JFK Assassination Reports and Records

LE T T E R O F TR A N S M I T T A L

BO A R D ME M B E R S: John R.Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson EX E C U T I V E DI R E C T O R: Laura A. Denk • DE P U T Y DI R E C T O R: Tracy J. Shycoff

i LE T T E R O F TR A N S M I T T A L

iii LE T T E R O F TR A N S M I T T A L

v AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S RE V I E W BO A R D

The Honorable John R. Tu n h e i m C h a i r m a n

Henry F. Graff

Kermit L. Hall

William L. Joyce

Anna K. Nelson

vii AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S RE V I E W BO A R D STA F F ( SE P T E M B E R 1 9 9 8 )

Laura A. Denk, Esq. Executive Director

Tracy J. Shycoff Deputy Director

Ronald G. Haron, Esq. General Counsel

K. Michelle Combs Associate Director for Research and Analysis

Eileen A. Sullivan Douglas P. Horne Press and Public Affairs Off i c e r Chief Analyst for Military Records

Robert J. Skwirot Kevin G. Ti e r n a n Chief Analyst for CIA R e c o r d s Chief Analyst for FBI Records

Irene F. Marr, Senior Analyst

Sarah Ahmed, Analyst Marie Fagnant, Analyst James C. Goslee, II, Analyst Benjamin A. Rockwell, Analyst Peter H. Voth, Analyst/Assistant Computer Specialist

Charles C. Rhodes, Computer Specialist

Jerrie Olson, Executive Secretary Catherine M. Rodriguez, Technical Assistant for Research and Analysis Janice Spells, Administrative Assistant

viii TA B L E O F CO N T E N T S

Preface ...... xxi

Executive Summary ...... xx i i i

Chapter 1: The Problem of Secrecy and the Solution of the JFK Act ...... 1

A. The Problem of Secrecy ...... 1 B. Prior Investigative Efforts ...... 2 1. The President’s Commission to Investigate the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Warren Commission) ...... 2 2. The President’s Commission on Central Intelligence Agency Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission) ...... 2 3. The Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee) ...... 3 4. The Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives (Pike Committee) ...... 3 5. The Select Committee on Assassinations of the House of Representatives (HSCA) . 3 6. Additional Congressional Investigations ...... 3 7. Records Held by Executive Branch Agencies ...... 4 8. Investigative Records in the Custody of Non-Federal Sources ...... 4 C. Skepticism Concerning the Government’s Conclusions ...... 4 D. The Solution: The JFK Act ...... 6 E. Legislative History of JFK Act ...... 6 F. Key Provisions of JFK Act ...... 7

Chapter 2: Establishment of the Review Board and Definition of “Assassination Record” . . . . . 13

A. Introduction ...... 13 B. Delay in Start Up ...... 13 1. JFK Act Deadlines ...... 13 a. Ninety days for President to appoint Review Board members. b. 300 days for government offices to review, identify, and organize assassination records. c. 300 days for NARA to establish JFK Collection. d. Three years for Board to complete work. 2. Passage of H.R. 1553 ...... 15 C. Defining “Assassination Record” ...... 15 1. Statutory Definition of “Assassination Record” ...... 16 2. Congressional Intent Concerning Definition ...... 16 3. Review Board’s Early Deliberations and Draft Definition ...... 17 4. Comments from Public ...... 17 a. Notice and Comment. b. Public Hearings.

ix 5. Definition ...... 18 a. Scope of assassination records. b. Scope of additional records and information. c. Sources of assassination records and additional records and information. d. Types of materials included in scope of assassination records and additional records and information. e. Assassination records released in their entirety. f. Originals and copies. D. Conclusion ...... 20

Chapter 3: Public Activities of the Assassination Records Review Board ...... 23

A. Introduction ...... 23 B. Public Hearings ...... 23 C. Public Meetings ...... 24 D. Experts Conferences ...... 24 E. Outreach ...... 25 1. Outreach to Academics ...... 25 2. Outreach to Students ...... 26 3. Outreach to Assassination Researchers ...... 26 4. Media ...... 26 F. Conclusion ...... 27

Chapter 4: Developing the Review Process ...... 29

A. Introduction ...... 29 B. JFK Act Requirements for Processing Documents ...... 29 C. Basic Elements of the Review Process ...... 30 D. Electronic Identification Aids ...... 31 E. Tracking the Review of Assassination Records ...... 32 1. Review Track Database ...... 32 2. Fast Track Database ...... 33 F. Consent Releases ...... 34 G. Board Procedures ...... 34 H. Miscellaneous Bottlenecks and Problems in the Review Process ...... 35 1. Duplicates ...... 35 2. Equities and Referrals ...... 35 a. Managing referrals. b. Dunning letters. c. Review Board joint declassification sessions. I. Document Processing After Review Board Votes ...... 37 J. Conclusion ...... 38

Chapter 5: The Standards for Review: Review Board “Common Law” ...... 41

A. Introduction and Background ...... 41 1. Current Guidelines for Release of Assassination-Related Information ...... 41 2. Key Distinctions Between Standards of Release Under the FOIA, the Executive Order, and the JFK Act ...... 42 a. JFK Act presumes disclosure of assassination records...... 43 b. JFK Act requires agencies to provide clear and convincing evidence...... 43 c. JFK Act requires the Review Board to balance evidence for postponement against public interest in release...... 44

x d. Segregability and substitute language...... 44 3. Federal Agency Record Groups and the Standards Applied to Them ...... 44 a. The FBI’s “core and related” files...... 44 b. The CIA’s Lee Harvey Oswald “201” file...... 45 c. The FBI’s “House Select Committee on Assassinations” (HSCA) subject files. . . 45 d. The CIA’s “segregated collection” files...... 45 e. FBI rec o r ds on the congressional committees that investigated the assassination. . 45 f. Requests for additional information...... 45 B. Declassification Standards ...... 45 1. Standard of Proof: Clear and Convincing Evidence ...... 45 a. Review Board guidelines...... 46 b. Commentary...... 46 i. “Rule of Reason.” A. “NBR” Guidelines: Records that Review Board judged were “not believed relevant” to the assassination ...... 47 B. Segregated Collection Guidelines ...... 47 2. Intelligence Agents ...... 48 a. CIA officers...... 48 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. b. “John Scelso” (pseudonym)...... 49 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. c. Information that identifies CIA officers...... 50 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. d. Names of National Security Agency employees...... 50 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. 3. Intelligence Sources and Methods and Other Matters Relating to the National Security of the United States ...... 50 a. CIA sources...... 51 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. b. CIA pseudonyms...... 51 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. c. CIA crypts...... 52 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. d. CIA sluglines...... 52 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. e. CIA surveillance methods...... 53 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. f. CIA installations...... 53 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. g. CIA prefixes (cable, dispatch, field report)...... 55 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. h. CIA job titles...... 55 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. i. CIA file numbers...... 55

xi i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. j. CIA domestic facilities...... 55 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. k. CIA official cover...... 56 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. l. Alias documentation...... 56 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. m. Foreign intelligence cooperation...... 56 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. n. Human sources in FBI foreign counterintelligence (assets)...... 56 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. o. FBI foreign counterintelligence activities...... 57 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary and overview of foreign counterintelligence appeals. A. The FBI’s May 1996 Appeals to the President B. Post-appeal decisionmaking p. Information that reveals the FBI’s investigative interest in a diplomatic establishment or diplomatic personnel...... 59 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. q. Technical sources in FBI foreign counterintelligence...... 59 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. r. Other classified file numbers relating to FBI foreign counterintelligence...... 60 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary s. FBI mail cover in foreign counterintelligence investigations ...... 60 i. Review Board guidelines ii. Commentary t. FBI tracing of funds in foreign counterintelligence investigations ...... 61 i. Review Board guidelines ii. Commentary. u. FBI physical surveillance...... 61 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. v. Operational details concerning Department of Defense operations...... 62 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. w. National Security Agency sources and methods...... 62 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary x. National Security Agency intercept traffic ...... 63 i. Review Board guidelines ii. Commentary 4. Personal Privacy ...... 63 a. Personal privacy generally ...... 63 i. Review Board guidelines ii. Commentary. b. Prisoner of War issues...... 64 i. Review Board guidelines.

xii ii. Commentary. c. Names of individuals in Secret Service “threat sheets.” ...... 64 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. 5. Informant Postponements ...... 65 a. Informant postponements generally...... 65 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. A. A note on the statutory framework for review of FBI informant postponements B. History of Review Board’s decisionmaking on informant postponements C. Effect of prior disclosures b. Individuals who provided information to the FBI, but who did not have an ongoing confidential relationship with the FBI...... 67 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. c. Individuals who gave the FBI information to which they had access by virtue of their employment...... 67 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. d. Deceased informants...... 68 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. e. “Negative Contacts”: Informants who provided no assassination-related information to the FBI...... 68 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. f. “Positive Contacts”: Informants who provided at least some assassination-related information to the FBI...... 69 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. g. FBI informant symbol numbers and file numbers...... 70 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. 6. Confidential Relationships Between Government Agents and Cooperating Foreign Governments ...... 71 a. Foreign liaison postponements in FBI files...... 71 i. Review Board guidelines. ii. Commentary. 7. Presidential Protection ...... 74 C. JFK Act Exemptions ...... 74 1. Tax Return Information ...... 74 2. Records Under Seal ...... 75 D. Appeals to the President Pending as of September 30, 1998 ...... 75 E. Conclusion ...... 75

Chapter 6, Part I: The Quest for Additional Information and Records in Federal Government Offi c e s . . . 81

A. Records Related To Lee Harvey Oswald ...... 82 1. Pre-assassination records ...... 82 a. CIA...... 82 i. Security file. ii. Records in the defector file. iii. HTLINGUAL records. b. FBI...... 83

xiii c. Secret Service...... 83 d. IRS/Social Security Administration...... 83 e. INS records on Lee and Marina Oswald...... 84 f. House Un-American Activities Committee...... 84 2. Military records ...... 84 a. U.S. Marine Corps records...... 84 i. U.S. Marine Headquarters copy of enlisted personnel file and medical file. ii. Additional relevant U.S. Marine Corps unit diaries. b. Military identification card...... 84 c. Possible ONI post-defection investigation...... 85 3. In the U.S.S.R...... 85 a. CIA operations in Moscow...... 85 b. American Embassy personnel...... 85 c. Search for American Embassy records...... 86 d. DCD/OO alleged debriefing of Lee Harvey Oswald...... 86 4. In Mexico City ...... 86 a. Technical surveillance...... 87 i. Audio and photographic. ii. Tapes, transcripts, and photographs in existence. b. Cable traffic...... 88 c. Win Scott files...... 90 d. Sylvia Duran...... 90 e. Legat administrative files...... 90 f. Anne Goodpasture deposition...... 91 B. Records On Cuba ...... 91 1. CIA Record...... 91 2. Military Records...... 91 a. Joint Staff Secretariat...... 91 b. Army...... 92 c. Office of the Secretary of Defense...... 92 d. Joint Chiefs of Staff history...... 92 3. Presidential Library collections ...... 92 a. JFK Library records...... 92 b. LBJ Library records...... 93 4. Church Committee Records ...... 93 C. Records On Vietnam ...... 93 1. CIA Records ...... 93 2. Military records ...... 93 a. Joint Staff Secretariat...... 94 b. Office of the Secretary of Defense...... 94 c. Joint Chiefs of Staff history...... 94 3. Presidential Library collections ...... 94 a. JFK Library...... 94 b. LBJ Library...... 94 4. Church Committee Testimony ...... 94 D. Records of Senior Agency Officials ...... 95 1. CIA ...... 95 a. Allen Dulles...... 95 b. John McCone...... 95 c. Charles Cabell and Marshall Carter...... 95 d. Richard Bissell, William Colby, and Richard Helms...... 95 e. James J. Angleton...... 96 f . Lawrence Houston...... 96 g . William Harvey...... 96 2. FBI ...... 96

xiv a. Hoover and Tolson records, including “Official and Confidential” files, chronological files, and phone logs...... 96 b. Miscellaneous administrative files from the Director’s Office...... 97 c. John P. Mohr Records...... 97 3. Secret Service ...... 97 4. Office of the Secretary of Defense ...... 98 5. Office of Naval Intelligence ...... 98 6. Army ...... 98 7. National Security Agency ...... 99 8. Department of State ...... 99 9. Department of Justice ...... 99 a. Office of Information and Privacy...... 99 b. Criminal Division...... 99 10. Department of the Treasury ...... 99 11. IRS ...... 100 E. Pro and Anti-Castro Cuban Matters ...... 100 1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee ...... 100 a. FBI field office files...... 100 b. CIA records on Richard Gibson...... 101 c. Department of Justice Criminal Division files on FPCC...... 101 2. Cuban COINTELPRO ...... 101 3. Anti-Castro Activities ...... 101 4. Cuban Intelligence Activities in the U.S.; Cuban Situation ...... 102 5. Anti-Castro Cuban Groups, Including DRE, Alpha 66, SFNE, JURE, FRD, CRC, and Commandos-L ...... 102 6. Threats Against the Life of Fidel Castro ...... 102 a. CIA DS&T records...... 102 b. FBI file captioned “Threats Against the Life of Fidel Castro.” ...... 102 7. American Gambling Interests in Cuba ...... 103 8. Sergio Arcacha-Smith, Antonio Veciana, and Bernardo de Torres ...... 103 F. Records on Organized Crime ...... 103 1. Sam Giancana ...... 103 2. FBI Electronic Surveillance of Carlos Marcello: BriLab ...... 104 3. Department of Justice Criminal Division Records ...... 104 G. Warren Commission Staff and Critics ...... 104 1. FBI Files on Warren Commission Staff ...... 105 2. CIA and FBI Files on Warren Commission Critics ...... 105 a. Mark Lane...... 105 b. Harold Weisberg...... 106 c. Josiah Thompson...... 106 d. Edward J. Epstein...... 106 e. Paul Hoch...... 106 f. David S. Lifton...... 106 g. Sylvia Meagher...... 106 H. Name Searches ...... 107 1. John Abt ...... 107 2. Edward Becker ...... 107 3. Carlos Bringuier ...... 107 4. George Bush ...... 108 5. Ed Butler and Information Council of the Americas ...... 108 6. Claude Barnes Capehart ...... 108 7. Lawrence Cusack ...... 109 8. Adele Edisen, Winston de Monsabert, Jose Rivera ...... 109 9. Billie Sol Estes ...... 109 10. Judith Campbell Exner ...... 109 11. H.L. Hunt and Family and Clint Murchison and Family ...... 110

xv 12. Joseph P. Kennedy ...... 110 13. Oswald LeWinter ...... 110 14. Marita Lorenz ...... 110 15. John Thomas Masen ...... 111 16. John Anthony McVickar ...... 111 17. Elizabeth Catlett Mora ...... 111 18. Gordon Duane Novel ...... 111 19. Orest Pena ...... 111 20. Carlos Quiroga ...... 111 21. Charles Small ...... 112 22. Clarence Daniel Smelley ...... 112 23. Richard Snyder ...... 112 24. Marty Underwood ...... 112 25. General Edwin Walker/Minutemen ...... 112 I. Miscellaneous ...... 113 1. CIA ...... 113 a. The U-2 connection and the fake manuals...... 113 b. The “Family Jewels.” ...... 113 2. FBI ...... 114 a. “Research Matters” file on John F. Kennedy...... 114 b. Liaison with other federal agencies...... 114 i. Secret Service/Protection of the President. ii. CIA. iii. NSA. iv. Customs. v. ATF. 3. Secret Service ...... 115 a. Protective survey reports...... 115 b. Shift reports...... 115 c. Eileen Dinneen memoranda...... 115 4. Department of State ...... 115 5. Army ...... 115 a. U.S. Army’s Investigative Records Repository ...... 115 b. Army Security Agency records and files ...... 116 c. Army Inspector General 1973 report on domestic surveillance abuses in the U.S. 116 6. White House Communications Agency ...... 116 7. Presidential Library Materials ...... 116 a. William Manchester interviews...... 117 b. Jacqueline B. Kennedy tapes at the LBJ Library...... 118 J. Conclusion ...... 118

Chapter 6, Part II: Clarifing the Federal Record on the Zapruder Film and the Medical and Ballistics Evidence ...... 121

A. Introduction ...... 121 B. Medical Evidence ...... 121 1. Medical issues ...... 121 C. Zapruder Film ...... 124 1. Ownership of the Zapruder film ...... 124 2. Staff examination of films designated as “in-camera” original, and first-generation copies, by NARA ...... 125 3. Eastman Kodak’s Pro Bono Work for the Review Board Related to the Zapruder Film (and Autopsy Photographs) ...... 125 4. The Review Board Staff’s Study and Clarification of Paul Hoch’s FOIA Lead “CIA Document 450” ...... 126 D. Ballistics ...... 127

xvi Chapter 7: Pursuit of Records and Information from Non-Federal Sources ...... 131

A. Pursuit of Records and Papers from Private Citizens and Organizations ...... 131 1. Gary Aguilar: Interviews with Drs. Humes and Boswell ...... 131 2. Richard Barnes: AP Wire Copy ...... 131 3. Dr. George Burkley ...... 131 4. Ed w a r d Scannell Butler: Materials from the Information Council of the Am e r i c a s . 132 5. Mrs. Marion Ebersole: Records of Dr. John J. Ebersole ...... 132 6. President Gerald Ford: Desk Diaries ...... 132 7. Justice Abe Fortas ...... 132 8. Captain J.W. “Will” Fritz ...... 132 9. Jim Garrison ...... 132 10. James P. Hosty, Jr...... 132 11. Wesley Liebeler ...... 132 12. David Lifton: Medical Evidence ...... 133 13. Holland McCombs ...... 133 14. Richard Case Nagell ...... 133 15. New Orleans Metropolitan Crime Commission ...... 134 16. Gerald Posner ...... 134 17. Frank Ragano ...... 134 18. J. Lee Rankin: Warren Commission Papers ...... 134 19. Clay Shaw: Personal Papers and Diary ...... 135 20. Walter Sheridan ...... 135 21. Sixth Floor Museum Records ...... 135 22. Martin Underwood ...... 135 23. Edward Wegmann ...... 136 24. Thomas W. Wilson ...... 136 B. Pursuit of Audio-Visual Material from Private Citizens and Organizations ...... 137 1. Tom Alyea: Film from Inside the Texas School Book Depository ...... 137 2. Charles Bronson: Film of Dealey Plaza ...... 137 3. CBS Outtakes ...... 137 4. Robert Groden ...... 137 5. Lt. Everett Kay: Audio Surveillance Tape ...... 137 6. Vincent Palamara: Interviews with Secret Service Personnel ...... 138 7. David Powers: Film of Motorcade ...... 132 8. David Taplin: November 24, 1963, Coverage of Dallas Police Department . . . . . 132 9. Stephen Tyler ...... 132 10. Janet Veazey: KTVT Outtakes ...... 132 11. Moses Weitzman ...... 138 12. Robert White: Evelyn Lincoln Materials ...... 139 C. Pursuit of State and Local Government Records ...... 139 1. New Orleans District Attorney Files ...... 139 2. Dallas City and County Records ...... 140 D. Pursuit of Records from Foreign Governments ...... 140 1. Russia ...... 141 2. Belarus ...... 141 3. Cuba ...... 141 4. Mexico ...... 142 5. Other Governments ...... 142 E. Conclusion ...... 142

xvii Chapter 8: Compliance with JFK Act by Government Offices ...... 145

A. Introduction ...... 145 B. Federal Agency Compliance with the JFK Act ...... 145 1. Central Intelligence Agency ...... 145 2. Federal Bureau of Investigation ...... 147 3. Secret Service ...... 149 4. National Security Agency ...... 149 5. Department of State ...... 150 6. Department of Justice ...... 151 a. Office of Information & Privacy. b. Criminal Division. c. Civil Division. d. Civil Rights Division. e. Office of Legal Counsel. 7. Department of the Treasury ...... 153 a. Main Treasury. b. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms. c. Customs Service. d. Internal Revenue Service. 8. National Security Council ...... 155 9. The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board ...... 155 10. Immigration & Naturalization Service ...... 155 11. Office of the Secretary of Defense ...... 156 12. Defense Intelligence Agency ...... 156 13. Department of the Army ...... 156 a. Investigative Records Repository. 14. Department of the Navy ...... 157 a. Office of Naval Intelligence. b. National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda. 15. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology ...... 158 16. Department of the Air Force ...... 158 17. Joint Staff ...... 159 18. White House Communications Agency ...... 159 19. U.S. Postal Service ...... 159 20. Social Security Administration ...... 159 21. Drug Enforcement Administration ...... 160 22. NARA, including Presidential Libraries ...... 160 a. NARA, Washington, D.C. b. NARA, Southwest Region, Fort Worth, Texas. c. Gerald R. Ford Library. d. John F. Kennedy Library. e. Lyndon B. Johnson Library. 23. General Services Administration ...... 163 C. Congressional Records ...... 163 1. House Select Committee on Assassinations ...... 163 2. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the Church Committee) ...... 164 3. House Select Committee on Intelligence (the Pike Committee) ...... 164 4. House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil & Constitutional Rights (the Edwards Committee) ...... 1655 5. House Government Operations Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights (the Abzug Committee) ...... 165 6. House Committee on Un-American Activities ...... 165 7. Library of Congress ...... 165 8. Other Congressional Records ...... 166 D. Conclusion ...... 166

xviii Review Board Recommendations ...... 169

Appendices

Appendix A: The Members of the Assassination Records Review Board ...... 177

Appendix B: The Staff of the Assassination Records Review Board ...... 179

Appendix C: President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 . . . . . 183

Appendix D: Assassination Records Review Board Guidance for Interpretation and Implementation of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 ...... 197

Appendix E: Meetings of the Review Board ...... 201

Appendix F: Summary of Review Board Votes on Records ...... 203

Acknowledgements ...... 205

xix AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S RE V I E W BO A R D FI N A L RE P O RT PR E FA C E

This Final Report of the A s s a s s i n a t i o n Chapter three explains how the Review Records Review Board details the Board’s B o a rd interacted with a very intere s t e d extensive work in fulfilling its statutory man- American public. Chapter three outlines the date. The JFK Act, however, necessitates that ways in which Review Board members and the Review Board’s report be different from staff worked with members of the public to reports of other assassination-related com- develop policy and seek records. missions and committees. Previous assassination-related commissions and committees Chapters four through eight of the Report were established for the purpose of issuing describe the heart of the Review Board’s final reports that would draw conclusions work—the identification and release of assas- about the assassination. Congress did not, sination records. Chapter four explains how however, direct the Review Board to draw the Review Board developed a re v i e w conclusions about the assassination, but to process that would ensure consistent review release assassination records so that the pub- of an enormous volume of records. Chapter lic could draw its own conclusions. Thus, this five describes in detail the standards that the Final Report does not offer conclusions about Review Board established for the release or, what the assassination records released did in some cases, protection of federal records. or did not prove. Rather, it identifies records Chapter six lists the numerous requests for that the Board released and describes the additional information and records that the processes and standards that the Board used Review Board made to federal agencies to to release them. The Board believes that its ensure that it did not leave important stones most substantial contribution has been to unturned. Throughout its brief history, enhance, broaden, and deepen the historical countless individuals and groups made re c o rd relating to the assassination. The requests of the Board for specific informa- American public ultimately will be the bene- tion. The Board had to respond to these by ficiaries of the JFK Act and the Review asking whether meeting these re q u e s t s Board’s work in ensuring access to the exten- would yield additional documents. Chapter sive reach of the JFK Collection. seven describes the Board’s quest for additional information and records, albeit from The first two chapters of the Report describe non-federal sources, and thus expands upon the Review Board and its establishment. chapter six. Chapter seven also describes the Chapter one describes the context in which types of assassination re c o rds that the Congress passed the JFK Act and briefly Review Board sought from state and local introduces some of the records that Congress governments as well as foreign governments. directed the Review Board to examine and Chapter eight provides details about the release if appropriate. Chapter two describes cooperation, or lack thereof, that the Review how the JFK Act both enabled and delayed B o a rd received from each federal agency the Review Board’s start-up. Chapter two with which it dealt, outlining in detail the also explains the Review Board’s first chal- Review Board’s “compliance program.” lenge—defining the statutory term “assassination record”—so that its search for records The last part of this report consists of the would be broad enough to ensure public con- Review Board members’ conclusions and fidence in the Board’s work but narro w their recommendations to the President, to enough not to consume Board time and Congress, and to existing and future federal resources on unrelated documents. agencies. The Board recognizes that for

xxi decades to come the federal government will magnified in the context of an assassination continue to face the challenge of finding the of a President in which there is great public most efficient way to declassify its records, interest, these problems are indeed present an activity the Board believes is essential to t h roughout the federal government. The maintaining our freedom. Although the remedies for excessive secrecy can be univer- problems caused by government secrecy are sally applied with positive results.

xxii EX E C U T I V E SU M M A RY

The Assassination Records Review Board Second, the Board consisted of five citizens, was a unique solution to a unique problem. trained in history, a rchives, and the law, who Although the tragic assassination of Presi- w e re not government employees but who dent John F. Kennedy was the subject of had the ability to order agencies to declas- lengthy official investigations, beginning sify government documents—the first time with the Warren Commission in 1964, and in history that an outside group has had continuing through the House Select Com- such power. Third, once the Board made the mittee on Assassinations, in 1978-79, the decision that a document should be declassi- American public has continued to seek fied, only the President could overrule its answers to nagging questions raised by this decision. Fortunately, Congress also gave inexplicable act. These questions were com- the Board a staff whose work was critical to pounded by the government penchant for its success. secrecy. Fears sparked by the Cold War dis- couraged the release of documents, particu- The JFK Act required all government agen- larly those of the intelligence and security cies to search for the records in their posses- agencies. Even the records created by the sion concerning the assassination and place investigative commissions and committees them in the National Archives. The Act pro- were withheld from public view and sealed. vided for the appointment of the members of As a result, the official record on the assassi- the Review Board within ninety days, but the nation of President Kennedy re m a i n e d transition between the Bush and Clinton shrouded in secrecy and mystery. administrations caused an 18-month delay between passage of the Act and the swear- The suspicions created by government ing-in of the Board members. Only then secrecy eroded confidence in the truthfulness could the Board hire staff and arrange for of federal agencies in general and damaged office space. This delay had two ramifica- their credibility. Finally, frustrated by the lack tions. First, the Act stated that the work of the of access and disturbed by the conclusions of Board was to be completed in three years, an Oliver Stone’s JFK, Congress passed the Pres - unrealistic goal since more than 18 months ident John F. Kennedy Assassination Records had already elapsed. (The Board’s work was Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act), mandating eventually extended to four years.) Second, the gathering and opening of all records con- agencies were sending documents to the cerned with the death of the President. National Archives before the Board established its guidelines for their release. Conse- The major purpose of the Review Board was quently and unfortunately, once the Review to re-examine for release the records that the Board did provide guidance to the agencies, agencies still regarded as too sensitive to much of their initial work had to be revised, open to the public. In addition, Congress further slowing the processing and re - established the Review Board to help restore reviewing by the Board and its staff. government credibility. To achieve these lofty goals, Congress designed an entity that was The Board’s first task was to define the term unprecedented. “assassination record” in order to frame the search for relevant records. The statutory def- T h ree provisions of the Act were at the heart inition, a record “related to the assassination of the design. First, Congress established the of President John F. Kennedy,” specifically Review Board as an independent agency. included any record from the investigating

xxiii agencies, and records in the possession of the withheld information so that the A m e r i c a n federal government, and any local or state public would be confident that assassina- government that assisted in the inquiry into tion re c o rds were open to the fullest extent the assassination. But, as noted in the Senate possible. report, “it is intended and emphasized that the search and disclosure of records under The JFK Act established a stringent standard this Act must go beyond those records.” Con- for postponing the opening of a record. Its gress empowered the Board to determine minimal list of required postponements and whether a document was an assassination emphasis on the bias toward disclosure sepa- re c o rd and to cast a broad net for such rated it from either the Freedom of Informa- records. Board members engaged in exten- tion Act (FOIA) or the Executive Order that sive discussion and sought advice from the provides for disclosure of national security public before finally issuing its broad defini- information. The Board proceeded cautiously tion. The definition enabled the Board to look as it examined its first documents under the beyond the narrower confines of the assassi- provisions of postponement in Section 6 of nation to find and release valuable docu- the JFK Act. In particular, the Board balanced ments from the early 1960s that enhance the evidence for postponement against the pub- historical understanding of that era, and the lic interest in release, bearing in mind the political and diplomatic context in which the Act’s “presumption of immediate disclo- assassination occurred. sure.” Before agreeing to postponement, the Board applied the stringent requirements for The Review Board overcame its early chal- the “clear and convincing evidence” required lenges and, with the help of its able staff, by the Act. Decisions had to be made on developed guidelines for the release of docu- names, dates, places, crypts, pseudonyms, ments. These served as the yardstick for both file numbers, sources of information and the its staff and the federal agencies. method by which it was obtained. Ulti- mately, the Board created a set of principles, The Board’s most important task was to a kind of “common law,” that could be review the information the agencies wished applied to many of the documents. Although to postpone rather than release and then to the agencies often objected to the Board’s vote either to sustain the postponement or decisions, they accepted both the statute and release the information. Since the Board was the Board’s interpretation of it and, for the working in uncharted territory, it developed most part, cooperated. c reative methods. Three review stages evolved over the four years of the Board’s The JFK Act specifically instructed the Review existence. At first, the Board scrutinized each Bo a r d to go beyond the scope of prev i o u s document with infinite care, and by choosing inquiries. Since both the Board and its staff to meet often, made decisions on a docu- had high level security clearances, no agency ment-by-document basis working to under- could prevent a search through every file. stand both the body of information at issue After locating files designated by the agencies, and the balance required by the JFK Act. It the Review Board staff members pursued new eschewed the more generic issue approach so u r ces of assassination rec o r ds. Most of the which was preferred by the agencies. Review Board’s additional requests for rec o r ds went to the CIA and FBI, but there During the second stage, the Board dele- we r e also requests to the Secret Service, the gated some routine decisionmaking to its Departments of State snd Defense, the B o a rd staff, which proceeded with such care National Security Ag e n c y , and The Pres i d e n t ’ s that even the slightest question about a doc- Fo r eign Intelligence Advisory Board. ument brought it to the Board’s attention. F i n a l l y, agencies recognized the voting pat- Given the massive volume of federal records, tern of the Board and for purposes of eff i- the search for additional records was time ciency began bypassing the review pro c e s s consuming and often frustrating. For every on their own initiative and releasing re c o rd s assassination record located and included in under the Board’s guidelines. The Board ’ s the collection, the staff literally re v i e w e d review process ultimately ensured that the h u n d reds of documents. The documents Review Board scrutinized each piece of located through this search for additional

xxiv records are among the most important in the cooperated with assassination re s e a rc h e r s collection—many were never reviewed by and the Coalition on Political Assassinations. the prior investigations. Over 100 press releases were issued, and Board members made themselves available The Review Board, in its effort to make the for many media interviews. JFK Collection valuable to historians, encouraged private citizens and organizations that Twice, the Review Board called together a possessed records of their own to donate g roup of invited guests who are “experts” in them to the JFK Collection. The collection their fields. The first conference was held in was significantly enriched by these dona- May 1995. It provided the Review Board and tions. They included, for example, the desk the staff with the opportunity to discuss diaries of former President and Warren Com- prior investigative efforts that were mission member Gerald Ford, the personal thwarted due to lack of access to re c o rd s . files of Jim Garrison, the New Orleans prose- The participants provided the Board staff cuting attorney, notes taken during inter- with recommendations for further searc h e s . views with Lee Harvey Oswald by both a The second conference, held in April 1998, Dallas Police Captain and a former FBI agent, focused narrowly on the issue of document and films from individuals in Dallas and declassification. This informative meeting P resident Kennedy’s aide, Dave Powers. helped Board members to formulate re c o m- They also include a donation of papers from mendations for this final re p o r t . the son of J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel of the Warren Commission, and the diary of From time to time the frequent and sustained Clay Shaw, the only person tried for the mur- contact with the public diverted the staff der of John F. Kennedy (and subsequently from its primary responsibilities—identify- acquitted). The Review Board added to the ing and releasing records. However, the ben- collection, too, information from state and efits far outweighed the costs. The Review local offices and officials who were tied to the Board received valuable leads from the pub- Oswald investigation. lic about the existence of other assassination records and, more important, received dona- The JFK Act also encouraged the Review tions that enhanced the collection at the Board to work with the Department of State National Archives. to include documents from foreign governments. The Board sought records from Rus- Finally, the Review Board staff implemented sia, Belarus, Cuba and Mexico. For the most a program to ensure, to the fullest extent pos- part, these attempts proved frustrating and sible, that each agency complied with the JFK fruitless owing to political and diplomatic Act. A signed declaration was required from constraints. Although many leads were pur- each agency, under penalty of perjury. This sued, only a few new records were obtained. compliance statement described the record Although this is a genuine loss to the histori- searches that the agency completed, records cal completeness of the assassination records, that it located, and other actions it took to work continues on these attempts and the comply with the law. B o a rd is hopeful that eventually these records, particularly the voluminous KGB Before agencies submitted their Final Decla- surveillance re c o rds on Oswald, will be rations of Compliance, the staff worked with added to the JFK Collection. them to resolve outstanding problems. In the compliance statement, each agency In the spirit of openness embodied in the JFK addressed the scope and adequacy of its Act, the Review Board devoted a significant search, the adequacy of its response to the amount of time and resources listening to requests for additional information, and the and corresponding with its various con- timeliness with which it processed its records stituencies. It held a total of seven public for release. The Board and staff also decided hearings, one each in Dallas, Boston, New to depose officials of agencies with poor Orleans, and Los Angeles and three in Wash- records systems and those that failed to com- ington, DC. In addition, Board members par- ply with the spirit of the Act. ticipated in meetings of historical associations, spoke to countless public groups, and The legacy of the JFK Review Board lies in

xxv the more than four million pages of records agencies to the assassination. They also now in the National Archives and available include documents that enhance the histori- to the public with remarkably few redac- cal understanding of that traumatic event in tions. These records include critical docu- recent American history by placing it in the mentation on the events in Dallas, Lee Har- broader context of political and diplomatic vey Oswald, and the reactions of government events.

Major Accomplishments of the Assassination Records Review Board

• Reviewed and voted on over 27,000 previously redacted assassination records;

• Obtained agencies’ consent to release an additional 33,000+ assassination records;

• E n s u red that the famous “Zapruder Film” of the assassination belonged to the A m e r i c a n people and arranged for the first known authenticity study of the Zapruder Film;

• Opened previously redacted CIA records from the Directorate of Operations;

• Released 99% of the “Hardway/Lopez Report” documenting the CIA’s records on Lee Har- vey Oswald’s trip to Mexico City before the assassination;

• Conducted a three-day audiotaped interview of former FBI Special Agent James P. Hosty, one of two agents who were responsible for the FBI’s cases on Lee and Marina Oswald prior to the assassination;

• Acquired for public release two sets of original notes from Lee Harvey Oswald’s interrogation in the Dallas Police Department taken by FBI Agent James Hosty and Dallas Homicide Division Captain “Will” Fritz (prior to the Board’s existence, it was thought that no original notes existed);

• Clarified the controversial medical record of President Kennedy’s autopsy and his treatment at Parkland Hospital by deposing 10 Bethesda autopsy participants, five Parkland Hospital treating physicians, and conducting numerous unsworn interviews of Parkland and Bethesda personnel;

• Secured records relating to District Attorney Jim Garrison’s prosecution of Clay Shaw for conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy, including Shaw’s diaries, records from Shaw’s defense attorneys, investigative records from the District Attorney’s office, and grand jury records;

• Obtained the full release of FBI documents that describe the FBI’s attempts to track Oswald’s activities in Europe prior to the assassination;

• Made available to the public all FBI and CIA documents from previous official investigations;

• Acquired for the American people film footage depicting events surrounding the assassination, portions of which had never been seen before, including the Dallas television station KTVT outtakes of President and Mrs. Kennedy in Dallas and the aftermath of the assassination;

• S p o n s o red ballistics and forensic testing of Wa r ren Commission Exhibit 567, the bullet “nose fragment” from the front seat of the Presidential limousine, (the HSCA F i rearms Panel first recommended the testing in 1978, but the testing was not conducted until the Review B o a rd existed);

xxvi • Permanently preserved all the autopsy photographs of President Kennedy in digitized form, and conducted sophisticated digital enhancement of selected, representative images;

• Reviewed IRS and Social Security tax, employment, and earnings records on Lee Harvey Oswald, the authenticity of which has been questioned by researchers who have not been allowed access to such material. Required IRS to prepare a releasable report without releasing tax return information, the disclosure of which is prohibited by Federal law.

Review Board Recommendations Recommendation 5: The Review Board recommends that the With the passage of the JFK Act and the cre- cumbersome, time-consuming, and expen- ation of the independent Review Board, Con- sive problem of referrals for “third party gr ess took a large step toward rebuilding pub- equities” (classified information of one lic confidence in the federal government, agency appearing in a document of another) confidence lost through years of excessive be streamlined by (a) requiring representa- se c re c y . The Review Board urges the Congres s , tives of all agencies with interests in selected government agencies, and the public to con- groups of records meet for joint declassifica- tinue the effort to open documents under the tion sessions, or (b) uniform substitute lan- pr ovisions of the JFK Act and to build on the guage be devised to deal with certain cate- foundation created by the Board. To that end, gories of recurring sensitive equities. the Review Board makes the following rec o m - me n d a t i o n s : Recommendation 6: The Review Board recommends that a com- Recommendation 1: pliance program be used in future declassifi- The Review Board recommends that future cation efforts as an effective means of elicit- declassification boards be genuinely indepen- ing full cooperation in the search for records. dent, both in the struc t u r e of the orga n i z a t i o n and in the qualifications of the appointments. Recommendation 7: The Review Board recommends the following to ensure that NARA can exercise the prov i - Recommendation 2: sions of the JFK Act after the Review Board ter- The Review Board recommends that any seri- minates: (a) that NARA has the authority and ous, sustained effort to declassify records means to continue to implement Board deci- requires congressional legislation with (a) a sions, (b) that an appeals proc e d u r e be devel- presumption of openness, (b) clear standards oped that places the burden for prev e n t i n g of access, (c) an enforceable review and access on the agencies, and (c) that a joint appeals process, and (d) a budget appropri- oversight group composed of rep re s e n t a t i v e s ate to the scope of the task. of the four organizations that originally nominated individuals to serve on the Review Board Recommendation 3: be created to facilitate the continuing execution The Review Board recommends that its of the access provisions of the JFK Ac t . “common law” of decision, formed in the context of a “presumption of disclosure” and Recommendation 8: the “clear and convincing evidence of harm” The Review Board recommends that the criteria, be utilized for similar information in Review Board model could be adopted and future declassification efforts as a way to applied whenever there are extraordinary simplify and speed up releases. circumstances in which continuing controversy concerning government actions has Recommendation 4: been most acute and where an aggressive The Review Board recommends that future effort to release all “reasonably related” fed- declassification efforts avoid the major short- eral records would serve usefully to enhance comings of the JFK Act: (a) unreasonable time historical understanding of the event. limits, (b) employee restrictions, (c) application of the law after the Board terminates, and (d) Recommendation 9: pr oblems inherent with rapid sunset prov i s i o n s . The Review Board recommends that both the

xxvii Freedom of Information Act and Executive Order 12958 be strengthened, the former to narrow the categories of information automatically excluded from disclosure, the latter to add “independent oversight” to the process of “review” when heads of agencies decide that records in their units should be excluded from release.

Recommendation 10: The Review Board recommends the adoption of a federal classification policy that substantially (a) li m i t s the number of those in government who can actually classify federal documents, (b) res t r i c t s the number of categories by which documents might be classified, (c) red u c e s the time period for which the document(s) might be classified, (d) en c o u r a g e s the use of substitute language to immediately open material which might otherwise be classified, and (e) in c r ea s e s the res o u r ces available to the agencies and NA R A for declassifying federal rec o rd s .

xxviii CH A P T E R 1 TH E PR O B L E M O F SE C R E C Y A N D T H E SO L U T I O N O F T H E J F K AC T

A. THE PROBLEM OF SECRECY cancer three months later before his new trial began.) Ruby maintained that he was not Uncage the documents. involved in the assassination of the President Let them see light. 1 and that he had not known Oswald prior to hearing his name in connection with the The Pr esident John F. Kennedy Assassination assassination. Ruby claimed that his fury Records Collection Act of 1992 was a unique over the assassination led him to kill Oswald. solution to the problem of secrec y . The prob - lem was that 30 years of government secrec y Aside from the assassination investigations relating to the assassination of President John that the Dallas police, the FBI, and the Secret F. Kennedy led the American public to believe Service conducted, President Lyndon B. John- that the government had something to hide. son immediately established the Pres i d e n t ’ s The solution was legislation that req u i r ed the Commission to Investigate the As s a s s i n a t i o n government to disclose whatever information of President Kennedy. Chief Justice of the U.S. it had concerning the assassination. S u p reme Court Earl Wa r ren headed the e fforts of the Wa r ren Commission. Te n The American public is well aware of the months later, the War r en Commission Report facts of this particular case: at approximately concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald acted 12:30 p.m. on November 22, 1963, as Presi- alone and shot the President from a sniper’s dent Kennedy traveled in a motorc a d e nest on the sixth floor of his workplace, the through Dealey Plaza in downtown Dallas, Texas School Book Depository. For a variety Texas, he was shot and suffered a massive of reasons, not the least of which was that the head wound. Doctors at Parkland Memorial War r en Commission conducted some of its Hospital in Dallas pronounced the President investigations in secret and sealed many of its dead shortly thereafter—at 1:00 p.m. rec o r ds, the American public never trus t e d the Commission’s conclusion. Subsequently, Later that day, Dallas police officers arrested other federal entities conducted partial or Lee Harvey Oswald as a suspect in the Presi- complete reinvestigations of the assassina- dent’s murder. Oswald was also a suspect in tion. The most significant of these rei n v e s t i - the murder of a Dallas patrolman that had gations was the House Select Committee on occurred that afternoon. By 1:30 p.m. on Assassinations (HSCA), which concluded in November 23, the Dallas police had charged 1979 that President Kennedy’s death was the Oswald with assassinating the Pre s i d e n t . result of a probable conspiracy. Less than 24 hours later, Lee Harvey Oswald was shot and killed by Jack Ruby during the In 1991, Oliver Stone’s JFK popularized a ver- Dallas Police Department’s transfer of sion of President Kennedy’s assassination Oswald from the city jail to the county jail. that featured U.S. government agents from Television cameras captured the scene of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Ruby shooting Oswald. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the military as conspirators. While the movie Dallas police officers arrested Jack Ruby. He was largely fictional, the information that was tried and convicted of Oswald’s murder Stone conveyed in the movie’s closing trailer in March 1964. (In October 1966, the Texas was true: the HSCA had reinvestigated the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the ver- murder and issued a provocative report, but dict and ordered a new trial. Ruby died of their records were sealed until the year 2029.

1 Stone suggested at the end of JFK that Amer- ual—Lee Harvey Oswald—as the lone assas- icans could not trust official public conclu- sin of President Kennedy. sions when those conclusions had been made in secret. Congress passed legislation—the The Wa r ren Commission did not, however, JFK Act—that released the secret records that reach its conclusion before conducting an prior investigations gathered and created. extensive investigation.3 During its tenure , the Wa r ren Commission deposed or inter- Nu m e r ous rec o r ds of previous investigative viewed 552 witnesses and generated or bodies such as the War r en Commission, the g a t h e red approximately 360 cubic feet of C h u rch Committee, and the HSCA w e re re c o rds, including some artifacts and se c r et. Yet members of these commissions exhibits. The Wa r ren Commission’s Sep- reached conclusions based on these investiga- tember 1964, 888-page report came with 26 tive rec o r ds. The American public lost faith volumes—over 16,000 pages—of testimony when it could not see the very documents and exhibits. whose contents led to these conclusions. President Johnson recognized the high public B. PRIOR INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS interest in the Warren Commission’s unpub- T h e re exists widespread suspicion lished records and initiated a plan for release about the government’s disposition of the material. The Johnson plan resulted in of the Kennedy assassination records the release of 98% of the Warren Commis- stemming from the beliefs that Fed- sion’s records by 1992. Thus, at the time that eral officials (1) have not made avail- C o n g ress passed the JFK Act, only 3,000 able all Government assassination pages of Wa r ren Commission material records (even to the Warren Commis- remained for the agencies and the Review sion, Church Committee, House Board to release. Assassination Committee) and (2) have heavily redacted the re c o rd s All Wa r ren Commission re c o rds, except released under FOIAin order to cover those records that contain tax return informa- up sinister conspiracies.2 tion, are available to the public with only minor redactions. The American public has expressed its dissatisfaction with both the work and the conclu- 2. The President’s Commission on sions of the official investigations of the assas- Central Intelligence Agency Activities sination and it was this dissatisfaction that Within the United States was primarily responsible for Congress’ ini- (Rockefeller Commission) tiative to establish the Assassination Records Review Board (Review Board). Section 3(2) of The 1975 Rockefeller Commission investi- the JFK Act defines the rec o r ds of each of gated the CIA’s illegal domestic activities.4 In these official investigative entities as assassi- the course of its work, the Commission nation rec o r ds. As such, the Review Board touched on several assassination-related top- worked to review and release al l rec o r ds that ics, including the identity of the “thre e these investigative entities used in rea c h i n g their conclusions about the assassination. tramps,” the possibility of CIA involvement in the assassination, and ballistics issues.5 At the same time, a brief description of each The Commission concluded that the CIAwas entity and the records it generated is useful not involved in the assassination, and that for understanding the enormity of the the President had not been hit by a shot fired Review Board’s task. from in front of the Presidential limousine.

1. President’s Commission to Investigate As of 1992, the Commission’s assassination- the Assassination of President John F. related files consisted of approximately 2,500 Kennedy (Warren Commission) to 4,000 pages, 95% of which were still secret and in the custody of the Gerald Ford Presi- The Warren Commission was the only inves- dential Library when Congress passed the tigative body to identify a specific individ- JFK Act.6

2 3. The Senate Select Committee to Study the JFK Act, the number of Pike Committee Governmental Operations with Respect re c o rds that contained information that to Intelligence Activities might be related to President Kennedy’s (Church Committee) assassination was unknown.

In 1975 and 1976, the Senate investigated ille- 5. The Select Committee on gal domestic activities of government intelli- Assassinations of the House of gence agencies.7 The Church Committee’s Representatives (HSCA) investigation uncovered allegations such as CIA assassination plots against Cuban Pre- In 1976, the House of Representatives estab- mier Fidel Castro in the 1960–1963 period. lished its Select Committee on Assassina- The CIA did not communicate the existence tions. The HSCA reinvestigated Pre s i d e n t of the plots to the Warren Commission, even Kennedy’s assassination and the assassina- though former CIA Director Allen Dulles (a tion of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The HSCA Warren Commission member) was aware of concluded that President Kennedy was prob- them. ably murdered as a result of a conspiracy and suggested that organized crime may have The Church Committee’s initial findings led played a role in the conspiracy. At the same Committee member Senator Richard time, the HSCA concurred with the Warren Schweiker to call for a reinvestigation of the Commission’s findings that Lee Harvey assassination. Through Senator Schweiker’s Oswald fired the two bullets that hit the Pres- efforts, the Church Committee formed a sub- ident, and that one of those bullets struck committee to evaluate the intelligence agen- both President Kennedy and Governor John cies’ handling of the JFK assassination inves- Connally of Texas (the so-called “single-bul- tigation. The subcommittee interviewed or let theory”). deposed over 50 witnesses, acquired over 5,000 pages of evidence from intelligence During its tenure, the HSCA took testimony agencies, and reviewed thousands of addi- from 335 witnesses and held 38 days of pub- tional pages.8 lic hearings. The HSCA generated approximately 414,000 pages of records relating to As of 1992, the Senate Select Committee on the assassination.11 In 1992, the HSCA’ s Intelligence possessed approximately 5,000 unpublished records resided with the House pages of assassination-related material from Administration Committee (now the House the Church Committee’s investigations.9 Oversight Committee). Although the Church Committee published some material in its reports, the bulk of the Because the HSCA investigated so many dif- Committee’s records remained closed. ferent possibilities in its investigation into possible conspiracies, its records, and federal 4. The Select Committee on Intelligence agency records that the HSCA used, have of the House of Representatives been among the most important records that (Pike Committee) the Review Board processed.

