caused through companion plants, Amagasaki No 2 and Amagasaki absenteeism or unusual inefficiency. East, is most apparent. There was no other lai'ger (5) No other loss due to shortage of essentials. combine of steam power plants in Japan, and they 3. Recuperability cycle. were mo.st important in the war economy. 26 SCAU • FCET P^^^T'

U S, STRATEGIC eOMBWG SUfiVEV

AMAGASAKI NO I STEAM POWER PLANT (PLOT PLAN) EXHIBIT- A % m. I UNE - FDQM AMAGiSAKI NO 2

NO. Z LINE - FROM AMA6ASAK1 NO 2

a " M LINES FHOM AMAOASAKI NO 2 ARE UNOEROROUNO

DCB— OIL CIRCUIT BREAKER M.T. —-MAIN THANSFORtilEB H. T. MOUSE TRANSFORMER P. T POTENTIAL TRANSFORMER C. T CURRENT TRANSFORMER LR.A.— LOAD RATIO ADJUSTOR - REACTOR DAMAGED STRUCTURES U S STWflTEOIC B0M6 SURVEY OUTDOOR SUeSTATlON

AMAGASAKt NO. I EXHIBIT B It

1- EXHIBIT C

Photo 1 —General view looking south, with new grinder building, and transmission towers.

F^ .^^

Photo 2—Closer view looking south showing west end, new grinder building and transmission towers. 697713—47—3 27 Photo 3—Direct hit on north coal convej-ors looking north.

Photo 4—Looking up between boilers No. 1 and No. 2, showing damage to boilers, light iron, sky light support and bomb hit on stack No. 1. 28 Photo 5 —Two bomb liits on ceiling of turbogeiu'iator room.

Photo 6—General view of switch and transformer yard. 29 Photo 7 —View of daniagetl switch and transformer yard

Photo 8 —View of damaficd switch and transformer yard 30 Photo 9—Ground view of damaged switch and transformer yard

Photo 10—Groimd view of damaged switch and transformer yard 31 1

Photo 1 —Closer view of damaged switch and transformer yard

^'fv -S^

:.;:';'-'»:?

Photo 12—General view of part of switch and transformer yard showing some of damaged section 32 :

PLANT REPORT NUMBER 5 AMAGASAKI STEAM POWER PLANT NO. 2 AMAGASAKI (NEAR OSAKA) JAPAN DATE INSPECTED 30 OCTOBER 1945

Summary. approximately \]4 billion KWH in 1943 or 4 percent

1. The Amagasaki Stoam Power Plant No 2, of all generation and almost 40 percent of the total located on the NE side of Amagasaki Harlior in generation of thermal plants. This was a factor of Osaka Bay, has a name plate rating of 300,000 KW. prime importance to the highly industrialized area in

It is in a two bay, large, concrete Imilding with coal which they were located and to the war industrj' as storage and handling ecjuipment on one side and in- a whole. Target information issued by the Joint door transformer and switching building on the other. Target Group had correctly summarized this situa-

It is the second largest in size and had the highest tion, but had not fully exploited the real significance output of the steam plants in Japan. It was very or ease with which these plants could have been important in the highly industrialized area of Osaka- destroyed. It is very apparent that a splendid oppor- Amagasaki-Kobe, especially during the dry season. tunity existed hei-e to apply a relatively small ex-

2. This plant was never a primary tar'get, but was penditure of strategic bombing and achieve a remark- damaged in a raid on the adjacent Nippon oil re- ably desti-uctive result. finery by the Twentieth AF on 9/10 August 1945. A The Plant and Its Function In total of 944.3 tons of bombs were dropped on this Enemy Economy. raid, and plant personnel estimated between 500 and 1. The Amagasaki No 2 was ranked second in 600 bombs fell on the Amagasaki No 2 and adjacent importance in Japan as well as in size. While it was Amagasaki No 1 plants. principally used during the dry season between 3. Physical damage was sustained throughout the November and March, it also supplemented hydro entire plant. Principal damage was inflicted on coal power at other times of the year. This plant handling equipment, boilers, turl^ines, generators, generated more KWH annually than any other steam controls (both boiler and electrical) transformers, and plant in Japan and, of all plants of any type, was switching equipment, any poi'tion of which would exceeded in production only by one hydro plant. Its have rendered the whole plant inoperable. The actual annual output, maximum peak month and peak KW production loss cannot be accurately estimated as load, during the war years was as follows power demand was down at the time of the damage. However, the plant produced an average of 538 million KWH annually during the 3 war years, and based on estimated restoration of 50 percent of the plant capacity by the end of one year and complete capacity by the end of two years, the loss in production is approximately 807 million KWH. No attempt at recuperation had been made. The vulneraliility of power plants is clearly shown, and the heavy damage with long period of recuperation clearly demonstrates the susceptibility of steam power plants to bomliing.

4. The size, importance, and location had been correctly evaluated in intelligence data, but damage had not been reported in the damage assessment report.

5. This plant was one of the group composed of

Amagasaki No 1, Amagasaki No 2, and Amagasaki East, all of which were located very close together. This combined group was by far the largest generator of electric energy in all Japan. Their output was area is nearly rectangular in shape approximatelj' the employees were used continuously and during the 965 ft by 1625 ft with a total acreage of 36 acres. nonoperating period performed plant maintenance. (Exhibit A) The main plant is housed in a reinforced Attacks. concrete and steel building approximately 625 ft b.y First Raid. 225 ft. (Exhibit C, photo 1) The building is box shape On 15 June 1945 between 0900 and 1000 an unde- M-ith a flat concrete roof, and 5 steel stacks which are termined number of fire bombs were dropped on the readilj' visable. Adjacent to and between the main plant which burned down a warehouse and killed building and canal is a large coal storage and handling 2 men. No record of this raid is in the mission report yard. On the opposite side of the main building and file. separated by a 45 ft wide open space is a large switching and transformer house approximately 505 ft long Second Raid. (parallel to the main plant) by 118 ft wide of light On 19 July 1945 at 2000 to 2010 this plant was hit steel construction with mostlj^ glass or light material in a raid directed against the Nippon Oil Refinery mission sides and end, and with hip-shaped lightweight roof. and tank farm, target 1203, 281 of the Twen- There are two transmission lines on single towers tieth AF. Eighty-four A/C of the 315th Wing dropped leaving the south end, paralleling the building, and 701.8 tons of 500-lb GP bombs fused 1/10 second 1 '40 tail a height of approximately then turning due north. To the north is located the nose, second from 16,000 ft 10— weather. In this raid one Amagasaki Plant No 1, and on the west, across a wth 8, 10/10 hit the no damage to the rather vdde canal, is located the Nippon Oil Eefinery boml) dock but caused and Tank Farm, and directly across the canal to the plant. In the strike attack report No. 126 no assess- of to this plant made. west and north is the Amagasaki Steel Works. ment damage was The boiler room contains 2 Tokj^o B&W lioilers Third Raid. and 7 Mitsubishi boilers each of 220 t/hr rating with This plant was completely put out of operation pulverized coal firing. The generator room has 4 tan- during a raid directed against the Nippon Oil Refin- dem, compound, turlwgenerator units, each generator ery and Tank Farm, target 1203, mission 322 of the 75,000 KW, totaling 300,000 KW in main generators. Twentieth AF on 9/10 August 1945. One hundred Two of these units are of Mitsubishi and two of and seven A/C of the 315th Wing dropped 944.3 tons Ishikawatima manufacture. The plant is operated on of .500-lb GP bombs fused 1/10 second nose and 1/40 a unit basis with two boilers per turbogenerator unit tail from a height of 15,200 to 17,300 ft with 0/10— and a provision to cut in a spare l^oiler. There are 8/10 weather. In this raid the number of bombs located in the switcliing and transformer house four dropped that fell in the plant area cannot be accu- 93,750-KVA banks of single-phase, OIWC trans- rately determined, but an estimate given by plant formers, stepping the generator voltage of 11 KV up persoimel was that between 500 to 600 bombs fell to 77 KV, and five 8,000-KVA, 3-phase, OISC, house in the Amagasaki No 1 and No 2 plant area. fransformers. In addition to the two 77-KV, out- Effects of Bombing. going, overhead lines (2 lines per tower), there are 1. Physical damage. 3 outgoing, 77-KV, underground lines to Amagasald a. The raid of 15 June 1945 destroyed a wooden Nol. (1) warehouse by fire with small loss of supplies. Bombs b. The plant uses coal from Kyushu and Hokkaido were incendiary and had no effect on the noncom- ot approximately 11,520 Btu brought by boat. There bustable plant structure. were no plant shut downs due to the lack of coal. (2) The raid of 19 July 1945 caused only sUght plant is owned and operated by the Japan 3. The damage to a dock on the canal and did no actual Transmission Co. Information was Generating and damage to the plant proper. obtained from the following: (3) The raid of 9/10 August 1945 was as follows: Mr. S. Kadono—Chief Engr, Knki Branch. An undetermined number of bombs struck the Mr. S. Kaku—Generating and Transforma- boiler house doing serious damage to all boilers and tion Engr, Kinki Branch. damaging fans, piping, air heaters, economizers, Mr. N. Tsuchiyama—Steam Power Engr, super heaters, coal conveyors, one stack, supports,

Kinki Branch. all instruments, and control. Exhibit C, photo 5

4. For operation during the war, approximately shows a general view of the roof of the boiler house 200 employees were used who worked in 2 shifts. and photo 6 shows damaged control board for boilers

Although operation of the plant is normally seasonal. No 5 and 6 behind which can be seen the general 34 boiler, piping, and other damage. This is typieal of is drawn .showing the approximate eastern limit of the eondition throughout the entire boiler house. the bombed ar(>a. A number of bombs struck the turbogenerator 2. Production loss. room damaging the buikhng and doing fragmentation a. This plant was in operation throughout the war ( and Ijhist damage to the turbogenerators. Exhibit ', although production declined consideiuljly in the photo 8 shows damaged unit No 3. Other units also latter part of 1944, and there was negligible produc- suffered damage. tion after March 1945. This was due to the loss of Bomb hits on the south gantry crane, coal con- load demands because of the destruction of industi-y veyors, and other parts put the entire coal handling thru bombing and/or to the incompleted program of equipment out of commission. Exhibit C, photos industry dispersion. Therefore it is not possible to 4 and 7 shows portions of this. accuiately estimate the actual loss. Based on the One bomb made a direct hit on the main electrical average annual production of 538 million KWH control room destroying control panels and setting it duiing each of the 3 war j-ears, and on the fact that on fire which in turn destroyed the control desk. Two the damage sustained would have caused a complete operators Avho were in a bomb shelter in this room shut down for at least one year with restoration of suffered no injuries. (Exhibit C, photo 9) only 50 percent capacity and another year for com- A large number of bombs struck the switching and lilete restoration, the loss in production caused is transformer house. All transformers, and most of the equivalent to approximatel.v 807 million KWH. oil circuit breakers, disconnecting smtches, bus sup- b. No substitution or modification was possible. ports, coolers, pumps, control panels, and control (1) Plant was completeh' put out of commission cables were destroyed or very severly damaged by bombing. directlj' or by the lesulting fire. Exhil)it C, photo 10 (2) No production was lost through diversion of shows a general view of the switching and trans- labor, material, or machine facilities. oil former house. Photo 11 shows a direct hit on an (3) No loss of production was caused through pro- circuit breaker \\dth fragmentation damage to others. tective measures. Photo 12 shows where a bomb detonated near the (4) No loss of production was caused through Ijase of a transformer banlc destroying the center absenteeism or unusual inefficiency. transformer and severly damaging an adjacent one (5) The only possible loss of production through- on the left. Photo 13 shows the 3 oil coolers for one out the war would have been the fact that boiler tube bank of transformers that has been damaged mostly replacements were hard to obtain. fire. 1 by In Exhibit C, photo can he seen the dam- 3. Recuperability cycle. transmission lines leave the plant. aged tower where a. At the time of inspection, no repairs had been This photo, as well as Photos No 2 and 3, shows the made or even started, and there was not even any wide spread destruction that existed throughout the effort to protect any equipment from the weather. plant. There is visable evidence of serious damage to some Protective measures consisted of the placing of 6 to generator windings and to core and coils of trans- 7 ft high concrete blast-wall in the space between formers indicating necessity of complete replace- turbogenerators extending about ^4 of the width of ments, but cases of fragmentation damage had not the bay (Exhibit C, photo 8), and placing at various been examined to determine the extent of internal

points throughout the plant and plant area concrete damage. It is conservatively estimated that, under

shelters of various sizes. favorable conditions of material and labor supply, it

b. According to plant personnel inter^-iewed, be- would require at least one year to place one-half of

tween 500 and 600 bombs fell in the area of this plant the plant iDack in operation and another year before

and the adjacent Amagasaki No 1. No bomb plot was the entire plant could be completed. available nor could an accurate one be made for with b. No production had been reattained at the time this number of bomb strikes, there were hits so close of inspection.

together that they could not be plotted individually. c. No portion of the plant could have been utilized Exhibit B is an aerial photograph taken on 13 August due to destruction or damage to so many portions 1945 and was a part of the damage assessment report essential to the entire plant. No 191 on target 90.25-1203, Nippon Oil Refinery 4. Vulnerability. and Tank Farm. This photograph shows the large The vulnerability of all steam power plants is fully number of bombs dropped on this plant area. A line covered in the final report which is applicable to this 35 plant. However, this is a good example of the com- report on raid 322, on Target 1203. Strike Attack pleteness of destruction that can be done. Report Xo 138 mentions the fact that, ''possible misidentification of the peninsula to the right of the Intelligence Check. target as the target itself may have caused the ten- 1. a. OSS report in general correctly identified dency in general towards that side," but no estimate and evaluated this plant. of any kind was made of damage to this plant. b. The Air Objective Folder 90.25 for Osaka Area issued by the OfRce of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Data Relevant To Other Studies. Intelligence, listed this plant by Target 540 B, cor- None. rectlj' located it on maps, evaluated its importance, and gave a reasonably correct plot plan. Photographic Evaluations and Impressions. information was lacking. The importance of this plant together with its two

c. JTG information was essentially correct. Aerial compani(jn plants, Amagasaki No 1 anil Amagasaki photographic cover was excellent. East, is most apparent. There was no other larger 2. Record of the raid of 9,' 10 August 1945 in which comlaine of steam power plants in Japan, and they this plant was severelj- damaged is covered in the were most important in the war economy. plani plete

Inte

1. and (

b. issue Intel recti and{ infoi

c. phot 2. this

2 > 2

'mRGEl^ 00^-1203 .S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY 13^ AMAGASAKI STEAM AUG. 1945 OIL POWER PLANT NO. N|^N l»lNERYa EXHIBITS TOiR FARM-AWAGASAK! 20 Ap-Mjssjof^ SF^ 9-rO AUG. 1945 OA REPORT 191

37 EXHIBIT C

Photo 1 —Goneral vimv of plaiil lonkiiiK noilli with |)ni'l (if liiiiKlins and stacks of A]iuii;;usaki in backgiouml al liglit

Photo 2 —Closer viowdf tlamagod boilor, tuilidKi'niMatdi-, and cdntrol scotionof plant at Icti and indoor transl'ormw and switcliing budding at right looking north 38 •jaiii^- :k:i^^&^

Photo 3 —View of damaged soul-li cud of Ixiilcj- house

Photo 4—View lookiiiK w(;st from top (jf boiler house showing damaged coal handling equipment witli Nippon (^il Refinery across canal 39 Photo 5 —ViL'w looking south of damaged lioilcr liiiiiso roof

««*

Phc)to 6 — View of boiler No. 5 and 6 control

40 Photo 7 —View looking iK^rth friMii top of boilci- house sh(i\vin=; damngcd coal handling cquip- nifnt with Nippon (Ml Refinery across canal.

Photo 8—View showing damaged turbogenerator unit and building damage. 41 Photo 9—View of bomb hit in main control room

Photo 10—General view inside transformer and switcliing building

42 m'Wm^-:^^ Photo 13 —View of damaged oil coolers for main transformers, station transformer directly behind

44 PLANT REPORT NUMBER 6 EAST AMAGASAKI STEAM POWER PLANT AMAGASAKI (NEAR OSAKA) JAPAN DATE INSPECTED 30 OCTOBER 1945

Summary. steam powci- plant in the ()saka-,\magasaki-Kobe

1. 'Vhv Ivist Ainufiasiiki plant is located on Osaka Area and tenth largest in .Jai)an. While it was princi-

Hay next to Amagasaki No. 1 and has 148,000 KW pally used during the dry winter season operating

in iianic plate generating capacity. It is in a single between Novemljer through March, it also supple- large building with coal storage and handling ecjuip- mented hydro power at otJier times of the year. Its inent on one side and an outdoor substation on the annual output, maximum peak month output and (ilherside. It was the tenth largest plant in .Japan and maximum KW peak during the war years, was as third in the Osaka-Amagasaki-Kobe Area and an follows: important plant in this highly industrial area especially during the dry winter season when hydro jiower was limited. 2. This plant was never a primary target nor was

il sultjected to any raids by the Twentieth AV. but

was attacked 'i times evidently Ijy carrier planes of (he V. S. Navy. Although the plant was not damaged, warehouses in the plant area were burned, and the ladialwr of a transformer in the outdoor substation of the Kansai Electric Supply Co. located in the same plant area was damaged by gun fire.

3. No physical damage to plant except near hit on intake tunnel. 4. The size, importance, and location had been correctly evaluated in intelligence data.

5. This plant was one of the group composed of

approximately 1 J'2 billion KWH in 1943 or 4 percent of all generation and almost 40 percent of the total generation of thermal plants. This was a factor of prime importance to the highly industrialized area in whicli they were located and to the war industry as a whole. Target information issued by the .Joint Target Group had correctly summarized this situation lint had not fully exploited the real significance or ease with which these plants could have been

destroyed. It is very apparent that a splendid opportunity existed here to apply a relatively small ex- penditure of strategic bombing and achieve a I'emark- ably dcsti\ictive result.

The Plant and Its Function In Enemy Economy.

1. l-'roduct of plant and importance in enemy economy.

Tile East Amagasaki plant is the third largest :

politan Vickers, 2 are 25,000-K^'' Seimens Schuckert b. Bomb plot and damage outline are shown in

and 1 is a 40,000-KVl" Metropolitan Vickers. In addi- Exhibit A. tion, there are 2 tui'bogenerator units; one is a 7,000- 2. Production loss. 1\W ^Mitsubishi (Ijjungstrum), and one is a 1,000- a. Production during the 3 war years averaged Iv\V Metropolitan Vickers. Each main unit is con- appi-oximat(>ly 133 million KWH annually, but was nected directly to a step-up transformer bank which negligible since March 1945 due to loss of demand ties into the 77-KW system. The total name plate through industiy damage or diversion. capacity of the plant is 140,000 KW in main genera- 6. No substitution or modification necessary. tors and 8,000 KW in house generators. c. Causes for loss

b. The plant uses coal of approximately 1 1 ,520 Btu (1) There was no production loss from bomb or from Kj-ushu and Hokkaido. There was no shut down strafing damage.

due to shortage of coal although at times the amount (2) No loss of production was caused through in storage was low. diversion of labor, mateiial. or machine facilities.

3. The plant is owned and operated bj' the Japan (.3) No loss of production was caused through pro- Generation and Transmission Company, and the tective measures.

follo'ft'ing were inter\-iewed: (4) No loss of production was caused through Mr. S. Kadono—Chief Engr, Ivinki Branch. absenteeism or unusual inefficiency. Mr. S. Kaku—Generation and Transforma- (5) No loss of production was caused through lack tion Engr, Kinki Branch. of fuel. ]\Ir. N. Tsuchiyama—Steam Power Engr, 3. Kecuperability cycle. Kinki Branch. a. As no damage was done, there was no measure Mr. B. Saiki—Chief Engr of East Amagasaki of recuperability obtainable. Plant. 4. Vulnerability. 4. The plant normally used 230 employees during The vulnerability of all steam power plants is fully the war but at present is down to 150, operating on covered in the final report which is fully applicable a 2 shift basis. Although operation of the plant is to this plant. normally seasonal, their employees are used continu- Intelligence Check. ously «ath nonoperating period being devoted to 1. a. OSS report in general correctly identified maintenance. and evaluated this plant.

Attacks. b. The Air Objective Folder 90.25 for Osaka Area According to plant personnel there were attacks issued by the Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, j on 15 June 1945, 5 August 1945, and 9 August 1945, Intelligence, listed this plant as a target, correctly \ records of which cannot be located in any reports of located it on maps, and evaluated its importance. the mission file of the Twentieth AF. Therefore it is c. JTG information covered location of the plant lielieved that these attacks were by carrier pianos of on aerial photographs, but gave no further details. the U. S. Na^T• 2. Although this plant was attacked, it was not Effects of Bombing. attacked by the Twentieth AF, and therefore no

1. Phj'sical damage. assessment report of damage is available. a. The damage was as follows: Data Relevant To Other Studies. (1) In the attack of 15 June 1945 there was strafing Amount of fuel in storage was low due to transpor- only. Damage was very slight, consisting only of the tation difficulties. radiator of one transformer in an outdoor substation being punctured by a bullet. No fire was caused. Also, . Evaluations and Impressions. during this raid part of the adjacent Hanshin Electric This plant is located on reclaimed land and is Railwaj^ plant was strafed, but no damage resulted. settfing at the rate of 3 to 4 in per year, and during a

(2) In the attack of 5 August 1945 incendiary recent typhoon there was approximately 7 ft of water liombs burned the warehouses marked in Exhibit A. in the plant.

(3) In the 9 August 1945 attack about 20 bombs The importance of this plant together with its two fell just outside the plant area on the railroad tracks. companion plants, Amagasaki No 1 and Amagasaki

One struck the intake canal but caused only minor No 2, is most apparent. Thei'c was no other larger damage and did not interfere with plant operations. combine of steam power plants in Japan, and they Only minor protective measures had been taken. were most important in the war economy. 46 U3AIU 300HS si' 5-:

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47 PLANT REPORT NUMBER 7 KASUGADE STEAM POWER PLANT NO 1 OSAKA, JAPAN DATE INSPECTED 28 OCTOBER 1945 Summary.

1. The Kiipugado No 1, located at the junction of the Hokkenya and Aji Rivers, has a name plate capacity in turbogenerator uiiits of 50,500 KW. The main plant is housed in a building having 4 hip- shaped bays, 2 of sheet steel on a steel frame, and 2 of reinforced concrete, with coal handling equipment on one side and coal storage on the other. It was rated 24th in Japan and 6th in Osaka-Amagasaki-Kobe Area, with an annual output averaging 22 million KWH during the three war years. 2. This plant was never a primary target. It was damaged slightly in a raid on the Osaka Urban Area l)y the Twentieth AF, on 1 June 1945. In the entire laid, 2890.7 tons of incendiary bombs were dropped with many falling in the warehouse and storage area between this plant and Kasugade No 2. 3. This plant proper suffered no physical damage. A number of warehouses burned causing loss of supplies and parts, but causing no production loss. 4. The size, importance, and location had been correctly evaluated in intelligence data, but damage had not been correctly stated in damage assessment leport.

5. A\'hile this plant, in itself, was not large nor particulaily important, it was adjacent to Kasugade No 2, and the two plants together formed a target worthy of consideration. A raid could have been directed jointly against the two plants to achieve greatly desirable results. The Plant and Its Function In Enemy Economy.

1. Product of plant and importance in enemy economy.

The Kasugade No 1 plant was one of a number of important steam power plants in the Osaka-Amaga- saki-Kobe Area and is ranked as 24th in Japan. While it was pi'incipally used during the dry winter season between November through March, it also supplemented hydro power at other times. Armual output, peak month, and peak load during the war years are as follows:

Year : ,

caV)les. (3) No loss of production was caused through pro-

h. The pl.ant uses ciuil of 11,520 Htu fidiii Kyiisliii tective measur(>s. and Hokkaido. There were no kIuiI downs dnc to lack (4) No loss of production was caused through of coal although at times the quantity in storage absenteeism or unusual inefficiency. was low. (5) No loss from other causes except a reduction

3. The plant is ownetl and ojx'rated by the Japan of output due to lo.ss of load deniand from indu.stry, Cienerating and Transmission Co. and persons inter- destruction, or dispersal. viewed were: 3. Kecuperability cycle. Mr. S. Kadono—Chief lOngr, Kinki Branch. None. Mr. S. Kaku—Generation and Transmission 4. Vulneraiiility. Engr, Kinki Branch. The vulnerability of all steam plants is fully cov- Mr. N. Tsuchiyama—Steam Power Engr, ered in the final report which is applicable to this Kinki Branch. plant. Mr. S. Asade—Head master of Kasugade No Intelligence Check.

1 and No 2 steam power plants. 1. a. OSS report in general correctly identified 4. The plant normally uses throughout the year and evaluated this plant.

93 employees on a 2 shift basis. Although operation of b. The Air Objective Folder No 90.25 for Osaka the plant is seasonal, the employees are used continu- Area issued by Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, ously with nonoperating periods being devoted to InteUigence, fisted this plant as Target 323, correctly maintenance. located it on map, evaluated its importance, but Attacks. gave no plot plan. Photographic information, how-

There were no primary attacks on this plant ; however, was correct. ever, warehouses were damaged during one raid on c. JTG was essentially correct in fisting this as a

Osaka Urban Area, mission 187, on 1 June 45 at secondary standby power plant in the Osaka-Nagoya 1028 to 1200. Five-hundred and Six A/C of the 58th, power system and gave the correct location on aerial 73rd, 313th and 314th Wings dropped 2890.7 tons of maps which were too small to distinguish details of incendiary bombs from a height of 18,000 to 28,500 the plants. ft mth 0/10—10/10 weather. This plant and com- 2. Record of raid in which this plant was damaged panion plant, Kasugade No 2, were just at the edge is covered in reports on raids 187 on Osaka Urban of areas bombed. Area. Assessment Report 84, 10 Effects of Bombing. Damage No June 1945, fisted 10 small storage type buildings and 3 small 1. Physical damage. buildings destroyed. These were in the area between a. This plant suffered no physical damage. The this plant and Kasugade No 2 and were used for bombs hitting in the area between Kasugade No 1 warehouse and storage. No report of damage was and 2 completely destroyed the warehouses and reported on the plant. storage spaces, thus destroying spares and supplies. 3. No mention was made in any damage assess- (Exhibit B report Kasugade No 2). The plant was ment of recuperation or dispersal other than in report shut down at the time of the raid. Protective measures No 84, that warehouse or storage buildings were taken were concrete shelters for employees at various destroyed. points and some fire extinguishing equipment.

b. Due to the fact that incendiary bombs were Data Relevant To Other Studies. dropped, no attempt had been made by plant per- None. sonnel to make a bomb plot, so that a record of the Evaluations and Impressions. actual number of bombs dropped into this warehouse This plant was an old plant and had a great many and storage area could not be obtained. small capacity boilers operating at low pressure. It 2. Production loss. certainly would not be an efficient plant, which would a. There was no loss of production. reflect in turn on the amount of coal used and for

6. No substitution or modification was necessary. which shipping space had to be provided. Normally

c. Causes for loss such a plant would only be considered an emergency

(1) This plant suffered no damage. standby to be used onlj' for taking care of a break

(2) No production loss was caused through diver- down in service, and not for periods corresponding to sion of labor; material, or machine facilities. the dry season. 49 < 8 UJ <

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50 PLANT REPORT NUMBER 8 KASUGADE STEAM POWER PLANT NO 2 OSAKA, JAPAN DATE INSPECTED 28 OCTOBER 1945

Summary. particular plant was old and had a wooden roof, a of construction that would 1. The Kasugade No 2, located at the junction of type never be used in a the Rokkenya and Aji Rivers, has a name plate modern plant. capacity in turbogenerator units of 65,000 KW; The Plant and Its Function In last unit of 25,000-KW was in- however, when the Enemy Economy. stalled, no additional capacity in boilers was added, 1. Product of plant and importance in enemy so therefore, the plant capacitj' is nearer 40,000 KW. economj'. The main plant is located in a building ha\'ing 3 hip- The Kasugade No 2 plant was one of a number of shaped bays, 2 of sheet steel on steel frames, and one important steam power plants in the Osaka-Amaga- of reinforced concrete with an annex of the same saki-Kobe Area and is ranked 23rd in Japan. While construction. It was rated 23rd in Japan and 5th in it was principally used during the dry winter season Osaka-Amagasaki-Kobe Area, with the annual out- between November and March, it also supple- put averaging 47 million KWH during the 3 war j^ars. mented hj'dro power at other times. Annual output, 2. This plant was never a primary target but was peak month, and peak load during the war years are damaged on 1 June 1945 during a raid on Osaka as follows: Urban area by the Twentieth AF. In the entire raid, 2890.7 tons of incendiary bombs were dropped. A Year number of bombs fell on the wooden roof of the annex and the turbogenerator bay and in the warehouse and storage area between this plant and Kasugade

No 1.

3. The principal physical damage was complete destruction of the main electrical control and various auxiliary panels, and control wiring on the top floor of the annex, with minor damage to insulators and a bushing in the outdoor substation. The plant was not in operation at the time of the damage, but at least one year's normal production loss was caused pri- marilj' due to fact that replacement material could not be ol)tained. No attempt at recuperation has been made. The vulnerabiUty of steam power plants is fuU}^ shown due to the destruction of a portion rendering the entire plant inoperative. 4. The size, importance, and location had been correctly evaluated in intelligence data, but damage had not been correctlj' stated in the damage assessment report.

