Pa Rt I: T H E Q U E S T F O R Ad D I T I O N a L I N F O R M at I O N a N D Re C O R D S I N Fe D E R a L G O V E R N M E N T of F I C E S

CHAPTER 6 PA RT I: T H E Q U E S T F O R AD D I T I O N A L I N F O R M AT I O N A N D RE C O R D S I N FE D E R A L G O V E R N M E N T OF F I C E S

A major focus of the Assassination Records fully evaluate the success of the Review Review Board’s work has been to attempt to Bo a r d’s approach is to examine the Review answer questions and locate additional infor- Bo a r d’s rec o r ds as well as the assassination mation not previously explored related to the rec o r ds that are now at the National Arc h i v e s assassination of President John F. Kennedy. and Records Administration (NARA) as a di r ect result of the Review Board’s req u e s t s . The Review Board’s “Requests for Ad d i t i o n a l Information and Records” to government Mo re o v e r , because the Review Board’s req u e s t s agencies served two purposes. First, the addi- we r e not always consistent in theme, the chap- tional requests allowed Review Board staff ter is necessarily miscellaneous in nature. members to locate new categories of assassination rec o r ds in federal government files. In Scope of Chapter some files, the Review Board located new assassination rec o r ds. In other files, it discov- Section 3(2) of the JFK Act defined the term e red that the file contained no re l e v a n t “assassination record” to include all records rec o r ds. In both cases, the Review Board staff that were “created or made available for use memorialized their findings in written mem- by, obtained by, or otherwise came into the oranda, with the hope that the public would possession of” any official entity that investi- be able to easily determine what files the staff gated the assassination. reviewed. Second, the additional re q u e s t s allowed Review Board staff to request back- This chapter does not discuss those records gr ound information that could assist in the that government offices identified for inclu- review of rec o r ds that it had identified as rel - sion in the JFK Collection. evant to the assassination. For example, Section 7(j)(1)(C)(ii) of the JFK Act empow- Review Board staff members might encounter e red the Board to direct government off i c e s particular cryptonyms, abbreviations, infor- to make available “addi- mant symbol numbers, file numbers, or offi c e tional information and designations in assassination re c o rds, but We cannot prevent the specula- re c o rds” that the Review tion that someone did cover up, could only determine the meaning of those B o a rd believed it needed but the arguments that a cover- ab b r eviations, numbers, and codewords by to fulfill its re s p o n s i b i l i- requesting and reviewing additional files. ties under the Act. A s up continues and will continue, the JFK Act specifically can somewhat at least, be less- While the Review Board made most of its i n s t ructed the Review ened.What has been lost cannot be replaced. But what we do additional requests to the FBI and the CIA, it B o a rd to go beyond have can be made public. We also made requests to other agencies, such as the scope of pre v i o u s should have access and our stu- the Secret Service, the Department of State, inquiries, the Review dents should have access to and the National Security Agency (NSA). The B o a rd tailored its addi- what still exists. government offices answered each of the tional requests to encom- pass those materials that —Bruce Hitchcock, May 1997 Review Board’s requests for additional infor- no previous investiga- mation and rec o r ds, as the Pr esident John F. tive body had identified Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1 as assassination-related. This chapter cov- 19 9 2 (JFK Act) req u i re d . This chapter serves ers o n l y those re c o rds that the Review as an overview of the Review Board’s req u e s t s B o a rd sought, pursuant to its authority, to rather than as a complete detailed explanation request additional information and of each request. The only way for the public to re c o rd s .

81 It is widely known that the Wa r ren Com- 1. Pre-Assassination Records mission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations conducted extensive The question of what U.S. government investigations of Jack Ruby, and, as a re s u l t records existed on Lee Harvey Oswald on government offices processed voluminous November 22, 1963, has never been answered Ruby re c o rds. The Review Board made to the satisfaction of the public. Thus, a pri- only two additional requests for informa- mary goal of the Review Board was to clarify tion and re c o rds concerning Ruby. There- the pre-assassination re c o rds held by the f o re, this chapter does not have a separate agencies which were most involved in the section on Ruby. Similarly, the JFK Collec- post-assassination investigation. tion contains a considerable number of re c o rds concerning Lee Harvey Oswald’s a. CIA. activities in New Orleans, but the Review B o a rd made only a few requests for addi- At the time of the assassination, the CIA held tional information and re c o rds re g a rd i n g four types of records which contained infor- Oswald in New Orleans. mation on Lee Harvey Oswald: a 201 or personality file which was released to the public A. RECORDS RELATED TO LEE HARVEY in 1992; an Office of Security file which OSWALD nearly duplicated the pre-assassination 201 file; HTLINGUAL re c o rds; and re c o rd s The Review Board’s additional re q u e s t s within a general file on U.S. citizens who had focused upon locating all records concerning defected to another country. Lee Harvey Oswald held by the U.S. government. The Review Board requested each i. Security file. CIA’s search of its Office agency to check their of Personnel Security database produced the One if the problems of secrets is archives, files, and data- original Office of Security’s subject file on that Americans are incapable of bases for information Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) established keeping secrets very long. Any- directly related to either circa 1960. The first volume of the Security thing like this would have Lee Harvey Oswald or file contains 19 documents, similar but not leaked out by now. his wife Marina Oswald. absolutely identical to the pre-assassination —Richard Helms, Given that many con- volume of Oswald’s 201 file. The Review February 7, 1996 spiracy theories allege B o a rd identified an additional six docu- U.S. government involve- ments, which appear to pre-date the assassi- ment with Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the nation, in later volumes of the Security file. assassination, the Review Board was particu- Although the HSCA reviewed the Office of larly interested in locating re c o rds that agen- Security file in 1978, Congress did not include this file with the other material cies had created or main- viewed by the HSCA that it sequestered. tained prior to the We did not understand how Consequently, this file did not end up in the assassination. In some intelligence agencies worked. CIAsequestered collection.2 As a result of the The CIA “gave [us] nothing cases, the Review Board Review Board’s request, CIA transmitted its more than what was asked for. simply released more Office of Security file to the John F. Kennedy Every time we asked for a file, information from files Assassination Records Collection (JFK Col- we had to write a letter.There that the public has long lection) at NARA. were no fishing expeditions. known about, such as —Ed Lopez and Dan Hardway the CIA 201 file on Lee ii. Records in the defector file. CIA estab- Harvey and Marina lished its 12-volume Office of Security Defec- Oswald or the FBI files tor file (#0341008) circa 1950 for the purpose on Lee Harvey Oswald. In other cases, the of re c o rding information on U.S. citizens Review Board’s additional requests led to who defected to other countries and informa- the release of new re c o rds, such as the CIA’ s tion on foreign citizens who were consider- security file on Lee Harvey Oswald, or ing defecting to the United States. The resulted in the release of previously denied Review Board staff reviewed the entire defec- re c o rds, such as the original files on the tor file for records related to Lee Harvey Oswalds from the Immigration and Natural- Oswald. The staff located records on Lee ization Service (INS). Harvey Oswald, including research notes,

82 press clippings, and duplicates of records and recommended to the FBI that these found in the Security file, and identified the records be included in the JFK Collection. records as appropriate for inclusion in the JFK Collection. The Review Board also sought to determine whether the FBI maintained a file in Mexico iii. HTLINGUAL rec o r d s . HT L I N G U A L is City on a “Harvey Lee Oswald” under the the crypt for CIA’s mail opening and mail file number 105–2137. The Mexico City Legal cover program for 1952 to 1973. The CIA Attache (Legat) opened a file on Lee Harvey reported to the Review Board that it Oswald (105–3702) in October 1963 following de s t r oyed most of its formal HTLINGUAL Oswald’s visit to Mexico City. Some of the rec o r ds in 1990 at the direction of CIA’s Offi c e documents in the Legat’s file contain nota- of General Counsel. The CIA se q u e s t e r ed col- tions for routing records to a file numbered lection, however, does contain several “soft” 105–2137, and were captioned “Harvey Lee or working files on Lee Harvey Oswald and Oswald.” One researcher conjectured that the HTLINGUAL pr oject, including the “soft” this file would predate the Lee Harvey file held by the Special Investigations Grou p Oswald file, 105–3702, and might lead the of the Counterintelligence Staff (CI/SIG). In Review Board to other FBI documents on Lee response to the Review Board’s request for Harvey Oswald. In response to the Review additional information, the CIA located addi- Board’s request, the FBI searched its Legat’s tional ref e r ences to HTLINGUAL rec o r ds in files for a file numbered 105–2137 and cap- ar chival files of the CIA’s Deputy Director of tioned “Harvey Lee Oswald,” but it did not Plans (now the Deputy Director of Opera- find such a file. tions). CIA pr ocessed the relevant rec o r ds for release to NARA. c. Secret Service.

b. FBI. The Review Board reviewed the Secret Ser- vice’s Protective Research Files and deter- The FBI opened its file on Lee Harvey mined that the Secret Service did not open a Oswald in 1959 when press reports from p rotective re s e a rch file (CO–2) file on Lee Moscow announced that Oswald, a twenty Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination. year old former Marine had renounced his S e c ret Service re c o rds extant indicate that U.S. citizenship and had applied for Soviet the Secret Service also did not have any citizenship. Between 1959 and November 22, information on Lee Harvey Oswald fro m 1963, the FBI filed approximately 50 records other government agencies prior to the f rom several government agencies in its a s s a s s i n a t i o n . Headquarters file on Oswald (105–82555). Although the FBI processed all of the pre- d. IRS/Social Security Administration. assassination documents in Oswald’s file under the JFK Act, the Review Board made To shed light on questions regarding Lee several additional requests to the FBI to Harvey Oswald’s employment history and determine whether it had other pre - sources of income, the Review Board sought assassination records on Lee Harvey Oswald to inspect and publicly release Internal Rev- in its files. enue Service (IRS) and Social Security Administration (SSA) re c o rds on Oswald. For example, the Review Board staff found Although the Review Board staff did review documents cross-referenced from files cap- IRS and SSA records, Section 6103 of the tioned “Funds Transmitted to Residents of Internal Revenue Code prohibits the disclo- Russia” and “Russian Funds.” The Review sure of tax return information, and section Board requested access to files with these 11(a) of the JFK Act explicitly preserves the case captions from FBI Headquarters and the confidentiality of tax return information. Dallas and New York Field offices for the Thus, the Review Board unfortunately could years 1959 through 1964. The Review Board not open Lee Harvey Oswald’s tax returns. staff located assassination records concern- The next chapter of this report explains, in ing attempts by Marguerite Oswald, Lee the IRS compliance section, the mechanics of Harvey Oswald’s mother, to send money to the Review Board’s and the IRS’s efforts to her son while he was in the Soviet Union, release this information.

83 e. INS records on Lee and Marina Oswald. run by an agency of the U.S. government, or a false defector sent on a mission to the U.S.S.R. Many researchers have asked how Lee Har- for a particular purpose and then used for dif- vey Oswald, a defector to the Soviet Union, fe r ent purposes by some members of the intel- could have been allowed to re-enter the ligence community following his return to the United States in 1962 with his wife, a Soviet United States. national, and how Marina Oswald would have been permitted to leave the Soviet a. U.S. Marine Corps records. Union when emigration was, at best, extremely difficult. In an attempt to shed The Review Board asked the Marine Corps to light on these questions, the Review Board search for any records relating to post-assas- requested and released original files on Lee sination investigations that the U.S. Marine and Marina Oswald from the U.S. Immigra- Corps might have completed, as some tion and Naturalization Service (INS). Subse- researchers believe. The U.S. Marine Corps quently, in late 1997, INS discovered in its searched files at both U.S. Marine Corps HQ investigative section, that it had an extensive in Quantico, and at the Federal Records Cen- working file on Marina Oswald that con- ter in Suitland, Maryland, but the Marine tained 1963–64 records directly relating to the Corps did not locate evidence of any internal assassination. investigations of Lee Harvey Oswald, other than correspondence already published in f. House Un-American Activities Committee. the Warren Report.

As of this writing the Review Board had i. U.S. Marine Headquarters copy of obtained authorization of the House Judi- enlisted personnel file and medical file. In 1997, ciary Committee to release its HUAC files on the Review Board transferred to the JFK Col- Lee Harvey Oswald. The records predomi- lection at NARA the original (paper) copies nantly postdated the assassination. However, of Lee Harvey Oswald’s U.S. Marine Corps HUAC held a few pre-assassination records Enlisted Personnel File, and Medical Treat- on Oswald, including articles on his defec- ment File. Previously, these files had been tion to the U.S.S.R. and his return to the U.S. maintained at U.S. Marine Corps Headquar- ters in Quantico, Virginia and had only been 2. Military records available in microfiche format in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests The question of whether the Marine Corps that people made to the Marine Corps. conducted a post-assassination investigation and produced a written report on former ii. Additional relevant U.S. Marine Corps Marine Private Lee Harvey Oswald, circa late unit diaries. The Review Board obtained from 1963 and early 1964, has never been res o l v e d U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters at Quan- to the satisfaction of the tico, Virginia, additional official U.S. Marine [T]he enduring controversy of public. Similarly, many Corps unit diaries from the units in which who Oswald really was , wh a t have wondered whether Oswald served. These additional diaries he was , is an inherent part of the the Office of Naval Intelli- complement the partial collection of unit historical truth of this case. . . gence (ONI) conducted a diaries gathered by the HSCA. Together, the Os wa l d , as you know, is the post-defection “net dam- Review Board and HSCA unit diary records most complex alleged or real age assessment” investi- appear to constitute a complete unit diary political assassin in American gation of Lee Harvey record for Oswald. Researchers can compare hi s t o r y. . . the idea that, for the Oswald circa 1959 or 1960. the in and out transfer dates in Oswald’s per- first time, citizens will be the Various former Oswald sonnel file with the original entries in the per- judge of the balance between associates and military tinent diaries to which they correspond. government secrecy and what investigators have rec a l l e d we know, rather than the agen- separate investigations.3 b. Military identification card. cies themselves or the courts, I R e s e a rchers have also think is extraordinary. . . questioned whether To resolve questions about whether Oswald’s —Philip Melanson, Oswald was an “authen- D D – 1173 Military Identification card pro- March 24, 1995 tic” defector, a “false vided some indication that Oswald had a defector” in a pro g r a m connection to CIA, the Review Board

84 requested and received additional informa- Investigative Service (NCIS) records manage- tion from the Federal Records Center in St. ment officials, one of whom personally veri- Louis, Missouri, from the personnel files of fied that he had searched for District Intelli- other Marines who had served with Oswald gence Office records (with negative results) (for comparison purposes), and from the U.S. from the San Diego, Dallas, and New Orleans Marine Corps and the U.S. Army’s Military District Intelligence Offices in 1996 with neg- History Institute. ative results. This search included “11 9 ” reports from the time period 1959–1964, dur- c. Possible ONI post-defection investigation. ing an extensive search of NCIS record group 181. The search included any records that The Review Board became aware of an indi- would have been related to Oswald’s defec- vidual named Fred Reeves of California, who tion. Thus, the Review Board ultimately was reputed to have been in charge of a post- located no documentary evidence to substan- defection “net damage assessment” of Oswald tiate Reeves’ claims. by the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) shortly after Oswald’s defection to the U.S.S.R. 3. In the U.S.S.R. The Review Board contacted Reeves, interviewed him twice by telephone, then flew him Various authors interested in Lee Harvey to Washington, D.C., where the Review Board Oswald have suggested that Oswald was a st a f f interviewed him in person.4 CI A so u r ce, asset, or operative at the time of his defection to the U.S.S.R. in October 1959. In 1959, Reeves was a civilian Naval Intelli- Re s e a r chers further suggest that Oswald either gence Operations Specialist.5 Reeves told the performed some sort of mission for the CIA, Review Board that a week or so after Oswald met with CIA personnel in the Soviet Union, or defected to the U.S.S.R., two officers from was debriefed by CIA personnel upon his ONI in Washington, D.C.,6 called him and return. The Review Board staff req u e s t e d asked him to conduct a background investi- information and rec o r ds from CIA and other gation at the Marine Corps Air Station in El agencies in an effort to pursue rec o r ds that Toro, California—Oswald’s last duty station might shed light on such allegations. before his discharge from the Marine Corps. Reeves said that he went to El Toro, copied a. CIA operations in Moscow. Oswald’s enlisted personnel file, obtained the names of many of his associates, and The Review Board staff examined extensive mailed this information to ONI in Washing- CIA records concerning the history and oper- ton, D.C. He said that ONI in Washington ran ations of the CIA in or against the Soviet the post-defection investigation of Oswald, Union in the late 1950s and early to mid and that the Washington officers then 1960s. The Review Board found no records directed various agents in the field. Although that suggested that Oswald had ever worked Reeves did not interview anyone himself, he for the CIA in any capacity, nor did any said that later (circa late 1959 or early 1960), records suggest that Oswald’s trip and defec- approximately 12 to 15 “119” reports con- tion to the Soviet Union served any intelli- cerning Oswald (OPNAV Forms 5520–119 are gence purpose. The Review Board staff also ONI’s equivalent of an FBI FD–302 investiga- interviewed the senior CIAofficer in Moscow tive report), crossed his desk. Reeves said he at the time of Oswald’s arrival and the CIA was aware of “119” reports from Japan and Chief of Station present when Oswald Texas, and that the primary concern of the departed the Soviet Union. Both individuals reports he read on Oswald was to ascertain stated that they had no knowledge of Oswald what damage had been done to national prior to the assassination, and they did not security by Oswald’s defection. Reeves believe that Oswald’s trip and defection to reported that he also saw eight to ten “119” the Soviet Union was orchestrated for any reports on Oswald after the assassination, intelligence purpose. and that he was confident he was not confus- ing the two events in his mind. b. American Embassy personnel.