In 1975, the House of Representatives also 6. Additional Congressional established a committee to investigate illegal Investigations domestic activities of government intelligence agencies. The Pike Committee devoted In addition to investigations of the above-ref - less time to issues related to Pre s i d e n t er enced special committees and commissions, Kennedy’s assassination than did the Church various congressional committees have Committee, but it completed some relevant examined aspects of the assassination story. work. However, due to the Pike Committee’s internal conflicts, as well as conflicts that it The House Un-American Activities Commit- had with the executive branch over access to tee, for instance, compiled a small number of records, the Committee never issued a report. pr e-assassination rec o r ds relating to Lee Har- The Committee did touch on some issues vey Oswald’s activities in New Orleans. At the related to the assassination of Pre s i d e n t time of the assassination, the Senate Internal Kennedy. At the time that Congress passed Security Subcommittee, had ongoing investi-

3 gations into the political situation in Cuba and, same point in time, the CIA had rel e a s e d when the President was killed, it conducted a ap p r oximately 11,000 pages of an estimated limited inquiry into the assassination. 250,000 to 300,000 pages of assassination rec o rd s . 13 Other agencies with smaller caches To the extent that these two committees proof assassination rec o r ds had released varying vided materials to the Warren Commission, pe r centages of their holdings by 1992. their records remained under the control of succeeding congressional committees and 8. Investigative Records in the Custody had not been released prior to consideration of Non-Federal Sources of the JFK Act. The JFK Act also provided the Review Board La t e r , in 1975, two House subcommittees held with authority to seek assassination records public hearings on issues relating to the trea t - from non-federal sources. Various local law ment of assassination rec o r ds. These were the e n f o rcement agencies assisted the War re n House Judiciary Committee’s Civil and Con- Commission and the FBI in their post-assas- stitutional Rights Subcommittee (Edward s sination investigation. Some local authorities Committee) that investigated the destruc t i o n also possessed relevant pre - a s s a s s i n a t i o n of the so-called “Hosty note” which Lee Har- records. New Orleans District Attorney Jim vey Oswald had left at the FBI Dallas field Garrison’s investigation and trial of Clay o ffice for Special Agent James Hosty on Shaw for complicity in the assassination is a November 6, 1963. After the assassination, prominent example of a non-federal inves- Hosty destroyed the note on the instruc t i o n s tigative effort that generated extensive assas- of his superior, Special Agent in Charge J. sination records. Other potential assassina- G o rdon Shanklin. Its existence re m a i n e d tion records, however generated, exist in the unknown outside the FBI for 12 years. The custody of private citizens and foreign gov- Government Information and Individual ernments. Subject to time and resource con- Rights Subcommittee of the Government straints, the Review Board also identified and Operations Committee (Abzug Committee) secured as much of this indeterminate group examined issues of access and openness rel a t - of records as possible. ing to War r en Commission rec o r ds. C. SKEPTICISM CONCERNING THE While the latter two hearings were pub- GOVERNMENT’S CONCLUSIONS lished, it was not known during consideration of the JFK Act whether additional and The circumstances of President Kennedy’s unpublished records remained in the com- assassination invited public skepticism from mittees’ files. the start. His death raised profound doubts in the minds of many Americans who could 7. Records Held by Executive not understand the apparently confused and Branch Agencies obscure motives of the alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald. The murder of Oswald by All of the major investigative efforts rec e i v e d Jack Ruby caused further skepticism as it assistance from the FBI and the CIA. Other suggested both a conspiracy and a cover-up. agencies, such as the Secret Service, the Department of State, and the Department of When President Johnson established the Justice, were also involved in official investi- Warren Commission in an apparent effort to gations. Federal agencies generated rec o rd s prevent parallel investigations, calm domes- for the investigative entities they worked tic fears, and defuse any potential interna- with, but they also retained a vast body of tional re p e rcussions of the assassination, rec o r ds. At the time of legislative considera- many Americans welcomed a simple expla- tion of the JFK Act, for instance, the FBI had nation of this event. Others, however, al r eady released some 220,000 pages of assas- observed incongruities in the Warren Com- si n a t i o n - r elated material under the Free d o m mission’s investigation. of Information Act (FOIA). Nonetheless, the Bu r eau estimated that approximately 260,000 War r en Commission member and future Pres - pages of additional assassination re c o rd s ident Gerald Ford declared early on that “the remained withheld or unproc e s s e d . 12 At the monumental rec o r d of the President’s Com-

4 mission will stand like a Gibraltar of factual believed that the unpublished evidence li t e r a t u r e through the ages to come.”14 Th re e would further undermine the report’s con- decades later, an American author likened the clusions. Once additional Warren Commis- Commission’s work to “a dead whale decom- sion records dribbled out to the public at the posing on a beach.”15 The juxtaposition of National Archives in the mid-1960s, critics these similes, as well as their temporal dis- such as Mark Lane and Edward Epstein tance from one another, tells a story about the began to publish books that questioned the changing perception of the War r en Commis- Commission’s conclusions. sion’s work over time. And while neither is fully accurate, they concur, at least, on the In 1967, New Orleans District Attorney Jim issue of size. The War r en Commission’s work Garrison’s indictment and trial of Clay Shaw pr oduct was massive. The size and scope of for conspiracy to murder the President pro- the published material provided critics with vided a credible platform and new momen- “a species of Talmudic text begging for com- tum for Wa r ren Commission critics. Flam- mentary and further elucidation.”16 boyant and articulate, Garrison was a media sensation. Although the American public Critics found ammunition with which to had differing opinions concerning Garrison, attack the Commission’s work. First, the his investigation altered the assassination Commission’s time and resource constraints debate. The investigation popularized a rad- forced it to rely mainly on the FBI to conduct ical critique of the official version of the the day-to-day investigation of the murder. assassination. In addition to generating Second, the Commission failed to examine assassination re c o rds, the Clay Shaw trial some of the most critical evidence in the case: was also the venue for an important assassi- the photographs and x-rays from President nation re c o rd milestone: the first public Kennedy’s autopsy. showing of Abraham Zapru d e r’s film footage of the assassination. Chairman Earl Warren felt that these materials were too gruesome to allow into the pub- When President Gerald Ford established the lic record. He thought that it “would make a Rockefeller Commission, he started a trend morbid thing for all time.” The Commission to examine U.S. government intelligence relied instead on artistic renderings of the actions during the 1960s and early 1970s. As photographs pre p a red by an illustrator part of its forensic review of the assassina- working from verbal descriptions provided tion, the Rockefeller Commission viewed the by the chief autopsy prosector. Some critics Z a p ruder film in February 1975. Shortly viewed the Commission’s failure to view the thereafter, the television program Goodnight photographs and x-rays as gross negligence. America showed the film. When the Ameri- can public saw the film, many concluded that Doubts about the medical evidence were President Kennedy’s fatal head wound had compounded for critics by the Commission’s been caused by a shot from the front. forensic conclusion that the President’s back and neck wounds, and Governor Connally’s At the same time, the Church Committee back, chest, wrist, and thigh wounds, were u n c o v e red U.S. government assassination all caused by the same bullet. Nothing the plots against foreign leaders, including Commission wrote or subsequently said Cuba’s Fidel Castro, during the 1960–1963 could convince critics that Commission period. Some of these plots involved orga- Exhibit 399, the so-called “magic bullet” nized crime figures. The Committee found (usually described as “pristine”), could have the intelligence agencies (primarily the CIA caused so many wounds while sustaining so and the FBI) deficient in their investigation of little damage itself. Critics argued that if the President Kennedy’s death, and critics called Commission was incorrect about the single- for a reinvestigation. bullet theory, then the Commission’s conclusion that Oswald acted alone could not stand. In September 1976, the HSCA began its work. By this time, skepticism concerning Critics found a number of inconsistencies the official explanation of the assassination when they measured the report against the had hardened in the minds of millions of 26 volumes of published evidence. Critics A m e r i c a n s .1 7 This skepticism was fueled by a

5 small cottage industry of authors, lecture r s , D. THE SOLUTION: THE JFK ACT and assassination re s e a rchers who noted that the government had not released ger- This resolution was introduced because mane re c o rds and had even lied to itself of the renewed public interest and con- about the case. cern over the records pertaining to the assassination of President John F. Initially critic-friendly, the Committee eventu- Kennedy.... There has been considerable ally sought to establish some distance between debate about these records, including its inquiry and that of War r en Commission accusations that these re c o rds, if critics. In the end, the Committee’s rep o r t released, would contain evidence of a reflected an interesting mix of conclusions government coverup or complicity of which only whetted res e a r chers’ appetites for government agencies in the assassina- the Committee’s re c o rds. Although the tion of President Kennedy.20 HS C A ’s report stated that it believed the Pres - ident’s death was the result of a conspiracy, it By 1992, the American public had expressed could not conclusively identify any conspira- its desire for legislative action. Even execu- tors other than Lee Harvey Oswald. tive branch agencies, who were more insu- lated than Congress from public outrage, The HSCA criticized the performance of the were anxious to put the issue of assassination Warren Commission and investigative agen- records behind them. The Senate report ulti- cies like the FBI and the CIA for their initial mately stated that “records related to the assassination investigations, but it concluded assassination of President John F. Kennedy that Lee Harvey Oswald had killed the Pres- a re the most publicly sought-after, unre- ident and that the single-bullet theory was leased records of our government.”21 sound. Despite these conclusions, however, the HSCA did validate some of the criticisms E. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF JFK ACT of the Warren Commission by concluding that there was a “high probability” that two When the second session of Congress opened gunmen fired at President Kennedy.18 in January 1992, members of Congress began to introduce bills and resolutions that would Under House rules, the HSCA’s unpublished mandate the release of assassination records were sealed for 50 years, until 2029. records.22 While none of these early proposals Because the HSCA investigation was marked enjoyed support from the Congre s s i o n a l by internal squabbling and disillusioned leadership, they did start a discussion in staffers, the Committee’s records were the Congress about secrecy and the assassination subject of ongoing contro v e r s y. Some ex- that resulted in passage of the JFK Act. Mean- staffers claimed the HSCA report did not while, influential voices joined the call to reflect their investigative work, and that open the government’s assassination records, information that did not conform with the perhaps most notably former President Ger- Committee leadership’s preconceived con- ald Ford, the last surviving member of the clusions was ignored or left out of the report Warren Commission.23 and supporting volumes. On March 26, 1992, Congressman Louis Four years after the HSCAissued its report, a Stokes introduced H.J. Res. 454 in the House former member of the Committee introduced of Representatives with 40 co-sponsors.24 On legislation to open the Committee’s records.19 the same day, Senator David Boren intro- The House Administration Committee held duced S.J. Res. 282 in the Senate with nine co- hearings, but the House never voted on the sponsors.25 Within weeks, both the House resolution and the HSCA records remained and Senate held hearings on the legislation.26 closed until Congress passed the JFK Act. In the hearings, members of Congress, representatives from government agencies, and When Congress did finally vote to open the public agreed on the need to open assas- HSCAand other assassination records, it had sination records. The CIAand the FBI, in par- less to do with the ameliorative effect of ticular, committed themselves to full cooper- time’s passage than it did with a popular if ation with Congress. Only the Department of controversial film, JFK. Justice, on behalf of the White House, raised

6 serious concerns about the legislation. These information about this tragic event. had to do, first, with constitutional issues relating to the appointment process and sta- The JFK Act established a neutral and inde- tus of the proposed Review Board and, sec- pendent body—the Review Board — t h a t ond, the proposed criteria for the continued could ensure maximum disclosure of federal withholding of certain types of information. government records on the Kennedy assassination and, in the process, restore the pub- The hearings established that existing mecha- lic’s confidence that their government was nisms for the release of assassination rec o rd s not keeping secret any relevant information. we r e not working and the only way to rel e a s e The JFK Act envisioned that government assassination rec o r ds was legislation. agencies and the Review Board could achieve c o m p rehensive and rapid disclosure of During the summer of 1992, committees in records, unimpeded by the usual obstacles to both the House and Senate reported favor- release. Congress crafted each of the JFK ably on the legislation.2 7 The full Senate passed the legislation on July 27, 1992. The Act’s statutory provisions to accomplish House of Representatives passed a some- these objectives. what different version on August 12, 1992. Differences between the House and Senate F. KEY PROVISIONS OF JFK ACT bills were unresolved as the end of the legislative session drew near, so the House of Congress stated that records relating to the Representatives passed the Senate version on assassination would “carry a presumption of September 30, 1992, the date of enactment of immediate disclosure.” Since most assassina- what was Public Law 102–526, The President tion records were more than 30 years old, John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collec - Congress stipulated that, “only in the rarest tion Act of 1992. of cases is there any legitimate need for continued protection.” President George W. Bush signed the bill into law on October 26, 1992, just days before the Accordingly, Congress declared that the gov- 1992 federal election, but left the appoint- ernment would establish a collection of ment of the Review Board to his successor, re c o rds on the assassination of Pre s i d e n t President William J. Clinton. President Clin- Kennedy at the National A rchives and ton nominated the five members of the Records Administration (NARA). The JFK Review Board in the latter half of 1993 and, Collection’s purpose would be to make after Senate review and confirmation, they records available to the public. were sworn in on April 11, 1994. The JFK Act included a specific sunset date (two years C o n g ress defined the term “assassination from the date of the statute’s enactment) with record” broadly to encompass all relevant an option for a one-year extension. This time- records. In the JFK Act’s legislative history, frame proved unrealistic, mainly due to the members of Congress specifically stated that long delay between the date of enactment they expected the Review Board to further and the actual appointment, confirmation, define the term “assassination record.” and swearing in of the Review Board. Con- gress therefore decided to reset the time clock in 1994, passing the President John F. Kennedy The JFK Act obligated all government offices Assassination Records Collection Extension Act to identify, review, process, and transfer to of 1994.28 In 1997, Congress extended the life NARA all assassination records within their of the Review Board one final time, until Sep- possession. The Act directed agencies not to tember 30, 1998, through enactment of Public destroy or alter assassination records in their Law 105–25.29 c u s t o d y. The Act prohibited government offices from withholding or redacting any The JFK Act is a unique statute. Its intent is to assassination records if those records had secure the public release of records relating to previously been disclosed to the public. And President Kennedy’s assassination and, in government offices could not withhold or doing so, assure the public that the federal redact any assassination records created out- government was not withholding material side the government.

7 To the extent that a government office had in an assassination record only if the agency “any uncertainty” as to whether its records could demonstrate—by providing “clear and were “assassination record[s] governed by” convincing evidence” to the Review Board— the JFK Act, the Act directed the government a compelling need for postponement. office to transmit the records to the Review Board, which would determine whether the Section 7 of the JFK Act was perhaps the records were, indeed, assassination records. Act’s cornerstone in that it created a truly independent board that would oversee the The Act empowered the Review Board to federal government’s implementation of the obtain physical custody of federal rec o rd s Act. The Act instructed the President to nom- “for purposes of conducting an independent inate five citizens “to serve as members of the and impartial review” or “for an administra- Review Board to ensure and facilitate the tive hearing or other Review Board function.” review, transmission to the Archivist, and In addition, this section req u i r ed government public disclosure of government re c o rd s o ffices to “make available to the Review related to the assassination of President John B o a rd any additional information and F. Kennedy.” The Act required members of rec o r ds” that the Review Board had reason to the Board to be “impartial private citizens” believe it req u i r ed for conducting a rev i e w . who were not presently employed by the federal government and had not “had any pre- Once government offices identified assassi- vious involvement with any official investi- nation re c o rds, the Act re q u i red them to gation or inquiry conducted by a federal, transmit the records to the Archivist, and state, or local government, relating to the make the records immediately available to assassination of President John F. Kennedy.” the public to the extent possible. If government offices believed that release of certain The Act further instructed the President to assassination records should be postponed, nominate “distinguished persons of high in full or in part, the Act instructed the offices national reputation in their respective fields to transmit the original record to NARAto be who are capable of exercising...independent included in a “protected collection,” which and objective judgment.” The Act envisioned would not be publicly available. a board consisting of at least one professional historian and one attorney, and it stated that H o w e v e r, the JFK Act mandated that all the President should consider recommenda- postponed assassination re c o rds be opened tions from the following professional associ- to the public no later than the year 2017 (25 ations: the American Historical Association, years from the date of enactment of the JFK the Organization of American Historians, the Act). Government offices could continue to Society of American A rchivists, and the postpone public release of material in assas- American Bar Association. sination re c o rds after the year 2017 if “the P resident certifies” that (1) “continued post- The Act called for the President to appoint the ponement is made necessary by an identifi- Bo a r d members and the Senate to confirm able harm to the military, defense, intelli- them. To ensure independence, the Act stipu- gence operations, law enforcement, or lated that the President could not rem o v e conduct of foreign relations” and (2) “the Bo a r d members except by “impeachment and identifiable harm is of such gravity that it conviction” or for specific cause. It also outweighs the public interest in disclosure . ” req u i r ed that the President issue a report to Without such certification, NARA w i l l Co n g r ess specifying the reason for rem o v a l . release all postponed re c o rds or portions of re c o rds in 2017.3 0 Having set out the parameters for establishing an independent board, the Act delineated The JFK Act established standards for post- the Board’s responsibilities and powers. The ponement to ensure that the JFK Act would Act gave the Review Board the power to release more information than was released identify, secure, and release records relating under the FOIA and Executive Orders gov- to President Kennedy’s assassination. erning declassification. Thus, government Ac c o rd i n g l y , the Review Board possessed offices could request the Review Board to authority to “render decisions” on (1) agree to postpone the release of information “whether a record constitutes an assassina-

8 tion record” and (2) “whether an assassina- authority to req u i r e the disclosure or post- tion record or particular information in an ponement of such re c o rd or information assassination record qualifies for postpone- under the standards set forth in section 6 [of ment of disclosure under this Act.” the JFK Act]....” Thus, if agencies disagree d with a Review Board determination to rel e a s e In addition, the JFK Act gave the Review information in a rec o r d, the affected agency Board power to obtain additional records could “appeal” to the President and req u e s t and information from government offices. that he overturn the Review Board’s decision. Further, the Act authorized the Review Board to issue “interpretive regulations.” Finally, the Act required the Review Board to submit, to the President and Congre s s , The Act gave the Review Board certain annual reports regarding its work. responsibilities to fulfill upon completion of its work. Thus, “[u]pon termination,” the Act The Act addressed public release of certain required the Review Board to submit a final special categories of records that may relate report to the President and Congress. In to the assassination, including records under addition, the “Review Board shall transfer all seal of a court and foreign records. The law of its records to the Archivist for inclusion in expressed the “sense of Congress” that the the collection, and no records of the Review Secretary of State should contact Russia to Board shall be destroyed.” secure public release of records of the former Soviet Union that may relate to the assassina- The JFK Act directed the Review Board to tion. Congress also urged the Secretary of appoint an Executive Director and staff to State to contact other foreign governments perform the work of, and report to, members that might have relevant records. of the Review Board. To ensure independence, staff members could not be present Congress clearly emphasized the supremacy employees of the federal government, nor of the JFK Act over other laws that might pre- could the Executive Director be affiliated clude disclosure of assassination-re l a t e d with any prior official investigation of the records. Thus, where the JFK Act required Kennedy assassination. public disclosure of a record, the Act would “take precedence over any other law..., judi- The Act directed the Board to provide, if pos- cial decision construing such law, or common sible, a summary of the redacted information law doctrine that would otherwise prohibit or a substitute record explaining the redacted such transmission or disclosure....” The only information. The Act further instructed the re c o rds that the Act exempted from its Review Board to release parts of records that “supremacy clause” were (1) IRS tax-related could not be released in full. records in which Section 6103 of the IRS Code p recluded disclosure, and (2) re c o rd s In addition to notifying NARA of its deci- donated to the United States under a deed of sions to release or postpone assassination gift whose terms precluded disclosure. records, the Act also required the Review Board to notify the originating agency as well The Act provided that provisions of the JFK as the public of any Board determination to Act pertaining to the operation of the Review designate a record as an assassination record. Board ceased to be effective when the term of the Review Board expired. However, all While the JFK Act authorized the Review remaining provisions of the JFK Act continue Bo a r d to make final and binding determina- in force: “The remaining provisions of this tions concerning the release or postponement Act shall continue in effect until such time as of a rec o r d, it provided that the Pres i d e n t the Archivist certifies to the President and the could reconsider any Board determination: Congress that all assassination records have “After the Review Board has made a formal been made available to the public in accor- determination concerning the public disclo- dance with this Act.” This provision is signif- su r e or postponement of disclosure of an icant because it underscores the continuing executive branch assassination re c o rd or obligation of federal agencies to re l e a s e information within such a rec o r d,...the Pres i - records on the assassination after the Review dent shall have the sole and nondelegable Board’s term expires.

9 F i n a l l y, Congress recognized that the Review Board would need power to re q u e s t materials that the agencies themselves would not have identified as assassination- related. The Act guaranteed that the Review B o a rd could enforce its authority through its use of the subpoena power and the power to grant immunity.

In sum, the JFK Act pro- The American public believes vided a new and unusual the truth has been hidden from legislative remedy to the them for over three decades. If problem of government there is truly nothing to hide, secrecy. It required fed- then there is no better reason for eral agencies to disclose, any and all classified docu- forthwith, their re c o rd s ments to be herewith declassi- on the assassination and fied. Only then can the people’s it empaneled an inde- trust be restored. pendent board to ensure —Stephen Tyl e r , June 28, 19 9 5 the full identification and release of those records. Years of secrecy about the Kennedy assassination investigations finally fell with the passage of this unique new law guaranteeing a presumption of openness and independent review of the records.

10 CHAPTER 1 ENDNOTES 1 House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law, Assassina - tion Materials Disclosure Act of 1992: Hearings on H.J. Res. 454, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, 96. (Prepared Statement of Jack Valenti, Special Assistant to President Johnson from November 1963 to June 1966). 2 Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992: Hear - ings on S.J. Res. 282, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 1992, 96. (Prepared Statement of Athan G. Theoharis, Professor, Department of History, Marquette University). 3 Exec. Order No. 11,130 (1963) (Issued by President Lyndon B. Johnson). 4 Exec. Order No. 11,828 (1975) (Issued by President Gerald R. Ford. The Rockefeller Com- mission released its report on June 16, 1975 and terminated that same month). 5 Pr esident’s Commission on Central Intelligence Activities Within the United States, Fi n a l Report of the Pres i d e n t ’ s Commission on Central Intelligence Activities Within the United States (Wa s h - ington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), 251–269. 6 In accordance with practice at the time, President Ford retained Rockefeller Co m m i s s i o n rec o r ds as part of his personal papers when he left office. This practice was ended by the Pres i - dential Records Act of 1978, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2207 (1994). President Ford subsequently donated these and other rec o r ds to his presidential library in Ann Ar b o r , Michigan. 7 The United States Senate established the Church Committee with S. Res. 21 on January 27, 1975. The Committee formally terminated on May 31, 1976. 8 U.S. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelli- gence Ac t i v i t i e s , The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976. S. Rept. 755, 1 (Book V). 9 House Judiciary Committee, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, H. Rept. 625, 15. This was the House Judiciary’s report on H.J. Res. 454. 10 Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations 19 (July 17, 1979). 11 House Judiciary Committee, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, H. Rept. 625, Part 1. 12 Ibid., 12. 13 House Judiciary Committee, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, H. Rept. 625, 13. 14 Quoted in Summers, Anthony and Robbyn Summers, “The Ghosts of November,” Vanity Fair, December 1994, 88. 15 Mailer, Norman. Oswald’s Tale: An American Mystery. New York: Random House, 1995, 351. 16 Ibid. Author Norman Mailer, like many before and after him, would find it “startling to dis- cover, as one pans these government volumes for bits of gold, how much does gleam in the sludge” (352). 17 Doubts about the Warren Commission’s findings were not restricted to ordinary Ameri- cans. Well before 1978, President Johnson, Robert Kennedy, and four of the seven members of the Warren Commission all articulated, if sometimes off the record, some level of skepticism about the Commission’s basic findings. 18 House Select Committee on Assassinations, Findings and Recommendations, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1979, H. Rept. 1828, 65. 19 H. Res. 160 was introduced by Congressman Stewart McKinney of Connecticut. It was co- sponsored by four additional former members of the HSCA: Representatives Robert Edgar, Harold Sawyer, Harold Ford, and Walter Fauntroy.

11 20 House Judiciary Committee, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, H. Rept. 625, 33. (Statement of Representative Louis Stokes). 21 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Report to Accompany S. 3006, The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rept. 328. 22 These early proposals were H.R. 4090, introduced by Congressman Trafficant of Ohio on January 3, 1992, H. Res. 325, introduced by Congressman Gonzalez of Texas on January 22, 1992; H. Res. 326 and H.R. 4108, both introduced by Congressman DeFazio of Oregon on Jan- uary 24. 23 George Lardner, Jr., “Ford Urges House Leaders to Seek Release Of All Records on Kennedy Assassination,” Washington Post, 30 January 1992, A–12. 24 Congressional Record, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, 138, daily ed. (26 March 1992): H1984– 86. 25 Co n g r essional Record, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, 138, daily ed. (26 March 1992): S4392–97. 26 The House Government Operations Committee held hearings on April 28th, May 15th and July 22nd. The House Judiciary Committee held a hearing on May 20th. In the Senate, the Gov- ernmental Affairs Committee held a hearing on May 12th. 27 The House Government Operations Committee approved the legislation in June (Report 102–625 I, June 29, 1992) and the House Judiciary Committee in August (Report 102–625 II, August 11, 1992). The Senate Governmental Af fairs Committee approved legislation in July (Report 102–328, July 22, 1992). The Senate committee approved an amendment in the nature of a substitute; the bill forwarded to the full Senate for its consideration theref o r e had a new designation, S. 3006. This was the bill the full House eventually voted on in September. 28 Public Law 103–345 was enacted October 6, 1994. The Extension Act had been introduced as H.R. 4569. 29 Introduced as H.R. 1553 by the Chairman of the Government Reform and Oversight Com- mittee, Congressman Dan Burton of Indiana, the bill was approved by the House on June 23, 1997 and by the Senate two days later. President Clinton signed the bill into law on July 3, 1997. 30 Many of the postponements agreed to by the Review Board in fact have release dates that are much earlier than 2017.

12 CH A P T E R 2 ES TA B L I S H M E N T O F T H E RE V I E W BO A R D A N D DE F I N I T I O N O F “ AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D”

A. INTRODUCTION government offices rea l - The term or definition of the term ized that they would “assassination records” is likely The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Col - need to re - review files to be the most important admin- lection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) provided opti- under the Review Board’ s istrative decision the Board will mistic deadlines by which Congress believed strict standards. Thus, ma k e . that government offices, the National while Congress passed —Mark Zaid and Charles A rchives and Records A d m i n i s t r a t i o n the JFK Extension Act in Sa n d e r s , October 11, 19 9 5 (NARA), and the Assassination Record s 19 9 4 1 to reset the clock Review Board should complete particular and to give the Board a activities. This chapter describes the actions full three-year mandate, it did not foresee the taken by the Review Board to begin its work. additional delays that occurred as a result of Initially, it was clear that the Review Board government offices’ early attempts to comply needed to provide critical guidance by defin- with the JFK Act without the Review Board’ s ing the term “assassination re c o rd.” The gu i d a n c e . Board’s definition of that term was the foundation that enabled the Board to begin the 1. JFK Act Deadlines critical task of reviewing records. a. Ninety days for President to appoint Review B. DELAY IN START UP Board members. Section 7(a)(2) of the JFK Ac t stated that the President would appoint When Congress drafted the JFK Act, it esti- Review Board members within ninety days mated that the Review Board would require after enactment of the statute. The statute a maximum of three years to accomplish its envisioned that the Board members would start work by the end of January 1993. Of work. There were, however, a number of course, the Review Board members could not delays in the early phase of the Board’s oper- begin work until after they were sworn in on ation that affected the ability of the Board to April 11, 1994, 15 months later than Congres s meet the deadline set by Congress. had intended. During the original ninety day period set out by the JFK Act, the Bush admin- Although President Bush signed the JFK Ac t istration was replaced by the Clinton adminis- into law on October 26, 1992, and although the tration, and although the delay caused by the act req u i r ed the President to make nomina- change in administration was fully under- tions within ninety days, President Bush standable, it significantly affected the sched- made no nominations. President Clinton did ule originally contemplated by Congress. The not nominate the members of the Review Review Board’s early pro g ress was also Bo a r d until September 1993, well after he took slowed by the fact that the Congress did not of fice in January 1993, and the Board was not ap p r opriate funds for the Board’s operation confirmed and sworn in until April 1994. Dur- until October 1, 1994. The early months were ing the 18 month period between the passage funded solely by a small transfer of funds of the JFK Act and swearing-in of the Review fr om the White House budget. Bo a r d members, some government agencies pr oceeded with independent reviews of their b. 300 days for government offices to re v i e w, a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related files, as the JFK A c t i d e n t i f y, and organize assassination re c o r d s. Sec- req u i r ed, but without the Review Board’ s tion 5 of the JFK Act re q u i red each govern- guidance. Unfortunately, once the Review ment office to re v i e w, identify and org a n i z e Bo a r d began work, it became apparent that assassination re c o rds within its custody.2 N o

13 government office completed its work Th e r e is a sufficient volume of known within 300 days as the statute directed, and assassination rec o r ds [for the agencies] to as the Review Board terminated its opera- or ganize and review at the outset. How- tions in September 1998, some government ev e r , it is intended that the Review Board o ffices still had not reviewed, identified, and issue guidance to assist in articulating o rganized all assassination re c o rds within the scope or universe of assassination their custody. For example, the Review rec o r ds as government offices and the B o a rd entered into memoranda of under- Review Board undertake their res p o n s i - standing with the FBI and the CIA to allow bilities. Such guidance will be valuable them to process selected groups of rec o rd s notwithstanding the fact that govern- such as duplicate documents and newly dis- ment offices will begin to organize and c o v e red CIA audiotapes from its Mexico review their rec o r ds before the Review City Station after the Review Board termi- Bo a r d is established. Government offi c e s nated its operations. ar e req u i r ed to begin the review and dis- cl o s u r e of rec o r ds upon enactment to The Act specifically re q u i red each govern- expedite public access to the many ment office to: (1) determine which of its rec o r ds which do not req u i r e additional re c o rds fit within the statutory definition of review or postponement. However, the assassination re c o rds, (2) determine which ultimate work of the Review Board will of its assassination re c o rds contained infor- involve not only the review of rec o rd s mation from another government office and recommended for postponement, but consult with the other government off i c e requiring government offices to prov i d e concerning the information in the re c o rd, (3) additional information and re c o rd s , determine which of its assassination re c o rd s wh e r e appropriate. Guidance, especially it could release, unredacted, to the public, that developed in consultation with the and (4) determine which of its assassination public, scholars, and affected govern- re c o rds were eligible for withholding under ment offices, will prove valuable to Section 6 of the Act, and then pre p a re those en s u r e the fullest possible disclosure and re c o rds for review by the Review Board .3 To cr eate public confidence in a working the extent that a government office had “any definition that was developed in an inde- uncertainty” as to whether its re c o rds were pendent and open manner.5 “assassination re c o rd[s] governed by” the JFK Act, the Act directed the government Unfortunately, once the Review Board pro- o ffice to transmit the re c o rds to the Review vided guidance to the agencies, much of the B o a rd for a determination as to whether the initial work of the agencies needed to be re c o rds were, indeed, assassination re c o rd s .4 revised, which, in turn, slowed down their processing and reviewing of assassination Federal agencies, particularly the CIA and records. For example, after Congress passed FBI, did not review and process the statuto- the JFK Act in 1992, the FBI began to review rily defined “assassination records” in the and release to NARAthe records that it made time allotted and make them available for available to the HSCA. Once the Review Review Board action. Moreover, even if gov- Board came into existence and established ernment offices had been able to meet the strict standards for release, the FBI re - 300-day deadline, the delay in the appoint- reviewed every page of its HSCA files using ment of the Review Board prohibited federal the Board’s standards. The FBI then made agencies from obtaining early guidance on “supplemental” releases to NARA. the questions of the definition of “assassination record” and the standards for postpone- In summary, the agencies, for different rea- ments under Section 6 of the JFK Act. sons, had not completed the work assigned to them by the JFK Act. The Review Board Congress realized that agencies would begin attributed such delays by the CIAand the FBI their JFK Act compliance before the Review both to the manner in which the agencies Board began to operate, but as the Senate declassified material and to the enormous Report on the JFK Act states, they trusted volume of work that they had not been able that the pre-Review Board compliance would to complete within the short deadlines pro- not cause additional delays. vided by Congress.

14 c. 300 days for NARA to establish JFK Collec - amend the JFK Act to provide one addi- t i o n. Section 4 of the JFK Act instru c t e d tional year for the Review Board to com- NARA to establish the JFK Collection within plete its work. Congressman Louis Stokes 300 days after Congress enacted the Act. On and Congressman Henry Waxman co-spon- August 23, 1993, exactly 300 days after the s o red the bill. enactment of the JFK Act, NARA officially opened the JFK Collection. On June 4, 1997, the National Security, Inter- national Affairs, and Criminal Justice Sub- d. Three years for Board to complete work. The committee of the House Government Reform JFK Act envisioned that the Review Board and Oversight Committee held a hearing on could start up, complete its work, and close H.R. 1553. The Honorable Louis Stokes, down within three years. The Act, however, Review Board Chair John Tunheim, writer contained certain provisions that considerably Max Holland, and teacher Bruce Hitchcock slowed the early phase of the Review Board’ s all testified in support of H.R. 1553. On July operation and delayed the point at which it 3, 1997, President Clinton signed H.R. 1553 could operate effectively in its review of into law, thus extending the authorization of rec o r ds. As an independent agency, the Board the Review Board for one additional year, to had to locate and construct office space that September 30, 1998. was suitable for the storage of classified material. At the same time, the Board had to hire a Following the passage of H.R. 1553, the Com- st a f f and obtain clearances for the staff at the mittee on Government Reform and Over- Top Secret level. In an effort to ensure the sight required the Review Board to provide independence of the Board, the JFK Act pro- monthly status reports regarding the provided that the Review Board could not hire (or jected completion of the Board’s mandate. detail) individuals employed by other federal Beginning in August 1997, the Review Board agencies. The Review Board did not have sent monthly letters to the Committee Chair- enough staff members to begin to review and man, Congressman Burton. pr ocess government rec o r ds until the beginning of 1995—two and one-half years after The Review Board used its additional year to Pr esident Bush signed the JFK Act. complete its work and terminated its operations, as promised, on September 30, 1998. F i n a l l y, federal agencies submitted to the Review Board more requests for postponements than the framers of the statute antici- C. DEFINING “ASSASSINATION RECORD” pated. While the JFK Act states that “only in the rarest cases” would agencies have a “legit- In order for the Review Bo a r d to begin the imate need for continued protection” of assas- d e c l a ssification of re c o rds related to the sination rec o r ds, agencies submitted tens of assassination of President Kennedy, it first had thousands of pages of rec o r ds to the Board the task of establishing the definition of an with requests for postponements. Thus, Con- “assassination record.” gr ess’ three-year timeline for the Review Board to fulfill its mandate was based on a view of The Review Board was [H]ow the term “ K e n n e d y agency rec o r ds that the agencies did not share. aware that prior commis- Assassination Records” should sions and committees be defined. . .is a very significant By the spring of 1996, the Review Board that examined the assas- question because it goes to the believed that in order for it to be faithful to its sination operated in heart of this Board’s capacity to historical responsibility and commitment to secret, and that the prob- restore the confidence of the release to the public all known assassination lems caused by such American people that they have records, it required an additional year. There- s e c recy had ultimately a right to know their own his- fore, it recommended to Congress that the led Congress to pass the tory.. . .” JFK Act be extended for one year. JFK Act and establish the —James Lesar, October 11,1995 Review Board. Thus, the 2. Passage of H.R. 1553 B o a rd determined that its deliberations on how to define the term On May 8, 1997, Congressman Dan Burton “assassination record” must be conducted in i n t roduced H.R. 1553, a bill that would the public eye.

15 In an effort to receive as much comment as Congress, the National Archives, “any Presi- possible from members of the public, the dential Library,” “any Executive agency, ” Review Board held public hearings devoted “any independent agency,” and “any other to its definition of the term. In addition, the office of the federal government,” as well as Board published its proposed definition in “any state or local law enforcement office” the Federal Register to attract additional pub- that assisted in an inquiry into the assassina- lic comments. tion of President Kennedy.7

Through its solicitation of public opinion, the The Senate Report on the JFK Act explains Review Board received affirmation of its that Congress carefully crafted its definition position in favor of a broad definition, as but expected that the Review Board would members of the public supported a broad need to further define the term. definition of the term “assassination record.” Given the wide range of assassination theo- The definition of assassination rec o r ds is ries that existed, the Board members believed a threshold consideration for the suc- that the definition could not exclude records cessful implementation of the Act. Its that would enhance the historical under- scope will be the barometer of public standing of the event, even if those records confidence in the release of assassination did not mention the assassination. rec o r ds. While the rec o r ds of past pres i - dential commissions and congres s i o n a l As their definition reflects, the Review Board committees established to investigate members ultimately concluded that the term the assassination of President Kennedy “assassination re c o rd” had to encompass ar e included as assassination rec o rd s records beyond those that mentioned central under this Act, it is intended and empha- topics such as one of the assassination inves- sized that the search and disclosure of tigations, Lee Harvey Oswald, his wife rec o r ds under this Act must go beyond Marina, his mother Marguerite, or Jack Ruby. those rec o r ds. While such rec o r ds are The Review Board, four of whom were valuable, they reflect the views, theories, trained historians, recognized that the defin- political constraints and prejudices of ition had to encompass records that would past inquiries. Proper implementation of enhance the historical understanding of the this Act and providing the Am e r i c a n event. Although the Review Board intended public with the opportunity to judge the to search for any “smoking gun” documents su r r ounding history of the assassination that might still exist, the Board knew that its for themselves, req u i r es including not greatest contribution would likely be to pro- on l y , but going beyond, the rec o r ds of vide to the public those records that would the War r en and Rockefeller Commis- frame the tragic event. sions, and the Church and House Select Assassination Committees.8 1. Statutory Definition of “Assassination Record” The JFK Act explicitly empowered the Review Board to decide “whether a record The JFK Act defined “assassination record” constitutes an assassination re c o rd . ”9 T h e as a record “related to the assassination of Review Board took seriously its obligation to President John F. Kennedy, that was created locate assassination records that fell outside or made available for use by, obtained by, or the scope of previous inquiries. Before the otherwise came into possession of” the fed- Review Board could embark on its search for eral government (or state or local law such records, however, it had to grapple with enforcement offices that assisted in an inves- the question of how extensive its searc h tigation of President Kennedy’s assassina- should be. t i o n ) .6 C o n g ress noted specifically that “assassination re c o rds” encompassed 2. Congressional Intent Concerning records relating to the Kennedy assassination Definition among the files of the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission, the Pike Com- Having directed the Review Board to further mittee, the House Select Committee on define the term “assassination rec o r d,” Con- Assassinations (the “HSCA”), the Library of gr ess specifically gave the Review Board the

16 10 power to issue interpretive reg u l a t i o n s . Th e input on how to define One involves setting the bound- legislative history of the Act explains why the term. At that hearing, aries of, q u o t e , “ a s s a s s i n a t i o n Co n g r ess thought that the Review Board— a n d members of the public ma t e r i a l . ” The joint resolution not the Congress—had to define the term. encouraged the Board to defines the term “a s s a s s i n a t i o n define the term broadly. ma t e r i a l ” as “a record that relates The term “assassination record” was not By mid-November 1994, in any manner or degree to the more specifically defined by the Com- only weeks after the assassination of President Joh n mittee because to do so before more is Board’s senior staff had F. K e n n e d y .” Given the wide known about the universe of records begun work, those staff ranges of theories that have would have been premature, and would members were circ u l a t- developed as to who killed Pres- have further injected the government ing draft definitions of ident Kennedy and why, ma n y between the records and the American this crucial statutory 11 types of records arguably relate public. term. The Review Board in some way to the assassina- and its senior staff spent ti o n . What records regarding, fo r C o n g ress was so interested in how the the month of December e x a m p l e , C u b a , Vi e t n a m , a n d Review Board would define “assassination 1994 discussing the most organized crime should be cov- record” that it requested each Board member important sections of the ered? This matter requires care- to provide written answers to the following definition, including pro- ful consideration. question as part of the confirmation process: visions about whether —Senator David L. Boren, certain types of records May 12, 1992 The definition of “assassination rec o rd s ” w e re relevant to the contained in the Records Review Ac t assassination, whether establishing this Board was intentionally assassination artifacts left very broad. What kinds of criteria should become part of the JFK Collection, and factors will you use in determining and whether the Collection could include whether or not a document or other item copies of original documents. will fall within the definition? The Review Board members ultimately All of the Review Board members answered decided on a proposed definition and pub- that they favored a broad definition of the lished the draft in the Federal Register in an term, but each recognized that the Board attempt to solicit public comment. The Janu- members would, in Judge Tunheim’s words, ary 8, 1995, Federal Register contains the have to “more fully understand the scope of Board’s proposed definition. the potential records before attempting to define the term.”12 Congress also asked the 4. Comments from Public Review Board members to respond to questions concerning assassination records in the With their proposed definition complete, the possession of private citizens, as well as Board members began to solicit comments questions concerning the Board’s authority from members of the public and from gov- to administer oaths and subpoenas and grant ernment agencies about the definition. immunity to witnesses in furtherance of compelling disclosure of assassination records a. Notice and Comment from private and foreign sources.13 The Review Board sought public comment 3. Review Board’s Early Deliberations on a proposed definition and set a 30-day and Draft Definition period for the purpose of receiving written c o m m e n t s .1 4 The Review Board re c e i v e d On July 12, 1994, at one of the Review written comments on its proposed definition Board’s first meetings, it began to consider from numerous federal agencies, state and the scope of its definition of “assassination local government entities, and individuals. record.” At that meeting, the Board members a g reed that they would need to conduct Nearly all of the commentators supported more research before they would be able to the comprehensiveness and flexibility of the craft a definition as Congress intended. The Board’s definition. Respondents made both purpose of the Review Board’s October 11, substantive and technical suggestions, many 1994, public hearing was to gather public of which the Board adopted into the final def-

17 inition. Commentators addressed a bro a d the assassination’s aftermath. The Board range of concerns, such as whether the recognizes that many agencies have Board’s proposed definition was too broad or al r eady begun to organize and rev i e w too vague, and whether the Board should rec o r ds responsive to the [JFK Act] even provide a list of names and subjects that, to be f o r e the Board was appointed and the extent they appeared in documents, began its work. Nevertheless, the Board’ s would presumptively be assassination aim is that this guidance will aid in the records. The Board also received comments ultimate assembly and public disclosure about whether the definition should cover of the fullest possible historical rec o r d on state and local government records, private this tragedy and on subsequent investi- records, and assassination artifacts. gations and inquiries into it.17

b. Public Hearings. The Review Board also The Review Board’s definition intended “to h e a rd testimony at public hearings on identify comprehensively the range of aspects of the proposed interpretive regula- rec o r ds reasonably related to the assassinations. In these public hearings, the Review tion of President Kennedy and investigations Board received testimony from NARA and undertaken in its aftermath,” and “to aid in the FBI on the scope of the definition. Mem- the consistent, effective, and efficient imple- bers of the public also offered comments on mentation of the JFK Act and to establish pro- the Board’s proposed definition. ce d u r es for including assassination rec o r ds in the JFK Assassination Records Collection The Review Board considered all comments established by Congress and housed at and created its final draft of the definition. NA R A ’s facility in College Park, Maryland.”18 The Board discussed its final draft at a public meeting, and explained how it had incorpo- a. Scope of assassination rec o r d s .19 The Board rated many of the comments received by the ultimately determined that any rec o r ds that Review Board on the proposed definition. we r e “reasonably related” to the assassination would be assassination rec o r ds. The Review The Review Board’s Federal Register no t i c e Bo a r d believed that its mandate from Congres s establishing the final definition of the term was to assemble all materials reasonably rel a t e d “assassination rec o r d” summarized the princi- to the assassination in the JFK Collection. pal substantive comments received and the Review Board’s responses to those comments.15 Section 1400.1 of the Board’s final definition of “assassination record” reads: 5. Definition (a) An assassination record includes, but The Review Board’s final definition of an is not limited to, all records, public and “assassination record” was published in the private, regardless of how labeled or Federal Register on June 28, 1995. identified, that document, describe, report on, analyze, or interpret activi- As the Supplementary Information accompany- ties, persons, or events re a s o n a b l y ing the proposed definition stated, the Review related to the assassination of President Bo a r d’s goal in issuing the guidance was: John F. Kennedy and investigations of or inquiries into the assassination. to implement congressional intent that the JFK Collection contain ‘the most com- (b) An assassination re c o r d f u r t h e r pr ehensive disclosure of rec o r ds rel a t e d includes, without limitation: to the assassination of Pre s i d e n t Ke n n e d y. ’ 16 The Board is also mindful of (1) All records as defined in Sec. 3(2) Co n g r ess’s instruction that the Board of the JFK Act; apply a ‘broad and encompassing’ working definition of “assassination rec o rd ” (2) All rec o r ds collected by or segreg a t e d in order to achieve the goal of assembling by all federal, state, and local government the fullest historical rec o r d on this tragic agencies in conjunction with any investi- event in American history and on the gation or analysis of or inquiry into the investigations that were undertaken in assassination of President Kennedy (for

18 example, any intra-agency investigation st a f f often reviewed rec o r ds that contained or analysis of or inquiry into the assassi- “symbol number informants” where the FBI nation; any inter-agency communication had substituted a number in place of an infor- reg a r ding the assassination; any req u e s t mant’s name. In part because of the Review by the House Select Committee on As s a s - Bo a r d’s regulation, the staff could request the sinations to collect documents and other FBI to reveal the informant’s true name and materials; or any inter- or intra-agency review the informant’s file. collection or segregation of documents and other materials); c. Sources of assassination records and addi - tional records and information.21 The Review (3) Other records or groups of records Board sought to cast a wide net in terms of listed in the Notice of A s s a s s i n a t i o n where it might locate assassination records. R e c o rd Designation, as described in The Board’s regulation, therefore, allowed it §1400.8 of this chapter. to seek assassination records in the possession of all federal government entities, all In its work, the Review Board often turned state and local government entities, private back to the breadth of its definition of the term individuals, private institutions, all courts, “assassination rec o r d.” Indeed, in the Board’ s and all foreign governments. last weeks of work, a rep r esentative from one government office told the Review Board that When the Review Board later sought to he did not believe that his office’s rec o r ds were obtain re c o rds from non-federal sourc e s , assassination rec o r ds because the rec o r ds did their regulatory definition proved useful. not mention the assassination, or any of the Over the objection of New Orleans District central assassination figures. When it was Attorney Harry Connick, Sr., the Review defining the term “assassination rec o r d,” the Board was able to obtain for the JFK Collec- Bo a r d anticipated that federal agencies and tion records that had been in the possession others who possessed relevant rec o r ds would of the New Orleans District Attorney’s office challenge the Board’s judgment. since the 1960s when former New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison prosecuted b. Scope of additional records and informa - Clay Shaw for conspiring to murder Presi- tion.20 The Review Board determined that it dent Kennedy. In litigation over the records, would request additional records and infor- the Review Board relied in part on its regula- mation when necessary for identifying, eval- tion defining the term “assassination record.” uating, or interpreting assassination records, including assassination records that agencies The regulation also proved helpful in the may not have initially located or identified. Review Board’s efforts to secure assassina- The Review Board’s regulatory definition tion records from former government offi- included a description of some items the cials. For example, the Board sought the Review Board might request from govern- records of Walter Sheridan, former investiga- ment agencies that included backgro u n d tor for Robert F. Kennedy, whom the Review information about how the agencies operate Board had reason to believe might possess and, in particular, how agencies performed assassination re c o rds. Although Sheridan their declassification review. was deceased, he owned such records “by virtue of [his] service with a government The work of the Review Board staff hinged on a g e n c y, office, or entity” and thus, the the breadth of the Board’s definition of “addi- Review Board was able to subpoena Mrs. tional rec o r ds and information.” Often, the Sheridan to determine whether he retained st a f f located a particular code name or num- any assassination records. ber in a federal agency rec o r d and needed the authority to req u i r e the federal agency to pro- d. Types of materials included in scope of assassi - vide information that would reveal the nation records and additional records and informa - underlying information. For example, in CIA ti o n . 22 The Review Board tried to be as inclusive documents, the Review Board staff encoun- as possible in identifying the type of material it te r ed pseudonyms and needed to know the could seek for inclusion in the JFK Collection, tr ue name of the individual in the rec o rd . and it included papers, maps, and other docu- Si m i l a r l y , in FBI rec o r ds, the Review Board mentary material, photographs, motion pic-

19 tu r es, sound and video rec o r dings, machine- rec o r ds to which the FBI assigned the “NAR” readable information in any form, and artifacts. ac r onym, the Review Board agreed that the rec o r ds were not relevant to the assassination. NA R A wanted the Review Board to exclude For example, the FBI designated as “NAR” the term “artifacts” from its definition of those sections of their HSCA ad m i n i s t r a t i v e “assassination rec o r d.” NARA believed that file that related to the HSCA’s investigation extensive public access to assassination arti- into the assassination of Martin Luther King, facts would undermine NARA’s ability to pre- Jr . However, the Board’s regulation mandated serve them. The Board members concluded that the Board, and not the FBI, make deter- that the term must become part of the defini- minations as to relevance, so the FBI abolished tion, but agreed to establish proc e d u r es for the “NAR” designation and made all such placing artifacts in the JFK Collection.23 Th e rec o r ds available to Board staff for rev i e w . Bo a r d agreed to allow NARA to make judg- ments about when and to whom it would On the other hand, in several of the FBI’s allow access to artifacts. To the extent that appeals to the President, the FBI argued that the NA R A could not allow access to members of information that the Review Board had voted to the public who wished to view particular arti- release was not relevant to the assassination. In facts, the Board’s regulation allowed NARA to those cases, the Review Board was able to argu e pr ovide the public with photographs, draw- ef fectively that the Board should determine ings, or similar materials depicting the artifact. whether information was relevant to the assassination and the appeals were withdrawn. The Review Board did act on its inclusion of the term “artifacts” in the definition when it f. Originals and copies. The Review Board requested that NARA become involved in defined when it would be willing to accept the testing of Warren Commission Exhibit copies of assassination rec o r ds in lieu of original 567, a bullet fragment found in President assassination rec o r ds for the JFK Collection.25 Kennedy’s limousine on November 22, 1963, and stored at NARAin the intervening years. With regard to motion pictures, the Review The Review Board oversaw testing of tiny B o a rd stated that “the camera original, strands of fiber on that bullet fragment as whenever available,. . . may be placed in the well as testing of other material on the bullet JFK Collection.” The regulation quietly fragment. NARA was hesitant to approve expressed the Review Board’s preference for testing of the fragment, but had the Review original motion pictures, but when the Board not included the term “artifact” in its Review Board resolved that the JFK A c t definition, the Board almost certainly could worked a “taking” of the Zapruder film such not have played a role in the testing. that the film belonged to the U.S. government and not the Zapruder family, the Board e. Assassination records released in their believed that a copy of the camera original entirety.24 The Review Board further required Zapruder film could not substitute for the that, in accordance with the JFK Act, assassi- camera original. nation records be released in their entirety unless the Board sustained agency postpone- Finally, the Board’s regulation established a ments. Practically, the Board meant that p ro c e d u re by which it would designate agencies could not object to the disclosure of records as assassination records.26 all or part of an assassination record “solely on grounds of non-relevance.” The Board D. CONCLUSION specifically wrote that it, not the agencies, would make determinations about whether Congressional and presidential delays, com- particular records were relevant. bined with unrealistic statutory deadlines, unfortunately contributed to a delay in the This section of the Board’s 1995 Guidance commencement of the Board’s work. Once specifically affected the FBI. From early 1993 the Review Board began to meet, however, its until the Board issued its definition in 1995, careful determination, following full public the FBI designated large parts of FBI files as debate, of the scope of the term “assassina- “NAR,” or “not assassination re l a t e d . ” tion record” laid the foundation for later Indeed, with reg a r d to the majority of the review of thousands of important records.

20 CHAPTER 2 ENDNOTES

1 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. 1998). 2 JFK Act at § 5(c)(1). 3 JFK Act at § 5(c)(2)(A)–(H). 4 JFK Act at § 5(c)(2)(F). 5 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Report to Accompany S. 3006, The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d. sess., 1992, S. Rept. 102–328, at 21. (hereafter “Senate Report”). 6 JFK Act at § 3(2). 7 JFK Act at § 3 (2)(A)–(L). Section 3(2) of the JFK Act specifically excluded from the definition of “assassination rec o r d” autopsy rec o r ds donated by the Kennedy family to the National Ar chives pursuant to a deed of gift. 8 Senate Report at 21. 9 JFK Act at § 7(I)(2)(A). 10 JFK Act at § 7(n). 11 Senate Report at 21. 12 Nominations of Graff, Tunheim, Nelson, Joyce, and Hall. The Review Board’s precise answers to the question as to how they would define the term “assassination record” follow: Henry Graff wrote, “Plainly any document that directly or tangentially deals with the assassination will be subsumed under the head of ‘assassination record,’ but I believe that some documents and classes of documents will have to labeled such on an ad hoc basis.” Judge Tun- heim wrote that it was his view that, “the Board should more fully understand the scope of the potential records before attempting to define the term. I favor a broad definition in order to fulfill the clear intent of Congress. One important criteria will be the extent to which the record adds to the public understanding of the events and characters involved in the assassination and its aftermath.” Anna Nelson explained that, “My sense at this point is that the Board should encourage this broad definition of records while we establish the parameters of the issue. Defining the records is the perfect topic for public hearings. Most individuals who have extensively studied the available information have opinions on this matter. In addition, the index of names from the [HSCA] report, and the subject index in the National Archives will help clarify the issues for us. I’m sure the Board will spend considerable time on this issue because of its importance to the work of the Board.” William Joyce wrote that, “The definition of ‘assassination records’ will be a major challenge for the Review Board to resolve in a work- able manner. In my view, the Review Board will need to establish criteria addressing: (a) the temporal proximity of the record in relation to the assassination, (b) the content of the record relative to the assassination, and (c) the relation of the record to important factors and issues perceived to be related to the assassination.” And Kermit Hall stated that, “The statute creating the Review Board defines an assassination record as [statutory definition]. These materials are certainly, therefore, the core of what constitutes the ‘assassination records’ that the Board is duty bound to treat. Any of these materials that are held in private hands are also covered by the statute and are subject to its provisions. In general, I think that the Board should take a broad view of what constitutes an assassination record within the terms of statute.” 13 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Nominations of Graff, Tunheim, Nelson, Joyce, and Hall, 103d Cong., 2d sess., 1994, S. Rept. 103–877. 14 In an effort to receive comments from all interested parties, the Review Board sent copies of the proposed interpretive regulations to agencies known to have an interest in and to be affected by the Review Board’s work, particularly those that either created or now hold assassination records, and to the appropriate oversight committees in Congress. The Review Board

21 also sent notices of the proposed interpretive regulations and requests for comments to many organizations and individuals who have demonstrated an interest in the release of materials under the JFK Act or who have engaged in research into the assassination of President Kennedy. 15 Guidance for Interpretation and Implementation of the President John F. Kennedy Assas- sination Records Collection Act of 1992, 36 C.F.R. § 1400 et seq. (1995). (hereafter “Definition”). 16 Senate report at 18. 17 60 Fed. Reg. 7506 (1995). 18 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400 et seq. 19 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.1. 20 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.2. 21 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.3. 22 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.4. 23 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.7. 24 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.5. 25 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.6. 26 Definition, 36 C.F.R. § 1400.8.