5. While this plant in itself was not large nor particularly important, it was adjacent to Kasugade

No 1, and the two plants together formed a target worthy of consideration. A raid could have been directed jointlj' against the 2 plants to achieve gi'eatly desirable results. Although damage was caused by incendiar.y bombs, it was not indicative that this type of bomb is successful against power plants, as this :

house transfonncrs. All roofs are made with eovcring 0/10— 10/10 weather. This plant and conipanion over wood sheeting, and all bays are provided with plant Kasugade No 1 were just at the edge of the ventilating louvers running full length. The length of area bombed.

the bays is approximately 200 ft, and the widths of Effects of Bombing. tiu> bays are: boiler 100 ft, turbogenerator 50 ft, and 1. Physical damage. the amiex 44 ft. There are a total of 8 reinforced con- a. The physical damage to the plant proper <-r('te stacks extending above the Ixiiler house about was caused by incendiary hitting twice the height of the bays. The two liarge or small bombs the wooden roof of the annex and setting it on fire. Falling \-essel coal unloading cranes are on the banks of Aji embers started a fire in an office on the third floor, then in River on south side of the boiler house. Coal is the main control room, finally cariied by a conveyor direct to the bunkers above the causing complete destruction of the control desk stokers or by car to the storage yai'd on the opposite and various control panels and control wiring, putting the sitle of the plant. Ashes are hauled by car to barges plant completely of commission. on Rokkenj'a River. out (Exhibit C, photo No 1 and The boiler house contains 32 B&W stoker-fired 2.) Bombs hit the roof of the boilers, 26 of 3.3,000-lbs/hrs and 6 of 38,000-lbs/hr turbogenerator bay next to the boiler house and maximum continous rating. The generator bay con- burned a large section of the roof, but did no other tains two Westinghouse 20,000-KW turbogenerator damage. One bomb hit the units installed in 1922 and one Iskikawajima 25,000- outdoor substation, damaging the insulators of bus and disconnecting KW unit installed in 1938. At the time of installation switches and of one bushing. of this last unit, there was installed a bank of three The balance of the liitting 30,000-K^'A, ()I8C transformers and an outdoor sub- bombs in the area between Kasugade 1 and completely station, stepping up to 77 KV for transmitting power No 2, destroyed the warehouses and storage spaces, thus destrojang to the Shinyodo River substation. This plant is also spares and supplies. (Exhibit B) tied to Kasugade No 1 by ten 11-KV, underground Protective measures taken were concrete shelters cables. The total nameplatc capacity is 65,000 KW. for employees at various points and some fire extin- h. The plant uses coal of 11,520 Btu from Kyushu guishing equipment. iind H(jkkaido. ThiMe were no shut downs due to lack b. Due to the fact that incendiary of coal, although at times the ciuantity in storage bombs were was low. dropped, no attempt had been made by plant pcr- somiel to make a bomb plot, so that a record of 3. The plant is owned and operated liy the Japan the actual number of bombs dropped into this area could ( lenerating and Transmission Co., and persons interviewed were: not be obtained. 2. Production loss. Mi-. S. Kadono—Chief Engi-, Kinki Branch. a. The plant was not in operation at the time of Mv. y. Kaku—Generation and Transmission Engr, Kinki Branch. the damage due to the loss of load from industry destruction, from dispersal and further to the Mr. N. Tsuchiyama—Steam Power Engr, due Kinki Branch. fact that the hydro power available was ample at the time to supply the requirements. Therefore, ISIr. S. Asade—Head master of Kasugade No actual loss is not computable but based on average 1, and No 2, steam power plants. load for the previous 3 war years. It is estimated 4. The plant normally uses throughout the year that a loss of 47 million was sustained. appi'oximately 100 employees on a two shift basis. KWH b. No substitution or modification was possible. Although operation of the plant is seasonal, the employees are used continuously with nonoperating c. Causes for loss The complete plant was rendered inopei-ativc I)eriods, being devoted to maintenance. (1) due to one particular damaged part, namely the Attacks. main electrical control.

There were no ])rimary attacks on this plant ; how- (2) No production loss \\as caused through diver- c\er, it was damaged during one raid on Osaka Urban sion of labor, material, or machine facihties.

Area, mission 187, on 1 June 1945 at 1028 to 1200. (3) No. loss of production was caused through Five-hundred and Ninth A/C of the 58th, 73rd, protective measures.

313th and 314th Wings dropp(>d 2890.7 tons of incen- (4) No loss of production was caused through diary bombs from a height of 18,000 to 28,500 ft with absenteeism or unusual inefficiency. 52 (5) No loss from otlicr causes. 2. .\ record of the raid in wiiicii this plant was

3. Hcciipci-iitnlity cncIc. damaged is covered in reports of raids 187 on ( )saka

ti. Tlic only irpair made hud Ixcn llic rcplaccniciit, Urlian ArCa. of danuiscd roofs. Based on ability to secure requiicd Damage Assessment Report No 84, 10 June 1945, inateiial and labor, it is estimated that eomplet(^ listed 10 small storage-type buildings and 3 small repairs ('(Uild Ik- made in approximately months; Iniildings destroyed. These were in the area between liowexci', under available eonditions, at least one this plant and Kasugade No I and were used for year would be re

b. No produelion had been reattaiiu'il at the time reported on the plant. of inspection. 3. No mention was made in anj' damage assess-

c. No portion of the plant could have liceii utilized ment of recuperation or dispei'sal other than in report

(l\ie lo destruction of the portion essential to the No 84, which states that warehouse or storage build- entire i)lant operation. ings were destroyed.

4. ^'uluerabihty. Data Relevant To Other Studies. The vulnerabihty of all steam plants is full.y eo^•- None. ered in the final report which is applicable to this

is example lilant. This a particularly good of the Evaluations and Impressions. dependence of an entire plant on each part of its This plant was an old plant and had a great many, operatin); cycle. small capacity boilers operating at low pressure. It Intelligence Check. certainlv would not be an efficient plant, which woukl

1. ((. ()S8 report in general correctly identified ri-flect in turn on the amount of coal used and for and evaluated this plant. which shipping space had to be provided. Normally

b. The Air Objective Folder No 90.25 for Osaka such a plant would only be considered an emergency Aiea issued by the Office of Assistant Chief of Air standi)}' to be used only for taking care of breakdown Staff, Intelligence, listed this plant as Target 323, service and not for periods corresponding to the dry

correctly located it on the map, evaluated its impor- season. tance, but gave no plot plan. Photographic informa- The fact that this plant was seriously damaged tion was correct. from incendiary bombs should not be used as a

c. -ITG was essentially correct in listing this as a criterion that this type of bomb is successful against secondary standby power plant in Osaka-Nagoya power plants. This plant was old, and the type of

power system and gave correct location on aerial wooden roof it had would never be used in a modern maps which were too small to distinguish details of plant. Therefore, incendiary bombs are not recom- the plants. mended for use against power plants.

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55 EXHIBIT C

Photo 1—View showing damaged control desk and auxiliary panels and also damaged shelter

Photo 2—View showing rear view of damaged auxiliary panels 56 PLANT REPORT NUMBER 9 KAWASAKI STEAM POWER PLANT KAWASAKI (NEAR TOKYO) JAPAN DATE INSPECTED 18 OCTOBER 1945

Summary. The Plant and Its Function In Enemy Economy. 1. The Kawasaki Steam Power Plant, located on 1. Product of plant and impoilance in enemy Tokyo Bay neai- Kawasaki, has 71,5nn KW in name economy. plate genei-uting eapaeity. Main buildings are of con- The Kawasaki jilant was the largest steam powei- crete coiistruction in two parts, the largei' part plant for powei- supply to the electric I'ailways in and containing plant power, with coal storage and han- around Tokyo. While it was used principally during dling equipment on one side, and the smaller part is the dry winter season between November and the indoor transformer and high tensitm switching March, it also .supplemented hydro power at other station. Its yeai'ly output averaged in excess of 100 times of the year. Its output for 1941, which is the million KWH annually during the first 8 years of the only record available as the othei-s had been lost due wai-. It was 29th in size in Japan, and a \ery impor- to air raids, is as follows: tant standby plant for supply of power to the Im- perial .Japanese Govermnent Railways especiall>' .Months during the dry season when hydro powei' was down,

2. This plant was never a primary target but was damaged in 3 raids on adjacent targets by the Twentieth AF. On 12/13 July 1945, 452 tons were dropped in the entire raid, and 4 bombs fell \\'ithin the plant area. On 25/26 July 1945, 650 tons were di()j)ped in the entire raid, and 57 l)ombs fell within the plant area. On 1/2 August 1945, 1017 tons were dropped in the entire raid, and 32 bombs fell within tile plant area.

3. The principal physical damage was the complete destruction of coal handling equipment and collapse of the circulating water intake tunnel which put the plant completely out of commis.sion. In addition, damage was done to the steam end of No. 3 tuil'ogenei'ator unit, to generator cables and control bay. Although the plant was not in operation at the time of the damage, the loss of pi'oduction is equivalent to at least 50 percent of one year's normal production or 57 million KWH. No attempt at recuperation has been made. The vulnerability of steam power

])lants is fully shown since the destruction of a portion i-endered the entire plant inoperative for a long period of time.

4. The size, importance, and location liad been coi-rectly evaluated in intelligence data, but damage iiad not l)een correctly stated in damage assessment icpoi'ts.

5. Of significance at this plant is the apparent ease with which a steam power plant can be rendered inoperative by a small tonnage pei' acre. : —

boilers and turbogenerator units and main electrical one hit the bviilding. The second damage occurred on control and auxiliarj' equipment in a 3-floor section, 25/26 July 1945 during a night attack on Hayama and the smaller section, also 3 floors, contains the Petroleum Refinery and Mitsubishi Oil Refinery, main step-up transformers, house transformers, and Mission No. 291 of the Twentieth AF. Seventy-Fifth (U)-K^' switch gear. The two parts are connected by A/C of the 315th Wing dropped 6.50 tons of 500-11. a narrow multifloor office building. The space between GP bombs fused 1/10 second nose, and 1/40 second

the parts is occupi(>d liy water tanks and transformer tail, from a height approximateh' 17,000 feet with repair building with track for transfer of trans- weather from 0/10 to 10/10. In this raid 57 lioml)s formers. There are 8 steel stacks, but they are fell in the plant area of which 9 hit or hit near build- not tall or particularly \asible. (Exhiliit B, photo ings close enough to cause damage, 32 hit the coal

No 1) The plant area is adjacent to a 600 ft canal, yard and coal handling equipment, and 3 hit th(> and between the main buildings and this canal is a intake tunnel. The third damage was on 1/2 August large coal storage and handling yard which is readily 1945 during a night attack on the Kawasaki Petro- identifiable. leum Center, the Hayama Petroleum Refinery, and The boiler room contains eight 88,000-lb/hr rating the Mitsubishi Oil Refinery, Mission No. 310 of the boilers on the basis of 1 1 ,340 Btu coal. Four are B&W Twentieth AF. One-Hundred and Twentieth A/C Stirling type with pulverized fuel-burning equip- of the 315th Wing dropped 1017 tons of 500-lb GP ment, and 4 are Mitsubishi Stirhng type with stokers. bombs fused 1/10 second nose, and 1/40 second tail, The generator room contains 2 Mitsubishi 25,000- from a height of approximately 17,500 ft ^^'ith 8/10 KW turbogenerator units, one BTH 20,000-KW 10/10 weather. In this raid 32 bombs fell in the plant turbogenerator and a 1 ,500-KW house unit totalling area of which 20 hit or hit near buildings close enough 71,500 KW in name plate capacity. The generators to cause damage and 1 hit near the intake tiuinel. are connected directly to their own bank of single- Effects of Bombing. phase, step-up transformers with all switching done 1. Physical damage. on the high voltage side. a. (1) The damage on 12/13 July 1945 was as b. The plant normally used coal of approximatelj^ follows 1 1 ,340 Btu that was received by ship from Kyushu One bomb hit damaged skip hoist control panel. and Hokkaido, but during the war period it was nec- One bomb hit in the coal yard doing little damage. essary to obtain coal from Taira, 100 km N. of The damage on 25/26 July 1945 was as follows: Tokyo. This coal had only approximately 7,200 Btu (2) Thirty-two bombs hit on coal handling equipment thus reducing the capacity of the plant to two-thirds causing hea\y damage. (Exhibit B, photos No 2 and of normal. 3) 3. The plant is owned and operated by the Im- Three cUrect bomb hits on boiler room as follows: perial Government Railways, and information was Boiler No 6 hit wall opposite doingno damage to olitained from Mr. K. Kamatsu, Chief Engineer. — boiler. 4. The plant normally uses 290 employees but Boiler No 3 direct hit on indiiced fan completely recently has been down to 200 operating on the basis — destroying it. of two shifts. Although operation of the plant is Boiler No 7 direct hit on steam header causing normally seasonal, the employees are used continu- — medium damage. ously during nonoperating periods which are devoted Three bomb hits on the skip hoist caused severe to maintenance. damage (Exhibit B, photo No 4). Attacks. Two bomb hits on the turbogenerator bay. The plant was never a primary target; however, it One bomb hit building causing medium damage. was damaged during three raids directed against One bomb hit turbine floor near the high pressure adjacent targets. The first damage was on 12/13 July end of unit No 3 cutting and destroying a heav^' floor 1945 during a night attack on Kawasaki Petroleum girder, damaging a stop valve, instruments, and Center, Mission 267 of the Twentieth AF, when 53 causing severe fragmentation damage to unit No 3 A/C of the 31oth Wing dropped 452 tons of 500-lb and damaged the exciter of unit No 2. (Exhibit B, (!P bombs fused 1/10 second nose, and 1/40 second photo No 5) tail, from a height of approximately 16,000 ft with Three bomb hits on circulating, water, intake 8/10—10/10 weather. In this I'aid 4 bombs fell tunnel causing collapse. within the plant area;. one fell in the coal yard, and ( )ne bomb hit in an open space between the turbo- 58 : : :

generator bay and the transformer bay back of the the numlw'r of passengers. However, it is reasonable office section damaging cable connection between to assume that the loss of production would have generatoi- No 3 and the c()rr<>sponding transformer been at least one season's normal production of }/2 of bank as well as damaging the transformer transfer that produced in 1941 or about 57,000,000 KWH. track. (Exhibit B, photo No 6). 6. No substitution or modification was possible.

(3) The damage on 1/2 August 1945 was as follows: c. Cause of loss One bomb hit the coal storage. (1) The entire plant was rendered completely Two bomb hits near the skip hoist. (Exhibit A and inoperative due to 2 main items of damage, namely, Exhibit B, photo No 4) destruction of coal handling eciuipment and destruc- Five bomb hits on the boiler room as follows: tion of the circulating water, intake tunnel, plus Boiler No 3—damaged roof but boiler not damaged. other damage. Boiler No 8—detonated near roof damaging coal (2) No production was lost through diversion of bunker. labor, material, and machine facilities. The other 5 bomb hits did minor damage to coal (3) No loss of production was caused through pro- bunkers and light structiu'es. tective measures. Two bomb hits on control bay (4) No loss of production was caused by absen- One destroyed voltage regulator and auxiliary teeism or unusual inefficiency. control panel for unit No 3. (5) A loss of production was caused throughout One damaged building only. the war because of the poor grade of coal used and Seven bomb hits on the transformer and high ten- because of the lack of transportation for better coal. sion ba.y. 3. Recuperability cycle. Six liombs detonated in the upper floors causing a. No lepairs had lieen made or even started, not medium damage to the liuilding and bus connections even repairing the building to protect indoor equip- and instrument transformers. ment from weather. Based on abihty to secure re- One bomb hit the outside wall causing httle quired materials and sldlled labor, it is estimated damage. that complete repairs could have been made and the One bomb hit the transformer repair shop damag- plant put back in operation as follows ing the wall but nothing- else. (1) From damage of 13/14 July 1945 repairs The warehouse area was severely bombed as shown would require 1 week. on l)omb plot (Exliibit A) resulting in destruction of (2) From damage of 25/26 July 1945 repairs many builcUngs containing spares and operating would recjuire 3 months. supphes. Twentj^-two persons were killed in a bomb (3) From damage of 1/2 August 1945 repairs shelter which received a direct bomb hit. would require 6 months. Balance of the bombs did minor damage through- b. No production had been reattained at the time out the area. The 2 bomb shelters were the only proof inspection. tective measures taken. c. No portion of the plant could have been utilized because of the destruction of portions essential to b. Bomlj plot (Exhibit A) furnished by plant personnel. the entire plant. 4. Vulnerability. 2. Production loss. The \ailnerabiHty of all stepm power plants is fully a. This plant produced 114,052,450 in 1941 KWH covered in the final I'eport which is particularly which increased for 1942, then began declining and applical:)le to this plant. reached a maximum drop of 30 percent. This variation was due in part to seasonal demands dependent Intelligence Check. on the supply of hydro power and in part to the 1. a. OSS report in general correctly identified ciuality of coal obtained, especially during the latter and evaluated this plant. part of the war. The plant was not operating at the b. The Air Olijective Folder 90.17 for Tokyo Area time of the various bomb damage dates as this power issued by the Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, was not needed at that time since hydro power was Intelligence, listed this plant as Target HI, correctly available. Also power demands were down because located it on maps, evaluated its importance and of the loss of load which resulted from the fact that gave a correct plot plan and photographic information. a large number of electric cars were lost in area bomb- c. JTG information was correct. Aerial photo- ing and that industrial plant dispersal had reduced graphic cover was excellent and location of buildings 697713—47—5 59 correct. The size of the plant area given was slightly tion in Report No 173 that the total damage was in error and weapon recommendation was not con- severe. curred in. Data Relevant To Other Studies. 2. Records of the raids in which this plant was The shortage of coal and necessity of using poor damaged are covered in raid report 267, 291, and 310 grade coal was due to transportation difficulties, on targets 116 127, and 128. especially the curtailment of ship transportation of a. Damage Assessment Eeport No. 1.57, covering coal. raid on 12/1.3 .July 194.5 does not list any damage to this plant. Evaluations and Impressions.

b. Damage Assessment Report No. 173, covering This plant is a typical example of general steam raid of 25/26 July 1945 and 1/2 August 1945 lists plant operation which is not up to standards of the total damage severe. similar plant operations in the U.S. No effort had c. Damage Assessment Report No 184, co\-ering laeen made at the time of inspection to clean up dam- raid on 1/2 August 1945 does not list any damage to age or even rejjair liomb holes in the roof or replace this plant, although aerial photographs if taken broken \\indows. The skiji hoist design and concen- would have shown additional strikes. tration at one point made it very vulnerable, and the 3. No mention was made in any damage assess- plant was put out of commission by damaging this ments of recuperation or dispersal other than to men- alone.

60 MITSUI BUSSAN SHIP CHANNEL

COOLING WATER INTAKE

LEGEND QUAY I MITSUBISHI PIER WALL 2 ABOUT 3 CU. YD. CAVED IN 3 ABOUT 4 CU YD CAVED IN 4 TRACKS DESTROYED 5 TRACKS DESTROYED 6 TRACK BENT OVER a LIFTED 7 TANK FOR STORING TURBINE LUBRICATING OIL DESTROYED -J 8 TRACKS DESTROYED 9 DIRECT HIT DESTROYED COAL UNLOAOER 10 TRACKS PARTIALLY DESTROYED 11 TRACKS DESTROYED FROM THIS POINT TO FRONT OF MILL ROOM 12 DIRECT HIT DESTROYED COAL UNLOADER 13 COMPLETELY DESTROYED 14 TRACKS OESTOYED FROM HERE TO QUAY WALL

BOMB STRIKES * 12 JULY 1945 • 25 JULY 1945 APPROX. SCALE IN FEET I AUGUST 1945 100 U S STRATEGIC BOMB SURVEY

KAWASAKI POWER PL/ NT EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT B

I: H!i im "fffi^WfiiBat h Photo 3 —View of damage to traveling gantry crane in coal vard

Photo 4—View showing damagod skiphoist and coal conveyor

62 Photo 5 — View showing bomb hit to left of turbine end of unit No. 3

Photo 6—View showing bomb hit in space between turbogenerator bay and transformer

i house

63 :

PLANT REPORT NUMBER 10 SENJU STEAM POWER PLANT TOKYO, JAPAN DATE INSPECTED 18 OCTOBER 1945

Summary.

1. The Senjii Steam Power Plant, located on the left bank of the Ara River in the northern edge of Tokyo, has a name plate capacity of 77,500 KW. The main plant is located in a single, large, concrete building wth adjacent coal storage and handling ecinipment. There are 4 steel stacks approximately 275 ft in height that made the plant easily identifiable. Its yearly output averaged 71 million KWH during the 3 war years, and, while not the largest

plant, it was a very important one in the Tokyo area, especially during the dry season when hydro power was insufficient. In addition, the generators were arranged for operation as synchronous condensers for use during the season when hydro power was available. 2. This plant was never a primary target nor was it ever damaged from any cause during the war.

3. No physical damage occurred ; therefore, there was no production loss, nor could any measure of

recuperability lie obtained. However, this plant was as vulnerable as any other steam power plant and particularly so because of its accessibility and ease of identification. 4. The size, importance, and location had been correctly evaluated in intelligence data.

5. The lack of even reasonable maintenance was very apparent and is indicative of the poor operation generally seen throughout all of the Japanese steam power plants.

The Plam and Its Function In Enemy Economy.

1. Product of plant antl importance in enemy economy. The Senju Steam Power Plant ranked loth in size in all Japan and 6th in the Tokyo supply area. It was piimanly used as Viase load during the dry hydro

season; however, load charts show that it operated to a considerable extent throughout the entire year. During the period of aliundant hydro power, the generators were used as synchronous condensers for power factor correction and stabiUzers on the long transmission lines, which was an important factor in the full utilization of transmitted power from hj'dro sources. The plant averaged 71 million KWH per

year during the -3 war years and its output in KWH was as follows liciiig hroujilit up til .spctTl clcrtriciilly hy means of a b. No substitution or modification possible. inotor sot. Westinghousc generator This set has a c. Causes for loss of production. 2r)()0-HP motor, 7oOO-KVA, 3-phasc, l,l(K)()-volt, (1) None from i)hysical damage. GOO-RPM generator, the generator of whirh also (2) None from diversion. serves as a synchronous condenser. The electrical bay from protective contains nine S500-K\'A, single-phase, OIWC trans- (3) None measures.

formei's in ''> hanks of 3 transformers with generators (4) None from absenteeism or inefficiency.

connected iliiect to each hank, (lenerator voltage is (5) Some production was lost because of the poor stepped up to (16 KV for transmittal liy high voltage grade of coal received since their normal ([uality coal lines to the Hanahata substation. could not be obtained Isecause of shipping losses.

is liy ship or b. Coal normally delivered barge 3. Recuperability cycle. direct is to the dock on the Ara River. Unloading ac- Since there was no damage, this was not a factor. complished by a sj'steni of belt conveyors, and there 4. Vulnerability. is a large storage area between the docks and the This plant, as are all steam plants, was vulnerable, plant. Distribution in the .storage area is by traveling and this is fully covered in the final industry report. cranes, and coal is transported to Ininkers above the In particular, this plant was easily identified due to boilers by belt convej^ors. The .source of fuel is either the prominence of its tall stacks. Hokkaido or Kyushu and it has a Btu value of al)out 11, 000. There was never a lack of coal during the war, Intelligence Check. but Cjuality was very pool- and the reserve storage 1. a. OSS report correctly located and described dangerously small. til is plant though the capacity given as well as some 3. The plant is owned by the Japan Electric Gen- of the equipment listed was erroneous. eration and Transmission Co. b. The Air Objective Folder 90.17 for Tokyo area Attacks. issued by the Office of Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, None. listed this plant as Target 230, correctly located it on Effects of Bombing. maps, and e^•aluated its importance fairly well, though

1. Physical damage. it failed to indicate the full use of the plant in its

This plant was never a primary target nor was it function of pro\'iding synchronous condensers.

damaged at any time from bombing or other causes. c. JTG information was similar in extent. There was pi-actically no efTort made to provide any protective installations. Data Relevant To Other Studies. 2. Production loss. Only a very small tiuantity of very poor quality a. The production of this plant averaged approxi- coal was on hand l^ecause of the curtailment of trans- mately 71 million KWH during the 3 war years ; how- portation. ever, production declined during the latter part of the war with none since March 1945. This was due to loss Evaluations and Impressions. of load due to bombing of industry or areas plus some The plant showed umnistakalile signs of neglect in loss because of industry dispersion. Therefore, planned maintenance, and since it had been operated through- production was an undetermined factor and the eco- out the war, this is indicative of the general inability nomic aspect, had this plant been bombed, cannot be or lack of initiative on the part of the Japanese in all accurately determined. their operations.

65 EXHIBIT A

66 PLANT REPORT NUMBER 11 TSURUMI STEAM POWER PLANT KAWASAKI (NEAR TOKYO) JAPAN

DATE INSPECTED 18 OCTOBER 1945

Summary. mented hydro power at other times of the year. Com-

1. The Tsurumi Steam Power Plant, located on plete production figures foi- the war years are given Tokyo Bay near Kawasaki, has 178,500 KW in name in Exhibit B. Totals for these years were as follows: plate generating capacity. It is in 2 large, concrete KWH l)uildings with coal storage and handling equipment 1942 209,102,520 on one side and an outdoor transformer and switch- 1943 146,268,840 ing station on the other. Its yeai-ly output averaged 1944 119,181,040 approximately 158 million KWH annually during the *1945 47,392,560 in size first in 3 war years. It was the third in Japan, •First 3 months only—no production since March 1945. the Tokyo area, and an important plant in the highl}' The product was supplied to the transmission net- industrialized area of Tokyo, especially during the work for general distribution with the major portion drj^ winter season when hydro power was scarce. being utilized in the Tokyo area, both for base and 2. This plant was never a primary target, but was peak loads, with base loads being of particular im- damaged in three raids on adjacent targets, by the portance during the dry season. Twentieth AF. On 12/13 July 1945, 452 tons were 2. a. The plant is located on Tokyo Bay. It was dropped in the entire raid, and 23 bombs fell within built on reclaimed land about 4 miles southwest of the effective area of this plant. On 25/26 July 1945, the mouth of the Tama River. The plant area is an 650 tons were dropped in the entire raid, and 22 irregular rectangle approximately 970 ft by 1070 ft bombs fell within the effective area of this plant. On with a total acreage of approximately 24 acres. 1/2 August 1945, 1017 tons were dropped in the en- (Exhibit A) It is in 2 parts, the older part being in a tire raid, and 12 bombs fell within this plant area. reinforced concrete building approximately 160 ft by 3. The principal physical damage was the com- 200 ft, and the new part in an adjoining, concrete plete destruction of the control room, almost com- building approximately 210 by 240 ft. (Exhibit C, plete destruction of the main transformer bank, and photo No 1) Each building contains a complete sufficient destruction of the coal handling ecjuipment plant, including a generator hall and boiler house sec- to render it useless. The plant was not in operation at tion, but there is a common electrical control room the time of the damage, but at least one year's pro- located in the new building and an adjacent, outdoor, duction loss was caused. No attempt at recuperation common, switch, and transformer station. There is a has been made. The vulnerability of power plants is total of 6 stacks, but they are not tall or particularly fully shown since the destruction of a poition rendered visible. The plant area is adjacent to a 600-ft canal, the entire plant inoperative. and between the main buildings and this canal is a 4. The size, importance, and location had been large coal storage and handling yard which is readily correctly evaluated in intelligence data, but damage identifiable. Also in the same immediate vicinity are had not been correctly stated in damage assessment a large flour mill and an oil tank farm, and directly reports. across the canal is the Kawasald Power Plant. The 5. Significant at this plant is the apparent ease entire area is highly industrialized. The older part with which a steam power plant can be rendered was completed in 1926. The boiler room contains inoperative by a small tonnage of bombs per acre. 6 B&W, water tube type boilers, 4 of which are The Plant and Its Function In 70-T/hr, and 2 are 90-T/hr. The generator room has Enemy Economy. 2 GE Curtis, impulse-type, horizontal shaft turbines,

1. The Tsurumi plant was one of the most impor- each with a GE 35,000-KW generator. In addition, tant steam plants in Japan, ranking third in size in there is a 2500-KW, GE, house generator operated

all Japan and first in size in the Tokyo supply area. by a separate turbine. The new part was completed

While it was used principally during the dry winter in 1935. The boiler room contains 4 CTM boilers each

season from November through March, it also supple- 1 70-T/hr. The generator hall contains 1 Mitsubishi 67 — :

and 1 AEG, tandem, eonipiumd, impulse-type, hori- a. (1) The damage on 12/13 July 1945 was as zontal shaft turbine, each with a 50,000-KW genera- follows:

tor of the same make, and on the same shaft of each is One bomb hit directly on a- 15,000-KVA, 11/66- a 3.000-K"\V house generator. The total name plate KV, single-phase transformer, completely destroying

capacity of the plant is 170,000 KSV in main genera- the transformer and setting fire to the oil wiiich tors and 8,500 K\\ in house generators. destroyed 2 adjacent transformers. Much miscel-

b. The plant normally used coal of approximately laneous damage was done to adjacent transformers, 6400 cal/kg (11520 Btu) that was shipped by barge bussing, and cables. (Exhibit C, photos 4 and o) or rail from NE Japan. The quahty of the coal became One bomb hit a water filter doing minor damage. progressively poorer, and the maximum output pos- Sixteen bombs hit coal conveyors and coal storage, sible was less than 100,000 KW. There were no power seriously damaging and rendering the coal conveyor shutdowns due to lack of fuel. completely inoperative. (Exhibit C, photos 2 and 3) Three bombs hit the cooling water intake tunnel, 3. The plant is owned by the Japan Electric Gen- eration and Transmission Company. Information causing serious damage. One warehouse. was ol:>tained from Mr. Kadata, ch engr for the plant. bomb badly damaged a wooden One bomb did minor damage to a wooden building. 4. The plant normally uses approximately 300 (2) The damage on 25/26 July 1945 was as follows: employees but recently the total has been reduced to Two bombs completely wTecked the coal drier. between 150 and 160. They operate 2 shifts. Opera- (Exhibit C, photos 6 and 7) tion of the plant is normally seasonal, but nonoper- One bomb hit the corner of a new generator hall, ating periods are devoted to maintenance. exploded in a section used as a warehouse and set fire Attacks. to inflammable contents. The fire completely de-

There were no specific attacks on this plant ; how- stroyed the control room. (Exliibit C, plioto 8)

ever, it was damaged during 3 raids directed against One bomb hit on the new generator hall, damaging adjacent targets. The first damage was on 12/13 July the crane rail and doing minor fragmentation damage 1945 during a night attack on the Kawasaki Petro- to a 50,000-K^^' generator and instruments. (Exhibit leum Center, mission No. 267 of the Twentieth AF. C, photo 9) Fifty-three A/C of the 315th Wing dropped 452 tons Three near misses on the generator hall damaged of 500-lb GP bombs, fused 1/10 sec nose and 1/40 the condense!- water lines. sec tail, from a height of approximately 16,000 feet One liomli hit in the center of the switch yard com-

\\-ith 8/10—10/10 weather. In this raid, 23 bombs fell pletely destroying a 22-KY, 600A, oil, circuit l)reaker within this plant area, but none hit the buildings. and doing much damage to the station structure, The second damage occurred on 25/26 July 1945 insulators, busses, etc. (Exliibit C, photo 10) during a night attack on the Petroleum Center and One bomb hit on the ash handling equipment doing Mitsubishi Oil Refinery at Kawasaki, Mission No. serious damage. 291 of the Twentieth AF. Seventy-five A/C of the Two bombs did further damage to the coal con- 315th Wing dropped 650 tons of 500-lb GP bombs veyor. fused 1/10 sec nose and 1/40 sec tail, from a height of One bomb damaged a section of the cooling water approximately 17,000 ft with weather from 0/10 intake hue. 10/10. In this raid, 22 bombs fell within this plant The balance of the bombs did minor damage area of which 2 fell buildings. third on the The dam- throughout the area. age was on i/2 August 1945 during a night attack on (3) The damage on 1/2 August 1945 was as the Kawasaki Petroleum Center at Hayama and follows Mitsubishi Oil Refinery, ^fission No 310 of the One bomb hit on the edge of a new boiler house, Twentieth AF. One hundred and Twentieth A/C of penetrating through the roof and detonating close to the 315th Wing dropped 1017 tons of 500-lb GP the ceiling near a boiler, seriously damaging the bombs fused 1/10 sec nose and 1/40 sec tail, from a economizer. (Exhibit C, photo 13) height of approximately 17,500 ft with 8/10—10/10 Two hits on the oil drums near a corner of the new weather. In this raid, 12 liombs fell within this plant house demolished the drums. (Exhibit C, photo 12) area of which 1 fell on buildings. One hit the blow-off tank near a corner of the new Eflfects of Bombing. boiler, demolishing the tank completely. (Exhibit C, 1. Physical damage. photo 11) 68 :

Two hits lack of transportation for the better coal. been taken. The main buildings had Ijeen painted 3. Recuperal)ility cycle. with an irregular pattern of black and white paint as a. No repairs had been made or were started. Based

camouflage. (Exhibit C, photos 1 and 7) The genera- on the ability to secure required materials and skilled tors and turbines had been enclost'd in a ring of dirt- labor, it is estimated that complete repairs could have filled straw bags. (Exhibit C, photo 14) Across the been made and the plant put back in operation as center of each generator hall had been placed a pro- follows

tective wall, about 8 ft high by 35 ft long, built of (1) From damage of 13/14 July 1945, repairs 2 sides of steel plates on angle iron frames placed would require approximately 6 months. about 12 in apart with the center filled with sand. (2) From damage of 25/26 July 1945, repairs (Exhibit C, photo 9) Concrete vaults for protection would require approximately 12 months. of workmen had been placed at various points (3) From damage of 1/2 August 1945, repairs throughout the plant. (Exhibit C, photo 8) Concrete, would require 6 months. blast, protective walls were built around the large b. No production had been reattained at time of transformers in the open air transformer and switch- inspection.

ing station. (Exhibit C, photos 4 and 5) c. No portion of the plant could have been utilized because of the destruction of portions essential to the 5. From information supplied by local officials and by personal inspection, a bomb plot has been pre- entire plant. pared. (Exhibit B). 4. Vulnerability. The vulnerability of all steam power plants is fully 2. Production loss. covered in the final report which is apphcable to this a. This plant produced approximately 209 million plant. KWH in 1942 which had decHned to 146 million in 1943, to 119 million in 1944, and went down to 47 Intelligence Check.

million in 1945. This variation was due in part to 1. a. OSS report in general correctly identified seasonal demands dependent on the supply of hydro and evaluated this plant.

power, and in part to the poor quality and limited b. The Air Objective Folder No 90.17 for Tokyo quantity of coal available, especially during the latter Area, issued by the Office of Assistant Chief of Air part of the war. The plant was not operating at the Staff, Intelhgence, listed this plant as Target 110,

time of the various bomb damage dates as this power correctly located it on maps, evaluated its impor- was not needed, since hydro was available, and power tance, and gave a reasonably correct plot plan; how- demands were down because of the loss of industrial ever, photographic information was obsolete.

load due to bombing and/or industrial plant dispersal. c. JTG information was essentially correct. Aerial No assessment can therefore Ije made as to the loss of photographic cover was excellent and location of

production caused by the bombing of this plant. buildings correct in all except one minor point. Size However, it is reasonable to assume that the loss of of the plant area given was slightly in error, and production because of bomb damage would have been weapon recommendation was not concurred in. at least one season's normal production of possibly 2. Records of the raids in which this plant was 158 million KWH, had conditions required the power. damaged are covered in reports on raids 267, 291, 6. No substitution or modification was possible. and 310, on Targets 116, 127, and 128. c. Causes for loss: a. Damage Assessment Report No 157, covering

(1) The complete plant was rendered inoperative the raid of 12/13 July 1945 does not list an}' damage because of the destruction of the coal handling equip- to this plant, although aerial photographs clearly ment and the control board, and partly inoperative show a number of strikes and damage.

by destruction of the main transformer banks. b. Damage Assessment Report No 173, covering

(2) No production was lost through diversion of raids of 25/26 July 1945 and 1/2 August does not list labor, material, or machine facilities. any damage, although aerial photographs clearly

(3) No loss of production was caused by protective show a number of strikes and damage.

measures. c. Damage Assessment Report No 184, covering 69 raid of 1/2 August 1945 lists additional assessment of the bomb damage had been made. The use of a single damage and includes this power plant ^^ith only control room for both sections of the plant proved minor damage, although damage was severe. unwise as its destruction rendered the entire plant 3. No mention was made in any damage assess- inoperative. ments of recuperation or dispersal other than to men- Exhibit B tion in Report No 184 that the plant was inoperative, Tsurumi Power which was correct.