In the spring of 1998, Review Board staff Re v i e w Bo a r d staff interviewed, or informally members met with two Naval Criminal spoke with, numerous individuals assigned

85 to the American Embassy in Moscow during Oswald. The CIA, however, did not locate the time period 1959–1963. The clarity of indi- any corroborating information or records in vidual memories of Oswald and/or the its files. Moscow Embassy varied widely and few stories were consistent. One of the most interes t - In an effort to better understand this mys- ing was the interview of Joan Hallett, the t e r y, the Review Board searched for rec o rd s receptionist at the American Embassy and the which might confirm or deny whether there first embassy person to meet Oswald. Hallett was any contact between Oswald and the was the wife of Assistant Naval Attache Com- C I A b e f o re or after his time in the Soviet mander Oliver Hallett and a temporary Union. The Office of Operations (OO), which receptionist during the summer Am e r i c a n in 1963 was a part of the Directorate of Intel- Exhibition at Sokolniki Park in Moscow. Hal- ligence, interviewed American citizens who lett’s recollections of Oswald’s visit place him might have come into contact with informa- at the embassy before the end of the Exhibi- tion or individuals of intelligence intere s t tion on September 5, 1959. Available rec o rd s while overseas.7 The Review Board staff show Oswald in the USSR no earlier than examined OO re c o rds and operational histo- October 15, 1959. While Hallett’s Department ries to gain an understanding of OO prac- of State employment rec o r ds document her tices in the early 1960s. The Review Board recollection that she was not employed as a s t a ff found no evidence of contact between receptionist as late as October 31, 1959, the Oswald and OO either before or after his Review Board found no documentary evi- time in the Soviet Union. While the rec o rd s dence to explain the variation in dates. showed that OO was interested in interviewing tourists to the Soviet Union for general c. Search for American Embassy records. information in the 1950s, by 1962 only trav- elers with special access, knowledge, or In an effort to account for the widely varying skills were of intelligence interest. OO had stories from the interviews of personnel no specific policy covering contacts with assigned to the American Embassy in returning defectors; however, a local field Moscow, the Review Board staff reviewed o ffice could initiate a contact if justified by a the Department of State post files for particular situation. CIA could not locate Moscow for the period 1959–1963, which are any re c o rds or reporting showing any OO available to the public at NARA. The Depart- contact with Oswald. ment of State was not able to locate the visitors book for Moscow circa 1959 nor any list While a DCD “A” file does exist in the CIA’s of visitors and tourists for late 1959. s e q u e s t e red collection, most of the documents in the file are from the mid-1970s; none d. DCD/OO alleged debriefing of predate the assassination. Furthermore, the Lee Harvey Oswald. file appears to have been created as DCD personnel attempted to locate any evidence of Part of the mystery surrounding Oswald’s contacts with Oswald in response to various defection and return to the U.S. is the ques- c o n g ressional investigative bodies. CIA tion of whether the CIA’s Office of Opera- processed this file for release to NARA. tions (later the Domestic Contacts Division) interviewed Oswald upon his return from 4. In Mexico City the Soviet Union. The [T]he CIA, with thorough photo- available evidence is con- Lee Harvey Oswald’s visit to Mexico City in graphic surveillance of both the t r a d i c t o r y. The Review S e p t e m b e r-October 1963, remains one of the Cuban and Soviet Embassies, B o a rd requested addi- m o re vexing subplots to the assassination had at least ten opportunities to tional information and s t o r y. Oswald’s fascination with the Soviet photograph Oswa l d , yet CIA records in an attempt to Union and Cuba is well-known, yet there records at the time of the assassi- coroborate a November exists no consensus of opinion as to why he nation allegedly did not contain 25, 1963, memorandum spent time at both the Soviet and Cuban a single photograph matchi n g which discusses the rec- Embassies during his brief stay in Mexico the man arrested in Dallas. ollections of a CIA staff City in late September and early October —Peter Dale Scott o fficer that the A g e n c y 1963. Why did Lee Harvey Oswald make c o n s i d e red interviewing this mysterious trip to Mexico just six weeks

86 prior to the assassination? Was the purpose the rec o r ds on the Station and Oswald’s Mex- of this trip merely to apply for a transit visa ico City visit in the JFK Collection at NARA at the Cuban Embassy in a desperate rep r esent the full universe of rec o r ds. Recog- attempt to return to Moscow after the Sovi- nizing the existence of gaps in the JFK Collec- ets had re b u ffed his direct approach? Since tion, the Review Board staff worked to verify the Mexico City chapter is so puzzling, and whether any additional extant rec o r ds could p rovides fertile ground for speculation, the pr ovide further information on or more tangi- Review Board sought to ensure that all gov- ble evidence of Oswald’s trip to Mexico City ernment re c o rds on this subject were and alleged contacts with the Soviet and released and took action to pursue addi- Cuban Embassies. The Review Board staff tional re c o rds. The Review Board facilitated examined the CIA se q u e s t e r ed collection, the the release of thousands of previously sani- Oswald 201 file, and the then unproc e s s e d tized and closed documents on the subject of files maintained by longtime CIA of ficer Russ Oswald’s trip to Mexico, including but not Holmes in an effort to locate any leads toward limited to re c o rds from CIA, FBI, Depart- unique information on Oswald’s visit and the ment of State, the Wa r ren Commission and CI A Station in Mexico City. the HSCA. The Review Board also pursued leads suggested by re s e a rchers and submit- i. Audio and photographic. C I A h a s ted requests to agencies for additional acknowledged that in 1963, at the time of re c o rds and/or evidence. Oswald’s visit, the Mexico City Station had in place two telephone intercept opera- a. Technical surveillance. tions—covering both the Soviet and Cuban Embassies; three photographic surveillance At the time of Oswald’s trip to Mexico, with operations targeting the Soviet compound; the Cold War well underway and the and one photographic surveillance opera- Kennedy Administration preoccupied with tion, which employed at least two cameras, Cuba, the CIA’s Mexico City Station housed targeting the Cuban compound. Painstaking one of the Agency’s major foreign clandes- negotiations between the Review Board and tine operations in the Western Hemisphere. CIA on the protection or release of technical The station maintained a multifaceted sur- and operational details resulted in CIA’s dis- veillance coverage of the Soviet and Cuban closure of a great deal of previously withheld diplomatic installations. CIA electronic sur- information concerning audio and photo- veillance confirmed that Lee Harvey Oswald graphic surveillance. This process then visited and communicated with both the paved the way for the Review Board to ask Cuban Consulate and the Soviet Embassy for specific types of records pertaining to between September 27 and October 1 or 2, CIA’s surveillance activities. 1963. Despite requests from several congressional investigative bodies and the Review The Review Board submitted formal and Board, the CIA never located photographic informal requests to CIA relating to elec- evidence of Oswald’s visit to either embassy. tronic surveillance operations. Several mem- Although CIA has transcripts of the calls bers of the Review Board staff reviewed the believed to have been made by Oswald, the sequestered collection microfilm, which con- CIA has consistently maintained that it did tained a broad universe of records on CIA not retain tapes from the period of Oswald’s technical operations and covered a period visit as the Station continually recycled the that extended beyond the assassination. tapes after it transcribed any useful informa- Because the release of the Warren Commis- tion. According to the transcripts, only one of sion Report in 1964 had a bearing on certain the calls, made to the Soviet Consulate, actu- surveillance operations in Mexico City, the ally identifies a Lee Oswald as the caller. Review Board sought to ensure that it Since CIA had already erased the tapes, in marked for inclusion in the JFK Collection all accordance with the Station’s standard pro- records reflecting any changes in or suspen- cedures, it could not perform post-assassina- sion of surveillance activity around the time tion voice comparisons. that the Wa r ren Commission released its report. In addition, the Review Board Given the importance of the Mexico City Sta- explored any newly identified operations or tion, the Review Board worked to ensure that surveillance activity.

87 During its review of all project files and ticular, and thus, the tape recordings them- operational reports, the Review Board found selves were not of intelligence value. direct references to electronic bugs and hidden microphones at the Cuban Embassy and On the day of the assassination when Oswald requested CIA to provide additional infor- was named as the alleged assassin, CIA mation. The Review Board attempted to Headquarters instructed its Mexico City Sta- determine whether CIA had any other election not to erase any tapes until it provided tronic intelligence that may have recorded further notification. Although CIA did not Oswald’s visits inside the Cuban consulate or locate tapes from the September- O c t o b e r discussions about his visits. In response to time frame, the Review Board’s additional this request, CIA provided evidence from a requests resulted in CIA’s identifying Mexico City history stating that its bugging approximately 185 additional tapes from the operation was not in place at the time of Station’s telephone operation from the days Oswald’s visit. CIA p rovided no further immediately following the assassination and information on hidden microphones. the next few weeks. The Review Board designated all of the tapes as assassination records Although CIAhad photographic surveillance and the CIA is currently processing the tapes targeting the front gates of both the Soviet for release to NARA. and Cuban Consulates, CIA reports that it did not locate photographic evidence of The Review Board’s efforts to locate new Oswald’s visits. In an effort to obtain addi- photographic evidence of Oswald in Mexico tional records on this subject, the Review City were unsuccessful. The Review Board B o a rd submitted additional requests for explored the possibility that CIA had addi- information pertaining to technical surveil- tional re c o rds pertaining to CIA p h o t o- lance. The Review Board staff also reviewed graphic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy. project files concerning all known telephonic Although the Mexico City Station ran three and photographic operations. The Review operations during the relevant time period, Board designated as assassination records all the HSCA investigators found photographic technical operational reports pertaining to evidence and log sheets from only one of the 1963–64 time frame that CIA had not these CIA operations.8 The HSCA material— already placed in the JFK Collection. These including the photographs of the man who new re c o rds included periodic pro g re s s was initially misidentified as Oswald—is reports, contact sheets, project re n e w a l available to the public at NARA. reports and related documentation on telephone and photographic surveillance, logs Beyond the photographic evidence from the that corresponded to photographic surveil- time period of Oswald’s visit, the CIA lance, contact sheets from photographic sur- s e q u e s t e red collection microfilm contained veillance, and transcripts of telephonic sur- additional log sheets and copies of film fro m veillance. the Cuban and Soviet surveillance operations. The Review Board believed these ii. Tapes, transcripts, and photographs in re c o rds may be useful to re s e a rchers for the e x i s t e n c e . C I A reported that it ro u t i n e l y purpose of establishing a frame of re f e re n c e erased tapes from telephone operations after or modus operandi, and for understanding two weeks, unless CIA identified a conversa- the scope of CIA coverage in 1963. In light of tion on a tape that was of particular intelli- the historical value of this material, the gence value. CIA stated that it destroyed Review Board declared all photographic tape[s] containing Oswald’s voice and other coverage for 1963 that it found in the CIA related calls as a matter of routine procedure, s e q u e s t e red collection microfilm as assassi- even though the Mexico City Station’s inter- nation re c o rd s . est in the Oswald conversations at the time that CIA intercepted them was such that the b. Cable traffic. Station transcribed them and reported them to CIA Headquarters in an October 8, 1963, The Review Board determined that, while cable. CIA reported that its interest at the much of the Mexico City Station cable traffic time was in an American talking to the Soviet existed in the JFK Collection, the traffic con- and Cuban Embassies, not in Oswald in par- tained numerous gaps, particularly in com-

88 munications between Mexico City and the the periods in question, the Office of CIAStation in Miami, JMWAVE.9 The Review Communications (OC) only held cables Board deemed these gaps to be significant long enough to ensure that they were because both CIA stations played roles in successfully transmitted to the named U.S. operations against Cuba. The cable traf- recipient. On occasion. . . cables were fic that the Review Board reviewed in the sometimes held for longer periods but CIA’s sequestered collection commences on not with the intention of creating a long- October 1, 1963, and contains the earliest term reference collection. known communication—an October 8, 1963, cable—between the Mexico City Station and In addition, CIA informed the Review Board CIA Headquarters concerning Lee Harvey that it did not have a repository for cables Oswald. and dispatches from stations in the 1960s.10 Although originating offices maintained In 1995, the Review Board submitted a for- temporary chronological files, the off i c e s mal request for additional information regarding the above-referenced gaps in CIA generally destroyed the temporary records in cable traffic. CIA did not locate additional less than ninety days. After the assassination, traffic for the specified periods. CIA com- the Office of the Deputy Director of Plans pleted its response to this request in February ordered relevant CIA offices to retain cables 1998 explaining that: that they would have otherwise destroyed. The HSCAused the remaining cable traffic to In general, cable traffic and dispatches compile its Mexico City chronology. Had CIA are not available as a chronological col- offices strictly applied the ninety-day rule, lection and thus, for the period 26 there might have been copies of cable traffic through 30 September 1963 it is not pos- commencing as early as August 22, 1963, sible to provide cables and dispatches in rather than October 1, 1963, available to CIA a chronological/package form. During on November 22, 1963. (See illustration.)

89 c. Win Scott files. Tirado de Duran.

Winston M. (Win) Scott was the CIA Chief of CIAhad transcribed intercepts of phone calls Station in Mexico City at the time of made between Silvia Duran and the Soviet Oswald’s visit. While the CIA had processed Consulate in Mexico City that related to her some of Scott’s files as part of its sequestered dealings with Oswald. Duran’s statement to collection, the Review Board followed up on the DFS after the assassination corroborated several leads suggesting that CIAmight have the information in CIA’s intercepts—that Lee additional Scott files from his Mexico City Harvey Oswald went to the Cuban Con- days. Scott apparently had an interest in the sulate to request a transit visa. The DFS pro- assassination, and was a prodigious record vided Duran’s interrogation reports to U.S. keeper. The Review Board asked the CIA to authorities in Mexico City and the reports search for any additional extant records that were widely disseminated to U.S. federal Scott had maintained. According to Anne agencies in the immediate aftermath of Pres- Goodpasture, who had worked with Scott in ident Kennedy’s death. Mexico City, Scott kept a collection of classified documents from his tenure as Chief of Given that the initial ten-page “confession” Station which he stored in a safe in his home or interrogation appeared to be a summary following his retirement. While the details of report of Duran’s account and the statements the story are unclear, the Review Board of several other individuals who also were understands that shortly after Scott’s death a r rested and questioned with Duran, the in 1973, CIACounterintelligence Chief James Review Board wondered whether the CIA J. Angleton, one of Scott’s longtime friends, had an “original” transcript from Duran’s traveled to Mexico City to make arrange- arrest. The Review Board requested that CIA ments with Scott’s wife search for such a transcript, but CIA searches The Committee has found. . . the for CIA personnel to all returned to the ten-page summary and FBI investigation, as well as the review Scott’s classified CIA did not locate additional records. CIA inquiry [into the Kennedy material. CIA produced assassination], was deficient on what it says are its com- e. Legat administrative files. the specific question of the sig- plete files on Scott, nificance of Oswald’s contacts including inventory lists, The FBI keeps administrative files on each of with pro-Castro and anti-Cas- some documents which its field offices and its Legal Attache, or tro groups for the many months a p p e a red to be fro m Legat, offices. The Legat administrative files before the assassination. Scott’s personnel file, contain communications between the Legat —Senate Report on JFK Act, and Scott’s semi-autobio- and FBI Headquarters concerning personnel, July 22, 1992 graphical novel. The real estate, supplies, construction, and to a Review Board examined lesser extent, relations between the FBI Legat these documents for and re p resentatives of other government information relevant to agencies abroad. The Review Board the assassination. The Review Board deter- requested and received from the FBI access to mined a small number of the records to be its Mexico City Legat administrative file with assassination records. the hope that the file might contain records concerning the assassination itself or records d. Sylvia Duran. concerning Oswald’s pre-assassination trav- els to Mexico. The Review Board also asked Silvia Tirado de Duran, a Mexican national the FBI for access to its Legat administrative who worked as a receptionist at the Cuban files for London, England; Bern, Switzerland; Consulate in Mexico City at the time of and Paris, France during the periods of Oswald’s visit, assisted Oswald in his quest 1960–1965 and 1977–1979 (the period of the to apply for a visa to ultimately return to the HSCA investigation.) The Review Board did U.S.S.R., and thus became a key figure in the not locate assassination rec o r ds in the Legat Mexico City chapter of the assassination files for London, Bern, or Paris files, or in the s t o r y. In the immediate aftermath of the 1977–1979 Mexico City Legat file. The Review assassination, the Mexican federal security Bo a r d did designate approximately thirty doc- service, Direccion Federal de Seguridad uments from the Mexico City Legat file for (DFS), arrested and interrogated Silvia 1960-1965 that discussed FBI staffing of the