22 CHAPTER 3 PU B L I C AC T I V I T I E S O F T H E AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S RE V I E W BO A R D

The underlying principles guiding the received such comments through its experts legislation are independence, public con- conferences, open meetings, public hearings, fidence, efficiency and cost effe c t i v e n e s s . 1 and extensive, ongoing contact with members of the public who wrote and called the A. INTRODUCTION Review Board.

While the Review Board members and staff To fulfill its statutory obligations, the Review focused the majority of their efforts on the Board held public hearings, open meetings, identification, rev i e w , and release of assassina- and conferences, and it actively solicited tion rec o r ds, the Pr esident John F. Kennedy input from the public and conducted ongo- Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (J F K ing efforts to keep the public informed of all Act) also directed the Review Board to “rec e i v e Review Board decisions. information from the public reg a r ding the identification and public disclosure of assassi- B. PUBLIC HEARINGS nation rec o r ds” and to “hold hearings.”2 In an effort to gather as [N]o one is going to get every- much information as pos- Prior commissions and committees that thing they want out of this sible from the Am e r i c a n examined the assassination conducted their Board or out of this govern- public about the exis- work in secret and then closed their records. m e n t , but I think it is terribly tence and location of The Review Board members recognized that important to start the right “assassination re c o rd s , ” they must set themselves apart by conduct- wa y , as you are, by plugging the Review Board con- ing their work in public. Thus, when the into the research , being open, ducted a total of seven Board confronted major policy decisions, it being inclusive; that is a very public hearings—one each solicited comments from the public. For good sign. in Dallas, Boston, New example, when the Review Board defined the —John Newman, Orleans, and Los An g e - term “assassination record,” it held a public October 11, 1995 les, and three in Was h i n g - hearing on the topic and solicited public ton, D.C. The Review comments. Likewise, the Review Board rec- Bo a r d believed that in order to ascertain what ognized that the government’s secretive han- materials existed throughout the country, it dling of the Zapruder film has been fodder was important to hold such hearings outside for conspiracy theorists. In an effort to avoid of Washington, D.C., and primarily in cities causing further speculation about the film, wh e r e key witnesses might be located or the Board determined that it must conduct its wh e r e important assassination-related events deliberations about the Zapruder film in had occurred. At each hearing, the Review public. To that end, the Board held a public Bo a r d invited members of the public to tes- hearing on the issue of whether the Zapruder ti f y , and the witnesses provided input about film was already or should become the prop- materials related to the assassination of Pres i - erty of the American people. dent Kennedy.

The Board did not, however, consult the pub- By all accounts, the Review Board’s public lic only on major policy decisions. It also hearings were a success. One of the first received thousands of comments from mem- Review Board hearings was held in Dallas, bers of the public as to where the Board Texas. In Chairman Tunheim’s opening might locate additional records and informa- remarks he said, “We are holding this hear- tion related to the assassination. The Board ing in Texas because we believe there are

23 records in this area, in this state, that are timony of individuals such as Marina essential to a complete record of this event.” Oswald Porter, Ruth Paine, and Perry Ray- In all, 19 witnesses testified and provided mond Russo, who played a role in Oliver suggestions to the Review Board as to where Stone’s JFK. it might find records related to the assassination. Of all Review Board hearings this par- These stories of the Review Board’s acquisi- ticular one had the most witnesses, and it tions of invaluable records relating to the was at this hearing that many members of the assassination of President Kennedy are public and the Review Board members met recounted in the other chapters of this report, for the first time. but they serve as excellent examples of the benefits that resulted from the Review I know that you are trying to The Boston hearing Board’s public hearings. redress the harm and the wound allowed the Review that was done to the American B o a rd to meet Priscilla Finally, the Review Board used the public spirit in 1963 and the confu- Johnson McMillan, a hearing format to make policy on its defini- sions that have arisen since so journalist who had con- tion of the term “assassination record” and that we may—the American ducted extensive inter- on the disposition of the famous “Zapruder people may be free to move on views with Marina film.” Thus, the Review Board did take seri- to the current history, w h i ch Oswald Porter for her ously Congress’ guidance to “receive infor- Marina and Lee clamors for its attention. book, . As mation from the public” on its most impor- —Priscilla Johnson McMillan, a result of her positive tant decisions. March 24, 1995 contacts with the Review B o a rd, Ms. McMillan C. PUBLIC MEETINGS determined to include a provision in her will donating to the JFK Col- While the majority of the Review Board’s lection at NARA all of the material she gath- meetings were not open to the public, ered for her book. Likewise, in New Orleans, because of the need to review and discuss Lindy Boggs, United States Ambassador to classified or confidential material, the the Vatican and wife of the late Congressman Review Board did hold twenty public meet- Hale Boggs, served as the Review Board’s ings. As opposed to the public hearings, ambassador in New Orleans. Hale Boggs’ where the Review Board would hear testi- papers are available at Tulane University, mony from witnesses, public meetings and Lindy Boggs granted the Review Board allowed members of the public to observe the access to her husband’s papers from his ser- Board at work. The Review Board discussed vice on the Warren Commission. a variety of business in its public meetings, including such topics as its policy regarding One of the Review Board’s primary goals in documents that the Review Board found to conducting its public hearings was to inform be of no believed relevance to the assassina- the American public that the Review Board tion, and the drafting of its Final Report. existed and that it sought assassination records. In New Orleans, the public hearing D. EXPERTS CONFERENCES ferreted out a treasure trove of assassination records, including long-lost grand jury tran- Twice during the Review Board’s tenure, it scripts from New Orleans District Attorney determined that it would benefit from the Jim Garrison’s prosecution of Clay Shaw for reflections of a group of invited guests who conspiring to murder President Kennedy. are specialists in their fields. The Review Prior to the public hearing, the man who pos- B o a rd held each “experts conference” in sessed the grand jury transcripts, Gary Ray- Washington, D.C. mond, a former investigator on Connick’s staff, maintained the records in his home. As The first conference occurred in May 1995, and a direct result of the Review Board’s hearing, included a group of authors and res e a rc h e r s Mr. Raymond decided that he had a duty to who had studied the assassination, as well as turn the records over to the custody of the st a f f members from both the War r en Commis- government. Several days after returning to sion and the HSCA. The roundtable discus- Washington, the Review Board members sion provided the Review Board and staff received a package containing grand jury tes- with an opportunity to determine which

24 rec o r ds were of the most interest both to the The panelists discussed various issues public and to those whose prior investigative including the simplification of the referral ef forts had been thwarted due to the lack of process throughout the intelligence commu- access to rec o r ds. The participants in the dis- nity, and the need for declassification entities cussion also provided a great number of rec - such as the Review Board to be independent ommendations about where the Review in nature. They also discussed different poli- Bo a r d might find assassination rec o r ds. cies for review, such as the declassification of records for special cases like the assassina- P rofessor Robert Blakey, former Chief Coun- tion of President Kennedy vs. agency-wide sel of the HSCA, reminded the Review declassification. Overall, the day long confer- B o a rd of the HSCA’s belief that it would ence was an informative session wherein the have benefitted from the FBI’s fuller disclo- panelists talked about the guidelines for the s u re of its electronic surveillance materials release of information and how it could real- f rom its organized crime files. As a dire c t istically be done. result of Professor Blakey’s suggestion, the Review Board requested from the FBI a E. OUTREACH b road cross-section of organized crime elec- t ronic surveillance files, the most significant Given that one of the pri- of which was certainly the FBI’s electro n i c mary objectives of the In this era of cynicism about surveillance of Carlos Marcello, alleged Co n g r ess in passing the government, your mission is of New Orleans crime boss. JFK Act was to res t o r e critical importance. public confidence in gov- —Lindy Boggs,June 28, 1995 Another participant, Paul Hoch, suggested ernment, the Review that the Review Board obtain the records in Bo a r d recognized that it the possession of Clay Shaw’s attorneys. In would need to maintain regular contact with April 1996, the Review Board released the members of the public who expressed an files of the late Edward Wegmann, who was in t e r est in the Board’s work. As part of its a member of the legal team that defended ef forts to communicate with the public, the Clay Shaw at his 1969 assassination conspir- Review Board maintained both a regular mail- acy trial. Mr. Wegmann’s family agreed to ing list and an e-mail mailing list consisting of donate the files, consisting of approximately ap p r oximately 1,000 con- 6,000 pages, to the JFK Collection. tacts. These mailings included press re l e a s e s , The real question about the In April 1998, the Review Board held another periodic updates on the impact of the [Review] Board— experts conference, this time narro w l y Review Board’s activities, how much impact has the focused on the issue of declassification of updates on the results of Board had on the way agencies government documents. The Review Board Review Board meetings, b e h a v e ? tailored its invitation list to include experts in information about docu- —Professor David Garrow, Washington’s declassification world. Ulti- ments transferred to the April 14, 1998 mately, the Review Board gathered twelve JFK Collection, and infor- representatives from both the private and mation about the Review public sector to discuss access—and lack Bo a r d’s Federal Register notices. thereof—to government records, the problems and possible solutions to the problem of Fr om time to time, Review Board members secrecy, lessons learned from the implemen- and staff spoke to groups of students, public tation of the JFK Act, and possible recom- gr oups, the media, and res e a r chers reg a rd i n g mendations to be made by the Review Board the Board’s work. In addition, Board members in its Final Report. The participants included and staff described their work to civic grou p s . representatives from the Project on Govern- ment Secrecy, Interagency Security Classifi- 1. Outreach to Academics cation Appeals Panel (ISCAP), the National Security Council, the non-governmental In 1996, the members of the Review Board National Security Archive, NARA, CIA, and made presentations at meetings of the Am e r i - the Information Security Oversight Off i c e can Historical Association, the Orga n i z a t i o n (ISOO), as well as representatives from Con- of American Historians, and the Society of gress and from the media. American A rchivists. The Review Board ’ s

25 ef forts allowed approximately 200 historians time to answering questions from the news to become familiar with the work of the Board. media throughout the Board’s existence. The Board believed its responsibility was to be as 2. Outreach to Students open as possible in discussing the effort to open the assassination records. During its tenure, the Review Board hosted six groups of high school students fro m Noblesville, Indiana. The The Review Board took both a proactive and reactive approach to its media relations pro- The only option for rightfully students, along with their gram. The Review Board disseminated restoring and renewing the history teacher, Mr. Bruc e public trust in its government Hitchcock, came to the a p p roximately 100 press releases and is by countermanding a history Review Board offices to updates to members of the media thro u g h- of political constraints and past serve as interns. The stu- out its short lifetime. The Board also prejudices in assassination dents provided the responded to many requests for interviews inquiries through an active and Review Board staff with and requests for information from members massive declassification of all invaluable assistance in of the media about its declassification c reating databases and records relating directly and e fforts. Contrary to prior commissions and indirectly to the President’s pr ocessing newly declassified documents for committees, the Review Board was willing assassination, and the time and to talk to members of the media to keep opportunity is obviously now. release to the Am e r i c a n —Richard Trask, public. Mr. Hitchcock also them informed of the Board’s latest activi- March 24, 1995 played an important rol e ties. The Review Board was about openness, in the Review Board ’ s and one way to keep as many members of extension of one year, as the public as possible informed about Board he provided testimony to the National Secu- activities was through the media. ri t y , International Af fairs, and Criminal Justice Subcommittee in support of the Review Although the Review Board as an agency Bo a r d’s request for a one-year extension. was not necessarily a household name All Board members took the time to speak a round the world, the Board members periodically to groups of students about the understood and appreciated the high public work of the Review Board. i n t e rest in the assassination itself and there- f o re made themselves available to the 3. Outreach to Assassination Researchers media. The Review Board and staff participated in countless newspaper, radio, and In 1994 and again in 1995, Review Board television interviews at both the local, Chairman John Tunheim spoke to the fall national, and international level. For exam- c o n f e rence of the Coalition on Political ple, stories about the work of the Review Assassinations, updating the group on the Board’s progress. Former Executive Director B o a rd were covered by all the major net- David Marwell spoke to the conference in works, CNN, Associated Press, the national 1996. The following day, the Review Board radio networks, and most major newspa- invited researchers to an open house at the pers throughout the country, including The Review Board’s office. Washington Post, The Los Angeles Ti m e s , and the Dallas Morning News. Internation- Chairman Tunheim also submitted Review a l l y, television networks in Germany and Board updates to journals and newsletters Japan conducted interviews with Board and that serve the research community, including s t a ff members, and an interview with a staff AARC articles about the Review Board to the member appeared in a newspaper in Q u a r t e r l y, Open Secre t s, and P ro b e, all of which cater to researchers and are circulated Poland. Whether it was a local radio station worldwide. in Arkansas or the national CBS Evening News with Dan Rather, in the spirit of 4. Media openness the Review Board went to gre a t lengths to accommodate all requests for Board members and staff devoted significant interviews.

26 F. CONCLUSION its constituency. From time to time the frequent and sustained contact with the public As we move toward the hopeful goal of diverted the staff from its primary responsi- full disclosure, I hope that all of you will bilities—identifying and releasing rec o rd s . continue to have an interest in the work However, the benefits far outweighed the of the Review Board, in the work that costs. The Review Board received valuable we are trying to do, and hope that you input from the public about the existence of all realize that you are our partners in “assassination records,” and most important, this very important effort as we move received donations of records and artifacts forward.3 f rom private citizens that have gre a t l y enhanced the JFK Collection at NARA. There In the spirit of the JFK Act, the Review Board is no doubt that the interaction with the pub- devoted a significant amount of time and lic allowed the Review Board to more com- resources talking to and corresponding with pletely satisfy the objectives of the JFK Act.

27 CHAPTER 3 ENDNOTES

1 Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Report to Accompany S. 3006, The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rept. 102–328, 17. 2 JFK Act at § 7(j)(1)(E) and (F). 3 Chairman Tunheim at the Review Board’s hearing in Dallas, TX, November 1994.

28 CHAPTER 4 DE V E L O P I N G T H E RE V I E W PR O C E S S

A. INTRODUCTION review of its records, was to take no more than 300 days. When the Assassination Records Review Board (Review Board) and its staff began to Generally, federal government agencies and process assassination records in late 1994, offices held one or more of the following they realized they would need a streamlined types of records: process to track thousands of documents. It took two years, but with the help of a com- (1) records relating to an agency’s assas- puter specialist, the staff transformed an sination investigation; unwieldy, paper-driven, labor-intensive sys- (2) records relating to an individual or to tem into a document-based, computerized a subject that is relevant to the assassi- system that automatically tracked each docu- nation; ment through the review process. (3) records that one of the official investigative entities used in an official assas- Developing a tracking system, however, was sination investigation, or just one logistical problem. Each federal exec- (4) records relating to an agency’s assis- utive agency and government office had its tance of another agency in an official own particular problems complying with the assassination investigation. John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collec - tion Act of 1992 (JFK Act.) This reality forced The JFK Act placed the largest burden on the Review Board to develop a re v i e w such agencies as the Federal Bureau of Inves- process that was broad enough to address tigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency each agency’s specific needs. This chapter (CIA), Secret Service, and the Department of explains how that review process worked. Defense because those agencies were deeply involved in the investigation of the assassi- B. JFK ACT REQUIREMENTS FOR nation.1 The JFK Act required the FBI, for PROCESSING DOCUMENTS example, to re v i e w, process, and transfer more than 795,000 pages to NARA, with Section 3(2) of the JFK Act defines assassina- identification aids, within 300 days. tion records to include any records “created or made available for use by, obtained by, or After the agencies had That’s what we hoped would otherwise came into possession of” the fed- identified and rev i e w e d happen, and its literally hap- eral government (or state or local law every assassination rec o rd , pening, as people are able to enforcement offices that assisted in an inves- the JFK Act re q u i re d look at the database and pro- tigation of President Kennedy’s assassina- them to create an elec- vide us with precise information tion). To ensure “expeditious public trans- t ronic identification aid on documents that they’re inter- mission to the archivist and public disclosure for each assassination ested in. of such records,” Section 5 of the JFK Act rec o r d. Congress believed —Steven D.Tilley, required each government agency to identify that this identification August 6, 1996 and organize all records it had pertaining to system would allow the Kennedy assassination and send them to NARA to build a central the National Archives and Records Adminis- directory of identification aids, making it eas- tration (NARA) along with an electro n i c ier for the public to access every assassina- finding aid to ensure easier public access. tion record in the JFK Collection.2 Unfortu- The entire process, including each agency’s nately, it also slowed down the process.3

29 record identification number. Tracking a collection of records such as the JFK Collection on a document-by-document basis is therefore alien to conventional archival practice. But Congress’ intent to account for every assassination record made it necessary to go beyond conventional practice.

C. BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE REVIEW PROCESS

The JFK Act was a novel approach to government declassification, and the Review Board wanted the process to reflect the fact that five American citizens would judge whether government secrets should continue to remain hidden. The Review Board decided at its earliest meetings that it would meet often and make decisions on a document-by-document basis, rather than on an issue-by-issue basis.4 In other words, rather than immediately making “Review Board policy” on postponements relating to protecting the privacy of individuals, the Review Board chose to review every privacy postponement claimed by an agency. The Review Board believed that its cautious ap p r oach would fulfill the JFK Act’s objective—to instill public confidence that all information that could be released would be released. The detailed review also allowed the Bo a r d to educate itself about the information in the rec o r d, something that could not be done except on a document-by-document basis.

NARA provided each agency with the com- As part of its document-by-document rev i e w , puter software to create its identification the Review Board req u i r ed agencies to pro- aids. NARA wanted each assassination vide specific evidence supporting their post- record to bear a unique identification number ponement claims—as the JFK Act req u i re d . 5 (as well as other document-specific informa- (The JFK Act req u i r ed release of all information, such as the date, number of pages, orig- tion in assassination rec o r ds in the year 2017, inator, recipient, subjects, etc.). This unique 25 years after the passage of the act, so the number consists of 13 digits divided into Review Board employs the term “postponed” three parts. The first 3 digits identify the to mean “redacted until the year 2017.”) By agency (for example all CIA records begin reviewing and evaluating every postpone- with “104”), the middle five digits identify ment at its earliest meetings, the Review the floppy disk number on which the agency Bo a r d developed a full understanding of the created the identification aid, and the last issues and of the types of evidence the agencies would provide. Once the Review Board five digits identify the particular record on became comfortable with the issues and with the agency’s floppy disk. (See illustration of the quality of agency evidence, it could dele- record identification aid.) gate more authority to the staff to present rec - ommendations for full Board action. Generally, NARA describes textual records by box or series of boxes. An archivist pre- The Review Board staff realized its review pares a finding aid for a group of records system would need the following elements: which consists of a general summary of the records, and a list of folder titles. In the JFK First, the federal agency would review its Act, however, Congress required that every records and tell the Review Board the loca- document in the collection be assigned a tion of its proposed postponements.

30 Second, the Board staff would then review type of “electronic identification aid” lan- the record and recommend that the Review guage that exists in the JFK Act in future Board either sustain or overrule the agency’s records management legislation. request for postponement. In compliance with sections 5(d)(1)(A) and Third, after making its recommendation, the (B) of the JFK Act, NARA cr eated its database staff would schedule the document for the system and loaded it onto 5 and 1/4 inch Review Board’s next meeting. To issue its floppy disks. NARA assumed that any gov- Federal Register notices in a timely way—as ernment office could load data from the disk the JFK Act required—the staff tracked the onto a computer, produce electronic identifi- document number, the agency’s request for cation aids to accompany its assassination postponements within the document, and rec o r ds, and then send the same disks back to the staff’s recommendation before the NARA. NARA then would integrate the disks Review Board voted on the record. into the main database for the JFK Collection.

Once the Review Board voted on the record, Despite the predictable problems, such as the Review Board staff could notify the agencies’ lack of appropriate computer agency of its determination, publish the equipment, or, more often, agencies’ lack of Review Board vote in the Federal Register, and employees to enter the data, most govern- transmit the record to NARA, unless the ment agencies managed to create electronic agency requested the Review Board to recon- identification aids. sider its decision. The Review Board secured copies of all avail- In the summer and fall of 1995, the Review able disks from NARA and installed agency- Board staff developed database systems for specific databases on its computer network. reviewing assassination records and tracking Every Review Board staff member had access Review Board votes. The system allowed the to these databases, and the database struc- s t a ff to review any assassination re c o rd , ture disks served as a foundation for the regardless of its originating agency. The staff, Review Board’s computer specialist to build with the help of a computer specialist, the Review Track database. designed its primary tracking system, called “Review Track,” to resemble NARA’s elec- The Review Board and the federal agencies tronic identification aid database. quickly learned that creating electronic identification aids and keeping databases Given that the JFK Act required the Review updated was a time-consuming, confusing, Board to publish all Board votes in the Federal and cumbersome process. Usually the origi- Register, the staff designed the Review Track nating agency would create its electro n i c database to be able to generate Federal Regis - identification forms on NARA’s floppy disks. ter notices. But in some cases the originating agencies— primarily within the Department of D. ELECTRONIC IDENTIFICATION AIDS Defense—had accessioned to NARA classified records, and were unwilling to create NARA’s electronic identification aid data- identification aids for assassination records. base system has its flaws, although these do For example, the Review Board staff agreed not lie in faulty computer pro g r a m m i n g . to create identification aids for thousands of Instead, the JFK Act’s well-intentioned records from the Army’s Califano papers and requirements that the Review Board track for the records of the Office of the Secretary documents on a postponement-by-postpone- of Defense. ment basis was, at times, the “tail that wagged the dog.” Further, it is not clear that The agencies typically created electro n i c the best way to create an accessible, easy-to- identification aids during their initial review use JFK Collection was to require agencies to of records. Ideally, the agencies would have attach a separate piece of paper to each created identification aids and sent them to record they processed. Because of these and NARA without modification. But, because other problems, the Review Board urg e s the electronic identification aids contained Congress to think twice before including the information relating to the Review Board’s

31 actions—or votes—on the records, the agen- identification aids might have been more cies and the Review Board were constantly useful to researchers if it had been indexed modifying and updating the data on the according to folder, rather than to individual disks. documents. A number of pro b l e m s D r. Joyce: Are these forms plagued the creation of E. TRACKING THE REVIEW OF related in any way to more—to the NARA e l e c t ro n i c ASSASSINATION RECORDS broader descriptions of the identification aid data- records in question? base. Generating an iden- 1. Review Track Database Mr.Tilley: No, its strictly the tification aid for each information that was created re c o rd placed a heavy As noted above, the Review Track database is when the—captured when the burden on NARA and on a modified NARA electronic identification agencies did the database entry every agency that aid database that Review Board staff used to on each document. It is strictly reviewed records under process assassination records. The Review the record identification form. the JFK Act. Resourc e s Track system evolved out of the Review They can see the whole form. that the Review Board Board staff’s early handwritten review, and it So,they can see all twenty-three and the agencies allo- continued to evolve as the Board and its staff fields, and they can get all the cated to electronic identi- streamlined the review process to meet the subjects. And they can see them fication aid pro d u c t i o n increasing volume of documents agencies could process. on the screen and they can print were resources that agen- that out. But there is no addi- cies could have applied The CIA, FBI, and NARAhad identified large tional information beyond what to review and release of was originally captured. numbers of assassination records. Each of records. The information these three agencies established JFK Act task Dr.Joyce: And there is no text of included on the RIF was the documents? forces and, due to the deadlines imposed by often sketchy, since the the JFK Act, developed units to pro c e s s Mr.Tilley: No. No, we have not indexers who created the records that the JFK Act covered before the done any text entry. There has forms were not always Review Board staff existed. The agencies had been no scanning of documents the individuals most internal models for addressing large declassi- at this time. knowledgeable on the fication projects, including the Freedom of —William Joyce and subjects. Thus, the data- Information Act (FOIA) model and the Steven D.Tilley, bases do not always pro- model the agencies use to implement the August 6, 1996 vide entirely accurate or Executive Order related to declassification. complete search results. Congress, however, had expressly rejected both the FOIAand the Executive Order mod- The JFK databases did, however, open infor- els in its passage of the JFK Act. mation on the records in the JFK collection to the public, especially when NARA made the Knowing that agencies had each processed databases available on the Internet. Those their assassination re c o rds diffe re n t l y , the identification aids furnished useful informa- Review Track had to accommodate a number tion to researchers and facilitated the page- of variations in the electronic identification by-page review that the Review Board aids. Some agencies had released redacted adopted. assassination records to NARA without submitting the records to the Review Board for a The Review Board re c- vote. Other agencies had initially, but not Tracking the large number of ommends that any future completely, reviewed records, but had given the records unique identifying numbers any- documents through the review decisions concerning the way. Still other agencies had created elec- process was a major informa- indexing of records take tion technology challenge. We tronic identification numbers for records that into account the pro b- reinvented the process and the the agency did not believe were assassina- lems and the benefits of systems on a month-by-month tion-related, and which the Review Board creating separate identi- basis. agreed were not related. Clearly, had the —Charles Rhodes, fication aids for individ- Review Board existed when the agencies July 30, 1998 ual records. Much of the began to review their records, some of the information that agen- time-consuming computer glitches may have cies provided on the been avoided.

32 lysts did not know the Board’s position on a Even so, the Review Board staff generally type of postponement, they would designate received from the agencies electronic identifi- the record a “red” document, and put it on cation aids indicating that the agency had the next Board meeting agenda. The staff also performed its duties under the JFK Act. The labeled a record red if it contained a type of Review Board staff then reviewed the docu- information that the Review Board usually ment using Review Track. The staff copied agreed to postpone but the staff believed the agency’s electronic identification aid should be released because the information was of higher public interest. The distinction between red and yellow records was never completely clear, but over time—as the staff and the agencies came to better understand what the Board wanted—the staff identified fewer and fewer items for discussion. When the number of documents the Review Board processed increased dramatically through 1996 and 1997, the number of red documents decreased while green re c o rds dominated meetings.

2. Fast Track Database

The Review Board’s meetings in 1995 and 1996 focused on the core assassination records, such as files re g a rding Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack Ruby, the Warren Commis- sion investigation, and the assassination investigations conducted by the agencies themselves. The Review Board applied the strictest scrutiny to claimed postponements in these files, which set the tone for the release of all remaining assassination records. from a disk, and evaluated each claimed After the Review Board finished reviewing postponement according to the Review the bulk of the core files, it turned its atten- B o a rd’s guidelines. (See illustration of tion to the review of the thousands of pages Review Track identification aid.) of less relevant, but still important, files. Because of time constraints, the Board The following chapter discusses the Review decided to pare down the review process for Board’s guidelines in great detail. In general these documents.6 S p e c i f i c a l l y, the Board terms, once the Board became sufficiently modified Review Track, calling the new sys- familiar with a particular issue, it would tem “Fast Track.” grant the staff decisionmaking authority over it. The Board called these “green” issues. Where Review Track required analysts to enter large amounts of data into the com- If analysts were unsure of the Board’s posi- puter concerning each re c o rd, Fast Tr a c k tion on a specific postponement, they labeled required analysts and administrative staff to the record “yellow” and put it on the agenda enter only the unique identifying number for the next Board meeting. Similarly, if ana- and the number of claimed postponements.

33 Following the on-the-document review by a Bo a r d analyst, the analyst or a Board administrative staff member would enter the rec o r d identification number and the number of postponements into the Fast Track database. Then the staff would present all of its green rec o rd s to the Review Board at its next meeting and ask the Board to accept the staff rec o m m e n d a t i o n s .

F. CONSENT RELEASES

Once the Review Board established its voting patterns, the agencies recognized that the Bo a r d would not sustain postponements of certain types of information. Thus, rather than submit documents to the Review Board that the agencies knew that the Board would release, the agencies began to simply rel e a s e the documents without asking the Board to postpone information in them. Many agencies ultimately released a large number of assassination rec o r ds in full because they pred i c t e d that the Board would release the rec o r d if it we r e presented to them for a vote. When agencies released rec o r ds before the Board ruled on them and because they knew the Bo a r d would release the rec o r d anyway, the Bo a r d called the release a “consent release.”

Most of the consent release documents had elec- Board analysts and their agency counterparts tr onic identification aids and were in the documented their review of the documents Review Board’s tracking system. The Board cre- on the actual documents. For example, a ated a separate database for these rec o rd s , Review Board analyst and an FBI analyst which allowed the Board to determine how would sit down with an assassination record, many agency rec o r ds were released. Every apply the Board’s standards of whether to agency that possessed assassination rec o rd s release or postpone the information at issue, released at least some of its rec o r ds as consent initial the document, and move on to the next releases. In fact, most of the documents rel e a s e d record. This significant revision in the review under the JFK Act were consent rel e a s e s . process allowed analysts G. BOARD PROCEDURES Agencies supplied the Review to spend less time enter- Board with only one copy of the ing data and more time At each of its closed meetings, the Review original security classified doc- with the assassination B o a rd members examined re c o rds. The ument and did not allow for records themselves. (See Board met in a closed conference room and further copying, thereby caus- illustration of Fast Track followed established rules of order with one ing another logistical problem. identification aid.) Board member, usually Chairman John Tun- The solution to this problem heim, mediating discussion, entertaining was a Rube Goldberg arrange- The Review Board also motions, and calling for votes. The Board ment of two television monitors developed uniform sub- determined that a quorum of three members connected to a relative of the stitute language codes so was necessary before a vote could take place, overhead projector called an that the analyst could jot and that a majority of the full Board was nec- “ E l m o .” Thus the five Board the code directly onto essary to carry a vote. A staff member, usu- members were able to examine the re c o rd, either in the m a rgin or above the ally the executive secretary, took minutes, simultaneously each document. 7 —Anna Kasten Nelson, 1998 re d a c t i o n . and an audiotape recorded the proceedings. Staff members presented records to the Board

34 members for their consideration and pro- therefore, was to attempt to ensure that it vided analysis of each postponement along processed all copies of the same document in with information that might provide the the same way. Board members with a context for understanding the document at issue. Staff mem- Wh e r e possible, the Review Board and the bers or representatives of the agencies pre- originating agencies used information from sented the evidence that agencies submitted the electronic identification aids to identify to support postponements. duplicates prior to the Board’s review of the re c o rd. For example, the FBI indexed its The process was laborious, especially in the rec o r ds so that it could keep track of all dupli- early meetings when Board members were cates of a particular rec o r d. The agency also developing their views on the postponement listed the rec o r d numbers of all duplicate criteria. For the most part, the Board rev i e w e d copies on the electronic identification aid. rec o r ds in the conference room. But the Board members did refine the manner in which they Other agencies were not as organized as the accomplished the physical review of rec o rd s . FBI. When processing CIA records, the Board In the early phases of the process, the full staff often encountered more than a dozen Board examined and debated on each post- copies of records. Because the CIAhas decen- ponement in each record. This method was tralized files, neither the agency nor the effective and allowed the Board to establish Review Board could determine where dupli- many of the guidelines that facilitated more cates of particular records might be. efficient review. Since CIA files do contain so many duplicate Once the Board established guidelines, they records, the Board and the Agency ultimately streamlined their review by requesting that agreed that, once the Board had voted on the staff present to the full Board (in the con- postponements in one copy of a record, the ference room) only those records that pre- CIA would have to assume primary respon- sented new issues. The full Board still sibility for processing duplicates to match the wanted to have at least one Board member first copy. The CIA identified the duplicates review each document, however. Thus, for a in a re-review of the JFK Collection, and the limited time, staff members prepared, made Board staff made sure the records the agency recommendations, and boxed re c o rds for identified as duplicates were in fact dupli- review by individual Board members. Board cates. The CIA has agreed to transfer all members then voted on computer to accept duplicates to NARA by September 1999. s t a ff recommendations or they marked records for discussion by the full Board in the 2. Equities and Referrals closed conference room. Eventually, the Board members were confident that the staff When one agency uses another agency’s applied their guidelines correctly and the information to create a re c o rd, the other Board members began to vote to approve agency’s information is called an “equity.” large numbers of “green” issues (in which Understandably, agencies try not to release the staff simply applied the Board’s guidance other agencies’ equities without first consult- to records.) The Board could then reserve ing with them. The process by which the meeting time for unresolved issues. agency that possesses the record consults with the agency whose equities are present in H. MISCELLANEOUS BOTTLENECKS AND the record is called the “referral” process. PROBLEMS IN THE REVIEW PROCESS Agencies also sometimes refer re c o rds to other agencies when the first agency believes 1. Duplicates that the other agency has an interest in the record of the first agency. For example, if rep- Nearly every assassination record appears at resentatives from the Customs Service and least twice in the JFK Collection. In some the CIA were at the same meeting and Cus- cases, the originating agency had two or toms created a record to memorialize the more copies of its own record. In other cases, meeting, Customs would likely “refer” the two or more agencies possessed copies of the meeting report to the CIA before agreeing to same record. The Review Board’s challenge, release the report.

35 Current procedures for process- In processing govern- mation so carefully, they have strong incen- ing records with multiple equi- ment records for release tives not to modify the referral process. ties are expensive and complex. under the terms of the An agency referring classified FOIA or under the terms Because the JFK Act did not consider or records to another agency for its of the Executive Ord e r a d d ress the referral issue, the pro c e s s review must make copies of the governing declassifica- impeded the pace of review and the Review records and specially packa g e tion, agencies: Board’s ability to release records. The Review and transport them in compli- Board realized that, to complete its work, it ance with security procedures (1) identify other could not allow the agencies to engage in ( w h i ch , depending on the agency’s equities in their their traditional referral process. Instead, the re c o r d s ’ classification levels, ca n records; Board would have to engineer the referral range from sending them via (2) send to the other process in one of three ways: registered mail to having them agency a copy of the (1) managing the referrals itself; personally transferred to a gov- record that contains that (2) sending “dunning letters” to agencies ernment courier by a staff per- agency’s equity; and that were delinquent in returning referred son with appropriate clear- (3) wait patiently— documents; or an c e s ) . This process is repeated sometimes for years—for (3) sponsoring joint declassification ses- for every record that contains the other agency to sions at the Review Board offices. ag e n c y equities and can occur process its equity in the multiple times if a single docu- re c o rd and return the a. Managing referrals. When the Review ment needs to be referred to record. Board controlled the referral process, as it did more than one agency and also with the Wa r ren Commission, the House when that record is returned to Only after the other Select Committee on Assassinations, and the referring agency only partly agency returns the rec o r d presidential library records, agencies tended de c l a s s i f i e d . At every step of this to the referring agency to return referred records much more quickly p r o c e s s, additional costs are does the referring agency than if the record came from another agency in c u r r e d . Not only is the process begin to process the through traditional channels. Managing the burdensome and costly for agen- rec o r d to protect its own referrals, however, took an enormous information. For exam- ci e s , but there are no deadlines amount of staff time and forced the Review ple, if the CIA pro v i d e d by which agencies must respond Board to spend much of its time managing the FBI with information to such referrals. The result can records rather than reviewing them. be lengthy delays before a about Lee Harvey review is completed and infor- Oswald’s activities in mation released to the public. Mexico City in 1963, the —The Commission on FBI would report, in its Protecting and Reducing own document, the infor- Government Secrecy, mation that CIA p ro- March 3, 1997 vided to the FBI. When the FBI evaluates this re c o rd for release, the first thing it does is send the rec o r d to CIA, requesting the CIA to evaluate whether CIA information in the rec o r d can be released. CIA evaluates its information and eventually returns the rec o r d to the FBI. Only then does the FBI begin to evaluate whether it can release the FBI information in the rec o r d.

The agencies are reluctant to change this process and they protect information that originates with another agency. Using the above example, if the FBI does not consult with the CIA before releasing the information, the CIA then may choose to release FBI information without consulting with FBI. Because the agencies guard their own infor-

36 b. Dunning letters. When agencies were delinquent in returning referred documents, the Review Board mailed letters to the agencies simply stating that if the agency did not process and return the record by a specified deadline, the Review Board would automatically vote to release the record. The dunning letters proved to be very effective in convincing agencies to return their referrals.

c. Review Board joint declassification sessions. “Joint declassification sessions” emerged as the Review Board’s most effective tool in addressing the problems caused by the referral process. The Review Board staff invited to these sessions re p resentatives from each agency that had equities in a given group of re c o rds. The re p resentatives came to the Review Board’s office to review the records. By the end of the one- or two-day session, the referral process was complete. (See illustration of Review Board joint declassification session form.)

The Review Board sponsored six joint declassification sessions. An unforeseen advantage of the sessions was that agencies were more likely to agree to release a record when they realized that other agencies had alre a d y agreed to do so.

I. DOCUMENT PROCESSING AFTER REVIEW BOARD VOTES

The JFK Act stated that agencies must deliver records to NARAwithin 45 days of a Review Board vote. The 45-day limit proved to be u n reasonable and, as such, the agencies rarely, if ever, adhered to the deadline.

After the Review Board voted on an assassination re c o rd, the JFK Act re q u i red the s t a ff to attach a “final determination form” to the re c o rd. For Review Track re c o rds, the final determination form identified each postponement, its location within the document, and the substitute language for the postponement. For Fast Track re c o rds, the final determination form identified the number of Review Board approved postponements in the document and listed the substitute language options that corresponded to codes noted on the document. (See illustrations of Review Track Final Determination Form and Fast Track Final Determination Form.)

37 interactions with the agencies. The Review Finally, after the Review Board staff com- Bo a r d voted on more than 27,000 documents pleted its final determination forms and in which the agencies had requested that the attached the forms to the records, they placed Review Board postpone information. Each of the document’s electronic identification aid these documents req u i r ed the attention of a into a database called the “Review Track Review Board analyst to shepherd the docu- Archive.” The Review Track Archive contains ment through the process of: (1) evaluating all assassination re c o rds on which the the postponed information according to the Review Board voted. Bo a r d’s guidelines; (2) presenting the document to the Review Board for a vote; (3) J. CONCLUSION rec o r ding the Review Board’s vote on the postponed information; (4) notifying the The Review Board’s most basic task was to agency of the Review Board’s decision; (5) review postponements claimed by federal publishing the decision in the Federal Register; agencies in their assassination rec o r ds and to and (6) preparing the document for transfer to vote either to sustain or release the informa- the JFK Collection. The Review Board ’ s tion at issue. The review of claimed postpone- review process ensured that it scrut i n i z e d ments consumed more Review Board staff each piece of withheld information so that the hours than any other task and was the pri- American public could have confidence that it mary focus of most of the Review Board’ s did not postpone any significant information.

38 CHAPTER 4 ENDNOTES

1 The National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”), of course, also was affected by Congress’ passage of the JFK Act, as they were responsible for establishing the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (“JFK Collection”). 2 JFK Act at § 4(a)(2)(B). 3 JFK Act at § 4(a)(2). 4 For a group of five citizens who were otherwise fully employed, the Review Board members met as a group very often—once or twice each month. The Review Board held the majority of its regular meetings in Washington, D.C. Due to the Review Board’s need to discuss classified and privacy protected material, the Review Board voted to close most of its meetings to the public. During its tenure, the Review Board held 48 closed meetings and processed for release more than 60,000 documents. All of these documents are now a part of the JFK Collec- tion at NARA. 5 Section 6 of the JFK Act lists criteria that agencies can cite when requesting postponements. The criteria and the Review Board’s standards for sustaining claimed postponements are fully explained in Chapter 4 of this report. 6 The next chapter explains in detail the standards that the Review Board established for the review of the “Segregated Collections.” 7 FBI Substitute Language Codes a re as follows: A. Informant Name; B. Informant Identifying Information; C. Informant Symbol Number; D. Informant File Number; E. Operational Detail; F. Identifying Information to Protect the Privacy of an Individual; G. File Number; H. Classi- fied Case Caption. C I A Substitute Language Codes a re as follows: 01 Crypt; 02 Digraph; 03 CIA Employee; 04 Asset; 05 Source; 06 Name of Person; 07 Pseudonym; 08 Identifying Informa- tion; 09 Date; 10 Location; 11 Country; 12 CIA Installation in Africa/Near East*; 13 CIA I n s t a l- lation in East Asia/ Pacific*; 14 CIA Installation in Northern Europe*; 15 CIA Installation in Western Europe*; 16 CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere*; 17 Cable Prefix for Africa/Near East*; 18 Cable Prefix for East Asia/ Pacific*; 19 Cable Prefix for Northern E u rope*; 20 Cable Prefix for Western Europe*; 21 Cable Prefix for Western Hemisphere*; 22 Dispatch Prefix; 23 File Number; 24 Operation Details; 25 None; 26 Scelso; 27 CIA Job Ti t l e ; 28 CIA; 29 Name of Organization; 30 Social Security Number; 31 Alias Documentation; 32 O fficial Cover (Details of Official Cover) [*a second number is included with this type of postponement to facilitate tracking individual locators throughout the Collection]. Military Sub - stitute Language Codes a re as follows: A. Operational Details; B. Name of Person; C. S o u rce/Asset; D. Identifying information to Protect the Privacy of an Individual; E. Location; F. Country/Nationality; G. Name of Organization; H. Intelligence/Counterintelligence Off i- cer; I. No Suitable Substitute Language.

39 CHAPTER 5 TH E STA N D A R D S F O R RE V I E W: RE V I E W BO A R D “ CO M M O N LAW”

A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND nine FOIA exemptions that allow government agencies to withhold information from Section 6 of the President John F. Kennedy the public include exemptions for informa- Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992,1 tion that relates to the national security, infor- (JFK Act), established a short list of reasons mation that is related to law enforcement that federal agencies could cite as a basis for activities, and information that would invade requesting postponement of public disclo- the personal privacy of individuals. The sure of records relating to the assassination of FOIA also allows agencies to protect infor- President Kennedy. The JFK Act directed the mation if its release would cause agencies to Review Board to sustain postponements operate in a fishbowl. For example, agencies under Section 6 only in the “rarest cases.” can withhold information that relates solely Beyond the statute’s presumption of disclo- to personnel practices or reveals the deliber- sure,2 the Review Board had little guidance ative process in its decision making. The from Congress concerning how to apply each FOIA further protects trade secrets, certain of the grounds for postponement. This chap- information relating to financial institutions, ter explains how the Review Board analyzed and certain geological and geophysical infor- and applied each of the postponement stan- mation. Finally, exemption b(3) of the FOIA dards of the JFK Act. works to exempt any information from disclosure if the Director of Central Intelligence 1. Current Guidelines for Release of determines that the material may not be Assassination-Related Information released.

Before Congress passed the JFK Act, mem- The second set of guidelines that governed bers of the public who wished to review the disclosure of records relating to the assassi- government’s assassination re c o rds could nation of President Kennedy before Congress either request the records under the Freedom passed the JFK Act was provided by Presi- of Information Act (FOIA)3 or await the dent Reagan’s Executive Order 12356. Execu- release of the records under the then-current tive Order 12356 was not as disclosure-ori- Executive Order on declassification.4 As of ented as Executive Order 12958, enacted by 1992, some agencies had a five year backlog President Clinton in 1995. The Senate Report in responding to FOIA requests, and mem- for the JFK Act notes that, bers of the public often waited for long periods of time to receive information that might Executive Order 12356, National Secu- be heavily redacted. Moreover Pre s i d e n t rity Information, has precluded the Reagan’s Executive Order 12356, in effect in release of [assassination] records.. . . 1992, was aimed more at protecting secrets [L]egislation is necessary. . . because E.O. than releasing information. 12356, “National Security Information,” has eliminated the government-wide Like the JFK Act, the FOIA is a disclosure schedules for declassification and statute that assumes that all government downgrading of classified information records, except for those that fit within one of the and has prevented the timely public dis- enumerated exemptions, may be released.5 Also closure of assassination records. . . 6 like the JFK Act, the FOIA places upon the government the burden of proving that mate- President Clinton’s Executive Order 12958, rial fits within the statutory exemptions. The currently in effect,7 is significantly more dis-

41 c l o s u re-oriented than President Reagan’s 2. Key Distinctions Between Standards order. The current Executive Order applies to of Release Under the FOIA, the Execu- all Executive branch records and, unlike the tive Order, and the JFK Act JFK Act, requires agencies to engage in a systematic declassification of all records more In considering whether the JFK Act was nec- than 25 years old. The Executive Order gives essary to guarantee public access to assassi- agencies five years—until April 2000—to nation records, Congress evaluated the effec- declassify all classified information that is (1) tiveness of both the FOIA and the more than 25 years old, and (2) is of perma- then-current Executive Order 12356. Both the nent historical value unless the “agency House and the Senate concluded that the head” determines that release of the informa- FOIA and the Executive Order, as adminis- tion would cause one of the nine enumerated tered by the executive branch, had failed to harms. The Executive Order provides for guarantee adequate public disclosure of continuing protection for sources and meth- assassination records. ods where disclosure would damage the national security. It also protects, inter alia, At the time that the JFK Act became law, the information that involves diplomatic rela- largest collections of records concerning the tions, U.S. cryptologic systems, war plans assassination were under the control of the that are still in effect, and protection of the FBI, the CIA, and the Congressional Commit- President.8 tees who investigated the assassination. The FOIA provides special protections for each of The JFK Act guidelines these entities, and thus could not serve as the We need to separate sources that governed the disclo- mechanism for maximum disclosure of from methods.This could be the sure of records relating to assassination re c o rd s . First, the FOIA most lasting effect of the Board. the assassination of Pres- exempts CIA operational files from disclo- —Steven Garfinkle, ident Kennedy were s u re .1 0 S e c o n d , the FOIA p rovides bro a d - April 14, 1998 detailed in section 6 of based protection for law enforcement files the JFK Act.9 The JFK Act and therefore allows the FBI to protect a sub- allowed the Review Board to postpone the stantial amount of its information from dis- release of assassination re c o rds only where closure.11 Third, the FOIA does not apply to the agencies provided clear and convincing unpublished Congressional records.12 Con- evidence that one of five enumerated harms gress found that the FOIA did not require would occur if the Review Board re l e a s e d adequate disclosure in those records that it the re c o rd a n d that the harm outweighed did cover. Thus, Congress believed that the the public interest in disclosure. The statute FOIA was not a satisfactory mechanism for allowed protection of intelligence agents guaranteeing disclosure of assassination and intelligence sources and methods if the records.13 agency could show that the agent, sourc e , or method currently re q u i red pro t e c t i o n . P resident Clinton did not sign Executive The statute further allowed the Board to Order 12958 until April 17, 1995—over two p rotect the identity of living persons who years after Congress passed the JFK Act. p rovided confidential information to the Clearly, the terms of the Executive Order government if the agency could show that applied to most assassination records since d i s c l o s u re of the person’s identity would they were of permanent historical value and pose a substantial risk of harm to the per- were over 25 years old. Even if President son. The JFK Act allowed the Review Board Clinton’s Executive Order had been in effect to postpone release of information if re l e a s e prior to 1992, it could not have achieved the would constitute an unwarranted invasion maximum disclosure accomplished by the of personal privacy or if release would com- JFK Act. The problem with the Executive p romise the existence of an understanding Order is that it allowed “agency heads” to of confidentiality between a government make the decision to exempt records from agent and a cooperating individual or for- automatic declassification provided that the eign government. Finally, the JFK A c t “agency head” expected that disclosure of allowed the Review Board to protect cur- the records would result in one of the nine rent information concerning protection of enumerated categories of harm. As many sec- government off i c i a l s . tions of this Report explain, the Review

42 Board found that “agency heads” tended to sumption of immediate disclosure.”14 The statute be quite reluctant to release their agencies’ further declared that “only in the rarest cases is s e c rets. The Executive Ord e r, while well- there any legitimate need for continued protection intentioned, failed to provide for any inde- of such records.”15 pendent review of “agency heads’” decisions on declassification. Thus, although the Exec- b. JFK Act requires agencies to provide clear utive Order’s standards for declassification and convincing evidence. appeared to be disclosure-oriented, the Exec- utive Order failed to hold agency heads If agencies wished to withhold information accountable for their decisionmaking. in a document, the JFK Act required the agency to submit clear and convincing evi- The JFK Act did require agencies to account dence that the informa- for their decisions. To ensure such account- tion fell within one of the The bill creates a strong pre- ability, Congress included four essential pro- n a r row postponement sumption on releasing docu- visions in the JFK Act: first, the JFK Act pre- criteria.16 me n t s . The onus will be on those sumed that assassination re c o rds may be who would withhold documents released; second, the JFK Act stated that an C o n g ress selected the to prove to the Review Board and agency could rebut the presumption of dis- clear and convincing evi- the American people why those closure only by proving, with clear and con - dence standard because documents must be shielded from vincing evidence, that disclosure would result “less exacting standards, public scrutiny. in harm and that the expected harm would such as substantial evi- —Senator John Glenn, outweigh any public benefit in the disclo- dence or a pre p o n d e r- May 12, 1992 sure; third, the JFK Act created an independent ance of the evidence, agency—the Review Board—whose mandate were not consistent with was to ensure that agencies respected the the legislation’s stated goal” of prompt and presumption of disclosure and honestly pre- full release.17 The legislative history of the sented clear and convincing evidence of the JFK Act emphasized the statutory require- need to protect information; and fourth, the ment that agencies provide clear and con- JFK Act required agencies to provide the vincing evidence. Review Board with a c c e s s to government records, even when those records would not There is no justification for perpetual become part of the JFK Collection. Without secrecy for any class of records. Nor can these accountability provisions, the JFK Act the withholding of any individual would not have accomplished its objective of record be justified on the basis of gen - maximum release of assassination records to eral confidentiality concerns applicable the public. So, while the FOIA and the Exec- to an entire class. Every record must be utive Order each expressed the goal of judged on its own merits, and every obtaining maximum disclosure, the JFK Act record will ultimately be made available ensured that the goal would be met. The two for public disclosure.18 accountability provisions that relate directly to the Section 6 grounds for postponement— When agencies did present to the Review the presumption of release and the standard Board evidence of harm that would result of proof—are discussed in detail below. The from disclosure, it had to consist of more t h i rd provision discussed below is the than speculation. Review Board’s obligation to balance the weight of the evidence in favor of postpone- The [Review] Board cannot postpone ment against the public interest in release. release because it might cause some con - ceivable or speculative harm to national a. JFK Act presumes disclosure of s e c u r i t y. Rather in a democracy the assassination records. demonstrable harm from disclosure must be weighed against the benefits of The most pertinent language of the JFK Act release of the information to the public.19 was the standard for release of information. According to the statute, “all Government The Review Board’s application of the clear records concerning the assassination of Pres- and convincing evidence standard is covered ident John F. Kennedy should carry a pre - in more detail in Section B of this chapter.

43 Section B includes a discussion of the “Rule 3. Federal Agency Record Groups and of Reason” that the Review Board ultimately the Standards Applied to Them. adopted with regard to receiving evidence from the agencies. The JFK Act defines “assassination records” to include records related to the assassination c. JFK Act requires the Review Board to of President Kennedy that were “created or balance evidence for postponement against made available for use by, obtained by, or public interest in release. otherwise came into the possession of” the following groups: the Warren Commission, Assuming that agencies did provide clear the four congressional committees that inves- and convincing evidence that information tigated the assassination, any office of the should be protected from disclosure, the federal government, and any state or local terms of section 6 required that information law enforcement office that assisted in a fed- not be postponed unless the threat of harm eral investigation of the assassination.22 outweighs the public interest in disclosure. As used in the JFK Act, “public interest” When it passed the JFK Act, Congre s s means “the compelling interest in the prompt intended for the JFK Collection to include the public disclosure of assassination records for record groups that it identified in section historical and governmental purposes and 3(2), but it also intended for the Review for the purpose of fully informing the Amer- Board to consider carefully the scope of the ican people about the history surrounding term “assassination record” and to issue an the assassination of President John F. interpretive regulation defining this crucial Kennedy.”20 The Review Board interpreted term.23 The Act requires government agencies the balancing requirement to mean that agen- to identify, organize, and process those assas- cies had to provide the Review Board with sination records that are defined as assassi- clear and convincing evidence of the threat of nation records in section 3(2). Chapter 6 of harm that would result from disclosure . this report explains how the Review Board However, to the extent that the JFK Act left interpreted its responsibility to define and room for discretion in evaluating the histori- seek out “additional records and informa- cal significance, or public interest, of particu- tion.” Set forth below is a description of some lar assassination records, it was the Review of the core government holdings on the Board—not the agency that originated the assassination which were released under the document—that was to exercise this discre- standards of the Review Board. tion. The burden was on the agencies to make the case for postponement, not to judge the a. The FBI’s “core and related” files. level of public interest in a particular document. The JFK Act established the Review The FBI’s “core and related” files consist of Board as a panel of independent citizens with those re c o rds that the FBI gathered in expertise as historians and archivists pre- response to FOIA requests that it received in cisely in order to secure public confidence in the 1970s for records relating to the assassi- such determinations.21 nation of President Kennedy. The “core” files include the FBI files on Lee Harvey Oswald d. Segregability and substitute language. and Jack Ruby, as well as the FBI’s Warren Commission files and the JFK assassination When the Review Board determined that the investigation file. The “related” files include risk of harm did outweigh the public interest FBI files on Lee Harvey Oswald’s wife in disclosure, it then had to take two addi- Marina and mother Marguerite, Oswald’s tional steps: (1) ensure that the agency friend George DeMohrenschildt, and the redacted the least amount of information Oswalds’ Dallas friends Ruth and Michael possible to avoid the stated harm, or “segre- Paine. The FBI began its processing of the gate” the postponed information, and (2) core and related files in 1993. The Review provide substitute language to take the place Board applied strict standards to its review of of the redaction. postponements in the core and related files.