Data Relevant To Other Studies. The shortage of coal and the necessity of using poor grade coal was due to transportation difficulties, especially the curtailment of barge transportation.

Evaluations and Impressions.

This plant is a typical example of generally poor Japanese steam generating plant operations. The general appearance of the plant indicates that the maintenance was bad. No effort to clean up any of ® DaDoaa ® ® ® DDDDDDDaa DDOa no

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LEGEND

• RAID NO I

Jmj RAJO m 3 BPPROx S"tti.e If* FEET J. i SrSATiLiC 6i!*B 3.JRVET rai< dai mil a mei tioi whi Da 1 poo espi

Eva 1 Jap gem mai EXHIBIT C

Photo 1 —General view iif ea.sC sitle oi plaid I'rcjm across canal

Photo 2—Damaged coal conveyors—Raid number 1 71 —

Photo 3—Damaged coal conveyors and crane

Photo 4—Main transformer hank showing transformer ruined by direct hit and adjoining ones ruined by oil fire

Raid number 1 72 Photo 5 —Rear view main transformer bank—note protective wall—Raid number 1

Photo 6—Damaged coal diiers blown completely off foundation—Raid number 2 73 Photo 7— Dnninf;'"il ''"nl driers anil Rfncral debris— Note camouflage paint on building— Raid number 2

Photo 8—Burned out control room— Note bomb shelter for operators—Raid number 2 74 Photo 9—Damaged turbine control instrument board in generator hall- -Note blast protective barrier wall—Raid number 2

Photo 10 —Destroyed O.C.B. and other damage to switch yard—Raid number 2 6977:3—47—6 75 Photo 1 1 —Damaged blow clown tank—Raid number 3

Photo 12 —Damagi-d oil cjiiUuir-i IjIowi] ri>uiijlutel.v out of ground liaid iiumljor 3 76 Photo 13—Damaged economizer by dii-ect hit on boiler house—Raid number 3

Photo 14—Method of blast protection around turbogenerators 77 PLANT REPORT NUMBER 12 USHIODA STEAM POWER PLANT KAWASAKI (NEAR TOKYO) JAPAN

DATE INSPECTED 18 OCTOBER 1945

Summary. pally used during the dry winter season from

1. Ushioda Steam Power Plant, located on the November through March, it also supplemented Kawasaki water front in Tokyo Bay, has 77,000 K\V hydro power at other times of the year. Complete in name plate generating capacity. It is in a large, production figures for the war years are given in steel, reinforced concrete building with an indoor Exhibit B. Totals for these years are as follows: transformer and s\\itching station and an outdoor KWH coal storage and handling equipment. Its yeai'ly out- 1942 108,203,800 put averaged approximately 91 million KWH during 1943 100,366,800 the 3 war years. It was an important steam station in 1944 64,407,600 the highly industrialized Tokyo area and, while its *1945 22,618,000 output was mainly during the dry season when hydro 'The plant has been out of operation since March 1945. is was insufficient, it operated to some extent through- The entire power output of this plant fed to a out the entire year. common transmission system with the majority of 2. This plant was never a primary target but was power utilized in the Tokyo and Yokohama area, damaged in 3 raids on adjacent targets by the Twen- both for base and peak loads wdth base loads of par- tieth AF. On 12/13 July 1945, 452 tons were dropped ticular importance during the dry season. in the entire raid, and 28 bombs fell within the effec- 2. a. The plant is located on the Kawasaki water tive area of this plant. On 25/26 July 1945, 650 tons front in Tokyo Bay, built on reclaimed land about were dropped in the entire raid, and 14 bombs fell 4 miles southwest of the mouth of the Tama River. within the effective area of this plant. On 1/2 August The plant area is a rectangular compound approxi- 1945, 1,017 tons were dropped in the entire raid, and mately 720 ft by 753 ft with a total acreage of ap-

26 bombs fell within this plant area. proximately 12.8 acres. The plot plan of the area is in is 3. The principal physical damage was the destruc- shown Exhibit A. The main plant in a 5-story tion of the buss bar feeders, demolishing of poi'tions liuilding al)out 190 ft sq, of steel and concrete con- of the inlet and outlet canal of the circulating water struction, vnih a concrete roof, and sidewalls of system, destruction of the coal handling and dr>-ing corrugated sheets made of asbestos and cement com- eciuipment, and damage to one turbogenerator. The position. It has 2 stacks about 110 ft high made of plant was not in operation at the time of the damage, heavy sheet iron. The building and stacks are camou- but at least 9 months' production loss was caused, flaged with white and black paint. Approximately which at the average rate of production would amount ]/2 of the entire plant area is used for coal storage and to appro.ximately 67 million KWH. No attempt at handling equipment. recuperation has been made. The vulnerability of The plant was completed in 1931 and has a total plate boiler steam power plants is shown by the fact that the name capacity of 77,000 KW. The room destruction of a portion rendered the entire plant has 3 B&W' water tulje boilers carr\ang'a steam pres- inoperative. sure of 375 lbs psi. There is room for the installation of l)oiler. boilers capacity of 130- 4. The .size, importance, and location had been a 4th The have a correctly evaluated in inteUigence data, but no dam- T/hr and were designed for use of 12,000 Btu coal. ages had been reported in damage assessment reports. There are 2 Rateau, multi-stage, impulse, tandem,

5. Significant in this plant are the apparent ease compound turbines and 2 35,000-KW Metropolitan with Mhich steam power plants can be rendered inop- Vickers generators. In addition, there is a separate erative, and the small tonnage per acre required to do it. 7,000-KW house turbogenerator. The s^vitching and transformer station is the indoor type and is located The Plant and Its Function In as an integral part of the main Iniilding. It contains Enemy Economy. two 3-phase, 43,750-KVA, oil-immersed, air-cooled,

1. The Ushioda plant is the third largest steam 11/66-KV transformers. The entire plant is in a run plant in the Tokyo supply area. While it is princi- down condition, especially the boiler house. 78 —

b. The plant normally used coal from Manchuria hit. The main warehouse was coniplctely destroyed transported by ship. During the war, water ship- by a direct hit. Ten men who sought shelter in a ditch ments were unobtainal)le. Some Kyushu coal was ob- were killed. Two near hits made the bridge crane for tained by rail but for the most part coal from Honshu coal distribution useless by damaging the I'ailway of was used. This coal was of poor quality and, there- the main track. obtainal)le fore, the maximum output was only (2) Damage on 25/26 July 1945 was as follows: 42,000 KW. The plant was never out of fuel as it was The circulating, water, inlet, canal tiumel was given 1st priority on coal supply. demolished by 3 direct hits. The blast effect of one of 3. The plant is owned by the Japan Electric these hits heavily damaged the coal drj^er equipment Generation and Transmission Co. Information was by puncturing the diyer drum and dislocating the obtained from Mr. S. Nakamura, asst chief operator main anchor that supported the dr.yer drum, due to of the station and Mr. Murota, head of the Electrical the collapse of the tunnel itself (Exhibit B, photo 11). Engineering Department of the Tokyo Branch of the The inclined belt conveyor of the coal handling equip- Electric CJeneration Japan and Transmission Co. ment was rendered useless by one direct liit, and (jne 4. The plant normally uses a total of 150 employ- near miss damaged the long coal conveyor located on ees operating in 2 shifts. This has been reduced to the canal side. 50 at present. (3) The damage on 1/2 August 1945 was as follows: Attacks. Nineteen bombs were very effective. The most There were no specific attacks on this plant; how- serious damage was done by a direct hit on the station ever, it was severely damaged during 3 raids directed building, cutting the main control cables and doing against adjacent targets. heavj^ damage to the 66, 11, and 3.3-KV busses

The first damage was on 12/13 July 1945 during a (Exhibit B, photos 1 and 2). The blast caused no fire, night attack on Kawasaki Petroleum Center, mission but the fragmentation did considerable damage to No. 267 of the Twentieth AF. Fifty-Third A/C of the the interior of the plant, particularly in the turbine 315th Wing dropped 452 tons of 500-lb GP bombs, and generator hall (Exhibit B, photo 6). One turbine fused 1/10 sec nose and 1/40 sec tail, from a height of was considerably damaged, and there was a hole in approximately 16,000 ft with 8/10—10/10 weather. the generator housing (Exhibit B, photos 3, 4, and 5). In this raid 28 bombs fell within this plant area, none The main cable of the 100-ton crane was damaged of which hit any main buildings. and the crane rendered useless (Exhibit B, photo 8). The second damage occurred on 25/26 July 1945 The control board of the auxiliary equipment on the during a night attack on the Petroleum Center and generator floor was damaged. External damage was Mitsubishi Oil Refinery at Kawasaki, mission No done by 3 near hits at the west corner of the building 291 of the Twentieth AF. Seventy-Fifth A/C of the (Exhibit B, photo 10). Nine double houses of plant 31.5th Wing dropped 650 tons of 500-lb GP bombs, employees were destroyed by 5 hits. The rail of the fused 1/10 sec nose and 1/40 sec tail, from a height of already damaged bridge crane was further damaged approximately 17,000 ft with weather from 0/10 by 2 more hits. A small warehouse was destroyed. 10/10. In this raid 14 bombs fell within the plant One 2-circuit, transmission tower and one 4-circuit area, none of which hit any main buildings. tower were demolished. One direct hit demolished The third damage was on 1/2 August 1945 during the ash handling equipment. a night attack on the Kawasaki Petroleum Center at Only a minor amount of protective measures had Hayama and Mitsubishi Oil Refinery, mission No been taken. Barriers of fabricated steel, made of angle 310 of the Twentieth AF. One-Hundred and Twen- iron placed approximately 4 in apart and filled with tieth A/C of the 315th Wing dropped 1,017 tons of timbers, were placed Isetween the machines. This wall 500-lb GP bombs, fused 1/10 sec nose and 1/40 sec proved very effective as there was no apparent dam- tail, from a height of approximately 17,500 ft with age to one turbogenerator which was located well

8/10—10/10 weather. In this raid 26 bombs fell -vvitliin the radius of the blast effect.

\\ithin the plant area, and 2 hit the main building. b. From information supplied by local officials and been pre- Effects of Bombing. by personal inspection, a bomb plot has pared. (Exhibit A) 1. Physical damage.

a. (1) Damage on 12/13 July 1945 was as follows: 2. Production loss. Three bombs were very effective. The circulating, a. Since the plant was not in operation at the time water, discharge tunnel was demolished by a direct the damage occurred, there was no actual production 79 :

loss. However, based on an estimate of at least 9 The vulnerability of all steam power plants is fully months to repair damage and place in operating con- covered in the final report which is applicable to this dition, about 67 million KWH were lost of an average plant. year's production. Intelligence Check. b. Xo substitution or modification was possible. 1. a. OSS report in general coi'rectly identified c. Causes for loss and evaluated this plant. (1) The complete plant was rendered inoperative, b. The Air Objective Folder No 90.17 for the especially due to the destruction of the coal handling Tokyo Area, issued by the Office of Assistant Chief equipment, damage to the control cable and bus bars, of Air Staff, Intelligence, listed this plant as Target damage to one turbogenerator, and damage to the No. 493, correctly located it on maps, evaluated its control board of the auxiliary equipment the on importance, and gave a reasonablj^ correct plot plan. generator floor. c. JTG information was essentially correct as to production was lost through diversion of (2) No the significance, location, description, and layout. labor, material, or macliine facilities. 2. Records of the raids in which this plant was loss of production caused Isy protective (3) No was damaged were covered in reports of raids 267, 291, measures. 310, on Targets 116, 127, and 128 respectively. No loss of production was caused through (4) a. Damage Assessment Report No 157, covering absenteeism or unusual inefficiency. raids of 12/13 July 1945, does not fist any damage to loss of production was caused throughout (5) A this plant, although aerial photographs clearly show the war because of the poor grade of coal used due to a number of strikes and damage. the lack of transportation for better coal. b. Damage Assessment Report No 173, covering 3. Recupeiability cycle. raids of 25/26 July 1945 and 1/2 August 1945, does a. No repairs had been made or even started. not list any damage, although aerial photographs Based on the ability to secure required materials and clearly show a number 'of strikes and damage. skilled labor, it is estimated that complete repairs c. Damage Assessment Report No 184, covering could have been made and the plant put back in raid of 1/2 August 1945, does not list any damage, operation as follows: although aerial photographs clearly show a number From the damage of 12/13 July 1945 repairs (1) of strikes and damage. would recjuire approximately 2 months. 3. No mention was made in any damage assess- From the damage of 25/26 July 1945 repairs (2) ment reports of recuperation or dispersal. would require approximately 3 months. Data Relevant To Other Studies. (3) From damage of 1/2 August 1945 repairs The shortage of coal and the necessity of using would require approximately 9 months. poor grade coal were due to transportation cfifficul- b. No production had been reattained at the time ties, especially the curtailment of barge transporta- of the inspection. tion of coal. c. No portion of the plant could have been utihzed because of the destruction of a portion essential to Evaluation and Impression. the entire plant. No effort is being made to repair or clean up any 4. Vulnerability bomb damages.

80 81 EXHIBIT B

Ushioda Steam Power Plant Production in KWH EXHIBIT C

Photo 1 —Close up view of damaged buss-run

Photo 2—General view showing damage to busses and cables

83 Photo 3 —Damaged number 2 steam turbine

Photo 4 —Close view of damaged number 2 steam turbine 84 Photo 5 —General view of blast effect in switch room and of number 2 steam turbine

Photo 6—Fragmentation effect in interior of generator hall 85 Phijlo 7— Fr.iKmcntaUon effect in interior of generator hall

Photo 8—Damaged crane scale in goncrator hall

86 Photo 9— I):unaKCcl 43,750-KVA .'i-pliase transformer

Photo 10—Damaged exterior of building

87 1

Photo 1 —Damaged coal diyer ami demolished water cooling iiilet tunnel

S8 PLANT REPORT NUMBER 13 SHIMOTAKI HYDRO POWER PLANT KINU RIVER, JAPAN

DATE INSPECTED 21 OCTOBER 1945

Summary. amount of storage built up by a diversion dam.

1. The Shimotaki Hydro Po\vei- Plant is located Therefore, the plant attains maximum output during on the right bank of the Kinu River appi-()ximatel\- the wet .season, but there is sufficient river run and 100 miles north of Tokyo and near the town of Nikko. storage available to provide a certain amount of

It is typical of many similar plants located in this generation throughout the entire year. The following mountainous section, but is the largest in that area. table gives maximum and minimum production, the It has at present 36,800 KW in name plate capacity. months in which they occurred, and percentage of

It is housed in 2 substantial, brick and concrete minimum to maximum. buildings, one of which houses the turbines and the Ex'pres

seasonal, it operated throughout the year, and was The plant generated the following KWH: its minimum monthly generation was 38.7 percent of its maximum month. The energy was delivered to the transmission lines of the Japan Electric Gener- ation and Transmission Company for general distribution, but its particular importance was to supply Tokyo and vicinity. 2. Tliis plant was never a primary target, nor was

it ever damaged by any war action.

3. Thei'e was no physical damage or production loss during the war. The plant had good securitj' from attack because of its obscure location on a shelf of a mountain, but the long, exposed penstocks were especially vulnerable, and damage to them would have been vital to plant operation. In case of damage, recuperation would have been long and difficult. 4. IntelUgence data was accurate.

5. \ATiile the size of this particular plant and the exposed position of its vital penstocks might have

made it a feasible target, the best method of destro>'- ing power supply from sources of this nature would be to attack and eliminate main substations, usually

located elsewhere, where electric energy is collected from a number of hydro plant sources.

The Plant and Its Function In Enemy Economy.

1. Product of plant and importance in enemy economy.

This plant is the largest and most important one of a group of similar plants located in the same area

and is typical of them all in operation and general

characteristics. It is a run-of-river type, with a small each consisting of a liorizontal-type genei'ator driven 2. Production loss. by 2 impulse-type turbines on a common shaft, each I'here was no production loss from any direct tui'bine ^ith a separate governor. The equipment was cause. originally furnished by Escher Wyss in 1913 for 25- 3. Rccuperaljility cj'cle. cycle operation, but was replaced in 1935 by Tokyo Since there was no damage, there is no measure of Shibaura with equipment for 50-cycle. Each unit is recuperability, but, had the plant been damaged, rated 11,500-IvVA at 80 percent power factor, repairs would have been difficult and time-consuming making a total for the plant of 36,800 KW. There because of its inaccessibility. was one additional unit, but it was removed in May 4. Vulnerability. of 1945 because of insufficient water supply. This plant was pro\-ided with good security from

b. The source of power is the Kinu River and the attack because of its obscure location on the shelf of natural gra\'ity drop from the diversion dam to the a mountain. However, it was susceptible to damage plant. Normally there are dry and wet seasons, but as is any hydro plant, and especially the long exposed the rainfall is such that some water is available penstocks which are visible for some distance from throughout the year with the result that the plant the air. An attack concentrated on the aquaduct or had a dry season minimum output equal to 38.7 per penstocks would effectively put the plant out of com- cent of the wet season maximum. mission and could easily cause a flood which would seriously damage the power plant and its equipment. 3. The plant was originally owned by the Kinu River Hydro Electric Company, which built the Intelligence Check. plant. It was taken over and is now owned by the The t)8S reports and other data accurately describe Japan Electric Generation and Transmission Com- the plant, its location, and physical characteristics, pany. Mr. T. Ishiwara is chief operator and supplied liut the equipment shown was somewhat at variance most of the information concerning this plant. with actual fact. 4. The plant has 10 employees. There are 4 men Data Relevant To Other Studies. per shift of 12 hours each, and during the daytime None. shift there are, in addition to the regular operators, Evaluations and Impressions. a chief operator and a female telephone operator. The long penstocks offered a good and effective Attacks. means of serious damage, but, on the other hand, There were no attacks on the plant at any time the obscure location of the plant made it reasonably during the war, nor was it ever a primary target. secure from possible attack. This plant is typical of many Japanese hydro plants and shows that the Effects of Bombing. most effective and successful way of eliminating 1. Physical damage. power supply from these sources would be to attack There was no physical damage from any war and destroy main substations where the supply is action. collected fi-om a number of hydro plants.

90 7

697713—47—

91 EXHIBIT B "1

Photo 1 —Takatoku Dam, Railway bridge, and highway bridge

Photo 2 —Shimotaki Plant sliciwing penstocks on the hill 92 PLANT REPORT NUMBER 14 HIDA RIVER HYDRO POWER PLANTS HIDA RIVER (CENTRAL HONSHU), JAPAN DATE INSPECTED 12 NOVEMBER 1945 Summary.

1. The group of 9 hydro plants, located on the Hida River north of Nagoya, has approximately 200,000 KVV installed generator capacity. The plants are in substantial concrete buildings wnth adjacent outdoor transformer and swatching stations. Al- though concrete diversion dams provide some storage capacity, they are principally run-of-river type plants. Maximum production was attained during the wet season, but there was continuous operation, and the minimum dry season month's production averaged 39.5 percent of the M'et season maximum. Their yearly output averaged slightly over one billion KWH per year during the 3 war years. The energy was utilized principally by the highly industrialized areas of Nagoya and Osaka, which were highly important in the war economy. 2. These plants were never a primary target nor were they ever damaged by any war action.

3. There was no physical damage or production loss during the war. Recuperation would have been slow in case of damage, partly because of their inaccessibility. These plants are not considered very \iilnerable due to their location. However, they are, as are all hydro plants, highly susceptible to damage. 4. Intelligence information was not good.

5. This study shows definitely that an attack on this type of plant would be impractical and that the most feasible method of rendering the average hydro plant incapable of production is to attack and eliminate main substations located elsewhere, which are the collecting points for a number of plants. The Plants and Their Functions In Enemy Economy.

1. This report covers a group of hydro plants forming the hydro power developed on the Hida River. The plants and their generating capacities are given in the table below: Capacities in KW Name plate capacity lew however, it stores approximately 42,000,000 cu ft of 2. Physical description of plant. water. There are three penstocks completely con- in a. The Hida River is one of many rivers located cealed beneath concrete masonry (Exhibit C, photo the mountainous regions of central Honshu hing 8). In the plant, there are 3 Francis-type turbines, approximately between 35°30' to 36°00' latitude and and generators manufactured by Hitachi. Each is 137°10' longitude. It is about 65 miles in length from rated 11,000-KVA at 80 percent P F or 8,800-KW; the source to the location of the last plant. The head, however, a total plant capacity of 30,000 KW has discharge, and relative positions of these plants are been attained, and the plant is so rated in the records. shown in Exliiljit A, and the location of plants, dams, There is one control room and an outdoor trans- tumiels, and so forth, is shown in Exliibit B. All the former and switching station (Exhibit C, photos 7 plants are, in general, of the same type with features and 8). This station is the terminal of a 77-KV line common to all hydro plants. Two plants were in- from a number of other upstream plants and trans- spected, namely the Seto and Kawabe plants. forms to a 154-KV line going to the Iwakura sub- as Seto 1 and No 2; The Seto plant is known No station. Complete engineering data on this plant are entire plant is actually in one building, however, the in the USSBS files. Seto No 1 although the source of water is different. These 2 plants are typical of the other hydro branch of the receives its water from the Masuda plants on the Hida River. Photographs of the Shimo- 2 from the Mase and Ugake Hida River and No hara plant and its storage and diversion dam are part (Seto No 1) branch of the same river. The first shown in Exhibit C, photos 9 and 10. in 1923. It has an effective head of was constructed b. The source of power is the Hida River water- of 1,110 cu ft/sec. Water 335 ft and uses a maximum shed, and except for small storage from dams princi- is diverted by a low concrete dam up- from the river pallj' used as diversion dams, the plants are run-of- canal and thence stream from the plant into an open river type. As such, their principal output was during head gates. No through a tuimel to the penstock the wet season, but the load data show that even in by the dam. appreciable volume of water is stored the dry season the plants were in a position to gener- leading to the plant, There are 4 exposed penstocks ate an average of 39.5 percent of their maximum. The turbines, in which are 4 EW, vei-tical-axis, Francis usable hydro storage was governed by orders issued generator. The each %\'ith a G,750-KW, Westinghouse by the Electric Power Bureau as determined by other second part (Seto No 2) was constructed in 1938. It governmental agencies. No change in power source has an effective head of 525 ft and uses a maximum occurred during the war l^ecause of any war action. the Mase branch, water is of 550 cu ft/sec. From 3. The plants are owned by the Japan Electric diverted to the Ugake branch across which is a con- Generation and Transmission Co. Information was crete dam approximately 250 ft in length and 64 ft obtained from: in height which impounds approximately 7 million Mr. S. Saito —Director and district mgr this dam, water is brought cu ft of water. From of Tokai district, Japan penstock head gates and through a tunnel to the Electric Generation and to the plant (Exhibit C, through 2 exposed penstocks Transmission Co., in vertical-axis, photo 3). There are 2 Mitsubishi, which these plants are a 11,000-KW, Mitsubishi Francis turbines each with located. is a common control room (Exhil)it generator. There Mr. Imura —Chf engr for the district. C, photo 2) for the entire plant and a common out- plant. Mr. R . Koto ^ —Chf engr for the Seto transformer station (Exhibit C, door switching and Mr. H. Okozono—Chf engr for the Kawabe 154-KV line lead- photo 1), which is connected to the plant. to the Kitakata and Sasazu substations. Com- ing 4. The Seto plant normally uses 32 employees, and engineering data on this plant are in the USSBS plete the Kawabe plant uses 18. The total for the entire files. Hida River plants is approximately 300 employees. ob- The Kawabe plant was constructed in 1937. It They work 2 shifts and are used continuously tains its water from the Hida River and has an effec- throughout the year. tive head of 77 ft with a discharge of 5,500 cu ft/sec. Attacks. Water from the river is diverted by a concrete dam River hydro plants was ever sub- (Exhibit C, photo 4) through a diversion canal head None of the Hida there was no damage from any race (Exhibit C, photo 5) to the head gates (Exhibit ject to attack, and of war action. C, photo 6). The dam is primarily a diversion dam; type 94 Effects of Bombing. Intelligence Check. 1. a. OSS reports in genci-al cori'd-tiy idcniificc] 1. Phy.siciil tlumage. and evaluated these plants with llic fnildwing excep- Since there was no damage, no study of lioinbing tions: effects could be made. (1) The Seto Plants were listed as 2 separate 2. Production loss. plants, namely, Seto No 1 and Seto No 2; Theie was no production loss. whereas they are one plant as OSS photo- 3. Recuperability cycle. graph No R"-108 clearly shows. No damage occured, and therefore no recuper- /;. The Air Objective Folder 90.20 for Nagoya Area

; however, since these ability could be determined listed the Seto plant but none of the others. The hydro plants, like most of the hydro plants in information given was correct but meager and the inacces- Japan, are located in very remote and photographs old and ot)solete. Target No. 11G4 had be sible places, the recuperability time would been assigned to this plant. considerably longer than normal. c. None of these plants was listed by JTG. 4. Vulnerability. Data Relevant To Other Studies. Hydro plants are vulnerable from the standpoint None. of their susceptibility to bomb damage. In particular, damage could be inflicted on penstocks or outdoor Evaluations and Impressions. switching and transformer stations that would render These plants are modern and maintenance is good. the plants inoperative for a long period. However, The natural resources of this river are developed in hydro plants are generally located in inaccessible an excellent manner. The Electric Power Bureau places in very mountainous country and would have \\ith the other interested bureaus, such as Agricul- to be bombed from a high level. The small size of the ture and Forestry, had set limitations on the low buildings and the large number of the plants would water point on the storage reservoirs, in order to make effective bombing very difficult. Therefore, the insure a constant water supply for other purposes. vulnerable points for these plants, as well as other During the war, the electric energy requirements hydro groups, are at the substations which collect were such that exceptions were made, and water was and redistribute their generated current. utilized far below this minimum on several occasions.

97 EXHIBIT C

Photo 1 —Sctd Plant—Outdoor switching and transformer station. Note blast protection barriers. Edge of camouflaged plant at left of picture

Photo 2 —Seto Plant—Interior view control board 98 Photo 3 —Seto Plant—Exposed penstocks to No 2 section

Photo 4—Kawabe Plant—Storage and diversion dam on Hida River—Note camouflage 99 Photo 5 —Kawabe Plant—Head race

Photo 6—Kawabe Plant—Diversion canal head gates 100 Photo 7—Kawabe Plant—General view outdoor switching and transformer station

Photo 8—Kawabe Plant—Outdoor switching and transformer station taken from top of penstocli inlet. Note protection barriers around main transformers 101 Photo 9—Shimohara Plant—General view. Buried penstocks are under stone masonry and railroad. Headgates are on extreme left top; tail race on extreme right bottom into Hida River

Photo 10—Shimohara Plant—Storage and diversion dam on Hida River above plant 102 :

PLANT REPORT NUMBER 15 KISO RIVER HYDRO POWER PLANTS KISO RIVER (CENTRAL HONSHU) JAPAN

DATE INSPECTED 2-3 NOVEMBER 1945

Summary. Name of plant 1. The group of 13 hydro plants, located on the Kiso River north of Nagoya, has 307,700 KW name plate generator capacity, or 324,700 KW government rated capacity. In addition, there is 18,000-KW plant under construction. The plants are in substantial concrete buildings with adjacent outdoor transformer and switching stations. Concrete dams are used for both diversion and storage, and there are approximately 106 million KWH of storage capacity. Maximum output is during the wet season, but their average output during the dry season is 40 percent of capacity. Their yearly output averaged 1,300 million KWH during the 3 war years. The energy was utilized by the highly industrialized areas of Nagoya and Osaka which were very important in the war economy. However, 5 of the plants were double frequency, so their energy could be supplied to either the 50- or 60- cycle area.