90 Mexico City Legat both before and after the F u r t h e r, Lee Harvey The Oswald visit was not, cer- as s a s s i n a t i o n . Oswald’s connection with tainly to my knowledge,ever an the Fair Play for Cuba operation, so it was just a flash f. Anne Goodpasture deposition. Committee made the in the pan, a product of some- Review Board’s search for thing that happened. . . Anne Goodpasture worked for Mexico City any rec o r ds on U.S.-Cuba —Anne Goodpasture, 1995 Chief of Station Win Scott for many years and policy all the more rel e - possessed a thorough understanding of the vant. The degree to which operations of the Mexico City Station. The U.S. policy toward Cuba following Pres i d e n t Review Board deposed Goodpasture at Kennedy’s assassination did or did not change length and she provided information con- pr ovides a final reason to search for rec o r ds to cerning the daily routine of the Mexico City enhance the historical understanding, or con- Station, the types of operations performed by text, of the assassination. the station, the management of operations performed by the station, and the working 1. CIA Records style of Win Scott. The Review Board believes that researchers will be particularly inter- Most of the relevant CIA records on Cuba ested in information she provided on the that the Review Board staff identified as handling of audio surveillance tapes in the a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related existed in the CIA station which may have recorded Lee Harvey s e q u e s t e red collection before the Review Oswald’s voice. Board began making requests for additional records and information. The Review Board B. R ECORDS ON CUBA identified additional records pertaining to the period 1960–1964 from some contempo- In the mid-1970s, the Church Committee pub- rary working files of a CIA office concerned licly revealed what journalists had been alleg- with Latin American issues. Most of these ing since 1967—that the U.S. government had records concerned the existence or activities sp o n s o r ed assassination attempts at various of the JMWAVE Station in Miami. Small times against Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Cas- numbers of records pertaining to Cuba or tr o presumably knew about these attempts U.S.-anti-Cuban activities were identified in long before the U.S. public, and some histori- the records of the Directorate of Plans (now ans and res e a r chers have questioned whether the Directorate of Operations) and in the files he retaliated by assassinating Pre s i d e n t of several senior officers of the CIA during Ke n n e d y . The Review Board sought to find the 1960–65 period. CIA processed for inclu- rec o r ds that would illuminate a slightly dif- sion in the JFK Collection those records that fe r ent but related area of interest: the degree the Review Board marked as assassination to which the U.S. government sponsore d records. potential uprisings and military coups within Cuba, and the extent of possible U.S. plans to 2. Military Records invade Cuba by overt military force. The Bo a r d believed that such rec o r ds would be of The Review Board staff located military in t e r est not only to mainstream historians, records on Cuba in four different collections but also to many who believe there was a of records. conspiracy to kill President Kennedy. For example, evidence of serious, or imminent, a. Joint Staff Secret a r i a t . contingency plans to invade Cuba with U.S. military forces during the Kennedy Ad m i n i s - The staff of the Joint Staff Secretariat search e d tration, if found, could provide either a for rec o r ds related to both Cuba and Vie t n a m motive for retaliation by Castro or a motive policy and flagged selected re c o rds fro m for domestic malcontents who might have 1961–1964 from the files of Joint Chiefs of been displeased that such plans were not St a f f Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer, Maxwell immediately implemented by the administra- Ta y l o r, and Earle Wheeler, and selected tion. The Review Board believed that there rec o r ds from 1961–1964 from the Central Files would be strong public interest in any rec o rd s of the Joint Staff for examination and consid- which would illuminate U.S. government eration by the Review Board staff. The policy deliberations on Cuba. Review Board staff flagged all but one of the

91 147 rec o r ds selected as appropriate for inclu- Part III—The Global Challenge). Poole is sion in the JFK Collection. Ap p ro x i m a t e l y presently updating and rewriting the two tw o - t h i r ds of the 147 rec o r ds related to Cuba volumes to improve their scholarship. When policy from 1961–196411—the re m a i n d e r he has finished, Poole will submit the vol- related to Vietnam policy. umes for a security review and the Joint Staff S e c retariat will forward the volumes to b. Army. NARA.

In 1963, Joseph Califano served as both Gen- 3. Presidential Library Collections eral Counsel to Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance and as Special Assistant to the Ar m y In response to public interest in, and specula- S e c re t a r y. NARA identified six Federal tion about, the possible connection between Re c o r ds Center boxes containing the Cuba Cuba or U.S. policy toward Cuba and the policy papers of Joseph Califano from 1963. assassination of President Kennedy, the The Review Board designated the six boxes of Review Board requested the John F. Kennedy “Califano Papers,” in their entiret y , as appro- and Lyndon Baines Johnson Pre s i d e n t i a l priate for inclusion in the JFK Collection. Libraries to search their holdings of Cuba records for assassination-related information. During 1963, Secretary Vance was the “DOD The Presidential Libraries identified addi- Executive Agent” for all meetings of the gov- tional assassination re c o rds in the Cuba ernmental task force, the “Interdepartmental Country files, the National Security files, var- Coordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs,” ious office files, personal papers of White (ICCCA). As Vance’s special assistant, Cali- House officials, and certain unpro c e s s e d fano often represented him at meetings of the collections of presidential aides and policy ICCCA, and was part of all ICCCA policy advisors. deliberations. The collection of Califano Papers represents a unique find and reflects a. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library much of the interagency planning activities records. related to Cuba during 1963. Augmenting the JFK Library’s initial search c. Office of the Secretary of Defense. and identification of assassination records, a joint team of Review Board staff and repre- A small number of sentatives from other agencies, visited the The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe re c o rds (appro x i m a t e l y JFK Library in June 1996 to conduct a com- that the Cuban problem must be forty) from the papers of prehensive review of JFK Library closed col- solved in the near future. Se c r etary of Defense Robert lections. The Review Board staff reviewed all —Memorandum for the McNamara at NARA con- of the Library’s National Security Files con- Secretary of Defense, tain some material on taining records on Cuba from the Kennedy Robert McNamara from the Cuba policy. The Review Administration. As a result of this effort, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs B o a rd processed these JFK Library released thirty boxes of Cuba of Staff, L.L. Lemnitzer, records for inclusion in files to the JFK Collection. The Library also April 10, 1962. the JFK Collection. opened its Presidential recordings on the Cuban Missile Crisis and sent copies of these d. Joint Chiefs of Staff to the JFK Collection. history. Subsequent to this visit, the Library identified The Kennedy Library very The Review Board staff additional assassination rec o r ds on Cuba. Of m u ch appreciates that it has reviewed and identified particular value were those rec o r ds which been able to open in excess of as assassination records discussed the Kennedy Administration’s pol- 30,000 pages of previously clas- two volumes of The His - icy toward Cuba, proposed anti-Castro activ- sified material, primarily on tory of the Joint Chiefs of ities, and Operation Mongoose planning. Cuba, through the efforts of the Staff, written by Walter S. Most of these rec o r ds were generated by the Assassination Records Review Poole (Volume VIII: Standing Group Committee of the National Board. 1961–1964, Part II— T h e Security Council with additional CIA an d —Stephanie Fawcett, Succession of Crises; and OSD memoranda discussing sensitive Cuban September 1998 Volume VIII: 1961–1964, operations. The Review Board staff also iden-

92 tified Cuban rec o r ds in the JFK Library’s against Fidel Castro, and includes materials closed papers of Attorney General Robert F. relating to the Church Committee’s examina- Ke n n e d y , Richard Goodwin, and Ralph Dun- tion of Operation Mongoose and AMLASH. gan and in the Department of Justice Crimi- In addition, the JFK Collection includes testi- nal Division microfilm collection. mony from key government officials knowl- edgeable on U.S. policy toward Cuba in the The Review Board discovered a wealth of 1960s, such as Robert McNamara, McGeorge Cuba material within the Robert F. Kennedy Bundy, Roswell Gilpatric, Richard Helms, (RFK) papers, though it did not declare all and John McCone. of the re c o rds as assassination re c o rds. To e n s u re that the JFK Library opened the RFK C. RECORDS ON VIETNAM papers, however, the Review Board designated those re c o rds which it believed to be The debate among historians continues over relevant. This group of re c o rds was subject whether President Kennedy would have esca- to a Deposit A g reement requiring the lated U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War e x p ress permission of the RFK donor com- had he lived, or whether he would have less- mittee, then headed by Michael Kennedy, to ened involvement and even withdrawn from authorize their re l e a s e .1 2 The Review Board Vietnam. The Review Board, there f o re , has not yet secured the final release of all of sought to locate any rec o r ds that would illu- the RFK papers, but the JFK Library fore i g n minate this debate or illuminate any diffe r - policy staff is working with the Review ences between the Kennedy Ad m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s B o a rd to attempt to obtain the release of the mid- and-late 1963 Vietnam policy and the RFK papers.1 3 Upon approval by the com- Johnson Administration’s 1964 Vietnam pol- mittee, the JFK Library will send these ic y . Much of the Review Board’s interest in important re c o rds to the JFK Collection at Vietnam rec o r ds, as in the case of the Review N A R A . Bo a r d’s search for Cuba rec o r ds, is in enhanc- ing the historical understanding or context of b. Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential the assassination. Library records. 1. CIA Records To ensure a more complete review of the LBJ Library’s holdings for assassination records, The Review Board’s additional re q u e s t s two members of the Review Board staff and a added few CIA re c o rds on Vietnam to the NARA representative visited the Library in JFK Collection. The Review Board identified March 1997. The Review Board conducted a a small number of re c o rds pertaining to Vi e t- comprehensive review of the closed National nam in the files of the Directorate of Plans Security files, including a targeted review of (now the Directorate of Operations) and in Cuban records. As expected, the LBJ Library the files of several senior CIA o fficials fro m was not as rich as the JFK Library in material 1963–65. Some re c o rds designated as assassi- pertaining to Cuba. In addition to identifying nation re c o rds concern CIA reporting on the records that had direct reference to the assas- assassination of South Vietnamese Pre s i d e n t sination, the Review Board was also inter- Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother in Novem- ested in those records that could reveal conti- ber 1963. Many of the Vietnam re c o rd s nuity or shifts in policy between the Kennedy examined by the Review Board staff dealt and Johnson Administrations. The Review wholly with CIA and military liaison and B o a rd designated additional assassination operations after 1965. CIA p rocessed for the records pertaining to Cuba found in John- JFK Collection the few Vietnam re c o rd s son’s Vice Presidential Security files, Cuba Review Board staff members identified as Country Files, and various Office Files of assassination re c o rd s . White House aides.

4. Church Committee Records 2. Military Records

The JFK Collection contains extensive The Review Board staff located military records relating to the Church Committee’s records on Vietnam in three different collec- investigation of alleged assassination plots tions of records.

93 a. Joint Staff Secretariat. obtaining records that could indicate any changes in President Kennedy’s plans The staff of the Joint Staff Secre t a r i a t regarding military involvement in Vietnam searched for records related to Vietnam pol- and any shift or continuity of policy at the icy and flagged selected re c o rds fro m beginning of President Johnson’s administra- 1961–1964 from the files of Joint Chiefs of tion. Staff Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer, Maxwell Ta y l o r, and Earle Wheeler, and selected a. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. re c o rds from 1961–1964 from the Central Files of the Joint Staff, for examination and The JFK Library identified a small number of consideration by the Review Board staff. The Vietnam-related documents in its National Review Board selected approximately fifty Security files. Most of the Vietnam records records for inclusion in the JFK Collection. date from August 1963 through the assassination, as the Kennedy A d m i n i s t r a t i o n b. Office of the Secretary of Defense. began to pay attention to events in Vietnam. The Library also released copies of Presiden- The Review Board identified for inclusion in tial recordings to the JFK Collection for the the JFK Collection a small number of records same period, which contained additional ( a p p roximately forty) from the personal information pertaining to Vietnam. papers of Secretary of Defense Robert McNa- b. Lyndon Baines Johnson mara at NARA that contain some materials Presidential Library. on Vietnam policy. In response to the public’s desire to know c. Joint Chiefs of Staff history. more about any shift in policy between the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, the The Review Board iden- Review Board extended its search at the LBJ Several colleagues have called tified a three-part Joint my attention to the role of the Library to include Vietnam materials from Chiefs of Staff off i c i a l the transitional period. Two members of the Assassination Records Review history titled The Joint Board in potentially effecting Review Board staff visited the LBJ Library in Chiefs of Staff and the War 1997 and reviewed a vast collection of the public release of documents in Vietnam, 1960-1968, as related to Vietnam policy and National Security Files and White House appropriate for inclusion Office Files. Not surprisingly, the search for perhaps other issues of foreign in the JFK Collection. policy in late 1963. .. I write relevant Vietnam-related material at the LBJ now to add my voice directly to 3. Presidential Library Library proved to yield more records than those calling for the complete Co l l e c t i o n s the search for Cuba-related records. Most of release of such materials. the additional assassination records identi- —Professor James K. Galbraith During most of President fied at the LBJ Library from this transitional Kennedy’s time in office, period concerned Vietnam. Some of these the Vietnam War was not records indicate that Vietnam, rather than the pressing issue for the White House that it Cuba, was quickly becoming a priority for became, a problem which had begun to heat President Johnson’s White House. up shortly before Kennedy’s death. Vietnam, as a foreign policy priority, then went on to 4. Church Committee Testimony consume the Johnson presidency. The per- ceived change in Vietnam policy between Among the major issues involving Vietnam these two presidential administrations has was the assassination of President Diem and provided another source of fodder for con- his brother in November 1963 shortly before spiracies. In response to concerns expressed P resident Kennedy’s assassination. The by the assassination research community that Review Board released classified Churc h the Vietnam question had not been ade- Committee testimony on this issue by CIA quately addressed by past investigations, the officers William Colby and Lucien Conein. Review Board extended its search of both the The Church Committee’s report on the Diem Kennedy and Johnson Presidential Library assassination relied heavily on their testi- materials to include records on Vietnam. The m o n y, which had remained classified for Review Board was primarily interested in over twenty years.

94 D. R ECORDS OF SENIOR AGENCY OFFICIALS the box and folder index The Board has an obligation to listings of McCone’s files, examine the records of former To the extent that agencies such as the CIA, McCone did not maintain public officials who partici- FBI, or Secret Service maintained the work- files on the assassination pated in any aspect or phase of ing files of those individuals who served as of President Kennedy, the investigation concerning the senior agency officials during the time of the assassination investiga- assassination, or of former pub- Kennedy assassination, the Review Board tion, Lee Harvey Oswald, lic officials closely allied with requested agencies to search those files for or the War r en Commis- Kennedy. assassination records. sion. McCone rec o r ds do —Anna Kasten Nelson include memoranda, brief- 1. CIA ing reports, and transcripts which discuss Oswald, the assassination, and The CIA maintains few working files of the assassination investigation. senior CIA officers from the 1950s and 1960s. To the extent that CIA p reserves such Within the McCone papers, the Review Board records, the records exist in the general filing noticed several file folders with notations or system under the office that the individual sheets indicating documents on a wide vari- held at the time, e.g. the Director of Central ety of subjects which are either missing or Intelligence (DCI) or their Deputy Directors we r e destroyed. Of the missing or destroy e d (DDCI). Based on the Review Board ’ s documents, two refer to the Kennedy assassi- observations, the contents of the DCI and nation. One document from a 1963 listing is DDCI working files primarily tend to be cor- described as “Date of Meeting—26 Nov; Par- respondence files, briefing papers, and work- ticipants—DCI & Bundy; Subjects Covered — ing files on general subjects rather than in- Msg concerning Pres. Kennedy’s assassina- depth collections of detailed material. tion.” The second document is described as “Date of Meeting—19 May ‘64; Participants— The Review Board staff requested and DCI, J.J. McCloy; Dinner at Residence—Re: reviewed files of DCIs Allen Dulles and John Oswald.” This document is annotated McCone, DDCIs Charles Cabell and Marshall “D e s t r oyed 1–28–72.” CIA historians noted Carter, and the office files of the Deputy that both documents were missing when they Director of Plans (DDP) (now the Directorate reviewed the files in 1986. The Review Board of Operations) for the time period 1958–1968. designated as assassination rec o r ds all rel e - Because records such as the briefing papers vant documents from the McCone files that CIA officers prepared for the DCI are including the notations on the destroyed and sensitive and worldwide in nature, the missing rec o rd s . Review Board designated only the relevant portions of the re c o rds as assassination c. Charles Cabell and Marshall Carter. records. Review Board staff located only a small num- a. Allen Dulles. ber of assassination records in the records of DDCIs Charles Cabell for 1959–1962 and CIA reviewed most of the files of DCI Allen Marshall Carter for 1962–1965. The DDCIs’ Dulles under its Executive Order 12958 records consist primarily of personal corre- declassification program. The Review Board spondence, official correspondence, and staff reviewed some of Dulles’ papers and his briefing papers. office calendars for the relevant time period. The Review Board marked some pages of the d. Richard Bissell, William Colby, and calendars, which re c o rded Dulles’ off i c i a l Richard Helms. and social activities, as assassination records. CI A pr ovided the Review Board with a mas- b. John McCone. sive index to the files of the Office of the Deputy Director of Plans (later the Deputy The Review Board staff examined CIA’s index Di r ector of Operations) covering the period to DCI John McCone’s files, reviewed files of fr om the late 1940s to the present. Review possible relevance, and marked relevant doc- Bo a r d staff carefully reviewed the index and uments as assassination rec o r ds. Ac c o r ding to identified potentially relevant material.