44 b. CIA’s Lee Harvey Oswald “201” file. e. FBI records on the congressional commit - tees that investigated the assassination. CIAopens a 201 file on an individual when it has an “operational interest” in that person. The JFK Act defined “assassination record” The CIA opened its 201 file on Lee Harvey to include records relating to the Kennedy Oswald in December 1960 when it received a assassination that were used by the congres- request from the Department of State on sional committees who investigated events 24 defectors. After President Kennedy’s assassi- surrounding the assassination. nation, the Oswald 201 file served as a depository for records CIA gathered and created B e f o re President Clinton appointed the during CIA’s wide-ranging investigation of Review Board, the FBI collected and began to the assassination. Thus, the file provides the process its administrative files relating to its most complete record of the CIA’s inquiry in involvement with each of these committees. In large part, the records contained in the the months and years immediately following Bureau’s administrative files related to topics the assassination. other than the Kennedy assassination. To the extent that the Review Board found records c. The FBI’s “House Select Committee on in these files that concerned topics other than Assassinations”(HSCA) Subject Files. the Kennedy assassination, it designated the records not believed relevant (or “NBR” as During the HSCA’s tenure, the Committee that acronym is defined infra) and removed made a number of requests to the FBI for them from further consideration. records that the Committee believed might be relevant to their investigation of the f. Requests for Additional Information. Kennedy assassination. In response to the HSCA’s requests, the FBI made available to Congress included in the JFK Act a provision the HSCA staff approximately 200,000 pages that allowed the Review Board to obtain of FBI files. The FBI began its processing of additional information and records beyond the “HSCASubject” files in 1993. The Review those that were reviewed by previous inves- Board applied its “Segregated Collection” tigations. Chapter 6 of this report explains guidelines (explained below) to the HSCA the requests that the Review Board made and subject files. the assassination re c o rds designated as a result of those requests. d. The CIA’s “Segregated Collection” files. B. DECLASSIFICATION STANDARDS HSCA investigators gained access to CIA files. Upon completion of the HSCA’s work, The Review Board’s primary purpose, as out- the CIA kept separate the files that it had lined in section 7(b) of the JFK Act, was to made available to the HSCA and retained determine whether an agency’s request for them as a segregated collection. This collec- postponement of disclosure of an assassination is divided into two parts: paper records tion record met the criteria for postponement set forth in section 6. Section 6 consisted of an and microfilm. CIA made 63 boxes of paper introductory clause, which established the re c o rds available to the HSCA s t a ff. The “clear and convincing evidence” standard, paper records consist, in many cases, of par- and five subsections that set forth the criteria ticular records that CIA culled from various under which the Review Board could agree files. The 64th box of the CIA’s segregated to postpone public disclosure of assassina- collection contains 72 reels of microfilm and tion-related information. represents the entire set of files from which records were made available to the HSCA. 1. Standard of Proof: Clear and Thus, in many cases, the microfilmed files Convincing Evidence contain material well beyond the scope of the HSCA investigation and may, for example, Text of Section 6 cover an agent’s entire career when only a small portion of it intersected with the assas- Disclosure of assassination records or par - sination story. ticular information in assassination records

45 to the public may be postponed subject to the attempt to arrive at consistent decisions, the limitations of this Act if [agencies provide] Board asked the staff to present the records clear and convincing evidence that [the on an issue-by-issue basis. For example, with harm from disclosure outweighs the public FBI records, the Review Board first sched- interest in release.] uled a group of FBI records for review and notified the FBI of the meeting date at which a. Review Board guidelines. For each recom- it intended to vote on the re c o rds. The mended postponement, the JFK Act requires Review Board invited the FBI to present its an agency to submit “clear and convincing evidence. Second, the FBI requested that it be evidence” that one of the specified grounds allowed to brief the members of the Review for postponement exists. 25 The Review Board Board. At the briefing, the FBI presented its required agencies to submit specific facts in position to the Board—both in an oral pre- support of each postponement, according to sentation and in a “position paper.” The FBI’s the Review Board’s guidelines for each post- “position papers” summarized the FBI’s gen- ponement type. eral policy preferences for continued classification of certain categories of information. b. Commentary. Although the agencies T h i rd, the Review Board staff re s e a rc h e d argued that the clear and convincing evi- existing law on each of the FBI’s “positions” dence standard could be and determined that the arguments that the I think today a great gulf exists satisfied by a general FBI put forth in support of its JFK Act post- between people and their explanation of those ponements were essentially the same argu- elected officials. Doubts about agencies’ positions in ments that the FBI offers to courts for FOIA this particular matter are a support of postpone- cases. Of course, in legislating the declassifi- symptom of that, and so I think ments, the Review Board cation standards of the JFK Act, Congress the purpose of this hearing is to determined that the clear intended for the JFK Act standards—and not ask some questions. Why does and convincing evidence the FOIA standards—to apply.Aware of con- information need to be with- requirement was a docu- gressional intent, the Review Board rejected held? At this moment in time, ment-specific one. Thus, the FBI’s general policy preferences on the what compelling interests are the Board required agen- basis that the arguments did not constitute there for the holding back of cies to present evidence the clear and convincing evidence necessary information? Are there legiti- that was tailored to indi- to support a request for a postponement mate needs in this respect? Who vidual postponements under section 6. The FBI did appeal the and what is being protected? within individual docu- Review Board’s decisions to the President, W h i ch individuals, w h i ch ments. but the Review Board’s document-specific agencies, which institutions are interpretation of the clear and convincing in the need of protection, and The JFK Act clearly evidence standard ultimately pre v a i l e d what national security interests required agencies to pro- when the vote was withdrawn. still remain? vide clear and convinc- —Senator William S. Cohen, ing evidence in support i. “Rule of Reason.” Of course, some assassi- May 12, 1992 of their postponements, nation records are of greater interest than but it did not establish a others. With regard to records that had a mechanism for when and close nexus to the assassination, the Review how such evidence should be presented. The Board strictly applied the law. For example, legislative history provides a clue as to Con- the Review Board voted to release in full gress’ intent: “[T]o the extent possible, con- nearly all of the information in the FBI’s pre- sultation with the government offices creates assassination Lee Harvey Oswald file and the an understanding on each side as to the basis bulk of the information in the HSCA’s report and reasons for their respective recommen- on CIA activities in Mexico City—the dations and determinations.”26 The Review “Lopez” report—because of the high public Board did consult with government offices to interest in that material. With regard to the determine fair, efficient, and reasonable pro- FBI files, the FBI believed that its arguments cedures for presenting evidence. were compelling enough to merit appeals to the President on nearly all of the Review The Review Board began its review of assas- Board’s decisions on the pre-assassination sination records by considering pre- assassi- Lee Harvey Oswald records. The FBI, the nation records on Lee Harvey Oswald. In an Review Board, the White House Counsel’s

46 O ffice, and ultimately the Department of to provide evidence on an informant. (See State spent a substantial amount of time illustration.) The form allowed the FBI to resolving the issues that arose in the appeal simply fill in the answers to a series of ques- process, and for those important records that tions about the informant in question, which were at issue, the Review Board considered in turn allowed the Review Board to focus on its time well-spent. The Review Board simi- those facts that it deemed to be dispositive in larly dealt with other key records and spent a particular document. This approach had as much time as was necessary to deliberate the added benefit of providing consistency to and decide upon those records. the Review Board’s decisionmaking.

The postponement-by-postponement review A large number of records that the JFK Act at each early Review Board meeting proved defined as “assassination records” proved to to be a slow and careful process. The post- be of very low public interest. The JFK Act ponement-by-postponement review proved required the Review Board to process all to be a necessary educational process for the records that were “made available” to the Board members. The Board members were a Warren Commission and the Congressional group of five citizens who were selected not Committees that investigated the assassina- for their familiarity with the subject of the tion, whether or not the records were used by assassination, but for their professional com- the Commission or the committees. Many of petence in history and law. Thus, through these records, while interesting from a histo- reviewing individual documents at its early rian’s perspective, are not closely related to meetings, the Board essentially educated the assassination. For those documents that itself about the assassination. were of little or no public interest, the Review Board modified its standards in the two ways While the Review Board did need time to edu- described below. cate itself and to develop its policies, the Bo a r d’s pace eventually increased. In an effo r t A. “NBR” Guidelines: Records that Review to streamline its work, the Review Board con- Board judged were “not believed relevant” to the sulted with federal agencies such as the CIA assassination. For those records that truly had and FBI to work out an approach for review of no apparent relevance to the assassination, rec o r ds that would allow the Review Board to the Review Board designated the records make informed decisions, but not req u i r e “not believed relevant” (NBR). The “NBR” agencies to spend hundreds of hours locating Guidelines allowed the Review Board to evidence for and providing briefings on each remove irrelevant records from further con- postponement within an assassination rec o r d. sideration. Records that the Review Board designated “NBR” were virtually the only The first step to developing a reasonable groups of records that the Review Board approach was for the Review Board to for- agreed to postpone in full. Thus, the Review mulate general rules for sustaining and Board was always extremely reluctant to des- denying postponements. The Review Board’s ignate records “NBR” and rarely did so. “guidance” to its staff and the agencies became a body of rules—a Review Board B. Segregated Collection Guidelines. For those “common law.” Once the Review Board noti- records that were not immediately relevant, fied an agency of its approach on a particular but shed at least some light on issues that the type of postponement, the agency learned to congressional committees that investigated p resent only those facts that the Review the assassination explored as potentially rele- Board would need to make a decision. For vant to the assassination, the Review Board example, with regard to FBI informants, the created the “Segregated Collection Guide- Review Board notified the FBI of what it con- lines.” The segregated collections records, sidered to be the relevant factors in its deci- although marginally relevant, were not sionmaking. In other words, it defined for the appropriate for “NBR” designation, as the Bureau what it considered to be “clear and “NBR” Guidelines would have resulted in convincing” evidence. Then, the Review withholding re c o rds in full. Instead, the Board worked with the FBI to create a one- Board passed the “Segregated Collection” page form titled an “Informant Postpone- Guidelines, which ensured that the Review ment Evidence Form” that the FBI could use Board staff would review every page of the

47 marginally relevant records, but would not a. CIA officers. require agencies to present the same amount of evidence in support of postponements. i. Review Board guidelines. The Review The regulations that the Review Board Board usually protected the names of CIA adopted on November 13, 1996, define “Seg- officers who are still active or who retired regated Collections” to include the following: under cover and are now living in potentially (1) FBI records that were requested by the risky circumstances. The Review Board usu- HSCA in conjunction with its investigation ally released names of deceased CIA officers into the assassination of President Kennedy, and the names of CIAofficers whose connection to the CIA was public knowledge. When the Church Committee in conjunction with the Review Board postponed names, it usu- its inquiry into issues relating to the Kennedy ally substituted the phrase, “CIAEmployee.” assassination, and the Pike Committee and Rockefeller Commission that investigated ii. Commentary. Names of numerous CIA issues related to the assassination; (2) CIA officers appeared in the CIA’s assassination records including the CIA’s segregated col- records. The Review Board and the CIA had lection of 63 boxes as well as one box of to confront the challenge presented by the microfilm records (box 64) and several boxes statute, which re q u i res name-specific evi- of CIA staff “working files.” The Review dence, but gathering such evidence proved to Board adopted revised guidelines on April be time-consuming and burdensome for the 23, 1997 in an attempt to streamline the CIA and the names of CIA officers in the review process of postponements in the segre c o rds were not always relevant to the regated collections, and ensure a page-by- assassination. The statute, of course, states page review of all documents in the segre- that the only way that the Review Board gated collections. The guidelines state, could protect names of intelligence agents “. . . even with the assumption that our oper- was if the CIAprovided clear and convincing ations may be extended through Fiscal Year evidence that the CIA officer’s identity “currently” required protection. 1998, the Review Board cannot hope to complete review of postponements in the Segre- The CIAinitially believed that the solution to gated Collections under the current method the above-referenced challenge was for the of review.” Where the Review Board’s stan- Review Board to agree with CIA that the dards differed between core files and segre- names of all CIA officers within the JFK Col- gated collection files, the guidelines set forth lection should be postponed until the year below note the distinction. 2017. The CIA supported its request for blanket postponements with two arguments: first, Thus, throughout its tenure, the Review since many CIA employees are “under Board sought to be vigorous in applying the cover,” CIA argued that its intelligence gath- law, but, in order to complete its work, found ering capability depended on employees it necessary to employ a “rule of reason.” maintaining cover, and, second, even though the majority of CIA officer names in the Col- 2. Intelligence Agents lection are names of retired CIA employees, CIA is bound by a confidentiality agreement Text of Section 6(1)(A) to protect the relationship. Many of these former employees objected to release of their former Agency affiliation, complaining that it . . . clear and convincing evidence that the violates this agreement and suggesting that threat to the military defense, intelligence such release might jeopardize business rela- operations, or conduct of foreign relations of tionships or threaten personal safety. the United States posed by the public disclo - sure of the assassination record is of such Mindful of the JFK Act’s requirement that gravity that it outweighs the public interest, agencies provide name-specific evidence, the and such public disclosure would reveal— Review Board would not agree to CIA’ s request for blanket postponements of CIA (A) an intelligence agent whose identity names. Instead, the Review Board requested currently requires protection. . . CIA to provide evidence for each name.

48 The CIA, however, was reluctant to produce was of sufficiently high public interest that it name-specific evidence and, on occasion, would require the CIA to provide additional C I A failed to furnish evidence when it evidence before it would consider protecting promised to do so. CIA’s initial refusal to the name. In these cases, the Review Board supply evidence on individual names was asked CIA to provide information on the met, not with the wholesale release of names employee’s current status, his or her location, by the Board, but with a firm insistence that and the nature of the work he or she did for the Agency meet the requirements of the Act. the CIA. The Review Board released the names of a few individuals who were of central impor- The Review Board determined that names tance to the assassination story early in the were of high public interest when the CIA process, but gave the Agency a number of officer at issue had a substantive connection additional opportunities to provide specific to the assassination story or where the CIA evidence on other names. officer’s name appeared in CIA’s Oswald 201 file. By July 1997, the Review Board had For example, in December 1995, the Review determined that where CIAofficer names did Board designated one day of their meeting not fit within one of the “high public inter- “name day,” and invited CIA to provide evi- est” categories, it would require CIA to pro- dence for names the Review Board had vide significantly less evidence in support of encountered in CIA records during the previ- its requests for postponement. Given the ous six to seven months. On that day, CIA large number of CIAofficer names in the CIA again requested the Review Board to sustain records, the Review Board determined that it the postponement of all CIA names. The had to adopt the practical high public inter- Review Board did not want to jeopardize the est/low public interest approach, particu- personal safety of individuals and gave CIA larly since it had limited time and resources more time to provide evidence. The Board set available to complete its own review of CIA other “name days” in May 1996 and May records. The Review Board would have pre- 1997. As deadlines for submission of evi- ferred to review each name at the same high dence approached, CIA a g reed to re l e a s e level of scrutiny that it used to review names some names, but in most cases, continued to of high public interest. Nevertheless, the offer less than satisfactory evidence on those B o a rd’s approach compelled the CIA t o they wished to protect. Gradually, the CIA release many more names than it would have did begin to provide supporting evidence of desired. the postponement of individual names. b. “John Scelso” (pseudonym). By May 1996, the Review Board had decided what evidence would meet the clear and con- i. Review Board guidelines. The Review vincing evidence standard. If the CIA pro- Board protected the true name of the individ- vided evidence that the individual retired ual known by the pseudonym of John Scelso under cover or abroad, or evidence that the until May 1, 2001 or three months after the individual objected to the release of his or her decease of the individual, whichever comes name when contacted (CIAagreed to attempt first. to contact former employees), the Review Board would protect the CIA officer’s name. ii. Commentary. The CIA employee who Moreover, where the CIA specifically identi- was head of CIA’s division “Western Hemi- fied an ongoing operation in which the indi- sp h e r e 3” during the period immediately vidual was involved or CIA could demon- after the assassination of President Kennedy strate that the person was still active with testified before the HSCA and the Church CIA, the Review Board would protect the Committee under the “throw-away” alias name. Because the JFK Act re q u i red the John Scelso. His true name appears on hun- Review Board to balance the potential harm dr eds of documents in the JFK collection, from disclosure against the public interest in many of which were the product of the release, there were cases in which the Review Agency’s extensive post-assassination inves- Board determined that, even though the CIA tigation that spanned the globe. In rev i e w i n g had provided the re q u i red evidence, the this particular name, the Review Board ’ s Review Board believed that the individual de s i r e to satisfy the public’s interest in rel e a s e

49 clashed with the CIA’s strong evidence in ii. Commentary. Whenever the Review support of postponement. Initially, the Board Bo a r d voted to protect the identity of an indi- was inclined to release Scelso’s true name, but vidual throughout federal agency assassina- the Agency argued convincingly against tion rec o r ds, it had to be realistic enough to release. CIA pr ovided evidence on the curren t realize that some information about individu- status of the individual, shared corres p o n - als is so specific that release of the information dence sent by him, and even arranged an would reveal the individual’s identity. Exam- interview between him and a Review Board ples of specific identifying information include st a f f member. As an interim step, the Review home addresses, birth dates, job titles, names Bo a r d inserted his prior alias “Scelso” as sub- of family members, and other less obvious, but stitute language. (See illustration.) Then, at its equally revealing pieces of information. May 1996 meeting, Board members determined to release “Scelso’s” true name in five d. Names of National Security Agency years or upon his death. employees.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Bo a r d protected the names of all National Security Agency employees that it encoun- te r ed. The Review Board would have consider ed releasing names of National Security Agency employees if it determined that a particular name was extremely relevant to the as s a s s i n a t i o n .

ii. Commentary. Due to the nature of NSA information, few NSA employee names a p p e a red in NSA’s assassination re c o rd s . Even though the Review Board did not often encounter NSA employee names, it did have to vote on those names that it did confron t . NS A ’s policy of not releasing the names of its employees conflicted with section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act that presumed release of such information unless NSA could prove that individual NSA employee names req u i re d pr otection. NSA ar gued that the release of any names, other than those of publicly acknowledged senior officials, jeopardized the potential security of U.S. cryptographic systems and those individuals. As it did with the names of other intelligence agents and offi - cers, the Review Board considered the names of NSA of ficers on a document-by-document basis. Given the nature of NSA in f o r m a t i o n , the Review Board members agreed that none of the few names which appear in the documents, and for which NSA requested prot e c - tion, was of high enough public interest or central to an understanding of the assassina- c. Information that identifies CIA officers. tion story. Thus, it protected the names.

i. Review Board guidelines. For specific 3. Intelligence Sources and Methods, information that, if released, would reveal and Other Matters Relating to the the identity of an individual CIA officer that National Security of the United States the Board had voted to protect, the Review Board protected the information. Text of Section 6(1)(B) and (C)

50 . . . clear and convincing evidence that the c o n s i d e red CIA employee names, and threat to the military defense, intelligence en c o u n t e r ed the same problems as it had in operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the review of CIA employee names. As with the United States posed by the public disclo - CI A employee names, CIA was reluctant to sure of the assassination record is of such pr ovide name-specific evidence to the Review gravity that it outweighs the public interest, Bo a r d, opting instead to offer general princi- and such public disclosure would reveal— ples supporting CIA’s request that the Review Bo a r d redact all names. (B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected The Review Board ulti- to be utilized, by the United States Govern - mately decided to protect The Review Board should con- ment and which has not been officially dis - the names of sourc e s , sider a variety of factors related closed, the disclosure of which would inter - assets, and informants in to the need to postpone disclo- f e re with the conduct of intelligence cases where the identity sure of intelligence sources and activities; or of the source is of m e t h o d s, including the age of reduced public intere s t the record, whether the use of a (C) any other matter currently relating to because CIA sources live particular source or method is the military defense, intelligence operations in countries other than already well known by the pub- or conduct of foreign relations of the United the U.S. and were more lic (e.g. that the Soviet Embassy States, the disclosure of which would likely to face harm if the in Mexico City was bugged demonstrably impair the national security of B o a rd disclosed their during the alleged visit of Lee the United States; relationship with CIA. In Harvey Oswa l d ) , and whether those records where the the source or method is inher- a. CIA sources. source’s identity was of ently secret, or whether was the possible public intere s t information it collected which i. Review Board guidelines. The Review in relation to the assassi- was secret. Board handled CIA sources, assets, infor- nation story or was —Senate Report on JFK Act, mants, and specific identifying information important to understand- July 22, 1992 under standards similar to the Board’s deci- ing information related to sions for CIA officers. Where the Review the assassination, the Board believed names held a high level of Review Board req u i r ed the CIA to prov i d e public interest, either because the name was additional evidence to support the prot e c t i o n central to the story or because assassination of the source’s identity. researchers expressed interest in the name, the Review Board subjected them to close When the Review Board postponed release of scrutiny. The Board generally protected the source names, it did so for ten years except in identity of foreign nationals unless they were cases where a foreign government might of high public interest and then the Review accuse the source of committing treason for Board required CIA to provide specific evi- assisting the CIA. In those cases, the Review dence in support of its claimed postpone- Board protected the source’s name and iden- ments. The Review Board protected domestic tifying information until 2017. sources, assets and informants where CIA demonstrated that release would jeopardize b. CIA pseudonyms. ongoing operations or harm individuals. If CIA did not provide evidence of one of the i. Review Board guidelines. With only a two above-re f e renced harms, the Review few exceptions, the Review Board released Board released the name at issue. In addition, the pseudonyms of individuals. In some where the public already knew the names of instances, the Review Board used pseudo- individuals who were connected to the CIA, nyms as substitute language for the individ- especially if the government had previously ual’s true name. released the information, the Review Board released the information. ii. Commentary. Very early in the review process, the Review Board determined that, ii. Commentary. The Review Board since pseudonyms were a sort of “throw ad d r essed the issue of whether to postpone or away” identity for individuals who were release source names at the same time that it under cover, the Review Board could release

51 the pseudonym without harming the indi- records. CIAargued that its use of crypts was vidual. The CIA did not object to the Review an operational method that should remain Board’s policy to release pseudonyms. The secret, even though CIAhad replaced most of CIA did identify several pseudonyms that it the crypts at issue years earlier. CIA believed believed to be particularly sensitive, and that if the Review Board released the crypts, demonstrated to the Review Board with clear researchers would be able to piece together and convincing evidence that release of those the records and determine the identity of pseudonyms would do irreparable harm. operations and individuals. CIA f u r t h e r argued that the burden of locating evidence c. CIA crypts. on each crypt was too heavy.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review The Review Board, conversely, believed that B o a rd released some CIA “ c r y p t s ” — c o d e CIA conceived crypts as a code to hide the words for operations and individuals. The identity of an operation or an individual, and Review Board also generally released CIA so the Review Board could release the crypts “digraphs”—the first two letters of a crypt and not compromise the operation or the that link a particular crypt to a particular individual. As with CIA agent names, the location. CIA often created crypts to refer to Review Board allowed the CIAample time to other U.S. government agencies; for example, locate evidence on each crypt. Finally, the the FBI was “ODENVY.” The Review Board Review Board released a group of CIAcrypts made a blanket decision to release all U.S. from Mexico City with the “LI” digraph. CIA government crypts. The Review Board nearly eventually agreed to release its crypts and always released CIA crypts where those digraphs in assassination records, and the crypts denoted operations or individuals Review Board eventually agreed to protect relating to Mexico City or Cuba. (The certain sensitive crypts. digraph for Mexico City was “LI,” and for Cuba, it was “AM.”) For all other crypts, the The Review Board recognized that it could Review Board protected the digraph and not conduct a crypt-by-crypt review for released the remainder of the crypt. The every CIA record that it encountered. CIA Review Board established a few exceptions, records contain hundreds of thousands of and where exceptions applied, the Board crypts. Given the need to finish its work, the required CIA to provide crypt-specific evi- Review Board decided that, for all crypts dence of the need to protect. e x c e p t the “LI,” “AM,” and “OD” series crypts, it would agree to postpone the loca- ii. Commentary. The Review Board had tion-specific digraph and release the actual to determine whether it believed that release crypts. Thus, the Review Board released most of CIA crypts would harm CIA operations crypts in the collection and the most relevant and individuals. Section 6(1)(B) and (C) of digraphs. The Review Board did make three the JFK Act provided the standard for post- exceptions to its general rule: it protected the ponement of CIA crypts. The Review Board digraph in non-core files when (a) the crypt required the CIA to provide crypt-specific appeared next to a true name that had been clear and convincing evidence that CIA cur- released, (b) when the crypt appeared next to rently used, or expected to use the crypt and specific identifying information, and (c) that CIA had not previously released the when CIA provided clear and convincing crypt. Thus, in order to convince the Review evidence that the Review Board should pro- Board to sustain postponements, the Board tect the digraph. required CIA to research each crypt to determine whether CIAstill used the individual or d. CIA sluglines. the operation and provide that evidence to the Review Board. i. Review Board guidelines. “Sluglines” are CIA routing indicators, consisting of two or As it did with CIA agent names, CIA initially more crypts, that appear above the text in requested the Review Board to sustain post- CIA cables. (See illustration.) The Review ponements of all CIA c r y p t s — e v e n Board released CIAsluglines according to the “ODENVY”—the CIA’s old crypt for the FBI same criteria it applied to crypts and that CIA had already released in other CIA digraphs.

52 ii. Commentary. The Review Board rent CIA surveillance operations. Finally, the released CIA sluglines because the Agency Review Board recognized that certain CIA never offered the Review Board any evidence surveillance operations in Mexico City in to explain why the Board should not release 1963 were already well-known to the public them. An example of a CIA slugline is because the U.S. government had disclosed “ RY B AT GPFLOOR.” “RY B AT” is a CIA details about those operations. CIA surveil- crypt that meant “secret,” and GPFLOOR lance, particularly telephone taps and photo was the crypt that CIA gave Lee Harvey operations, was a major element in the story Oswald during its post-assassination investi- of Oswald’s 1963 trip to Mexico City. (See gation. CIA initially asked the Review Board illustration.) to postpone the CIAslugline even where CIA had released the individual crypts that made The Board, therefore, concluded that the pub- up the slugline elsewhere. For example, in lic interest in disclosure far outweighed any the case of “RYBAT GPFLOOR,” the CIA risk to national security and directed release agreed to release the crypt “RYBAT” in two of the information. However, in records that places elsewhere in the document at issue, CIA proved did contain information about and the CIA a g reed to release the crypt current operations, the Review Board voted GPFLOOR when it appeared in the text. CIA to postpone the information. told the Review Board that it could not, how- e v e r, release the slugline “RY B AT GPFLOOR.” CIA o ff e red no substantive arguments to support its request for postponement of the slugline. Given the statute’s demand that CIA provide clear and convincing evidence in support of its requests for postponement, the Review Board voted to release CIA sluglines. e. CIA surveillance methods.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board generally released CIA surveillance methods, the details of their implementation, and the product produced by them where the Review Board believed the methods were relevant to the assassination. The Review Board sustained postponements of CIAsurveillance methods where CIA p rovided convincing evidence that the method still merited protection. Where the Review Board sustained the CIA’s requests for postponement of surveillance methods, it substituted the language “surveillance method,” “operational details,” or “sensitive operation.”

ii. Commentary. As with all its sources and methods, CIA initially requested the f. CIA installations. Review Board to postpone all of its surveillance methods since, CIA argued, CIA cur- i. Review Board guidelines. The Review rently conducts surveillance operations. The Board used date “windows” within which it Review Board, on the other hand, believed released the locations of CIA installations that it was not a secret that CIA currently where the location was relevant to the assas- conducts surveillance operations. Moreover, sination. Specifically, the Review Board the Review Board did not believe that its released the location of CIA i n s t a l l a t i o n s votes to release CIA surveillance methods in relating to Mexico City during the time Mexico City in 1963 would jeopardize cur- period 1960-1969. Likewise, the Review

53 Board generally released the location of all the Review Board divided the world into five CIA installations that were relevant to the regions: Western Hemisphere, We s t e r n assassination during the time period Europe, Northern Europe, East Asia/ Pacific, between the date of the assassination— and Africa/ Near East/ South Asia. Then the November 22, 1963—and the date that the Board added a number to refer to each differ- Warren Commission issued its report in Sep- ent location in the region. Thus, “CIA Instal- tember 1964. Finally, the Review Board gen- lation in Western Hemisphere 1” serves as a erally released the location of all CIAinstalla- place holder for a particular installation in all tions that appeared in Oswald’s 201 file CIA assassination records. during the time period January 1, 1961 through October 1, 1964. The Review Board ii. Commentary. Initially, the Review did grant CIA a few exceptions to its general Board released CIA installation locations in rule, and except for the specific time win- CIA documents relevant to Oswald’s visit to dows described above, the Review Board Mexico City. CIA did not raise significant protected all information that identified CIA objections to the Review Board’s release of its installation locations. installations in these records.

The Review Board created substitute lan- When the Review Board began to vote to guage for its postponement of CIA installa- release the location of additional CIA instal- tions to enable researchers to track a particu- lation locations, the CIA did object, but did lar CIA installation through the JFK not offer evidence of the harm to national collection without revealing the city or coun- security that it believed would result from try in which it is located. To accomplish this, d i s c l o s u re of the information. The CIA

54 threatened to appeal to the President to over- h. CIA job titles. turn the Review Board’s votes, but the Review Board’s position was that the JFK Act i. Review Board guidelines. The Review required release of information where CIA Board voted to release CIA employees’ job did not provide convincing evidence to sup- titles except when the Board’s disclosure of port their postponements. The Review Board the title might reveal the identity of an indi- allowed the CIA ample time to gather and vidual or CIA installation requiring protec- present its evidence to support its requests tion. for postponements as both the CIA and the Review Board hoped to avoid a CIA appeal ii. Commentary. Although the Review to the President. Board did not believe that it should vote to protect CIAjob titles, standing alone, it some- U l t i m a t e l y, the CIA determined that it would times voted to protect titles if they revealed t rust Review Board members with the infor- other information that the Review Board had mation that the Review Board re q u i red to voted to protect. postpone the release of the location of a small number of CIA installations. In an i. CIA file numbers. e ffort to balance high public interest in the location of CIA installations and the need to i. Review Board guidelines. CIA organizes p rotect certain installations, the Review many of its files by country and assigns B o a rd decided to establish date “windows” “country identifiers” within particular file within which it would release CIA i n s t a l l a- numbers. The Review Board released nearly tion locations. all CIA file numbers that referred to Mexico City. The Review Board protected the “coun- The CIAnever appealed a Review Board vote try identifiers” in CIA file numbers for all to the President. other countries with the exception of country identifiers “15” and “19.” The Review Board g. CIA prefixes (cable, dispatch, field report). generally released all CIA “201” or “personality” file numbers where the files related to i. Review Board guidelines. CIA cable, dis- the assassination. patch, and field report “prefixes” are identifiers that CIA uses on its communications to ii. Commentary. The CIA rarely objected indicate the installation that generates a par- to the Review Board’s release of its file num- ticular message. Where the Review Board bers. had voted to release the location of a particu- j. CIA domestic facilities. lar CIA installation, the Review Board also voted to release CIA cable, dispatch, and i. Review Board guidelines. The Review field report prefixes that the installation gen- Board released references to domestic CIA erated. Likewise, the Review Board protected facilities where the CIA has previously offi- cable, dispatch, and field report pre f i x e s cially disclosed the existence of the facility. where it voted to protect the location of the The Review Board did not release informa- CIA installation. tion that would reveal the location of domestic CIA facilities where the CIAprovided evi- The Review Board replaced the prefixes that dence that the facility was still in use. it protected with substitute language similar to that used for CIA installations. An exam- ii. Commentary. The Review Board rarely ple of substitute language for CIAprefixes is: encountered the issue of whether to release “Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in Western the location of CIA domestic facilities in Hemisphere 1.” assassination re c o rds, as CIA o ff i c i a l l y acknowledges most of its domestic facilities. ii. Commentary. Once the Review Board When the Review Board did vote to postpone voted to release the location of a particular the location of CIA domestic facilities, it CI A installation, the Review Board and CIA required the CIA to provide extensive evi- did not disagree that the Board should rel e a s e dence as to why the CIAhad to keep the loca- cable, dispatch and field report prefixes. tion of those facilities secret.

55 k. CIA official cover. re s e a rchers. The Review Board members accepted CIA’s arguments, primarily because i. Review Board guidelines. CIA “official they agreed that the public interest in the cover” is a means by which a CIA officer can specific details about alias documentation operate overseas in the guise of an employee was low. The Review Board determined that of another government agency. In congres - it did not want the CIA to spend a large sional documents, the Review Board released amount of time gathering evidence in sup- general information about official cover but port of postponements that were of low pub- protected specific details. With regard to exec - lic interest and, thus, it did not require the utive branch documents, the CIA convinced the CIA to provide evidence in support of every Review Board that, while Congress might postponement relating to alias documenta- reveal information about official cover, the tion. executive branch does not generally reveal information about official cover because to m. Foreign intelligence cooperation. do so would damage the national security. Thus, the Review Board sustained CIA’ s i. Review Board guidelines. The Review postponements regarding official cover in Board postponed references to foreign intelli- executive branch documents unless the U.S. gence cooperation with the CIA. government had previously officially disclosed the information at issue. ii. Commentary. The Review Board vigorously debated the issue of foreign intelli- The Review Board inserted the phrase “offi- gence cooperation with the CIA a n d cial cover” as substitute language when it demanded extensive evidence and multiple postponed such information. briefings from the CIA on the subject. Though in some instances Board members ii. Commentary. The Review Board ini- judged that the information might add to the tially considered the issue of official cover to historical understanding of the assassination, be an “open secret” that was well-known to the Review Board, with some dissent, deter- the public. Thus, they were loathe to withhold mined that the evidence to postpone the such obvious information. The CIA, however, information outweighed this potential value. supported its strong objections in briefings and negotiations with the Board, and eventu- n. Human sources in FBI foreign ally convinced the Review Board that the counterintelligence (assets). harm in releasing information about offi c i a l cover outweighed any additional information i. Review Board guidelines. The Review that assassination res e a r chers might gain from Board evaluated the need to postpone the knowing details about official cover. identity of human sources in foreign counterintelligence operations on a case-by-case l. Alias documentation. basis. Where the human source was a foreign national, the Review Board generally agreed i. Review Board guidelines. CIA employ- to protect the individual’s identity unless the ees and agents use aliases and the CIA cre- individual’s connection with the FBI was ates documentation to support its employ- already known to the foreign government at ees’ and agents’ aliases. The Review Board issue. Where the human source was a United released information that revealed that CIA States citizen interacting with foreign govern - employees and agents used aliases. The ment officials, the Review Board sometimes Board protected specific details about how released the identity of the individual if the CIA documents particular aliases. public interest in the name of the asset was high. Where the human source was a United ii. Commentary. The CIA argued that it States citizen interacting with other United currently uses alias documentation and that States citizens, the Review Board tended to aliases are vital to CIA’s performance of its evaluate the release of the source’s name intelligence operations. The CIA also argued more like other domestic informants. that the Review Board’s release of specific information about alias documentation ii. Commentary. In its position paper, the would not be useful to assassination FBI defined “intelligence source” as “any

56 individual who has provided or is currently nation re c o rds contain information that providing information pertaining to national reveal many of the FBI’s foreign counterintel- security matters, the disclosure of which ligence activities during the cold war period. could reasonably be expected to result in Beginning in late 1995, the Review Board damage to the FBI’s intelligence and counter- considered how it could release as much intelligence-gathering capabilities.” information as possible in the records without jeopardizing operations that still require The FBI offe r ed the following arguments in protection. support of its request to keep intelligence so u r ces’ identities secret: (1) Review Board In spring 1996, the di s c l o s u r e of intelligence sources would harm Review Board considered In all cases where the Review the FBI’s ability to develop and maintain new and voted on a group of Board is considering postpone- and existing sources, because sources would FBI rec o r ds relating to the ment, it should keep the with- reasonably believe that the government FBI’s foreign counterin- held information to an absolute would reveal their identities, and (2) disclo- telligence activities. In minimum, and ensure that the su r e of intelligence sources may subject the response to the Review postponement is narrowly so u r ces, their friends, and their families to Bo a r d’s requests for evi- drawn for the shortest possible physical harm, ridicule, or ostracism. dence on the fore i g n d u r a t i o n . In so doing, t h e c o u n t e r i n t e l l i g e n c e Review Board should release as The Review Board’s interpretation of the rec o r ds, the FBI had pro- m u ch information from the “clear and convincing” evidence standard vided its “position paper” records as is possible. req u i r ed it to reject the FBI’s general policy on foreign counterintelli- —Senate Report on JFK Act, ar guments, and instead req u i r ed the FBI to gence activities. In its July 22, 1992 pr esent asset-specific evidence that explained p a p e r, the FBI defined the particular harm that the FBI expected the “intelligence activities” as asset to face if the Review Board voted to dis- “intelligence gathering action or techniques close his or her identity. As a general rule, the utilized by the FBI against a targeted individ- Review Board usually protected the identities ual or organization that has been determined of foreign nationals who could be pros e c u t e d to be of national security interest.” The FBI’s in their home countries for espionage. Like- primary argument in support of its request for wise, where the asset was a United States cit- continued secrecy of intelligence activities izen interacting with foreign government offi - was that disclosure of specific information cials, the Review Board considered whether describing intelligence activities would rev e a l the individual was in a position of trust with to hostile entities the FBI’s targets and priori- the foreign government and whether he or ties, thereby allowing hostile entities to she might be in danger if the Review Board develop countermeasures . disclosed his or her relationship with the FBI. Unlike the above-ref e r enced scenarios, the Sections 6(1)(B) and (C) of the JFK Act pro- so u r ce who was a United States citizen interact - vided the standard for postponement. In ing with other United States citizens was gener- addition, the JFK Act’s legislative history ally evaluated according to the Board ’ s instructed the Review Board to consider a domestic informant standards. variety of factors related to the need to postpone disclosure of intelligence sources and o. FBI foreign counterintelligence activities. methods, including the age of the record, whether the use of a particular source or i. Review Board guidelines. As a general method is already well-known by the public, rule, the Review Board believed that most whether the source or method is inherently aspects of the FBI’s foreign counterintelli- secret, or whether the information collected gence activities against Communist Bloc was secret.27 countries during the cold war period were well-known, were of high public interest, The Review Board considered the FBI’s evi- and were not eligible for postponement pur- dence and weighed it against public interest suant to § 6(1)(B)-(C) of the JFK Act. in the records. After careful consideration, the Review Board decided to release some ii. Commentary and overview of foreign foreign counterintelligence information. The counterintelligence appeals. The FBI’s assassi- Board’s primary reason for releasing such

57 records was its belief that the FBI’s evidence by employing the sources or methods at issue did not enumerate specific harms that would since the FBI did not cite the laws or treaties result from disclosure. to which it referred and the Review Board could not locate any laws or treaties that A. The FBI’s May 1996 Appeals to the were in effect at the time that the records President. On May 10 and 28, 1996, the FBI were created. Third, despite the FBI’s asser- appealed to the President to overturn the tion to the contrary, the Review Board had Board’s vote on 17 records relating to the evidence that other governments do acknowl- FBI’s surveillance of officials and establish- edge that, in past years, they conducted for- ments of four Communist countries—the eign counterintelligence operations against Soviet Union, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and other countries. Poland—during the 1960s. The FBI’s overarching arguments were that disclosure of the The Review Board believed that the FBI had information would reveal sensitive sources not provided evidence of a “significant, and methods that would compromise the demonstrable harm” to current foreign rel a - national security of the United States, and tions or intelligence work. Thus, the Board that disclosure of the targets of the surveil- asked the President to deny the FBI’s req u e s t s lance—the four Communist countries— for postponement. The White House did not would harm the foreign relations of the ex p r essly rule on the appeals. Instead, after United States. several meetings involving rep re s e n t a t i v e s fr om the Review Board, the FBI, and the White The FBI sought to postpone five types of House, the White House directed the FBI to source and method capabilities: tracing of pr ovide the Review Board with specific evi- funds, physical surveillance (lookout logs), dence in support of its postponements. The mail cover, electronic surveillance, and type- White House requested the Review Board to writer and fingerprint identification. The reconsider the Bureau’s specific evidence. The Review Board’s response briefs to the Presi- FBI, in turn, withdrew the first two of its dent dealt with each source or method in pending appeals, including some rec o r ds in turn. Specific details regarding the appeal of which the Review Board voted to rel e a s e each issue are discussed below. information obtained from a technical source.

In response to the FBI’s overarching argu- B. Post-appeal decisionmaking. After fur- ment that disclosure of the information ther negotiations, the Review Board and the would reveal sensitive sources and methods FBI agreed to release most information and compromise the national security, the re g a rding its foreign counterintelligence Review Board responded that if the national activities against Communist Bloc countries security would be harmed by release of this as “consent releases.” In those few cases information, the harm would have already where the Bureau believed that foreign coun- occurred, since the FBI had already released terintelligence activity against Communist both the identities of the target countries and Bloc countries still required protection, the the sources and methods that the FBI used in Bureau submitted for the Board’s determina- its operations. tion postponement-specific evidence.

In response to the FBI’s arguments that dis- To the extent that the information in the FBI’s c l o s u re of the targets of the surveillance p roposed redaction did not meaningfully would harm the foreign relations of the United contribute to the understanding of the assas- States, the Review Board responded in three sination, the Review Board allowed the FBI parts. F i r s t, the information that the FBI to postpone direct discussions of fore i g n sought to protect is widely available in the counterintelligence activities against n o n- public domain, from both official govern- Communist Bloc countries. With regard to ment sources and secondary sources, so if the FBI’s “segregated collections,” the foreign relations are harmed by disclosure of Review Board stated in its segreated collec- the information, then the harm has already tion guidelines, o c c u r red. S e c o n d , the FBI simply did not prove its argument that it may have violated It is presumed that the FBI will, at least international law or “diplomatic standards” partially, carry over its post-appeal stan-

58 dards for disclosing foreign counterin- and routing of technical sources. The Review telligence activities targeting Commu- B o a rd evaluated “specific” information nist-bloc nations. To the extent that the about technical sources on a case-by-case HSCA subjects reflect foreign counterin- basis, agreeing to sustain postponements telligence activities against other provided that the FBI proved that the “oper- nations that have not been addressed by ational detail” at issue was currently utilized the Review Board in the “core” files, the and not officially disclosed. FBI will be allowed to redact direct discussion of such activities, unless the As a general rule, the Review Board agreed information in the proposed redaction to postpone until the year 2017 symbol and meaningfully contributes to the under- file numbers for technical sources provided standing of the assassination. that the source was still properly classified pursuant to the current executive order. The p. Information that reveals the FBI’s Review Board released classified symbol and investigative interest in a diplomatic file numbers for technical sources if the num- establishment or diplomatic personnel. ber had been previously released in a similar context, or if the source was of significant i. Review Board guidelines. The Review interest to the public. The Review Board Board released information that revealed that a g reed that the phrases, “source symbol the FBI had an investigative interest in Com- number” and “source file number” would munist Bloc countries’ diplomatic establish- provide adequate substitute language. ments and personnel. Likewise, the Review Board generally agreed to protect informa- Even for that material which did not con- tion that reveals that the FBI has an inves- tribute in a meaningful way to the under- tigative interest in a non-Communist Bloc standing of the assassination, the Review foreign diplomatic establishment or in for- Board still released as much information as eign personnel. possible about the FBI’s use of technical s o u rces in its foreign counterintelligence ii. Commentary. In the FBI’s May 1996 activities against non-Communist Bloc coun- appeals to the President, the overriding issue tries. In these less relevant cases, the Review was whether the FBI could, in 1996, keep Board did, however, often protect the iden- secret its 1960s investigative interest in the tity of the country that was the target of the diplomatic establishments and personnel of FBI’s surveillance. The Review Board was Communist Bloc countries. (For a full discus- m o re willing to protect specific details sion of the Review Board’s decisionmaking regarding installation, equipment, location, with regard to the FBI’s foreign counterintel- transmittal, and routing of technical sources ligence activities, see section B.3.o.2.B above.) where the FBI proved (1) that the source currently required protection, and (2) that the q. Technical sources in FBI foreign U.S. government had not officially disclosed counterintelligence. the source.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review ii. Commentary. The legislative history B o a rd usually released nearly all general for the JFK Act mentions that the Review information and some specific information Board could release information that specifi- (or operational details) regarding the FBI’s cally identifies “listening devices on tele- n o n - c u r rent technical sources where the phones.” The history states that these are an source provided information on Communist “intelligence source or method” that should Bloc targets. not be postponed in circumstances where they are “already well-known by the “General” information is information that public.”28 the FBI obtains from its technical sources on Communist Bloc countries’ diplomatic estab- The Review Board believed that the FBI’s use lishments and personnel, including tran- of non-human sources or methods (e.g., elec- scripts from electronic surveillance. “ S p e- tronic surveillance and “black bag jobs”) in cific” information is information regarding f o reign counterintelligence operations installation, equipment, location, transmittal, against Communist Bloc countries’ diplo-

59 matic establishments and personnel was, in whether the Review Board would allow the many aspects, a matter of official public FBI to protect classified file numbers when record. The FBI appealed to the President a the corresponding operation was no longer number of Review Board decisions involving current. The Review Board took the position non-human sources or methods. The Review that non-current classified file numbers were Board staff called to the President’s attention not entitled to protection. In its May 28, 1996, those prior disclosures that were relevant to appeal on foreign counterintelligence deciding the issues on appeal. records, the FBI argued that if the Review Board released classified file numbers for ter- In its May 10, 1996, appeal of the Review minated operations, that release would Board’s decisions on foreign counterintelli- prompt people to file FOIA requests for the gence records, the FBI requested that the underlying files, “resulting inevitably in President override the Review Board’s deci- more and more information from the file sions to release information that related to being released.”29 In its response, the Review electronic intercepts of telephone and tele- Board stated simply that “[m]aking it more type communications involving Communist difficult for researchers to file FOIA requests Bloc officials. In its appeal briefs, the FBI is not among the reasons for postponement argued that the identities of its electronic sur- provided by the JFK Act.” veillance targets were secret. The Review Board collected a large body of evidence The President did not decide the issues on proving that, at least with regard to Commu- appeal, but the FBI ultimately agreed to rel e a s e nist-Bloc countries, the government has some non-current classified file numbers. a l ready acknowledged that the FBI conducted extensive technical surveillance of s. FBI mail cover in foreign counterintelli - foreign establishments during the 1960s. In gence investigations. fact, the official public record and secondary sources revealed information regarding wire- i. Review Board guidelines. The Review taps and electronic surveillance against for- Board released information that revealed that eigners and foreign establishments that was the FBI conducted mail cover operations more specific than information that the FBI against the Soviet Embassy in the 1960s. The sought to protect. Review Board did not encounter a gre a t number of additional records regarding mail Although the President did not make a deci- cover operations. When the Review Board sion, the FBI ultimately agreed to release gen- did encounter mail cover operations in other eral information acknowledging that the FBI FBI records, it released the information at had technical sources against Communist issue unless the FBI could provide evidence Bloc targets during the Cold War period. that the operation was still ongoing and required protection. The Review Board did r. Other classified file numbers relating to FBI not relax its standard on this issue in the seg- foreign counterintelligence. regated collection files.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review ii. Commentary. With reg a r d to the FBI’s Board generally agreed to protect classified use of mail cover, the Review Board had to file numbers in FBI foreign counterintelli- decide whether and to what extent it should gence files, provided the FBI could prove that reveal the Bureau’s use of this method in con- the file number corresponded to a current ducting foreign counterintelligence activities. and ongoing operation. However, where the The Review Board used the same reasoning it FBI had released a particular classified file employed for other foreign counterintelli- number in other contexts, the Review Board gence activities—mainly that foreign counter- voted to release the number. intelligence operations against the USSR and other Communist Bloc countries during the ii. Commentary. The Review Board Cold War no longer merit protection. More- agreed that file numbers corresponding to ov e r , the Review Board believed that the pub- current and ongoing intelligence operations lic is already well aware that the FBI used the w e re entitled to protection under section methodology of mail cover and, thus, such 6(1)(B) and (C). The only question, then, was operations should not be prot e c t e d .

60 In its May 10, 1996, appeal to the President, decision to release information from six doc- the FBI asked the President to overturn the uments related to the FBI’s ability to track Board’s decision to release information from funds from diplomatic establishments. The two documents that the FBI alleged would FBI and the Department of State argued, first, reveal that the FBI engaged in a “mail cover” that disclosure would reveal sensitive operation against the Soviet Embassy in sources and methods, and second, that disclo- Washington, D.C. in 1963. The Bureau argued sure would reveal that Soviet government that the “[h]ow, when where, and [the] cir- bank accounts were the target of FBI counter- cumstances” of its mail cover operation were intelligence activities. among its most “closely guarded secrets.” The Review Board responded that the The Review Board responded that the infor- “sources and methods” employed in tracking mation that the Bureau sought to redact had of funds already has been disclosed. The a l ready been released. In the 1970s, the Board cited FBI documents that reveal the Church Committee disclosed the mail cover FBI’s ability to trace funds, as well as other operation at issue—the “Z-coverage” pro- federal government records that explained gram. In addition, the Review Board pro- that the FBI engaged in covert examination of duced three previously released assassina- financial records and bank accounts in order tion records in which the FBI disclosed that to determine whether an individual was the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. was engaged in espionage. In addition, the targeted under the “Z-coverage” program, a Review Board noted that the FBI cannot now program that the document discloses existed classify that the Soviet government was the pursuant to an agreement with the Post principal target of the Bureau’s foreign coun- Office. As with the other foreign counterin- terintelligence activities in the United States, telligence records that the FBI appealed, the again citing FBI documents as well as a FBI ultimately withdrew its appeals and lengthy list of publicly available federal gov- began to treat this type of information as a ernment publications that disclosed the FBI’s consent release. interest in Soviet financial activities in the United States. In late 1996, the National Secu- t. FBI tracing of funds in foreign rity Agency and the CIA removed whatever counterintelligence investigations. fig leaf remained covering the FBI’s tracing of funds. In the NSA/CIA joint publication, i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American B o a rd released information that disclosed Response 1939-1957 (Robert Louis Benson & that the FBI was capable of tracking funds Michael Wa r n e r, eds., 1996), the agencies and examining bank accounts of Communist released records that explicitly stated that the Bloc enterprises during the Cold War era. FBI monitored Soviet bank accounts in the United States. The Venona releases also show ii. Commentary. The issue arose re g a rd- that the Soviets knew about the FBI’s moni- ing the FBI’s tracing of funds as to whether toring of their finances in the 1940s. the Review Board should release the FBI’s monitoring of financial re c o rds and bank The Review Board concluded that previous accounts for the purpose of investigating official disclosures of the FBI’s ability to trace espionage. The Review Board decided that funds in foreign counterintelligence investi- since the U.S. government had pre v i o u s l y gations prevented the FBI from making a disclosed this method to the public, it convincing argument that the method should not protect the information. The remained a secret. The White House did not Review Board voted to release FBI re c o rd s make a decision on the appealed records. re g a rding tracing of funds transferred to Ultimately, the Bureau agreed to release the Oswald in Russia and re c o rds re g a rding the documents at issue. FBI’s ability to track funds from diplomatic establishments. u. FBI physical surveillance.