2. These plants were never a primary target nor were they ever damaged by any war action.

3. There was no physical damage or production loss during the war. Recuperation would have l^een slow in case of damage, partly because of inaccessibility. These plants are not considered very vulnerable, because of their location; however, they are,

like all hydro stations, highly susceptible to damage.

4. Intelligence information was not good.

5. This study shows definitely that an attack on this type of plant would be impractical, and that the most feasible method of rendering the average hydro

plant incapable of production is to attack and eliminate main substations located elsewhere which are the collecting points for energy from a number of plants.

The Plants and Their Functions In Enemy Economy.

1. This report covers a group of hydro plants forming the hydro power developed on the Kiso River. The plants, their generating capacities, and completion dates are given in the table above tion, the months in which they occurred, and percentage of minimum to maximum. 8,500-KVA, 6.6/154-KV, single-phasf transfonncrs. of approximately 70 ft. Construction was started in Init was never completed Connection is made to the main, Kijso, 154-KV, 1943 and was well along construc- transmission line to Osaka. because cement was not obtainable. In the tion work alwut 300 Chinese coolie prisoners of war The Oi plant was completed in Novemlier 1924 and were used. is the largest plant on the Kiso River (Exhil^it C, Exhibit C, photos 3 and 4 show the Ontake plant. photo 15). The dam is a concrete, overflow, gravity- Ph(jtos 5 and 6 show the Tokiwa plant, and photo 14 type with 21 tainter gates and impounds approxi- shows the 8uhara plant. mately 250 million cu ft effective water storage, and b. The source of power is the Kiso River water- approximately 400 million cu ft total storage. Water shed. The plants are typical run-of-river type, and is lirought to the plant through a pressure tunnel dams are principally used for diversion. However, 1 ,020 ft in length to a surge tank and thence through there is some reservoir storage, especially at the 3 concealed penstocks, each 250 ft long. The effective Miura plant (Exhibit C, photos 1 and 2) which is at head is 1,400 ft, and the water quantity used is 4,900 the head waters, and thus the flow can be governed cu ft /sec. There are 4 Allis Chalmers, single-wheel, and utilized to the best advantage by all the plants. vertical turbines, each with a General Electric gener- Therefore, while maximum generation is during the ator rated 13,750-KVA at 80 percent PF. This gives wet season, the plants are in a position to generate a total name plate rating of 44,000 KW; however, considerable energy throughout the entire year. The the maximum power obtainable is 48,000 KW, and table below gives the effective storage in cu ft and the size of the plant is so rated. Adjacent to the based on allowable low water levels as set by plant, there are 3 banks of transformers, each con- KWH the Power Bureau and other departments involved sisting of three 9,200-KVA, 6.6/154-KV, single-phase such as Agriculture and Forestry. There is consider- transformers, of which one bank is spare. On a higher ably more storage availaljle, and, during the war, elevation located nearby is a switching station to water levels in the reservoirs were, on a number of which a connection is tapped to the 154-KV, Kiso occasions, drawn far below the effective levels. The line to Osaka and also is the starting point of the storage in KWH is based on that obtainable by all Kansai, 154-KV line to Osaka via Yao. plants below the reservoir: The Kaneyama plant was completed in March 1944. (Exhibit C, photo 17) Across the Kiso River is Plant a concrete storage and diversion dam (Exhibit C, photo 16), approximately 600 ft in length, with 14 tainter gates. This dam stores approximately 280 million cu ft of water of which 94 million cu ft are classed as available. From a head race adjacent to this dam, there are 3 concealed steel-Uned concrete tunnels or penstocks to the plant. In the plant are 3 Kaplan-type Mitsubishi-make turbines, each with a Mitsubishi generator wth a name plate rating of 15,500 KVA at 80 percent PF. The total name plate rating of the plant is 37,200 KW; however, the rating given on the records is 37,100 KW. Adjacent to the

plant is an outdoor transformer and switching station (Exhibit C, photo 18). There are three 15,500 KVA 3-phase 11/154-KV transformers and a tap to the Kansai transmission line to the Yao substation near Osaka. Complete engineering data on the plants inspected

are in USSBS files. The plants in this hydro area which were not visited are, in substance, the same

type of plant. In addition to the plants listed, there is one plant under construction, named Agematsu, located between the Nezame and the Momoj-ama plants. It was to be 8,000 KW in capacity with a head : imately 300. They work two shifts and are used con- The Kaneyama Plant shown as completed and in tinuously throughout the year. use in 1939. The plant actually started operating the first unit in August 1943 and the plant was completed Attacks. in March 1944. None of the Iviso River hydro plants was ever Tokiwa, shown as completed in 1939, was actually subject to attack and there was no damage from any completed in 1941. type of war action. The Miura and the Ontake plants were not listed Effects of Bombing. since they were both new plants, however, the Miura Dam and plant are shown on Map No 2455. 1. Physical damage. b. The Air Objective Folder No 90.16 lists the fol- Since there was no damage, no study of bomljing lowing plants and assigns target numbers: effects could be made. 2. Production loss. *Otaki 1498 There was no production loss. Momoyama 1499 3. Recuperability cycle. Yomikaki 1502 No damage occurred and therefore no recupera- Oi 1505 bihty could be determined. However, since these Kasagi 1615 hydro plants, like most of the hydro plants in Japan, •This is evidently tlie Nezame plant incorrectly named. are located in vei-y remote and inaccessible places, There is no explainable reason why some of the the recuperability time would be considerably longer less important ones are listed and larger ones omitted. than normal. c. JTG lists the same plants as the Air Objective 4. ^'ulnerability. Folder and gives brief descriptions. Hydro plants are \iilnerable from the standpoint of their susceptibility to bomb damage, and, in par- Data Relevant To Other Studies. ticular, damage could be done to penstocks or out- None. door switching and transformer stations that would Evaluations and Impressions. render the plants inoperative for a long period. How- These plants are modern and maintenance is good. ever, they are generally located in inaccessible places The natural resources of this river have been devel- in very mountainous country and would have to be oped in an excellent manner. The Electric Power bombed from a high level. The small size of the Ijuild- Bureau, with the other interested bureaus such as ings and the great number of the plants would make Agriculture and Forestry, had set limitations on the effective bombing very difficult. Therefore, the vul- low water point on the storage reservoirs, in order to nerable points for this, as well as other hydro groups, insure a constant water supply for other purposes. are at the substations which collect and redistribute During the war, however, the electric energy require- their generated current. ments were such that exceptions were made and Intelligence Check. water was utilized far below this minimum on several 1. a. OSS reports in general correctly identified occasions. Chinese coolie prisoners of war were used and evaluated these plants with the following in the construction of a new plant which was never exceptions completed because of the lack of cement.

106 T^£ M/UfiA RE^£RVOfR->SA>fw^C»fiM*mitM /30Z /O /iao\/£ THe SIA

TAKIGOSHI

/0<9^ ooo >• EXHIBIT C

Photo 1 —Miura Dam

Photo 2—View of Miura Dam from reservoir 109 Photo 3—Ontake Diversion Dam (during construction)

110 Photo 4—Ontake Power Plant, Penstock & Headtank

111 Photo 5 —Tokiwa Diversion Dam

Photo 6—Tokiwa Power Plant (during construction) 112 Photo 7—Nezame Power Plant—General view

Photo 8—Nezame Power Plant—Switch yard at left 113 Photo 9—Nezame Power Plant Penstocks

Photo 10—Momoyama Power Plant—General view 114 Photo 11 —Momoyama Power Plant general view from penstocks Photo 13 — Mniiioyama power plant switch yard

Photo 14—Suhaxa power plant—general view 116 o o

117 -r^ •:"S

" , .-Av3

Photo 16—Kanej'ama power plant diversion and storage dam

Photo 17—Kaneyama power plant entrance 118 Photo 18—Kaneyama power plant transformor and switching station

119 PLANT REPORT NUMBER 16 SAKU HYDRO ELECTRIC STATION TONE RIVER, NEAR SHIBUKAWA, JAPAN

DATE INSPECTED 15 NOVEMBER 1945

Summary. the basis of the ability to restore production. Re- 1. The Saku Hydro-electric Station, located on cuperation ability was, in this case, greater than the Tone River opposite from the Town of Shibu- average, since materials and facilities were available. kawa, is the largest hydro station in the Tokyo plain Had damage been very slightly greater, recuperation area and had on 15 Novemlier 1945, 67,200 KW of would have taken far longer. This jilant was more name plate capacity, but is rated by official records \ailncrable than the average hydro plant, since it at 72,700 KW capacity. The plant is divided into was in an open valley and easily identifiable. 2 sections. One section consists of a 7.6 mile intake 4. The size, importance, and location had been tunnel, a small forebay, a pressure tunnel, a surge correctly evaluated in intelligence data, and the tank, and 3 steel penstocks bringing water from a single hit correctly reported. Damage was not assessed diversion dam on the Tone River. The second section nor could such assessment be made from the air. secures its water supply from the Agatsuma River 5. While the damage caused no large production through 2 miles of tunnel and covered canal, a con- loss, it is significant that serious damage was done by crete surge tank, and a steel penstock to the north a single bomb and tliat power plants were proved to end of the power house. The power house is a peaked lie susceptible to great damage from strafing. roof, concrete building i\'ith a steel switch yard to the The Plant and Its Function In north. The second section is not in service because of Enemy Economy. the removal of the generator for a projected plant in Kyushu. The plant generated approximately 390 1. The product of the plant and its importance in million KWH per year during the 3 war years. While enemy economy. its output was seasonal, there was sufficient river run The Saku plant, one of nearly 400 in the hydro to operate continuously throughout the year, and its system of the Japan Electric Generation and Trans- minimum dry season month generation was 52.7 per- mission Company, was the largest in the Tokyo plain cent of its maximum wet season month generation. 50-cycle area; eleventh in capacity importance in the The energy was delivered to the transmission lines of company; and produced approximately 1.1 percent the .Japan Electric Generation and Transmission of the utility energy used in Japan. Its monthly gen-

( 'ompany for general distribution, and most of it was eration is recorded in Exliibit B for the years 1942 to utilized in the Tokyo area. July 1945, and averaged 390,000,000 KWH per year 2. The plant was never a primarj^ target, but was for the 3 war years. The maximum load carried was damaged on 30 July 1945 by carrier-based Navy 72,700 KW with 4 units operating and 66,000 KW planes unable to reach their planned objective. One after one small unit was removed. At the time of 250 lb fragmentation bomb hit near the turbine room, inspection, a total of 36,000 KW was being carried on damaging one generator and dostrojang a regional the 2 operable units. Load curves for the war period load dispatcher's office building, and 50-cal strafing are shown in E.xhibit A, which also shows the poten- I)unctured in several places the surge tank above the tial generation based on available water power. This penstocks. shows that almost all available power was being

3. The principal physical damage was physical utilized until March 1945, at which time the demand injury to the stator windings of one 28,000-KVA became greatly reduced because of the destruction of generator which was not operating at the time of the industries and cities or the loss of industrial usage raid. No repairs have been started, although spare during dispersal. The output was supplied to the coils and facilities are available. While production Japan Electric Generation and Transmission Com- was down at the time of damage, because of loss of pany for general distrit)utiou, and most of it was demand through industry or city destruction, the loss utilized in the Tokyo area. of production from the damage to the plant, based on 2. a. The plant is located on the east bank of the average pi'otluction during the 3 war years, amounted Tone River opposite the town of Shibukawa. The to approximately 38 million KWH. This loss is on main building is a 3-stor>', peak roof, reinforced con- 120 :

Station Master, all of crotp, rpctangtilar l)uil(iin>!:, approxiinatcly 75 f( hy Sadakichi Yomaguchi, Mlcctric Generation and Transmission 200 ft, which lumscs all tuiho-gcnerators, equipment, Japan and controls. Adjacont to one end of the building, Co. and at a slightly higher elevation, is located an nut- 4. There are i\ormally 00 employees. This number door transformer and switching station. Although the (lid not fluctuate (hiring (he war period. entire plant is together, it was constructed in 2 sec- Attacks. tions. The first section was completed in 192S and The plant was attacked by a flight of 7 or 8 carrier- consists of a dam on the Tone River, 7.6 miles of based planes at 0700, 30 July 1945, flying from a intake tunnel, a forehay regulating reservoir, an southerly direction at low altitude. This has been luidergroimd steel pressiu'e conduit approximately identified as strike "Dog Two", 30 July, of Carrier 500 ft in length, a steel surge tank mounted on a steel USS Randolph, CV-15, stationed at the time about tower with an overall height of approximately 250 ft, 140 miles south of Nagoya. and 3 steel penstocks leading from the surge tank to the turbines. The effective head is approximately Effects of Bombing.

375 ft and the maximum flow^ is 2065 cu ft/sec. Therc^ 1. Physical damage. are 3 Allis Chalmers, Francis-type, vertical tiu-bines, One 250 lb HE fragmentation bomb struck a stone each with a Westinghouse 2S,000-KVA, 3-phas(% wall 20 ft from the south corner of the power house. 50-cycle, 11 KV generator. The second section was Fragments and flying debris broke the windows on completed in 193S. The water is from the Agatsuma the SE end of the power house, and one fragment cut River, diverted by a dam through 2 miles of intak(> through the sheet metal casing of one 28,000-KVA tunnel and covered canal to a forebay and through generator, damaging the stator windings. The ma- one penstock to the jilant. Effective head is 80 ft and chine was not ojierating at the time. This same bomb maximum water flow is 1169 cu ft/sec. There is nn(^ demolished a frame building housing the district load Hitachi, propeller-type, vertical turbine which was dispatcher's office, located about 35 ft from the point previously connected to a Hitachi, 7500 KVA, 90 j^er- of explosion. The surge tank was strafed by 50-cal cent PF, 3-phase, 11 KV, 50-cycle generator. This machine gun fire, and punctured in several places. generator been for transfer to anothcn- has removed 2. Production loss. plant. The total name plate capacity of this plant Coincidental with the bombing, the small generator was, prior to removal of this unit, 73,950 KW and is was being dismantled for transfer to another plant, carry its official at present 67,200 KW. The Japanese and so production records reflect its removal as well not changed licensed capacity at 72,700 KW, and have as bomb damage; also, production was down because since of one unit. The the records the removal the of the loss of load from desti-uction of industries and switch and transformer station contains 9 outdoor cities. The entire plant was out of service for 12 days trans- Tokyo Shibaura 9,333-KVA, single-phase, while bullet holes in the surge tank were being welded. formers in 3 banks, transforming from 11 to 154 KV. The damaged generator has not been repaired. Exhibit C shows photographs of the plant, penstocks, Therefore, the production loss is based on average and substation. production during the 3 war years, on the basis of the b. The water supply is from the Tone and Agatsu- entire plant production for the time to repair the ma Rivers. The Tone River, above the dam, has a surge tank, and one-third of plant production for water shed of 680 square miles, and the Agatsuma 2 months, because of the loss of one large generator River above the dam has a water shed of 500 square and time estimated to place it back in service. This miles. The rainfall is approximately 30 inches per estimated loss equalled 38 million K'NATI. year at the Tone intake, 900 ft above sea level. The 3. Recuperability. river flow is at a minimum in February and reaches The plant was put back into operation after 12 during March, April, and May. Exhibit A maximum days for repairs to the surge tank. The damaged gen- variation in plant output due to river flow. shows erator, for which spare coils are on hand, could have plant is the Japan Electric Gen- 3. The owned by been restored to service in approximately 2 months, Transmission Information eration and Company. although no start has been made on its repair. was furnished by the following 4. Vulnerability. Sho Nishikawa, Chief, Gumma District This ])lant, like all power jjlants, is \ailnerable to Kazuo Hase, Chief, Electric Power Section, bomb damage. No hits on in^portant equipment were Gumma District made, and the one bomb was light, with the strike 121

point outside the plant. Thoroforo no concliision.s can the Japan I'^lectric Generation and Transmission Co.,

he drawn regarding the effect of a hit on vital equip- is well built and maintained. The supervisors and ment. The strafing of the surge tank produced no operators showed intelligence and knowledge; superior substantial daniag(\ Better targets wouki hav(^ Ixh'II to that of operators in other plants visited, had a

th(^ main transformers or the machinery inside the pride in their property and work, and appeared power house windows. capable of handling their responsibilities.

Intelligence Check. Exhibit B Saku Hydro Power Plant 1. a. Tlie OSS Report correctly evahiated the Generation in KWII plant as of date of preparation.

h. The Air Objective Folder No 90.13 for Takasaki Area, issued by the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, listed this plant as Target No 1,059, cor-

rectly located it on maps, described it ad(^quately,

(>valuated its importance correctly, and presented a good photograph of the plant prior to the extension to the northwest. 2. Record of this raid, as reported in the USS Randolph action report for the period of 1 July to

15 Aiigust 1945, reported 1 direct bomb hit on the plant, but did not mention strafing. Sixteen VP' and 15 VB took part in the strike over the area. No photos were taken during or after the raid, and no evaluation of damage was reported. Evaluations and Impressions. The Saku Plant, one of the best in the system of 124 EXHIBIT D

Photo 1 —Tone River below Saku plant

Photo 2—Penstocks and bridge Photo 3—Transformer l).ank

Photo 4—Bomb fragment holes in generator housing

126 Photo 5—Gcneijil view from switchyard

Photo 6—Taiik (damaged by strafing) and penstocks

127 Photo 7—General view of plant, tail race, and switchyard

Photo 8—General view from factory across river 128 Photo 9—General view of plant and tail race from switchyard

Photo 10—Penstocks and tank from bridge 129 :

PLANT REPORT NUMBER 17 SUBSTATIONS, NAGOYA, JAPAN

DATES INSPECTED 30-31 OCTOBER 1945, 1 NOVEMBER 1945

Summary. is not normally the case in a modern station. The

1. This report covers three primary and two negligible effect of incendiary bombs against a modern secondary substations; namely, the Inuyama, the station is shown. Serious damage from strafing was Iwakura, and the Nisshiu primarj^ and the Rokugo done, but is possible onlj^ when air defense is negli- and the Taiko secondary. The primary stations are gible and low-level attacks can be made. The damage located in the suburban and the secondary stations from high explosive bombing is conclusively shown in the urban area of Nagoya. The primary have a and the vulnerability to this tj-pe of attack is by far total of 330,000 KVA and the secondary 82,000 KVA the greatest. in transformer capacity, and while this is large, it 4. These stations, with 2 exceptions, were not does not indicate their full importance. The primaiy listed in intelligence information. The 2 exceptions stations collect, control, transform, and dispatch were Inuyama and Iwakura, and these are shown in current from the hydro generating plants in central the Air Objective Folder and also by JTG. However, Honshu to Nagoya and also to the main transmission their evaluation was incorrect in both these docu- lines to Osaka. These three stations covered herein, ments. No intelligence information was given on the together with the Mie station, covered in a separate results of damage. report, are all the primaiy stations in the Nagoya 5. The most significant evaluation of the study area. Therefore, collectively thcj^ are of utmost im- made of these stations is the importance of these portance in the continuous flow of current from its primary substations to the Nagoya and Osaka areas, source to consumer as their function is a vital link in not individually but collectively. They are vital and the chain of supply. The 2 secondary substations are necessary links in the supply of hydi-o generated merely two of a large number of this type of station power from central Honshu to these highly indus- in Nagoya, but are representative of all such stations, trialized areas. Their interconnections were such that though these did supply electric energy to the Mitsu- destruction of one station would not in itself have bishi Aircraft Engine Works, a vital war industry. eliminated any appreciable quantity of energy, as Except for the Rokugo secondary station, all sub- means could have been evolved to cu-cumscribo the stations were outdoor type. Substations are not pro- damage. But, had all the prhnaiy substations been ducing units and therefore production is not herein destroyed, together with the local steam plant facili- calculated, but their importance and function in an ties which were few, most of the electric supply

(>nemy economy is in proportion to their size. would have been effectively eliminated.

2. None of these substations was ever a primary The Plant and Its Function In target, but they were damaged at various times Enemy Economy. during area raids or attacks on adjacent industries, 1. The product of the plant and its importance in as is explained in detail in this report. enemy economy. done to transformers, oil 3. Principal damage was This report covers a group of both primary and control boards, and switch gear, and circuit breakers, secondary substations in or near the city of Nagoya. of ability to handle the normal resulted in a large loss The names of these substations, together with their of energj'. However, since the area served amount function, transformers installed, and KVA rated simultaneously, the load was likewise was destroyed capacity are as follows lost and the economic value of the loss in substation .\'ame and function capacity was negligible. Recuperation of substations is shown to be long and difficult where damage to major equipment occurred. The vulnerability of substations is definitely shown. Although some loss was due to fire from incendiary bombs, that was only because of unusual and peculiar conditions: i.e., location in a crowded inflammable area and the use of inflammable materials in station construction, which These stations arc not all the i)riniary or secondary I''()r i)uri)<)ses of consolidation, each station is

substations in the Nagoya aiea. A substation is an individually listed with its description, attacks, dam- important link in the chain of distributicni of electric age, and other information. current from its source of genei'ation to th(> ultimate; Inuyama. consumer, and its destruction would prevent the use This substation is located approximately 16 mil(>s of the current. Therefore, these stations were impor- north of the center of Nagoya, and is one of four tant in the complete electrical system and the indi- jirincipal primaiy substations in thc^ Nagoya area. vidual importance of each must be considered in All the 154-KV transmission lines that serve Nagoya terms of the question of whether an adjacent station proper, as well as the principal transmission lines to could function as a substitute in case of destruction. Osaka, pass through these four stations. This is a The thre(> primary substations covered in this report, very large substation of great importance, not just together with the Mie Substation, covered in a from its capacity in transformers, but because it is separate report, comprise all the primary substations a large concentration point for incoming lines from in this area and are very important not only to Na- the hydro power generating stations in the central goya but in the collection of control, transformation, Honshu area, transforms incoming 77 KV lines to and dispatch of current to Osaka. Incoming current 154 KV for re-transmission on to Osaka, and is a from the central Honshu hydro generating plants is general switching and dispatching station. The sta- handled through these stations and their continuous tion, except for buildings to house offices, dispatching functioning, not individually but collectively, is nec- and controls, repairs, warehouses and incidental essary in the utilization of this supply. These four equipment, is a complete outdoor type. (Exhibit B, stations form a ring around Nagoya and into them photos 4, 5, and 6.) It covers an area of approxi- come many lines that collect the current from various mately 6 acres and is generally square in shape. groups of hydro plants. Tlie stations in turn, are tied Although it operates as one station, it is in two adja- into each other, and the capacity of the individual cent parts, having originally been constructed by two station is such that destruction of any one station different companies and then consolidated when thi^ could be overcome either by by-passing the station Japan Electric Generation and Transmission Com- (since transmission lines themselves are unlikel}' to pany assumed the operation of all large transmission be destroyed for any distance) or by re-routing gener- facilities in Japan. The east part (Exhibit B, photos ation from the hydro plants via some other trans- 1 and 2) was installed by the Daido Electric Power mission line (of which there are many) to another Company in 1926 with one bank of three 15,000 KVA station. Therefore, the importance of these stations 154/77 KV transformers. In March 1928, a second lies in their collective function and, in order to elimi- similar bank was installed, but one bank was re- nate effectively most of the hydro power, all nnist be moved in February, 1945, due to loss of load. The destroyed. The hydro power jjlants themselves are west part (Exhibit B, photo 3) was installed by the too numerous and too difficult to locate to attempt Toho Electric Power Company in 1924 and is pri- their destniction. There is some hydro power that marily a switching section, but has one bank of three conies in directly to secondary substations. Thus, 5,000-KVA, 77/33 KV transformers for the pvupose elimination of these four substations would not com- of supplying tlie branch line to Hagiu'o. This station pletely isolate all hydro stations, but would affect is carried on Japanese records as 60,000-KVA capac- the majority and is of vital importance not only to ity. However, until February 1945, it actually had Nagoya but to Osaka as well. This is more fully cov- 105,000 KVA. The following two-circuit transmission ered in the final industry report on the vulnerability lines enter or leave this station: of the electric power industiy. The secondary sub- Kansai Line—154 KV—From Kasagi PP and stations reported herein are by no means all, nor even others. intended to be the most important in this area, but Kiso Line—154 KV—From Suhara PP and they are representative, were severely damaged, and others. adequately illustrate the lasting and effectual damage Miuo Branch Line— 154 KV—Tap from Mino that can be done. In Exliibit A there is a more com- Transmission line that I'uns from Kawabe plete tabulation of pertinent data, and complete plot PP to Iwakura SS. plans, diagrams, and other information are available Kansai Line—154 KV—To Yao SS near Osaka. in USSBS files. Kiso Line— 154 KV—To Furukawabashi SS 2. Physical description of the plant. near Osaka. 131 Kaniiya Line—77 KV—Tup from (3kuwa line fourth damage was on 14 August 1945 at 1253 by

that runs from Okuwa PP and others. machine guns of two P-51 planes. There is no record Kawabe Line—77 KV—From Kawabe PP of any attacks in this area on this date. Damage con- and others. sisted of a total of 5 holes in main tanks and 8 holes Iwakura Line—77 KV—To Iwakura SS near in conservator of three 15,000-KVA transformers. Nagoya. The interiors of the transformers have not been inspected for Hagiiro Branch—33 KV—To Haguro SS in damage. Oil did not catch fire. In addi- Aiclii Prefecture. tion, there were 3 bushings broken on these transformers, 4 broken on 154-KV oil circuit breakers, While the importance of the station cannot be 1 bushing on 154-KV aluminum cell arrester, 1 bush- judged by the transformer loads, the station load ing on 77-KV potential transformer, 1 shot hole in a dmung the war years was about 400 million KWH 77-KV oil circuit breaker, about 60 strain bus insu- amiually, with a peak of 90,000 KW on the east sta- lators broken, and other minor damage. All the dam- tion and 11,000 KW on the west station. Of this load, age was repaired reasonably quickly except that, fol- only about 20 million KWH went to the 33-KV line lowing the attack on 30 July, the east or 154-KV to Haguro, which is relatively unimportant. In section was discontinued and has been closed since November 1945, the load had dropped to the point because of the absence of load demand. The damage where the two transformer banks of 45,000 KVA each of 14 August rendered this portion completely inoper- were not needed, and one was removed in February able until major repairs are made on the main trans- as a safety precaution. formers, which it is estimated will require 6 months. This substation was never the subject of a primary The only protective measures taken were blast attack, but was slightly damaged on several occa- barriers (Exhibit B, photos 2 and 6) of wood and sand sions; principally by strafing. The first damage was placed between the main transformers. on 9 June 1945 at 1256 by machine gun strafing of one P-51 plane. There is no record of any raid on this Iwakura. date in the intelligence files. Damage was slight, con- This substation is located approximately 8 miles sisting of one hole in a 77-KV current transformer north of the center of Nagoya and is one of 4 princi- tank, damaged oil filled bushing, and snapping of one pal primary substations in the Nagoya area. All the conductor of a 154-KV line that fell on the Haguro 154-KV lines that serve Nagoya, as well as the princi- 33-KV line and burnt out a potential transformer. pal transmission lines to Osaka, pass through these

The second damage was on 15 July 1945 at 1305 by 4 stations. This substation is very large and of great machine gun strafing of two P-51 planes. No record importance, not just from its capacity in trans- of any raid on this date is in the intelligence files. formers, but because it is a large concentration point Damage consisted of one hole in the tank of three for incoming lines from the hydro power generating lo4-KV oil circuit breakers, bushings broken on 4 stations in the central Honshu area, transforms in- others. The oil flowed out of these oil circuit breakers coming 77-KV lines to 154 KV for retransmission on but did not catch fire. In addition, there were 13 line to Osaka, and is a general switching, dispatching and switch insulators, 1 post type and 13 strain insulators control point for the distribution to Nagoya. The broken, one shot hole in cooling water piping for one station is an outdoor type except for buildings to 5,000-KVA traiasformer, and one shot hole in an oil house offices, control and dispatching boards, repair storage tank. There was some minor building dam- shop, warehouses, synchronous condensers and inci- age. The third attack was on 30 July 1945 at 0735 by dental equipment. (Exhibit B, photos 7 and 8). The four P-51 planes. There were 6 (presumably 100 lb) area covered by the station is approximately 14 acres bombs dropped of which only 4 fell in the station and is L-shaped. Although it operates as one station, area and these caused only minor damage. There was it is in two adjacent parts, having originally been also machine! gun strafing. Total damage consisted of constructed by two different companies. The older the bn^aking of 3 transmission line conductors, a total portion was installed by the old Toho Electric Power of 38 hol(!s in 3 small station transformers, mostly Company and consisted of a switching station only, through the radiator, and 4 holes in an induction divided into two separate sections—one for handling voltage regulator. There is record of 4 attacks in the all 154-KV lines and the other for 77-KV lines. The

Nagoya area on this date by Navy planes and it is newer portion was installed by Japan Electric Power possible this was done by some of these instead of Company and was designed for- 4 banks of trans- P-51 planes as reported by station persormel. The formers, each consisting of 3, single-phase, 13,333 KVA tranHfomicrs, 154 to 77 KV; however, only 3 damaged bank is anipk; to care for all pi-csent hanks w(>re installed, making a total of 120,000 K\'A requinnnents. in transformer capacity. Its purpose was two-fold in This station was damaged by war action only onc(^ that incoming 154-KV transmission could be reduced and that was on 14 August 1945, the day before the tf) 77 KV for use in Nagoya distribution oi- incoming end of the war, when it was th(! object of a strafing

77-KV could be steppetl up to 154-KV foi' I'e trans- attack. No record of any attack is on the intelligences mission on to Osaka. All the separate portions of thc^ records. Shot holes punctured the tank of one trans- .station were interconnected with tie-lines, and oper- former and set the oil on fire; this fire compkitely ated as a single station by the Japan Electric Genera- destroyed the entire bank of three transformers. tion and Transmission Company. Also, there had (Exhibit B, photo 9). Medium damage was also dom; been installed temporary bj'-pass lines and plans for to six 154-KV oil circuit breakers and one additional reconnecting incoming and outgoing lines in event of transfcjrmer, also light damage to three 77-KV the destruction of the station, but this would have breakers and other minor damage. The bank in eliminated all control and definitely limited the which the one transformer was slightly damage