95 Ac c o r ding to CIA, it incorporated into these was an assassination record and marked it of fice files all of the still existing rec o r ds of for inclusion in the JFK Collection at NARA. Ri c h a r d Bissell, William Colby, and Richard Helms as DDPs. Again, due to the sensitive g. William Harvey. and worldwide nature of many of the DDP/DDO files, the Review Board designated William Harvey was intricately involved in the only certain portions of the rec o r ds for rel e a s e planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion and the to the JFK Collection. various assassination plots against Fidel Cas- tr o. The Review Board received a query from a e. James J. Angleton. res e a r cher concerning the possible existence of “operational diaries” that Harvey may have Knowledge of the rec o r ds that James J. An g l e - cr eated. CIA se a r ched its Directorate of Opera- ton, Chief of Counterintelligence for thirty tions rec o r ds and did not locate any rec o rd s years, allegedly created, and the prob a b l e belonging to Harvey. The introduction to the d e s t ruction of those 1967 CIA Inspector General’s (IG) report on plots to assassinate Castro notes that Richard Because the files that were once records after his retirement, has generated Helms directed that, once the IG’s office pro- known as Angleton’s have been duced the report, CIA should destroy all notes dispersed within the DO records, extensive public interes t . In an attempt to satisfy the and source material that it used to draft the they are no longer identifiable as report. CIA may have destroyed Harvey’s a collection. public’s curiosity about alleged diaries in response to Helms’ direc t i v e . —From CIA Response to Angleton’s files, the Review Board informal request Review Board asked the Fi n a l l y , Review Board staff also asked various CIA-IR-4 for information on CI A (1) to search for any CI A reviewers who worked on rec o r ds rel a t i n g James Angleton files, extant rec o r ds that An g l e - to the Bay of Pigs whether they had located August 24, 1998 ton maintained, and (2) to any operational diaries belonging to Harvey. account for the destruc - Despite its efforts, the Review Board did not tion of his files or the incorporation of his files locate any diaries. into other filing systems. In response, the Direc - 2. FBI torate of Operations provided three memoranda that document CIA’s multi-year rev i e w 14 The Review Board attempted to determine of Angleton’s counterintelligence files. Th e s e whether the FBI retained any sets of working memoranda state that CIA reviewed An g l e - files of its top officials during the years sur- ton’s rec o r ds and incorporated a small perce n t - rounding the assassination. Public specula- age into the files of the Directorate of Opera- tion regarding the alleged secret files of FBI tions. CIA de s t r oyed other rec o r ds, either Director J. Edgar Hoover is widespread. Of because the rec o r ds were duplicates or because course, following Hoover’s death, his CI A decided not to retain them. The Direc t o r a t e personal secretary, Helen Gandy, destroyed of Operations did not provide destruc t i o n many of his “Personal and Confidential” rec o r ds to account for the Angleton files. files, so that the full extent of Hoover’s Per- sonal files will never be known. Although the f. Lawrence Houston. FBI has processed over 15,000 pages of Hoover’s “Official and Confidential” files L a w rence Houston was the CIA G e n e r a l under the FOIA, the public speculates that Counsel for much of the agency’s early years. some of Hoover’s secret files are still extant. Few of his working papers, however, still exist today. The Review Board staff reviewed In an effort to locate any working or secret files a small number of papers identified as of FBI officials, the Review Board req u e s t e d belonging either to the files of Lawrence and received from the FBI access to rec o rd s Houston or the Office of the General Counsel that might shed light on the question of what, for the time period 1959–1964. The staff did if any, files are still in the FBI’s custody. not detect any additional assassination re c o rds in this collection of Houston’s a. Hoover and Tolson records, including papers. However, the Office of the General “Official and Confidential” files, chronolog - Counsel had retained a file on CIA records ical files, and phone logs. that were held by the Warren Commission. The Review Board determined that this file The Review Board requested that the FBI

96 s e a rch for Hoover and Tolson “working” c. John P. Mohr records. re c o rds relevant to President Kennedy’s assassination. The FBI made Dire c t o r When Director Hoover died in 1972, Clyde Ho o v e r ’s “Official and Confidential” (O&C) Tolson inherited the bulk of Hoover’s estate. files available to the Review Board and the When Tolson died, John P. Mohr, former Review Board designated as assassination Assistant Director for Administration of the rec o r ds the two O&C files on John Kennedy, FBI, served as the executor of Tolson’s estate. the O&C file relating to Secret Service-FBI Some authors allege that Mohr purged J. a g reements on Presidential protection, a Edgar Hoover’s personal files after Hoover’s memorandum reg a r ding Hoover’s conversa- death in 1972. When Mohr died in February tion with Lyndon Johnson about the assassi- 1997, the Review Board issued a subpoena to nation (from the Johnson O&C file), and sev- his estate to determine whether Mohr eral other documents from the O&C files. The retained any re c o rds related to Pre s i d e n t Review Board also reviewed Dire c t o r Kennedy’s assassination or to the FBI’s inves- Ho o v e r ’s telephone logs. Recognizing that tigation of the assassination. Mohr’s estate the FBI has already made the logs public in its p roduced, and the Review Board staff F O I A reading room, the Review Board inspected, Mohr’s records. Mohr’s records relieved the FBI from the burden of further included three files of Mohr’s personal corre- pr ocessing the logs under the JFK Act. Finally, spondence, a set of Warren Commission vol- Hoover maintained various subject files umes, and the FBI’s initial reports on Presi- (apart from the O&C files), including materi- dent Kennedy’s assassination. The Review als on the assassination. The Review Board B o a rd staff found no new assassination asked the FBI to locate these materials, but the records, and, as such, released Mohr’s estate FBI has not been able to locate the materials. from any obligation to turn records over to the JFK Collection. The Review Board also requested and received from the FBI access to the files of 3. Secret Service Clyde Tolson, which consisted solely of original memoranda from Director Hoover. In response to the Review Board’s request for Unfortunately, the chronological file started files of Secret Service officials, Secret Service with January 1965, and the FBI could not reported that it did not maintain office files account for any 1963–64 files that Tolson may for senior officials such as Chief James J. have maintained. The Review Board identi- Rowley, Chief of the Protective Research Sec- fied several documents as assassination tion Robert Bouck, or Chief Inspector records. Thomas Kelly.

b. Miscellaneous administrative files from The Secret Service located various Rowley the Director’s Office. correspondence and memoranda, but did not provide any information as to the disposition The Review Board requested access to a vari- of any working files maintained by Chief ety of FBI Director’s Office administrative Rowley. The Review Board also sought infor- files. The Review Board examined files for mation as to the identity and disposition of the relevant time period with the following any working files maintained by Bouck case captions: Assistant Dire c t o r’s Off i c e because Bouck was responsible for the collec- Administrative File, the Attorney General, tion of information relating to potential Attorney General’s Briefing, Criminal Divi- threats to the President and Vice-President. sion of the Department of Justice, Director’s Mr. Bouck testified before the Warren Com- Office Administrative File, Executive Confer- mission re g a rding protective intelligence ence, National Security Council, Office Mem- information gathered in connection with oranda, Protection of the Attorney General, President Kennedy’s trip to Dallas. As with Threats Against the Attorney General, and Chief Rowley, the Secret Service identified White House. The Review Board staff desig- various Bouck documents, but did not (or nated a small number of documents from could not) account for whether there were these files—primarily on organized crime— any personal working files maintained by as assassination records. Mr. Bouck.15

97 4. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Board identified a file relating to Operation Mongoose, which was subsequently opened. In 1997, the Review Board staff met with offi- The Review Board identified as assassination cials from OSD and emphasized the impor- re c o rds approximately forty re c o rds fro m tance of identifying and reviewing records McNamara’s files that are relevant to U.S. for Secretary of Defense McNamara, who policy in Cuba or Vietnam. A d d i t i o n a l had executed an affidavit for the Warren records relating to the Warren Commission Commission stating that Oswald was not an were located among the General Counsel’s informant or intelligence agent for the U.S. files and additional records relating to the military. McNamara was also an important H S C A w e re located among Secretary of figure because of his direct and daily involve- Defense Harold Brown’s files. ment in creating U.S. policy on Cuba and Vietnam. 5. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)

The Review Board also asked OSD to locate The Review Board requested that the Navy and review files of the OSD General Counsel and ONI search for the rec o r ds of Director of who had “serve[d] as the liaison with the Naval Intelligence Rear Admiral Rufus Tay l o r . [Warren] Commission for the Department of The Review Board acquired a copy of an Defense.” unsigned September 21, 1964, affidavit reg a r d- ing Oswald that Taylor appears to have exe- The OSD advised the Review Board that cuted and forwarded to Secretary of Defense “[a]ll official files of Secretary McNamara McNamara. The affidavit states that that ONI [had] been searched” and that “[n]o items never utilized Lee Harvey Oswald as an agent relating to the Wa r ren Commission were or an informant. (See illustration.) ONI did not found.” Inventories of Secretary McNa- locate any files belonging to Tay l o r . mara’s re c o rds were forwarded to the Review Board. In addition, a detailed inven- 6. Army tory of additional records of Secretary McNa- mara at NARAwas also provided. Within the The Review Board staff requested that the McNamara records at NARA, the Review Army identify for review under the JFK Act

98 certain additional, discrete record groups. w e re no separately maintained files for S p e c i f i c a l l y, the staff asked the Army to Messrs. Kennedy, Katzenbach, and Clark. locate the 1963–64 files for top Army officials, The archivists believed that such files most including the Secretary of the A r m y, the likely would have been stored at a presiden- Chief of Staff for the Army, the Assistant tial library. Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, and With respect to Attorney General files post- top officials of the U.S. Army Intelligence and dating 1975, the Review Board sought to Security Command. The Army located no inspect the files of Attorney Generals Edward assassination re c o rds in response to the Levi and Griffin Bell for any materials relat- Review Board’s requests. ing to the Kennedy assassination investigations of the Church Committee and the 7. National Security Agency HSCA. The Office of Information and Pri- vacy made available for inspection certain The Review Board requested that NSA locate original files for Attorneys General Levi and the original files of top NSA officials during Bell, which yielded additional assassination the period of the Warren Commission (NSA records. The Review Board designated as Director Lt. Gen. Gordon Blake and NSA assassination re c o rds files that primarily Deputy Director Dr. Louis Tordella). NSA related to DOJ’s work with the HSCAand the located materials on the Warren Commission Church Committee. from files of Deputy Director Tordella. b. Criminal Division 8. Department of State The Review Board requested that the Crimi- The Review Board ensured that the Depart- nal Division make available all files sepa- ment of State inventoried all files of its top rately maintained by Herbert J. Miller, Jr., of ficials who would have had some offi c i a l Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal involvement with the investigation of the Division at the time of the assassination. Mr. assassination, including Secretary of State Miller had been designated as DOJ’s “liai- Dean Rusk, Undersecretary George Ball, son” to the Warren Commission. The Review Deputy Undersecretary Alexis Johnson, Board also sought the files of J. Walter Yea- Ambassador Thompson, Ambassador Thomas gley, Assistant Attorney General for the Inter- Mann, and other State Department offi c i a l s . nal Security Division, to determine whether The Department of State was very cooperative he (or his office) had any pre-assassination in making available to the Review Board man- records relating to Oswald. The Criminal ifests for these archive rec o r ds. Division reported that it maintained no discrete files for Miller17 and Yeagley.18 9. Department of Justice 10. Department of the Treasury a. Office of Information and Privacy (OIP) The Review Board requested that Main Trea- The Review Board raised with the Depart- sury review its holdings to identify records of ment of Justice’s OIP the issue of whether C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury there were any separately maintained files at the time of the assassination and Warren for Attorneys General Robert F. Kennedy, Commission investigation. Review Board Nicholas Katzenbach, and Ramsey Clark in staff independently reviewed archive trans- view of their positions and re s p e c t i v e mittal forms for Treasury records and identi- involvement with investigations of the assas- fied certain Treasury re c o rds for re v i e w, sination. OIP reported that records of the which Treasury provided to Board staff. As a Attorney General and Deputy Attorney Gen- result of its review, the Review Board staff eral were not maintained as a separate file identified files of J. Robert McBrien relating system until 1975 under Attorney General to his work as Treasury’s liaison to the HSCA Edward Levi.16 Two archivists for the Depart- and Church Committee.19 ment of Justice also confirmed that distinct files for the Office of Attorney General were The Review Board also requested a complete not archived prior to 1975 and that there accounting for the files of high-level Treasury

99 officials who would have had involvement in e fforts to uncover re c o rds beyond those the assassination investigation, especially examined by prior investigative bodies important because Secret Service was part of focused primarily on FBI records. the Department of the Treasury and ultimately reported to Secretary Dillon. Accord- 1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee i n g l y, the Review Board asked for an accounting of the files of Secretary Dillon, The Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) Special Assistant to the Secretary Robert Car- was a pro-Castro organization with head- swell, Treasury Secretary John Connally, and quarters in New York. The FPCC had chap- General Counsel at the time of the Warren ters in many cities, but Lee Harvey Oswald Commission investigation G. D’Andelot was its founding and, it seems, only member Belin. Treasury officials reviewed its invento- in New Orleans. In the summer of 1963, ries and reported that its “review disclosed Oswald distributed handbills that he had no additional JFK-related records.”20 Treasury printed that advocated “Hands Off Cuba!” also reported that it did “not have custody of and invited members of the public to join the any Dillon files,”21 which presumably reside New Orleans chapter of the FPCC. The War- with a presidential library. ren Commission and the congressional committees that investigated the assassination 11. IRS discuss Oswald’s connection to the FPCC in their respective reports. As such, the Review Although the IRS reported that it searched Board’s routine processing of federal agency for records of top IRS officials who assisted in records from Warren Commission files and the Wa r ren Commission investigation, it files concerning other congressional commit- stated that it did not locate any such records. tees encompassed records on the FPCC. Not all FPCC records, however, found their way E. PRO- AND ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN MATTERS into the existing collections. Where Review Board staff noticed gaps in the documenta- Both the Warren Commission and the HSCA tion regarding the FPCC, it requested that considered the possibility that pro-Castro or federal agencies provide access to additional anti-Castro activists had some involvement records and information. in the assassination of President Kennedy, as both pro- and anti-Castro groups in the U.S. a. FBI field office files. had contact with Lee Harvey Oswald. The Warren Commission investigated Oswald’s When the FBI processed its “core and Communist and pro - C a s t ro sympathies, related” files and “HSCA Subject” files, it including his involvement with the Fair Play processed the FBI Headquarters file on the for Cuba Committee, and his September 1963 FPCC, but it did not process any records trip to Mexico City. In addition, the Church from the FBI’s New York and Dallas field Committee, an internal CIA Task Force, and office files on the FPCC. Thus, the Review the HSCA all re-examined the extent to Board staff requested access to these two which the Cuban government or pro-Castro field office files. activists in the U.S. might have been involved in the assassination. The only records that the Review Board staff located in the Dallas field office file were Given the amount of time that prior inves- duplicates of Headquarters records that the tigative bodies spent considering the possi- FBI had already processed as part of its “core bility that either pro- or anti-Castro Cuban and related” files or HSCA files. The FBI forces may have played a role in President a g reed to include the Dallas field off i c e Kennedy’s assassination, the Review Board copies in the JFK Collection. sought to collect and process all relevant federal records relating to such groups. To the The New York field office file proved to be extent that both pro- and anti-Castro Cuban much more voluminous than the Dallas file groups coordinated their activities within the and yielded more assassination records. A United States, the FBI would be the agency number of the records that the Review Board most likely to have investigative records on s t a ff designated as assassination re c o rd s their activities. Thus, the Review Board ’ s from the New York file involved June Cobb,