In its May 10, 1996, appeal to the President, i. Review Board guidelines. The Review the FBI and the Department of State asked Board released information that disclosed the President to overturn the Review Board’s that physical surveillance is a method that

61 the FBI employs in conducting investiga- v. Operational details concerning Department tions. Moreover, the Review Board specifi- of Defense operations. cally released information that the FBI conducted physical surveillance in its foreign i. Review Board guidelines. In many mili- counterintelligence investigations against tary records, particularly Joint Chiefs of Staff Communist Bloc countries. records and Army records, the Review Board often upheld agency requests for postpone- ii. Commentary. In the course of many ments under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act. FBI investigations, physical surveillance is The Review Board protected details of force not a classified operation and thus would deployments (i.e., numbers of ships, aircraft, not be protectable under section 6(1). How- troops, warheads, etc.), details concerning e v e r, as part of its May 10, 1996, appeal to precise targeting information, details of pro- P resident Clinton, the FBI requested that the posed operational activities or OPLANs, and P resident overturn the Review Board’s deci- information that revealed real-world exercise sion to release one document because it situations or real-world threat environments. revealed that the FBI conducted physical The Department of Defense had to provide surveillance on the Soviet Embassy and that evidence that disclosure of the information it kept a “lookout log” that re c o rded visitors today, because the similarity of some cur- to the Embassy. rently proposed combat operations or OPLANs, was so close to those used in the The Review Board voted to release the record documents in question that it would demon- because the FBI had not offered adequate evi- strably impair the national security of the dence in support of its redactions and United States. because it was important to the story. The Review Board substituted the phrase The Review Board again stressed the statu- “operational details” wherever it agreed to tory requirement that the FBI provide docu- the above-referenced postponements. ment-specific, clear and convincing evidence in support of its proposed redactions. In its ii. Commentary. The Review Board response brief, the Review Board noted that e n c o u n t e red operational details when it the FBI had previously officially acknowl- reviewed the first large groups of military edged the particular physical surveillance records on Cuba and Vietnam policy. operation that the document at issue revealed, and that former Director Webster w. National Security Agency sources had publicly acknowledged that the FBI con- and methods. ducts physical surveillance and used the physical surveillance of the Russian Embassy i. Review Board guidelines. The Review as an example. Board generally protected National Security Agency sources and methods such as target- The Review Board concluded that previous ing, intercept, and transmission indicators, o fficial disclosures of the FBI’s physical internal production indicators, and routing surveillance of the Soviet Embassy prevented and dissemination information unless the the FBI from making any plausible or con- Review Board determined that the specific vincing argument that the method was one source or method was important to an under- that should remain secret. The FBI ultimately standing of the assassination or events sur- withdrew its appeal of the Board’s decision rounding the assassination on “lookout logs.”30 ii. Commentary. With re g a rd to signals The Review Board also took the position that, intelligence (SIGINT), NSA informed the even in documents where the Board might Review Board that specific information agree to protect the identity of a particularly revealed in raw intercept traffic or intercept sensitive target of the FBI’s physical surveil- reporting can provide a great deal of infor- lance, the fact that the FBI uses the method of mation to foreign entities on U.S. govern- physical surveillance in conducting investi- ment targeting, intercept, and cryptographic gations is not secret and is not eligible for capabilities which could harm current SIG- postponement. INT capabilities. Revealing to a foreign gov-

62 ernment or entity that the U.S. government a. Personal privacy generally. was capable of targeting and reading some or all of their communications, even in 1963, i. Review Board guidelines. During the could provide information to that govern- course of the Review Board’s work, the ment or entity as to whether NSAhas the tar- B o a rd almost never agreed to sustain geting, intercept, and cryptographic capabili- agency’s requests for postponements on per- ties to read similar communications today. sonal privacy grounds. The two exceptions to NSA’s position was that it is often not the the Review Board’s policy to release records basic information contained in the intercept with privacy postponements were social but rather the fact of the intercept or the spe- security numbers and information about cific technical details of how and from where prisoners of war. The Review Board deter- the intercept was acquired that requires pro- mined that the public interest in disclosure of tection. The Review Board protected NSA social security numbers was so small that any information such as specific details like risk of harm would outweigh it. Accordingly, transmission times, transmission methods, the Board routinely protected social security geographic locations, and government build- numbers throughout assassination records. ings or military unit numbers where the Likewise, the Board protected significant Board determined that such information was amounts of information in files of prisoners not important to an understanding of the of war, as explained below. events surrounding the assassination. In the segregated collections, the FBI rarely x. National Security Agency intercept traffic. requested that the Review Board sustain privacy postponements, and so the FBI unilater- i. Review Board guidelines. The Review ally released the information that would fall Board generally protected National Security into the category of “personal privacy” infor- Agency intercept traffic unless the Review mation. In some segregated collection Board determined that the specific source or records, the Review Board agreed to post- method was important to an understanding pone personal privacy information where of the assassination or events surrounding agencies provided the Review Board with the assassination evidence that the person in question is alive, living in the same area, the public interest in ii. Commentary. NSA’s position is that the information is extremely low, and the the nature of intercept traffic is such that it individual would truly suffer a substantial picks up a wide variety of information and a intrusion of privacy if the Board releases the significant amount of non-relevant informa- information. For example, the Review Board tion. NSA summaries of intercept traffic usu- agreed to sustain the postponement of the ally examine a wide variety of intercepts on identity of a 13-year-old girl who was a rape many different subjects worldwide. Thus, the victim. The name in question appeared in the Review Board protected blocks of informa- file of an organized crime figure who was tion where it believed the information did himself only of marginal relevance to the not appear to be relevant to an understand- assassination story. ing of the Kennedy assassination story. The Review Board developed substitute language ii. Commentary. The Review Board began that described NSA information that it voted its document review work in its closed meeting to postpone. on January 25, 1995. At that meeting, the Review Board discussed personal privacy 4. Personal Privacy information in four Warren Commission rec o r ds, but did not vote on the four rec o r ds at Text of Section 6(3) that meeting, opting instead to defer final decision on the rec o r ds. On March 6 and 7, 1995, the . . . clear and convincing evidence that the Review Board staff presented to the Review public disclosure of the assassination record Bo a r d a briefing book on personal privacy could reasonably be expected to constitute postponements. The Board’s General Counsel an unwarranted invasion of personal pri - pr ovided the Board with a memorandum that vacy, and that invasion of privacy is so sub - identified several types of information that stantial that it outweighs the public interest would potentially implicate privacy concerns.

63 The Review Board discussed the scope and deciding whether, and how, privacy post- intent of section 6(3) and how the personal pri- ponements requested under Section 6 (3) of vacy provisions of the JFK Act might apply to the JFK Act would be applied to Korean War 18 sample documents. At the end of the meet- POW records in general, and specifically, to ing, the Review Board again decided that it POW debriefing records, in cases where the would defer a vote on the rec o r ds and on the Review Board deemed the individual at issue personal privacy postponements in general. to be relevant to the assassination. Initially, Later in 1995, the Review Board made its first the Army and the Defense Prisoner of decisions on privacy issues. War/Missing Personnel Management Office (DPMO) requested that the Review Board Although the Review Board expected that it sustain postponements of all prisoner of war would encounter a number of personal pri- debriefing records on privacy grounds. Ulti- vacy postponments, the FBI and CIA d i d mately, the Review Board and the Army not request many postponments citing sec- came to agreement that the Review Board tion 6(3). could release the most relevant information in POW records without causing an unwar- In one case, the FBI appealed to the President ranted infringement on personal privacy. the Review Board’s vote to release information about a prominent Warren Commission The Army requested that the Review Board critic that the FBI requested be postponed on postpone information for 10 years, until personal privacy grounds. The Review Board 2008, on the basis of its belief that most sur- c a refully considered the privacy concerns viving POWs from the Korean conflict involved and requested that the President would be deceased by that time. The subject uphold the Board’s decision to release the of POW re c o rds from the Vietnam war or important information in the record. As of other conflicts did not come before the this writing, the White House had not Review Board . resolved the issues on appeal. c. Names of individuals in Secret Service b. Prisoner of War issues “threat sheets.”

i. Review Board guidelines. Military rec o rd s i. Review Board guidelines. Because of high that contained information reg a r ding Korea n public interest in the information, the Review War prisoners contained issues of personal Bo a r d voted to release the identities of indi- privacy that the Review Board resolved in the viduals who threatened President Kennedy following manner. The Review Board deter- even where the Secret Service maintained mined that it would release the name of the mental health rec o r ds and other personal POW subject of interest, dates and basic facts information concerning such individuals. of his imprisonment, any documents describing or quoting written or oral statements ii. Commentary. The Secret Service kept made by the POW subject of interest for the re c o rds on individuals whom the Secret Ser- imprisoning authority during his confine- vice’s Protective Research Section consid- ment, and debriefing statements the POW e red to be potential threats to Pre s i d e n t subject of interest made about himself, or any K e n n e d y, Vice President Johnson, and their statements others made about him. The families, between March and December Review Board agreed to postpone until the 1963. HSCA s t a ff member Eileen Dinneen year 2008 personal identifiers of both the sub- reviewed the Secret Service files and kept ject of interest and all other individuals men- detailed notes on the material that she tioned in the subject’s debriefing file (e. g . , date reviewed. Dinneen’s documents identified and place of birth and military service num- the names of the individuals, and contained ber), the names of those who made statements condensed information about their personal about the subject of interest during debriefings, b a c k g round and affiliations. In some cases, and all statements made during debriefings the documents contained brief information about POWs other than the subject of interes t . about an individual’s mental health history. Although the Secret Service did not oppose ii. Commentary. The Review Board was the release of the text of these documents, it eventually confronted with the challenge of a rgued that many of the names should be

64 postponed pursuant to Section 6(3) of the section (4). . . clear and convincing evidence JFK Act as an “unwarranted invasion of per- that the public disclosure of the assassina - sonal privacy.” tion record would compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality cur - The Review Board afforded the Secret Service rently requiring protection between a Gov - the opportunity to present clear and convinc- ernment agent and a cooperating individual ing evidence as to why the names in the doc- or a foreign government, and public disclo - uments should be postponed. Through writ- sure would be so harmful that it outweighs ten submissions and oral presentations, the the public interest; Secret Service primarily offered policy reasons in support of its arguments for post- a. Informant postponements generally. ponement of the names. After carefully considering the Secret Service’s arguments, the i. Review Board guidelines. As a general Review Board determined that the Secret Ser- rule, the Review Board did not postpone vice had not met its statutory burden of proof information that would reveal the identity of by “clear and convincing evidence,” and an informant unless the FBI could pro v i d e , voted to release four re c o rds, including at least, evidence that the informant was names, in April 1998. alive and still living in the same area. The Review Board recognized two significant The Secret Service appealed the Review exceptions to the general rule. First, even B o a rd’s decision to the President, and w h e re the FBI provided such evidence, the included with their appeal numerous letters Review Board released informant identities f rom mental health professionals. The Secre t if it found that the informant’s identity was Service enlisted the assistance of the mental of high public interest. Second, the Review health community in defending its ability to B o a rd did, in some cases, allow postpone- cooperate with that community in perform- ment of informant identities even though the ing its duty of protecting government off i- FBI could not provide evidence that the cials. The Secret Service had not pro v i d e d informant was alive and living in the same the Review Board with such letters when it a rea if the FBI could prove that disclosure requested that the Board protect the names would subject the informant to a significant that it provided to the President. In its re p l y t h reat of harm. to the Secret Service’s appeal, the Review B o a rd argued that the Secret Service failed to Where a person’s relationship with the FBI meet its statutory burden of proof with had already been made public, the Review respect to the postponement of these names, Board did not agree to protect the fact of the and urged the President to release these his- relationship between the government and torically significant documents in full.3 1 As of the individual. this writing, the White House had not made a decision as to whether to uphold or over- ii. Commentary. turn the Review Board’s votes. The Review B o a rd believes that the re c o rds, including A. A note on the statutory framework for the names, should be opened and stro n g l y review of FBI informant postponements. The u rged the President to uphold the Review FBI initially cited sections 6(2) and 6(4) in B o a rd’s decisions. support of informant postponements. Sec- tion 6(2) clearly re q u i red that the Bure a u 5. Informant Postponements p rove that the informant was living and that the informant faced a substantial risk of Text of Sections 6(2) and 6(4) harm if the Review Board released the information. Because section 6(2) re q u i red infor- section (2). . . clear and convincing evidence mant-specific evidence, the FBI decided to that the public disclosure of the assassina - rely exclusively on Section 6(4) for infor- tion record would reveal the name or iden - mant postponements, and not Section 6(2)— tity of a living person who provided confi - even though most of the re c o rds, as origi- dential information to the United States and nally processed by the FBI, re f e r red to both would pose a substantial risk of harm to that subsections in support of informant post- person ponements.

65 B. History of Review Board’s decision-making on off e r ed examples of prior releases that had not informant postponements. The Review Board resulted in expected harm. The FBI did agree first considered informant postponements in to provide particularized evidence on three of its meeting on May 2 and 3, 1995. The FBI’s the four documents. The FBI’s evidence was to initial evidence in support of informant interview the informants to determine postponements consisted of a briefing that whether they would object to having their FBI officials gave to the Review Board, fol- identities disclosed. Of course, all of the infor- lowed by the FBI’s “position papers” on con- mants or their relatives objected to disclosure fidential informant postponements. In the of their identities. Upon receipt of the FBI’s position paper, the FBI distinguished among evidence, the Review Board rec o n s i d e r ed the informants, explaining that informants diff e r informant postponements and determined depending on the type of information they that it would release all information except for p rovided to the FBI and the level of confi- the numeric portion of the symbol numbers. dentiality that existed between the FBI and the informant at the time that the informant The Review Board’s September 28, 1995, let- p rovided the information. The FBI further ter to the FBI informing the FBI of its deci- explained that, whether or not the FBI sions on the documents provided useful and e x p ressly promised to keep informant specific guidance as to what type of evidence names confidential, they had a “moral con- the Review Board was looking for—inter- tract” with people who provided the FBI viewing informants would not be necessary, with information. nor would the Review Board find it useful. Instead, the Review Board needed to know After hearing the FBI’s general policy argu- whether informants were still alive and ments, the Review Board informed the FBI whether the informant file contained corrob- that it interpreted the “clear and convincing” orating evidence of harm that would befall evidence standard to require the agencies to the informant if his identity were disclosed. provide very specific evidence tailored to Ultimately, the FBI was able to satisfy the individual postponements. Review Board’s requests for evidence on informant issues by providing information In the summer of 1995, the Review Board that was available at FBI headquarters. considered four documents containing informant postponements. Three of the docu- After the FBI appealed the Review Board ’ s ments concerned symbol number infor- decisions on four informant re c o rds, the FBI mants. The fourth document disclosed the eventually eliminated general policy arg u- name of a deceased informant. Because the ments from its evidence submissions and FBI did not present document-specific evi- p rovided evidence in support of informant dence in support of its postponements, the postponements on standard forms titled B o a rd voted to release the re c o rds. On “Informant Postponement Evidence Form.” August 11, 1995, the FBI appealed to the Pres- Once the Review Board received the FBI’s ident the Review Board’s decisions on those specific evidence, it developed a group of four records. The FBI argued that disclosure guidelines for the review of informant post- of informant information would result in the p o n e m e n t s . following harms: first, harm to existing informants; second, harm to the FBI’s ability to C. Effect of prior disclosures . If the name re c ruit new informants and its ability to of an informant in a particular rec o r d had obtain cooperation from existing informants, al r eady been released in a context that di s c l o s e d and third, harm to the government’s “word” the informant relationship with the FBI, then the since disclosure results in a breach of a Review Board released the name. If an infor- promise of confidentiality. mant symbol number in a particular rec o r d had al r eady been released in a context where the In its response briefs to the President, the same informant symbol number provided the Review Board emphasized the JFK Act’s clear same information as in the rec o r d at issue, the and convincing evidence standard and Review Board released the symbol number. explained that speculative harm does not provide sufficient grounds for withholding of As a practical matter, both the FBI and the information. In addition, the Review Board Review Board made an effort to track the

66 names and symbol numbers of FBI infor- question requested confidentiality. Moreo v e r , mants whose relationships with the FBI had the FBI implied that, even where a request for already been made public. When Review confidentiality is not explicit on the face of the Board staff members encountered informant document, the identities of such persons will names or symbol numbers that were eligible be withheld in cases where their providing the for postponement, staff members researched information to the FBI involved a “breach of whether the name or symbol number had tr ust” (e. g . , a phone company employee who a l ready been released. Similarly, the FBI gives out an unlisted number.) maintained and checked an informant card file that tracked those informant names and The Review Board rejected the FBI’s argu- symbol numbers that had been publicly dis- ment and voted to release the names pur- closed and in what contexts. suant to Section 6(4) of the JFK Act. Section 6(4) required that the FBI provide clear and b. Individuals who provided information to convincing evidence that disclosure would the FBI, but who did not have an ongoing compromise the existence of an understand- confidential relationship with the FBI. ing of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a government agent and a i. Review Board guidelines. Where an indi- cooperating individual. That the individual vidual provided information to the FBI and lacked one of the Bureau’s many informant requested that the FBI protect his or her iden- designations (e.g., potential security infor- tity, but the FBI provided no evidence of an ongo - mant (“PSI”), potential criminal informant ing confidential relationship with the individual, (“PCI”), panel source, established sourc e , the Review Board voted to disclose all identi- informant symbol number) suggested to the fying information about that individual. Review Board that the individual did not have an ongoing relationship with the FBI. To ii. Commentary. When the FBI first began the extent that the FBI believes that a particu- to present evidence to the Review Board in lar “protect identity” source did have an defense of its attempts to protect its infor- ongoing relationship with the FBI, it pro- mants, it asked that the Review Board protect vided evidence to the Review Board of the the identity of any individual who either relationship. Without the benefit of such evi- expressly or implicitly requested confiden- dence, the Review Board assumed that “pro- tiality when providing information to the tect identity” sources were not sources with Bureau. Persons who provide information in an “understanding of confidentiality cur- exchange for express promises of confiden- rently requiring protection.” The Review tiality may include neighbors or other Board learned that FBI agents often offered acquaintances of a subject of investigation, as confidentiality as a matter of course to inter- well as employees of state and local govern- viewees, whether or not the individual ments, financial institutions, airlines, or requested or required confidentiality. Even- hotels. According to the FBI, tually, the Review Board and the FBI agreed that the FBI would release the names of these Where such a promise is given, docu- individuals unilaterally. ments containing such information will contain the name of the person provid- c. Individuals who gave the FBI information ing the information as well as language to which they had access by virtue of their specifically setting forth the fact that employment. confidentiality was requested. No file is opened on such persons and no symbol i. Review Board guidelines. The FBI unilat- numbers are assigned to protect their erally released the identities of individuals identities.32 who gave the FBI information to which they had access by virtue of their employment, In i t i a l l y , the FBI’s policy was to protect “the such as telephone company employees and identities of persons who gave the FBI infor- utility employees. mation to which they had access by virtue of their employment,” reg a r dless of whether ii. Commentary. Until the summer of 1995, “their providing the information).. . in v o l v e [ d ] the FBI protected the identities of all persons a breach of trust,” provided that the person in who gave the FBI information to which they

67 had access by virtue of their employment pro- informant was still living, it believed that vided one of the two following circu m s t a n c e s deceased informants were generally not enti- existed: (1) the employee requested confiden- tled to protection. ti a l i t y , or (2) the employee’s providing the information involved a breach of trust (e. g . , a However, in its response to the FBI’s infor- phone company employee who gave out an mant appeals, the Review Board did state unlisted number.) The Review Board believed that, in some rare cases, the FBI might be able that disclosure of the identities of such indi- to prove clearly and convincingly that a viduals would not subject the individuals to “confidential relationship” with a deceased the type of harm that the JFK Act req u i r ed to informant currently required protection. For sustain informant postponements. Once the example, the FBI could have shown that the Review Board voted to release the identities of relatives of a high-level organized crime persons who gave the FBI information to informant could still be at risk of retaliation. which they had access by virtue of their employment, the FBI acquiesced and pro- The Review Board debated extensively the ceeded to release unilaterally the identities of issue of what constituted adequate evidence such individuals. that an informant was currently living. Specifically, the Board had to determine what d. Deceased informants. evidence was necessary to prove that someone who, according to a search of the FBI’s i. Review Board guidelines. With very few computer databases, is now living, is in fact exceptions, the Review Board released the the same individual named as an FBI infor- identities of deceased informants in the core mant. and related files. U l t i m a t e l y, the Review Board determined In the segregated collection files, the Review that the FBI must verify that the informant Board did not require that the FBI provide was still alive by matching the informant’s evidence that an informant was alive to sus- name plus date of birth or Social Security tain a postponement unless the Review Board number. The Review Board did not consider staff member had some reason to believe that name alone or name plus general location to the informant was deceased. Thus, unless the be adequate evidence that an informant was informant was of relatively high public inter- still living. est, the Review Board voted to protect the informant’s identity. In the cases where a e. “Negative Contacts”: Informants who staff member had a reason to believe that an provided no assassination-related informant was deceased, the staff did request information to the FBI. the FBI to provide evidence concerning the informant and released the informant’s iden- i. Review Board guidelines. When an FBI tity if the informant was deceased. agent asked an informant for information on a particular topic and the informant reported ii. Commentary. A “named informant” is that he or she had no information to provide, an individual whose name appeared in the FBI called the contact a “negative con- assassination re c o rds and who had some tact.” Where the FBI adequately identified type of ongoing confidential re l a t i o n s h i p the “negative contact” informant as still liv- with the FBI. The FBI records often refer to ing, the Review Board agreed to postpone for such informants as “PSIs” (potential security ten years “negative contact” named infor- informants) or “PCIs” (potential criminal mants and all specific identifying informa- informants), but “established sourc e s , ” tion, such as street addresses, telephone “panel sources,” and others also fell into the numbers, and informant-specific portions of category of “named informants.” The Review FBI case numbers and file numbers. A n Board attempted to categorize informants informant was “adequately identified as still according to the level of confidentiality that living” if the FBI identified him or her existed between the FBI and the informant. through current information with a living While the Review Board was often willing to person with the same name and other specif- sustain postponements of named informants ically identifying information (e.g., name and when the FBI could demonstrate that the date of birth or Social Security number.)

68 Where the FBI did not adequately identify a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related information. Where the the informant as still living, the Review FBI adequately identified the informant as Board voted to release the name and any still living, the Review Board adopted a case- accompanying identifying information. by-case approach, considering the factors listed in the commentary below. When the The FBI unilaterally released all unclassified Review Board voted to postpone the identity “negative contact” symbol number infor- of a “positive contact” informant, it voted to mants. postpone it for ten years, and adopted a p p ropriate substitute language. The ii. Commentary. In the FBI’s early investi- Review Board released informant names if gations into the assassination of President the informant was of particular relevance to Kennedy, Director Hoover ordered special the assassination. agents to ask all informants for re l e v a n t information. Even when informants reported Where the FBI did not adequately identify that they knew nothing that would assist the the informant as still living, the Review FBI in its investigation, FBI agents filed Board released the informant’s name and any reports in the assassination investigation file accompanying information. See 4. (Deceased documenting the “negative contact.” Informants) above.

As a result of Director Hoover’s broad direc- ii. Commentary. The Review Board ’ s tive to agents to question all informants con- decision making with regard to “positive cerning the assassination, the assassination contact” informant postponements involved investigation file provides a reasonably com- an evaluation of some combination of the fol- prehensive picture of the state of the FBI’s lowing factors: informant network in late 1963 and early 1964. The FBI, of course, preferred that this (A) the significance of the information that overview of its informant operations not be the informant provided to understanding disclosed to the public. The Review Board of the assassination; acknowledged that the public had little or no interest in knowing the identities of each (B) the importance of the identity of the “negative contact” informant. At the same informant to assessing the accuracy of the time, the Review Board believed that the reported information; and public did have an interest in having accurate information concerning the FBI’s activi- (C) the significance of the threat of harm to ties in the days and weeks following the the informant from disclosure, considering assassination. As a compromise, the FBI the following: agreed that it would unilaterally release all unclassified negative contact symbol number (1) whether the informant is still living, informants (on the theory that, with no addi- and if so, whether the informant still lives tional information from or about the infor- in the same area; mant, no researcher could ever determine the identity of the informant) and the Review (2) the amount of time that has passed Board agreed that it would protect those since the informant last provided informa- “negative contact” named informants that tion; were still alive (on the theory that, since they provided no information about the assassina- (3) the type of information the infor- tion, there was little value to be gained from mant provided; disclosing the identities of hundreds of living FBI informants.) (4) the level of confidentiality that existed between the FBI and the informant f. “Positive Contacts”: Informants who pro - at the time that the informant provided the vided at least some assassination-related information; and information to the FBI. (5) any specific evidence of possible i. Review Board guidelines. “Positive con- harm or retaliation that might come to the tact” informants provided at least s o m e informant or his or her relatives.

69 Although no one factor was dispositive in information to the FBI on a regular basis” every case, the Board considered certain fac- (quoting FBI position paper), the FBI may tors to be more important than others in have assigned a “symbol number” to the making decisions to release re c o rds. For informant. The informant did not know his example, if public interest in a particular doc- or her symbol number. Rather, the symbol ument was high, the Board released infor- number was an internal number that allowed mant names in the document even though an FBI agent to write reports about the infor- the Bureau was able to provide evidence that mant and information that the informant would have otherwise justified postpone- p rovided to the FBI without writing the ment of the informant’s identity. informant’s name. Most informant symbol numbers consisted of three parts—the prefix In those cases where the Review Board agree d indicated the field office to which the infor- to protect an informant’s name and specific mant reported (e.g. “NY” for New Yo r k , identifying information, substitute language “DL” for Dallas, “TP” for Tampa), the such as “informant name,” “s t r eet addres s , ” numeric portion corresponded directly to a “informant file number,” or “informant symbol particular informant, and the suffix indicated number” replaced the redacted information. whether the informant usually provided the FBI with information about criminal (C) or g. FBI informant symbol numbers and file security (S) cases. In longer, formal FBI numbers. reports from field offices to headquarters, where many informants were used, the FBI i. Review Board guidelines. As a general added yet another layer of security to the rule, the Review Board routinely agreed to informant’s identity by assigning temporary postpone for ten years the “numeric” portion symbol numbers (T-1, T-2, etc.. . . ). of informant symbol numbers and the “case number” portion of informant file numbers, The Review Board came to believe that, in the provided that the informant’s symbol number majority of the FBI’s assassination rec o rd s , had not already been made public. The di s c l o s u r e of the numeric portions of the sym- Review Board used the phrases “informant bol number (and the numeric portions of the symbol number” and “informant file num- co r r esponding informant file) were of little ber” as substitute language. public interest. Rather than req u i r e the FBI to res e a r ch the status of every symbol number Routine exceptions to this rule occurred in informant, the Review Board determined that two types of documents. First, in documents it would allow the FBI to protect the numeric that refer to an informant by both name and portions of informant symbol numbers and symbol (and/or file) number, the Review file numbers, reserving the right to req u e s t Bo a r d considered the symbol number to be evidence on any informant the Review Board specific information that might identify an co n s i d e r ed to be of significant public interes t . in f o r m a n t . Second, the FBI agreed to unilaterally release the entire symbol number for In support of its argument to keep the symbol “unclassified negative contacts”—those FBI and file numbers for informants secret, the informants who were asked about a particu- FBI argued that the “mosaic theory” justified lar subject, but had no “positive” information. postponement of any portion of an infor- (Se e c. FBI Informants: Negative Contacts.) mant’s symbol number. The Review Board rejected the mosaic theory as the sole basis for The non-routine exception to the general rul e postponement of symbol numbers, or for any ar ose in documents in which the unred a c t e d other particular postponement issue, simply information in the document un a m b i g u o u s l y because the mosaic theory itself contains no identified the informant. Such documents were limiting principle. However, the JFK A c t not routine because the Board did not agree to req u i r ed the Review Board to balance any pr otect the numeric portions of the informant’s in c r ementally greater risk that the release of symbol and file number in a document that further information would lead to disclosure otherwise revealed the informant’s identity. of (and harm to) the informant against the public interest in releasing the information. In ii. Commentary. When the FBI had an infor- striking this balance, the Review Board gave mant who provides “valuable and sensitive gr eat weight to the public interest in the infor-

70 mation provided. In the “core and rel a t e d ” bols” under the JFK Act after the Review files, the Review Board did not postpone the B o a rd’s first few discussions about infor- information provided by symbol number mant postponements. informants even though it would postpone the numeric portion of the symbol number. 6. Confidential Relationships Between Government Agents and Cooperating The Review Board has consistently released Foreign Governments. the prefixes and suffixes of informant symbol numbers, even in cases where it sustained the Text of Section 6(4) “numeric” part of the symbol number. Thus, for the hypothetical symbol number “NY . . .clear and convincing evidence that the 1234-C,” “NY” and “-C” would be released, public disclosure of the assassination re c o r d even if the Review Board sustained post- would compromise the existence of an ponement of the “1234.” After the Review understanding of confidentiality curre n t l y Board’s action, researchers would know that requiring protection between a Government the informant was run by the New York City agent and a cooperating individual or a for - field office and reported on criminal (rather eign government, and public disclosure than “security”) cases, but may not know the would be so harmful that it outweighs the informant-specific numeric portion of the public intere s t ; symbol number. a. Foreign liaison postponements in the FBI In the “core and related” files, the Review files. B o a rd did not postpone any part of a “T- symbol” number. Rather, the FBI began to i. Review Board guidelines. Information unilaterally release these “temporary sym- that the FBI receives from cooperating for-

71 eign governments appears throughout the ii. Commentary. Given that the FBI has a FBI’s files. The official position of the FBI is gr eat deal of foreign government information in that any foreign government information in its files, the FBI asked the Review Board to post- FBI files is the property of the foreign gov- pone release of all such information because it ernment, and as such, the FBI cannot release ad h e r es to the position that it does not have the information without first obtaining the authority to release another government’s infor- consent of the foreign government that pro- mation. The Review Board did not necessarily vided the information. When the Review ag r ee with the FBI’s position that the United B o a rd believed that information in FBI States cannot unilaterally release information re c o rds truly was “foreign government” received from another government. information, it worked with the FBI to a p p roach the foreign government and On August 8, 1995, the FBI appealed to the attempt to persuade the foreign government President the Review Board’s decisions to that it is in our countries’ mutual interests to release five documents that contained for- release liaison information in assassination eign relations postponements. The FBI made records. When necessary, the Review Board three arguments in support of its postpone- requested the assistance of the Department of ments: first, the fact of the liaison relationship State in approaching foreign governments. between the FBI and the foreign government in question was a classified secret; second, the In the segregated collection files, the Review FBI had never officially released documents Board recognized that the cost of releasing demonstrating the nature of the relationship f o reign government information far out- between the FBI and foreign government; weighed the benefits of releasing information and third, release of information about the of marginal relevance, as most of the segre- relationship would cause dramatic harm to gated collection files are. Thus, the Board sus- the United States’ foreign relations with the tained postponements of foreign government foreign government in question. information in the segregated collection files, provided the information was not assassina- On August 11, 1995, the Review Board tion-related. responded to the President that its research

72 in publicly available sources supported the its decisions on the documents on appeal, but Review Board’s decisions to release the five also instructed the FBI to provide the Review records at issue. In response to the FBI’s first Board with postponement-specific evidence two arguments, the Review Board explained in support of its claimed postponements. The that the FBI had publicly announced its liai- Review Board and the FBI agreed to the son relationship with the foreign government White House request and entered into a Stip- at issue more than thirty years ago, and that ulation on August 30, 1995. the FBI h a d al re a d y released assassination records that described the FBI’s liaison rela- The Review Board then met with rep re s e n t a - tionship with the foreign government. The tives of the Department of State and the United Review Board offered a three-part response States Ambassador for the foreign government to the FBI’s third argument that harm would to discuss the documents at issue. As a result of result from release of information about the the meeting, the foreign government agreed to liaison relationship: first, the FBI had not met release of the overwhelming majority of infor- the “clear and convincing evidence” stan- mation in the documents. The Review Board dard because it had not identified a particu- ag r eed to sustain the one postponement that lar harm that would result; second, if foreign the foreign government requested, which was relations would be harmed as a result of the name of an employee of the foreign gov- release of information about the liaison rela- ernment, recognizing that the identity of the tionship, the harm would have alre a d y individual was of little or no interest to the occurred when the relationship was previ- public. (See illustration.) ously disclosed by the FBI; and third, harm to foreign relations was unlikely because the After the appeals process had ended, the FBI information in the documents is the type of maintained its position that it could not rel e a s e information that we would expect govern- fo r eign government information without the ments to share in law enforcement activities. consent of the foreign government. The Review Board recognized that it simply did The FBI then consulted representatives of the not have the time or the res o u r ces to pursue foreign government to ask whether the for- release of each postponement in the same way eign government would object to an official that it pursued release of the five appealed disclosure of the liaison relationship. The for- documents. Initially, the Review Board had eign government asked the FBI not to reveal hoped to approach each foreign government the relationship, and the FBI argued to the separately in an attempt to convince the gov- P resident that the United States should ernments that release of liaison information in respect the request of the foreign govern- assassination rec o r ds would benefit both the ment. The Review Board noted that, had the United States and the foreign governments. In FBI released the records without consulting the end, the Review Board recognized that the the foreign government, foreign re l a t i o n s easiest way to release the foreign information would not have been harmed, but since the in the FBI rec o r ds would be for the FBI, FBI did consult the foreign government, the t h rough its “Legats” (Legal Attaches), to FBI itself had created a foreign re l a t i o n s request the foreign government at issue to problem. Despite the paradox that resulted release the information. The Review Board from the FBI’s consultation with the foreign saw three advantages to this approach: fi r s t , in government, the Review Board took the posi- those cases where the FBI was successful in tion that the foreign government’s desire that obtaining release of the information, the rec o r d the FBI not release the information was a relat issue would be available to the public with evant factor in the balancing test but that, in no further action by the Review Board; se c o n d , this case, the public interest in disclosure out- allowing the FBI to request release of forei g n weighed the foreign government’s unex- information using the same channels throu g h plained desire to protect the information. which they obtain foreign information makes it possible for the FBI to maintain positive rel a - After the FBI and the Review Board briefed tions with their foreign contacts; and th i r d , th e the issues to the President, representatives of Review Board relinquished no rights to make the Review Board and the FBI met with the its own approach to the foreign government, White House Counsel’s Office. The White either before or after the FBI Legat had House asked the Review Board to reconsider ap p r oached its foreign contacts.

73 Practically, the FBI sent the records at issue to d u re currently utilized, or re a s o n a b l y its Legats with a letter from Director Freeh expected to be utilized, by the Secret Service explaining to the foreign government how or another Government agency responsible important release of the information was to for protecting Government officials, and the FBI and to the American people. In addi- public disclosure would be so harmful that it tion to materials from the FBI, the Review outweighs the public interest. Board enclosed a letter to the foreign government explaining our statute and our mission To date, the Secret Service has not relied on and requesting release of the records. Section 6(5) of the JFK Act to support any requests for postponement of records. When the Legats were unsuccessful in obtaining the consent of the foreign government to C. JFK ACT EXEMPTIONS release the information, either because the Legat’s contacts did not approve the release or In addition to deciding postponements, the because the Legat’s local contacts no longer Review Board also had to address certain cat- existed, the Review Board requested the egories of information exempted from the Department of State to approach the forei g n JFK Act. government dire c t l y. Diplomatic channels pr oved to be a time-consuming way to rel e a s e 1. Tax Return Information rec o r ds. The Department of State was still awaiting responses from some foreign govern- The Review Board encountered a wide vari- ment officials as to whether the government ety of tax return information in its review of could release their information in FBI rec o rd s . assassination records. Although current fed- The Department of State assured the Review eral law prohibits the IRS and other federal Bo a r d that it would continue to pursue rel e a s e agencies from disseminating tax return infor- of this information even after the Review mation, in the 1960s, the IRS often shared its Bo a r d terminated its operations on September information with law enforcement agencies 30, 1998, and provide the information to the including the FBI and investigative bodies JFK Collection when it received decisions from such as the Warren Commission. The Warren the foreign governments at issue. Commission, in particular, collected tax data If the Review Board adopted the same policy on many of the individuals that it studied, on marginally relevant foreign government including Lee Harvey Oswald. information in the segregated collections that it followed for records more closely related to When Congress was considering the JFK Act, the assassination, the Review Board and its the IRS requested that the JFK Act trump cur- staff would have spent the majority of the rent federal law protecting tax return infor- last year of the Review Board’s operations mation and allow the IRS to release tax return approaching foreign governments to try to records relating to the assassination of the obtain the release of information that was of President. Congress refused to allow the IRS, little public interest. The Review Board came or any other federal agency, to disclose tax to believe that the cost of release of the infor- return information. Thus, section 11(a) of the mation outweighed the benefits of releasing JFK Act reads, in relevant part, this marginally relevant information in the segregated collection files. Thus, in its April When this Act requires transmission of a 1998 meeting, it agreed to designate the irrel- record to the Archivist or public disclo- evant information as “NBR” and applied its sure, it shall take precedence over any “NBR” guidelines. other law (except section 6103 of the Inter - nal Revenue Code) . . .that would other- 7. Presidential Protection wise prohibit such transmission or disclosure. . . . Text of Section 6(5) Section 6103 is the section of the Internal Rev- . . . clear and convincing evidence that the enue Code that prohibits federal government public disclosure of the assassination record agencies that possess tax return information would reveal a security or protective proce - from disclosing that information.

74 While the Review Board understands con- E. CONCLUSION gressional reluctance to recklessly release the tax return information of American citizens, When it first assembled, the Review Board it is truly unfortunate that the Review Board faced the daunting task of setting the stan- could not make available to the public the tax dard for the declassification of hundreds of return records of Lee Harvey Oswald for the thousands of federal records. These records years prior to the assassination. The Review included those under the purview of the Board received many inquiries from the pub- CIA’s Directorate of Operations (DO), which traditionally has been exempt from declassi- lic requesting that the Board release the fication review. In addition to the raw intelli- Oswald tax returns so that the public could gence material included in the DO’s files, resolve inconsistencies in the data concern- CIA records also included sensitive records ing Oswald’s earnings. Although the IRS from the Counterintelligence Staff, the Office determined that the Review Board necessar- of Personnel, and Security. The Board also ily had to review tax return information in c o n f ronted the task of reviewing rec o rd s order to complete its work, it could not allow from the National Security Agency, most of the Review Board to disclose tax return infor- which were classified at the “Sensitive Com- mation unless Congress granted a specific partmented Information” (SCI) level and pre- exemption to the strictures of section 6103. viously never had been subject to any review outside of NSA. The Review Board ulti- Thus, the Review Board recommends that mately reviewed for declassification some of C o n g ress enact legislation exempting Lee the most secret records from many other Harvey Oswald’s tax return information, agencies and offices, including FBI source Oswald employment information obtained files and Protective Research Section files of by the Social Security Administration, and the Secret Service. other tax or IRS related information in the The Review Board received little guidance files of the Wa r ren Commission and the either from past governmental experience or HSCA from the protection afforded it by sec- f rom Congress in the legislative history tion 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, and behind the JFK Act. The words of Section 6 that such legislation direct that these records proved, however, to be of significant impor- be released to the public in the JFK Collec- tance to the Review Board and for the accom- tion. plishment of its work. As interpreted and applied by the Review Board over an 2. Records Under Seal e x t remely wide range of documents, the words of Section 6 established an entirely Section 10 of the JFK Act allows the Review new standard for the release of governmental Board to identify records under seal of court information. The “common law” developed and request the Attorney General’s assis- by the Review Board and largely accepted by tance in petitioning a court to lift its seal on the agencies stands as an important part of the records. The Review Board only identi- the Review Board’s legacy of public release fied one instance where it believed that of government records. important assassination re c o rds re m a i n e d under seal of court and it requested and obtained the assistance of the Department of Justice in lifting the seal on the records.

D. APPEALS TO THE PRESIDENT PENDING AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1998

As of this writing (September 1998), the FBI and Secret Service appeals to the President— both relating to the Review Board’s votes to release information the agencies believed to invade privacy—were pending.

75 CHAPTER 5 ENDNOTES

1 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994) (hereinafter “JFK Act”). 2 “[A]ll Government records related to the assassination of President Kennedy should carry a presumption of immediate disclosure.” JFK Act, § 2(a)(2). 3 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988) (hereinafter “FOIA”). 4 President Reagan’s Executive Order was in effect at the time that the JFK Act was passed. See Exec. Order No. 12,356, 3 C.F.R. 166 (1982-1995) (hereinafter “Executive Order 12356”). The current Executive Order is Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333 (1995-present) (hereinafter “Executive Order 12958”). 5 The Freedom of Information Act Exemptions. (b) This section does not apply to matters that are— (1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order; (2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; (3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld; (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and priv- ileged and confidential; (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; (6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;

76 (8) contained in or related to examination operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or (9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells. 6 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 102d cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rep. No. 102-328, 17, 20. 7 Because the audience for this report presumably will encounter the current Executive Orde r mo r e often, the standards for release of information under Executive Order 12958 are quoted. We have not quoted the standards for release of information under Executive Order 12356. 8 Executive Order 12958, Section 3.4(a)–(b): Automatic Declassification (April 17, 1995). (a) Subject to paragraph (b), below, within 5 years from the date of this order, all classified information contained in records that (1) are more than 25 years old, and (2) have been determined to have permanent historical value under title 44, United States Code, shall be automatically declassified whether or not the records have been reviewed. Subsequently, all classified information in such records shall be automatically declassified no longer than 25 years from the date of its original classification, except as provided in paragraph (b), below. (b) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification under paragraph (a), above, specific information, the release of which should be expected to: (1) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or reveal information about the application of an intelligence source or method, or reveal the identity of a human intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national security interests of the United States; (2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction; (3) reveal information that would impair U.S. cryptologic systems or activities; (4) reveal information that would impair the application of state of the art technology within a U.S. weapon system; (5) reveal actual U.S. military war plans that remain in effect; (6) reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair relations between the United States and a foreign government, or seriously and demonstrably undermine ongoing diplomatic activities of the United States; (7) reveal information that would clearly and demonstrably impair the current ability of United States Government officials to protect the President, Vice President, and other officials for whom protection services, in the interest of national security, are authorized; (8) reveal information that would seriously and demonstrably impair current national security emergency preparedness plans; or (9) violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement. 9 JFK Act Section 6: Grounds for postponement of public disclosure of records. Disclosure of assassination records or particular information in assassination records to the public may be postponed subject to the limitations of this Act if there is clear and convincing evidence that— (1) the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination record is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal— (A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection; (B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or

77 (C) any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States, the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States; (2) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal the name or identity of a living person who provided confidential information to the United States and would pose a substantial risk of harm to that person; (3) the public disclosure of the assassination record could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy is so substantial that it outweighs the public interest; (4) the public disclosure of the assassination record would compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a Government agent and a cooperating individual or a foreign government, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest; (5) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal a security or protective procedure currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the Secret Service or another Government agency responsible for protecting Government officials, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest. 10 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). 11 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). 12 The Senate believed that the “legislation is necessary” in part “because congressional records related to the assassination would not otherwise be subject to public disclosure until at least the year 2029.” S. Rep. at 20. The “FOIAdoes not provide public access to unpublished congressional records.” CRS Report for Congress: President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Disclosure: An overview (March 3, 1993). 13 See House Committee on Government Operations, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 625, pt. 1, at 18. 14 Section 2(a)(2) (emphasis added). 15 Section 2(A)(7) (emphasis added). 16 See Sections 6, 9(c)(1). 17 House Committee on Government Operations, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 625, pt. 1, at 25. 18 House Committee on Government Operations, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 625, at 16 (emphasis added). 19 House Committee on Government Operations, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, 102d Cong., 2d sess., H. Rept. 625, at 26 (emphasis added). 20 JFK Act, Section 3(10). 21 See, e.g., Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 102d cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rep. No. 102-328, 30. 22 JFK Act, Section 3(2). 23 The JFK Act, section 7(n), allows the Review Board to issue interpretive regulations. In its report on the JFK Act, the Senate noted, Government offices are required to begin the review and disclosure of records upon enactment to expedite public access to the many records which do not require additional review or postponement. However, the ultimate work of the Review Board will involve not only the review of records recommended for postponement, but requiring government offices to provide additional information and records, where appropriate. 24 JFK Act, section 3(2).

78 25 JFK Act, sections 6, 9(c)(1). 26 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 102d cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rep. No. 102-328, 31. 27 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 102d cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rep. No. 102-328, 2977. 28 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 102d cong., 2d sess., 1992, S. Rep. No. 102-328 (emphasis added). 29 FBI’s May 28, 1998, Appeal at 8. 30 Review Board’s Reply Memorandum to the President, May 22, 1998, and Surreply Memo- randum, June 19, 1998. 31 Review Board’s Reply Memorandum to the President, May 22, 1998, and Surreply Memo- randum, June 15, 1998. 32 FBI Memorandum, FBI Informant/Confidentiality Postponements, p. 3.

79 CHAPTER 6 PA RT I: TH E QU E S T F O R AD D I T I O N A L IN F O R M AT I O N A N D RE C O R D S I N FE D E R A L GO V E R N M E N T OF F I C E S

A major focus of the Assassination Records fully evaluate the success of the Review Review Board’s work has been to attempt to Bo a r d’s approach is to examine the Review answer questions and locate additional infor- Bo a r d’s rec o r ds as well as the assassination mation not previously explored related to the rec o r ds that are now at the National Arc h i v e s assassination of President John F. Kennedy. and Records Administration (NARA) as a di r ect result of the Review Board’s req u e s t s . The Review Board’s “Requests for Ad d i t i o n a l Information and Records” to government Mo re o v e r , because the Review Board’s req u e s t s agencies served two purposes. First, the addi- we r e not always consistent in theme, the chap- tional requests allowed Review Board staff ter is necessarily miscellaneous in nature. members to locate new categories of assassination rec o r ds in federal government files. In Scope of Chapter some files, the Review Board located new assassination rec o r ds. In other files, it discov- Section 3(2) of the JFK Act defined the term e red that the file contained no re l e v a n t “assassination record” to include all records rec o r ds. In both cases, the Review Board staff that were “created or made available for use memorialized their findings in written mem- by, obtained by, or otherwise came into the oranda, with the hope that the public would possession of” any official entity that investi- be able to easily determine what files the staff gated the assassination. reviewed. Second, the additional re q u e s t s allowed Review Board staff to request back- This chapter does not discuss those records gr ound information that could assist in the that government offices identified for inclu- review of rec o r ds that it had identified as rel - sion in the JFK Collection. evant to the assassination. For example, Section 7(j)(1)(C)(ii) of the JFK Act empow- Review Board staff members might encounter e red the Board to direct government off i c e s particular cryptonyms, abbreviations, infor- to make available “addi- mant symbol numbers, file numbers, or offi c e tional information and designations in assassination re c o rds, but We cannot prevent the specula- re c o rds” that the Review tion that someone did cover up, could only determine the meaning of those B o a rd believed it needed but the arguments that a cover- ab b r eviations, numbers, and codewords by to fulfill its re s p o n s i b i l i- requesting and reviewing additional files. ties under the Act. A s up continues and will continue, the JFK Act specifically can somewhat at least, be less- While the Review Board made most of its i n s t ructed the Review ened.What has been lost cannot be replaced. But what we do additional requests to the FBI and the CIA, it B o a rd to go beyond have can be made public. We also made requests to other agencies, such as the scope of pre v i o u s should have access and our stu- the Secret Service, the Department of State, inquiries, the Review dents should have access to and the National Security Agency (NSA). The B o a rd tailored its addi- what still exists. government offices answered each of the tional requests to encompass those materials that —Bruce Hitchcock, May 1997 Review Board’s requests for additional infor- no previous investiga- mation and rec o r ds, as the Pr esident John F. tive body had identified Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1 as assassination-related. This chapter cov- 19 9 2 (JFK Act) req u i re d . This chapter serves ers o n l y those re c o rds that the Review as an overview of the Review Board’s req u e s t s B o a rd sought, pursuant to its authority, to rather than as a complete detailed explanation request additional information and of each request. The only way for the public to re c o rd s .