Okashi Line—77-KV—From hydro plants in shape, measuring about 600 ft by 500 ft, and con- Gifu area. taining about 7 acres. It is an outdoor type (Exliibit Iwatsuka Line—77-KV—To Nagoya secon- B, photo 11) except for buildings to house offices, dary substations. control and dispatching boards, synchronous con- Atsuta Line—77-KV—To Nagoya secondary densers, warehouses, repair shops, and incidental substations. equipment. There were 2 transformer banks each This station also had three 25,000-KVA syn- consisting of 3-single-phase, 25,000-KVA, 154/77 KV chronous condensers operating 11 KV from a tertiary transformers, making a total capacity of 150,000 winding of the transformers. The importance of the KVA. Because the loss of load made all this capacity station cannot be judged by its transformer loads, unnecessary, and because of fear of bombing, one since it receives 77 KV and retransforms it to 154 KV bank of transformers was in the process of being for transmission to Osaka or receives 154 KV and removed to a safe place so that it could be used as transforms it to 77 KV for Nagoya. The load there- spare. (Exhibit B, photo 12). Two of these trans- fore varies in accord with the requirement of different formers had been moved out of normal position as conditions. The loss of load due to area and industry well as one oil circuit breaker, bussing, and incidental bombing has been such that the one remaining un- equipment, but all this equipment was still on the

13c — station property bccaus(^ of lack of transportation. and a few 100-lb HE bomlis on urban area of Nagoya

Therefore, it was as much subject to damage, had the and on 17 May 1945, 457 B-29 aircraft tlropped station been bombed, as the equipment in use and so 3,609 tons of IB on south urban area of Nagoya. their precautions would have been to no avail. Due These are evidently the raids on which the incendiary to the anticipated removal of this one bank, the sta- bombs fell on this station, but it was never a primary tion is carried on government and company records target. Blast barriers made of wood and sand had as 75,000-K^'A capacity, but this is not actual capac- been placed around the transformer bank (Exhibit ity, as both the design and equipment in place during B, photo 13), but no other protection was provided the war were 150,000 KVA. There are also two and such vital equipment as the 154-KV oil circuit 20,000-KW, i-otaiy, sj'uchronous condensers that breakers (Exhibit B, photo 14), and other similar operate at 11 KV from tertiary windings of the main items (Exhibit B, photo 15) were totally unprotected. transformers. The following incoming and outgoing two-circuit lines connect to the station: Rokugo. Tem-yu Line—154 KV—From Yasuoka Hy- This was one of the largest secondary substations dro Power Plant and others in central in Nagoya. It is owned by the Chubu Electric Supply Honshu. Company, the distributing company for this area. Kushihara Line—77 KV—From Kushihara Located in the northeast section of the city of Na- Hydro Power Plants and others in nearby goya, it furnished current to a large section of this Honshu. part of the town and in addition, was one of two (the Kachigawa Line—77 KV—TO Kachigawa and other is Taiko) that served the large Mitsubishi Air- indoor type with all Rokugo secondaiy substations and tie to craft Works. The station was an Iwakura primary substation. equipment located indoors except one 10,000-KVA, transformer and 1 bank of three 4,000 KVA Wizuho Line—77 KV—To Mizuho and other 3-phase transformers. It was housed in a group of Ijuildings, secontlary substations. some of brick and plaster with steel truss and tile Higashi Line 77 KV—To Showacho secon- roofs and others of wood ; all of very old construction. dary substation. (Exhibit B, photo 16). The station proper is rec- Narumi Line—77 KV—To a large group of tangular in shape, approximately 350 ft by 450 ft, secondary substations as well as tic line containing 3.7 acres. Adjacent to it was an electrical from Tokayama primaiy substation. store room area (Exhibit B, photo 20), about 140 ft This was a very uuportant station to the Nagoya by 240 ft, containing 0.8 acre, making a total for the area. The maximum current ever handled was whole station of 4.5 acres. In addition to controls, 140,000 KW, of which 110,000 was from the 154-KV switches, bussing, and such associated apparatus, lines and 30,000 from the 77-KV lines. The group of there was one 10,000-KVA, 77/1 1-KV, 3-phase trans- hydro stations connected to the incoming lines had former (to feed Mitsubishi Aircraft Works) fifteen a capacity below that of this substation, which ac- 2,500-KVA, 77/11-KV, single-phase transformers counts for this load being b(!low station capacity. (of which 3 were classed as spares) and three 4,000- Those plants connected to the 154-KV hues gener- KVA, 77/11-KV, single-phase transformers for gen- ated at 1 1 KV, which was transformed at the respec- eral use, making a total station capacity of 52,000 tive plants to 154 KV for transmission purposes. In KVA. In addition, there was a 10,000-KVA, syn- case of loss of this substation, production from these chronous condenser. plants could have been diverted through Matushima This station was never a primary target, but was switching station to Inuyama, but line limitations severely damaged on 14 May 1945 tluring a raid on would have made this impractical and the loss to the tlie north urban area of Nagoya whi'n 411 B-29 air- Nagoya area would have been very serious. There craft dropped 2516 tons of IB. A large number (quan- would have been no possible method by which to tity unknown) fell on this station. The fire resulting change the 154-KV incoming line to 77 KV in order from the burning of the combustible buildings on and to temporarily juniper the station. to the station property completely destroyed This station was never damaged by any war action. adjacent There was one incendiary bomb raid on 7 January the electrical store room (Exhibit B, photo 20), test- 1945 and another on 17 May 1945, but neither did ing shop, numerous other miscellaneous buildings, any damage. Intelligence records show that on 7 and partially destroyed the office, switchroom (Ex- January 1945, 4 B-29 aircraft dropped 4 tons of IB hibit B, photo 7), 11- and 77-KV, oil, circuit breaker 134 :

room (Exhibit B, photo IS), tho transff)i'mor room Mitsubishi factor\' as the primary target. Fftiir housing the group of 2,500 KVA transformers, as bombs struck the station and completely ruined it. well as tlio 10,000-KVA, S-phasc transformer located Otic bomb fell near, and another made a direct hit on adjacent thercti!. (FAliitiit B, photo 19). All th(> oil the transformer bank (I'^.xhibit B, pholo 21), s|)liltiug circuit breakers, the control board (Exhibit B, photo the cases on the transformers, setting fire to the oil, 17), and th(> transformers were put completely out of and completely demolishing them beyond any pos- sei'vice, and while minute examination has not been sible rejiair. (Exhibit B, ))hotos 21, 22, 23 and 24). made, it is expected these are all completely mined. Another made a tlirect hit on the group of oil circuit

The 10,00()-KVA transformer will require a complete breakers, splitting the tanks, setting the oil on fire rebuilding. The thre(> 4,000-KVA transformers were and completely ruining them. (Exhibit B, photo 25). not damaged and were placed back in operation on Another hit near the 77-KV' bus structure tore it up 22 .luly 1945. This is the only portion (except the completely. This bomb apparently did not completely synchronous condens(M-) of the station that was not detonate as a portion of the casing was found in the badly damaged. All the load sheets were destroyed crater. (Exhibit B, photo 26). This station was com- liy fire, Imt officials advised that the station was pletely destroyed; the damage was greater than that carrying a load of about 32,000 KVA, and, since at any other station s(>en that had been hit by Jiigh rc^storation of the on(> remaining transformer bank, explosive bombs. The damage that was done with so th(^ load is from 2000 to 2300 KVA. No protective few bombs was remarkable. No prot(>ctive measures measures of any kind had been taken. Compl(>te re- of any kind had been taken. pairs to all equipment and buildings will require at At the time of the raid of 7 April 1945, the Mitsu- least six months. bishi works was in the process of dispersing to the mountains and much equipment had already been Taiko. removed. Therefore, the load was onlj* abuot one- This was a comparatively small secondare' sub- third of normal. This same raid destroyed what was station, but important in that it supplied the Mitsu- left of Mitsubishi, so there was no need to relniild t he- bishi Aircraft Engine Works. However, another sta- station. It would have required at least 6 months to tion (Rokugo) also supplied the same industry and rebuild it. each of these stations was practically a standby for 3. All the primary' substations were owned by the the other. The station was owned by the Chubu Elec- Japan Electric Generation and Transmission Com- tric Supply Companj', the distributing company for pany and the secondary substations by the Chubu this area, and was installed only to supply the Electric Supply Company, which is the electric dis- Mitsubishi plant. The station was a complete out- tributing companj' in this area. Information was door type except for buildings to house the control supplied by the following persons room, offices, and warehouse. The area covered by S. Saito—director of Japan Electric Genera- tho station was about 175 ft by 300 ft, or 1.2 acres. tion and Transmission Co., and district There were three 10,000-KVA 77/1 1-KV trans- manager of Tokai district in which these formers with 6 oil circuit breakers on the 77-KV side stations are located. as there were 2 incoming 77-KV lines. Underground S. Yoneda assst. district managxn- and district cables feed 11 KV from the station to the Mitsubishi — factory. engr. This station was never a primary target but was G. Inouke—director and chf engr of Chubu damaged on three occasions during raids on adjacent Electric Supply Co. areas. On 13 December 1944, 71 B-29 aircraft dropped H. Ogawa—station master Inuyama Station. 96 tons of HE and 85 tons of IB on the Mitsubishi M. Okaeda—station master Iwakura Station. Aircraft Engine woi-ks. Six incendiary bombs fell on H. Nagata—station master Nisshin Station. the station, burning the warehouse but otherwise G. Iwai—station master Rokugo Station. doing no damage. On 22 December 1944, 48 B-29 air- 4. There was a total average of 100 employees for craft droi^ped 130 tons of 500-lb incendiary clustei's. all the 5 stations in this n^port. This number did not

One struck a 77-KV oil circuit breaker breaking a varj' greatly throughout the war and was stable all liushing and another damaged a lightning arrester, diu-ing the year. Operators worked 2 shifts and others, but damage was so slight that there was not even a such as maintenance men, worked one. Because of .service interruption. On 7 April 1945, 154 B-29 air- damage to stations and complete elimination of one, craft dropped 614 tons of 500-lb HE bombs with the the number of employees is now down to atiout 75. 135 Attacks. c. The undamaged portion of each station can be In no case was any station ever the object of a utilized. primary attack, but was damaged as a result of an 4. Vulnerability. area raid or attack on some adjacent industrial tar- a. The study of these stations shows conclusively got. Under each station is given attack data, where it the vulnerability of substations. The damage done by is available. strafing was extensive and proves that this type of attack is desirable. However, air defense must be Eflfects of Bombing. practically nil to make strafing possible. Since vulner- 1. Physical damage. ability must be considered from the standpoint of a. This information is covered individually under unfavorable conditions of attack, and methods that each substation, as well as briefly in Exhibit A. will secure the maximum of damage and thus, the b. No effort was made to pi-epare a bomb plot of longest recuperability cycle, it is not believed that each station, but effects can be seen from photos in strafing is a practical attack method. The damage Exhibit B. done by fire caused by incendiary bombs does not 2. Production loss. indicate that substations are vulnerable to this type a. The simultaneous destruction of the area or of attack. Contrary to general practice, the Japanese industry served neutralized any actual loss by dam- use considerable wood and other inflammable ma- age or destruction of the stations, as load was lost at terial in the construction of their substations, partic- the same time. However, where possible, load data is ularly the older ones and the distribution substations. given under each individual report. These were located in the centers of densely popu- b. No substitution or modification was necessarj' lated areas among highly inflammable surroundings, as the load was destroyed. and so were subject to the same degree of damage as c. Reasons for loss of production. their immediate vicinity. But where this particular (1) Refer to tabulation under Exhibit A or to condition does not exist, incendiary bombs do not individual station reports. cause any damage to substations. This is shown in (2) No production was lost through diversion of the attacks on Nisshin and Taiko. Substations are labor, material, or machine facilities. particularly vulnerable to HE bombs and the definite (3) No loss was caused through protective meas- ]5roof of this is at Taiko, where four 500-lb bombs ures. completely destroyed the entire station. Heavy ton- (4) No loss was caused through alisenteeism or nage per acre is not required and although generally unusual inefficiency. the small area covered by a substation does make the (5) No loss was caused l^y any shortage of essen- target somewhat difficult to locate and hit from high tials. altitudes, when they are hit by HE bombs, the re- 3. Recuperability cycle. sults are very destructive and lasting. a. Where, damage was slight, repairs were made with no loss of time. TlTiere damage was heav>', i.e., Intelligence Check. involving the loss of a transformer or other major 1. a. The OSS report did not list any of these equipment, no effort had been made to effect repairs. substations. Estimates are given in each individual report, and b. The Air Objective Folder 90.20 for the Nagoya those stations heavily damaged will require at least area issued by the office of Assistant Chief of Air () months to be put back in original operating condi- Staff, Intelligence, listed only 2 of these stations, tion. This estimate is based on having supplies and namely Inuyama and Iwakura, correctly located repair facilities available. With the widespread dam- them and briefiy evaluated them, but their evalua- age and the fact that the electrical equipment manu- tion in the summaiy was incorrect. facturers were either damaged or set up to manufac- c. The JTG listed the Inuyama and Iwakura sta- ture other types of equipment, it is doubtful that any tions and correctly located them. However, under substantial amount of repair cfjuld be completed in the significant evaluation, it states that these two less than one year. stations control the hydro power to Nagoya and b. The level of production reattained is an uncer- Osaka which is not true. tain factor, for with the load lost, there was no need 2. interpretation of damage was made. to attempt to restore capacity to its former level. The No photo

part which remains and which is operaljle is stated in 3. No photo interpretation of recuperation or dis- each station report. persal was made. 136 Data Relevant To Other Studies. stations would have had is most impressive. How-

None. ever, it is ecjually impn^ssive that this effect would Evaluations and Impressions. only result if they were destroyed collectively. The The primary substations were modern and well damage results that can be obtained from high ex- operated, although there was obviously an excess of plosive bombs is most definitely shown at the Taiko

{(luijinient. Tlu^ effect that tlu; destruction of thes(^ station. EXHIBIT B

Photo 1 —Inuyama—General view, east substation, 154-KV section

Photo 2—Inuyama—General view, east substation, 77-KV Section and Transformer Bank. (Note bomb barriers) 138 Photo 3—Inuyama—General view, west substation

Photo 4—Inuyama—View of 154-KV section of east substation 697713—47—10 139 Photo 5—Inuyama—Bank of 12—154-KV, oil, circuit breakers

Photo 6—Inuyama—Close view of 15000-KVA transformers, sliovving bomb blast barrier 140 Photo 7—Iwakura—General view south section (Old Toho)

Photo 8—Iwakura—General view north section (Old Nippon) 141 Photo 9—Iwakura—Bank of 13,333 KVA transformers damaged by fire

Photo 10—Iwakura—Transformer banks, damaged transformers on far end 142 1

Photo 1 —Nissliin—General view of station

Photo 12—Nisshin—Transformers, 25,000 KVA each. Blank spaces are where transformers had been removed for safety 143 Photo 13—Nisshin—Transformer bank showing blast barriers

Photo 14—Nisshin— 154 KV oil circuit breakers 144 —

Photo 1 5 —Nisshin Lightning arrestor installation

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Photo 16—Rokugo—General view of damaged station 145 Photo 17—Rokugo—Remains of control board

Photo 18—Rokugo—77-KV oil circuit breakers destroyed by fire 146 Photo 19—Rokugo—10,000-KVA 3-Phasc transformer completely ruined by fire

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Photo 20—Rokugo—General view burned electrical storeroom adjacent to substation 147 Photo 2 1 —Tiiiko —Transformer bank of 3—10000-KVA transformers completely destroyed by direct hit and fire

Photo 22^Taiko—Transformer No 1 of destroyed bank 148 Photo 23—Taiko—Transformer No 2 of destroyed bank

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Photo 24—Taiko—Transformer No 3 of destroyed bank 149 Photo 25 —Taiko—Destroyed group of oil circuit breakers

Photo 26—Taiko—Casing of 500 lb bomb found in bottom of crater at station 150 PLANT REPORT NUMBER 18 MIE SUBSTATION YOKKAICHI MIE PREFECTURE (NEAR NAGOYA) JAPAN DATE INSPECTED 28 OCTOBER 1945

Summary. The Mie substation is the main primary substation of 1,54 1. Tho Mio Substation is locatpd in Mio Profoc- transforming f ransmission line voltage KV and ture, approxiniatol}- 25 miles southwest of the city of serving the very important Yokkaichi area south of Nag;oya. It had a transformer capacity of 100,000 the city of Nagoya. This area, located on Ise Bay, KVA, and was a very important factor in the elec- contains, besides the port and city of Yokkaichi, the

Irical supply to th(> highly industrialized area on the Utsube River Oil Refinery, Ishihara Smelter and Re- west side of Ise Bay, which includes oil refineries, finery, the Mitaki River Oil Refinery, Second Naval naval installations, and harbor and dock facilities. Fuel Depot, and many other imjiortant industrial 1942 this station averaged 2. This station was never a primary target, but and naval installations. In was heavily damaged on 9 July 1945 during a raid by approximately 20 million KWH monthly, with maxi- the the Twentieth AF on the Utsube Oil Refinery. The mum demand of 42,500 KW. In 194.3 monthly to station was evidently attacked, either in error, or as average was about the same, with demand up a target of opportunity, as the primary target was 44,500 KW, and in 1944 the maximum demand was located over 2 miles away. There were 16 hits of 42,500 KW, average demand 34,000 KW, maximum average 500-lb GP bombs in the station area, of which 6 were daily deliveiy 800,000 KWH, and monthly effective. slightly under 20 million KWH. The station was completed and put into operation in 1940. Its total 3. The principal damage was destruction of the capacity 100,000 entire transformer capacity, consisting of a total of transformer was KVA. 6 transformers, which rendered the station completely 2. Physical description of plant. This substation is located approximately 25 miles inoperative. No production loss was sustained be- southwest of the city of Nagoya at about the inter- cause of their ability to make substitution by tempo- 136°36' 34°56' latitude and raiy means through another substation. Recupera- section of longitude and railroad station of Shiohama tion would require about one year. Vulnerability of 13^2 miles due east of the and 3 miles southwest of the town of Yokkaichi. The such stations is demonstrated conclusively by the is 400 ft square, contain- large and lasting damage caused by a veiy few bombs. station area approximately ing about 4 acres. (Exhibit A). Except for a small 4. No intelligence data was ever given on this building housing the control room and dispatcher's station, nor was the damage either assessed or office, a transformer repair building, and minor stor- reported. age buildings, all equipment is located outdoors. 5. It is very significant concerning this station to (Exhibit C, photo 1 for general view). Incoming note that the heavy damage was caused by a com- voltage is 154 KV, which enters the station from the jjaratively small amount of bombing effort. How- west in 2 circuits on the same towers. These circuits ever, it is also significant that temporary measures are tapped to the main 154-KV line that runs from could, and did, overcome the loss of the station. Iwakura Substation in Nagoya to the Yao Substation \^niile this was, to some degree, due to loss of load in Osaka. The 154-KV section contains 2 154-KV, air from area and industry bombing, it is evident that blast breakers and interconnecting bussing and dis- the bombing of a single substation produces no desir- connects. There are 2 banks of transformers. One able economic efTect and that only by a combination bank consists of three 20,000-KVA and the other has of the destruction of the majority of substations, three 13,333-KVA transformers, all with rating of together with steam generating plants, within an 154/77 KV and with U-KV tertiary winding. There area, can the electric power supply be effectively is one 20,000-KVA transformer spare. The 77-KV destroyed. section contains potential and current transformers,

The Plant and Its Function In discoimects, oil circuit breakers, and usual bussing.

Enemy Economy. There is also an installation of static condensers.

1. Product f)f plant and its importance in enemy There are 4 outgoing 77 KV circuits, 2 of which feed economy. the distribution substations at Y''okkaichi and Tsu, 151 and the other 2 go to the Na\';s' substation for use by condensers, completely demolishing about half of the the Na'vy and industrials. condenser capacity and doing heavy fragmentation

3. The station is owned by the Japan Electric damage to the cases, insulators, and racks of the Generation and Transmission Company. Informa- balance. (Exhibit C, photo 9). The only protective tion was secured from Mr. S. Saito, director and head measures taken were the wood and sand blast barriers of the Tokai district in which this station is located, that had been placed around the main transformers, and Mr. G. Matsudo, station master. and which proved ineffective because of their con- 4. The station normally has 20 employees, and struction of inflammable material. this number has not changed throughout the war. b. An accurate bomb plot showing exact location Two shifts are worked. of hits and the damage has been prepared and is shown in Exhibit A. Attacks. 2. Production loss. This station was subjected to bombing with HE a. Although the station was rendered completely bombs on the night of 9 July 1945 at approximately inoperable, no production loss occurred. The station 2330. Records do not show that this station was ever had over-capacity to start with, and, at the time of a primary target, so evidently it was damaged during the damage, much of its usual load had been lost a raid on the Utsube Oil Refinery, which was the because of damage to the industrial area served. Also, primai-y target of attack on 9 July 1945. In this raid ways and means were devised to by-pass the station. 61 a/c of the Twentieth AF dropped 469 tons of 500-lb general purpose HE bombs. There were 16 hits b. Definite means of substitution and modification 154- on this station. were obtained. The station was supplied by two KV circuits tapped on the 2-circuit Iwakura-Osaka Effects of Bombing. transmission line. When the bombing rendered the

1. Physical damage. transformers useless, one of the circuits was cut at a. Of the 16 hits that were made within or adja- the junction point where the feeders to this station cent to the station area, 10 were on the north side of tapped the main lines from Iwakura Substation. the 77-KV section and did only minor fragmentation Connections at Iwakura were changed so that this damage. The others did the following damage: circuit became 77-KV instead of its usual 154 KV, Two hits near the towers supporting the incoming and a jumper was placed completely around the sta- 154-KV lines tore down the lines and damged sup- tion, thus connecting the outgoing lines directly to porting insulators, although towers remained intact. feeders from the Iwakura Sulistation. Exhibit B One hit in center of 154-KV bus structure com- shows the normal comiections diagram and tempo- pletely demolished about half of this structure with rary emergency connections. Thus, service was es- however, there was no control at Mie Sub- all supports, and fragmentation damaged both the tablished ; 154-KV air blast breakers and supporting structures. station and there were certain other limiting factors. furnished (Exhibit C, photos 6 and 7). The substation of Iwakura could not have One direct hit near the end of the transformer bank this load had not its own load been curtailed by did the greatest damage. This hit was directly beside industrial and area bombing. The transmission line again, the loss of a 20,000-KVA transformer and damged it beyond to Osaka was definitely limited, but, this repair. The oil was set on fire, and this fire enveloped load in Osaka made this unimportant. However, the complete transformer l)ank and burned for 18 is an example of what can be done to provide con- hours. All 6 transformers were completel.y ruined (the tinuous service during an emergency. spare transfomier was in the repair shop at the time), c. (1) The causes for loss of this station were the and will require major repairs and rebuilding. The complete loss of transformer capacity because of complete bus structure over the traasformers was bombing and resultant fire.

destroyed. Wood and sand blast barriers placed (2) No loss was caused through diversion of labor, around the transformers for protection added inflam- materials, or other facilities.

mable material to the fire and did more harm than (3) The protective measures taken did add to the

good. (Exhibit C, photos 2, 3, 4 and 5). fire loss, although to what extent is problematical.

One hit was directly on one set of potential and (4) No loss was caused through absenteeism or current traasformers in 77-KV section. (Exhibit C, inefficiency. photo 8). Equipment was s(!verfily damaged. (5) No loss was caused through shortage of essen- One hit was directly on one (uad of bank of static tial materials. 152 3. Rocuporaliility oyclc. less. It can, therefore, be said that as small a quantity

Based on ability to socurc necessary materials, it as four-tenths of a ton per acre will produce lasting would require appi'oximately one year to effect coin- damage to this typo of iastallation.

|)lete repairs. This is on the assunijition that no spare Intelligence Check. transformers were available elsewhere ; for these dam- 1. No pre-raid data was found on this station in aged transformers will c(>rtainly require a complete any of the intelligence materials. factory reliuild job. Tlie fact that a means of substi- 2. No damage assessment was made. tution and modification was used successfully in this 3. No iihoto interpretation was made. case does not mean quick recuperability. The loss of any single station can usually be overcome, but, Data Relevant To Other Studies. when a number of stations are put out of sei-vice, no None. substitution is possible and recuperation is as long as is required to rebuild completely. No attempt to Evaluations and Impressions. effect anj' repairs had been made. This was a new and modern station, and its main- 4. Vulnerability. tenance and operation were good. The ability to over-

This is an excellent example of the vulnerability of come the loss showed good judgement and execution. substations. Of the 16 bombs that struck the station, The fact that heavy damage was caused by a small only 6 were within effective range, but these, and (juantity of bombs demonstrates the vulnerability of especially one, rendcn-ed this station completely use- .substations.

153

NORMAL CONNECTIONS PRIOR TO DAMAGE -TO OSAKA FROM IWAKURA S9- EXHIBIT C

Photo 1 —General view of station.from lii-l-KV end

Photo 2—Bomb crater from direct hit at end of transformer bank Photo 3—Bank of 6 damaged transformers

Photo 4—Damaged 20,000-KVA transformer (end transformer in photo 3)

15't Photo 5 —Dfimagcil 20,000 KVA transformer (tliiril trnnsfiirmer in photo 3)

Photo 6—Damaged 154 KV air blast Ijreakcr. Note fragmentation marks

158 Photo 7—Diiut't liit ou 154 KV bus structure

Photo 8 —Bonili crater froin hit, near 77 KV potential transformers

159 Photo 9—Direct hit on static condensers

160 PLANT REPORT NUMBER 19 SECONDARY SUBSTATIONS OSAKA, JAPAN

DATE INSPECTED 1 NOVEMBER 1945

Summary. The Plant and Its Function In

1. This report covers 6 secondary substations Enemy Economy. owned by tlu; Kansai Electric Supply Company, 1. The product of the plant and its importance in which is the electric distributing company in the enemy economy. Osaka ar(>a. These substations are located in Osaka This report covers a group of damaged secondary and arc not all the substations there, but the princi- or distribution substations in the city of Osaka or its pal damaged ones. Their sizes are relatively small, immediate vicinity. The names of these substations and these 6 total 66,700 KVA in transformer rated together with their capacities are as follows: capacity. It is difficult to point out any specific im- KVA portance in the enemy economy other than that sub- Nakamoto 6,000 stations in general arc an important link in the chain Sakurajima 17,500 of electric supply from generation to the consumer, Sakaigawa 7,000 and since Osaka was an important area, these sub- Dotombori 6,000 stations were equally important in proportion to Ishizugawa 28,200 their size. Yamatogawa 3,000 2. These substations were never a primary target, but were damaged in conjunction with various area These stations are not all the substations in Osaka, raids or attacks on adjacent industries. but are the principal secondary stations that were 3. Principal damage was done to transformers, damaged. A substation is an important link in the switchboards, control wiring, switch gear, and build- chain of distribution of electric current from its ings. While much damage was caused by fire, this was source of generation to the ultimate consumer, and mostly the result of their being located in crowded therefore its destruction prevents the use of the cur- areas adjacent to highly inflammable buildings, and, rent. These stations were important in the complete to some extent, of being housed in buildings with roofs electrical system, and the individual importance of of combustible material. Since the area they served each, as a single unit, is not herein emphasized. In was destroyed, the production loss by the station Exhibit A there is a more complete tabulation of destruction was of no economic importance. It is pertinent data. shown that secondary substations are highly vulner- 2. Physical description of plant. able and that recuperation is a long process. For purposes of convenience, each station is sepa- 4. These substations (with one exception) had not rately Usted with its description, attacks, damage, been listed in intelUgence reports, and no specific and other information. damage assessments made. However, secondaiy sub- Substation. stations are too numerous to list aU of them, and un- Nakamoto less serving some particularly valuable specific indus- This station was contained in a single reinforced tiy of great militaiy importance, would not be concrete building, with a hip-type, steel-covered individually listed. roof, built about 25 years ago. Exhibit B, photo 1 station where it re- 5. These stations were seriously damaged by fire, shows a view of the front of the which would give the impression that this type of ceived a direct hit. Exhibit B, photo 2 shows an installation was particularly vulnei'able to incendiary inside view fi-om the front end of the building with the left trans- bomb damage. This is not, however, generallj^ true, the 10-KV switching structure on and and had they been isolated from surrounding com- formers in cells on the right. Induction regulators are bustible buildings and been constructed, as sub- located directly in back of the transformer cells. stations usually are, completely of non-combustible Exhibit B, photo 3, gives a view looking toward the materials, they would have been practically undam- front of the station at the level of the mezzanine floor control board at left, and aged from fire, except that caused by high explosive on which are located the bombs. shows the top of the 10-KV switching structure and 161 the transformers in cells. The battery was located in This station used 4 employees per shift and at the

the far left corner on the first floor, with the control time of the raid 3 were present, but none was injiu'ctl. panel and the charging motor generator set on the Since the surrounding area was completely de- mezzanine floor directly above. The 3-KV switching stroyed, this substation will not be rebuilt. Informa- structure is on the mezzanine floor at the rear end of tion was furnished by T. Ozawa, station master. the building with all lines going out overhead. Sakaigawa Substation. The attack on this substation was on 14 August This substation, located in a small factory and 1945 at 1100. It was hit by one GP bomb at the front residential area, was of reinforced concrete construc- end of the building (E.xhibit B, photo 1), damaging tion with hipped wooden roof, and had been extended the building severely, damaging the storage battery and revamped several times. As a result, it is housed on the ground floor at the front right hand corner of in a number of rooms which make a veiy poor ar- the building, and damaging one bushing on the near- rangement, especially the 20-KV switchgear of the est transfonner. (Exhibit B, photo 2, shows a view cell type consti'uction. The 3-KV switching is of the taken from the rear of the substation). No bombs open type supported on a frame work (Exliibit B, dropped on any of the surrounding buildings. photo 7), and other parts are of the cell construction Two operators were used in this station on each type. At this station the transformers are installed shift with other men doing maintenance work. During outdoors. The present, high tension, oil circuit this raid 4 persons were slightly injured. For em- breakers have an interrupting capacity of 300,000 ployees' protection air-raid shelters were provided. KVA. For improving the power factor, there were Because of changed conditions due to the bombing of installed outdoors ten 150-KVA, 3-KV, capacitor the surrounding area, this substation will be abolished. units. Information was furnished by K. Suguira, station No direct hit was made on this building, but IBs master. hit the adjoining building on t\w. north and flames Sakurajima Substation. were communicated to this substation, damaging the control panels, wiring, This substation was located Ln a heavily indus- the control and the 3-KV switching. (Exhibit ti'ialized area, which manufactured airplane pro- B, photo 7). No persons were injured in this station no protecting shelters were pellers, metal products, etc. (Exhibit B, photos 5 and and installed. Information furnished I. Yomishita, 6). The control and switching equipment was housed was by in a one-floor, reinforced concrete building with a station master. hip-shaped roof, steel sheet covered, while the trans- Dotombori Substation. formers were installed outdoors to the left of tliis This substation was mostly of reinforced concrete building. (Exliibit B, photo 4) In order to improve consti'uction; some of the older parts were of brick, the power factor, static-type condensers were and all had wooden roofs. All equipment, except the installed. static capacitors, was housed indoors, with the 3-KV This substation was attacked on 24 July 1945 and 1 1-KV switchgear and transformers on the ground during a general attack on this area and suffered a floor and their control on the second floor. In a direct hit on the building, resulting in a fire which, separate concrete building with a wooden roof was with flames from burning adjoining factories, com- located a 1,000-KVA, 3-KV, synchronous condenser pletely destroyed the building and contents. The fire with its control, and outside of this building were damaged the outdoor transformers, but these had foundations for ten 150-KVA, 3-KV, static, capacitor not been examined, at time of inspection, to deter- units, but only 3 were in place. mine whether the core and coils were damaged be- There was one direct hit by an IB on the roof at yond repair. Exhibit B, photo 6, shows a view of an about the middle of the control room. The resulting adjacent factory destroyed in the same raid. It is fire destroyed nearly all of the control board and fol- believed that even if this substation had not been hit lowed the control wiring to the first floor, but did no directly, it would have been destroyed by the fire damage to the 3-KV switchmg. (Exhibit B, photo 8). from the adjoining factories, as station personnel Also, as a result of this hit, the wooden roof of the stated that the substation was surrounded by a sea of building in which the synchronous condenser was flames, and that 1,000 to 1,500 persons perished in located burned, and falling embers destroyed the the adjoining areas. It will bo noted in photos 4 and control. The synchronous condenser escaped damage,

5, that a reinforced concrete wall about 7 ft high had but is now exposed to the weather as the roof has not been installed on 2 sides of the substation building. been repaired. 162 :

An (lil lank oulsidc the suhslatioii was ilaiiiaj^rd Uy outdoor substation was simple and spacing large, but

fiiv. olherwis(^ it had no special featur(\s.