100 a woman who was an intelligence asset dur- Review Board located some assassination ing the 1960–64 period, primarily for the CIA records regarding the FPCC and Vincent T. but also for the FBI, regarding Castro, Cuba, Lee within the Criminal Division’s files. and the FPCC. In addition, Cobb was the asset who first informed the CIA of Elena 2. Cuban COINTELPRO G a r ro De Paz’s allegation that Oswald attended a “twist” party in Mexico City with Early in its tenure, the Review Board exam- Sylvia Duran. For the above reasons, the ined the FBI’s FOIA “reading room” records Review Board staff recommended to the FBI on the FBI’s COINTELPRO against pro-Cas- that it process as assassination records any tro Cubans—primarily the FPCC and the FPCC documents that referenced June Cobb. July 26th Movement—during the early 1960s. The Review Board also found assassination- The Review Board’s examination of the read- related records in the New York field office ing room materials led the Review Board to file concerning the FBI’s efforts to infiltrate make a request to the FBI for a Headquarters and disrupt the FPCC. file entitled, “Cuban Matters—Counterintel- ligence Program—Internal Security—Cuba” The bulk of the remaining records that the and for any other Headquarters files docu- Review Board staff designated as assassina- menting efforts by the FBI or other agencies tion records from the New York FPCC file of the U.S. government to disrupt, discredit, involve the FBI’s investigation of the FPCC. or bring into disrepute the FPCC or its mem- Many researchers view Oswald’s role in the bers or activities. The FBI made its records FPCC as an indication that he may have been available to the Review Board and, but for an asset of one or more U.S. intelligence some very recent, unrelated documents, the agencies. That is, they theorize that he was a Review Board designated all records in the “plant,” an intelligence asset sent on a coun- Cuban COINTELPRO file as assassination terintelligence mission against the FPCC. records. Thus, Review Board staff designated as assassination records those documents which Records that the Review Board designated as address the urgency with which the Bureau assassination records from the COINTEL- viewed the FPCC, the priority the Bureau PRO file include FPCC and July 26th Move- placed on infiltrating the group, and Bureau ment membership and mailing lists. The file intentions/plans to initiate counterintelli- further details the FBI’s basis for initiating its gence activities against the group. The counterintelligence program against the two Review Board staff employed similar reason- p ro - C a s t ro organizations. Finally, the file ing in designating records as assassination- provides details concerning the methods that related in the FBI’s Cuban Counterintelli- the Bureau used to disrupt the activities of gence Program (COINTELPRO) file the FPCC and the July 26th Movement. referenced below. 3. Anti-Castro Activities; IS b. CIA records on Richard Gibson. (Internal Security)-Cuba

In 1960–63, Richard Thomas Gibson was the In the spring of 1996, the Review Board Director of the New York chapter of the received a letter from a member of the FPCC. CIA opened a 201, or personality, file res e a r ch community noting that one of the on Gibson because of his support of both “Hands Off Cuba” pamphlets that appeared Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba. The in the New Orleans FPCC file contained a 1960–1964 records include the Warren Com- cro s s - re f e r ence to a file entitled “Anti-Castro mission’s investigation of Gibson, and CIA Activities; IS–Cuba” and numbered NO (New included those records in the JFK Collection. Orleans) 105–1095. The Review Board staff established that the FBI had not processed this c. Department of Justice Criminal Division particular file under the JFK Act, and then files on FPCC. requested that the FBI provide access to all files bearing the above-ref e r enced caption The Review Board staff requested that the f rom Headquarters and from the New Department of Justice Criminal Division Orleans, Miami, Tampa, New York, and Dallas search for records relating to the FPCC. The field offices during the relevant time period.

101 After reviewing New Orleans file 105–1095, Latin American issues. Most of the relevant the Review Board staff designated two vol- C I A re c o rds concerned the existence and umes of the file as assassination records. activities of the CIA’s JMWAVE station in Miami. The Review Board also identified a 4. Cuban Intelligence Activities in the small number of records pertaining to U.S. U.S.; Cuban Situation anti-Cuban activities in the Directorate of Plans files and in the files of DCI John During its review of the FBI’s assassination McCone. The Review Board marked relevant records, the Review Board staff saw file refer- records and requested that CIA process the ences to cases captioned “Cuban Intelligence records for inclusion in the JFK Collection at Activities in the U.S.” and “Cuban Situa- NARA. tion.” The Review Board requested access to Headquarters files and files from the Miami, 6. Threats Against the Life of Tampa, New York, Washington, D.C., and Fidel Castro Dallas field offices with the above-referenced captions, and designated forty records from As widely reported, the U.S. government those files as assassination records. Most of attempted, at various times, to assassinate the relevant records concern activity in the Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Due to the high anti-Castro community following the Bay of level of public interest in this topic, the Pigs invasion and following Pre s i d e n t Review Board requested that agencies locate Kennedy’s assassination. any relevant records and provide them to the Review Board staff. 5. Anti-Castro Cuban Groups, Including DRE, Alpha 66, SFNE, JURE, FRD, a. CIA DS&T records. CRC, and Commandos-L At the request of the Review Board, the CIA In an effort to gather and se a r ched its Directorate of Science and Tec h - I was completely convinced review re c o rds re l a t i n g nology (DS&T) databases and rec o r ds for files during this entire period, that to the activities of promi- on possible assassination attempts against this operation had the full nent anti-Castro Cuban Fidel Castro. 22 CI A ’s search produced only authority of every pertinent groups who might have one re c o rd—a handwriting analysis. The echelon of CIA and had full had some involvement in Review Board staff reviewed the rec o r d and authority of the White House, the assassination of Pres- determined that it was not relevant to the either from the President or ident Kennedy, the Review assassination of President John F. Kennedy. from someone authorized and Board requested the FBI known to be authorized to speak to provide access to files b. FBI file captioned “Threats Against the for the President. on the above-referenced Life of Fidel Castro.” —William Harvey’s testimony an t i - C a s t r o Cuban grou p s before the Church Committee for Headquarters and the An HSCA Outside Contact Report dated June 25, 1975 New Orleans, Miami, F e b ruary 18, 1978, indicates that the HSCA Tampa, New York, and requested access to an FBI file captioned Dallas field offices. The “ T h reats Against the Life of Fidel Castro” or FBI kept voluminous files on each anti-Cas- some similar caption. The HSCA never made tro Cuban group. Review Board staff mem- a formal request for such a file, and the FBI bers reviewed hundreds of volumes of did not provide to the HSCA a file with such re c o rds in search of assassination-re l a t e d a caption. The Review Board re q u e s t e d material. The files did yield approximately access to any FBI Headquarters files with seventy assassination records. this or a similar caption. The FBI located and p rovided two re c o rds that re f e re n c e d The Review Board also requested the CIA to “ T h reats Against the Life of Fidel Castro , ” provide files on the above-referenced groups, which summarized Walter Winchell’s radio to the extent that the CIA had not already b roadcasts, and compared the bro a d c a s t s processed such records under the JFK Act. with information that the FBI had concern- The Review Board identified additional ing threats against Castro. The Review Board re c o rds from 1960–1964 in contemporary designated both of these re c o rds for inclu- working files of a CIA office concerned with sion in the JFK Collection.

102 7. American Gambling Interests in Cuba other assassination- We had begun to see a general related information on outline of the truth in 1979, as As part of its efforts to gather records relating these three individuals. the House Select Committee on to a Cuban connection to the assassination, The Review Board desig- Assassinations finished its the Review Board staff requested that the FBI nated thirty-three docu- investigation: leaders of orga- provide access to all Headquarters, Miami, ments for processing as nized crime were behind the Tampa, and Havana files captioned, “Ameri- assassination re c o rd s President’s murder. can Gambling Interests in Cuba.” from the many files the —Robert Blakey, Fatal Hour FBI produced in The FBI’s Miami field office (into which all of response to the Review the Havana Legal Attaché’s, or Legat’s, files B o a rd’s request. The relevant documents were forwarded when the Legat closed) and concern the Cuban exile community’s reac- Tampa field office reported to FBI Headquar- tion to President Kennedy’s assassination. ters that they did not have any files with the above-referenced caption. The Review Board F. RECORDS ON ORGANIZED CRIME staff did not locate any material in the FBI Headquarters files related to the assassina- The question as to tion of President Kennedy. Most of the files whether organized crime The most durable conspiracy that the FBI located consisted of pre-1959 played a role in a possi- theory is that the Mafia killed records monitoring the activities of Florida ble conspiracy to assassi- the president. racketeers who were trying to establish gam- nate President Kennedy —Anthony and Robbyn bling and hotel facilities in Cuba. is one that nearly every Summers, in “The Ghosts of government investiga- November,”Vanity Fair, 8. Sergio Arcacha-Smith, Antonio tion into the assassina- December 1994 Veciana, and Bernardo de Torres tion has addressed. Thus, the Review Board processed a large number Se r gio Ar cacha-Smith, Antonio Veciana, and of files on organized crime figures and orga- Be r n a r do de Tor r es were anti-Castro Cuban nized crime activities simply because federal activists in the early 1960s. Arc a c h a - S m i t h agencies made their organized crime files was the New Orleans rep r esentative to the available to previous government investiga- Cuban Revolutionary Council until 1962, and tions. For example, the FBI’s “HSCA subject in that capacity, he used an office in the build- files” contain large portions of the FBI’s files ing at 544 Camp Street. The 544 Camp Stree t on organized crime figures such as Santos ad d r ess was printed on FPCC literature that Trafficante, Carlos Marcello, Angelo Bruno, Lee Harvey Oswald distributed in New Frank Ragano, the Lansky brothers, Johnny Orleans in August of 1963. Veciana led Roselli, Nick Civella, and Joe Campisi. The Alpha–66, a violent anti-Castro orga n i z a t i o n majority of records that Review Board ana- that engaged in paramilitary operations lysts processed in these files were not directly against Castro’s Cuba as well as assassination a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related, but because prior attempts against Castro. Veciana testified to investigative bodies considered these men to the HSCA that he acted as an agent of the U.S. be relevant, the records have been included government, and that he met Lee Harvey in the JFK Collection. In several instances, Oswald in Dallas in 1963 in the presence of however, the Review Board pursued addi- his American “handler.” Tor r es was a Cuban tional records that had not been reviewed by exile living in Miami who later worked with prior investigative bodies. New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison in his investigation of Clay Shaw. 1. Sam Giancana

The HSCA reviewed FBI Headquarters files From the time he was a young man, Sam on Arcacha-Smith, Veciana, and de Torres, so Giancana rose within the Chicago organized the FBI processed some records on these crime syndicate until he became syndicate three men with its “HSCA Subject” files. The leader in 1957. After an eight-year stint in Review Board requested that the FBI conduct Mexico, Giancana was deported back to an additional search at Headquarters, and in Chicago where he was murdered in 1975, the New Orleans, Houston, and Dallas field shortly before he was scheduled to testify offices to determine whether the FBI had before the Church Committee. The Review

103 Board considered Giancana to be of historical interest with respect to the Kennedy assassi- The FBI maintains its tapes and transcripts nation for a number of reasons: (1) Giancana from the “BriLab” surveillance, but because was involved in the CIA plots to assassinate the FBI’s source of authority for the surveil- Fidel Castro; (2) Giancana expressed hostility lance was 18 U.S.C. § 2501 et seq. (Title III), the t o w a rd the Kennedys because of the “take” from the surveillance remained under Kennedys’ war against organized crime; (3) court seal.25 Thus, the assassination research Giancana had associates in common with community was not able to confirm or reject President Kennedy (namely, Frank Sinatra allegations that the tapes or transcripts con- and Judith Campbell Exner); (4) Giancana tain information relevant to the assassina- allegedly contributed to Kennedy’s 1960 tion. Once the Review Board obtained a court presidential campaign; and (5) Giancana was order allowing it access to the materials, the allegedly linked to Joseph P. Kennedy staff reviewed all of the transcripts from the through the illicit liquor trade. FBI’s surveillance on Marcello in New Orleans. Although the staff did not locate the The FBI Headquarters file on Sam Giancana specific conversations that the researchers consists of 37 volumes of records dating from mentioned, it did locate thirteen conversa- 1954 to 1975. When the Review Board staff tions that it believed to be assassination began to review the FBI’s “main” file on Sam records. Most of the conversations took place Giancana in early 1995, it realized that the in the summer of 1979 during the period that FBI had not designated for processing any the HSCA released its report. The conversa- re c o rds that predated January 1, 1963.2 3 tions primarily focused on Marcello’s reac- Apparently, the HSCA had requested access tion to the HSCA’s allegations that he may to the entire FBI file on Giancana, but the FBI have been involved in the assassination. With p rovided only portions of its file to the the help of the U. S. Attorney’s Office in the HSCA. The Review Board staff requested Eastern District of New Orleans, the Review and received access to sections spanning the Board obtained a court order to release tran- years 1958–1962. After reviewing the addi- scripts of the 13 conversations to the public. tional volumes, the Review Board designated the earlier-dated material as assassination 3. Department of Justice Criminal records in the summer of 1995, and the FBI Division Records processed the records under the JFK Act. The Review Board sought to inspect the 2. FBI Electronic Surveillance of Carlos Criminal Division’s extensive org a n i z e d Marcello: BriLab crime files on individuals who were alleged to have had involvement in the assassination, Many of the books on the who were associated in some manner with The most telling evidence in our assassination of Pre s i- Jack Ruby, or who had made claims of orga- investigation of organized crime dent Kennedy discuss nized crime involvement in the assassina- was electronic surveillance of the possibility that Car- tion. The Review Board staff reviewed these major underworld figures by los Marcello, alleged files and designated specific materials as the FBI. o rganized crime boss of assassination records. As noted by the Crim- —Robert Blakey, in Fatal Hour New Orleans, was inal Division, the Division had, “[i]n an involved in the assassi- unprecedented approach,. . . ully opened its nation. In the late 1970s, the FBI investigated files and indices to the Review Board . ” M a rcello on an unrelated matter—the “Hundreds of organized crime case files and bribery of organized labor. As part of the other files of a general nature were made “BriLab” investigation, the FBI conducted available for Review Board staff scrutiny. . . ” a p p roximately eight months of electro n i c surveillance on Marcello’s home and on his G. WARREN COMMISSION STAFF AND CRITICS o ffice at the Town and Country Motel. A c c o rding to several sources, the “BriLab” Given that the Warren Commission consti- tapes contained conversations in which Car- tuted the first official investigation into the los Marcello or his brother Joseph admitted events surrounding the assassination of Pres- that they were involved in the Kennedy ident Kennedy, the Review Board clearly had a s s a s s i n a t i o n .2 4 an interest in ensuring that all federal agency

104 records on the Warren Commission and its In response to the Review In the case of the Kennedy activities became part of the JFK Collection. Bo a r d’s request, the FBI a s s a s s i n a t i o n , u n p r e c e d e n t e d Although the agencies processed a larg e pr ovided all of its head- belief in all kinds of nonsense, number of Warren Commission era docu- quarters file ref e r ences on coupled with extraordinary ments as part of their core files, the Review all of the War r en Com- disrespect for the Wa r r e n Board staff questioned whether federal agen- mission staff members. C o m m i s s i o n , has waxed in cies such as the FBI and the CIA opened and Fr om the Redlich req u e s t , good times and bad times and maintained files on the Warren Commission the Review Board desig- flourishes among remarkable staff members because they were working for nated as assassination- numbers of otherwise sober- the Wa r ren Commission. Likewise, the related a group of rec o rd s minded people. Review Board staff questioned whether fed- on Redlich within the —Max Holland, eral agencies such as the FBI and CIAopened FBI’s file on the Emer- November 1995 and maintained files on critics of the Warren gency Civil Liberties Commission because they were criticizing Committee. Otherwise, the Warren Commission’s conclusions. although Review Board staff did locate some a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related re c o rds, the FBI had 1. FBI Files on Warren Commission Staf f al r eady processed most of the rec o r ds as part of its core files. The Review Board did no t In an effort to determine whether the FBI locate any information to indicate that the FBI opened or maintained files on Warren Com- systematically kept rec o r ds on War r en Com- mission staff, the Review Board requested mission staff members simply because they FBI Headquarters file references on Warren we r e employed by the War r en Commission. Commission Assistant Counsel Norman Redlich. While reviewing the files provided 2. CIA and FBI Files on Warren Commission Critics in response to the Review Board’s request for Norman Redlich’s files, the Review Board In an effort to determine whether the FBI staff observed a reference to General Counsel opened or maintained files on Warren Com- J. Lee Rankin’s request that the FBI conduct a mission critics because they criticized the b a c k g round investigation on Redlich and Warren Commission’s work and findings, also on Assistant Counsel Joseph A. Ball. The the Review Board requested access to all staff then asked for FBI Headquarters file ref- records on prominent Warren Commission erences on Rankin and Ball, as it seemed that critic Mark Lane and to all pre-1973 Head- the FBI may have maintained a file on Ball’s quarters file references to the other Warren investigation. Redlich’s file also showed that Commission critics listed below. the Civil Service Commission (CSC) had conducted a background investigation on a. Mark Lane. Redlich before Rankin asked the FBI to do an investigation. Consequently, the Review When the Review Board began to examine the Board questioned whether the CSC had car- FBI’s “core and related” files, it noticed that a ried out background checks on other Warren number of rec o r ds that mentioned the name Commission staff members. In an effort to Mark Lane cros s - re f e r enced the FBI’s main file determine whether similar files existed at the on Lane. Because the FBI had not slated the FBI for other Warren Commission staffers, Lane main file for JFK Act processing, the the Review Board ultimately extended the Review Board requested access to all file ref e r - request to include Assistant Counsel Leon D. ences to Mark Lane or to Lane’s Citizens’ Hubert, Jr. (whose file the Review Board Committee of Inquiry in the files of FBI Head- thought may also contain re f e rences to quarters and the New York field office. The Hubert’s career in New Orleans politics). In Review Board staff’s examination of the Lane addition, the Review Board asked the FBI to main file revealed that approximately eight provide a statement on whether it opened volumes of the file contained a significant per- any files, individually or collectively, on centage of documents relating to the Kennedy other individuals who worked as Warren assassination. The Review Board re c o m- Commission Assistant Counsels or staff mended that those eight volumes be included members, because of their employment with in the JFK Collection. In addition to the Lane the Warren Commission. main file, the Review Board designated as