81 It is widely known that the Wa r ren Com- 1. Pre-Assassination Records mission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations conducted extensive The question of what U.S. government investigations of Jack Ruby, and, as a re s u l t records existed on Lee Harvey Oswald on government offices processed voluminous November 22, 1963, has never been answered Ruby re c o rds. The Review Board made to the satisfaction of the public. Thus, a pri- only two additional requests for informa- mary goal of the Review Board was to clarify tion and re c o rds concerning Ruby. There- the pre-assassination re c o rds held by the f o re, this chapter does not have a separate agencies which were most involved in the section on Ruby. Similarly, the JFK Collec- post-assassination investigation. tion contains a considerable number of re c o rds concerning Lee Harvey Oswald’s a. CIA. activities in New Orleans, but the Review B o a rd made only a few requests for addi- At the time of the assassination, the CIA held tional information and re c o rds re g a rd i n g four types of records which contained infor- Oswald in New Orleans. mation on Lee Harvey Oswald: a 201 or personality file which was released to the public A. RECORDS RELATED TO LEE HARVEY in 1992; an Office of Security file which OSWALD nearly duplicated the pre-assassination 201 file; HTLINGUAL re c o rds; and re c o rd s The Review Board’s additional re q u e s t s within a general file on U.S. citizens who had focused upon locating all records concerning defected to another country. Lee Harvey Oswald held by the U.S. government. The Review Board requested each i. Security file. CIA’s search of its Office agency to check their of Personnel Security database produced the One if the problems of secrets is archives, files, and data- original Office of Security’s subject file on that Americans are incapable of bases for information Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) established keeping secrets very long. Any- directly related to either circa 1960. The first volume of the Security thing like this would have Lee Harvey Oswald or file contains 19 documents, similar but not leaked out by now. his wife Marina Oswald. absolutely identical to the pre-assassination —Richard Helms, Given that many con- volume of Oswald’s 201 file. The Review February 7, 1996 spiracy theories allege B o a rd identified an additional six docu- U.S. government involve- ments, which appear to pre-date the assassi- ment with Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the nation, in later volumes of the Security file. assassination, the Review Board was particu- Although the HSCA reviewed the Office of larly interested in locating re c o rds that agen- Security file in 1978, Congress did not include this file with the other material cies had created or main- viewed by the HSCA that it sequestered. tained prior to the We did not understand how Consequently, this file did not end up in the assassination. In some intelligence agencies worked. CIAsequestered collection.2 As a result of the The CIA “gave [us] nothing cases, the Review Board Review Board’s request, CIA transmitted its more than what was asked for. simply released more Office of Security file to the John F. Kennedy Every time we asked for a file, information from files Assassination Records Collection (JFK Col- we had to write a letter.There that the public has long lection) at NARA. were no fishing expeditions. known about, such as —Ed Lopez and Dan Hardway the CIA 201 file on Lee ii. Records in the defector file. CIA estab- Harvey and Marina lished its 12-volume Office of Security Defec- Oswald or the FBI files tor file (#0341008) circa 1950 for the purpose on Lee Harvey Oswald. In other cases, the of re c o rding information on U.S. citizens Review Board’s additional requests led to who defected to other countries and informa- the release of new re c o rds, such as the CIA’ s tion on foreign citizens who were consider- security file on Lee Harvey Oswald, or ing defecting to the United States. The resulted in the release of previously denied Review Board staff reviewed the entire defec- re c o rds, such as the original files on the tor file for records related to Lee Harvey Oswalds from the Immigration and Natural- Oswald. The staff located records on Lee ization Service (INS). Harvey Oswald, including research notes,

82 press clippings, and duplicates of records and recommended to the FBI that these found in the Security file, and identified the records be included in the JFK Collection. records as appropriate for inclusion in the JFK Collection. The Review Board also sought to determine whether the FBI maintained a file in Mexico iii. HTLINGUAL rec o r d s . HT L I N G U A L is City on a “Harvey Lee Oswald” under the the crypt for CIA’s mail opening and mail file number 105–2137. The Mexico City Legal cover program for 1952 to 1973. The CIA Attache (Legat) opened a file on Lee Harvey reported to the Review Board that it Oswald (105–3702) in October 1963 following de s t r oyed most of its formal HTLINGUAL Oswald’s visit to Mexico City. Some of the rec o r ds in 1990 at the direction of CIA’s Offi c e documents in the Legat’s file contain nota- of General Counsel. The CIA se q u e s t e r ed col- tions for routing records to a file numbered lection, however, does contain several “soft” 105–2137, and were captioned “Harvey Lee or working files on Lee Harvey Oswald and Oswald.” One researcher conjectured that the HTLINGUAL pr oject, including the “soft” this file would predate the Lee Harvey file held by the Special Investigations Grou p Oswald file, 105–3702, and might lead the of the Counterintelligence Staff (CI/SIG). In Review Board to other FBI documents on Lee response to the Review Board’s request for Harvey Oswald. In response to the Review additional information, the CIA located addi- Board’s request, the FBI searched its Legat’s tional ref e r ences to HTLINGUAL rec o r ds in files for a file numbered 105–2137 and cap- ar chival files of the CIA’s Deputy Director of tioned “Harvey Lee Oswald,” but it did not Plans (now the Deputy Director of Opera- find such a file. tions). CIA pr ocessed the relevant rec o r ds for release to NARA. c. Secret Service.

b. FBI. The Review Board reviewed the Secret Ser- vice’s Protective Research Files and deter- The FBI opened its file on Lee Harvey mined that the Secret Service did not open a Oswald in 1959 when press reports from p rotective re s e a rch file (CO–2) file on Lee Moscow announced that Oswald, a twenty Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination. year old former Marine had renounced his S e c ret Service re c o rds extant indicate that U.S. citizenship and had applied for Soviet the Secret Service also did not have any citizenship. Between 1959 and November 22, information on Lee Harvey Oswald fro m 1963, the FBI filed approximately 50 records other government agencies prior to the f rom several government agencies in its a s s a s s i n a t i o n . Headquarters file on Oswald (105–82555). Although the FBI processed all of the pre- d. IRS/Social Security Administration. assassination documents in Oswald’s file under the JFK Act, the Review Board made To shed light on questions regarding Lee several additional requests to the FBI to Harvey Oswald’s employment history and determine whether it had other pre - sources of income, the Review Board sought assassination records on Lee Harvey Oswald to inspect and publicly release Internal Rev- in its files. enue Service (IRS) and Social Security Administration (SSA) re c o rds on Oswald. For example, the Review Board staff found Although the Review Board staff did review documents cross-referenced from files cap- IRS and SSA records, Section 6103 of the tioned “Funds Transmitted to Residents of Internal Revenue Code prohibits the disclo- Russia” and “Russian Funds.” The Review sure of tax return information, and section Board requested access to files with these 11(a) of the JFK Act explicitly preserves the case captions from FBI Headquarters and the confidentiality of tax return information. Dallas and New York Field offices for the Thus, the Review Board unfortunately could years 1959 through 1964. The Review Board not open Lee Harvey Oswald’s tax returns. staff located assassination records concern- The next chapter of this report explains, in ing attempts by Marguerite Oswald, Lee the IRS compliance section, the mechanics of Harvey Oswald’s mother, to send money to the Review Board’s and the IRS’s efforts to her son while he was in the Soviet Union, release this information.

83 e. INS records on Lee and Marina Oswald. run by an agency of the U.S. government, or a false defector sent on a mission to the U.S.S.R. Many researchers have asked how Lee Har- for a particular purpose and then used for dif- vey Oswald, a defector to the Soviet Union, fe r ent purposes by some members of the intel- could have been allowed to re-enter the ligence community following his return to the United States in 1962 with his wife, a Soviet United States. national, and how Marina Oswald would have been permitted to leave the Soviet a. U.S. Marine Corps records. Union when emigration was, at best, extremely difficult. In an attempt to shed The Review Board asked the Marine Corps to light on these questions, the Review Board search for any records relating to post-assas- requested and released original files on Lee sination investigations that the U.S. Marine and Marina Oswald from the U.S. Immigra- Corps might have completed, as some tion and Naturalization Service (INS). Subse- researchers believe. The U.S. Marine Corps quently, in late 1997, INS discovered in its searched files at both U.S. Marine Corps HQ investigative section, that it had an extensive in Quantico, and at the Federal Records Cen- working file on Marina Oswald that con- ter in Suitland, Maryland, but the Marine tained 1963–64 records directly relating to the Corps did not locate evidence of any internal assassination. investigations of Lee Harvey Oswald, other than correspondence already published in f. House Un-American Activities Committee. the Warren Report.

As of this writing the Review Board had i. U.S. Marine Headquarters copy of obtained authorization of the House Judi- enlisted personnel file and medical file. In 1997, ciary Committee to release its HUAC files on the Review Board transferred to the JFK Col- Lee Harvey Oswald. The records predomi- lection at NARA the original (paper) copies nantly postdated the assassination. However, of Lee Harvey Oswald’s U.S. Marine Corps HUAC held a few pre-assassination records Enlisted Personnel File, and Medical Treat- on Oswald, including articles on his defec- ment File. Previously, these files had been tion to the U.S.S.R. and his return to the U.S. maintained at U.S. Marine Corps Headquar- ters in Quantico, Virginia and had only been 2. Military records available in microfiche format in response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests The question of whether the Marine Corps that people made to the Marine Corps. conducted a post-assassination investigation and produced a written report on former ii. Additional relevant U.S. Marine Corps Marine Private Lee Harvey Oswald, circa late unit diaries. The Review Board obtained from 1963 and early 1964, has never been res o l v e d U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters at Quan- to the satisfaction of the tico, Virginia, additional official U.S. Marine [T]he enduring controversy of public. Similarly, many Corps unit diaries from the units in which who Oswald really was , wh a t have wondered whether Oswald served. These additional diaries he was , is an inherent part of the the Office of Naval Intelli- complement the partial collection of unit historical truth of this case. . . gence (ONI) conducted a diaries gathered by the HSCA. Together, the Os wa l d , as you know, is the post-defection “net dam- Review Board and HSCA unit diary records most complex alleged or real age assessment” investi- appear to constitute a complete unit diary political assassin in American gation of Lee Harvey record for Oswald. Researchers can compare hi s t o r y. . . the idea that, for the Oswald circa 1959 or 1960. the in and out transfer dates in Oswald’s per- first time, citizens will be the Various former Oswald sonnel file with the original entries in the per- judge of the balance between associates and military tinent diaries to which they correspond. government secrecy and what investigators have rec a l l e d we know, rather than the agen- separate investigations.3 b. Military identification card. cies themselves or the courts, I R e s e a rchers have also think is extraordinary. . . questioned whether To resolve questions about whether Oswald’s —Philip Melanson, Oswald was an “authen- D D – 1173 Military Identification card pro- March 24, 1995 tic” defector, a “false vided some indication that Oswald had a defector” in a pro g r a m connection to CIA, the Review Board

84 requested and received additional informa- Investigative Service (NCIS) records manage- tion from the Federal Records Center in St. ment officials, one of whom personally veri- Louis, Missouri, from the personnel files of fied that he had searched for District Intelli- other Marines who had served with Oswald gence Office records (with negative results) (for comparison purposes), and from the U.S. from the San Diego, Dallas, and New Orleans Marine Corps and the U.S. Army’s Military District Intelligence Offices in 1996 with neg- History Institute. ative results. This search included “11 9 ” reports from the time period 1959–1964, dur- c. Possible ONI post-defection investigation. ing an extensive search of NCIS record group 181. The search included any records that The Review Board became aware of an indi- would have been related to Oswald’s defec- vidual named Fred Reeves of California, who tion. Thus, the Review Board ultimately was reputed to have been in charge of a post- located no documentary evidence to substan- defection “net damage assessment” of Oswald tiate Reeves’ claims. by the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) shortly after Oswald’s defection to the U.S.S.R. 3. In the U.S.S.R. The Review Board contacted Reeves, interviewed him twice by telephone, then flew him Various authors interested in Lee Harvey to Washington, D.C., where the Review Board Oswald have suggested that Oswald was a st a f f interviewed him in person.4 CI A so u r ce, asset, or operative at the time of his defection to the U.S.S.R. in October 1959. In 1959, Reeves was a civilian Naval Intelli- Re s e a r chers further suggest that Oswald either gence Operations Specialist.5 Reeves told the performed some sort of mission for the CIA, Review Board that a week or so after Oswald met with CIA personnel in the Soviet Union, or defected to the U.S.S.R., two officers from was debriefed by CIA personnel upon his ONI in Washington, D.C.,6 called him and return. The Review Board staff req u e s t e d asked him to conduct a background investi- information and rec o r ds from CIA and other gation at the Marine Corps Air Station in El agencies in an effort to pursue rec o r ds that Toro, California—Oswald’s last duty station might shed light on such allegations. before his discharge from the Marine Corps. Reeves said that he went to El Toro, copied a. CIA operations in Moscow. Oswald’s enlisted personnel file, obtained the names of many of his associates, and The Review Board staff examined extensive mailed this information to ONI in Washing- CIA records concerning the history and oper- ton, D.C. He said that ONI in Washington ran ations of the CIA in or against the Soviet the post-defection investigation of Oswald, Union in the late 1950s and early to mid and that the Washington officers then 1960s. The Review Board found no records directed various agents in the field. Although that suggested that Oswald had ever worked Reeves did not interview anyone himself, he for the CIA in any capacity, nor did any said that later (circa late 1959 or early 1960), records suggest that Oswald’s trip and defec- approximately 12 to 15 “119” reports con- tion to the Soviet Union served any intelli- cerning Oswald (OPNAV Forms 5520–119 are gence purpose. The Review Board staff also ONI’s equivalent of an FBI FD–302 investiga- interviewed the senior CIAofficer in Moscow tive report), crossed his desk. Reeves said he at the time of Oswald’s arrival and the CIA was aware of “119” reports from Japan and Chief of Station present when Oswald Texas, and that the primary concern of the departed the Soviet Union. Both individuals reports he read on Oswald was to ascertain stated that they had no knowledge of Oswald what damage had been done to national prior to the assassination, and they did not security by Oswald’s defection. Reeves believe that Oswald’s trip and defection to reported that he also saw eight to ten “119” the Soviet Union was orchestrated for any reports on Oswald after the assassination, intelligence purpose. and that he was confident he was not confusing the two events in his mind. b. American Embassy personnel.

In the spring of 1998, Review Board staff Re v i e w Bo a r d staff interviewed, or informally members met with two Naval Criminal spoke with, numerous individuals assigned

85 to the American Embassy in Moscow during Oswald. The CIA, however, did not locate the time period 1959–1963. The clarity of indi- any corroborating information or records in vidual memories of Oswald and/or the its files. Moscow Embassy varied widely and few stories were consistent. One of the most interes t - In an effort to better understand this mys- ing was the interview of Joan Hallett, the t e r y, the Review Board searched for rec o rd s receptionist at the American Embassy and the which might confirm or deny whether there first embassy person to meet Oswald. Hallett was any contact between Oswald and the was the wife of Assistant Naval Attache Com- C I A b e f o re or after his time in the Soviet mander Oliver Hallett and a temporary Union. The Office of Operations (OO), which receptionist during the summer Am e r i c a n in 1963 was a part of the Directorate of Intel- Exhibition at Sokolniki Park in Moscow. Hal- ligence, interviewed American citizens who lett’s recollections of Oswald’s visit place him might have come into contact with informa- at the embassy before the end of the Exhibi- tion or individuals of intelligence intere s t tion on September 5, 1959. Available rec o rd s while overseas.7 The Review Board staff show Oswald in the USSR no earlier than examined OO re c o rds and operational histo- October 15, 1959. While Hallett’s Department ries to gain an understanding of OO prac- of State employment rec o r ds document her tices in the early 1960s. The Review Board recollection that she was not employed as a s t a ff found no evidence of contact between receptionist as late as October 31, 1959, the Oswald and OO either before or after his Review Board found no documentary evi- time in the Soviet Union. While the rec o rd s dence to explain the variation in dates. showed that OO was interested in interviewing tourists to the Soviet Union for general c. Search for American Embassy records. information in the 1950s, by 1962 only trav- elers with special access, knowledge, or In an effort to account for the widely varying skills were of intelligence interest. OO had stories from the interviews of personnel no specific policy covering contacts with assigned to the American Embassy in returning defectors; however, a local field Moscow, the Review Board staff reviewed o ffice could initiate a contact if justified by a the Department of State post files for particular situation. CIA could not locate Moscow for the period 1959–1963, which are any re c o rds or reporting showing any OO available to the public at NARA. The Depart- contact with Oswald. ment of State was not able to locate the visitors book for Moscow circa 1959 nor any list While a DCD “A” file does exist in the CIA’s of visitors and tourists for late 1959. s e q u e s t e red collection, most of the documents in the file are from the mid-1970s; none d. DCD/OO alleged debriefing of predate the assassination. Furthermore, the Lee Harvey Oswald. file appears to have been created as DCD personnel attempted to locate any evidence of Part of the mystery surrounding Oswald’s contacts with Oswald in response to various defection and return to the U.S. is the ques- c o n g ressional investigative bodies. CIA tion of whether the CIA’s Office of Opera- processed this file for release to NARA. tions (later the Domestic Contacts Division) interviewed Oswald upon his return from 4. In Mexico City the Soviet Union. The [T]he CIA, with thorough photo- available evidence is con- Lee Harvey Oswald’s visit to Mexico City in graphic surveillance of both the t r a d i c t o r y. The Review S e p t e m b e r-October 1963, remains one of the Cuban and Soviet Embassies, B o a rd requested addi- m o re vexing subplots to the assassination had at least ten opportunities to tional information and s t o r y. Oswald’s fascination with the Soviet photograph Oswa l d , yet CIA records in an attempt to Union and Cuba is well-known, yet there records at the time of the assassi- coroborate a November exists no consensus of opinion as to why he nation allegedly did not contain 25, 1963, memorandum spent time at both the Soviet and Cuban a single photograph matchi n g which discusses the rec- Embassies during his brief stay in Mexico the man arrested in Dallas. ollections of a CIA staff City in late September and early October —Peter Dale Scott o fficer that the A g e n c y 1963. Why did Lee Harvey Oswald make c o n s i d e red interviewing this mysterious trip to Mexico just six weeks

86 prior to the assassination? Was the purpose the rec o r ds on the Station and Oswald’s Mex- of this trip merely to apply for a transit visa ico City visit in the JFK Collection at NARA at the Cuban Embassy in a desperate rep r esent the full universe of rec o r ds. Recog- attempt to return to Moscow after the Sovi- nizing the existence of gaps in the JFK Collec- ets had re b u ffed his direct approach? Since tion, the Review Board staff worked to verify the Mexico City chapter is so puzzling, and whether any additional extant rec o r ds could p rovides fertile ground for speculation, the pr ovide further information on or more tangi- Review Board sought to ensure that all gov- ble evidence of Oswald’s trip to Mexico City ernment re c o rds on this subject were and alleged contacts with the Soviet and released and took action to pursue addi- Cuban Embassies. The Review Board staff tional re c o rds. The Review Board facilitated examined the CIA se q u e s t e r ed collection, the the release of thousands of previously sani- Oswald 201 file, and the then unproc e s s e d tized and closed documents on the subject of files maintained by longtime CIA of ficer Russ Oswald’s trip to Mexico, including but not Holmes in an effort to locate any leads toward limited to re c o rds from CIA, FBI, Depart- unique information on Oswald’s visit and the ment of State, the Wa r ren Commission and CI A Station in Mexico City. the HSCA. The Review Board also pursued leads suggested by re s e a rchers and submit- i. Audio and photographic. C I A h a s ted requests to agencies for additional acknowledged that in 1963, at the time of re c o rds and/or evidence. Oswald’s visit, the Mexico City Station had in place two telephone intercept opera- a. Technical surveillance. tions—covering both the Soviet and Cuban Embassies; three photographic surveillance At the time of Oswald’s trip to Mexico, with operations targeting the Soviet compound; the Cold War well underway and the and one photographic surveillance opera- Kennedy Administration preoccupied with tion, which employed at least two cameras, Cuba, the CIA’s Mexico City Station housed targeting the Cuban compound. Painstaking one of the Agency’s major foreign clandes- negotiations between the Review Board and tine operations in the Western Hemisphere. CIA on the protection or release of technical The station maintained a multifaceted sur- and operational details resulted in CIA’s dis- veillance coverage of the Soviet and Cuban closure of a great deal of previously withheld diplomatic installations. CIA electronic sur- information concerning audio and photo- veillance confirmed that Lee Harvey Oswald graphic surveillance. This process then visited and communicated with both the paved the way for the Review Board to ask Cuban Consulate and the Soviet Embassy for specific types of records pertaining to between September 27 and October 1 or 2, CIA’s surveillance activities. 1963. Despite requests from several congressional investigative bodies and the Review The Review Board submitted formal and Board, the CIA never located photographic informal requests to CIA relating to elec- evidence of Oswald’s visit to either embassy. tronic surveillance operations. Several mem- Although CIA has transcripts of the calls bers of the Review Board staff reviewed the believed to have been made by Oswald, the sequestered collection microfilm, which con- CIA has consistently maintained that it did tained a broad universe of records on CIA not retain tapes from the period of Oswald’s technical operations and covered a period visit as the Station continually recycled the that extended beyond the assassination. tapes after it transcribed any useful informa- Because the release of the Warren Commis- tion. According to the transcripts, only one of sion Report in 1964 had a bearing on certain the calls, made to the Soviet Consulate, actu- surveillance operations in Mexico City, the ally identifies a Lee Oswald as the caller. Review Board sought to ensure that it Since CIA had already erased the tapes, in marked for inclusion in the JFK Collection all accordance with the Station’s standard pro- records reflecting any changes in or suspen- cedures, it could not perform post-assassina- sion of surveillance activity around the time tion voice comparisons. that the Wa r ren Commission released its report. In addition, the Review Board Given the importance of the Mexico City Sta- explored any newly identified operations or tion, the Review Board worked to ensure that surveillance activity.

87 During its review of all project files and ticular, and thus, the tape recordings them- operational reports, the Review Board found selves were not of intelligence value. direct references to electronic bugs and hidden microphones at the Cuban Embassy and On the day of the assassination when Oswald requested CIA to provide additional infor- was named as the alleged assassin, CIA mation. The Review Board attempted to Headquarters instructed its Mexico City Sta- determine whether CIA had any other election not to erase any tapes until it provided tronic intelligence that may have recorded further notification. Although CIA did not Oswald’s visits inside the Cuban consulate or locate tapes from the September- O c t o b e r discussions about his visits. In response to time frame, the Review Board’s additional this request, CIA provided evidence from a requests resulted in CIA’s identifying Mexico City history stating that its bugging approximately 185 additional tapes from the operation was not in place at the time of Station’s telephone operation from the days Oswald’s visit. CIA p rovided no further immediately following the assassination and information on hidden microphones. the next few weeks. The Review Board designated all of the tapes as assassination records Although CIAhad photographic surveillance and the CIA is currently processing the tapes targeting the front gates of both the Soviet for release to NARA. and Cuban Consulates, CIA reports that it did not locate photographic evidence of The Review Board’s efforts to locate new Oswald’s visits. In an effort to obtain addi- photographic evidence of Oswald in Mexico tional records on this subject, the Review City were unsuccessful. The Review Board B o a rd submitted additional requests for explored the possibility that CIA had addi- information pertaining to technical surveil- tional re c o rds pertaining to CIA p h o t o- lance. The Review Board staff also reviewed graphic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy. project files concerning all known telephonic Although the Mexico City Station ran three and photographic operations. The Review operations during the relevant time period, Board designated as assassination records all the HSCA investigators found photographic technical operational reports pertaining to evidence and log sheets from only one of the 1963–64 time frame that CIA had not these CIA operations.8 The HSCA material— already placed in the JFK Collection. These including the photographs of the man who new re c o rds included periodic pro g re s s was initially misidentified as Oswald—is reports, contact sheets, project re n e w a l available to the public at NARA. reports and related documentation on telephone and photographic surveillance, logs Beyond the photographic evidence from the that corresponded to photographic surveil- time period of Oswald’s visit, the CIA lance, contact sheets from photographic sur- s e q u e s t e red collection microfilm contained veillance, and transcripts of telephonic sur- additional log sheets and copies of film fro m veillance. the Cuban and Soviet surveillance operations. The Review Board believed these ii. Tapes, transcripts, and photographs in re c o rds may be useful to re s e a rchers for the e x i s t e n c e . C I A reported that it ro u t i n e l y purpose of establishing a frame of re f e re n c e erased tapes from telephone operations after or modus operandi, and for understanding two weeks, unless CIA identified a conversa- the scope of CIA coverage in 1963. In light of tion on a tape that was of particular intelli- the historical value of this material, the gence value. CIA stated that it destroyed Review Board declared all photographic tape[s] containing Oswald’s voice and other coverage for 1963 that it found in the CIA related calls as a matter of routine procedure, s e q u e s t e red collection microfilm as assassi- even though the Mexico City Station’s internation re c o rd s . est in the Oswald conversations at the time that CIA intercepted them was such that the b. Cable traffic. Station transcribed them and reported them to CIA Headquarters in an October 8, 1963, The Review Board determined that, while cable. CIA reported that its interest at the much of the Mexico City Station cable traffic time was in an American talking to the Soviet existed in the JFK Collection, the traffic con- and Cuban Embassies, not in Oswald in par- tained numerous gaps, particularly in com-

88 munications between Mexico City and the the periods in question, the Office of CIAStation in Miami, JMWAVE.9 The Review Communications (OC) only held cables Board deemed these gaps to be significant long enough to ensure that they were because both CIA stations played roles in successfully transmitted to the named U.S. operations against Cuba. The cable traf- recipient. On occasion. . . cables were fic that the Review Board reviewed in the sometimes held for longer periods but CIA’s sequestered collection commences on not with the intention of creating a long- October 1, 1963, and contains the earliest term reference collection. known communication—an October 8, 1963, cable—between the Mexico City Station and In addition, CIA informed the Review Board CIA Headquarters concerning Lee Harvey that it did not have a repository for cables Oswald. and dispatches from stations in the 1960s.10 Although originating offices maintained In 1995, the Review Board submitted a for- temporary chronological files, the off i c e s mal request for additional information regarding the above-referenced gaps in CIA generally destroyed the temporary records in cable traffic. CIA did not locate additional less than ninety days. After the assassination, traffic for the specified periods. CIA com- the Office of the Deputy Director of Plans pleted its response to this request in February ordered relevant CIA offices to retain cables 1998 explaining that: that they would have otherwise destroyed. The HSCAused the remaining cable traffic to In general, cable traffic and dispatches compile its Mexico City chronology. Had CIA are not available as a chronological col- offices strictly applied the ninety-day rule, lection and thus, for the period 26 there might have been copies of cable traffic through 30 September 1963 it is not pos- commencing as early as August 22, 1963, sible to provide cables and dispatches in rather than October 1, 1963, available to CIA a chronological/package form. During on November 22, 1963. (See illustration.)

89 c. Win Scott files. Tirado de Duran.

Winston M. (Win) Scott was the CIA Chief of CIAhad transcribed intercepts of phone calls Station in Mexico City at the time of made between Silvia Duran and the Soviet Oswald’s visit. While the CIA had processed Consulate in Mexico City that related to her some of Scott’s files as part of its sequestered dealings with Oswald. Duran’s statement to collection, the Review Board followed up on the DFS after the assassination corroborated several leads suggesting that CIAmight have the information in CIA’s intercepts—that Lee additional Scott files from his Mexico City Harvey Oswald went to the Cuban Con- days. Scott apparently had an interest in the sulate to request a transit visa. The DFS pro- assassination, and was a prodigious record vided Duran’s interrogation reports to U.S. keeper. The Review Board asked the CIA to authorities in Mexico City and the reports search for any additional extant records that were widely disseminated to U.S. federal Scott had maintained. According to Anne agencies in the immediate aftermath of Pres- Goodpasture, who had worked with Scott in ident Kennedy’s death. Mexico City, Scott kept a collection of classified documents from his tenure as Chief of Given that the initial ten-page “confession” Station which he stored in a safe in his home or interrogation appeared to be a summary following his retirement. While the details of report of Duran’s account and the statements the story are unclear, the Review Board of several other individuals who also were understands that shortly after Scott’s death a r rested and questioned with Duran, the in 1973, CIACounterintelligence Chief James Review Board wondered whether the CIA J. Angleton, one of Scott’s longtime friends, had an “original” transcript from Duran’s traveled to Mexico City to make arrange- arrest. The Review Board requested that CIA ments with Scott’s wife search for such a transcript, but CIA searches The Committee has found. . . the for CIA personnel to all returned to the ten-page summary and FBI investigation, as well as the review Scott’s classified CIA did not locate additional records. CIA inquiry [into the Kennedy material. CIA produced assassination], was deficient on what it says are its com- e. Legat administrative files. the specific question of the sig- plete files on Scott, nificance of Oswald’s contacts including inventory lists, The FBI keeps administrative files on each of with pro-Castro and anti-Cas- some documents which its field offices and its Legal Attache, or tro groups for the many months a p p e a red to be fro m Legat, offices. The Legat administrative files before the assassination. Scott’s personnel file, contain communications between the Legat —Senate Report on JFK Act, and Scott’s semi-autobio- and FBI Headquarters concerning personnel, July 22, 1992 graphical novel. The real estate, supplies, construction, and to a Review Board examined lesser extent, relations between the FBI Legat these documents for and re p resentatives of other government information relevant to agencies abroad. The Review Board the assassination. The Review Board deter- requested and received from the FBI access to mined a small number of the records to be its Mexico City Legat administrative file with assassination records. the hope that the file might contain records concerning the assassination itself or records d. Sylvia Duran. concerning Oswald’s pre-assassination trav- els to Mexico. The Review Board also asked Silvia Tirado de Duran, a Mexican national the FBI for access to its Legat administrative who worked as a receptionist at the Cuban files for London, England; Bern, Switzerland; Consulate in Mexico City at the time of and Paris, France during the periods of Oswald’s visit, assisted Oswald in his quest 1960–1965 and 1977–1979 (the period of the to apply for a visa to ultimately return to the HSCA investigation.) The Review Board did U.S.S.R., and thus became a key figure in the not locate assassination rec o r ds in the Legat Mexico City chapter of the assassination files for London, Bern, or Paris files, or in the s t o r y. In the immediate aftermath of the 1977–1979 Mexico City Legat file. The Review assassination, the Mexican federal security Bo a r d did designate approximately thirty doc- service, Direccion Federal de Seguridad uments from the Mexico City Legat file for (DFS), arrested and interrogated Silvia 1960-1965 that discussed FBI staffing of the

90 Mexico City Legat both before and after the F u r t h e r, Lee Harvey The Oswald visit was not, cer- as s a s s i n a t i o n . Oswald’s connection with tainly to my knowledge,ever an the Fair Play for Cuba operation, so it was just a flash f. Anne Goodpasture deposition. Committee made the in the pan, a product of some- Review Board’s search for thing that happened. . . Anne Goodpasture worked for Mexico City any rec o r ds on U.S.-Cuba —Anne Goodpasture, 1995 Chief of Station Win Scott for many years and policy all the more rel e - possessed a thorough understanding of the vant. The degree to which operations of the Mexico City Station. The U.S. policy toward Cuba following Pres i d e n t Review Board deposed Goodpasture at Kennedy’s assassination did or did not change length and she provided information con- pr ovides a final reason to search for rec o r ds to cerning the daily routine of the Mexico City enhance the historical understanding, or con- Station, the types of operations performed by text, of the assassination. the station, the management of operations performed by the station, and the working 1. CIA Records style of Win Scott. The Review Board believes that researchers will be particularly inter- Most of the relevant CIA records on Cuba ested in information she provided on the that the Review Board staff identified as handling of audio surveillance tapes in the a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related existed in the CIA station which may have recorded Lee Harvey s e q u e s t e red collection before the Review Oswald’s voice. Board began making requests for additional records and information. The Review Board B. RECORDS ON CUBA identified additional records pertaining to the period 1960–1964 from some contempo- In the mid-1970s, the Church Committee pub- rary working files of a CIA office concerned licly revealed what journalists had been alleg- with Latin American issues. Most of these ing since 1967—that the U.S. government had records concerned the existence or activities sp o n s o r ed assassination attempts at various of the JMWAVE Station in Miami. Small times against Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Cas- numbers of records pertaining to Cuba or tr o presumably knew about these attempts U.S.-anti-Cuban activities were identified in long before the U.S. public, and some histori- the records of the Directorate of Plans (now ans and res e a r chers have questioned whether the Directorate of Operations) and in the files he retaliated by assassinating Pre s i d e n t of several senior officers of the CIA during Ke n n e d y . The Review Board sought to find the 1960–65 period. CIA processed for inclu- rec o r ds that would illuminate a slightly dif- sion in the JFK Collection those records that fe r ent but related area of interest: the degree the Review Board marked as assassination to which the U.S. government sponsore d records. potential uprisings and military coups within Cuba, and the extent of possible U.S. plans to 2. Military Records invade Cuba by overt military force. The Bo a r d believed that such rec o r ds would be of The Review Board staff located military in t e r est not only to mainstream historians, records on Cuba in four different collections but also to many who believe there was a of records. conspiracy to kill President Kennedy. For example, evidence of serious, or imminent, a. Joint Staff Secret a r i a t . contingency plans to invade Cuba with U.S. military forces during the Kennedy Ad m i n i s - The staff of the Joint Staff Secretariat search e d tration, if found, could provide either a for rec o r ds related to both Cuba and Vie t n a m motive for retaliation by Castro or a motive policy and flagged selected re c o rds fro m for domestic malcontents who might have 1961–1964 from the files of Joint Chiefs of been displeased that such plans were not St a f f Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer, Maxwell immediately implemented by the administra- Ta y l o r, and Earle Wheeler, and selected tion. The Review Board believed that there rec o r ds from 1961–1964 from the Central Files would be strong public interest in any rec o rd s of the Joint Staff for examination and consid- which would illuminate U.S. government eration by the Review Board staff. The policy deliberations on Cuba. Review Board staff flagged all but one of the

91 147 rec o r ds selected as appropriate for inclu- Part III—The Global Challenge). Poole is sion in the JFK Collection. Ap p ro x i m a t e l y presently updating and rewriting the two tw o - t h i r ds of the 147 rec o r ds related to Cuba volumes to improve their scholarship. When policy from 1961–196411—the re m a i n d e r he has finished, Poole will submit the vol- related to Vietnam policy. umes for a security review and the Joint Staff S e c retariat will forward the volumes to b. Army. NARA.

In 1963, Joseph Califano served as both Gen- 3. Presidential Library Collections eral Counsel to Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance and as Special Assistant to the Ar m y In response to public interest in, and specula- S e c re t a r y. NARA identified six Federal tion about, the possible connection between Re c o r ds Center boxes containing the Cuba Cuba or U.S. policy toward Cuba and the policy papers of Joseph Califano from 1963. assassination of President Kennedy, the The Review Board designated the six boxes of Review Board requested the John F. Kennedy “Califano Papers,” in their entiret y , as appro- and Lyndon Baines Johnson Pre s i d e n t i a l priate for inclusion in the JFK Collection. Libraries to search their holdings of Cuba records for assassination-related information. During 1963, Secretary Vance was the “DOD The Presidential Libraries identified addi- Executive Agent” for all meetings of the gov- tional assassination re c o rds in the Cuba ernmental task force, the “Interdepartmental Country files, the National Security files, var- Coordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs,” ious office files, personal papers of White (ICCCA). As Vance’s special assistant, Cali- House officials, and certain unpro c e s s e d fano often represented him at meetings of the collections of presidential aides and policy ICCCA, and was part of all ICCCA policy advisors. deliberations. The collection of Califano Papers represents a unique find and reflects a. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library much of the interagency planning activities records. related to Cuba during 1963. Augmenting the JFK Library’s initial search c. Office of the Secretary of Defense. and identification of assassination records, a joint team of Review Board staff and repre- A small number of sentatives from other agencies, visited the The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe re c o rds (appro x i m a t e l y JFK Library in June 1996 to conduct a com- that the Cuban problem must be forty) from the papers of prehensive review of JFK Library closed col- solved in the near future. Se c r etary of Defense Robert lections. The Review Board staff reviewed all —Memorandum for the McNamara at NARA con- of the Library’s National Security Files con- Secretary of Defense, tain some material on taining records on Cuba from the Kennedy Robert McNamara from the Cuba policy. The Review Administration. As a result of this effort, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs B o a rd processed these JFK Library released thirty boxes of Cuba of Staff, L.L. Lemnitzer, records for inclusion in files to the JFK Collection. The Library also April 10, 1962. the JFK Collection. opened its Presidential recordings on the Cuban Missile Crisis and sent copies of these d. Joint Chiefs of Staff to the JFK Collection. history. Subsequent to this visit, the Library identified The Kennedy Library very The Review Board staff additional assassination rec o r ds on Cuba. Of m u ch appreciates that it has reviewed and identified particular value were those rec o r ds which been able to open in excess of as assassination records discussed the Kennedy Administration’s pol- 30,000 pages of previously clas- two volumes of The His - icy toward Cuba, proposed anti-Castro activ- sified material, primarily on tory of the Joint Chiefs of ities, and Operation Mongoose planning. Cuba, through the efforts of the Staff, written by Walter S. Most of these rec o r ds were generated by the Assassination Records Review Poole (Volume VIII: Standing Group Committee of the National Board. 1961–1964, Part II— T h e Security Council with additional CIA an d —Stephanie Fawcett, Succession of Crises; and OSD memoranda discussing sensitive Cuban September 1998 Volume VIII: 1961–1964, operations. The Review Board staff also iden-

92 tified Cuban rec o r ds in the JFK Library’s against Fidel Castro, and includes materials closed papers of Attorney General Robert F. relating to the Church Committee’s examina- Ke n n e d y , Richard Goodwin, and Ralph Dun- tion of Operation Mongoose and AMLASH. gan and in the Department of Justice Crimi- In addition, the JFK Collection includes testi- nal Division microfilm collection. mony from key government officials knowledgeable on U.S. policy toward Cuba in the The Review Board discovered a wealth of 1960s, such as Robert McNamara, McGeorge Cuba material within the Robert F. Kennedy Bundy, Roswell Gilpatric, Richard Helms, (RFK) papers, though it did not declare all and John McCone. of the re c o rds as assassination re c o rds. To e n s u re that the JFK Library opened the RFK C. RECORDS ON VIETNAM papers, however, the Review Board designated those re c o rds which it believed to be The debate among historians continues over relevant. This group of re c o rds was subject whether President Kennedy would have esca- to a Deposit A g reement requiring the lated U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War e x p ress permission of the RFK donor com- had he lived, or whether he would have less- mittee, then headed by Michael Kennedy, to ened involvement and even withdrawn from authorize their re l e a s e .1 2 The Review Board Vietnam. The Review Board, there f o re , has not yet secured the final release of all of sought to locate any rec o r ds that would illu- the RFK papers, but the JFK Library fore i g n minate this debate or illuminate any diffe r - policy staff is working with the Review ences between the Kennedy Ad m i n i s t r a t i o n ’ s B o a rd to attempt to obtain the release of the mid- and-late 1963 Vietnam policy and the RFK papers.1 3 Upon approval by the com- Johnson Administration’s 1964 Vietnam pol- mittee, the JFK Library will send these ic y . Much of the Review Board’s interest in important re c o rds to the JFK Collection at Vietnam rec o r ds, as in the case of the Review N A R A . Bo a r d’s search for Cuba rec o r ds, is in enhanc- ing the historical understanding or context of b. Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential the assassination. Library records. 1. CIA Records To ensure a more complete review of the LBJ Library’s holdings for assassination records, The Review Board’s additional re q u e s t s two members of the Review Board staff and a added few CIA re c o rds on Vietnam to the NARA representative visited the Library in JFK Collection. The Review Board identified March 1997. The Review Board conducted a a small number of re c o rds pertaining to Vi e t- comprehensive review of the closed National nam in the files of the Directorate of Plans Security files, including a targeted review of (now the Directorate of Operations) and in Cuban records. As expected, the LBJ Library the files of several senior CIA o fficials fro m was not as rich as the JFK Library in material 1963–65. Some re c o rds designated as assassi- pertaining to Cuba. In addition to identifying nation re c o rds concern CIA reporting on the records that had direct reference to the assas- assassination of South Vietnamese Pre s i d e n t sination, the Review Board was also inter- Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother in Novem- ested in those records that could reveal conti- ber 1963. Many of the Vietnam re c o rd s nuity or shifts in policy between the Kennedy examined by the Review Board staff dealt and Johnson Administrations. The Review wholly with CIA and military liaison and B o a rd designated additional assassination operations after 1965. CIA p rocessed for the records pertaining to Cuba found in John- JFK Collection the few Vietnam re c o rd s son’s Vice Presidential Security files, Cuba Review Board staff members identified as Country Files, and various Office Files of assassination re c o rd s . White House aides.

4. Church Committee Records 2. Military Records

The JFK Collection contains extensive The Review Board staff located military records relating to the Church Committee’s records on Vietnam in three different collec- investigation of alleged assassination plots tions of records.

93 a. Joint Staff Secretariat. obtaining records that could indicate any changes in President Kennedy’s plans The staff of the Joint Staff Secre t a r i a t regarding military involvement in Vietnam searched for records related to Vietnam pol- and any shift or continuity of policy at the icy and flagged selected re c o rds fro m beginning of President Johnson’s administra- 1961–1964 from the files of Joint Chiefs of tion. Staff Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer, Maxwell Ta y l o r, and Earle Wheeler, and selected a. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. re c o rds from 1961–1964 from the Central Files of the Joint Staff, for examination and The JFK Library identified a small number of consideration by the Review Board staff. The Vietnam-related documents in its National Review Board selected approximately fifty Security files. Most of the Vietnam records records for inclusion in the JFK Collection. date from August 1963 through the assassination, as the Kennedy A d m i n i s t r a t i o n b. Office of the Secretary of Defense. began to pay attention to events in Vietnam. The Library also released copies of Presiden- The Review Board identified for inclusion in tial recordings to the JFK Collection for the the JFK Collection a small number of records same period, which contained additional ( a p p roximately forty) from the personal information pertaining to Vietnam. papers of Secretary of Defense Robert McNa- b. Lyndon Baines Johnson mara at NARA that contain some materials Presidential Library. on Vietnam policy. In response to the public’s desire to know c. Joint Chiefs of Staff history. more about any shift in policy between the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, the The Review Board iden- Review Board extended its search at the LBJ Several colleagues have called tified a three-part Joint my attention to the role of the Library to include Vietnam materials from Chiefs of Staff off i c i a l the transitional period. Two members of the Assassination Records Review history titled The Joint Board in potentially effecting Review Board staff visited the LBJ Library in Chiefs of Staff and the War 1997 and reviewed a vast collection of the public release of documents in Vietnam, 1960-1968, as related to Vietnam policy and National Security Files and White House appropriate for inclusion Office Files. Not surprisingly, the search for perhaps other issues of foreign in the JFK Collection. policy in late 1963. .. I write relevant Vietnam-related material at the LBJ now to add my voice directly to 3. Presidential Library Library proved to yield more records than those calling for the complete Co l l e c t i o n s the search for Cuba-related records. Most of release of such materials. the additional assassination records identi- —Professor James K. Galbraith During most of President fied at the LBJ Library from this transitional Kennedy’s time in office, period concerned Vietnam. Some of these the Vietnam War was not records indicate that Vietnam, rather than the pressing issue for the White House that it Cuba, was quickly becoming a priority for became, a problem which had begun to heat President Johnson’s White House. up shortly before Kennedy’s death. Vietnam, as a foreign policy priority, then went on to 4. Church Committee Testimony consume the Johnson presidency. The perceived change in Vietnam policy between Among the major issues involving Vietnam these two presidential administrations has was the assassination of President Diem and provided another source of fodder for con- his brother in November 1963 shortly before spiracies. In response to concerns expressed P resident Kennedy’s assassination. The by the assassination research community that Review Board released classified Churc h the Vietnam question had not been ade- Committee testimony on this issue by CIA quately addressed by past investigations, the officers William Colby and Lucien Conein. Review Board extended its search of both the The Church Committee’s report on the Diem Kennedy and Johnson Presidential Library assassination relied heavily on their testi- materials to include records on Vietnam. The m o n y, which had remained classified for Review Board was primarily interested in over twenty years.

94 D. RECORDS OF SENIOR AGENCY OFFICIALS the box and folder index The Board has an obligation to listings of McCone’s files, examine the records of former To the extent that agencies such as the CIA, McCone did not maintain public officials who partici- FBI, or Secret Service maintained the work- files on the assassination pated in any aspect or phase of ing files of those individuals who served as of President Kennedy, the investigation concerning the senior agency officials during the time of the assassination investiga- assassination, or of former pub- Kennedy assassination, the Review Board tion, Lee Harvey Oswald, lic officials closely allied with requested agencies to search those files for or the War r en Commis- Kennedy. assassination records. sion. McCone rec o r ds do —Anna Kasten Nelson include memoranda, brief- 1. CIA ing reports, and transcripts which discuss Oswald, the assassination, and The CIA maintains few working files of the assassination investigation. senior CIA officers from the 1950s and 1960s. To the extent that CIA p reserves such Within the McCone papers, the Review Board records, the records exist in the general filing noticed several file folders with notations or system under the office that the individual sheets indicating documents on a wide vari- held at the time, e.g. the Director of Central ety of subjects which are either missing or Intelligence (DCI) or their Deputy Directors we r e destroyed. Of the missing or destroy e d (DDCI). Based on the Review Board ’ s documents, two refer to the Kennedy assassi- observations, the contents of the DCI and nation. One document from a 1963 listing is DDCI working files primarily tend to be cor- described as “Date of Meeting—26 Nov; Par- respondence files, briefing papers, and work- ticipants—DCI & Bundy; Subjects Covered — ing files on general subjects rather than in- Msg concerning Pres. Kennedy’s assassina- depth collections of detailed material. tion.” The second document is described as “Date of Meeting—19 May ‘64; Participants— The Review Board staff requested and DCI, J.J. McCloy; Dinner at Residence—Re: reviewed files of DCIs Allen Dulles and John Oswald.” This document is annotated McCone, DDCIs Charles Cabell and Marshall “D e s t r oyed 1–28–72.” CIA historians noted Carter, and the office files of the Deputy that both documents were missing when they Director of Plans (DDP) (now the Directorate reviewed the files in 1986. The Review Board of Operations) for the time period 1958–1968. designated as assassination rec o r ds all rel e - Because records such as the briefing papers vant documents from the McCone files that CIA officers prepared for the DCI are including the notations on the destroyed and sensitive and worldwide in nature, the missing rec o rd s . Review Board designated only the relevant portions of the re c o rds as assassination c. Charles Cabell and Marshall Carter. records. Review Board staff located only a small num- a. Allen Dulles. ber of assassination records in the records of DDCIs Charles Cabell for 1959–1962 and CIA reviewed most of the files of DCI Allen Marshall Carter for 1962–1965. The DDCIs’ Dulles under its Executive Order 12958 records consist primarily of personal corre- declassification program. The Review Board spondence, official correspondence, and staff reviewed some of Dulles’ papers and his briefing papers. office calendars for the relevant time period. The Review Board marked some pages of the d. Richard Bissell, William Colby, and calendars, which re c o rded Dulles’ off i c i a l Richard Helms. and social activities, as assassination records. CI A pr ovided the Review Board with a mas- b. John McCone. sive index to the files of the Office of the Deputy Director of Plans (later the Deputy The Review Board staff examined CIA’s index Di r ector of Operations) covering the period to DCI John McCone’s files, reviewed files of fr om the late 1940s to the present. Review possible relevance, and marked relevant doc- Bo a r d staff carefully reviewed the index and uments as assassination rec o r ds. Ac c o r ding to identified potentially relevant material.