Althout!;h, at tlic fiinc dI' lliis raid, 5 men were in This substation was sul)j(;cted to an attack bj^ IBs the station, none was injured. Information w'us fur- and, according to M. Yamauchi, mast(!r of the sta- nislied by J. Doi, station master. tion, threi! 26-lb IBs and 25 small bombs wmv droppcnl with high accuracy on the Iniildings of this station. Substation. Yamatogawa None of the buildings across the narrow road from All equipnienl was lioused in Ijrick stucco-covi'red these buildings was hit. All the buildings were burned. buildings, with wooden rooves. The 3-KV switching, At the time of the raid, one of the 4,200-KVA, transformers, battery and charger, and control panels OIWC, main transformers was in the repair shop, were located in the larger room, while the 10-KV and the core and coils were completely destroyed as switching was housed in a separate smaller room. At well as the bushings. The tank can be cleaned and the time of inspection, this 10-KV switching had refinished for further use. The warehouse was com- been completely disassembled, but other damaged pletely destroyed as was the pump house. The roof parts had not been disassembled. This station was of the building in which the control and 3-KV tniilt about 30 years ago, and, since it is located in a switching were located was set afire, and falling badly damaged area, it will be abohshed. embers completely destroyed the control pahels, antl This station received no direct hit, but burned badly damaged the 3-KV switching. No protective because of fire from surrounding burning buildings covering had been provided at time of inspection. which set the roof on fire. Falling embers damaged (E.xhibit B, photo 10). A few shelters had been pro- the 3-KV switchgcar of open construction, trans- vided for employees. One man was injured in the raid foj-mers, battery, charger and its control, the main and died 10 hours thereafter as a result. control in the main room, as well as the 10-KV 3. These various substations are owned by the; switching in the adjoining room. Exhibit B, photo 9, Kansai Electric Supply Company, which is the elec- shows the main control panels with 3-KV switching tric distribution company in the Osaka area. Infor- in the rear, with the battery charger and the control mation was obtained from the various masters of the panel at the left. One transformer can be seen back substations. of the 3-KV switchgear. The transformer bushings 4. The uLunbcr of employees at each substation is and fittings were damaged, but the oil inside did not given under the gt'neral description for each .sub- catch fire, and therefore these can be easily repaired. station where data were definite. This is true of all circuit breakers, but no protection against weather has been made. Attacks. At this station 4 men are employed, and no one Under each station is listed the date of the damag(>. was injured. Thtn-e had been no shelters provided. In no case was any station the subject of a specific Information was furnished by U. Sakamoto, station attack, but was damaged as a result of an area raid master. or an attack on some adjacent industrial target. Ishizugawa Substation. These attacks, all by the Twentieth AF, are listed as follows This substation occupies an area of about 200 by City of Osaka.—90.25 250 ft and is of the outdoor type, with the exception Missio7i 13 March 1945; 275 A/C of the 73rd, of the 3-KV switching and main control panels 42. 313th, and 314th Bomb Wings partici- (Exhibit B, photo 10), which were located in a brick- pated; time of attack was 1457Z to faced, reinforced concrete building with a wooden 1825Z; altitude from 5,000 to 9,400 ft. roof in one corner of substation area. Along one side, next to this, was the water pumping equipment for Bombs dropped: some of the water-cooled transformers, housed in a 194.5 tons E-28 (500#IC) wootlen Iniikling. A short distance away, across the 812.0 tons E-36 (500#IC) entrance road, was located the wooden wai'ehouse 671.4 tons E-46 (500#IC) which contained spare bushings for the transformers 54.7 tons M-47A2 (100#IB) and the oil circuit breakers, oil, and 3 induction regu- Damage: 8.1 sq mi destroyed; 13 num- lators. E.\hibit A gives a tabulation for the number of ber targets destroyed or dam- incoming lines, transformers, outgoing lines, capacity, aged. See D/A#24. No bomb and voltage ratio of transformers. The layout of the plot available. 163 SAKI URBAN.—90.25 Mission 258. On night of 9/10 July 1945, 73rd Bomb Wing participated, dropping a total of 778.9 tons on primary and 19.6 tons on opportunity, between 100233K- 100406K, from 10,000-11,350 ft, 1/10 clouds over target.

Type bombs itnd highly influnnnable districts, were subject to the stations wer(^ tlamaged are briefly covtTcsd in rt'ports same degree of fire damage as their surroundings. for the area, and it will be noted that nothing is

Also, there is considerable inflammable oil in sub- included in these; reports regarding damage; to these stations which, once released and ignited, will do a secondary substations. great deal of damage. Substations arc very vulner- 3. No mention was made in any damage assess- able, as studies of these stations show, but are more ment of recuperation or dispersal. subject to lasting damage through high explosive Data Relevant To Other Studies. bombing than incendiary bombing. None.

Intelligence Check. Evaluations and Impressions. 1. a. OSS Report did not list any of these sub- These substations hatl been retained a long lime stations except Ishizugawa. beyond the logical point of replacement and badly 6. The Air Objective P'older 90.25 for Osaka Area needed simplification and modernization. Their loca- issued by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air tions were, in most cases, in crowded areas with Staff, Intelligence, did not list these secondary highly combustible buildings immediately adjacent, substations. and almost no protective measures were taken. Ob-

c. JTG did not include any information on thes(> viously, the loss of the area rendered the substations secondary substations. luiimportant, but the destruction of the primary sub-

2. Records of raids in which these secondary substations would also have made these stations useless.

EXHIBIT A—OSAKA SECONDARY SUBSTATIONS EXHIBIT B

Photo 1 —Front view of Nakamoto substation

Photo 2—Nakamoto substation interior view ground floor—lOKV switching structure at left and transformers in cells at right 166 Photo 3—Nakamoto substation-view looking towards front of station taken just above mezzanine floor level

Photo 4—Sakurajima substation-view showing substation with outdoor transformers 167 Photo 5 —Sakurajima substation-view showing this substation at left and damaged industrial plant in backgrounrl

Photo 6—View of damaged manufacturins l)uildin}j nv.nr .Sakurajima substation 168 Photo 7—Sakaigawa substation, damaged 3-KV switching

V"^«-

Photo 8—Dotoinbori substation-view showing ihimaged control panels and control wiring, part in foreground removed 169 Photo 9—Yamatogawa substation-view showing main control panels, 3-KV switching in rear, and roof completely destroyed

Photo 10— Lsliizugawa substation-view showing location of damaged control board in front of damaged 3-KV switch gear

170 PLANT REPORT NUMBER 20 YAO SUBSTATION OSAKA, JAPAN DATE INSPECTED 29 OCTOBER 1945

Summary. The Plant and Its Function In

1. The Yao Suhstation is located at the town of Enemy Economy. Shiki in the Minanii-Kawaciii district of Osaka Pro- 1. The product of fbe plant and its importance in focturo, a short distance north of the Hanshin Air- enemy economy. field, on the Kansai main-line railway. It had a nomi- The Yao Substation is one of 3 primary substations nal capacity of .300,000 KVA, and is one of ,3 primary transforming the transmission line voltage of 154- substations in the Osaka-Amagasaki-Kobe Area. It KV from hydro-electric generating stations to 77-KV was a very important and necessary .'substation in the serving the network system in the Osaka-Amaga- process of transmission of electric cnrnnit from h_vdro saki-Kobe Area for general distribution. It is the plants for utilization in this highly industrialized largest single substation in all Japan and veiy impor- section. tant in this highly industrial section. 2. This substation was never a primary target, but 2. Physical description of plant. was damaged by two raids, one on 28 July and the This substation is located at the town of Shiki in other on 30 July 194.5. Evidently these attacks were the Minami-Kawachi district of Osaka Prefecture, made by carrier planes of the U.S. Navy, using on the Kansai main-line railway, running north and bombs, rockets, and machine guns, and thought to a little east from the Hanshin airfield. The plant area be by Mr. Eguchi, Master of substation, P-51 planes. is nearly rectangular, approximately 790 ft north- There was a total of 14 hits by rockets or bombs which south, and 630 ft east-west, equaling approximately are definitely located, but doubt exists in some in- 11.5 acres. There is a reinforced concrete synchronous stances as to whether they were small bombs or condenser and control building, approximately 245 rockets. No estimate of the namber of individual ma- ft long and 60 ft wide, which is located on the north chine gim bullet hits could be made, but they were side of the plant area. This building contains five great in number. 30,000-KVA, three-phase, 60-cycle, 11-KV, sjti- of 3. The principal damage was the destruction chronous condensers, with space for 2 more together 9 transformers, each 20,000 KVA, and the main con- with all controls. All other equipment is located out- trol, which temporarily put the substation completely doors. The 154-KV section is located in the eastern indefinitely limited capacity to out of operation and half of the plant area. There are 4 incoming 154-KV two-fifths of the original capacity. Production loss lines, 2 entering the station from the north, identified since loss of load through previous was not estimated as the Hokuriku Trunk Lines from Sasazu station area neutralized economic effect. bombing had any near the city of Toyama, and 2 entering the station permit the Temporary measures had been made to from the west, identified as the Kansai Tnmk Lines use of the undamaged transformers, but no start had from Inuyama substation, near Nagoya. There are been made on replacement or repair to the damaged 5 transformer banks, each consisting of three 20,000- transformers. KVA, 3-winding, single-phase, OISC transformers 4. The importance and location were correctly with conservation tanks, wound for primary voltage evaluated in intelligence data, although the size of of 140 KV with suitable taps, for secondary of 77 KV, the station as given was too low. No probal^le damage and for tertiary of 11 KV; the tertiary is connected has been reported. to a synchronous condenser. Space is provided for

5. It is .significant in this station to note that heavj^ 2 additional banks of transformers. and lasting damage can be done with a compara- The 77-KV section is located in the west half of the tively small amount of bombing effort. It is also plant area and nearly all of the ten 77-KV overhead especially significant that rockets and machine ginis lines leave the substation toward the west. used in strafing could and did cause serious damage, Outside the plant, in the same compound, are lo- although this type of attack is not recommended in cated various wooden buildings, used as offices, shops, preference to the use of HE bombs. and warehouses. In the northeast corner is located a

(;il771.'!—47— 12 171 : concrete basin for storage of cooling water for syn- to all 4 breakers, and photos No 4 and 5 show views chronous condensers. of the damaged grounding resistors. 3. The substation is owned and operated by the One hit directly on the 11-KV connections from Japan Electric Generation and Transmission Com- transformer bank 5 to synchronous condensers. Dam- pany, and the following persons were interviewed age was medium. Mr. S. Kadono, chf engr, Kinki Branch One hit was in the 77-KV switching structure. Mr. S. Kaku, generation and transmission According to Mr. Eguchi, the rocket hit the concrete engr, Enki Branch base of the oil circuit breaker, detonating and com- Mr. M. Eguchi, master of Yao substation pletely destroying the oil circuit breaker, instrument 4. The number of employees at this substation is transformers, and the structure. The resulting oil fire 40, with no change from normal or war conditions. caused fiu-ther damage, including that to a small They operate on a basis of 2 shifts. power transformer located to the south. Exhibit A,

photo 7, shows damage which would appear to he Attacks. caused by an HE bomb. According to Mr. Eguchi, master of the station, One hit was on the main building, causing minor there were 2 attacks by P-51 planes with rockets and damage only. Further damage during this raid was machine guns. The first was on 28 July 1945 at 1315, the incoming line breaker bushing and tank, 2 poles and evidently the nearby airfield was the primary of the adjacent disconnecting switch, tie breaker target, with the substation as a secondary target. The tank, and the bushing of the 140-KV, oil, circuit planes came from the north and circled the substa- breaker for number 4 transformer bank. Other dam- tion twice before attacking. The second raid was on age to the 140-KV structure was mostly to the insu- 30 July 1945 by 8 planes in 2 formations of 4 each, lators of the bus supports and the disconnecting which came from the northeast, circled the substation switches. As a result of the strafing, a great many oil twice at comparatively low altitude, and then came circuit breakers, potential transformers, and light- in from the west for the attack. ning arresters suffered damage, and a large number No report of any mission by the Twentieth AF is of insulators were broken. available, and therefore it is believed that these b. The damage on 30 July 1945 was as follows: planes were carrier planes of the U.S. Navy. Two hits were outside of the plant area proper, There is considerable doubt as to whether some of damage was minor. the hits were made by small general purpose bombs One hit was on 77 KV structure—minor damage; or by rockets. The station personnel feel certain that parts damaged, such as insulator connections and only rockets were used, but evidence indicates the structure. possibility that some of the hits at least were with One hit was in the 140-KV section causing no small bombs. However, it is equally certain that there damage. were some rocket hits, and careful examination was 07ie hit glanced off a transformer bushing and made to see the effect of rockets on this type of landed at a point nearby, damaging the bushing installation. slightly.

Eflfects of Bombing. Two hits caused only minor damage.

1. Physical damage. Two hits were on the control building. It is quite

a. (1) The damage on 28 July 1945 is as follows: certain that these were rockets. One of the 2 rockets One hit outside the synchronous condenser build- went through the wall above the main control floor, ing, causing only minor damage. starting a fire which completely destroyed the control One hit destroyed part of the outdoor neutral desk and auxiliary panels. The other went through grounding resistor used on high tension side. Because under the main floor, causing a fire which destroyed of possible fragmentation from this rocket and the the control cable. At the time of inspection, damage strafing of other transformers, the transformer oil to walls had been repaired. Exhibit A, photo 8, show was released and ignited; the resulting fire eventually half of control desk repaired. enveloped 9 transformers together with structure and In Exliibit A, photo 2, some vertical rods can be connections above the transformers, and four 140-KV seen at the extreme right of the picture, and in photo oil circuit breakers. Exhibit A, photos No 1, 2, 3 and No 3 this same type of rod can be seen in the fore-

4, give views of damaged transformers, photo 6 ground. These are for the concrete walls, being con- shows 140-KV oil circuit breaker, typical of damage structed across the transfer track from the trans- 172 formors in front of the 154-KV, oil, oircuif hroakors. substations carried the load. As the main control, Tlicao 7-ft walls had been finished opposite trans- including battery, was destroyed, a small auxiliary former banks nos 4 and 5, but not opposite the others. plant was installed to furnish power for control and These walls had been damaged slightly. Other pro- operation of the oil circuit breakers so that the 2 re- tective measures were shelters for personnel at maining banks of transformers could be used. At the various points. time of inspection part of the control room had been

(1) The temporary loss of the entire station was damaged are not available, as no report can be lo- due to loss of the main control room by fire. The loss cated. Evidently the information given by Mr. of three-fifths of the station capacity was due to the Eguchi, master of the substation, was correct, and it destruction of the 3 banks of transformers through is believed that the raids were by carrier planes of the liombing and resulting fire. United States Navy. No damage assessment report is

(2) No production was lost through diversion of on file. labor, material, or machine facilities. 3. No reports of assessment of recuperation or

(3) No loss of production was caused through pro- dispersal are on file. tective measures. Data Relevant To Other Studies. No loss of production was caused through ab- (4) None. senteeism or unusual inefficiency.

(5) No loss was caused by loss of any other Evaluations and Impressions. essentials. This substation had been well maintained and the

3. Rccuperability cycle. plant persoimel were doing very excellent work get- The complete substation was out of commission for ting the station control and other parts back into only a short period during which the other 2 primary operation. 173 While this station demonstrated fully the compara- tion of the industr>^ and cities in the area served; tive ease with which substations can be heavily therefore, no results were obtained in this case. How- damaged and rendered inoperative for long periods ever, assuming that the load had existed at the time of time, it also shows that there is no economic effect of damage, most of the loss could still have been unless other stations or facilities within the same area overcome. Recommendations covering the destruc- are simultaneous^ damaged. In this case, the loss of tion of substations and its effects on electric power load had already been accomplished through destruc- service are fully covered in the final industry I'eport.

EXHIBIT A

Photo 1 —General view of main damaged section, looking south from control room

174 Photo 2—Closer view of damage to transformers and structure, looking north—synchronous condenser building in background

175 Photo 3—Another view of nearest bank shown in photo 2—reinforcing rods for protective wall in foreground

Photo 4—Another view of damaged transformers and structure, with outdoor grounding resistors in foreground 176 Photo 5 —Closer view of damaged grounding resistors

Photo 6—View showing damaged 140-KV oQ circuit breaker for transformer bank No 1, with east end of synchronous condenser building at left 177 Photo 7—View showing damage done by rocket hit in 77-KV switching section

«•• ISSS '••• ••'>•

Photo 8—View of partially repaired control desk 178 .

PLANT REPORT NUMBER 21 SHIOJIRI SUBSTATION NEAR MATSUMOTO, CENTRAL HONSHU, JAPAN

DATE INSPECTED 4 NOVEMBER 1945

Summary. The Plant and Its Function In

1. The Sliiojiri Svibsfation is locaknl in central Enemy Economy.

Honslui near the city of Matsuinoto. It had a trans- 1. The product of the i)lant and its importance in former capacity of 60,000 KVA; however, since an enemy economy. iinjiortant function of the station was to act as a This is a veiy important switching and transformer switching and control point for incoming and out- station in the transmission system of the Japan Elec- going lines of the same voltage not req\iiring trans- tric Generation and Transmission Company. Its formation, the capacity of transformers does not jirincipal function is to act as a switching and cen- indicate its true size. The station is a complete out- tralized control point for incoming 154-KV trans- door type. During the 3 war years, the output of the mission lines from various groups of hydi'o stations station was approximately 100 million KWH per in the centi'al Honshu mountainous area, and to annum, not an appreciable quantity in the total of retransmit to lines going to Tokyo or Nagoya. It also all of Japan. The principal function of the station was receives current from one group of hydro stations at to act as a central collection point for energy from 77 KV, transforms to 154 KV, and retransmits. This 3 separate groups of hydro generating stations, and station also serves one large industrial customer. This to control, switch, and disjiatch this energy to several is contrary to usual practice as the Japan Electric different outgoing transmission lines mainly going to Generation and Transmission Company generally the Tokyo Area. Where such energy was received at supplies only the various distributing companies.

77 KV, it was transformed to 154 KV. In addition, This customer is the Showa Denko Company's car- this station supplied encrgj' directly to a large indus- bonmdum factory, located nearby, and it is served trial plant located nearby. directly by a 77-KV line with a maximum load of

2. There were no attacks on, or war danuigc to, 15,000 KW. The total energy passed through this the station. station was approximately 100 million KWH annually, but the monthly load varied in accordance 3 There was no physical damage nor any produc- with the hydro seasons. tion loss. Therefore, no recuperation cycle was established. It was vulnerable to attack as are all sub- 2. Phj'sical description of plant. stations, though its location made it somewhat a. This substation is located at thv village of inaccessible. In the event of damage or destruction, Hirooka, near the city of Matsumoto in Nagano Pre- means of bypassing the station could have been put fecture, central Honshu, and was put in operation in in effect, and thereby much of the loss could have November of 1924. The area covered is very irregular been overcome, and thus anj' economic result would in shape, but generally is somewhat formed like an have been neutralized. L and covers about 5J-2 acres. Except for buildings to 4. This station was not mentioned in any intelli- house the office, control room, repair shops and ware- gence data. house, the station is a complete outdoor type. (Exhibit A, photo 1). The following incoming or out- 5. The value of the study of this station lies m the the station: fact that any effort that might have been expended going lines are connected to for its destruction would have been futile, since Takasegawa Line 154-KV, 2 circuit from means were available to overcome to a large extent hydro plants on the Takase River. the difficulties that would have been caused bj' its Azusagawa Line 154-KV, 2 circuit from

destruction. Therefore, it can be seen that, in making hydro plants on the Azusa River. any plans for elimination of the electric system of Hirao Line 77-KV, 2 circuit from hydro Japan, the effects to be attained by destruction of plants in the Hirao area. substations must be based on careful consideration Koshin Line 154-KV, 2 circuit to Asahi of the functions of each station and of the existence substation at Tokyo. of means by which the loss can be overcome. Matsushima Line 154-KV, 2 circuit to 179 Miils\i.sliiin:i switcliinn .sliitioii I'ruiii wliicli area of a hij^li pl;iiii and couM li:i\ e liern e;isil\' located

point till' Tt-niyil lino mors to Nisshin suli and appro.'iched.

slulion in Nll(!:o\ii iiml tlu' Tsuniijiinn line /), 11,'ld this slalioii lieeii destroyed, certain iiielli-

^;u^H (o v.'iiioiis snl>st!i(ions nt Tokvo ods could li;i\e lieen adopted to count eiacl the i-lTects.

Shown Pi'iiko l.ini' 77-K\', I fiiciiit to The 'J incominj? and - oulj^oinv; lal-KN' lines could Sliowa Pinko l.'o. i'!iil>oiut(iliiiii phmt. all lia\e lieen connected together hy means of toiu-

'riic ti'.'insloinicr i'!i|i!U'itv ol I he station is (ill.tUU) poiaiy liy-pass jumpers ;iroinid the stiition, or each

K\ A consist iiiK of 'J l>anks witli ,! sinnlc-pluisc tians- of the incoiuinv, lines could ha\e heen conni'cled to

I'orniors, cju'li niti-il ID.tMUi K\ A IM/77-K\', niul one of the outnoinn lines. Control would liaAc heen tluMi- is ono s|mrt' transt'ornu'r. i^Ksliihil A, iiholo 'JV lost, liut some seml>l;ince of opeiation would lia\e

riifiT IS a total of cli'Vi-n I.M-K\ and s('V(>n 77- K\' oil l>een secured. The le.al hottlenei'k wnuld ha\e heen nicnil l>it'akt>i's (lOxhihit A, photo H), loj!;t'tlu'i wiih the fact thai means to iransl'orm, and thus iitiliise the the nsnal Imssing, luis slructnirs, station tians- ener>!,y comin,u in on the 77-l\.\' line from that group fomn'i's, polontial and tnnrrnt tiansfoiiniMs, fontfol of hydro pkants would have heen destroyed, and,

uiil iiistiimunl lioai'ils, oil tanks, coolinj^ poiul. aiul llius, this power would lia\e heeii lost. In addition, other I'unipnu'nt. ^K\hiliit A, pl\t>to 1). the meai\s to .servt> the Showa 1 >enko Industrial

.V Tin- station is owned liv the Japait MleiMiic riant would have hetMi curtailed, hut it might ha\e (i<'neiation and Transnussion C'oiiipan>, and infoi- lieeii possiMe temporarily to connect this feeder line mation was fnmished 1\\ Salniiv" Iwaiuine, station to tlu> iucoming 77-K\' line and thus utili/.e at least master, part of tliis hydiM power and iU the same lime piM-

\. The ninnlier of workers nsually t>n\pK>yed in I he vide service to tht> iuilustrial plant. Tluis, the liottU>- station is II, whu'li uiiml>er did not \!ii'v thro\i«,lionl iu>cks caused hy destruction of this st.ation could the war. largely ha\e been oviacome, and, tluMX>fore, there

would have l>i>en no large lienelicial n>svilts altaineil Attacks. unless lUher suhstat liuis were simultaneously Xi>ni\ desti\i>ed. rtViits ol lUtiwhini". Intcllijicncc C'hcck. 1, Phvsieal ilaniHK''. I, This station was not listotl in any intelligi-noo Nv>ne. data. 2, riMduotiun K>st!. Data Rck\ .uu lo c^thtr Studies. Nont\ None, .A, UeouperalMlity oyolo.

Not dottMiniiU'il sis theix' was no ihunnjt^". Kviiliuitions «nil Impressions. 4, \'uhu-ral>ility, This station was well constructed ami openited.

(I, I'his stalioik is as suswptil>le to dan>a,u.\' as ai\' The importance was detiniti-ly estaMished, hut, likt^

ill snlvsijjtions. It was located iu wntml Honshu wise, the means of oveiToining any ilanta^' or dt>- some distance f«\>n\ the c*iast, and thiMX^foit^ was iu>t st rut't ion w (-r\- sv> easy auil amid be ert\>cted so ijuickly

very accessihle. Thongh locatevl in a mountainous thai it appearji that it would have Ihvu quite futile to

-eclion of Japan, iho station itself was sitviatetl ii\ an exjHMvd an> etWut to eliminate tho station.

ISO I'Xiiiiur A

Ph(ili> I- ( ilMll'l .'ll \ H'W nl' stMlioll

I'luno i—Portion of 164-KV aootnui iiiul U),OltU-KV.\ 161/77 KV Iranafoniuira 181 Photo 3—Portion of 77-KV section showing oil circuit breakers

,^^-'

Photo 4—54-KV section showing outgoing 154 KV Unes 182 PLANT REPORT NUMBER 22 KAWASAKI SUBSTATION KAWASAKI (NEAR TOKYO) JAPAN

DATE INSPECTED 19 OCTOBER 1945

Summary. tant primary substations in the highly industrialized

1. The Kawasaki Substation is located about a and densely populated area of Tokyo, Kawasaki and mile west of the Kawaski Power Plant of the Imperial Yokohama. Its principal function was to receive cur- Government Railways in the city of Kawasaki, be- rent from several groups of hydro plants, located in tween Tokyo and Yokohama, and had a nominal the mountainous areas of central Honshu, by means capacity of 210,000 KVA. It is one of the important of several incoming transmission lines of 154-KV, primarj' substations in the Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yoko- transform to 66-KV, and to dispatch by outgoing hama Area, in the supply of electric energy from lines to the network system for general distribution. distant hydro stations to the network system serving , 2. This substation is located at 1173 Yanagi dis- this large industrial and populated section. trict, Kawasaki City, near Tokyo. It is adjacent to

2. This substation was never a primary target but the Tokyo Shibaura Engineering Works Plant No 2, was damaged in the raid of 15/16 April 1945 on the and about a mile west by south from the Kawasaki Kawasaki urban area by the Twentieth AF. During power station of the Imperial Government Railways. this raid approximately 1,200 tons of incendiaiy Also, about a mile NW is located the Tokyo Shibaura bombs were dropped, and S bombs fell within the Engineering Works Plant No 1. The plant area is plant area. irregular in shape and has a total acreage of approxi- 3. The principal damage was practically complete mately 7.5 acres. The control room and offices are destruction of one bank of 60,000 KVA in trans- contained in a concrete building approximately in the formers and of the station control cables. Because of center of the plant area, but otherwise all equipment damage elsewhere on the incoming lines, the sub- is of the outdoor type. There are 6 incoming lines, 2 of station was not in operation during the raid. The only which are the Tashiro, and the other 2 are the Kita- attempt at recuperation that was made was the re- tama transmission lines. pair of the control cables and inspection of the trans- 3. There are 4 banks of main transformers with a formers. The vulnerability of substations is fully total capacity of 210,000 KVA. Two of the banks shown because of the heavy destruction caused by each consist of three 20,000-lCVA, single-phase trans- relatively few bomb strikes, all of which were formers OISC with primary winding for 140-KV, incendiaries. secondary 66-KV, and tertiarj^ of 22-KV. One of 4. The size, importance, and location, as well as these banks was installed in April 1944, and the other pi-obable damage, had been I'easonably correctly, but in April 1945. The other 2 banks each consist of three very briefly, evaluated in intelligence data. 15,000 KVA, single-phase transformers OISC with 5. This station was an open-air type, yet was primary winding for 140-KV, secondaiy 66-KV, and seriously damaged as the result of incendiary bombs. tertiary winding of 22-KV. Both of these banks were The direct hit on the large transformer by one bomb installed in 1926. burned a hole in the radiator, caused an oil leak, and The 154-KV section of the station is west of the then set the oil on fire; this in turn almost totally control building and contains all the transformer destroyed 5 transformers. This was, however, a verj' banks, together with necessary oil circuit breakers, unusual incident. Had the position of the bomb hit bus structures, and bussing. Switching is arranged so been even slightly different, such as a near miss, no that the transformers can be operated in parallel or serious damage would have occurred. On the other single on all windings bj' means of a double bus, each hand, an HE bomb, in either a direct hit or near miss, bus being sectionalized. would have caused heavy destruction. Therefore, the The 66-KV section is located to the south of the conclusion should not be made that IBs are the proper control building and contains the switching equip- weapon for use against substations. ment for the secondary side of the main transformers ThePIant and Its Function InEnemy Economy. and the six outgoing overhead lines leaving the sta- 1. The Kawasaki Substation was one of the imjior- tion to the south. 183 The 22-IvV section is located to the east of the structures at the right of the photograph. Following control building and contains the switching for the the damage, the transformer locations were changed tertiary side of the main transformers and 14 out- and spread out in order to provide a safeguard against going lines, most of which are underground. Adjacent a recurrence of similar damage. The good trans- to this section is located 20,000 KVA in outdoor formers were put in i^ositions 1, 3, and 5 and the static condensers made up of 4 sections of 5,000-KVA damaged transformers between them in positions each; each section is, in turn, made up of 250-KVA 2, 4, and 6. units. One bomb hit near the control building, burning a

In the control building is located the dispatching wooden extension as well as burning the contents of office for this substation as well as the Keinan, Osaki, the south end of the concrete control building. and Totsuka substations. One bo7nb hit near the wooden extension of the con- 4. All 154 and 66-KV portions of the station are trol building, burning out the control cable in a owned by the Japan Electric Generation and Trans- concrete duct with a wooden cover at 2 points about mission Company, while the 22-KV portion is owned 20 ft apart. by the Kanto Electric Supply Company, the dis- One bomb hit near the base of a tower carrying trilniting organization for this area. 66-KV connections, doing no damage to the tower 5. This substation normally used 15 men on the but damaging a control cable. basis of 2 shifts, but at present only 9 men are being One bomb hit near the static condensers, burning a used. There are 2 operators per shift, and the rest of hole in one 250-KVA unit. the employees perform general maintenance and One bomb hit directly on the warehouse—the re-

repair work. sultant fire completely destroyed it. Attacks. One bomb hit directly on the forge shop—the resultant fire completely destroyed it. There were no specific attacks on this substation; One bomb hit on a 20-KV outdoor structure, however, it was damaged during one raid on 15/16 damaging insulators and bending connections. April 1945 between 2200 and 0100, during an attack not in on the Kawasaki urban area, mission No 68 of the At the time of the raid, this station was Twentieth AF. Two hundred and nineteen A/C of the operation, since the lines were out because of bomb 318th, 314th, and 315th Wings dropped approxi- damage elsewhere. Dugout shelters were provided of mately 1,200 tons of incendiary bombs from a height for employees, and blast walls, made up wooden sides with the base very much wider than the top and of 8,000 ft with clear to 3/10 weather. According to earth filled, installed in front of banks of trans- plant personnel, there were 8 bombs that fell in the were substation area. formers. The walls were located on the near side of the pits in front of the transformers, and had been Eflfects of Bombing. completely removed at the time of inspection. Similar 1. Physical damage was as follows: walls were installed for protection of the 160-KV a. One direct hit by an incendiary bomb on the lireakers. Fire protection was inadequate to deal middle transformer of one bank of 60,000-KVA with a transfonner oil fire of such magnitude as transformers. (Exhibit A, photo 2) This burned a occurred at this station. hole in the radiator of the transformer, causing the b. Information was supplied by Mr. K. Wako, oil to leak and setting it on fire. The resulting trans- chief of the station, and by personal inspection. former oil fire enveloped both adjacent transformers 2. Production loss. in this bank (Exhibit A, photos 3 and 4), seriously is of several primary substations damaging all 3 transformers as well as the overhead a. As this one supplying the industrial and residential areas which structure and connections. In Exhibit A, photo 1, it can be seen that the resultant heat buckled the up- were severely bombed during the raid when this sta- dates, the load right colunm of the structure to the left of this bank tion was damaged, and also at other of transformers. This photograph does not show the was down to a practically negligible quantity. Before of inspec- transformers in the position they were in when the the raid it was 30,000 KW, and, at the time damage took place. There were originally 2 banks of tion, it was only 10,000 KW. 3 transformers in each bank, all placed in a single row b. No substitution was needed as there was excess and numbered 1 through 6 from left to right. The capacity in undamaged portions. damaged bank was composed of transformers 4, 5, c. (1) Only the part damaged was made inopera- and 6, which occupied the space between the upright tive. 184 Chief of Air (2) No prochiction was lost through diversion of Area, issued by the Office of Assistant l:il)()r, nuitcriiil, or iiuichine facilities. Staff, Intelligence, listed this .substation as target evaluated its (3) No loss of production was caused through pro- 105, correctly located it on maps, and tective nioasiiros. importance, but did not give a plot plan and photo-

(4) No loss was caused through absenteeism or graphic information. unusual inefficiency. c. JTG information was very meager, though k)cated the target (.5) A loss of load was caused by bombing of indus- aerial photographic information trial antl residential areas. correctly and the size of the; pk)t plan was approxi-

4. Recuperability cycle. mately correct. in which this substation was The station was shut down one day and then 2. Records of raid are covered in the Report on Mission No 68 placed back in temporaiy service by operating the damaged the Kawasaki urlian area. Damage Assessment various oil circuit breakers by hand, without any on covering this raid was practically meter readings. It took one week to repair the control Report No 47 cables. The damaged transformers have been exam- correct. 3. mention was made in any damage assess- ined, and it was found that the core and coils of one No transformer could be used, but that the others could ments of recuperation or dispersal. not be. It is estimated that it would take 2 years to Data Relevant To Other Studies. get new transformers. The undamaged portion of the None. plant is available with 150,000 KVA capacity. Evaluations and Impressions. 4. Vulnerability. This substation contained a section for 110-KV The vulnerability of substations is fully covered in which was not used; this section was neither diverted the final report, which is applicable to this substation. to 66-KV use, nor dismantled for scrap use when Intelligence Check. they were in such need of material. General upkeep of appeared 1. a. OSS reports in general correctly identified the yard was poor ; however, the equipment and evaluated this substation. to be well maintained. There was a large over-capac-

b. The Air Objective Folder 90.17 for the Tokyo ity for the load demantl.