105 as s a s s i n a t i o n - r elated the entire file on the Cit- The CIA has a small 201 file on Thompson izens’ Committee of Inquiry, as well as rec o rd s which indicates that he was considered to be in the FBI’s Communist Party COINTELPRO of possible operational interest to the Agency file, and a select few rec o r ds about Lane that in the early 1960s while he was living over- ap p e a r ed in the files of other individuals. The seas. CIA lost interest however, and the CIA Review Board’s inquiry revealed that the FBI records that the Review Board examined do maintained substantial files on Lane’s not appear to reflect that Thompson worked pr ofessional and personal activities, and kept for the CIA in any capacity. The Review detailed files on Lane’s political activism. Board staff did not locate any assassination records in the 201 file. The CIA did not open a 201 file on Lane. The Agency’s records on Lane consist of: a dis- d. Edward J. Epstein. patch dated January 23, 1970, an Office of General Counsel letter dated March 29, 1977, FBI records containing the name Edward Jay six FOIA requests, and one public affairs Epstein concern Epstein’s general journalistic request. Review Board staff reviewed these activities. The few assassination-re l a t e d records but did not designate them as assas- records in Epstein’s file were processed by sination records. Review Board staff found the FBI as part of their “core” files. Thus, the one additional reference to Lane in a foreign Review Board staff did not designate any government document and designated the additional records as assassination records. information as assassination related. CIA located an Office of Security file and a b. Harold Weisberg. Publications Review Board file on Epstein as well as three CIA records documenting the FBI records on Warren Commission critic CIA’s destruction of records under a stan- Harold Weisberg related to Weisberg’s previ- d a rd re c o rds destruction schedule. The ous employment with the Department of d e s t royed re c o rds related to three FOIA State, We i s b e rg’s public participation in requests. None of the FOIA requests asked political issues, and We i s b e rg’s published for information on Epstein. The Review work as a journalist. The only assassination- Board staff did not designate any additional related file on Weisberg the FBI produced in records as assassination records. response to the Review Board’s request was its file concerning a FOIA lawsuit that Weis- e. Paul Hoch. berg brought against the Department of Jus- tice. The Review Board recommended that Aside from the few assassination-re l a t e d the FBI process the FOIA litigation file as an records in FBI files containing the name Paul assassination record under the JFK Act. Hoch that were processed by the FBI as part of their “core” files, the Review Board did not The Review Board determined that the CIA locate any additional assassination records. pr ocessed most of its files on Wei s b e r g as part of the CIA se q u e s t e r ed collection. The Review f. David S. Lifton. Bo a r d examined a CIA Of fice of Security file on Wei s b e r g and identified a small number of The name David S. Lifton appeared only in the documents as assassination rec o r ds. FBI’s “core” files. The FBI did not produce any additional files that contained Lifton’s name. c. Josiah Thompson. g. Sylvia Meagher. In FBI files containing the name of Josiah Thompson, the Review Board staff located FBI files relating to Sylvia Meagher con- one assassination-related document that the tained five documents that the Review FBI had processed as part of its “core” files B o a rd believed to be assassination-re l a t e d . on the JFK Assassination. The document was The FBI processed these five documents as about Thompson’s book Six Seconds in Dallas. part of the “core” files. The Review Board The Review Board instructed the FBI to i n s t ructed the FBI to process these five docu- process the document as a duplicate of the ments as duplicates of re c o rds that appeare d record that appeared in the “core” files. in the “core” files.

106 The CIA reported that it no longer had any The remainder of the records involve Com- rec o r ds on Meagher. At one time, the Office of munist Party meetings at which attendees Security had a file on Meagher and a 1968 discussed the Kennedy assassination. Ramparts magazine article. The Review Board also located a ref e r ence to a Privacy Ac t 2. Edward Becker request made by Meagher. CIA de s t r oyed the Privacy Act request and the Office of Security Ed w a r d Becker claims that, in September 1962, folder under normal rec o r d control schedules. he met with Carlos Marcello and three other men, and heard Marcello threaten to have H. NAME SEARCHES P resident Kennedy killed. The HSCA reviewed the FBI’s headquarters file on The Review Board requested searches of fed- Ed w a r d Becker and, as such, the FBI proc e s s e d eral records for new or additional informa- it under the JFK Act. The Review Board tion and records on individuals who proved requested access to the Los Angeles field offi c e to be of interest to investigative bodies such file on Edward Becker, as well as access to the as the Warren Commission and the HSCA. co n t r ol file on the Los Angeles informant who di s c r edited Becker’s allegation. The Review In addition, the Review Board received hun- Bo a r d designated two documents from the Los d reds of letters, telephone calls, and tele- Angeles field office file on Becker and one doc- faxes from members of the public re q u e s t i n g ument from the Los Angeles informant’s con- the Board to locate government re c o rds on tr ol file. All three of the designated rec o rd s individuals who the public believed were concerned Becker’s allegation that Marce l l o linked in some way to the assassination. th r eatened President Kennedy. O b v i o u s l y, the Review Board staff could not request and review re c o rds on every name 3. Carlos Bringuier that came to its attention. The Review Board requested additional information and Carlos Bringuier was an anti-Castro Cuban re c o rds on some individuals, and this sec- activist in New Orleans who had re p e a t e d tion attempts to summarize the bulk of the contact with Lee Harvey Oswald in the Review Board’s requests for information on names that are not mentioned in other places summer of 1963. Bringuier managed a cloth- within this Report. ing store in New Orleans, and he was also the New Orleans re p resentative of the anti- 1. John Abt C a s t ro organization Directorio Revolu- c i o n a ro Estudiantil (the DRE). Oswald vis- Following his arrest on November 22, 1963, ited Bringuier’s store in early August 1963 Lee Harvey Oswald stated to representatives w h e re the two engaged in a discussion on of the media that he wanted to be repre- the Cuban political situation. A c c o rding to sented by John Abt. Abt was an attorney who B r i n g u i e r, Oswald portrayed himself as had re p resented the Communist Party, being anti-Castro and anti-communist. Sev- USA.26 Abt’s primary residence was in New eral days later, someone told Bringuier that York City, but he was spending the weekend an American was passing out pro - C a s t ro of November 22, 1963 at his cabin in Con- leaflets in New Orleans. Bringuier and two necticut. Thus, the Review Board requested others went to counter-demonstrate, and access to the FBI’s files on John Abt from FBI Bringuier was surprised to see that Oswald Headquarters and from the New York and was the pro - C a s t ro leafleter. Bringuier and New Haven field offices. Although the New Oswald argued and both were arrested for Haven office reported that it had no file ref- disturbing the peace. The publicity from the e rences to Abt, the FBI made available a l t e rcation and trial (Oswald pleaded guilty re c o rds from Headquarters and from the and was fined $10 and Bringuier and his New York field office. The Review Board des- friends pleaded not guilty and the charg e s ignated 24 records (all dated after November w e re dismissed) resulted in a debate on 22, 1963) for processing under the JFK Act. WDSU radio between Bringuier and Some of the designated re c o rds relate to Oswald on August 21, 1963. The Review whether Abt and Oswald knew each other B o a rd designated six serials from the New prior to President Kennedy’s assassination. Orleans file on Bringuier.

107 4. George Bush Review Board designated five records to be processed under the JFK Act. All of the des- A November 29, 1963, memorandum from ignated records concern Butler’s contact with FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the Director Oswald in August 1963. of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State refers to the fact that Chapter 7 of this Report discusses the information on the assassination of President Review Board’s attempts to obtain records Kennedy was “orally furnished to Mr. directly from Mr. Butler and INCA. G e o rge Bush of the Central Intelligence Agency.” At the request of the Review Board, CIA processed all of its records on Butler as the CIA made a thorough search of its part of its sequestered collection. records in an attempt to determine if the “George Bush” referred to in the memoran- 6. Claude Barnes Capehart dum might be identical to President and former Director of Central Intelligence George One res e a r cher inquired whether a Claude Herbert Walker Bush. That search deter- Barnes Capehart was ever an employee, mined that the CIA had no association with d i rectly or indire c t l y, under any name, George Herbert Walker Bush during the time whether on salary or contract, of the CIA, or a frame referenced in the document. co m p a n y , business, agency, or other entity operated by the CIA. The HSCA was inter- The records that the Review Board examined ested in Capehart, who claimed to have been showed that the only other “George Bush” in Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963, as a serving in the CIA in 1963 was a junior ana- CI A employee. The CIAgranted Review Board lyst who has repeatedly denied being the st a f f full access to its rec o r ds on Capehart. “George Bush” referenced in the memorandum. The Review Board staff found one ref- CI A rec o r ds state that Capehart worked for erence to an Army Major General George two diffe r ent private business contractors on Bush in the calendars of Director of Central U.S. government classified projects, but the Intelligence Allen Dulles. There was no indi- rec o r ds the Review Board examined do not cation if this General Bush could be the refer- show that CIA ever employed him as an offi - enced George Bush. The Review Board ce r , staffe r , asset, or source. The rec o r ds indi- marked the calendar page as an assassination cate that at least one of the private contractors record. for whom Capehart worked, Global Marine, Inc., did have CIA contracts. The rec o r ds fur- 5. Ed Butler and Information Council of ther indicate that a background investigation the Americas (INCA) was run on Capehart in August and Septem- ber 1973, so that he could work on those con- Ed w a r d Scannell Butler debated Lee Harvey tracts as a crane operator/driller from October Oswald in New Orleans in the summer of 1963 30, 1973 to July 9, 1975. As part of his work on the radio station WDSU. The radio debate with Global Marine Inc., Capehart signed oc c u r r ed shortly after Oswald was arrested for se c r ecy agreements with CIA in October 1973 disturbing the peace in August 1963. Follow- and January 1975. ing the assassination, but before Pres i d e n t Johnson formed the War r en Commission, But- The CIA holds two files on Capehart—an ler testified before a Senate Internal Security Office of Security File and a medical file. The Subcommittee re g a rding his contact with CIA processed its Office of Security file as Oswald. Butler had long been associated with part of the segregated collection. The medical the Information Council of the A m e r i c a s file, not part of CIA’s segregated collection, (INCA), a New Orleans-based clearinghouse concerns an accident which occurred on one for anti-Communist information, and particu- of the construction sites, and the Review larly for anti-Castro Cuban information. Board did not believe it was relevant. The medical file does not contain any information The Review Board requested access to all FBI on or evidence of any possible psychological headquarters and New Orleans field office problems. The CIA reported that it has never files on Edward Scannell Butler and the had an Office of Personnel file or a 201 file on Information Council of the Americas. The Capehart.

108 Th e r e is no evidence in either the Office of The Review Board requested FBI records on Security file or the medical file to suggest that these individuals from FBI Headquarters and Capehart worked for the CIA on any addi- field offices in Baltimore, Dallas, Denver, tional contracts nor in any capacity, direct or New Orleans and Washington, D.C. The FBI in d i r ect, other than as the employee of a pri- retrieved only a few records relating to the vate contractor, Global Marine, Inc., working individuals referenced above, all of which on CIA contracts. There is no evidence in the the Review Board designated as assassina- files that the Review Board saw to suggest tion records. that CIA ever assigned him a pseudonym or that he used another name. Finally, there is no 9. Billie Sol Estes information in the rec o r ds to support Cape- hart’s allegations concerning the Kennedy In the 1980s, Billy Sol Estes alleged that Lyn- assassination nor to confirm his wherea b o u t s don Johnson was involved in the assassina- during the relevant time period. tion of President Kennedy. Estes was report- edly a con artist who claims to have had a 7. Lawrence Cusack financial relationship with Lyndon Johnson. The Review Board requested access to all FBI The late Lawrence Cusack was a prominent Headquarters files on Billie Sol Estes. The New York attorney in the 1950s and 1960s Review Board designated eight serials for who represented, among other clients, the processing as assassination records under the Archdiocese of New York. The Review Board JFK Act. All of the designated records con- received information that Cusack performed cern Estes’ alleged knowledge of persons some legal work for Joseph P. Kennedy and connected to the assassination of President that Cusack’s son was engaged in an attempt Kennedy. to sell a group of allegedly salacious documents regarding Cusack’s professional (but 10. Judith Campbell Exner secret) relationship with President Kennedy. The documents at issue allegedly contained Judith Campbell Exner claims to have been a information regarding President Kennedy’s link between President Kennedy and Mafia relationship with Marilyn Monroe and with members Sam Giancana and Johnny Roselli. various mafia figures. Questions were raised Introduced to John Kennedy by Frank Sina- concerning the authenticity of the docu- tra during Kennedy’s 1960 presidential pri- ments, and Cusak’s son subsequently was mary campaign, she claimed to have had a indicted on fraud charges. relationship with John Kennedy that lasted from the winter of 1960 until March of 1962. In an effort to determine whether the FBI had In 1975, Ms. Exner gained national media any information on Lawrence Cusack’s rela- attention when she testified before the tionship with the Kennedy family, the Church Committee in its investigation of the Review Board requested access to all FBI C I A plots to assassinate Fidel Castro . Headquarters and New York field office files Between 1976 and 1997, Ms. Exner filed on Lawrence X. Cusack. The Review Board numerous lawsuits against the FBI seeking did not find any assassination records in the access to all information the FBI held on her. materials provided by the FBI. The Review Board requested access to all FBI Headquarters and field office main files on 8. Adele Edisen, Winston de Monsabert , Judith Campbell Exner. The FBI produced Jose Rivera several small field office files containing p ress clippings the FBI collected on Ms. Dr. Adele Edisen has written several letters to Exner, as well as several files which reflect the Review Board and has also provided Ms. Exner’s efforts to gain access to her infor- public testimony to the Review Board. In her mation in the FBI’s files. The FBI also pro- letters and testimony, Dr. Edisen stated that, duced several files with references to women in New Orleans on November 24, 1963, she with names similar to Judith Campbell recounted to an FBI agent and a Secret Ser- E x n e r. The Review Board designated as vice agent her knowledge of apparent deal- assassination records all main files on Ms. ings between Dr. Jose Rivera, Mr. Winston de Exner, as well as all records that made refer- Monsabert, and Lee Harvey Oswald in 1963. ence to Ms. Exner. The Review Board also