95 Ac c o r ding to CIA, it incorporated into these was an assassination record and marked it of fice files all of the still existing rec o r ds of for inclusion in the JFK Collection at NARA. Ri c h a r d Bissell, William Colby, and Richard Helms as DDPs. Again, due to the sensitive g. William Harvey. and worldwide nature of many of the DDP/DDO files, the Review Board designated William Harvey was intricately involved in the only certain portions of the rec o r ds for rel e a s e planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion and the to the JFK Collection. various assassination plots against Fidel Cas- tr o. The Review Board received a query from a e. James J. Angleton. res e a r cher concerning the possible existence of “operational diaries” that Harvey may have Knowledge of the rec o r ds that James J. An g l e - cr eated. CIA se a r ched its Directorate of Opera- ton, Chief of Counterintelligence for thirty tions rec o r ds and did not locate any rec o rd s years, allegedly created, and the prob a b l e belonging to Harvey. The introduction to the d e s t ruction of those 1967 CIA Inspector General’s (IG) report on plots to assassinate Castro notes that Richard Because the files that were once records after his retirement, has generated Helms directed that, once the IG’s office pro- known as Angleton’s have been duced the report, CIA should destroy all notes dispersed within the DO records, extensive public interes t . In an attempt to satisfy the and source material that it used to draft the they are no longer identifiable as report. CIA may have destroyed Harvey’s a collection. public’s curiosity about alleged diaries in response to Helms’ direc t i v e . —From CIA Response to Angleton’s files, the Review Board informal request Review Board asked the Fi n a l l y , Review Board staff also asked various CIA-IR-4 for information on CI A (1) to search for any CI A reviewers who worked on rec o r ds rel a t i n g James Angleton files, extant rec o r ds that An g l e - to the Bay of Pigs whether they had located August 24, 1998 ton maintained, and (2) to any operational diaries belonging to Harvey. account for the destruc - Despite its efforts, the Review Board did not tion of his files or the incorporation of his files locate any diaries. into other filing systems. In response, the Direc - 2. FBI torate of Operations provided three memoranda that document CIA’s multi-year rev i e w 14 The Review Board attempted to determine of Angleton’s counterintelligence files. Th e s e whether the FBI retained any sets of working memoranda state that CIA reviewed An g l e - files of its top officials during the years sur- ton’s rec o r ds and incorporated a small perce n t - rounding the assassination. Public specula- age into the files of the Directorate of Opera- tion regarding the alleged secret files of FBI tions. CIA de s t r oyed other rec o r ds, either Director J. Edgar Hoover is widespread. Of because the rec o r ds were duplicates or because course, following Hoover’s death, his CI A decided not to retain them. The Direc t o r a t e personal secretary, Helen Gandy, destroyed of Operations did not provide destruc t i o n many of his “Personal and Confidential” rec o r ds to account for the Angleton files. files, so that the full extent of Hoover’s Per- sonal files will never be known. Although the f. Lawrence Houston. FBI has processed over 15,000 pages of Hoover’s “Official and Confidential” files L a w rence Houston was the CIA G e n e r a l under the FOIA, the public speculates that Counsel for much of the agency’s early years. some of Hoover’s secret files are still extant. Few of his working papers, however, still exist today. The Review Board staff reviewed In an effort to locate any working or secret files a small number of papers identified as of FBI officials, the Review Board req u e s t e d belonging either to the files of Lawrence and received from the FBI access to rec o rd s Houston or the Office of the General Counsel that might shed light on the question of what, for the time period 1959–1964. The staff did if any, files are still in the FBI’s custody. not detect any additional assassination re c o rds in this collection of Houston’s a. Hoover and Tolson records, including papers. However, the Office of the General “Official and Confidential” files, chronolog - Counsel had retained a file on CIA records ical files, and phone logs. that were held by the Warren Commission. The Review Board determined that this file The Review Board requested that the FBI

96 s e a rch for Hoover and Tolson “working” c. John P. Mohr records. re c o rds relevant to President Kennedy’s assassination. The FBI made Dire c t o r When Director Hoover died in 1972, Clyde Ho o v e r ’s “Official and Confidential” (O&C) Tolson inherited the bulk of Hoover’s estate. files available to the Review Board and the When Tolson died, John P. Mohr, former Review Board designated as assassination Assistant Director for Administration of the rec o r ds the two O&C files on John Kennedy, FBI, served as the executor of Tolson’s estate. the O&C file relating to Secret Service-FBI Some authors allege that Mohr purged J. a g reements on Presidential protection, a Edgar Hoover’s personal files after Hoover’s memorandum reg a r ding Hoover’s conversa- death in 1972. When Mohr died in February tion with Lyndon Johnson about the assassi- 1997, the Review Board issued a subpoena to nation (from the Johnson O&C file), and sev- his estate to determine whether Mohr eral other documents from the O&C files. The retained any re c o rds related to Pre s i d e n t Review Board also reviewed Dire c t o r Kennedy’s assassination or to the FBI’s inves- Ho o v e r ’s telephone logs. Recognizing that tigation of the assassination. Mohr’s estate the FBI has already made the logs public in its p roduced, and the Review Board staff F O I A reading room, the Review Board inspected, Mohr’s records. Mohr’s records relieved the FBI from the burden of further included three files of Mohr’s personal corre- pr ocessing the logs under the JFK Act. Finally, spondence, a set of Warren Commission vol- Hoover maintained various subject files umes, and the FBI’s initial reports on Presi- (apart from the O&C files), including materi- dent Kennedy’s assassination. The Review als on the assassination. The Review Board B o a rd staff found no new assassination asked the FBI to locate these materials, but the records, and, as such, released Mohr’s estate FBI has not been able to locate the materials. from any obligation to turn records over to the JFK Collection. The Review Board also requested and received from the FBI access to the files of 3. Secret Service Clyde Tolson, which consisted solely of original memoranda from Director Hoover. In response to the Review Board’s request for Unfortunately, the chronological file started files of Secret Service officials, Secret Service with January 1965, and the FBI could not reported that it did not maintain office files account for any 1963–64 files that Tolson may for senior officials such as Chief James J. have maintained. The Review Board identi- Rowley, Chief of the Protective Research Sec- fied several documents as assassination tion Robert Bouck, or Chief Inspector records. Thomas Kelly.

b. Miscellaneous administrative files from The Secret Service located various Rowley the Director’s Office. correspondence and memoranda, but did not provide any information as to the disposition The Review Board requested access to a vari- of any working files maintained by Chief ety of FBI Director’s Office administrative Rowley. The Review Board also sought infor- files. The Review Board examined files for mation as to the identity and disposition of the relevant time period with the following any working files maintained by Bouck case captions: Assistant Dire c t o r’s Off i c e because Bouck was responsible for the collec- Administrative File, the Attorney General, tion of information relating to potential Attorney General’s Briefing, Criminal Divi- threats to the President and Vice-President. sion of the Department of Justice, Director’s Mr. Bouck testified before the Warren Com- Office Administrative File, Executive Confer- mission re g a rding protective intelligence ence, National Security Council, Office Mem- information gathered in connection with oranda, Protection of the Attorney General, President Kennedy’s trip to Dallas. As with Threats Against the Attorney General, and Chief Rowley, the Secret Service identified White House. The Review Board staff desig- various Bouck documents, but did not (or nated a small number of documents from could not) account for whether there were these files—primarily on organized crime— any personal working files maintained by as assassination records. Mr. Bouck.15

97 4. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Board identified a file relating to Operation Mongoose, which was subsequently opened. In 1997, the Review Board staff met with offi- The Review Board identified as assassination cials from OSD and emphasized the impor- re c o rds approximately forty re c o rds fro m tance of identifying and reviewing records McNamara’s files that are relevant to U.S. for Secretary of Defense McNamara, who policy in Cuba or Vietnam. A d d i t i o n a l had executed an affidavit for the Warren records relating to the Warren Commission Commission stating that Oswald was not an were located among the General Counsel’s informant or intelligence agent for the U.S. files and additional records relating to the military. McNamara was also an important H S C A w e re located among Secretary of figure because of his direct and daily involve- Defense Harold Brown’s files. ment in creating U.S. policy on Cuba and Vietnam. 5. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)

The Review Board also asked OSD to locate The Review Board requested that the Navy and review files of the OSD General Counsel and ONI search for the rec o r ds of Director of who had “serve[d] as the liaison with the Naval Intelligence Rear Admiral Rufus Tay l o r . [Warren] Commission for the Department of The Review Board acquired a copy of an Defense.” unsigned September 21, 1964, affidavit reg a r d- ing Oswald that Taylor appears to have exe- The OSD advised the Review Board that cuted and forwarded to Secretary of Defense “[a]ll official files of Secretary McNamara McNamara. The affidavit states that that ONI [had] been searched” and that “[n]o items never utilized Lee Harvey Oswald as an agent relating to the Wa r ren Commission were or an informant. (See illustration.) ONI did not found.” Inventories of Secretary McNa- locate any files belonging to Tay l o r . mara’s re c o rds were forwarded to the Review Board. In addition, a detailed inven- 6. Army tory of additional records of Secretary McNa- mara at NARAwas also provided. Within the The Review Board staff requested that the McNamara records at NARA, the Review Army identify for review under the JFK Act

98 certain additional, discrete record groups. w e re no separately maintained files for S p e c i f i c a l l y, the staff asked the Army to Messrs. Kennedy, Katzenbach, and Clark. locate the 1963–64 files for top Army officials, The archivists believed that such files most including the Secretary of the A r m y, the likely would have been stored at a presiden- Chief of Staff for the Army, the Assistant tial library. Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, and With respect to Attorney General files post- top officials of the U.S. Army Intelligence and dating 1975, the Review Board sought to Security Command. The Army located no inspect the files of Attorney Generals Edward assassination re c o rds in response to the Levi and Griffin Bell for any materials relat- Review Board’s requests. ing to the Kennedy assassination investigations of the Church Committee and the 7. National Security Agency HSCA. The Office of Information and Pri- vacy made available for inspection certain The Review Board requested that NSA locate original files for Attorneys General Levi and the original files of top NSA officials during Bell, which yielded additional assassination the period of the Warren Commission (NSA records. The Review Board designated as Director Lt. Gen. Gordon Blake and NSA assassination re c o rds files that primarily Deputy Director Dr. Louis Tordella). NSA related to DOJ’s work with the HSCAand the located materials on the Warren Commission Church Committee. from files of Deputy Director Tordella. b. Criminal Division 8. Department of State The Review Board requested that the Crimi- The Review Board ensured that the Depart- nal Division make available all files sepa- ment of State inventoried all files of its top rately maintained by Herbert J. Miller, Jr., of ficials who would have had some offi c i a l Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal involvement with the investigation of the Division at the time of the assassination. Mr. assassination, including Secretary of State Miller had been designated as DOJ’s “liai- Dean Rusk, Undersecretary George Ball, son” to the Warren Commission. The Review Deputy Undersecretary Alexis Johnson, Board also sought the files of J. Walter Yea- Ambassador Thompson, Ambassador Thomas gley, Assistant Attorney General for the Inter- Mann, and other State Department offi c i a l s . nal Security Division, to determine whether The Department of State was very cooperative he (or his office) had any pre-assassination in making available to the Review Board man- records relating to Oswald. The Criminal ifests for these archive rec o r ds. Division reported that it maintained no discrete files for Miller17 and Yeagley.18 9. Department of Justice 10. Department of the Treasury a. Office of Information and Privacy (OIP) The Review Board requested that Main Trea- The Review Board raised with the Depart- sury review its holdings to identify records of ment of Justice’s OIP the issue of whether C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury there were any separately maintained files at the time of the assassination and Warren for Attorneys General Robert F. Kennedy, Commission investigation. Review Board Nicholas Katzenbach, and Ramsey Clark in staff independently reviewed archive trans- view of their positions and re s p e c t i v e mittal forms for Treasury records and identi- involvement with investigations of the assas- fied certain Treasury re c o rds for re v i e w, sination. OIP reported that records of the which Treasury provided to Board staff. As a Attorney General and Deputy Attorney Gen- result of its review, the Review Board staff eral were not maintained as a separate file identified files of J. Robert McBrien relating system until 1975 under Attorney General to his work as Treasury’s liaison to the HSCA Edward Levi.16 Two archivists for the Depart- and Church Committee.19 ment of Justice also confirmed that distinct files for the Office of Attorney General were The Review Board also requested a complete not archived prior to 1975 and that there accounting for the files of high-level Treasury

99 officials who would have had involvement in e fforts to uncover re c o rds beyond those the assassination investigation, especially examined by prior investigative bodies important because Secret Service was part of focused primarily on FBI records. the Department of the Treasury and ultimately reported to Secretary Dillon. Accord- 1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee i n g l y, the Review Board asked for an accounting of the files of Secretary Dillon, The Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) Special Assistant to the Secretary Robert Car- was a pro-Castro organization with head- swell, Treasury Secretary John Connally, and quarters in New York. The FPCC had chap- General Counsel at the time of the Warren ters in many cities, but Lee Harvey Oswald Commission investigation G. D’Andelot was its founding and, it seems, only member Belin. Treasury officials reviewed its invento- in New Orleans. In the summer of 1963, ries and reported that its “review disclosed Oswald distributed handbills that he had no additional JFK-related records.”20 Treasury printed that advocated “Hands Off Cuba!” also reported that it did “not have custody of and invited members of the public to join the any Dillon files,”21 which presumably reside New Orleans chapter of the FPCC. The War- with a presidential library. ren Commission and the congressional committees that investigated the assassination 11. IRS discuss Oswald’s connection to the FPCC in their respective reports. As such, the Review Although the IRS reported that it searched Board’s routine processing of federal agency for records of top IRS officials who assisted in records from Warren Commission files and the Wa r ren Commission investigation, it files concerning other congressional commit- stated that it did not locate any such records. tees encompassed records on the FPCC. Not all FPCC records, however, found their way E. PRO- AND ANTI-CASTRO CUBAN MATTERS into the existing collections. Where Review Board staff noticed gaps in the documenta- Both the Warren Commission and the HSCA tion regarding the FPCC, it requested that considered the possibility that pro-Castro or federal agencies provide access to additional anti-Castro activists had some involvement records and information. in the assassination of President Kennedy, as both pro- and anti-Castro groups in the U.S. a. FBI field office files. had contact with Lee Harvey Oswald. The Warren Commission investigated Oswald’s When the FBI processed its “core and Communist and pro - C a s t ro sympathies, related” files and “HSCA Subject” files, it including his involvement with the Fair Play processed the FBI Headquarters file on the for Cuba Committee, and his September 1963 FPCC, but it did not process any records trip to Mexico City. In addition, the Church from the FBI’s New York and Dallas field Committee, an internal CIA Task Force, and office files on the FPCC. Thus, the Review the HSCA all re-examined the extent to Board staff requested access to these two which the Cuban government or pro-Castro field office files. activists in the U.S. might have been involved in the assassination. The only records that the Review Board staff located in the Dallas field office file were Given the amount of time that prior inves- duplicates of Headquarters records that the tigative bodies spent considering the possi- FBI had already processed as part of its “core bility that either pro- or anti-Castro Cuban and related” files or HSCA files. The FBI forces may have played a role in President a g reed to include the Dallas field off i c e Kennedy’s assassination, the Review Board copies in the JFK Collection. sought to collect and process all relevant federal records relating to such groups. To the The New York field office file proved to be extent that both pro- and anti-Castro Cuban much more voluminous than the Dallas file groups coordinated their activities within the and yielded more assassination records. A United States, the FBI would be the agency number of the records that the Review Board most likely to have investigative records on s t a ff designated as assassination re c o rd s their activities. Thus, the Review Board ’ s from the New York file involved June Cobb,

100 a woman who was an intelligence asset dur- Review Board located some assassination ing the 1960–64 period, primarily for the CIA records regarding the FPCC and Vincent T. but also for the FBI, regarding Castro, Cuba, Lee within the Criminal Division’s files. and the FPCC. In addition, Cobb was the asset who first informed the CIA of Elena 2. Cuban COINTELPRO G a r ro De Paz’s allegation that Oswald attended a “twist” party in Mexico City with Early in its tenure, the Review Board exam- Sylvia Duran. For the above reasons, the ined the FBI’s FOIA “reading room” records Review Board staff recommended to the FBI on the FBI’s COINTELPRO against pro-Cas- that it process as assassination records any tro Cubans—primarily the FPCC and the FPCC documents that referenced June Cobb. July 26th Movement—during the early 1960s. The Review Board also found assassination- The Review Board’s examination of the read- related records in the New York field office ing room materials led the Review Board to file concerning the FBI’s efforts to infiltrate make a request to the FBI for a Headquarters and disrupt the FPCC. file entitled, “Cuban Matters—Counterintel- ligence Program—Internal Security—Cuba” The bulk of the remaining records that the and for any other Headquarters files docu- Review Board staff designated as assassina- menting efforts by the FBI or other agencies tion records from the New York FPCC file of the U.S. government to disrupt, discredit, involve the FBI’s investigation of the FPCC. or bring into disrepute the FPCC or its mem- Many researchers view Oswald’s role in the bers or activities. The FBI made its records FPCC as an indication that he may have been available to the Review Board and, but for an asset of one or more U.S. intelligence some very recent, unrelated documents, the agencies. That is, they theorize that he was a Review Board designated all records in the “plant,” an intelligence asset sent on a coun- Cuban COINTELPRO file as assassination terintelligence mission against the FPCC. records. Thus, Review Board staff designated as assassination records those documents which Records that the Review Board designated as address the urgency with which the Bureau assassination records from the COINTEL- viewed the FPCC, the priority the Bureau PRO file include FPCC and July 26th Move- placed on infiltrating the group, and Bureau ment membership and mailing lists. The file intentions/plans to initiate counterintelli- further details the FBI’s basis for initiating its gence activities against the group. The counterintelligence program against the two Review Board staff employed similar reason- p ro - C a s t ro organizations. Finally, the file ing in designating records as assassination- provides details concerning the methods that related in the FBI’s Cuban Counterintelli- the Bureau used to disrupt the activities of gence Program (COINTELPRO) file the FPCC and the July 26th Movement. referenced below. 3. Anti-Castro Activities; IS b. CIA records on Richard Gibson. (Internal Security)-Cuba

In 1960–63, Richard Thomas Gibson was the In the spring of 1996, the Review Board Director of the New York chapter of the received a letter from a member of the FPCC. CIA opened a 201, or personality, file res e a r ch community noting that one of the on Gibson because of his support of both “Hands Off Cuba” pamphlets that appeared Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba. The in the New Orleans FPCC file contained a 1960–1964 records include the Warren Com- cro s s - re f e r ence to a file entitled “Anti-Castro mission’s investigation of Gibson, and CIA Activities; IS–Cuba” and numbered NO (New included those records in the JFK Collection. Orleans) 105–1095. The Review Board staff established that the FBI had not processed this c. Department of Justice Criminal Division particular file under the JFK Act, and then files on FPCC. requested that the FBI provide access to all files bearing the above-ref e r enced caption The Review Board staff requested that the f rom Headquarters and from the New Department of Justice Criminal Division Orleans, Miami, Tampa, New York, and Dallas search for records relating to the FPCC. The field offices during the relevant time period.

101 After reviewing New Orleans file 105–1095, Latin American issues. Most of the relevant the Review Board staff designated two vol- C I A re c o rds concerned the existence and umes of the file as assassination records. activities of the CIA’s JMWAVE station in Miami. The Review Board also identified a 4. Cuban Intelligence Activities in the small number of records pertaining to U.S. U.S.; Cuban Situation anti-Cuban activities in the Directorate of Plans files and in the files of DCI John During its review of the FBI’s assassination McCone. The Review Board marked relevant records, the Review Board staff saw file refer- records and requested that CIA process the ences to cases captioned “Cuban Intelligence records for inclusion in the JFK Collection at Activities in the U.S.” and “Cuban Situa- NARA. tion.” The Review Board requested access to Headquarters files and files from the Miami, 6. Threats Against the Life of Tampa, New York, Washington, D.C., and Fidel Castro Dallas field offices with the above-referenced captions, and designated forty records from As widely reported, the U.S. government those files as assassination records. Most of attempted, at various times, to assassinate the relevant records concern activity in the Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Due to the high anti-Castro community following the Bay of level of public interest in this topic, the Pigs invasion and following Pre s i d e n t Review Board requested that agencies locate Kennedy’s assassination. any relevant records and provide them to the Review Board staff. 5. Anti-Castro Cuban Groups, Including DRE, Alpha 66, SFNE, JURE, FRD, a. CIA DS&T records. CRC, and Commandos-L At the request of the Review Board, the CIA In an effort to gather and se a r ched its Directorate of Science and Tec h - I was completely convinced review re c o rds re l a t i n g nology (DS&T) databases and rec o r ds for files during this entire period, that to the activities of promi- on possible assassination attempts against this operation had the full nent anti-Castro Cuban Fidel Castro. 22 CI A ’s search produced only authority of every pertinent groups who might have one re c o rd—a handwriting analysis. The echelon of CIA and had full had some involvement in Review Board staff reviewed the rec o r d and authority of the White House, the assassination of Pres- determined that it was not relevant to the either from the President or ident Kennedy, the Review assassination of President John F. Kennedy. from someone authorized and Board requested the FBI known to be authorized to speak to provide access to files b. FBI file captioned “Threats Against the for the President. on the above-referenced Life of Fidel Castro.” —William Harvey’s testimony an t i - C a s t r o Cuban grou p s before the Church Committee for Headquarters and the An HSCA Outside Contact Report dated June 25, 1975 New Orleans, Miami, F e b ruary 18, 1978, indicates that the HSCA Tampa, New York, and requested access to an FBI file captioned Dallas field offices. The “ T h reats Against the Life of Fidel Castro” or FBI kept voluminous files on each anti-Cas- some similar caption. The HSCA never made tro Cuban group. Review Board staff mem- a formal request for such a file, and the FBI bers reviewed hundreds of volumes of did not provide to the HSCA a file with such re c o rds in search of assassination-re l a t e d a caption. The Review Board re q u e s t e d material. The files did yield approximately access to any FBI Headquarters files with seventy assassination records. this or a similar caption. The FBI located and p rovided two re c o rds that re f e re n c e d The Review Board also requested the CIA to “ T h reats Against the Life of Fidel Castro , ” provide files on the above-referenced groups, which summarized Walter Winchell’s radio to the extent that the CIA had not already b roadcasts, and compared the bro a d c a s t s processed such records under the JFK Act. with information that the FBI had concern- The Review Board identified additional ing threats against Castro. The Review Board re c o rds from 1960–1964 in contemporary designated both of these re c o rds for inclu- working files of a CIA office concerned with sion in the JFK Collection.

102 7. American Gambling Interests in Cuba other assassination- We had begun to see a general related information on outline of the truth in 1979, as As part of its efforts to gather records relating these three individuals. the House Select Committee on to a Cuban connection to the assassination, The Review Board desig- Assassinations finished its the Review Board staff requested that the FBI nated thirty-three docu- investigation: leaders of orga- provide access to all Headquarters, Miami, ments for processing as nized crime were behind the Tampa, and Havana files captioned, “Ameri- assassination re c o rd s President’s murder. can Gambling Interests in Cuba.” from the many files the —Robert Blakey, Fatal Hour FBI produced in The FBI’s Miami field office (into which all of response to the Review the Havana Legal Attaché’s, or Legat’s, files B o a rd’s request. The relevant documents were forwarded when the Legat closed) and concern the Cuban exile community’s reac- Tampa field office reported to FBI Headquar- tion to President Kennedy’s assassination. ters that they did not have any files with the above-referenced caption. The Review Board F. RECORDS ON ORGANIZED CRIME staff did not locate any material in the FBI Headquarters files related to the assassina- The question as to tion of President Kennedy. Most of the files whether organized crime The most durable conspiracy that the FBI located consisted of pre-1959 played a role in a possi- theory is that the Mafia killed records monitoring the activities of Florida ble conspiracy to assassi- the president. racketeers who were trying to establish gam- nate President Kennedy —Anthony and Robbyn bling and hotel facilities in Cuba. is one that nearly every Summers, in “The Ghosts of government investiga- November,”Vanity Fair, 8. Sergio Arcacha-Smith, Antonio tion into the assassina- December 1994 Veciana, and Bernardo de Torres tion has addressed. Thus, the Review Board processed a large number Se r gio Ar cacha-Smith, Antonio Veciana, and of files on organized crime figures and orga- Be r n a r do de Tor r es were anti-Castro Cuban nized crime activities simply because federal activists in the early 1960s. Arc a c h a - S m i t h agencies made their organized crime files was the New Orleans rep r esentative to the available to previous government investiga- Cuban Revolutionary Council until 1962, and tions. For example, the FBI’s “HSCA subject in that capacity, he used an office in the build- files” contain large portions of the FBI’s files ing at 544 Camp Street. The 544 Camp Stree t on organized crime figures such as Santos ad d r ess was printed on FPCC literature that Trafficante, Carlos Marcello, Angelo Bruno, Lee Harvey Oswald distributed in New Frank Ragano, the Lansky brothers, Johnny Orleans in August of 1963. Veciana led Roselli, Nick Civella, and Joe Campisi. The Alpha–66, a violent anti-Castro orga n i z a t i o n majority of records that Review Board ana- that engaged in paramilitary operations lysts processed in these files were not directly against Castro’s Cuba as well as assassination a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related, but because prior attempts against Castro. Veciana testified to investigative bodies considered these men to the HSCA that he acted as an agent of the U.S. be relevant, the records have been included government, and that he met Lee Harvey in the JFK Collection. In several instances, Oswald in Dallas in 1963 in the presence of however, the Review Board pursued addi- his American “handler.” Tor r es was a Cuban tional records that had not been reviewed by exile living in Miami who later worked with prior investigative bodies. New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison in his investigation of Clay Shaw. 1. Sam Giancana

The HSCA reviewed FBI Headquarters files From the time he was a young man, Sam on Arcacha-Smith, Veciana, and de Torres, so Giancana rose within the Chicago organized the FBI processed some records on these crime syndicate until he became syndicate three men with its “HSCA Subject” files. The leader in 1957. After an eight-year stint in Review Board requested that the FBI conduct Mexico, Giancana was deported back to an additional search at Headquarters, and in Chicago where he was murdered in 1975, the New Orleans, Houston, and Dallas field shortly before he was scheduled to testify offices to determine whether the FBI had before the Church Committee. The Review

103 Board considered Giancana to be of historical interest with respect to the Kennedy assassi- The FBI maintains its tapes and transcripts nation for a number of reasons: (1) Giancana from the “BriLab” surveillance, but because was involved in the CIA plots to assassinate the FBI’s source of authority for the surveil- Fidel Castro; (2) Giancana expressed hostility lance was 18 U.S.C. § 2501 et seq. (Title III), the t o w a rd the Kennedys because of the “take” from the surveillance remained under Kennedys’ war against organized crime; (3) court seal.25 Thus, the assassination research Giancana had associates in common with community was not able to confirm or reject President Kennedy (namely, Frank Sinatra allegations that the tapes or transcripts con- and Judith Campbell Exner); (4) Giancana tain information relevant to the assassina- allegedly contributed to Kennedy’s 1960 tion. Once the Review Board obtained a court presidential campaign; and (5) Giancana was order allowing it access to the materials, the allegedly linked to Joseph P. Kennedy staff reviewed all of the transcripts from the through the illicit liquor trade. FBI’s surveillance on Marcello in New Orleans. Although the staff did not locate the The FBI Headquarters file on Sam Giancana specific conversations that the researchers consists of 37 volumes of records dating from mentioned, it did locate thirteen conversa- 1954 to 1975. When the Review Board staff tions that it believed to be assassination began to review the FBI’s “main” file on Sam records. Most of the conversations took place Giancana in early 1995, it realized that the in the summer of 1979 during the period that FBI had not designated for processing any the HSCA released its report. The conversa- re c o rds that predated January 1, 1963.2 3 tions primarily focused on Marcello’s reac- Apparently, the HSCA had requested access tion to the HSCA’s allegations that he may to the entire FBI file on Giancana, but the FBI have been involved in the assassination. With p rovided only portions of its file to the the help of the U. S. Attorney’s Office in the HSCA. The Review Board staff requested Eastern District of New Orleans, the Review and received access to sections spanning the Board obtained a court order to release tran- years 1958–1962. After reviewing the addi- scripts of the 13 conversations to the public. tional volumes, the Review Board designated the earlier-dated material as assassination 3. Department of Justice Criminal records in the summer of 1995, and the FBI Division Records processed the records under the JFK Act. The Review Board sought to inspect the 2. FBI Electronic Surveillance of Carlos Criminal Division’s extensive org a n i z e d Marcello: BriLab crime files on individuals who were alleged to have had involvement in the assassination, Many of the books on the who were associated in some manner with The most telling evidence in our assassination of Pre s i- Jack Ruby, or who had made claims of orga- investigation of organized crime dent Kennedy discuss nized crime involvement in the assassina- was electronic surveillance of the possibility that Car- tion. The Review Board staff reviewed these major underworld figures by los Marcello, alleged files and designated specific materials as the FBI. o rganized crime boss of assassination records. As noted by the Crim- —Robert Blakey, in Fatal Hour New Orleans, was inal Division, the Division had, “[i]n an involved in the assassi- unprecedented approach,. . . ully opened its nation. In the late 1970s, the FBI investigated files and indices to the Review Board . ” M a rcello on an unrelated matter—the “Hundreds of organized crime case files and bribery of organized labor. As part of the other files of a general nature were made “BriLab” investigation, the FBI conducted available for Review Board staff scrutiny. . . ” a p p roximately eight months of electro n i c surveillance on Marcello’s home and on his G. WARREN COMMISSION STAFF AND CRITICS o ffice at the Town and Country Motel. A c c o rding to several sources, the “BriLab” Given that the Warren Commission consti- tapes contained conversations in which Car- tuted the first official investigation into the los Marcello or his brother Joseph admitted events surrounding the assassination of Pres- that they were involved in the Kennedy ident Kennedy, the Review Board clearly had a s s a s s i n a t i o n .2 4 an interest in ensuring that all federal agency

104 records on the Warren Commission and its In response to the Review In the case of the Kennedy activities became part of the JFK Collection. Bo a r d’s request, the FBI a s s a s s i n a t i o n , u n p r e c e d e n t e d Although the agencies processed a larg e pr ovided all of its head- belief in all kinds of nonsense, number of Warren Commission era docu- quarters file ref e r ences on coupled with extraordinary ments as part of their core files, the Review all of the War r en Com- disrespect for the Wa r r e n Board staff questioned whether federal agen- mission staff members. C o m m i s s i o n , has waxed in cies such as the FBI and the CIA opened and Fr om the Redlich req u e s t , good times and bad times and maintained files on the Warren Commission the Review Board desig- flourishes among remarkable staff members because they were working for nated as assassination- numbers of otherwise sober- the Wa r ren Commission. Likewise, the related a group of rec o rd s minded people. Review Board staff questioned whether fed- on Redlich within the —Max Holland, eral agencies such as the FBI and CIAopened FBI’s file on the Emer- November 1995 and maintained files on critics of the Warren gency Civil Liberties Commission because they were criticizing Committee. Otherwise, the Warren Commission’s conclusions. although Review Board staff did locate some a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related re c o rds, the FBI had 1. FBI Files on Warren Commission Staff al r eady processed most of the rec o r ds as part of its core files. The Review Board did no t In an effort to determine whether the FBI locate any information to indicate that the FBI opened or maintained files on Warren Com- systematically kept rec o r ds on War r en Com- mission staff, the Review Board requested mission staff members simply because they FBI Headquarters file references on Warren we r e employed by the War r en Commission. Commission Assistant Counsel Norman 2. CIA and FBI Files on Warren Redlich. While reviewing the files provided Commission Critics in response to the Review Board’s request for Norman Redlich’s files, the Review Board In an effort to determine whether the FBI staff observed a reference to General Counsel opened or maintained files on Warren Com- J. Lee Rankin’s request that the FBI conduct a mission critics because they criticized the b a c k g round investigation on Redlich and Warren Commission’s work and findings, also on Assistant Counsel Joseph A. Ball. The the Review Board requested access to all staff then asked for FBI Headquarters file ref- records on prominent Warren Commission erences on Rankin and Ball, as it seemed that critic Mark Lane and to all pre-1973 Head- the FBI may have maintained a file on Ball’s quarters file references to the other Warren investigation. Redlich’s file also showed that Commission critics listed below. the Civil Service Commission (CSC) had conducted a background investigation on a. Mark Lane. Redlich before Rankin asked the FBI to do an investigation. Consequently, the Review When the Review Board began to examine the Board questioned whether the CSC had car- FBI’s “core and related” files, it noticed that a ried out background checks on other Warren number of rec o r ds that mentioned the name Commission staff members. In an effort to Mark Lane cros s - re f e r enced the FBI’s main file determine whether similar files existed at the on Lane. Because the FBI had not slated the FBI for other Warren Commission staffers, Lane main file for JFK Act processing, the the Review Board ultimately extended the Review Board requested access to all file ref e r - request to include Assistant Counsel Leon D. ences to Mark Lane or to Lane’s Citizens’ Hubert, Jr. (whose file the Review Board Committee of Inquiry in the files of FBI Head- thought may also contain re f e rences to quarters and the New York field office. The Hubert’s career in New Orleans politics). In Review Board staff’s examination of the Lane addition, the Review Board asked the FBI to main file revealed that approximately eight provide a statement on whether it opened volumes of the file contained a significant per- any files, individually or collectively, on centage of documents relating to the Kennedy other individuals who worked as Warren assassination. The Review Board re c o m- Commission Assistant Counsels or staff mended that those eight volumes be included members, because of their employment with in the JFK Collection. In addition to the Lane the Warren Commission. main file, the Review Board designated as

105 as s a s s i n a t i o n - r elated the entire file on the Cit- The CIA has a small 201 file on Thompson izens’ Committee of Inquiry, as well as rec o rd s which indicates that he was considered to be in the FBI’s Communist Party COINTELPRO of possible operational interest to the Agency file, and a select few rec o r ds about Lane that in the early 1960s while he was living over- ap p e a r ed in the files of other individuals. The seas. CIA lost interest however, and the CIA Review Board’s inquiry revealed that the FBI records that the Review Board examined do maintained substantial files on Lane’s not appear to reflect that Thompson worked pr ofessional and personal activities, and kept for the CIA in any capacity. The Review detailed files on Lane’s political activism. Board staff did not locate any assassination records in the 201 file. The CIA did not open a 201 file on Lane. The Agency’s records on Lane consist of: a dis- d. Edward J. Epstein. patch dated January 23, 1970, an Office of General Counsel letter dated March 29, 1977, FBI records containing the name Edward Jay six FOIA requests, and one public affairs Epstein concern Epstein’s general journalistic request. Review Board staff reviewed these activities. The few assassination-re l a t e d records but did not designate them as assas- records in Epstein’s file were processed by sination records. Review Board staff found the FBI as part of their “core” files. Thus, the one additional reference to Lane in a foreign Review Board staff did not designate any government document and designated the additional records as assassination records. information as assassination related. CIA located an Office of Security file and a b. Harold Weisberg. Publications Review Board file on Epstein as well as three CIA records documenting the FBI records on Warren Commission critic CIA’s destruction of records under a stan- Harold Weisberg related to Weisberg’s previ- d a rd re c o rds destruction schedule. The ous employment with the Department of d e s t royed re c o rds related to three FOIA State, We i s b e rg’s public participation in requests. None of the FOIA requests asked political issues, and We i s b e rg’s published for information on Epstein. The Review work as a journalist. The only assassination- Board staff did not designate any additional related file on Weisberg the FBI produced in records as assassination records. response to the Review Board’s request was its file concerning a FOIA lawsuit that Weis- e. Paul Hoch. berg brought against the Department of Jus- tice. The Review Board recommended that Aside from the few assassination-re l a t e d the FBI process the FOIA litigation file as an records in FBI files containing the name Paul assassination record under the JFK Act. Hoch that were processed by the FBI as part of their “core” files, the Review Board did not The Review Board determined that the CIA locate any additional assassination records. pr ocessed most of its files on Wei s b e r g as part of the CIA se q u e s t e r ed collection. The Review f. David S. Lifton. Bo a r d examined a CIA Of fice of Security file on Wei s b e r g and identified a small number of The name David S. Lifton appeared only in the documents as assassination rec o r ds. FBI’s “core” files. The FBI did not produce any additional files that contained Lifton’s name. c. Josiah Thompson. g. Sylvia Meagher. In FBI files containing the name of Josiah Thompson, the Review Board staff located FBI files relating to Sylvia Meagher con- one assassination-related document that the tained five documents that the Review FBI had processed as part of its “core” files B o a rd believed to be assassination-re l a t e d . on the JFK Assassination. The document was The FBI processed these five documents as about Thompson’s book Six Seconds in Dallas. part of the “core” files. The Review Board The Review Board instructed the FBI to i n s t ructed the FBI to process these five docu- process the document as a duplicate of the ments as duplicates of re c o rds that appeare d record that appeared in the “core” files. in the “core” files.

106 The CIA reported that it no longer had any The remainder of the records involve Com- rec o r ds on Meagher. At one time, the Office of munist Party meetings at which attendees Security had a file on Meagher and a 1968 discussed the Kennedy assassination. Ramparts magazine article. The Review Board also located a ref e r ence to a Privacy Ac t 2. Edward Becker request made by Meagher. CIA de s t r oyed the Privacy Act request and the Office of Security Ed w a r d Becker claims that, in September 1962, folder under normal rec o r d control schedules. he met with Carlos Marcello and three other men, and heard Marcello threaten to have H. NAME SEARCHES P resident Kennedy killed. The HSCA reviewed the FBI’s headquarters file on The Review Board requested searches of fed- Ed w a r d Becker and, as such, the FBI proc e s s e d eral records for new or additional informa- it under the JFK Act. The Review Board tion and records on individuals who proved requested access to the Los Angeles field offi c e to be of interest to investigative bodies such file on Edward Becker, as well as access to the as the Warren Commission and the HSCA. co n t r ol file on the Los Angeles informant who di s c r edited Becker’s allegation. The Review In addition, the Review Board received hun- Bo a r d designated two documents from the Los d reds of letters, telephone calls, and tele- Angeles field office file on Becker and one doc- faxes from members of the public re q u e s t i n g ument from the Los Angeles informant’s con- the Board to locate government re c o rds on tr ol file. All three of the designated rec o rd s individuals who the public believed were concerned Becker’s allegation that Marce l l o linked in some way to the assassination. th r eatened President Kennedy. O b v i o u s l y, the Review Board staff could not request and review re c o rds on every name 3. Carlos Bringuier that came to its attention. The Review Board requested additional information and Carlos Bringuier was an anti-Castro Cuban re c o rds on some individuals, and this sec- activist in New Orleans who had re p e a t e d tion attempts to summarize the bulk of the contact with Lee Harvey Oswald in the Review Board’s requests for information on names that are not mentioned in other places summer of 1963. Bringuier managed a cloth- within this Report. ing store in New Orleans, and he was also the New Orleans re p resentative of the anti- 1. John Abt C a s t ro organization Directorio Revolu- c i o n a ro Estudiantil (the DRE). Oswald vis- Following his arrest on November 22, 1963, ited Bringuier’s store in early August 1963 Lee Harvey Oswald stated to representatives w h e re the two engaged in a discussion on of the media that he wanted to be repre- the Cuban political situation. A c c o rding to sented by John Abt. Abt was an attorney who B r i n g u i e r, Oswald portrayed himself as had re p resented the Communist Party, being anti-Castro and anti-communist. Sev- USA.26 Abt’s primary residence was in New eral days later, someone told Bringuier that York City, but he was spending the weekend an American was passing out pro - C a s t ro of November 22, 1963 at his cabin in Con- leaflets in New Orleans. Bringuier and two necticut. Thus, the Review Board requested others went to counter-demonstrate, and access to the FBI’s files on John Abt from FBI Bringuier was surprised to see that Oswald Headquarters and from the New York and was the pro - C a s t ro leafleter. Bringuier and New Haven field offices. Although the New Oswald argued and both were arrested for Haven office reported that it had no file ref- disturbing the peace. The publicity from the e rences to Abt, the FBI made available a l t e rcation and trial (Oswald pleaded guilty re c o rds from Headquarters and from the and was fined $10 and Bringuier and his New York field office. The Review Board des- friends pleaded not guilty and the charg e s ignated 24 records (all dated after November w e re dismissed) resulted in a debate on 22, 1963) for processing under the JFK Act. WDSU radio between Bringuier and Some of the designated re c o rds relate to Oswald on August 21, 1963. The Review whether Abt and Oswald knew each other B o a rd designated six serials from the New prior to President Kennedy’s assassination. Orleans file on Bringuier.

107 4. George Bush Review Board designated five records to be processed under the JFK Act. All of the des- A November 29, 1963, memorandum from ignated records concern Butler’s contact with FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to the Director Oswald in August 1963. of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State refers to the fact that Chapter 7 of this Report discusses the information on the assassination of President Review Board’s attempts to obtain records Kennedy was “orally furnished to Mr. directly from Mr. Butler and INCA. G e o rge Bush of the Central Intelligence Agency.” At the request of the Review Board, CIA processed all of its records on Butler as the CIA made a thorough search of its part of its sequestered collection. records in an attempt to determine if the “George Bush” referred to in the memoran- 6. Claude Barnes Capehart dum might be identical to President and former Director of Central Intelligence George One res e a r cher inquired whether a Claude Herbert Walker Bush. That search deter- Barnes Capehart was ever an employee, mined that the CIA had no association with d i rectly or indire c t l y, under any name, George Herbert Walker Bush during the time whether on salary or contract, of the CIA, or a frame referenced in the document. co m p a n y , business, agency, or other entity operated by the CIA. The HSCA was inter- The records that the Review Board examined ested in Capehart, who claimed to have been showed that the only other “George Bush” in Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963, as a serving in the CIA in 1963 was a junior ana- CI A employee. The CIAgranted Review Board lyst who has repeatedly denied being the st a f f full access to its rec o r ds on Capehart. “George Bush” referenced in the memorandum. The Review Board staff found one ref- CI A rec o r ds state that Capehart worked for erence to an Army Major General George two diffe r ent private business contractors on Bush in the calendars of Director of Central U.S. government classified projects, but the Intelligence Allen Dulles. There was no indirec o r ds the Review Board examined do not cation if this General Bush could be the refer- show that CIA ever employed him as an offi - enced George Bush. The Review Board ce r , staffe r , asset, or source. The rec o r ds indi- marked the calendar page as an assassination cate that at least one of the private contractors record. for whom Capehart worked, Global Marine, Inc., did have CIA contracts. The rec o r ds fur- 5. Ed Butler and Information Council of ther indicate that a background investigation the Americas (INCA) was run on Capehart in August and Septem- ber 1973, so that he could work on those con- Ed w a r d Scannell Butler debated Lee Harvey tracts as a crane operator/driller from October Oswald in New Orleans in the summer of 1963 30, 1973 to July 9, 1975. As part of his work on the radio station WDSU. The radio debate with Global Marine Inc., Capehart signed oc c u r r ed shortly after Oswald was arrested for se c r ecy agreements with CIA in October 1973 disturbing the peace in August 1963. Follow- and January 1975. ing the assassination, but before Pres i d e n t Johnson formed the War r en Commission, But- The CIA holds two files on Capehart—an ler testified before a Senate Internal Security Office of Security File and a medical file. The Subcommittee re g a rding his contact with CIA processed its Office of Security file as Oswald. Butler had long been associated with part of the segregated collection. The medical the Information Council of the A m e r i c a s file, not part of CIA’s segregated collection, (INCA), a New Orleans-based clearinghouse concerns an accident which occurred on one for anti-Communist information, and particu- of the construction sites, and the Review larly for anti-Castro Cuban information. Board did not believe it was relevant. The medical file does not contain any information The Review Board requested access to all FBI on or evidence of any possible psychological headquarters and New Orleans field office problems. The CIA reported that it has never files on Edward Scannell Butler and the had an Office of Personnel file or a 201 file on Information Council of the Americas. The Capehart.

108 Th e r e is no evidence in either the Office of The Review Board requested FBI records on Security file or the medical file to suggest that these individuals from FBI Headquarters and Capehart worked for the CIA on any addi- field offices in Baltimore, Dallas, Denver, tional contracts nor in any capacity, direct or New Orleans and Washington, D.C. The FBI in d i r ect, other than as the employee of a pri- retrieved only a few records relating to the vate contractor, Global Marine, Inc., working individuals referenced above, all of which on CIA contracts. There is no evidence in the the Review Board designated as assassina- files that the Review Board saw to suggest tion records. that CIA ever assigned him a pseudonym or that he used another name. Finally, there is no 9. Billie Sol Estes information in the rec o r ds to support Cape- hart’s allegations concerning the Kennedy In the 1980s, Billy Sol Estes alleged that Lyn- assassination nor to confirm his wherea b o u t s don Johnson was involved in the assassina- during the relevant time period. tion of President Kennedy. Estes was report- edly a con artist who claims to have had a 7. Lawrence Cusack financial relationship with Lyndon Johnson. The Review Board requested access to all FBI The late Lawrence Cusack was a prominent Headquarters files on Billie Sol Estes. The New York attorney in the 1950s and 1960s Review Board designated eight serials for who represented, among other clients, the processing as assassination records under the Archdiocese of New York. The Review Board JFK Act. All of the designated records con- received information that Cusack performed cern Estes’ alleged knowledge of persons some legal work for Joseph P. Kennedy and connected to the assassination of President that Cusack’s son was engaged in an attempt Kennedy. to sell a group of allegedly salacious documents regarding Cusack’s professional (but 10. Judith Campbell Exner secret) relationship with President Kennedy. The documents at issue allegedly contained Judith Campbell Exner claims to have been a information regarding President Kennedy’s link between President Kennedy and Mafia relationship with Marilyn Monroe and with members Sam Giancana and Johnny Roselli. various mafia figures. Questions were raised Introduced to John Kennedy by Frank Sina- concerning the authenticity of the docu- tra during Kennedy’s 1960 presidential pri- ments, and Cusak’s son subsequently was mary campaign, she claimed to have had a indicted on fraud charges. relationship with John Kennedy that lasted from the winter of 1960 until March of 1962. In an effort to determine whether the FBI had In 1975, Ms. Exner gained national media any information on Lawrence Cusack’s rela- attention when she testified before the tionship with the Kennedy family, the Church Committee in its investigation of the Review Board requested access to all FBI C I A plots to assassinate Fidel Castro . Headquarters and New York field office files Between 1976 and 1997, Ms. Exner filed on Lawrence X. Cusack. The Review Board numerous lawsuits against the FBI seeking did not find any assassination records in the access to all information the FBI held on her. materials provided by the FBI. The Review Board requested access to all FBI Headquarters and field office main files on 8. Adele Edisen, Winston de Monsabert, Judith Campbell Exner. The FBI produced Jose Rivera several small field office files containing p ress clippings the FBI collected on Ms. Dr. Adele Edisen has written several letters to Exner, as well as several files which reflect the Review Board and has also provided Ms. Exner’s efforts to gain access to her infor- public testimony to the Review Board. In her mation in the FBI’s files. The FBI also pro- letters and testimony, Dr. Edisen stated that, duced several files with references to women in New Orleans on November 24, 1963, she with names similar to Judith Campbell recounted to an FBI agent and a Secret Ser- E x n e r. The Review Board designated as vice agent her knowledge of apparent deal- assassination records all main files on Ms. ings between Dr. Jose Rivera, Mr. Winston de Exner, as well as all records that made refer- Monsabert, and Lee Harvey Oswald in 1963. ence to Ms. Exner. The Review Board also

109 designated the entire FBI file on the murder K e n n e d y. The Review Board found only of Johnny Roselli which the FBI produced in three records that it believed to be assassina- response to this request. tion-related, all relating to threats that were made by private citizens to Joseph P. 11. H.L. Hunt and Family and Clint Kennedy and his sons. Murchison and Family 13. Oswald LeWinter Some researchers allege that the assassination of President Kennedy was master- In 1997, the Review Board received a query minded by wealthy Dallas oilmen H.L. Hunt f rom a re s e a rcher as to whether a man and Clint Murchison. The Review Board named Oswald LeWinter had any ties, cur- requested access to all FBI headquarters and rent or past, with the CIA. A c c o rding to the Dallas field office files on the following indire s e a rc h e r, LeWinter claimed to be the cur- viduals during the period 1960 through 1969: rent Deputy Director of Countere s p i o n a g e H.L. Hunt, Nelson Bunker Hunt, Lamar for the CIA with information on the assas- Hunt, Clint Murchison, Sr., Clint Murchison, sination of President Kennedy. The Review Jr., and Paul M. Rothermel. FBI files con- B o a rd staff examined CIA and FBI re c o rd s tained many references to the Hunts, the on LeWi n t e r. FBI and CIA files indicate that Murchisons, and Rothermel, but the docu- L e Winter is a well-known fabricator with ments were primarily concerned with their an interest in intelligence and law enforc e- business dealings or their political activities. ment activities who frequently makes The Review Board designated for the JFK claims related to sensational or unusual Collection ten documents from the files the news events. The re c o rds that the Review FBI produced in response to the Review B o a rd examined did not show that Oswald Board’s request. L e Winter was ever employed by or worked for the CIA in any capacity. Further, CIA 12. Joseph P. Kennedy reported that it has never employed anyone with a title or position equivalent to In light of allegations that Joseph P. “Assistant or Deputy Director of Coun- Kennedy’s organized crime connections t e re s p i o n a g e . ” helped to fund John Kennedy’s 1960 campaign for the Democratic nomination, the 14. Marita Lorenz Review Board requested FBI files on Joseph P. Kennedy. Given that Joseph P. Kennedy Marita Lorenz allegedly was involved in the was a prominent American who served in early plots to assassinate Fidel Castro; asso- many high-level government positions, the ciated with some of the more colorful gun- Review Board limited its request for FBI files running characters in the assassination on Joseph P. Kennedy to: (1) a list of file num- story; and has worked as an informant for bers and case captions of files where Mr. government agencies, including the Dru g Kennedy was the main subject of the file; and E n f o rcement A g e n c y. A c c o rding to former (2) field office files for the 1956 FBI investiga- H S C A s t a ffers, Lorenz claimed to have wit- tions of Kennedy in connection with his nessed a meeting between Frank Sturg i s , appointment to the Presidential Board of a.k.a. Frank Fiorini, and E. Howard Hunt, Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activi- both of whom had denied knowing each ties of the U.S. government. The Review other in testimonies to the Rockefeller Com- B o a rd singled out Kennedy’s 1956 back- mission. Although there are extensive FBI ground investigation because of its proximity files on Lorenz, the Review Board located no to the 1960 presidential election, and the alle- additional files in the CIA collections under gations of organized crime influence during her name. Upon the suggestion of former that election. The Review Board also H S C A s t a ffers to look further into Marita requested that the FBI provide a list of file L o renz, the Review Board requested DEA numbers and case captions that contained and INS to search their respective agency documents mentioning Joseph P. Kennedy. files for re c o rds on Lorenz. While INS had no The vast majority of records that the FBI pro- re c o rds, DEA p roduced two files, none of duced concerning Joseph P. Kennedy were which contained information of relevance to not related to the assassination of President the assassination.

110 15. John Thomas Masen serials from the Headquarters file on Mora which concerned the Oswald investigation in John Thomas Masen was a Dallas area gun Mexico City. dealer who was arrested on gun smuggling ch a r ges two days before the assassination of 18. Gordon Duane Novel Pr esident Kennedy. During the fall of 1963, Masen supplied arms to the Directorio Rev- Gordon Novel came to olucianario Estudiantial (DRE), an anti-Castro the attention of New At the time it seemed to me that gr oup based in Miami. The FBI interviewed Orleans District Attorney LHO was reciting propaganda Masen during the assassination investigation Jim Garrison after mak- f o r m u l a s, as well as phrases reg a r ding allegations that he may have sold ing claims that he was an used in connection with his 6.5 mm Mannlicher-C a r cano ammunition to employee of the CIA in demand for citizenship renunci- Lee Harvey Oswald. Some res e a r chers have New Orleans in 1963 and ation, that he perhaps did not alleged that Masen had connections to knew both Lee Harvey fully understand himself, and Oswald. The Review Board requested access Oswald and Jack Ruby. that he may have been coached to FBI files on John Thomas Masen from the The CIA has a 201 and an by persons unknown. following locations: Headquarters, San An t o - Office of Security file on —From Affidavit of John A. nio, Dallas, and Miami. The FBI reported that Gordon Novel. The 201 McVickar,June 23, 1997 the Miami field office file had been destroy e d , file includes a Domestic but the Review Board designated as assassina- Contacts Division “A” file which CIA incor- tion rec o r ds the Headquarters, San An t o n i o , porated into the 201 file. The Review Board and Dallas field office files in their entiret y . reviewed both files and designated as assas- These files describe the FBI’s investigation of sination records the entire Office of Security Masen in 1963 and 1964, and his association file, and relevant documents from the 201 file with the DRE. which did not duplicate re c o rds alre a d y found within the CIA sequestered collection. 16. John Anthony McVickar 19. Orest Pena John Anthony McVickar was a consular officer in Moscow from 1959 to 1961 where he Orest Pena was a New Orleans bar owner dealt with Lee Harvey Oswald and Marina and an anti-Castro activist. Pena and Oswald Oswald. McVickar shared an office with con- obtained passports on the same day in the sular officer Richard Snyder in 1959 and so summer of 1963. Pena testified before inves- was present to hear Snyder’s October 31 tigative committees, and claimed he was an interview with Oswald. McVickar was inter- FBI informant. In an effort to verify his claims viewed by members of the Review Board that he was an informant, the Review Board staff and provided affidavits to the Review requested access to any Headquarters or field Board. McVickar said he had no connections office files under the “134” or “137” classifi- to the CIA. The “John A. McVickar” file that cation (the FBI file classification for its infor- exists in the CIAsequestered collection is that mant source files). The FBI found no files of an individual with a diff e rent middle responsive to this request. name and no connection to the assassination. 20. Carlos Quiroga 17. Elizabeth Catlett Mora Carlos Quiroga was an anti-Castro Cuban Elizabeth Catlett Mora was a pro m i n e n t activist in New Orleans who had contact American communist who lived in Mexico with Lee Harvey Oswald in the summer of City in the early 1960s. Mora was an associate 1963. Quiroga received Oswald’s flyer on the of Vincent T. Lee, head of the FPCC, and trav- FPCC, contacted Oswald, and feigned inter- eled to Cuba with him in December 1962. The est in the FPCC. In addition, Quiroga spent Review Board requested access to FBI Head- time with Oswald in an effort to determine quarters and Mexico City file references to whether the FPCC was a serious pro-Castro Mora to determine if the Communist com- group in New Orleans. The Review Board munity in Mexico City had any contact with requested access to all Headquarters and Oswald during his trip to Mexico City in the New Orleans field office files regarding Car- fall of 1963. The Review Board designated 12 los Quiroga. The Review Board designated

111 six serials from the New Orleans file as assas- Of fice of Personnel file, but did not designate sination records. any rec o r ds as assassination rec o rd s .

21. Charles Small 24. Marty Underwood

Charles Small was a prominent American Marty Underwood was an advance man who Communist who lived in Mexico City in the worked for both President Kennedy and Pres - early 1960s. The Review Board requested ident Johnson. He was part of the team that access to FBI Headquarters and Mexico City accompanied President Kennedy to Texas in file references to Small to determine if the November 1963. Certain res e a r chers contend Communist community in Mexico City had that when Judith Campbell Exner in April 1960 any contact with Oswald during his trip to allegedly delivered a satchel of cash to Mafia Mexico City in the fall of 1963. The Review boss Sam Giancana as a favor to then pres i - Board designated as assassination records 18 dential candidate Senator John F. Kennedy, serials from the files produced in response to Underwood was on the same train from Was h - this request. These documents primarily ington, D.C. to Chicago, with instructions to relate to the Mexico City Communist com- “keep an eye” on her. The Review Board was munity’s reaction to the assassination and to also interested in learning more about Under- the fact that Oswald had visited Mexico City wood’s relationship with Winston Scott, the shortly before the assassination. CI A Chief of Station in Mexico City, whom he met during the Johnson administration. The 22. Clarence Daniel Smelley Review Board requested access to all file ref e r - ences on Marty Underwood. The FBI pro- Cl a r ence Daniel Smelley was a member of the duced two documents responsive to this International Brot h e r hood of Teamsters in request, and neither rec o r d contained any Birmingham, Alabama, who alleged in 1964 as s a s s i n a t i o n - r elated information. Al t h o u g h that he had information in his possession that Underwood’s oral history is at the LBJ Library, Teamster President Jimmy Hoffa had con- he has refused to sign a deed to open the his- sp i r ed to and carried out the assassination of to r y . While the Review Board considered the P resident Kennedy. The Review Board oral history to be an assassination rec o rd , requested access to the FBI Headquarters file Underwood gave permission to open only titled “James Riddle Hoffa; Clarence Daniel those sections which pertain directly to the Smelley; Unknown Subjects,” as well as the assassination. The LBJ Library will send those c o r responding Memphis and Birmingham sections to the JFK Collection. field office files. The Review Board designated the entire Headquarters file for proc e s s - 25. General Edwin Walker and the ing under the JFK Act. This file documented Minutemen the Bureau’s investigation of Smelley and his allegations. The FBI reports that it destroy e d General Edwin Walker, a retired Army Major c o r responding Memphis and Birmingham General, was an extreme right-wing political field office files in the 1970s. activist living in Dallas in 1963. He was forced into retirement from the U.S. Army in 23. Richard Snyder 1961 for distributing right-wing literature to soldiers under his command. General Walker Ri c h a r d Snyder was the Department of State was involved in organizing the protests of consular officer on duty at the Am e r i c a n James Meredith’s matriculation to the Uni- Embassy in Moscow when Lee Harvey versity of Mississippi in the fall of 1962, as Oswald appeared at the embassy to announce well as protests of Adlai Stevenson’s visit to his defection on October 31, 1959. Though Dallas in October 1963. After the events of Snyder had briefly worked for the CIA in 1949 November 22–24, 1963, Marina Oswald con- and 1950, the Review Board staff could locate fided to authorities that she believed it was no evidence in CIA files that he still had any Lee Harvey Oswald who shot at General connection to the CIA at the time of Oswald’s Walker’s home in April 1963. defection. CIA pr ocessed its 201 rec o r d on Snyder as part of the sequestered collection. The Review Board was interested in whether The Review Board staff examined Snyder’s the FBI had any information which indicated

112 that Walker or his followers: (1) had Richard Bissell’s request. The false test flight expressed any desire to assassinate President manuals contained incorrect information on Kennedy; (2) had any contact with Lee Har- the plane’s weight, speed, altitude, and load vey Oswald; or (3) had any information factor limits. Rich claims that Lockheed pro- regarding the Walker shooting. The Review duced the four manuals but only Bissell Board requested access to Headquarters and knew how or if the CIA got them to the Sovi- Dallas field office files on General Walker, the ets. Did Oswald, or others like him, carry Minutemen, the Headquarters file number these fake manuals into Soviet hands? 100–439412, and the Dallas field office file number 105–1475. The FBI produced numer- In an effort to locate re c o rds to confirm ous files in response to this request, and the Rich’s story, the Review Board staff con- Review Board recommended 191 documents tacted several individuals who were from the various files be processed as assas- involved with the U–2 program at CIA. In sination re c o rds. These documents con- addition, the Review Board staff examined cerned threats against President Kennedy n u m e rous files from the earliest days of the and members of the Kennedy Administra- U–2 including some of the original test flight tion and reactions within the right-wing manuals. The Directorate of Science and political community to the assassination of Technology found no mention of any fake President Kennedy. U–2 manuals in its archives or database. In addition, Lockheed, when queried, re p o r t e d The Review Board also requested the Crimi- that re c o rds of that age, if they still existed, nal Division of the Department of Justice to w e re neither indexed nor archived. In short, search for files on Walker. The Review Board the Review Board staff was unable to find staff located a small number of assassination any individual who had ever heard of any records in the Criminal Division’s files. fake U–2 manuals or any re c o rd which even hinted at the existence of any manuals. Wi t h I. MISCELLANEOUS Rich and Bissell both deceased, the existence or plans for four fake U–2 manuals re m a i n s This section, organized by agency, sets forth a mystery.2 7 some of the searches for additional information and records which did not easily fit b. The “Family Jewels.” within other sections or chapters. The 693-paged “Family Jewels” is not a sin- 1. CIA gle written document or report, but rather a collection of separate memoranda or letters At the request of the Review Board, the CIA f rom individuals, branches, divisions, and undertook a search for and located the original o ffices within the CIA. It grew out of a early rec o r ds reg a r ding the development of the request by James Schlesinger, then Dire c t o r U–2 plane. The CIA also located one of the few of Central Intelligence, instructing individ- extant, unredacted, and still closely held copies ual Agency components to detail acts or of the so called “Family Jewels” document. p rograms being conducted by the A g e n c y which might possibly violate the charter of a. The U–2 connection and the “fake” manuals. the CIA. Although Schlesinger did not place a time limit on responses, the majority of the Many researchers have wondered whether material detailed in the “Family Jewels” is Lee Harvey Oswald learned enough about f rom the late 1960s and early 1970s. The the U–2 airplane during his U.S. Marine “Family Jewels” contains multiple copies of Corps service in Japan to provide useful memoranda as diff e rent authors attached information to the Soviets as to its airspeed p revious branch, office, or division materi- and altitude or whether he might have als to individual treatises, retorts, elabora- played a diff e rent role re g a rding Soviet tions, or addenda. The collection does not knowledge of the airplane. In his 1994 per- have a table of contents, sequence, or org a- sonal memoir, Ben Rich, the former director nizational rationale. CIA stamped the pages of Lockheed’s research and design “Skunk c o n s e c u t i v e l y, and they appear roughly to Works,” states that Lockheed flight engineers be numbered in the order in which they produced four false test flight manuals at w e re collected.