185 EXHIBIT A

-**5H.

Photo 1 —60,000-KVA transformer banks, showing transformer positions from left to

I'ifjlit, numbered 2 through 6 (No 1 transformer not shown on left). Damaged transformers were originally in positions 4, 5 and 6; now occupy positions 2, 4, and 6

Photo 2 —View showing damaged transformer in original position No 6 Photo 3 —Viinv slunviiiK (l:imnf;i'il (ransfornicr

in iii'ifjiiKil posilinn Nil 1, jilKitn Nd 1

Photo 4—View showing flamaged transformer with radiators removed, originally occupying

position No 5, photo No 1

fin??!.")—47— 13 187 .

PLANT REPORT NUMBER 2 3 TOKYO PRIMARY SUBSTATIONS TOKYO, JAPAN DATES INSPECTED 27 OCTOBER—9 NOVEMBER 1945

Summary. and all of them have over-capacity. Therefore, the 1. This report covers a group of 6 primaiy sub- destruction of any one, or even a few, could be quickly stations located in the vicinity of Tokyo and serving overcome by by-passing the station and/or re-routing the highly important industrialized and populated transmission. Thus, while individually they are vul- area of Tokj'o, Kawasaki, and Yokohama. These 6 nerable to damage, definite, serious economic effects substations have a total transformer capacity of only result from the destruction of all or a majority 864,000 KVA, and while they do not constitute all of them. the primary substations serving this area, their com- 4. Pre-raid intelligence data was practically nil. bined capacity represents approximately 55 percent 5 The most significant evaluation of this study is of the total. These stations are all outdoor type, with the revealed fact that there were a multiplicity of reinforced concrete buildings to house the control facilities and over-capacity, which would act as a room, offices, repair shops, and other similar installa- safeguard against economic consequences from the tions. In addition to transformers, switching equip- destruction of any single station. This was not an ment, and other necessary facilities, all the stations intentional war precaution, but rather the result of are equipped with rotary and/or static condensers. duplicate facilities having been installed by several

The principal function of these stations is to receive, different operating companies prior to the consolida- transform, and dispatch current from the hydro tion into the one company, namely, the Japan Elec- power stations in central and northern Honshu to the tric Generation and Transmission Company. The 66-KV network supplying this area. over-capacity was largely due to a tendency of the 2. There were no primary attacks on these sta- Japanese to install facilities capable of handling pos- tions, but slight damage was inflicted on 2 of the sible future demands too vaguely estimated to con- stations during area raids. One was on 26 May 1945 stitute good engineering or economic practice. Despite when about 200 IBs fell on the Kameido stations, and these facts, it has been conclusively shown that the the other was on 13 July 1945 when 7 HE bombs fell destruction of a majority of these stations, plus the on the Hatogaya station. main steam plants in the area, would have produced 3. There was no appreciable damage in either raid, a definite collapse of the electric system in this area, and no interruption in service occurred. In particular, with serious economic results. This whole matter is it should be noted that a large number of incendiaries more fully covered in the industry report of the Elec- fell on the Kameido station with no effect, thus show- tric Power Division. ing the futility of this type of bomb against modem The Plant and Its Function In substations. While this report covers only about half Enemy Economy. the primary substations in this area, a study of the 1. Product of the plant and its importance in damage done to all the primaiy substations (shown enemy economy. in the Electric Power Industry Report) reveals that This report covers a group of primary substations less than 8 percent of the total capacity of the entire in the Tokyo area which are listed with their size and area was eliminated by either direct or indirect dam- location below: age from bombing. Production loss was nil and recuperation from the minor damage was immediate. Name However, had there been substantial damage, recuperation would have been difficult and lengthy. Since there was practically no damage, actual vulnerability was not demonstrated, l)ut these substations are as vulnerable and susceptible to damage as all such installations are. However, these substations are all interconnected, both primary and secondary, by means of a loop system, are served from the hydro plants through various transmission lines and routes, ;

Those aro not all the primary suhstations in this are used as warehouses, employoes' houses, and the area, and these particular ones were not seleeled be- like. More complete (>(|uipmeiit details, load and other cause of any individual specific significance. Rathi^r, (lata are given in Exhibit A, and photographs of the they were chosen as a representative group, in order various stations are shown in Exhibit B, photos 1-23. to determine visually the type of construction, oper- When the main dispatching head(iuarters of the; ating conditions, and other factors. A substation is an Japan Electric Generation and Transmission Com- important link in the chain of distribution of electric pany in down-town Tokyo was destroyed by fire, the

curri'nt from its source of generation to the ultimate headquartei's was set vip temporarily in the Wadabori consumer, and its destruction would prevent the us(> Station. The principal function of all these stations is of the current. However, the individual importance to receive current from the hydro plants in central of any substation must be determined by considering and north Honshu and transform, switch, control whether an adjacent substation could function as a and feed it into the 66-KV network. substitute in case of destruction. In the case of these 3. These substations are owned by the Japan Elec-

substations, as well as all the substations serving the tric Generation and Transmission Company, and highly industrialized and populated area of Tokyo, information was furnished by K. Sugawara, chf, and Kawasaki, and Yokohama, there were, in all instances, E. Ebinuma, chf engr of the Tokyo district. other facilities available so that the destruction of Attacks. any one station would have caused no serious eco- There were no primary attacks on these sub- nomic effect. There are incoming transmission many stations, but on 2 occasions thcjro was slight damage lines from various groups of hydro generating plants during area raids on Tokyo. On 26 May 1945 about these lines individually feed into several different 200 IBs fell on the Kameido station and on 13 July substations, and the substations in turn are tied 1945, 7 HE bombs fell on the Hatogaya station. together in the form of a loop or ring system around Effects of Bombing. the area. Since transmission lines themselves are 1. Physical damage. unlikely to be destroyed for any distance, the de- In the 26 May 1945 raid, one warehouse and one struction of any substation, or even several substa- dwelling burned and one transformer bushing was tions, could be overcome either by installing a by-pass broken at the Kameido station. Although about 200 around the damaged station, or by rerouting genera- IBs fell on the station, of which 33 fell directly on the tion from the hydro plants via some other trans- concrete roof of the control house, the entire damage mission line to another station. All substations were was negligible. On 13 July 1945 the 7 HE bombs that greatly over capacity, so that the actual capacity loss fell on Hatogaya station did no damage. Some slight of one, or even several, would not be an effective attempt at providing bomb protection had been deterrent to the continuous functioning of the sys- made. Cinder-filled wooden barriers had been placed tem. Only by the destruction of all or a majority of around transformers, and the control buildings had the primary substations, together with a portion of been painted dark gray or camouflaged by irregular the steam plants in the area, could a definite and color patterns. effective disruption of the power supply be accom- 2. Production loss. plished. These substations furnished their output to None. a secondary distribution system; this system inter- 4. Recuperability cycle. connected the other substations in the form of a ring The damage done was so slight that recuperation about the area. Therefore, the individual importance was immediate. However, had there been any serious of these substations could not be determined, except damage, actual recuperation would have been very in respect to the relation which their individual size lengthy, although modification or substitution would bears to the total demand of the area. have been possible under certain conditions. 2. Physical description of plant. 4. Vulnerability. All of these stations are outdoor type and occupied Since no damage was done, no proven conclusions areas averaging about 7 acres each. The substation as to specific vulnerability can be stated. However, structural work is of fabricated steel, and occasion- these stations were located in the plains around ally reinforced concrete was used in the upright sup- Tokyo where they could have been reasonably easily porting members. Reinforced concrete buildings located with the transmission lines as landmarks, house the offices, control rooms, repair shops, syn- especially from lower altitudes. Since one station chronous condensers, etc., while wooden buildings received about 200 IB hits with no appreciable dam- 189 age, it i.s clear that this typo of bomb is not effective Data Relevant To Other Studies. against substations, However, the equipment in sub- None. stations is, to a large extent, fragile and open, and, m Evaluations and Impressions. addition, much of it is highh^ specialized and not These stations were well constructed and main- easily replaced, such as high voltage oil or air blast tenance was good. Thej" all had over-ca]iacit>' which circuit breakers and transformers. Such equipment is was not done purposely as a war time protective also highly susceptible to damage from fragmenta- measure, but was partly a result of much duplication tion or blast. Therefore, it is considered that substa- and paralleling of facilities prior to consolidation into tions are very vulnerable to damage from bombs. HE one operating company, and partly the consequence of a tendency of the Japanese to install facilities far Intelligence Check. in excess of immediate needs. This over-cajiacity did, 1. Air Objective Folder 90.17 for Tokyo Area, however, act somewhat as a safeguard in the matter issued by the Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, of recuperation from possible bombing losses, since Intelligence, listed onlj- one of these substations, they could have shifted loads to other stations, by namely, Hatogaya, and the information given on it means of network or loop lines, or could have re- was meager and inaccurate. JTG listed none of these routed incoming current via other transmission lines. substations except Hatogaya, and, in this instance, This does not mean that substations woukl not be the information given was meager and inaccurate. effective targets in eliminating power, but rather

OSS did not list any of these substations. that the effectiveness would lie only in the destruc-

2. No photo interpretation of damage, recuperation of all or a majority of them. This matter is cov- tion, or dispersal was made since none occurred. ered fully in the Electric Power Industiy Report. EXHIBIT A—TOKYO TRANSMISSION SUBSTATIONS Primary Substation Equipment Data

Station EXHIBIT B

111 I AA / ' ' i i3 « *

Photo 1 —1-40-KV and 22-KV switchyard. Komatsugawa substation

Photo 2—Komatsugawa substation—140-KV transformers. Note cinder-filled wooden protection barriers 191 Photo 3—Koraatsugawa substation—Control room and board

Photo 4— 11U-I\V :iii(i 22-KV swiulix aid. Control building in background. Komatsugawa substation 192 Photo 5 —Switchyard and 22-KV outgoing hnes. Komatsugawa substation

Photo 6—Kameido substation—Control roomand board 193 ;!l

i v.? frT'

Photo 7—Kameido substation—Switchyard, control building to loft, repair and testing building to right

Photo 8—Hanabata substation—Ground resistors on 140-KV neutral 194 —

Photo 9 —Haiiabata substation—140-KV switch.yard

Photo 10 Hauabata substation—66-KV switchyard 195 1

'9 .- , ^ r» ' "llJE „, -, -T J- -ai

Photo 1 — Hanabata substation—66-KV switchyard

Photo 12—Kcilioliu substation—Area surrounding station 196 Photo 13 —Keihoku substation—Area surrounding station

Photo 14—Keihoku substation—Switchyard 197 Photo 1 5 —Kcihoku substation—Switchyard

Photo 16—Hatogaya substation—Switciiyaid witli coulrol building in background 198 Photo 17—Hatogaya substation—30,000-KVA Mitsubishi condenser out of service because of burned out field coils (not as a result of bomb damage.)

Photo 18—Hatogaya substation—30,000-KVA Mitsubishi condenser out of service because of burned out field coils (not as a result of bomb damage) 199 /^

.'...l^?r,

Photo 19—Wadabori substation—140-KV section

Photo 20—Wadabori substation—concrete upright supports 200 Photo 21 —Wadabori substation—Control building

Photo 22—Wadabori substation—Portion of control board 201 Photo 2 3— W' adabori substation—140-KV air blast breakers

202 : PLANT REPORT NUMBER 24 TOKYO SECONDARY SUBSTATIONS TOKYO, JAPAN DATES INSPECTED 26, 27, 28 OCTOBER 1945 AND 1 AND 4 NOVEMBER 1945

Summary. dary substations are too numerous to list individu-

1. This report covers 9 secondary substations ally unless one happens to serve some specific industry owned by the Kanto Electric Supply Company, of great military importance. which is the electric distributing organization in the 5. There is a great tendency on the part of the Tokyo area. These substations are located in Tokyo Japanese to install over-capacity in their substations, or its immediate environs. They do not constitute all and the peak loads ever carried were, in most in- the substations there, but are a representative group stances, far below the station capacity. This was not of various types with different degrees of damage done purposely as a war safety factor, but might well from various causes. The total capacity of these 9 have proven beneficial; for in the event of destruction stations is 80,500 KVA in transformer capacity, and of a single station, adjacent stations could have been their individual sizes are relatively small. These sub- utilized for substitution. However, since, in the case stations do not have any particular significance or of these stations, the area was destroyed along with specific importance in the enemy economy, except the station, the load was simultaneously lost and any that any substation is an indispensable link in the need for alternate facilities was neutralized. Of par- supply of electric energy from the source of genera- ticular significance is the fact that where good, tion to the ultimate consumer. Tokyo was the most modern, fireproof construction was used and proper important industrial and most populated area in protection provided against inflammable surround- Japan, and, therefore, these substations were equally ings, as in the Oshima substation, incendiary bombs important in proportion to their size. had no effect even though direct hits were made on

2. These substations were never a primary target the station. but were damaged simultaneously with the areas in The Plant and Its Function In which they were located, during raids on those areas. Enemy Economy. 3. Principal damage was done to transformers, 1. Product of the plant and its importance in switchgear, control boards, and buildings. Most of enemy economy. the damage was caused by fire, but this was largely This report covers a group of damaged secondary because of their location in crowded areas adjacent to or distribution substations in the city of Tokyo or its highly inflammable buildings, and was not the direct immediate vicinity. The names of these substations effect of IBs on the stations. Since the area they with their capacities are as follows served was destroyed along with the station, the pro- KVA duction loss was of no economic importance. It is Chigasaki 11,500 shown that recuperation is a long process and that Hachioji 16,500 substations are highly vulnerable. However, where Hongincho 3,000 the station is of modern, fireproof construction and Jukkcngawa 9,000 isolated from exposure to adjacent highly inflammable Kojimachi 6,000 buildings, IBs have little or no direct or indirect Nippori 9,000 harmful effects. Strafing produced, in one instance, Oshima 12,000 great damage, but since strafing is possible only when Ozaku 7,500 air defense will permit low altitude attack, it is not Sugamo 6,000 considered to be a proper method of general effective- Total 80,500 ness. HE bombs are the proper weapon to produce

the greatest and most lasting damage to substations. These stations are only a few of all the distribution 4. These substations had not been listed in any substations in Tokyo and its vicinity, and there is no intelligence data and, with one minor exception, no particular significance in their selection, other than specific damage assessments had been made. Secon- that they are representative of the various types, use 697713—47—14 203 several different kinds of construction, and present a Principal physical damage—The end transformer varietj' of degrees of damage. Substations are an was struck by an incendiaiy bullet which caused this important link in the supply of electric energy from transformer to explode; the fire spread and involved its source of generation to the ultimate consumer, the other transformers of the bank. The middle trans- and, therefore, their destruction prevents the use of former of the second bank also was fired by an incen- the energy. The importance of a substation in an diary. The fire spread throughout the station, com- enemy economy is measured in relation to its size and pletely destro3nng all 10 transformers. Three 66-KV the type of consumer. Some substations serve only oil circuit breakers were completely destroyed and residential or small commercial loads, while others one was about 25 percent destroyed. The heat de- may supply important industrials. However, as a stroyed about 30 percent of the steel structure. Two safety factor, it is usual to interconnect adjacent sub- 22-KV oil circuit breakers were about 25 percent stations so that, in the event of the loss of one, inter- destroyed by heat. Numerous bus supports, bushings, ruption of service is avoided by use of substitute or and insulation were damaged by bullets. Wlierever a alternate facilities. Furthermore, distribution sub- bullet struck a transformer, damage was complete

stations are generally not large individually, and because of fire. Exhibit A, photos 1-8, show some of they are relatively unimportant, but collectively, or the damage. in groups, they do assume a definite and important Production loss—When this station was put out of part in the continuous supply of energy, which is a commission, the load was transferred to the Hirat-

prime factor in an enemy economy. suka substation. This method of load supply is being 2. Physical description of the plant. used at present, and no attempt has been made to For purposes of convenience, each station is sepa- rebuild the station. A temporary bank of three 1,000-

rately listed with its location, principal features, KVA, 22/3.3-KV is being used to feed the 3.3-KV

function, attacks, damage, production loss, recupera- feeders. The former 22-KV outgoing line is being used bility, vulnerability, and significant evaluation and as an incoming line from Hiratsuka. impressions, Recuperability—A large part of the steel work of the station will need to be replaced and new trans- Chigasaki Substation. formers and oil switches will be needed. A 75 percent Location Kanagawa, Koza, Chigasaki. — rebuild job will be necessary on the electrical bus Size There is a total capacity of 11,500 KVA — work and control wiring. If equipment is made avail- made up of 1 bank of three 2,000-KVA, 66/3.3-KV, able, from 9 to 12 months will be required to rebuild 1 bank of three 1,500-KVA, 66/22-KVA with one the station. 1,500 spare, and 1 bank of three 333-KVA, 66/22- Vulnerability—This station was especially vul- KVA with one 333-KVA spare. There are 2 incoming nerable from the air because it was located in a wide, 66-KV circuits and 1 outgoing 22-KV and six 3.3-KV open area, surrounded by small residential struc- circuits. tures. The supply lines are on steel towers and come Principal features This substation is an outdoor — across open country; this made it very easy to find type with steel, box, girder construction. The trans- the station by following the lines. formers are installed in a straight line on one side of Significant evaluation and impressions—The de- the structure. The control is from a small adjacent struction of this station was of psychological value buOding. There is an additional steel stmcture near rather than real value. A station of this size can the structure for switching main a 22/3.3-KV usually be taken from the system without causing an arrangement. excessively long interruption to service. The service Function It supphed current to residential and — interruption is more of an inconvenience than any- rural customers at a very low load factor. There were thing else. The people of a community look upon the no industrial installations in this area. The normal power supply as a major item and it is of great load on this station was about 7,000 to 8,000 KW, importance in their eyes. When it is interrupted, it and the aimual output was about 4 million KWH. has a marked effect on their minds, and brings the Attacks only attack was on 6 August 1944. —The war to their door. Four P-51 planes approached from the north at 0930 and strafed the station at a low altitude, with 50-cal Hachioji Substation. armor piercing, and incendiary ammunition. The Location—Tokyo, Hachioji, Hiraoka-machi. planes circled the station 3 times. About 300 Japa- Size—There is a total of 16,500 KVA, made up of nese soldiers came to put out the fire. one 7,500-KVA, 66/3.3-KV, three-phase transformer 204 and one bank of three 3,000-KVA, 66/3.3-KV, single- made up of one bank of thro(> 1 ,000-KVA, 22/3.3-KV phase transformers with one 3,000-KVA spare. Tiie transformers with one 1,()00-KVA spare. Originally, station is supplied by two 66-KV lines and has eleven it had a capacity of 9,000 KVA made up of one bank 3.3-KV outgoing circuits. of three 3,000-KVA transformers with one 3,000-KVA Principal features—This station is a combination spare. The station is .supplicid by three 22-KV under- outdoor-indoor type; the transformers are located in ground lines and feeds eight 3.3-KV feeders. tile outdoor stool structure, and the low voltage Principal features—This station was built in 1910.

equipment is located in a building. The building is a It is a complete indoor type, housed in a two-story one-story, concrete structure with a flat roof. The building of concrete construction, with a peak roof. electrical control and switching equipment was of The electrical equipment is installed on pipe frame conventional design. work. The station location is in a residential area. To Function—This station is the distribution point for protect against fires during earthquakes, steel shut ters the city of Hachioji, a suburb of Tokyo, and the sur- were installed over the windows. (Exhibit A, photo 11). rounding rural area. A large cement mill was the Function—This station is a distribution station largest user of power, but there were also some small feeding a residential and small commercial area. The industrial plants in the town that made small com- load on the station was 3,000 KW before the raid and ponents for aircraft, and also some textile man- was reduced to less than 1,000 KW after the raid. ufacturers. The load is back now to 2,000 KW, feeding into an Attacks—On 2 August 1945 an incendiary area raid undamaged area. was made in the early afternoon. Attacks—The only attack was on 29 November Principal physical damage—The substation proper 1944, which was the date of one of the first incendiary did not receive any direct hits, although 6 IBs dropped raids on the Tokyo area. near the structure. The fu-e from the adjacent area Principal physical damage—Two incendiaries struck spred,d to the substation building and destroyed part the roof directly, making 2 small holes, neither of of the building and 6 of the distribution switching which was large enough to allow the bombs to come bays. The distribution feeders left the station under- through. The entire area was destroyed by fire but ground. All the cable entrances were destroyed com- no damage was done to the station. The steel shutters pletely. None of the outdoor structure was harmed. over the windows protected the electrical equipment. Production loss—The load on the station prior to Product-ion loss—The destruction of the area the raid was about 3,000 KW. The destruction of the almost entirely eliminated the need for this station. area practically eliminated the need for this station. Recuperability—No damage. The present load of the area is 200 to 300 KW. Vulnerability—This station is well constructed and Recuperability—A temporary building has been not vulnerable to incendiary bombs unless roof pene- built and 5 of the 11 distribution circuits have been tration can be accomplished. It is vulnerable to HE

put back into service, using overhead instead of on direct hits. It is well protected against fire from underground take-off. If equipment and materials surrounding areas. were available, the station could be rebuilt to its Evaluations and impressions—It was interesting to original capacity in about 3 months. learn that this station is one that operates on a two- Vulnerability—This station is vulnerable to direct shift basis of 12 hours in each shift, with 2 men on a or near hits by HE bombs. The station would be shift. The men rotate the shifts and live in the station. rendered inoperative for a long period, if the large Each man has 2 days off per month. An impressive

tranformers were destroyed. fact is that incendiary bombs fell directly on the Significant evaluation and impressions—The loss was station with no effects. This shows that this type of caused by fii-e from adjacent inflammable structures bomb is not effective against stations in which there

(Exliibit A, photos 9 and 10) and not by direct is no inflammable construction. action of the incendiaries on the station. Had the Jukkengawa Substation. station been in a cleared area, no damage would have Location—Tokyo, Kameido-machi. resulted. This shows that only in rare and unusual Size—There is a total capacity of 9,000 KVA, made instances do incendiary bombs damage substations. up of one bank of three 3,000-KVA, 22/3.3-KV with Hongincho Substation. one spare 3,000-KVA transformer. In addition, there Location—Tokyo, Nihombashi-Ku, Hongoku-cho. is one bank of three 500-KVA, 3.3-KV, 200-V, with Size—There is a total capacity of 3,000 KVA, one 500-KVA transformer for a spare, to supply a 205 special power circuit. The station has four 22-KV circuits and supplies twelve S.S-KV distribution underground incoming hnes, and six 3.3-KV out- circuits. going hues. Principal features—This substation is an indoor Prina'pal features—The station is an indoor type, type, housed in a reinforced concrete building of 3 located in a three-story concrete building with a peak stories, with a flat roof of concrete. The electrical roof. The transformers are on the first floor, the oil constmction is conventional indoor type, similar to switches and disconnects on the second floor, and U.S. construction of the early 1920s. switchboard on the third floor. The station is quite Function—This station provided the electric sup- old, and the electrical equipment and installation are ply to residential areas, some small commercial

of conventional tj^je. It is located along the canal establishments, and the Imperial Palace. Normally, with industrial buildings on 3 sides. To the rear of the the station carried a maximum load of 3,000 KW. building is one of the principal warehouses of the The annual output was about 6 million KWH. Kanto Electric Supply Company, where they stored Attacks—There was one attack on 25 May 1945 wire, cable, insulators, and small transformers and with no direct hits on this station. Some 50-cal ex- maintenance equipment. pended incendiary cartridges were picked up in the Function—The station furnished electric supply to adjacent area. an industrial area made up of fairly large industrial Principal physical damage—The fire from the adja- concerns manufacturing machine parts and chains. cent area broke the glass in a steel door, allowing Attacks—The only attack was on 10 March 1945 flames to ignite the oil in a 3-phase voltage regiilator. during an incendiary raid on the general industrial This fire destroyed the first floor bus work and did area. considerable damage to the building. On the second Principal physical damage—The warehouse was a floor the windows were barricaded on the inside with light building and burned readily and the substation wood as a protection against explosion. These barriers was exposed to this fire without any protection. The caught fire and started a fire in the bus structure fire spread to the station and completely destroyed which destroyed the 22-KV cable risers, several oil the building and all the electrical equipment. In circuit breakers, and the entire switchboard. The front of the station there were stored four 3,000-KVA, transformers were completely destroyed. (Exhibit A, 22/3.3-KV transformers, which were also destroyed. photos 14-20). Production loss—This station supplied only the Production loss—The output of this station was immediate industrial area which was completely de- reduced to zero. Only about 200 ICW of the load stroyed at the same time, and so the need for this remains in this area, and that is being supplied from station was eliminated. other stations. Recuperability—A complete rebuilding will be nec- Recuperability—If equipment can be obtained it essary, and if equipment and materials are available would take from 8 to 9 months to construct a station a new station can be built in from nine months to a to take the place of the destroyed one. year. Vulnerability—This station was destroyed by IBs Vulnerability—This station was destroyed only only because it was located in an area closely sur- because it was located in a congested industrial sec- rounded by inflammable buildings. It was, however, tion and surrounded on 2 sides by closely-built, small vulnerable to HE bombs. The electrical equipment industrial buildings. Otherwise, it would not have was installed in a congested manner and lieav>^ dam- been affected by incendiary bombs. age would invariably follow HE bombing. Signijkant evaluations and impressions—Although Significant evaluation and impressions—The de- the station was of fireproof construction, the proximity struction of the service area of this station eliminated of highly inflammable buildings was the cause of its the need for the station. A new station can be con- complete destruction. Installations as important as structed in time to supply service to the new re- this should be isolated. constructed area.