109 designated the entire FBI file on the murder K e n n e d y. The Review Board found only of Johnny Roselli which the FBI produced in three records that it believed to be assassina- response to this request. tion-related, all relating to threats that were made by private citizens to Joseph P. 11. H.L. Hunt and Family and Clint Kennedy and his sons. Murchison and Family 13. Oswald LeWinter Some researchers allege that the assassination of President Kennedy was master- In 1997, the Review Board received a query minded by wealthy Dallas oilmen H.L. Hunt f rom a re s e a rcher as to whether a man and Clint Murchison. The Review Board named Oswald LeWinter had any ties, cur- requested access to all FBI headquarters and rent or past, with the CIA. A c c o rding to the Dallas field office files on the following indire s e a rc h e r, LeWinter claimed to be the cur- viduals during the period 1960 through 1969: rent Deputy Director of Countere s p i o n a g e H.L. Hunt, Nelson Bunker Hunt, Lamar for the CIA with information on the assas- Hunt, Clint Murchison, Sr., Clint Murchison, sination of President Kennedy. The Review Jr., and Paul M. Rothermel. FBI files con- B o a rd staff examined CIA and FBI re c o rd s tained many references to the Hunts, the on LeWi n t e r. FBI and CIA files indicate that Murchisons, and Rothermel, but the docu- L e Winter is a well-known fabricator with ments were primarily concerned with their an interest in intelligence and law enforc e- business dealings or their political activities. ment activities who frequently makes The Review Board designated for the JFK claims related to sensational or unusual Collection ten documents from the files the news events. The re c o rds that the Review FBI produced in response to the Review B o a rd examined did not show that Oswald Board’s request. L e Winter was ever employed by or worked for the CIA in any capacity. Further, CIA 12. Joseph P. Kennedy reported that it has never employed anyone with a title or position equivalent to In light of allegations that Joseph P. “Assistant or Deputy Director of Coun- Kennedy’s organized crime connections t e re s p i o n a g e . ” helped to fund John Kennedy’s 1960 campaign for the Democratic nomination, the 14. Marita Lorenz Review Board requested FBI files on Joseph P. Kennedy. Given that Joseph P. Kennedy Marita Lorenz allegedly was involved in the was a prominent American who served in early plots to assassinate Fidel Castro; asso- many high-level government positions, the ciated with some of the more colorful gun- Review Board limited its request for FBI files running characters in the assassination on Joseph P. Kennedy to: (1) a list of file num- story; and has worked as an informant for bers and case captions of files where Mr. government agencies, including the Dru g Kennedy was the main subject of the file; and E n f o rcement A g e n c y. A c c o rding to former (2) field office files for the 1956 FBI investiga- H S C A s t a ffers, Lorenz claimed to have wit- tions of Kennedy in connection with his nessed a meeting between Frank Sturg i s , appointment to the Presidential Board of a.k.a. Frank Fiorini, and E. Howard Hunt, Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activi- both of whom had denied knowing each ties of the U.S. government. The Review other in testimonies to the Rockefeller Com- B o a rd singled out Kennedy’s 1956 back- mission. Although there are extensive FBI ground investigation because of its proximity files on Lorenz, the Review Board located no to the 1960 presidential election, and the alle- additional files in the CIA collections under gations of organized crime influence during her name. Upon the suggestion of former that election. The Review Board also H S C A s t a ffers to look further into Marita requested that the FBI provide a list of file L o renz, the Review Board requested DEA numbers and case captions that contained and INS to search their respective agency documents mentioning Joseph P. Kennedy. files for re c o rds on Lorenz. While INS had no The vast majority of records that the FBI pro- re c o rds, DEA p roduced two files, none of duced concerning Joseph P. Kennedy were which contained information of relevance to not related to the assassination of President the assassination.

110 15. John Thomas Masen serials from the Headquarters file on Mora which concerned the Oswald investigation in John Thomas Masen was a Dallas area gun Mexico City. dealer who was arrested on gun smuggling ch a r ges two days before the assassination of 18. Gordon Duane Novel Pr esident Kennedy. During the fall of 1963, Masen supplied arms to the Directorio Rev- Gordon Novel came to olucianario Estudiantial (DRE), an anti-Castro the attention of New At the time it seemed to me that gr oup based in Miami. The FBI interviewed Orleans District Attorney LHO was reciting propaganda Masen during the assassination investigation Jim Garrison after mak- f o r m u l a s, as well as phrases reg a r ding allegations that he may have sold ing claims that he was an used in connection with his 6.5 mm Mannlicher-C a r cano ammunition to employee of the CIA in demand for citizenship renunci- Lee Harvey Oswald. Some res e a r chers have New Orleans in 1963 and ation, that he perhaps did not alleged that Masen had connections to knew both Lee Harvey fully understand himself, and Oswald. The Review Board requested access Oswald and Jack Ruby. that he may have been coached to FBI files on John Thomas Masen from the The CIA has a 201 and an by persons unknown. following locations: Headquarters, San An t o - Office of Security file on —From Affidavit of John A. nio, Dallas, and Miami. The FBI reported that Gordon Novel. The 201 McVickar,June 23, 1997 the Miami field office file had been destroy e d , file includes a Domestic but the Review Board designated as assassina- Contacts Division “A” file which CIA incor- tion rec o r ds the Headquarters, San An t o n i o , porated into the 201 file. The Review Board and Dallas field office files in their entiret y . reviewed both files and designated as assas- These files describe the FBI’s investigation of sination records the entire Office of Security Masen in 1963 and 1964, and his association file, and relevant documents from the 201 file with the DRE. which did not duplicate re c o rds alre a d y found within the CIA sequestered collection. 16. John Anthony McVickar 19. Orest Pena John Anthony McVickar was a consular officer in Moscow from 1959 to 1961 where he Orest Pena was a New Orleans bar owner dealt with Lee Harvey Oswald and Marina and an anti-Castro activist. Pena and Oswald Oswald. McVickar shared an office with con- obtained passports on the same day in the sular officer Richard Snyder in 1959 and so summer of 1963. Pena testified before inves- was present to hear Snyder’s October 31 tigative committees, and claimed he was an interview with Oswald. McVickar was inter- FBI informant. In an effort to verify his claims viewed by members of the Review Board that he was an informant, the Review Board staff and provided affidavits to the Review requested access to any Headquarters or field Board. McVickar said he had no connections office files under the “134” or “137” classifi- to the CIA. The “John A. McVickar” file that cation (the FBI file classification for its infor- exists in the CIAsequestered collection is that mant source files). The FBI found no files of an individual with a diff e rent middle responsive to this request. name and no connection to the assassination. 20. Carlos Quiroga 17. Elizabeth Catlett Mora Carlos Quiroga was an anti-Castro Cuban Elizabeth Catlett Mora was a pro m i n e n t activist in New Orleans who had contact American communist who lived in Mexico with Lee Harvey Oswald in the summer of City in the early 1960s. Mora was an associate 1963. Quiroga received Oswald’s flyer on the of Vincent T. Lee, head of the FPCC, and trav- FPCC, contacted Oswald, and feigned inter- eled to Cuba with him in December 1962. The est in the FPCC. In addition, Quiroga spent Review Board requested access to FBI Head- time with Oswald in an effort to determine quarters and Mexico City file references to whether the FPCC was a serious pro-Castro Mora to determine if the Communist com- group in New Orleans. The Review Board munity in Mexico City had any contact with requested access to all Headquarters and Oswald during his trip to Mexico City in the New Orleans field office files regarding Car- fall of 1963. The Review Board designated 12 los Quiroga. The Review Board designated

111 six serials from the New Orleans file as assas- Of fice of Personnel file, but did not designate sination records. any rec o r ds as assassination rec o rd s .

21. Charles Small 24. Marty Underwood

Charles Small was a prominent American Marty Underwood was an advance man who Communist who lived in Mexico City in the worked for both President Kennedy and Pres - early 1960s. The Review Board requested ident Johnson. He was part of the team that access to FBI Headquarters and Mexico City accompanied President Kennedy to Texas in file references to Small to determine if the November 1963. Certain res e a r chers contend Communist community in Mexico City had that when Judith Campbell Exner in April 1960 any contact with Oswald during his trip to allegedly delivered a satchel of cash to Mafia Mexico City in the fall of 1963. The Review boss Sam Giancana as a favor to then pres i - Board designated as assassination records 18 dential candidate Senator John F. Kennedy, serials from the files produced in response to Underwood was on the same train from Was h - this request. These documents primarily ington, D.C. to Chicago, with instructions to relate to the Mexico City Communist com- “keep an eye” on her. The Review Board was munity’s reaction to the assassination and to also interested in learning more about Under- the fact that Oswald had visited Mexico City wood’s relationship with Winston Scott, the shortly before the assassination. CI A Chief of Station in Mexico City, whom he met during the Johnson administration. The 22. Clarence Daniel Smelley Review Board requested access to all file ref e r - ences on Marty Underwood. The FBI pro- Cl a r ence Daniel Smelley was a member of the duced two documents responsive to this International Brot h e r hood of Teamsters in request, and neither rec o r d contained any Birmingham, Alabama, who alleged in 1964 as s a s s i n a t i o n - r elated information. Al t h o u g h that he had information in his possession that Underwood’s oral history is at the LBJ Library, Teamster President Jimmy Hoffa had con- he has refused to sign a deed to open the his- sp i r ed to and carried out the assassination of to r y . While the Review Board considered the P resident Kennedy. The Review Board oral history to be an assassination rec o rd , requested access to the FBI Headquarters file Underwood gave permission to open only titled “James Riddle Hoffa; Clarence Daniel those sections which pertain directly to the Smelley; Unknown Subjects,” as well as the assassination. The LBJ Library will send those c o r responding Memphis and Birmingham sections to the JFK Collection. field office files. The Review Board designated the entire Headquarters file for proc e s s - 25. General Edwin Walker and the ing under the JFK Act. This file documented Minutemen the Bureau’s investigation of Smelley and his allegations. The FBI reports that it destroy e d General Edwin Walker, a retired Army Major c o r responding Memphis and Birmingham General, was an extreme right-wing political field office files in the 1970s. activist living in Dallas in 1963. He was forced into retirement from the U.S. Army in 23. Richard Snyder 1961 for distributing right-wing literature to soldiers under his command. General Walker Ri c h a r d Snyder was the Department of State was involved in organizing the protests of consular officer on duty at the Am e r i c a n James Meredith’s matriculation to the Uni- Embassy in Moscow when Lee Harvey versity of Mississippi in the fall of 1962, as Oswald appeared at the embassy to announce well as protests of Adlai Stevenson’s visit to his defection on October 31, 1959. Though Dallas in October 1963. After the events of Snyder had briefly worked for the CIA in 1949 November 22–24, 1963, Marina Oswald con- and 1950, the Review Board staff could locate fided to authorities that she believed it was no evidence in CIA files that he still had any Lee Harvey Oswald who shot at General connection to the CIA at the time of Oswald’s Walker’s home in April 1963. defection. CIA pr ocessed its 201 rec o r d on Snyder as part of the sequestered collection. The Review Board was interested in whether The Review Board staff examined Snyder’s the FBI had any information which indicated

112 that Walker or his followers: (1) had Richard Bissell’s request. The false test flight expressed any desire to assassinate President manuals contained incorrect information on Kennedy; (2) had any contact with Lee Har- the plane’s weight, speed, altitude, and load vey Oswald; or (3) had any information factor limits. Rich claims that Lockheed pro- regarding the Walker shooting. The Review duced the four manuals but only Bissell Board requested access to Headquarters and knew how or if the CIA got them to the Sovi- Dallas field office files on General Walker, the ets. Did Oswald, or others like him, carry Minutemen, the Headquarters file number these fake manuals into Soviet hands? 100–439412, and the Dallas field office file number 105–1475. The FBI produced numer- In an effort to locate re c o rds to confirm ous files in response to this request, and the Rich’s story, the Review Board staff con- Review Board recommended 191 documents tacted several individuals who were from the various files be processed as assas- involved with the U–2 program at CIA. In sination re c o rds. These documents con- addition, the Review Board staff examined cerned threats against President Kennedy n u m e rous files from the earliest days of the and members of the Kennedy Administra- U–2 including some of the original test flight tion and reactions within the right-wing manuals. The Directorate of Science and political community to the assassination of Technology found no mention of any fake President Kennedy. U–2 manuals in its archives or database. In addition, Lockheed, when queried, re p o r t e d The Review Board also requested the Crimi- that re c o rds of that age, if they still existed, nal Division of the Department of Justice to w e re neither indexed nor archived. In short, search for files on Walker. The Review Board the Review Board staff was unable to find staff located a small number of assassination any individual who had ever heard of any records in the Criminal Division’s files. fake U–2 manuals or any re c o rd which even hinted at the existence of any manuals. Wi t h I. MISCELLANEOUS Rich and Bissell both deceased, the existence or plans for four fake U–2 manuals re m a i n s This section, organized by agency, sets forth a mystery.2 7 some of the searches for additional information and records which did not easily fit b. The “Family Jewels.” within other sections or chapters. The 693-paged “Family Jewels” is not a sin- 1. CIA gle written document or report, but rather a collection of separate memoranda or letters At the request of the Review Board, the CIA f rom individuals, branches, divisions, and undertook a search for and located the original o ffices within the CIA. It grew out of a early rec o r ds reg a r ding the development of the request by James Schlesinger, then Dire c t o r U–2 plane. The CIA also located one of the few of Central Intelligence, instructing individ- extant, unredacted, and still closely held copies ual Agency components to detail acts or of the so called “Family Jewels” document. p rograms being conducted by the A g e n c y which might possibly violate the charter of a. The U–2 connection and the “fake” manuals. the CIA. Although Schlesinger did not place a time limit on responses, the majority of the Many researchers have wondered whether material detailed in the “Family Jewels” is Lee Harvey Oswald learned enough about f rom the late 1960s and early 1970s. The the U–2 airplane during his U.S. Marine “Family Jewels” contains multiple copies of Corps service in Japan to provide useful memoranda as diff e rent authors attached information to the Soviets as to its airspeed p revious branch, office, or division materi- and altitude or whether he might have als to individual treatises, retorts, elabora- played a diff e rent role re g a rding Soviet tions, or addenda. The collection does not knowledge of the airplane. In his 1994 per- have a table of contents, sequence, or org a- sonal memoir, Ben Rich, the former director nizational rationale. CIA stamped the pages of Lockheed’s research and design “Skunk c o n s e c u t i v e l y, and they appear roughly to Works,” states that Lockheed flight engineers be numbered in the order in which they produced four false test flight manuals at w e re collected.

113 In response to the Review Board’s informal vice that Oswald was a threat to the Presi- request CIA–IR–08, the CIA agreed to meet dent. In light of allegations that federal agen- with a member of the Review Board staff to cies neglected to adequately share law review the “Jewels” and identify assassina- enforcement information, the Review Board tion-related material. Portions of 27 pages staff believed that information of the 1960s were marked as assassination records to be era, which related to liaison between federal processed for inclusion in the JFK Collection government agencies on law enforc e m e n t at the National Archives. matters generally and matters affecting Pres- idential protection specifically, would be rel- 2. FBI evant for purposes of the JFK Collection.

a. “Research Matters” file on John F. Kennedy. i. Secret Service/Protection of the President. The Review Board requested access to the The Review Board requested access to file FBI’s files captioned “Liaison with the Secret number 94–37374 in the summer of 1995. Service” and “Presidential Protection.” Both The file was one of the 164 files that com- of these files had previously been available in prised J. Edgar Hoover’s “Official and Con- the FBI’s FOIA reading room in a heavily fidential (O&C)” files, which were re m o v e d redacted form. The FBI’s file on Presidential f rom Hoover’s office after his death and are Protection does not begin until 1964, and the c u r rently maintained by the FBI as a gro u p Review Board designated all documents to maintain their integrity. The file consists from 1964, and 27 documents from post-1964, of five volumes, and three “EBFs,” or enclo- as assassination records. The Review Board s u res behind file. The FBI processed the also designated the FBI’s entire file on the e n t i re file under the JFK Act. The file consists Dillon Commission as assassination-related. of a mix of material relating to John K e n n e d y. Volumes 1, 2, 3, and the first half of ii. CIA. Although the HSCA re v i e w e d Volume 4 all predate the assassination. The portions of the FBI’s liaison file with the second half of Volume 4 and all of Volume 5 CIA, the Review Board requested access to contain documents that are dated after the additional sections of the FBI/CIA l i a i s o n assassination and consist of condolence let- file covering the period 1957 through 1969 in ters and other material relating to Pre s i d e n t an effort to locate new assassination re c o rd s . K e n n e d y. The earliest documents in the file The Review Board designated all documents date back to the late 1940s, when John f rom the CIA liaison file for the years 1963 Kennedy ran for and was elected to Con- and 1964 as well as 67 documents from the g ress. The pre-assassination file contains period before and after 1963 and 1964 for social and professional corre s p o n d e n c e p rocessing as assassination re c o rds. These between Kennedy and Director Hoover. It documents cover a wide variety of topics also contains a significant number of news- related to the assassination including infor- paper articles and information about mation about how the FBI and the CIA Kennedy’s election races. Once Kennedy s h a red information when their intere s t s became President, the file captured informa- overlapped. tion about Presidential protection and liaison with the Secret Service. The file also con- iii. NSA. The Review Board staff’ s tains letters and call reports from members review of the FBI liaison file with NSAfor the of the public to the FBI generally and to years 1959–1964 produced no additional D i rector Hoover specifically relating to Pre s- assassination records. ident Kennedy. iv. Customs. The Review Board staff’s b. Liaison with other federal agencies. review of the FBI’s liaison file with the Cus- toms Service produced no additional assassi- In his Warren Commission testimony, Secret nation records. Service agent Rowley commented that, had federal agencies shared their information v. ATF. The Review Board staff’s review relating to Lee Harvey Oswald, the govern- of the FBI’s liaison file with the Bureau of ment could have compiled a list of at least 18 Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms produced no items that would have alerted the Secret Ser- additional assassination records.