Kojimachi Substation. Nippori Substation. Location—^Tokyo, Kojimachi-cho. Location—Tokyo, Arakawa, Nippori-cho. Size—^There is a total capacity of 6,000 KVA, Size—There is a total capacity of 9,000 KVA, made up of one bank of three 2,000-KVA, OISC, made up of one bank of three 3,000-KVA, 22/3.3-KV 22/3.3-KV transformers with one 2,000-KVA spare. transformers with one 3,000-KVA spare. The station The station is served by two 22-KVA underground is supplied by two 22-KV underground lines and sup- 206 under- plies nine 3.3-KV distribution circuits. Tlu; li.'i 2,000-KVA span;. There are eight 22-KV feeders leave the station underground for a short ground incoming lines and sixteen 3.3-KV outgoing distance. circuits. Principal features—The station is an indoor type Principal features—This is a new substation, com- station. The building was of reinforced concrete and pleted in 1937. It is a 3-story reinforced concrete steel, with a iransite peaked roof. The electrical building with a flat concrete roof. (Exhibit A, photo installation was conventional pipe frame work, with 23) The electrical apparatus is installed in individual concrete the oil switches located on a balcony and the trans- bays with the bus work mounted on the formers on the first floor. The switch board was also ceilings. The building is on a plot of ground sur- located on the balcony in a separate room. rounded on 3 sides by second class residences. The and is open to the Function—Electric supply to a large residential front lot belongs to the company during earth- area and some small industrial plants, including one street. Because of fires encountered with industrial machine shop, manufacturing link chain quakes, the building was designed no windows side walls with large windows on belts. The station load was 3,500 KW maximum and on any of the but to very effective in saving 2,000 KW average. the front. This proved be This station also controls the Sunamachi Attacks—There was one attack on 16 April 1945 the station. (Exhibit A, photo by supervisory when the area was struck by an incendiary raid. substation 25) control over the company's own underground tele- Principal physical datnage—One of the incendiary phone cable. bombs penetrated the transite roof and landed on the distribution substation for an in- ti'ansformer floor near one of the transformers. The Function—Main dustrial area and some small residences. The load was ensuing fire completely destroyed the transformers, before the raid. Just after the raid the all other electrical equipment, and the building. 8,000 KVA primarily pumping load in (Exhibit A, photos 21 and 22). load dropped to 300 KW, the station to keep out water. The load has now built Production loss—The elimination of the supply up to 1,500 KW. area of this station rendered the station useless. At the morning of 10 March 1945 there present there is no load in the area except a little Attacks—On incendiary raid on the surrounding area. lighting that is supplied from another station. was an physical damage—Six IBs landed on the Recuperability—No attempt has been made as yet Principal of the concrete construction, there to rebuild the station because there is no present need roof but, because were left to burn for the capacity. About 9 months to a year will be was no penetration. The bombs one case the bomb landed upright, required to build a new station, if materials and themselves out. In through the equipment can be made available. and there is a perfect hexagon hole just surface of the concrete roof about one-quarter of an Vulnerability—This station was vulnerable to in- (Exhibit A, photo 24). There was no dam- cendiary damage in that the roofing material was not inch deep age to the substation electrical equipment. The sufficiently resistive. Had it been concrete, there fire, but since there would probably have been no damage. However, HE adjacent area was destroyed by windows on the sides of the building adjacent bombs would have done great damage in either case. were no to the fire, it did not spread to the station. Intelligence check—Intelligence photos show com- Production loss The area supplied by this station plete destruction of the area. This station is indicated — completely destroyed, eliminating the need for as having suffered exterior roof damage. The real was the station output. damage is the destioiction of the interior equipment,

which is difficult to evaluate in aerial photography. Recuperability—Not damaged. is constructed to Significant evaluations and impressions—This type Vulnerability—This station well of substation was a practical type of design for this protect it against damage by earthquake; this makes sei-vice; however, the buildings should be of good it difficult to damage except by direct hit by HE concrete construction with a heavy roof. bombs. Significant evaluations and impressions—This sub- Oshima Substation. station is an excellent example of the protective Location—Tokyo, Joto, Oshima-cho. quality of proper construction. Most modern secon- Size—This station has an installed capacity of dary substations are similarly built and therefore 12,000 KVA, made up of 2 banks, each consisting of present barriers to damage by weapons other than three 2,000-KVA, 22/3.3-KV transformers with one HE bombs. 207 Ozaku Substation. flying, at which time bombing by HE would be very Location—Nishitama, Nishitama-mura. much more effective. Size—This station has a total capacity of 7,500 Sugamo Substation. K'S'A, made up of one bank of three 1,000-KVA, Location Tokyo, Toshima, Sugamo. 66/3 .3-KV and one bank of three 1,500-KVA, 66/22- — Size The total capacity of this KV transformers. There are two 66-KV incoming — substation was 6,000 KVA, made up of two banks of three 1,000- Hnes, and one 22-KV and six 3.3-KV outgoing lines. KVA, OISC, 22/3.3-KV transformers with one 1,000- Pmicipal features—The station is an outdoor steel KVA, OISC spare. There was also a 500-KW, 600- structure, with the transformers in a line on one side volt, rotary converter for interurban railway service. of the station. A wooden story-and-a-half control The station was supplied over two 22-KV circuits house is adjacent to the outdoor stioictiu'e. (Exhibit and had six 3.3-KV outgoing circuits. A, photos 26, 27 and 28) Principal features—This station was a combination Function—This station supplied electric energy to railway and light and power station. The building adjacent residences and rural area. The normal load was of brick construction with a peak roof, and had was 3,000 KW, which now has dropped to about indoor pipe frame work similar to that used in U.S. 1,000 KW. No annual output figures were available. about 1920. Attacks—On 20 May 1945, at 1030, three planes ap- Function—This station furnished electric supply proached from the NE and strafed the station at very to several small manufacturing plants, residences, low altitude, using 50-cal armor piercing bullets. This commercial establishments, and electric interurban was the only raid experienced at this station. I'ailway. The maximum load on the station was 4,000 Principal physical damage—Every transformer in KW with an annual output of about 8,000,000 KWH. the station was hit with from 2 to 6 bullets. Some Attacks—This station was not a primary target, penetrated the cooling fins on the radiators and others but, on 14 April 1945, during an area raid, there was cut through the fins on the main tanks. About 100 a direct HE hit on one corner of the building, demol- V)ullets came through the building of which 10 hit the ishing the side of the building and a corner of the marble switch board and damaged the board and roof. (Exhibit A, photo 33) Subsequent IBs hit the some instruments. (Exliibit A, photo 29) An electric adjacent territoiy. arc started a fire in one transformer; this fire spread Principal physical damage—The HE did consider- to 1 other transformer and 1 66-KV oil cucuit able damage to the building, but practically none to breaker which was destroyed. The fire was under the electrical equipment. The IBs dropped on the control before any of the other transformers or equip- adjacent area started fires that spread to the sub- ment was damaged. station. The fire completely destroyed all the electri- Production loss—This station was not an important cal equipment and the station is beyond repair. link in the system. It was a distribution point for (Exhibit A, photos 31, 32 and 33) residential and rural load. The loss of production had Production loss—The output of this station was no duect effect on production capability. reduced to zero. The destruction of the service area Recuperability—The company promptly moved eliminated all but 1,000 to 1,200 KW of the load, spare transfonuers in the bank in place of the ones which was transferred to other stations. If equipment damaged by fire. While this moving was going on, a could be obtained, it would take about 8 to 9 months very ingenious job of electric welding was done on the to rebuild the station. punctured transformers. (Exhibit A, photo 30) All Vulnerability—This station was vulnerable to IBs the holes were closed and the oil replaced. The sta- only in that the surrounding area was made up of tion was out of service three days. middle class Japanese residences constructed of wood. Vulnerability—This station could be reasonably It is not vulnerable to direct incendiary hits, but is easily located because it was in open territory with vulnerable to HE bombs, especially if a delayed fuse steel tower transmission lines coming into the station. is used, so that penetration can be made and the Evaluations and impressions—Although, seemingly bomb reach the lower levels before detonation occurs. nmch damage was done by strafing, recuperation Significant evaluations and impressions—This, is a was quick, and the effects were of no consequence. It peculiar case of damage caused by an HE bomb is not considered that strafing is a proper method of which did not itself cause serious damage, but did attack against substations, and should only be em- cause exposure of the interior of the building. There- ployed after defense conditions permit low level by, the fire from the adjacent area was able to spread 208 to the station, and caused almost coniplcsto dostruc- Intelligence Check. ,tion. Either the HE or the incendiary by itself would Secondary substations were not listed in any of the not have had any effective! nisults. sources of intelligcuicc; information, nor, except in the 3. All stations are owned by the Kanto El(!Ctric on(! instance of the Nippori station, was any mention Supply Company, which is the distributing organiza- made of any damage assessment. tion in the Tokyo area. 4. These stations use from 4 to 10 men per station; Data Relevant To Other Studies. they operate in 2 shifts. Any unusual maintenance or None. repairs are done by separate crews. Attacks. Evaluations and Impressions. This is shown under each individual station. It was significant that in practically every case Eflfects of Bombing. damage was complete or very great. Where damage

The physical damage that occurred is shown under was light, the factors of prevention were good, fire- each individual station. In every case, the destruc- proof construction and elimination of exposure to tion of the area neutralized the need for the station adjacent inflammable areas. Although fire from IBs and, therefore, production loss cannot be measured. caused most of the damage, this was not because of Recuperability is proven to be difficult and lengthy IBs on the stations themselves, but because of expo- where the damage was substantial. Substations, as sure to the terrific fire caused by these bombs in found from a study of the entire group, are very vul- surrounding densely built areas. The most effective nerable; however, where construction is modern, they and dependable weapon against modern substations are vulnerable only to HE bombs. of either indoor or outdoor construction is HE bombs

209 EXHIBIT A

Photo 1 —Chigasaki substation—front view of building showing 50-cal pcnctratiuu. Tlic building on front left is temporary new building. Bomb shelter in left foreground

Photo 2—Chigasaki substation—General view through center bay showing steel structure collapse from heat 210 Photo 3—Chigasaki substation—Transfonncr liuiik No 1 cxplddc^d when struck Ijy 5()-(!al iriceiidinry bullet

4 Photo —Oiigaaaki^suljstation—Transformer destroyed Ijy fire. Note 50-caJ penetration through radiators 211 Photo 5—Chigasaki substation—Two banks of 154-KV OCB destroyed by fire. 50-cal incendiary hit on bushing

Photo 6—Chigasaki substation—154-KV OCB destroyed by fire 212 Photo 7—Chigasaki substation—22-KV OCB damaged by fire

Photo 8—Chigasaki substation—Japanese copy of American manufactured liquid high voltage fuse 213 Photo 9—Hachioji substation—Area around the substation

Photo 10—Hachioji substation—Area around station showing crowded, inflammable buildings. Buildings shown have been built since the area was destroyed by fire on 2 August 1945 214 Photo 1 1 —Hongincho substation—View showing metal window shutters installed to protect against fires during earthquake

215 Photo 12—Jukkengawa substation—Front view of building—transformer room in foreground- spare trarLsformers, stored in yard, also destroyed

Photo 13—^.Tukkengawa substation—rear view of building, transformer room on right 216 5

Photo 14—Kojimachi substation—General view of surrounding territory showing complete destruction. Diet Building in center background

Photo 1 —Kojimachi substation—Wooden blast barriers over windows burned and damaged cable entrances 217 Photo 16—Kojimachi Substation—Rear view of switchboard which was located on second floor

7 Photo 1 —Kojimachi Substation—Front view of switchboard which was located on second floor 218 Photo 18—Kojimachi substation—Transformer and bus structure damage on first floor

Photo 19—Kojimachi substation—Additional view of transformer damage 697713—47—15 219 Photo 20—^Kojimachi substation—Three-phase 3.3 KV bus voltage regulator. Located on first floor in separate room

220 Photo 21 —Nippori substation—General view of station. Incendiary bomb penetrated roof in center foreground

Photo 22—Nippori substation—View from inside switch room, second floor, to show hole in roof made by bomb 221 j:^^ 1ft; It

Photo 23—Oshima substation—General view of property showing building construction to protect against fires during earthquakes

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Photo 24—Oshima substation—View of in.uk mi lonciete tile roof made by incendiary bomb. Empty incendiary case for comparison 222 Photo 25—Osliima substation—Supervisory control board for remote control of Sunamachi substation

223 Photo 26—Ozaku substation—General view of station from back, showing destroyed transformer in right background

Photo 27—Ozaku substation—View inside the switching structure 224 Photo 28—Ozaku substation—Japanese copy of familiar American liquid fuse

Photo 29—Ozaku substation—Front view of switchboard showing 50-cal penetrations 225 Photo 30—Ozaku substation—Example of welding repairs to transformer tank penetrated by 50-cal bullets. No fire had occurred

226 1

Photo 3 —Sugamo substation—Front view of building—transformer and regulator storage yard in foreground

Photo 32—Sugamo substation—Rear view of building. Transformers and switchboard showing are completely destroyed 227 Photo 33 —Sugmiio substation—Rear corner of buildiug where HE bomb hit

228 UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

LIST OF REPORTS

Till! fiillowiiiK is a bililiogrMpliy "f ri'iiorts ri'.sultinf; from 27 Rudolph Rauteiibai-h Leichiiictallgiessereien, Solingen, the Survey's studies of tho European anil I'aeilie wars. Germany Those reports marked with an asterisk (*) may be purchas(Ml 28 Lippewerke Vereiniglc Aluminiumwerko A G, Lunen, from the Superintendent of Documents at the Govermiient Germany Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 29 Vereinigte Doutschi; Metallwerke, Heddernheim, Germany European War 30 Duercner Metallwerke A (J, Dureii Witt(!nau-Berlin OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN & Waren, Germany *1 Tlic United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Sum- AREA STUDIES DIVISION mary Report (European War) *31 *2 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Over- Area Studies Division Report 32 A D(!tailed Study of the ICIli^ets all Report (European War) of Area Bombing on Hamburg *3 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on tlie German War Economy 33 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Wuppertal AIRCRAFT DIVISION 34 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing (By Division and Branch) on Dusseldorf *4 Aircraft Division Industry Report 35 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing 5 Inspection Visits to Various Targets (Special Report) on Solingen 36 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing Airframes Branch on Remscheid 6 Junkers Aircraft and Aero Engine Works, Dessau, 37 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Germany Darmstadt 7 Erla Maschinenwerke G m b H, Heiterblick, German 38 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on 8 A T G Maschinenbau, G m b H, Leipzig (Mockau), Lubeck Germany 39 A Brief Study of the Effects of Ai'ea Bombing on 9 Gothaer Waggonfabrik, A G, Gotha, Germany Berlin, Augsburg, Bochum, Leipzig, Hagen, Dort- 10 Focke Wulf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany mund, Oljerhausen, Sclnveinfurt, and Bremen f Over-all Report 11 Mcsserschmitt A G, Part A J CIVILIAN DEFENSE DIVISION

Augsburg, Germany 1 Part B *40 Civilian DefeiLse Division—Final Report [Appendices I, II, III 41 Cologne Field Report 12 Dornier Works, Friedrichshafen & Munich, Germany 42 Bonn Field Report 13 Gerhard Fieseler Werke G m b H, Kassel, Germany 43 Hanover Field Report 14 Wiener Neustaedter Flugzeugwerke, Wiener Neu- 44 Hamburg FieUl Rejiort—Vol I, Text; Vol II, Exhibits stadt, Austria 45 Bad Oldesloe Field Report Aero Engines Branch 46 Augsburg Field Rejjort 47 Reception Areas in 15 Bussing NAG Flugmotoremverke G m b H, Bruns- Bavaria, Germany wick, Germany EQUIPMENT DIVISION 16 Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke G m b H, Taucha, Germany Electrical Branch 17 Bavarian Motor Works Inc, Eisenach & Durrerliof, *48 German Electrical Equiijment Industry Report Germany 49 Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim Kafertal, Germany 18 Bayerisehe Motorenwerke A G (BMW) Munich, Optical and Germany Precision Instrument Branch *50 Optical and Precision Instrument 19 Henschel Flugmotorenwerke, Kassel, Germany Industry Report Light Metal Branch Abrasives Branch *51 The German Abrasive Industry 20 Light Metals Industry I Part I, Aluminum 52 Mayer and Schmidt, of Germany \Part II, Magnesium Offenbach on Main, Germany 21 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Hildesheim, Ger- Anti-Friction Branch many *53 The German Anti-Friction Bearings Industry 22 Metallgussgesellschaft G m b H, Leipzig, Germany 23 Aluminiumwerk G m b H, Plant No. 2, Bitterfeld, Machine Tools Branch Germany *54 Machine Tools & Machinery as Capital Equipment 24 Gebrueder Giulini GmbH, Ludwigshafen, Germany *55 Machine Tool Industry in Germany 25 Luftschiffbau, Zeppelin GmbH, Friedrichshafen 56 Herman Kolb Co., Cologne, Germany on Bodensee, Germany 57 Collet and Engelhard, Offenbach, Germany Wieland 26 Werke A G, Ulm, Germany 58 Naxos Union, Frankfort on Main, Germany 229 MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION Ordnance Brancn 59 Tho Defeat of the Lieniuin Air Foree *101 Ordnance Industry Report 60 \-Weapons (Crossbow) Campaign 102 Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerke A G, Magdeburg, 61 Air Force Rate of Operation Germany Operations 62 Weather Factors in Combat Bombardment 103 Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, in the European Theatre Bochum, Germany 63 Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and Medium 104 Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany Bombers in the ETO 105 Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseldorf, Germany 64 Description of RAF Bombing 106 Hermann Goering Werke, Braunschweig, Hallendorf, 64a The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German Logistics Germany MORALE DIVISION 107 Hannoverische Maschinenbau, Hanover, Germany 108 Gusstahlfabrik Friedrich Krupp, Essen, Germany *64b The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale (Vol I and Vol II) OIL DIVISION Medical Branch *109 Oil Division, Fin;d Report *65 Tlu' ElVect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care *110 Oil Division, Final Report, Appemlix in Germany *H1 Powder, Explosives, Special Rockets and Jet Pro- MUNITIONS DIVISION pellants. War Gases and Smoke Acid (Ministerial Report No. Heavy Industry Branch 1) 112 Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater Germany *()6 The Coking Industry Report on Germany 113 The German Oil Industry, Ministerial Report Team 78 67 Coking Phuit Report No. 1, Sections A, B, C, & D 114 Ministerial Report on Chemicals 68 Gutehoffnungshuette, Oberhausen, Germany 69 Friedrich-Alfred Huette, Rheinliausen, Germany Oil Branch 70 Neunkirchon Eisenwcrkc A G, Neunkirchon, Germany 115 Ammoniakvverke Merseburg b H, Leuna, Ger- 71 Reichswerke Hermann Goering A G, HaUendorf, G m Germany many—2 Appendices 116 Braunkohle Benzin A G, Zeitz and Bohlen, Germany 72 August Thyssen Huette A G, Hamborn, Germany Wintershall A G, Leutzkendorf, Germany 73 Frii'ilrich Krupp A G, Borbeck Plant, F^ssen, Germany 117 Ludwigshafen-Oppau Works of I Farbenindustrie 74 Dortmund Hoerder Huettenverein, A G, Dortmund, G Germany A G, Ludwigshafen, Germany 118 Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Germany, 75 Hoesch A G, Dortmund, Germany Vol I Vol. II 76 Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikatiim A G, Bochum, Germany 119 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Harburg Re- finery, Hamburg, Germany Motor Vehicles and Tanks Branch 120 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Grasbrook *77 ticrman Motor Vehicles Industry Report Refinery, Hamburg, Germany *78 Tank Industry Report 121 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Wilhelmsburg 79 Daimler Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany Refinery, Hamburg, Germany SO Renault Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, Paris 122 Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Ilauxel, Gernuuiy, Vol. 81 Adam Opel, Russelheim, Germany I & Vol II 82 Daimler Beiiz-Gaggenau Works, Gaggenau, Gernumy 123 Europaeische Tanklager und Transport A G, Ham- S3 Miuschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg, Nurnberg, Ger- burg, Germany many 124 Ebano Asphalt Werke A G, Harburg Refinery, Ham- 84 Auto Union A G, Chemnitz and Zwickau, Germany burg, Germany 85 Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany 125 Mecrbeck Rheinpreussen Synthetic Oil Plant—Vol. I 86 Maybach Motor Works, Friedrichshafen, Germany & Vol II 87 Voigtlander, Maschinenfabrik A G, Plauen, Germany 88 Volkswagenwerke, Fallersleben, Germany Rubber Branch 89 Bussing NAG, Brunswick, Germany 126 Deutsche Dunlop Gummi Co., Hanau on Main, 90 Muehleiibau Industrie A G (Miag) Brunswick, Germany Germany 91 Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerke, Magdeburg, Germany 127 Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany Submarine Branch 128 Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant 92 Gciiu.in Submarine Industry Report 129 Ministerial Report on German Rubber Industry 93 Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg A G, Augsburg, Branch Germany Propellants 94 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany 130 Elektrochemischewerke, Munich, Germany 95 Deutschewcrke A G, Kiel, Germany 131 Schoenebcck Explosive Plant, Lignose Sprengstoff 96 Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau, Bremen, Germany Werke G m b H, Bad Salzemen, Germany 97 Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft, Kiel, Germany 132 Plants of Dynamit A G, Vormal, Alfred Nobel & Co, 98 Howaldtswerke A G, Hamburg, Germany Troisdorf, Clausthal, Drummel and Dunebcrg, Ger- 99 Submarine Assembly Shelter, Farge, Germany many 100 Bremer Vulkan, Vegesack, Germany 133 Deutsche Sprengchemie G ni b H, Kraiburg, Germany 230 OVER-ALL ECONOMIC EFFECTS DIVISION 185 Synthetic Oil Plant, Meerbeck-Hamburg, Germany 186 Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany 134 Over-all Economic Effects Division Report Klockner Humboldt Deutz, Ulm, Germany Gross National Product.. Special papers 187 18S Kuliroel Hydmgenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Germany Kriegseilberichte which together Neukirclien ICisenwcrke A G, Neukirchen, Germany Ili^rmann Goering Works. comprise the 189 Railway Viaduct at AKenbeckeii, Ciermany Food and Agriculture ahove report 190 191 Railway Viaduct at Arnsburg, Gcrtiiany l.'Jta Tndustrial Sales Output and Productivity 192 Deurag-Nerag RefimMies, Misburg, Germany PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION 193 Fire Raids on ( lerman Cities 194 I G Farbenindustrie, Ludwigshafen, Germany, Vol I 134b Physical Damage Division Report (ETO) & Vol n 135 Villacoublay Airdrome, Paris, France 195 Roundhouse in Marshalling Yard, Ulm, Germany 136 Railroad Repair Yards, Malines, Belgium 196 I G Farbenindustrie, Leverkusen, Germany 137 Railroad Repair Yards, Louvain, Belgium 197 Chemisclie-Werke, Huels, Germany 13S Railroad Repair Yards, Hasselt, Belgium 198 Gremberg Marshalling Yard, Grcmberg, Germany 139 Railroad Repair Yards, Namur, Belgium 199 Locomotive Shops and Bridges at Hamm, (jormanj' 140 Submarine Pens, Brest, France 141 Powder Plant, Angouleme, France TRANSPORTATION DIVISION 142 Powder Plant, Bergerac, France *200 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Trans- 143 Coking Plants, Montigny & Liege, Belgium portation 144 Fort St. Blaise Verdun Group, Metz, France 201 Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass Hf) Gnome et Rhone, Limoges, France 202 Effects of Bombing on Railroad Installations in Regens- 146 Michelin Tire Factory, Clermont-Ferrand, France burg, Nurnberg and Munich Divisioas 147 Gnome et Rhone Aero Engine Factory, Le Mans, France 203 German Locomotive Industry During the War 148 Kugelfischer Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbach, Germany 204 German Military Railroad Traffic 149 Louis Breguet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France UTILITIES DIVISION 150 S. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France •205 German Electric Utilities Industry Report 151 A. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France to 10 in Vol I "Utilities Division Plant Reports" 152 V Weapons in London 206 1 in Vol II "Utilities Division Plant Reports" 153 City Area of Ivrefeld 207 11 to 20 alische Elektrizitaetswerk 154 Public Air Raid Shelters in Germany 208 21 Rheinische-Westf A G 155 Goldenberg Thermal Electric Power StatioD, Knap- Pacific War sack, Germany OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN 156 Brauweiler Transformer & Switching Station, Brau- *1 Summary Report (Pacific War) weiler, Germany *2 Japan's Struggle to End The War 157 Storage Depot, NahboUenbach, Germany *3 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and 158 Railway and Road Bridge, Bad Munster, Germany Nagasaki 159 Railway Bridge, EUer, Germany 160 Gustloff-Werke Weimar, Weimar, Germany CIVILIAN STUDIES 161 Henschell & Sohn GmbH, Kassel, Germany Civilian Defense Division 162 Area Survey at Pirmasens, Germany 4 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 163 Hanomag, Hanover, Germany Subjects, Tokyo, Japan 164 MAN W^erke Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany 5 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 165 Friedrich Krupp A G, Essen, Germany Subjects, Nagasaki, Japan 166 Erla Maschinenwerke GmbH, Heiterblick, Germany *6 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 167 A T G Maschinenbau G m b H, Mockau, Germany Subjects, Kyoto, Japan Erla 168 Maschinenwerke GmbH, Mockau, Germany 7 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Bayerische 169 Motorenwerke, Durrerhof, Germany Subjects, Kobe, Japan 170 Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke G m b H, Taucha, 8 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Germany Subjects, Osaka, Japan 171 Submarine Pens Deutsche-Werft, Hamburg, Germany 9 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 172 Multi-Storied Structures, Hamburg, Germany Subjects, Hiroshima, Japan—No. 1 173 Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany *10 Summary Report Covering Air Raid Protection and 174 Kassel Marshalling Kassel, Yards, Germany Allied Subjects in Japan 175 Ammoniawerke, Merseburg-Leuna, Germany *11 Final Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 176 Brown Boveri et Cie, Maimlieim, Kafertal, Germany Subjects in Japan 177 Adam Opel A G, Russelsheim, Germany Medical Division 178 Daimler-Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germanj' *12 Effects of on Health and Medical Serv- 179 Valentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, Germany The Bombing ices in ISO Volkswaggonwerke, Fallersleben, Germany Japan *13 The Effects of Atomic on Health and Medical 181 Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany Bombs 182 Ship Yards Howaldtswerke, Hamburg, Germany Services in Hiroshima and Nagasaki 183 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany Morale Divisioa 184 Dainaler-Benz A G, Mannheim, Germany '14 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale 231 ECONOMIC STUDIES *30 Kyushu Airplane Company Corporation Report Aircraft Division No. XV (Kyushu Hikoki KK) *15 The Japanese Aircraft Industry (Airframes) *16 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. *:U Shoda Engineering Company Cnrporntion Report No. I Corporation Report No. XVI (Mitsubishi Jukogj'o KK) (Shoda Seisakujo) (Airframes & Engines) (Components) *17 Xakajima Aircraft Company, Ltd. *32 Mitaka Aircraft Industries Corporation Report No. II Corporation Report No. XVI I (X.ikajima Hikoki KK) (Mitaka Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha' (Airframes & Engines) (Components) *ls Kawanishi Aircraft Company *33 Nissan Automobile Company Corporation Report No. Ill Corporation Report No. XVIII (Kawanishi Kokuki Kabushiki Kaishn) (Ni.ssan Jidosha KK) (.Airframes) (Engines) *19 Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company, Inc. *34 Army Air Ar.senal & Navy Air Depots Corporation Report No. IV Corporation Report No. XIX (Kawasaki Kokuki Kogj-o Kabushiki Kaislia) (Airframes and Engines) (Airframes & Engines) *35 Underground Production of Japanese Aircraft

*20 .\iclii Aircraft Company Report No. XX Corporation Report No. V Basic Materials Division (Aichi Kokuki KK) *3G Coal and Metals in .lapan's War Economy (.•\irfrnnies & Engines) Capital Goods, Equipment and Construction Division *21 Sumitomo Metal Industries, Propeller Divi.sion Cnrporation Report No. VI '37 The Japanese Construction Industry (Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo KK, Puropcra *3S Japanese Electrical Equipment Seizo.sho) •39 The Japanese Machine Building Industry

(Propellers) Electric Power Division *22 Hitachi Aircraft Company *40 The Electric Power Industry of Japan Corporation Report No. VII *41 The Electric Power Industry of Japan (Plant Reports) (Hitachi Kokuki KK) (Airframes & Engines) Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies Division *23 Japan International Air Industries, Ltd. *42 The .Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and IHili- Corporation Report No. VIII z at ion of Manpower (Nippon Kokusai Koku Kogyo KK) Military Supplies Division (Airframes) *43 Japanese War Production Industries *24 .lapan Musical Instrument Manufacturing Company 44 .Japanese Naval Ordnance Corporation Report No. IX 45 Japanese Army Ordnance (Nippon Gakki Seizo KK) *4Ci Japanese Naval Shipljuilding (Propellers) *47 Japanese Motor Vehicle Industry *25 Tachikawa Aircraft Company *48 Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding Corporation Report No. X Oil and Chemical Division (Tachikawa Hikoki KK) 49 Chemicals in Japan's War (Airframes) 50 Chemicals in Japan's War—Appendix *2(j Fuji Aii-plane Company 51 Oil in Japan's War Corporation Report No. XI 52 Oil in Japan's War—Appendix (Fuji Hikoki KK) (.'Virframes) Over-all Economic Effects Division *27 Showa Airplane Company *53 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Corporation Report No. XII Economy (Including Appendix A: U. S. Economic (Showa Hikoki Kogyo KK) Intelligence on Japan—Analysis and Comparison; (Airframes) Appendix B: Gross National Product on Japan and

*2,S Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Company, Ltd. Its Components; Appendix C: Statistical Sources). Corporation Report No. XIII Transportation Division (Ishikawajima Kokii Kogyo Kabushiki 54 The War Agaiast Japanese Tran.sportation, 1941-1945 Kaisha) (Engines) Urban Areas Division *2it Nijipon Airplane Company Effects of Air Attack on Japanese Urban Economy Corporation Report No. XIV (Summary Report) (Nippon Hikoki KK) *5fj Effects of Air Attack on ITrban Complex Tokyo- (Airframes) Kawasaki-Yokohama 232 •57 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Niigoya 86 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (F^n- *58 Effects of Air Attack on Osaka-Kobo-Kyoto closures O and II), Shionoini-Saki and Nojima-Saki 59 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagasaki Areas (En- 60 Effects of Air Altack on (lie City of flirosliiina 87 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party closure I), Comments and Dala on Effectiveness MILITARY STUDIES of Ammunition Military Analysis Division 88 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- closure J), Comments and Data on Accuracy of 61 Air Forces Alhed with the United States in the War Firing Against Japan 89 Reports of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 62 Japanese Air Power closure K), Effects of Surface Bombardments on 63 Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics Japanese War Potential (M The Effect of Air Action ob Japanese Ground Army Logistics Physical Damage Division 65 Employment of Forces ITniler the Southwest Pacific 90 I'ffect of the Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan (a Command Report on Ivght Cities) Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bom- 66 The 01 The Eflects of the Ten Thousand Pound Boml) on in the Against Japan (Twentieth tjardment War Japanese Targets (a Report on Nine Incidents) Air Force) 92 Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan Air Operations in China, Burma, India World War 67 — 93 Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan II 94 Effects of the Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Japanese Air Transport in the War Against Japan 68 The Command Targets (a Report on Five Incidents) 69 Thirteentli Air Force in the War Against Japan The 95 Effects of Two Thousand, One Thousand, and Five 70 The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War Hundred Pound Bombs on Japanese Targets (a Against Japan Report on Eight Incidents) Air Force in Against Japan 71 The Fifth the War 96 A Report on Physical Damage in Japan (Summary Naval Analysis Division Report)

*72 The Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols I and G-2 Division 11) 97 Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence *73 Campaigns of the Pacific War 98 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- 74 The Retluction of Wake Island nese Homeland, Part I, Comprehensive Report *75 The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul 99 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- 76 The American Campaign Against Wotje, Maloelap, nese Homeland, Part II, Airfields Mille, and Jaluit (Vols I, II and III) 100 Evaluation of Photograpliic Intelligence in the Japanese *77 The Reduction of Truk Homeland, Part III, Computed Bomb Plotting 78 The Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against Japan 101 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in tlie Japa- 79 Report f)f Ships Bombardment Survey Party—Fore- nese Homeland, Part IV, Urban Area Analysis word, Introduction, Conclusions, and General Sum- 102 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- mary nese Homeland, PartV, Camouflage 80 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 103 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- closure A), Kamaishi Area nese Homeland, Part VI, Shipping 81 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 104 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- closure B), Hamamatsu Area nese Homeland, Part VII, Electronics 82 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 105 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the ,Iapa- closure C), Hitachi Area nese Homeland, Part VIII, Beach Intelligence S3 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 106 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- closure D), Hakodate Area nese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery 84 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 107 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- closure E), Muroran Area nese Homeland, Part X, Roads and Railroads 85 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 108 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- closure F), Shimizu Area nese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis

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