114 3. Secret Service “threat sheets” was the subject of the Secret Service’s May 1998 appeal to the President. a. Protective survey reports. 4. Department of State Whenever the President traveled outside of Washington, D.C., the Secret Service would Robert Edward Webster was a technician generate a Protective Survey Report, or a working on the American Exhibition in “trip report.” Trip reports, composed by Moscow in the summer of 1959 when he S e c ret Service agents who conducted decided to renounce his citizenship and defect advance work for the President’s trips, con- to the Soviet Union. Webster appeared at the tained information ranging from logistical U.S. Embassy to announce his defection two details about seating arrangements to details weeks prior to Oswald’s visit. Research e r s about individuals in the area known to have have suggested that accounts of Oswald’s made threats against the President’s life. appearance at the embassy differ because Some of the survey reports document infor- embassy personnel have confused the arrivals mation Secret Service received from other of Webster and Oswald. In an effort to explore agencies such as the FBI or the CIA. any physical similarities between the two men, the Review Board asked the Department The survey reports detail Pre s i d e n t of State to locate a circa 1959 passport photo- Kennedy’s travel, whereabouts, associations, graph of Web s t e r . The Department of State and activities for his entire administration. pr oduced its passport file on Web s t e r , and They also provide a complete picture of the tr a n s f e r r ed the file to the JFK Collection. The S e c ret Service’s protection of Pre s i d e n t passport file includes new, detailed informa- Kennedy. tion on Web s t e r ’s defection.

b. Shift reports. 5. Army

The White House Detail consisted of Secret The Review Board’s two primary concerns Service agents whose duties were to person- with Army records were: first, to open the ally protect the life of the President, the Vice counterintelligence files located at the Inves- President, and their respective families. The tigative Records Repository (IRR) at Fort White House Detail kept “shift reports,” usu- Meade; and second, to determine whether ally authored by the Special Agent in charge Army intelligence units had any re g u l a r of the shift, that detailed the activity of each responsibilities for protection of the Presi- section during their assigned working hours. dent as part of their normal duties circa 1963.

c. Eileen Dinneen memoranda. a. U.S. Army’s Investigative Records Repository. Eileen Dinneen, a staff researcher for the HSCA, obtained access to protective intelli- This facility at Fort Meade in Maryland, a gence files and Protective Survey Reports. part of the Army’s Intelligence and Security Dinneen documented her review of these Command (INSCOM), contains investigative files in memoranda and reports. The Review files on individuals of counterintelligence Board staff found useful Dinneen’s docu- interest to the Army. The HSCA studied 34 mentation of information contained in the IRR “case files,” and thus, the A r m y Secret Service protective intelligence files of processed those records for inclusion in the individuals whom the Secret Service consid- JFK Collection. The Review Board requested ered to be dangerous to the lives of the Pres- three additional files and designated them ident, the Vice President, and their families assassination records. The three additional from March to December 1963. For each pro- case files declared as assassination records by tective intelligence file she reviewed, Din- the Review Board pertain to Alfredo Mirabal neen created a one-page report documenting Diaz, Jordan James Pfuntner, and Clemard the name of the individual and various bio- Joseph Charles. The Review Board staff also graphical and background information the designated one additional file consisting of Secret Service maintained on the individual. an assortment of extracts from various Army The Board’s vote to release in full these Intelligence Regulations.

115 b. Army Security Agency records and files. Air Force One and Andrews Air Force Base during the return flight from Dallas to Wash- The Review Board did not locate any addi- ington, D.C. As many people are now aware, tional assassination records from the Army in the 1970s, the LBJ Presidential Library Security Agency’s files. Review Board staff released edited audio cassettes of unsecured, searched for information and records con- or open voice conversations with Air Force cerning ASA electronic surveillance from the One, Andrews Air Force Base, the White 1960s, but was unsuccessful in its efforts to House Situation Room, and the Cabinet Air- locate any such material. Army personnel craft carrying the Secretary of State and other provided to the Review Board staff a unit his- o fficials on November 22, 1963. The LBJ tory which gave a generic description of ASA Library version of these tapes consists of surveillance activities in Mexico City in 1963. about 110 minutes of voice transmissions, but The one paragraph that addressed this activ- the tapes are edited and condensed, so the ity was short, not very detailed, and Review Board staff sought access to described the ASA surveillance effort of the unedited, uncondensed versions. Since the Cuban and Soviet Embassies as larg e l y edited version of the tapes contains consider- unsuccessful, due to technical diff i c u l t i e s . able talk about both the forthcoming autopsy This paragraph did not provide any raw on the President, as well as the reaction of a intelligence or surveillance data. government in crisis, the tapes are of considerable interest to assassination researchers c. Army Inspector General 1973 report on and historians. domestic surveillance abuses in the U.S. Given that the LBJ Library released the tapes In 1997, the Review Board requested that the in the 1970s, the paper trail is now sketchy and Army’s Inspector General’s Office locate and quite cold. The LBJ Library staff is fairly confi- provide a copy of its own 1973 report on dent that the tapes originated with the White domestic surveillance abuses in the United House Communications Agency (WHCA). States, in the hope that this document might The LBJ Library staff told the Review Board mention domestic surveillance activity in the st a f f that it received the tapes from the White early 1960s and provide leads to the Review House as part of the original shipment of Pres - Board. (The Church Committee cited this ident Johnson’s papers in 1968 or 1969. report in detail.) The Army IG off i c e Ac c o r ding to the LBJ Library’s documenta- responded to the Review Board staff that it tion, the accession card reads: “WHCA?” and could not locate its own report. is dated 1975. The Review Board staff could not locate any rec o r ds indicating who per- 6. White House Communications Agency formed the editing, or when, or where.

WHCAwas, and is, responsible for maintain- The Review Board’s repeated written and oral ing both secure (encrypted) and unsecured inquiries of the White House Communica- (open) telephone, radio, and telex communi- tions Agency did not bear fruit. The WHCA cation between the President and the govern- could not produce any rec o r ds that illumi- ment of the United States. Most of the per- nated the provenance of the edited tapes. sonnel that constitute this elite agency are U.S. military communications specialists; 7. Presidential Library Materials many, in 1963, were from the Army Signal Corps. On November 22, 1963, WHCA was The JFK Act obliged both the John F. Kennedy responsible for communications between and Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Libraries and among Air Force One and Two, the to grant the Review Board access to donor- White House Situation Room, the mobile restricted material and to rec o r ds stored under White House, and with the Secret Service in a deposit agreement to determine whether the the motorcade. material contains assassination information. In i t i a l l y , both presidential libraries were rel u c - The Review Board sought to locate any audio tant to release their most closely guarde d recordings of voice communications to or rec o r ds involving Jacqueline Kennedy, Robert from Air Force One on the day of the assassi- Ke n n e d y , and William Manchester. In the case nation, including communications between of both libraries, privacy concerns, as well as

116 political motivations, delayed the decision- the JFK Library. Because The public was curious, a n d making process. The Review Board was able to of their unique historical that curiosity could not be sat- se c u r e the LBJ Library’s agreement to rel e a s e value, the Review Board isfied without revealing what the Jacqueline B. Kennedy tapes and tran- regards these interviews 28 we had decided to omit. At the sc r i p t s ; obtain William Manchester’s permis- as highly relevant to the same time, some political fig- sion to allow a member of the Review Board assassination. This out- ures described in the manu- st a f f to review his papers on The Death of a standing collection of script demanded that they be Pre s i d e n t ; and secure the cooperation of the JFK materials should be presented in glowing terms. I Library in approaching the Kennedy family made available to the balked and refused to make reg a r ding the release of the sealed tapes and public as soon as possi- changes that would falsify his- transcripts of Manchester’s interviews with ble. At this point, how- t o r y . Jacqueline B. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy. e v e r, Manchester has —William Manchester, in refused to cooperate and Death of a President a. William Manchester interviews. it is unfortunately impos- sible to open the records Most of William Manchester’s work papers without his consent. relating to his work on The Death of a Pres i d e n t ar e stored at the JFK Library under a 1967 The tapes and transcripts of William Man- Deposit Ag r eement. Of particular historical ch e s t e r ’s interviews of Robert F. Kennedy and value are the extensive personal interviews he Jacqueline B. Kennedy are subject to a 1967 conducted in the early aftermath of the Pres i - legal agreement which states that they were dent’s death. In contrast to other rec o r ds in the not to be made public for 100 years “except.. . Collection that shed light on the assassination on the express written consent of plaintiff investigations, the Manchester interviews [Jacqueline B. Kennedy].” With Mrs. Onas- ch r onicle the human side of the story. Man- sis’s death, her daughter Caroline Kennedy chester envisioned that The Death of a Pres i d e n t became her rep r esentative and is the only w o u l d p rovide “one complete, accurate person with authority to give consent to open account about the assassination,. . . that would this material. be based on material gathered while the memories were still fres h . ” 29 The interviews cap- The Review Board recog- tu r ed and rec o r ded the early recollections and nizes that the interviews In my view, the Manch e s t e r reactions of people closest to Pre s i d e n t have extraordinary his- interviews have an extraordi- Kennedy and provide a lens through which torical value and so it narily unique historical value the tragedy of the event can be seen and pursued this matter with and are the most important understood in the context of the times. the JFK Library and with records not yet released. .. I am William Manchester. Af t e r hopeful that you might agree to Beginning in early 1995, the Review Board evaluating whether the release the material before the made repeated attempts to gain access to the court order could be Review Board completes its M a n c h e s t e r’s papers at the JFK Library. In lifted, the Review Board work in September so we can June 1998, Manchester agreed to allow a decided to approach Car- help manage the release in an Review Board staff member to review his oline Kennedy to discuss appropriate manner. material at the Library. This review re v e a l e d the possibility of having —Hon. John R. Tunheim’s letter that, while much of the information Man- the tapes and transcripts to Caroline B. Kennedy chester obtained from the interviews is opened at the Kennedy incorporated into his book, his raw notes L i b r a r y. Caroline Kennedy wrote to the would be of great value and interest to Review Board in late August 1998, informing re s e a rchers. the Board of her decision n o t to release the material at this time, nor would she agree to Although Manchester recorded some of his allow one of the Review Board members to interviews on tape, the recordings were not review the material to determine whether available at the Library. Only the written the tapes contained assassination-re l a t e d notes and/or transcripts of his interviews are m a t e r i a l . in this collection. Furthermore, not all of the interviews that Manchester referenced in The The Review Board was very disappointed Death of a President are accounted for in the that Caroline Kennedy declined to even allow notebooks and transcripts he deposited in the Review Board access to the material. The

117 Bo a r d hopes that she will agree to public J. CONCLUSION release at a later time. The Review Board examined a large number of b. Jacqueline B. Kennedy tapes at the records in its efforts to identify additional fed- LBJ Library. eral records and information related to the assassination, many of which are not detailed T h e re are six re c o rded telephone conversa- in this report. For every assassination record tions between Jacqueline B. Kennedy and that the Review Board located and included in P resident Johnson within the collection of the JFK Collection, the staff literally reviewed p residential re c o rdings at the LBJ Library. hundreds of documents. The need to review The Review Board has worked consistently every file on a document-by-document basis with the LBJ Library to secure their re l e a s e . meant that the Review Board simply did not The LBJ Library was concerned about donor have time to request additional information restrictions associated with the release of and records on every research lead that it these tapes. Finally , in March 1998 the LBJ received. For those requests that the Review Library decided to release the six conversa- Board staff did make, the Review Board staff tions provided that they be opened along team leaders kept notebooks that documented with the next scheduled release of Pre s i d e n t the Review Board staff’s efforts to locate addi- Johnson’s re c o rdings. The Review Board tional records at the FBI, CIA, and Department understands that these tapes will be of Defense. To the extent that the public is released on September 18, 1998, along with i n t e rested in finding information on the the release of the August to November 1963 Review Board’s additional requests, the note- re c o rd i n g s . books document which records Review Board staff reviewed and which records the Review Board has designated as assassination-related.

118 CHAPTER 6 PART I: ENDNOTES 1 JFK Act, § 5(c)(2)(H). 2 Chapter 5 of this Report defines the CIA’s Sequestered Collection. 3 In Volume 11 of its report, the HSCA attempted to deal with allegations of a possible military investigation of Oswald by the Marine Corps following the assassination. Also, some former USMC associates of Oswald have told researchers that they recall civilian investigators asking questions about Oswald following his defection in late 1959 or early 1960. 4 The in-person, unsworn interview was tape-recorded, and the three written interview reports are dated August 5, August 13, and September 16, 1997, respectively. 5 Reeves served in the District Intelligence Office of the San Diego, California 11th Naval District. 6 One of the officers who called Mr. Reeves was Rufus Taylor, who was Director of Naval Intelligence in 1964. 7 The Office of Operations later became the Domestic Contacts Division (DCD) of the Direc- torate of Operations. 8 See the HSCA’s report on Oswald in Mexico City, The Lopez Report, where the subject of CIA photographic surveillance operations is discussed at length. 9 The Review Board was not able to locate cables or dispatches from the following periods: Mexico City Station to Headquarters (September 26–30, 1963); Headquarters to Mexico City Station (September 26–30, 1963); JMWAVE to Headquarters (September 26–November 21, 1963); Headquarters to JMWAVE (September 26–November 21, 1963); and all traffic between the Mexico City Station and JMWAVE for the periods September 26–October 20, 1963 and November 22–December 30, 1963. 10 According to CIA, in the 1960s, offices of record for cable traffic and dispatches did not cre- ate cable and dispatch files for reference collection purposes. 11 Approximately half of the records on Cuba were from 1962 and the other half were from 1963. Very few records from 1961 or 1964 were present. 12 The RFK donor committee was established in the 1970s for the purpose of overseeing the processing of RFK papers which were held on a deposit agreement at the JFK Library. It tradi- tionally has been comprised of Kennedy family members and scholars and is now headed by Max Kennedy, one of Robert F. Kennedy’s sons. 13 When the Review Board decided in 1996 that it would not object to the JFK Library keeping custody of the RFK Cuba-related records, provided that the JFK Library agree to release the records, the JFK Library moved to process the records as part of the executive order mandatory review declassification. Consequently, the Library included the RFK records in the pilot scanning project conducted by CIA, with the stipulation that they be reviewed under JFK Act guidelines. The process was delayed due to a combination of technical problems with the scanning project and a change in leadership of the donor committee following the death of Michael Kennedy. 14 The CIAmemoranda bear the dates November 23, 1976; August 5, 1977; and November 29, 1979. 15 Secret Service Final Declaration of Compliance. 16 OIP Final Declaration of Compliance. 17 Mr. Miller was later subpoenaed by the Review Board, and he had retained numerous records from his tenure as Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. 18 Criminal Division Initial Statement of Compliance (dated January 29, 1997).

119 19 Dec. 19, 1996, Review Board Letter to Main Treasury. 20 Main Treasury Final Declaration ¶ 10. 21 Id. ¶ 19. 22 In the early 1960s, the Technical Services Division (TSD), was a part of the Directorate of Plans (now the Directorate of Operations). Later administrative shifts moved TSD (renamed the Office of Technical Service) to the DS&T and the files of the relocated office were incorporated into the DS&T system. 23 The FBI had only designated for processing under the JFK Act sections 17–18 and 20–37 of the Giancana file. Section 17 of the file began with the year 1963, and so the FBI had not designated for processing any volumes of records that predated January 1, 1963. 24 Robert Blakey and Richard Billings, Fatal Hour (1981); Anthony Summers, Conspiracy 503–504 (1980); Gerald Posner, Case Closed 459–460 (1993); John H. Davis, Mafia Kingfish, 519–524 (1989); Ronald Goldfarb, Did the Mob Kill JFK?, Washington Post, Dec. 10, 1995 at C3:1. 25 When the FBI determines that electronic surveillance is a necessary component of a particular investigation, the FBI goes to a federal court and obtains authorization pursuant to Title III to establish the surveillance. Title III operates to automatically place al l materials obtained from the overhear under court seal. Then, if the U.S. Attorney wants to use the tapes in a pros e c u - tion, they have to petition the federal court to have the seal lifted only for the portions of the tapes that will be played at trial. The practical effect of this proc e d u r e is that everything that is no t played at trial remains under seal. Thus, in order for the Review Board staff to obtain access to the BriLab surveillance, it had to move to unseal the materials for the purpose of its rev i e w . Then, when the Review Board staff located assassination rec o r ds within the BriLab materials, it requested the Title III court to unseal the rec o r ds for the purpose of public disclosure. 26 The Worker newspaper, to which Oswald subscribed, often mentioned Abt. 27 Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years At Lockheed. New York: Little Brown, and Company. 1994. 28 Scheduled to be released on September 18, 1998. 29 William Manchester, Foreward to The Death of a President, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, p. ix–x.

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