113 In response to the Review Board’s informal vice that Oswald was a threat to the Presi- request CIA–IR–08, the CIA agreed to meet dent. In light of allegations that federal agen- with a member of the Review Board staff to cies neglected to adequately share law review the “Jewels” and identify assassina- enforcement information, the Review Board tion-related material. Portions of 27 pages staff believed that information of the 1960s were marked as assassination records to be era, which related to liaison between federal processed for inclusion in the JFK Collection government agencies on law enforc e m e n t at the National Archives. matters generally and matters affecting Pres- idential protection specifically, would be rel- 2. FBI evant for purposes of the JFK Collection.

a. “Research Matters” file on John F. Kennedy. i. Secret Service/Protection of the President. The Review Board requested access to the The Review Board requested access to file FBI’s files captioned “Liaison with the Secret number 94–37374 in the summer of 1995. Service” and “Presidential Protection.” Both The file was one of the 164 files that com- of these files had previously been available in prised J. Edgar Hoover’s “Official and Con- the FBI’s FOIA reading room in a heavily fidential (O&C)” files, which were re m o v e d redacted form. The FBI’s file on Presidential f rom Hoover’s office after his death and are Protection does not begin until 1964, and the c u r rently maintained by the FBI as a gro u p Review Board designated all documents to maintain their integrity. The file consists from 1964, and 27 documents from post-1964, of five volumes, and three “EBFs,” or enclo- as assassination records. The Review Board s u res behind file. The FBI processed the also designated the FBI’s entire file on the e n t i re file under the JFK Act. The file consists Dillon Commission as assassination-related. of a mix of material relating to John K e n n e d y. Volumes 1, 2, 3, and the first half of ii. CIA. Although the HSCA re v i e w e d Volume 4 all predate the assassination. The portions of the FBI’s liaison file with the second half of Volume 4 and all of Volume 5 CIA, the Review Board requested access to contain documents that are dated after the additional sections of the FBI/CIA l i a i s o n assassination and consist of condolence let- file covering the period 1957 through 1969 in ters and other material relating to Pre s i d e n t an effort to locate new assassination re c o rd s . K e n n e d y. The earliest documents in the file The Review Board designated all documents date back to the late 1940s, when John f rom the CIA liaison file for the years 1963 Kennedy ran for and was elected to Con- and 1964 as well as 67 documents from the g ress. The pre-assassination file contains period before and after 1963 and 1964 for social and professional corre s p o n d e n c e p rocessing as assassination re c o rds. These between Kennedy and Director Hoover. It documents cover a wide variety of topics also contains a significant number of news- related to the assassination including infor- paper articles and information about mation about how the FBI and the CIA Kennedy’s election races. Once Kennedy s h a red information when their intere s t s became President, the file captured informa- overlapped. tion about Presidential protection and liaison with the Secret Service. The file also con- iii. NSA. The Review Board staff’ s tains letters and call reports from members review of the FBI liaison file with NSAfor the of the public to the FBI generally and to years 1959–1964 produced no additional D i rector Hoover specifically relating to Pre s- assassination records. ident Kennedy. iv. Customs. The Review Board staff’s b. Liaison with other federal agencies. review of the FBI’s liaison file with the Cus- toms Service produced no additional assassi- In his Warren Commission testimony, Secret nation records. Service agent Rowley commented that, had federal agencies shared their information v. ATF. The Review Board staff’s review relating to Lee Harvey Oswald, the govern- of the FBI’s liaison file with the Bureau of ment could have compiled a list of at least 18 Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms produced no items that would have alerted the Secret Ser- additional assassination records.

114 3. Secret Service “threat sheets” was the subject of the Secret Service’s May 1998 appeal to the President. a. Protective survey reports. 4. Department of State Whenever the President traveled outside of Washington, D.C., the Secret Service would Robert Edward Webster was a technician generate a Protective Survey Report, or a working on the American Exhibition in “trip report.” Trip reports, composed by Moscow in the summer of 1959 when he S e c ret Service agents who conducted decided to renounce his citizenship and defect advance work for the President’s trips, con- to the Soviet Union. Webster appeared at the tained information ranging from logistical U.S. Embassy to announce his defection two details about seating arrangements to details weeks prior to Oswald’s visit. Research e r s about individuals in the area known to have have suggested that accounts of Oswald’s made threats against the President’s life. appearance at the embassy differ because Some of the survey reports document infor- embassy personnel have confused the arrivals mation Secret Service received from other of Webster and Oswald. In an effort to explore agencies such as the FBI or the CIA. any physical similarities between the two men, the Review Board asked the Department The survey reports detail Pre s i d e n t of State to locate a circa 1959 passport photo- Kennedy’s travel, whereabouts, associations, graph of Web s t e r . The Department of State and activities for his entire administration. pr oduced its passport file on Web s t e r , and They also provide a complete picture of the tr a n s f e r r ed the file to the JFK Collection. The S e c ret Service’s protection of Pre s i d e n t passport file includes new, detailed informa- Kennedy. tion on Web s t e r ’s defection.

b. Shift reports. 5. Army

The White House Detail consisted of Secret The Review Board’s two primary concerns Service agents whose duties were to person- with Army records were: first, to open the ally protect the life of the President, the Vice counterintelligence files located at the Inves- President, and their respective families. The tigative Records Repository (IRR) at Fort White House Detail kept “shift reports,” usu- Meade; and second, to determine whether ally authored by the Special Agent in charge Army intelligence units had any re g u l a r of the shift, that detailed the activity of each responsibilities for protection of the Presi- section during their assigned working hours. dent as part of their normal duties circa 1963.

c. Eileen Dinneen memoranda. a. U.S. Army’s Investigative Records Repository. Eileen Dinneen, a staff researcher for the HSCA, obtained access to protective intelli- This facility at Fort Meade in Maryland, a gence files and Protective Survey Reports. part of the Army’s Intelligence and Security Dinneen documented her review of these Command (INSCOM), contains investigative files in memoranda and reports. The Review files on individuals of counterintelligence Board staff found useful Dinneen’s docu- interest to the Army. The HSCA studied 34 mentation of information contained in the IRR “case files,” and thus, the A r m y Secret Service protective intelligence files of processed those records for inclusion in the individuals whom the Secret Service consid- JFK Collection. The Review Board requested ered to be dangerous to the lives of the Pres- three additional files and designated them ident, the Vice President, and their families assassination records. The three additional from March to December 1963. For each pro- case files declared as assassination records by tective intelligence file she reviewed, Din- the Review Board pertain to Alfredo Mirabal neen created a one-page report documenting Diaz, Jordan James Pfuntner, and Clemard the name of the individual and various bio- Joseph Charles. The Review Board staff also graphical and background information the designated one additional file consisting of Secret Service maintained on the individual. an assortment of extracts from various Army The Board’s vote to release in full these Intelligence Regulations.

115 b. Army Security Agency records and files. Air Force One and Andrews Air Force Base during the return flight from Dallas to Wash- The Review Board did not locate any addi- ington, D.C. As many people are now aware, tional assassination records from the Army in the 1970s, the LBJ Presidential Library Security Agency’s files. Review Board staff released edited audio cassettes of unsecured, searched for information and records con- or open voice conversations with Air Force cerning ASA electronic surveillance from the One, Andrews Air Force Base, the White 1960s, but was unsuccessful in its efforts to House Situation Room, and the Cabinet Air- locate any such material. Army personnel craft carrying the Secretary of State and other provided to the Review Board staff a unit his- o fficials on November 22, 1963. The LBJ tory which gave a generic description of ASA Library version of these tapes consists of surveillance activities in Mexico City in 1963. about 110 minutes of voice transmissions, but The one paragraph that addressed this activ- the tapes are edited and condensed, so the ity was short, not very detailed, and Review Board staff sought access to described the ASA surveillance effort of the unedited, uncondensed versions. Since the Cuban and Soviet Embassies as larg e l y edited version of the tapes contains consider- unsuccessful, due to technical diff i c u l t i e s . able talk about both the forthcoming autopsy This paragraph did not provide any raw on the President, as well as the reaction of a intelligence or surveillance data. government in crisis, the tapes are of considerable interest to assassination researchers c. Army Inspector General 1973 report on and historians. domestic surveillance abuses in the U.S. Given that the LBJ Library released the tapes In 1997, the Review Board requested that the in the 1970s, the paper trail is now sketchy and Army’s Inspector General’s Office locate and quite cold. The LBJ Library staff is fairly confi- provide a copy of its own 1973 report on dent that the tapes originated with the White domestic surveillance abuses in the United House Communications Agency (WHCA). States, in the hope that this document might The LBJ Library staff told the Review Board mention domestic surveillance activity in the st a f f that it received the tapes from the White early 1960s and provide leads to the Review House as part of the original shipment of Pres - Board. (The Church Committee cited this ident Johnson’s papers in 1968 or 1969. report in detail.) The Army IG off i c e Ac c o r ding to the LBJ Library’s documenta- responded to the Review Board staff that it tion, the accession card reads: “WHCA?” and could not locate its own report. is dated 1975. The Review Board staff could not locate any rec o r ds indicating who per- 6. White House Communications Agency formed the editing, or when, or where.

WHCAwas, and is, responsible for maintain- The Review Board’s repeated written and oral ing both secure (encrypted) and unsecured inquiries of the White House Communica- (open) telephone, radio, and telex communi- tions Agency did not bear fruit. The WHCA cation between the President and the govern- could not produce any rec o r ds that illumi- ment of the United States. Most of the per- nated the provenance of the edited tapes. sonnel that constitute this elite agency are U.S. military communications specialists; 7. Presidential Library Materials many, in 1963, were from the Army Signal Corps. On November 22, 1963, WHCA was The JFK Act obliged both the John F. Kennedy responsible for communications between and Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Libraries and among Air Force One and Two, the to grant the Review Board access to donor- White House Situation Room, the mobile restricted material and to rec o r ds stored under White House, and with the Secret Service in a deposit agreement to determine whether the the motorcade. material contains assassination information. In i t i a l l y , both presidential libraries were rel u c - The Review Board sought to locate any audio tant to release their most closely guarde d recordings of voice communications to or rec o r ds involving Jacqueline Kennedy, Robert from Air Force One on the day of the assassi- Ke n n e d y , and William Manchester. In the case nation, including communications between of both libraries, privacy concerns, as well as

116 political motivations, delayed the decision- the JFK Library. Because The public was curious, a n d making process. The Review Board was able to of their unique historical that curiosity could not be sat- se c u r e the LBJ Library’s agreement to rel e a s e value, the Review Board isfied without revealing what the Jacqueline B. Kennedy tapes and tran- regards these interviews 28 we had decided to omit. At the sc r i p t s ; obtain William Manchester’s permis- as highly relevant to the same time, some political fig- sion to allow a member of the Review Board assassination. This out- ures described in the manu- st a f f to review his papers on The Death of a standing collection of script demanded that they be Pre s i d e n t ; and secure the cooperation of the JFK materials should be presented in glowing terms. I Library in approaching the Kennedy family made available to the balked and refused to make reg a r ding the release of the sealed tapes and public as soon as possi- changes that would falsify his- transcripts of Manchester’s interviews with ble. At this point, how- t o r y . Jacqueline B. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy. e v e r, Manchester has —William Manchester, in refused to cooperate and Death of a President a. William Manchester interviews. it is unfortunately impos- sible to open the records Most of William Manchester’s work papers without his consent. relating to his work on The Death of a Pres i d e n t ar e stored at the JFK Library under a 1967 The tapes and transcripts of William Man- Deposit Ag r eement. Of particular historical ch e s t e r ’s interviews of Robert F. Kennedy and value are the extensive personal interviews he Jacqueline B. Kennedy are subject to a 1967 conducted in the early aftermath of the Pres i - legal agreement which states that they were dent’s death. In contrast to other rec o r ds in the not to be made public for 100 years “except.. . Collection that shed light on the assassination on the express written consent of plaintiff investigations, the Manchester interviews [Jacqueline B. Kennedy].” With Mrs. Onas- ch r onicle the human side of the story. Man- sis’s death, her daughter Caroline Kennedy chester envisioned that The Death of a Pres i d e n t became her rep r esentative and is the only w o u l d p rovide “one complete, accurate person with authority to give consent to open account about the assassination,. . . that would this material. be based on material gathered while the memories were still fres h . ” 29 The interviews cap- The Review Board recog- tu r ed and rec o r ded the early recollections and nizes that the interviews In my view, the Manch e s t e r reactions of people closest to Pre s i d e n t have extraordinary his- interviews have an extraordi- Kennedy and provide a lens through which torical value and so it narily unique historical value the tragedy of the event can be seen and pursued this matter with and are the most important understood in the context of the times. the JFK Library and with records not yet released. .. I am William Manchester. Af t e r hopeful that you might agree to Beginning in early 1995, the Review Board evaluating whether the release the material before the made repeated attempts to gain access to the court order could be Review Board completes its M a n c h e s t e r’s papers at the JFK Library. In lifted, the Review Board work in September so we can June 1998, Manchester agreed to allow a decided to approach Car- help manage the release in an Review Board staff member to review his oline Kennedy to discuss appropriate manner. material at the Library. This review re v e a l e d the possibility of having —Hon. John R. Tunheim’s letter that, while much of the information Man- the tapes and transcripts to Caroline B. Kennedy chester obtained from the interviews is opened at the Kennedy incorporated into his book, his raw notes L i b r a r y. Caroline Kennedy wrote to the would be of great value and interest to Review Board in late August 1998, informing re s e a rchers. the Board of her decision n o t to release the material at this time, nor would she agree to Although Manchester recorded some of his allow one of the Review Board members to interviews on tape, the recordings were not review the material to determine whether available at the Library. Only the written the tapes contained assassination-re l a t e d notes and/or transcripts of his interviews are m a t e r i a l . in this collection. Furthermore, not all of the interviews that Manchester referenced in The The Review Board was very disappointed Death of a President are accounted for in the that Caroline Kennedy declined to even allow notebooks and transcripts he deposited in the Review Board access to the material. The

117 Bo a r d hopes that she will agree to public J. CONCLUSION release at a later time. The Review Board examined a large number of b. Jacqueline B. Kennedy tapes at the records in its efforts to identify additional fed- LBJ Library. eral records and information related to the assassination, many of which are not detailed T h e re are six re c o rded telephone conversa- in this report. For every assassination record tions between Jacqueline B. Kennedy and that the Review Board located and included in P resident Johnson within the collection of the JFK Collection, the staff literally reviewed p residential re c o rdings at the LBJ Library. hundreds of documents. The need to review The Review Board has worked consistently every file on a document-by-document basis with the LBJ Library to secure their re l e a s e . meant that the Review Board simply did not The LBJ Library was concerned about donor have time to request additional information restrictions associated with the release of and records on every research lead that it these tapes. Finally , in March 1998 the LBJ received. For those requests that the Review Library decided to release the six conversa- Board staff did make, the Review Board staff tions provided that they be opened along team leaders kept notebooks that documented with the next scheduled release of Pre s i d e n t the Review Board staff’s efforts to locate addi- Johnson’s re c o rdings. The Review Board tional records at the FBI, CIA, and Department understands that these tapes will be of Defense. To the extent that the public is released on September 18, 1998, along with i n t e rested in finding information on the the release of the August to November 1963 Review Board’s additional requests, the note- re c o rd i n g s . books document which records Review Board staff reviewed and which records the Review Board has designated as assassination-related.

118 CHAPTER 6 PART I: ENDNOTES 1 JFK Act, § 5(c)(2)(H). 2 Chapter 5 of this Report defines the CIA’s Sequestered Collection. 3 In Volume 11 of its report, the HSCA attempted to deal with allegations of a possible military investigation of Oswald by the Marine Corps following the assassination. Also, some former USMC associates of Oswald have told researchers that they recall civilian investigators asking questions about Oswald following his defection in late 1959 or early 1960. 4 The in-person, unsworn interview was tape-recorded, and the three written interview reports are dated August 5, August 13, and September 16, 1997, respectively. 5 Reeves served in the District Intelligence Office of the San Diego, California 11th Naval District. 6 One of the officers who called Mr. Reeves was Rufus Taylor, who was Director of Naval Intelligence in 1964. 7 The Office of Operations later became the Domestic Contacts Division (DCD) of the Direc- torate of Operations. 8 See the HSCA’s report on Oswald in Mexico City, The Lopez Report, where the subject of CIA photographic surveillance operations is discussed at length. 9 The Review Board was not able to locate cables or dispatches from the following periods: Mexico City Station to Headquarters (September 26–30, 1963); Headquarters to Mexico City Station (September 26–30, 1963); JMWAVE to Headquarters (September 26–November 21, 1963); Headquarters to JMWAVE (September 26–November 21, 1963); and all traffic between the Mexico City Station and JMWAVE for the periods September 26–October 20, 1963 and November 22–December 30, 1963. 10 According to CIA, in the 1960s, offices of record for cable traffic and dispatches did not create cable and dispatch files for reference collection purposes. 11 Approximately half of the records on Cuba were from 1962 and the other half were from 1963. Very few records from 1961 or 1964 were present. 12 The RFK donor committee was established in the 1970s for the purpose of overseeing the processing of RFK papers which were held on a deposit agreement at the JFK Library. It traditionally has been comprised of Kennedy family members and scholars and is now headed by Max Kennedy, one of Robert F. Kennedy’s sons. 13 When the Review Board decided in 1996 that it would not object to the JFK Library keeping custody of the RFK Cuba-related records, provided that the JFK Library agree to release the records, the JFK Library moved to process the records as part of the executive order mandatory review declassification. Consequently, the Library included the RFK records in the pilot scanning project conducted by CIA, with the stipulation that they be reviewed under JFK Act guidelines. The process was delayed due to a combination of technical problems with the scanning project and a change in leadership of the donor committee following the death of Michael Kennedy. 14 The CIAmemoranda bear the dates November 23, 1976; August 5, 1977; and November 29, 1979. 15 Secret Service Final Declaration of Compliance. 16 OIP Final Declaration of Compliance. 17 Mr. Miller was later subpoenaed by the Review Board, and he had retained numerous records from his tenure as Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. 18 Criminal Division Initial Statement of Compliance (dated January 29, 1997).

119 19 Dec. 19, 1996, Review Board Letter to Main Treasury. 20 Main Treasury Final Declaration ¶ 10. 21 Id. ¶ 19. 22 In the early 1960s, the Technical Services Division (TSD), was a part of the Directorate of Plans (now the Directorate of Operations). Later administrative shifts moved TSD (renamed the Office of Technical Service) to the DS&T and the files of the relocated office were incorporated into the DS&T system. 23 The FBI had only designated for processing under the JFK Act sections 17–18 and 20–37 of the Giancana file. Section 17 of the file began with the year 1963, and so the FBI had not designated for processing any volumes of records that predated January 1, 1963. 24 Robert Blakey and Richard Billings, Fatal Hour (1981); Anthony Summers, Conspiracy 503–504 (1980); Gerald Posner, Case Closed 459–460 (1993); John H. Davis, Mafia Kingfish, 519–524 (1989); Ronald Goldfarb, Did the Mob Kill JFK?, Washington Post, Dec. 10, 1995 at C3:1. 25 When the FBI determines that electronic surveillance is a necessary component of a particular investigation, the FBI goes to a federal court and obtains authorization pursuant to Title III to establish the surveillance. Title III operates to automatically place al l materials obtained from the overhear under court seal. Then, if the U.S. Attorney wants to use the tapes in a pros e c u - tion, they have to petition the federal court to have the seal lifted only for the portions of the tapes that will be played at trial. The practical effect of this proc e d u r e is that everything that is no t played at trial remains under seal. Thus, in order for the Review Board staff to obtain access to the BriLab surveillance, it had to move to unseal the materials for the purpose of its rev i e w . Then, when the Review Board staff located assassination rec o r ds within the BriLab materials, it requested the Title III court to unseal the rec o r ds for the purpose of public disclosure. 26 The Worker newspaper, to which Oswald subscribed, often mentioned Abt. 27 Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years At Lockheed. New York: Little Brown, and Company. 1994. 28 Scheduled to be released on September 18, 1998. 29 William Manchester, Foreward to The Death of a President, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, p. ix–x.

120 CHAPTER 6 PAR T II: CLA R I F I N G TH E FED E R A L REC O R D ON TH E ZAP R U D E R FI L M AN D TH E MED I C A L AN D BAL L I S T I C S EVI D E N C E

A. INTRODUCTION 1. Medical Issues

Many students of the assassination believe One of the many tragedies related to the that the medical evidence on the assassina- assassination of President Kennedy has been tion of President Kennedy, in concert with the incompleteness of the autopsy record and the ballistics evidence and film recordings of the suspicion caused by the shroud of secrecy the events in Dealey Plaza, is the most impor- that has surrounded the records that do exist. tant documentation in the case, as indeed it Although the professionals who participated would be in any homicide investigation. The in the creation and the handling of the med- Review Board believed that, in order to truly ical evidence may well have had the best of address the public’s concerns relating to pos- intentions in not publicly disclosing informa- sible conspiracies and cover-ups relating to tion—protecting the privacy and the sensibil- the assassination, it would need to gather ities of the President’s family—the legacy of some additional information on all three of such secrecy ultimately has caused distrust these topics. The pages that follow detail the and suspicion. There have been serious and Review Board’s efforts to develop additional legitimate reasons for questioning not only information on these highly relevant and the completeness of the autopsy records of interesting topics. President Kennedy, but the lack of a prompt and complete analysis of the records by the B. MEDICAL EVIDENCE1 Warren Commission.

The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Among the several shortcomings regarding Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) did not the disposition of the autopsy records, the task the Assassination Records Review Board following points illustrate the problem. First, with the mission of investigating the assassi- there has been confusion and uncertainty as nation or of attempting to resolve any of the to whether the principal autopsy prosector, substantive issues surrounding it. But the Dr. James J. Humes, destroyed the original JFK Act did authorize the Review Board to draft of the autopsy report, or if he destroyed pursue issues related to the documentary notes taken at the time of the autopsy. Sec- record, including the completeness of records ond, the autopsy measurements were fre- and the destruction of records. In an informal quently imprecise and sometimes inexplica- discussion with the Review Board, Congress- bly absent. Third, the prosectors were not man Louis Stokes, former Chairman of the shown the original autopsy photographs by House Select Committee on Assassinations the Wa r ren Commission, nor were they (HSCA), strongly encouraged the Review asked enough detailed questions about the Board to do what it could to help resolve autopsy or the photographs. Fourth, the per- issues surrounding the documentary record sons handling the autopsy records did not of the autopsy. He advised the Board that the c reate a complete and contemporaneous medical evidence is of particular importance accounting of the number of photographs and that he hoped that it would do all it nor was a proper chain of custody estab- could to complete the record. Despite being lished for all of the autopsy materials. Fifth, hampered by a 33-year-old paper trail, the when Dr. Humes was shown some copies of Review Board vigorously pursued additional autopsy photographs during his testimony records related to the medical evidence and before the HSCA, he made statements that the autopsy, commencing in 1996. were interpreted as suggesting that he had

121 revised his original opinion significantly on and public-spirited cooperation of the East- the location of the entrance wound. These man Kodak Company, NARA, the FBI, and a shortcomings should have been remedied representative of the Kennedy family, the shortly after the assassination while memo- Review Board was able to provide secure ries were fresh and records were more read- transportation to ship the autopsy pho- ily recoverable. tographs to Rochester, New York, to be digitized on the most advanced digital scanner in The first step taken by the Review Board in the world. The digitized images will be capa- re g a rd to the medical evidence was to ble of further enhancement as technology arrange for the earliest possible release of all and science advance. The digitizing should relevant information in the Warren Commis- also provide assistance for those who wish to sion and HSCA files. Prior to the passage of pursue the question of whether the autopsy the JFK Act, the files from the HSCA con- photographs were altere d .2 The Review tained numerous medical records that had Board also was able to identify additional never been released to the public. After the latent autopsy photographs on a roll of film JFK Act came into effect, but before the that had (inaccurately) been described as Review Board was created, the National “exposed to light and processed, but show- A rchives and Records A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ing no recognizable image.” Again with the (NARA) released many of these re c o rd s . generous cooperation of Kodak, the latent Once the Review Board staff was in place in photographs were digitized and enhanced fall of 1994, it attempted to identify all for further evaluation. These digitized remaining records that appeared to be con- records have already been transferred to the nected to the medical evidence and arranged John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Col- for their prompt release. All of these records lection (JFK Collection) at NARA. Access to were sent to NARA by early 1995 without these materials is controlled by a representa- redactions and without postponements. tive of the Kennedy family.

The Review Board queried several govern- On another front, through staff efforts, the ment entities about possible files related to Review Board was able to locate a new wit- the autopsy, including the Bethesda National ness, Ms. Saundra Spencer, who worked at Naval Medical Center, the Armed Forc e s the Naval Photographic Center in 1963. She Institute of Pathology, the Naval Photo- was interviewed by phone and then bro u g h t graphic Center, the Senate Select Committee to Washington where her deposition was on Intelligence (for Church Committee taken under oath in the presence of the Records), and the President John F. Kennedy autopsy photographs. Ms. Spencer testified Library. The Review Board also attempted to that she developed post-mortem pho- contact all former staff members of the House tographs of President Kennedy in November Select Committee on Assassinations. With 1963, and that these photographs were dif- the exception of the autopsy photographs f e rent from those in the National A rc h i v e s and x-rays, which are exempt from public since 1966. In another deposition under oath, disclosure under the JFK Act, the Review D r. Humes, one of the three autopsy pro s e c- Board arranged for the release of all govern- tors, acknowledged under questioning—in mental records related to the autopsy. There testimony that appears to differ from what are no other restricted records related to the he told the Wa r ren Commission—that he autopsy of which the Review Board is aware. had destroyed both his notes taken at the autopsy and the first draft of the autopsy The Review Board’s search for rec o r ds there- report. Autopsy prosector Dr. “J” Thornton upon extended to conducting informal inter- Boswell, in an effort to clarify the impre c i- views of numerous witnesses, taking deposi- sion in the autopsy materials, marked on an tions under oath of the principal persons who anatomically correct plastic skull his best cr eated autopsy rec o r ds, and arranging for recollection of the nature of the wounds on the digitizing of the autopsy photographs. the President’s cranium. The autopsy pho- t o g r a p h e r, Mr. John Stringer, in detailed tes- There were many notable successes resulting t i m o n y, explained the photographic pro c e- from the Board’s work, a few of which may d u res he followed at the autopsy and he briefly be mentioned here. With the generous raised some questions about whether the

122 A N D T H E ME D I C A L A N D BA L L I S T I C S EV I D E N C E supplemental brain photographs that he t reatment at Parkland Memorial Hospital took are those that are now in NARA. His and at the autopsy at Bethesda Naval Hospi- former assistant, Mr. Floyd Riebe, who had tal. In the late 1970s, at the time of the earlier told several re s e a rchers that the HSCA’s investigation, Dr. Burkley, through autopsy photographs had been altered based his attorney, suggested to the HSCA that he upon his examination of photographs that might have some additional information have been circulating in the public domain, about the autopsy. Because Dr. Burkley is re-evaluated his earlier opinion when shown now deceased, the Review Board sought the actual photographs at NARA. additional information both from his former lawyer’s firm, and from Dr. Burkley’s family. P e rhaps the most challenging aspect of the The Burkley family said it did not possess Review Board’s work on the medical evi- any papers or documents related to the assas- dence was the preparation and taking of the sination, and declined to sign a waiver of depositions of the principal persons with attorney-client privilege that would have knowledge about the autopsy and autopsy permitted the Review Board access to the re c o rds. Although conducting such work files of Mr. Illig (also now deceased), was not re q u i red by the JFK Act, the Review Burkley’s former attorney. B o a rd sought to obtain as much information as possible re g a rding the documentary Memories fade over time. A very important re c o rd. A c c o rd i n g l y, it identified all of the fi g u r e in the chain-of-custody on the autopsy still-living persons who were involved in materials, and the living person who perha p s the creation of autopsy re c o rds and bro u g h t mo r e than any other would have been able to virtually all of them to NARA. For the first resolve some of the lingering questions rel a t e d time, in the presence of the original color to the disposition of the original autopsy t r a n s p a rencies and sometimes first-genera- materials, is Robert Bouck of the Secret Ser- tion black-and-white prints, the witnesses vice. At the time he was interviewed he was w e re asked questions about the authenticity quite elderly and little able to remember the of the photographs, the completeness of the important details. Similarly, the rec o r ds show autopsy re c o rds, the apparent gaps in the that Carl Belcher, formerly of the Department re c o rds, and any additional information in of Justice, played an important role in prep a r - their possession re g a rding the medical evi- ing the inventory of autopsy rec o r ds. He was, dence. The witnesses came from as far away ho w e v e r , unable to identify or illuminate the as Switzerland (Dr. Pierre Finck) and as rec o r ds that, on their face, appear to have been close as Maryland (Dr. “J” Thornton written by him. Boswell). In conducting the depositions, the Review Board staff sought to approach the Finally, a significant problem that is well questioning in a professional manner and known to trial lawyers, judges, and psychol- without prejudging the evidence or the wit- ogists, is the unreliability of eyewitness testi- n e s s e s . mony. Witnesses frequently, and inaccurately, believe that they have a vivid recollection of Near the end of its tenure, the Review Board events. Psychologists and scholars have long- also took the joint deposition of five of the since demonstrated the serious unreliability Dallas physicians who treated the President’s of peoples’ recollections of what they hear wounds at Parkland Memorial Hospital on and see. One illustration of this was an inter- November 22, 1963. view statement made by one of the treating physicians at Parkland. He explained that he There were three closely related problems was in Trauma Room Number 1 with the that seriously impeded the Review Board’s President. He recounted how he observed efforts to complete the documentary record the First Lady wearing a white dress. Of surrounding the autopsy: a cold paper trail, course, she was wearing a pink suit, a fact faded memories, and the unreliability of eye- known to most Americans. The inaccuracy of witness testimony. An example of the cold his recollection probably says little about the paper trail comes from Admiral Georg e quality of the doctor’s memory, but it is Burkley, who was President Kennedy’s mili- revealing of how the memory works and tary physician and the only medical doctor how cautious one must be when attempting who was present both during emergency to evaluate eyewitness testimony.

123 The deposition transcripts and other medical Zapruder family, through its attorney, again evidence that were released by the Review sought return of the original film. NARA Board should be evaluated cautiously by the declined to return the original film, knowing public. Often the witnesses contradict not that the JFK Act may have affected the legal only each other, but sometimes themselves. ownership status of the film. For events that transpired almost 35 years ago, all persons are likely to have failures of Thereafter, NARA, the Review Board, and memory. It would be more prudent to weigh the Department of Justice sought to clarify all of the evidence, with due concern for the status of the original film under the JFK human error, rather than take single state- Act, including whether the U.S. government ments as “proof” for one theory or another. could legally acquire the original film and what the value of compensation to the C. ZAPRUDER FILM Zapruder family would be under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. In addition, In the spring of 1996, the Review Board the U.S. government had numerous discus- began to consider how it might answer ques- sions with legal counsel for the Zapruder tions about chain-of-custody, or provenance, family regarding a legal “taking” of the film, of selected film records, or enhance or better the compensation to be accorded to the fam- preserve selected film records. ily, and copyright issues regarding the film.

1. Ownership of the Zapruder Film In 1997, the Review Board deliberated, and ultimately asserted, its authority under the At the time that Congres s JFK Act to acquire legal ownership of the Wh y is this [Zapruder] film so passed the JFK A c t , original Zapruder film. On April 2, 1997, the important? It is enormously Abraham Zapru d e r’ s Review Board held a public hearing “to seek im p o r t a n t , if you want to know famous 8mm film depict- public comment and advice on what should what happened in Dealey Plaza, ing the death of Pres i d e n t be done with the camera-original motion pic- this film shows you, as much as Kennedy was in the pos- ture film of the assassination that was taken any film can. All queries and session of NARA. The by Abraham Zapruder on November 22, challenges to. . . [ i t s ]. . . a u t h e n- Z a p ruder film, which 1963.” The issue facing the Board was ti c i t y , if this film is in govern- re c o rds the moments whether the Zapruder film was an “assassi- ment hands, can be satisfac t o - when President Kennedy nation record” that “should be in the JFK rily overcome. When that is was assassinated, is per- Collection at the Archives” and whether it do n e , this film then becomes a haps the single most “should. . . be Federal Government property baseline for all additional stud- important assassination rather than the property of private citizens.” 5 ies for what happened in Dealey rec o r d. In 1978, Ab r a h a m The Review Board also had to consider how Pl a z a . . . there should be a proto- Za p ru d e r ’s son, Henry G. to acquire the film for the American people, col established as for how a dig- Za p ru d e r , deposited the whether through the exercise of a takings itized copy is made with the original Zapruder film power or through negotiation with the state of the art equipment. . . th a t with the National Zapruder family. digitized copy, wh i c h is then Ar chives for safekeeping. fully authenticated, should then Legal ownership of the At its April 1997 hearing, the Review Board be the basis of all research in film, however, was still h e a rd testimony from six experts who the future. retained by the Zaprud e r ad d r essed a variety of issues, including the —Josiah Thompson, fa m i l y . As the Zaprud e r constitutional and legal issues involved in April 2, 1997 family stated upon trans- ef fecting a “taking” of the film and the bene- mission of the film to the fits in having U.S. government ownership of National Ar chives, “the Film will be held by the original film. Following the Zapruder film the A rchives solely for storage purposes hearing, the Review Board held an open meet- an d. . . the Ar chives has acquired no rights ing on April 24, 1997, and resolved to secure whatsoever to the Film.”3 legal ownership of the original Zapruder film for the American people. The Board’s “State- In March 1993, shortly after passage of the ment of Policy and Intent with Regard to the JFK Act, Henry Zapruder sought unsuccess- Za p r uder Film,” adopted unanimously by the fully to remove the original film from the Bo a r d, resolved: (1) that the Zapruder film National A rchives. In October 1994, the was an assassination rec o r d within the mean-

124 A N D T H E ME D I C A L A N D BA L L I S T I C S EV I D E N C E ing of the JFK Act; (2) that the Board would graphic experts. Ultimately, the staff recom- attempt to ensure that the best available copy mended, and the Review Board agreed, that of the film be made available to the public at it would approach Eastman Kodak to request the lowest reasonable price; (3) that the Board that Kodak examine the Zapruder film. would work cooperatively with the Zaprud e r family to produce the best possible copy for scholarly and res e a r ch purposes, establish a base ref e r ence for the film through digitization, and to conduct all appropriate tests to evaluate authenticity and to elicit historical and evidentiary evidence; and (4) that the original film be transferred to the JFK Collec- tion on August 1, 1998 and that the Review Bo a r d would work with Congress to res o l v e this issue.

In June 1998, Congressman Dan Burton, Chairman of the House Committee on Gov- ernment Reform and Oversight, which over- sees the work of the Review Board, wrote to the Department of Justice expressing Con- gressional support for the efforts of DOJ to carry out the “Board’s commitment to ensuring that the original Zapruder film remains in the custody of the American people as the most important ‘assassination record.’”6 At the time of this Report, the Department of Justice was engaged in negotiations with the Zapruder family to resolve all outstanding issues relating to the legal transfer of the film f rom the family to the U.S. government, including the issue of compensation to be paid to the family for the film. The transfer of the original Zapruder film to the JFK Collec- 3. Eastman Kodak’s Pro Bono Work for the tion was effective August 1, 1998. Review Board Related to the Zapruder Film (and Autopsy Photographs) 2. St a f f Examinations of Films Designated as “In-Camera” Original, The Review Board first met with the Eastman and First Generation Copies, by NARA Kodak Company in June 1996 in Washington to discuss a wide variety of possible research The Review Board determined that there topics related to a host of potential film should be an examination of the Zapruder issues. At that time, Kodak stated that it films at NARAdesignated as the original and would provide a limited amount of pro bono the two Secret Service copies (believed to be work for the Review Board. The Review first generation copies) for the purpose of Board continued discussions with Kodak lab- recording characteristics of the three films. oratory officials based in Rochester, New (See illustration.) (The Review Board subse- York, and subsequently met with Kodak quently determined that the LMH Com- technical experts James Milch and Roland pany—the Zapruder family’s company— Zavada in Washington, D.C. At that meeting, possessed a third first generation copy of the the Review Board identified three major Zapruder film.) The Review Board hoped areas of interest, only one of which related to that the recorded observations would serve the Zapruder film: (1) the possible digitiza- to provide information to a public that would tion and enhancement of the Zapruder film, not be able to obtain physical access to these as well as edge print analysis of the original films, and second, would determine whether and first generation copies, and study of the the film should be examined by photo- optical characteristics of the Zapruder cam-

125 era in relation to perceived “anomalies” in the digital preservation and enhancement of the original film; (2) the possible enhance- the autopsy images of President Kennedy, ment and, if necessary, optical (i.e., film, not under the direct guidance of Toner. medical) analysis of autopsy images; and (3) a study of the provenance of film materials In September 1997, Toner and Zavada visited subpoenaed by the Review Board fro m Washington and, in addition to studying Robert J. Groden for examination. Kodak lab- selected autopsy film and x-ray images at oratory experts Milch and Zavada viewed NARA, they also studied perceived anom- the original Zapruder film, a Secret Service alies in the inter-sprocket areas of the original first generation copy, and some of the Gro- Zapruder film, and the emulsion characteris- den materials for the first time at NARA dur- tics and edge print characteristics of what ing their September 1996 visit to Washington. NARA presumed to be the camera-original Zapruder film and the two Secret Service first Kodak subsequently generation copies. (See the 3 illustrations on To call Zapruder’s film remark- offered to contribute up page 121.) Following this visit, Zavada began able is an exaggerated under- to $20,000 of labor and writing his extensive report on Zapruder film st a t e m e n t . It is, due to the sub- materials to the Review issues, which expanded in scope as his ject matter and the clear angle of Board in pro bono work— research into camera optics and printer char- view undoubtedly one of the the equivalent of roughly acteristics continued. This report was sched- most historically important, if 35 days of effort. Kodak uled for completion by Kodak no later than not the most important, mo v i e confirmed, at a meeting September 30, 1998; six copies were sched- films ever made. with the Review Board in uled for deposit at NARA in the JFK Collec- —Richard Trask, April 2, 1997 August of 1997, that tion. Zavada, a retired Kodak film chemist who was formerly Kodak’s pre- Kodak ultimately spent appro x i m a t e l y eminent 8 mm film expert, was the consul- $53,000 on work related to the digitization tant that Kodak had hired to: (1) attempt to and enhancement of the President’s autopsy write a “primer” explaining the optical and images, and approximately $11,000 on work mechanical operating characteristics of Abra- related to Zapruder film issues, significantly ham Zapruder’s 8 mm Bell and Howell home exceeding its original estimate of donated movie camera; (2) explain the relationship, if labor and materials. The Review Board grate- any, between the camera’s operating charac- fully acknowledges the public service pro- teristics and perceived “anomalies” in the vided to the American people by the East- original film; and (3) answer questions about man Kodak Company. the provenance of the original film and the first generation copies. (“Provenance” issues 4. The Review Board Staff’s Study and that Mr. Zavada took on included studying Clarification of Paul Hoch’s FOIA the chain-of-custody documents executed in Lead “CIA Document 450” November 1963 by Abraham Zapruder; conducting interviews of surviving personnel The Review Board staff located and inter- involved in the development of the original viewed two former employees of the CIA’ s film, and the exposure and developing of the National Photographic Interpretation Cen- three first generation copies; and studying ter (NPIC) and questioned them about manufacturer’s edge print, processing lab “ C I A Document 450,” a 1970s Freedom Of edge print, and the physical characteristics of Information Act release—original docu- the optical printer believed to have been used ment undated—that indicates NPIC had a to create the three first generation copies on version of the Zapruder film, made November 22, 1963.) “internegatives” and “copies,” conducted a “print test,” and performed a shot-and-tim- In addition, in August 1997 James K. Toner, ing analysis based on interpretation of the the Laboratory Head of Kodak’s Imaging Sci- film’s content. ence Resources Lab in Rochester, presented a methodology for making the best possible Both individuals indicated that the interneg- direct digitization of the original Zapruder atives made were of single frames only, and film. Kodak also began to make arrange- the prints made (from these same internega- ments with NARA and the Review Board for tives) were of single frames only—for brief-

126 A N D T H E ME D I C A L A N D BA L L I S T I C S EV I D E N C E

ing boards—and that they never reproduced shirt collar. [See illustration.] In January 1996, (or altered) the film as a motion picture. They John Keeney, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen- identified portions of the document related eral, wrote to FBI Director Louis Fre e h to this activity—magnification and reproduc- requesting that the FBI “initiate an inquiry tion of small motion picture frames as prints. into specific aspects of the assassination the- To this extent, the document has been demys- ory related to collected bullet fragments and tified. However, other questions, such as who residues now in the possession of the federal conducted the shot-and-timing analysis, and government.” who assembled the briefing boards, remain unanswered. The Review Board determined that the Firearms Examination Panel of the HSCA D. Ballistics recommended analysis of CE 567 more than 19 years ago. For unknown reasons, the In April 1995, a member of the public wrote Panel’s recommendation did not appear in to Attorney General Janet Reno to advise her the HSCA’s March 1979 final report. The that Warren Commission Exhibit 567 (CE Review Board contacted former HSCA staff 567)—a bullet fragment—may have embed- members to determine why this recommended in it tiny strands of fiber that the writer dation was deleted from the draft when the believed came from President Kennedy’s final HSCA report was published, but the

127 former HSCA staff members and Firearms In August 1998, after lengthy consideration Panel members contacted were not able to about whether the testing would be appro- provide a reason for the omission of the rec- priate, NARA finally agreed to allow limited ommendation. testing of CE 567 to complete the earlier recommendation of the HSCA’s Firearms Panel. In March 1996, the Review Board, the FBI, the NARA also determined that the bullet frag- Department of Justice, and NARA began a ment should be tested for “suspected biolog- series of meetings to discuss re-examination ical tissue and/or organic material,” the pres- of the ballistics evidence. In June 1996, the ence of which was noted by the HSCA in FBI provided its report to the Review Board 1978 and the FBI in 1996. and stated that “a complete fiber analysis could be conducted on the fibrous debris In September 1998, testing began on CE 567 adhering to CE 567 and the materials com- and, at the time of this writing (September posing the shirt and the tie [of President 1998), was ongoing. NARA will issue its rep o r t Kennedy].” on the results of the testing in October 1998.

128 A N D T H E ME D I C A L A N D BA L L I S T I C S EV I D E N C E

CHAPTER 6 PART II: ENDNOTES

1 Most of the section of this Report relating to medical evidence and medical issues was printed and distributed to the public in a Staff Report dated July 31, 1998 when the Review Board released its deposition transcripts and written reports of unsworn interviews relating to medical issues. 2 Although the Review Board does not offer opinions on the substantive issues related to the assassination, it believes that trained medical personnel will possibly be able to provide additional illuminating explanations regarding the autopsy after examining the enhanced images. It should be noted, however, that although the digitizing significantly enhanced the clarity of the images, many questions are likely to remain unanswered. 3 July 10, 1978 Letter from Henry G. Zapruder to James Moore, National Archives. 4 Transcript of Review Board Proceedings, Hearing on the Status and Disposition of the “Zapruder Film,” April 2, 1997, at 5 (statements of Chairman Tunheim). 5 Id., at 11 (statements of General Counsel Gunn). 6 June 5, 1998 Letter from Chairman Burton to Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division.

129 CHAPTER 7 PU R S U I T O F RE C O R D S A N D IN F O R M AT I O N F R O M NO N- FE D E R A L SO U R C E S

I firmly believe that the Board has an obligation to seek out assassination records from all sources; public and private. The goal of Congress in passing S. 3006 was to ensure broadest possible disclosure of the records relating to the assassination. The fact that a document exists only in private hands should not deter the Board in any way from seeking to compel its transmission to the National Archives.—Judge Tunheim at the Review Board nomination hearings.

Through fair and impartial application of the criteria developed by the Review Board and keeping in mind always the express purposes of the enabling legislation, I believe that the Review Board should be as aggressive as it needs to be to achieve disclosure of relevant records. That also applies to records held by private citizens...—William Joyce at the Review Board nomination hearings.

A. PURSUIT OF RECORDS AND PAPERS FROM A P news reports of President Kennedy’s PRIVATE CITIZENS AND ORGANIZATIONS assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald’s arrest, Jack Ruby’s shooting of Lee Harvey Oswald, The Review Board actively encouraged pri- and President Kennedy’s funeral. Barnes, a vate citizens and organizations who pos- San Francisco-based A P reporter in 1963, sessed assassination records to donate them obtained permission from his editor to keep to the JFK Collection to make the collection the wire copy, which would otherwise have as historically rich as possible. Fortunately, been thrown away. private citizens were willing to donate materials, often in the form of a deed of gift, to the collection. The Review Board also received 3. Dr. George Burkley countless essays, interview transcripts and books, usually not accompanied by a deed of The Review Board contacted the children of gift. These, too, will become part of the JFK deceased Vice Admiral George G. Burkley, Collection. Below is an overview of materials former military White House physician to donated by private citizens. P residents Kennedy and Johnson, to find out if their father had deposited his papers at 1. Gary Aguilar: Interviews with any institution, or if they possessed any Drs. Humes and Boswell assassination re c o rds. The staff came up e m p t y - h a n d e d . Dr. Gary Aguilar of San Francisco provided the Review Board with an audiotape of his According to House Select Committee on 1994 telephone interviews with Dr. James J. Assassinations re c o rds, Burkley’s personal Humes and Dr. “J” Thornton Boswell, the attorney apparently told the HSCA that his two Navy prosectors at President Kennedy’s client believed there was a conspiracy to kill autopsy. President Kennedy. Mr. Illig, Burkley’s attor- 2. Richard Barnes: AP Wire Copy ney, however, is now deceased. The Review Board staff asked Burkley’s daughter, the Richard Barnes, a former Associated Press executor of his estate, to sign a waiver allow- reporter, donated to the JFK Collection AP ing the Review Board access to papers at wire copy for November 22 through Novem- Illig’s law firm, but she declined to sign and ber 26, 1963. The material chronicles the first return the waiver.

131 4. Edward Scannell Butler: Materials Fortas donated his papers to Yale University, from the Information Council of the but the Review Board secured copies of the Americas a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related material for the JFK Collection. NARA will open Fortas’ assassi- Chapter 6 of this report discusses the Review nation-related papers in January 2001, which B o a rd’s attempts to locate government is the same date that Yale will open the records on Edward Scannell Butler and his remainder of his papers. organization, the Information Council of the Americas. INCA is a New Orleans-based 8. Captain J.W. “Will” Fritz clearinghouse for anti-communist information, and particularly for anti-Castro Cuban Dallas Police Department Captain J.W. “Will” information. Fritz served as Lee Harvey Oswald’s primary interrogator when Oswald was in police cus- Although Butler allowed Review Board staff tody from the afternoon of November 22 to view INCA files, he said he could not pro- until the morning of November 24, 1963. vide copies of them to the JFK Collection Fritz was the chief of the Dallas Police until he catalogued the material. He also Department’s Homicide and Robbery declined the Board’s offer to send its staff B u reau. In November 1997, the Review members to New Orleans to determine what B o a rd acquired and released handwritten INCA records would be of value to the JFK notes that Fritz apparently made following Collection. his interviews with Oswald.

5. Mrs. Marion Ebersole: Records of Dr. 9. Jim Garrison John J. Ebersole The late Jim Garrison was the New Orleans The Review Board staff contacted the widow District Attorney who investigated and pros- of Dr. John J. Ebersole, the Navy radiologist ecuted Clay Shaw for conspiracy to assassi- who was on duty the night of President nate President Kennedy and swho was por- Kennedy’s autopsy at Bethesda National trayed in Oliver Stone’s film, JFK. Naval Medical Center. Although he was not yet board-certified, he served as the consult- Garrison’s family donated 15,000 pages of his ing radiologist during the procedure. Eber- assassination papers, which include records sole said she did not have any of her hus- from his investigation and prosecution of band’s personal papers or any assassination Shaw, as well as other files on individuals or records. subjects that Garrison believed to be connected to the assassination. 6. President Gerald Ford: Desk Diaries 10. James P. Hosty Jr. Pr esident Gerald Ford donated to the JFK Col- lection selected entries from his desk diaries In November 1996, the Review Board inter- (calendars) from 1963 and 1964 during the viewed James P. Hosty, Jr., the FBI agent period that he served as a member of the War - responsible for handling the Lee Harvey ren Commission. The Review Board staff Oswald and Marina Oswald cases when they reviewed the calendars for relevance and lived in Dallas. Hosty was present during the selected excerpts for donation to the JFK Col- initial Dallas police interrogation of Oswald lection with the cooperation of President Ford. and took contemporaneous handwritten notes. Although the notes were believed to 7. Justice Abe Fortas have been destroyed, Hosty donated the notes, and other materials relating to the Former Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas, assassination and the FBI’s investigation, to who was an adviser to President Johnson, the JFK Collection. kept papers that include drafts of President Johnson’s and Lady Bird Johnson’s written 11. Wesley Liebeler statements to the Warren Commission and documents rebutting passages from William Wesley Liebeler, former Assistant Counsel to Manchester’s book, The Death of a President. the Warren Commission, testified before the

132 Review Board at its Los Angeles public hear- 14. Richard Case Nagell ing in September 1996. At the time of his tes- t i m o n y, Liebeler provided to the Review In his book The Man Who Knew Too Much, Board copies of six chapters from his unfin- author Dick Russell wrote about Richard ished book on the assassination. In addition, Case Nagell, a former Army Counterintelli- Liebeler provided the Review Board with a gence Officer who told Russell he: (1) had report on the Zapruder film written by conducted surveillance on Lee Harvey UCLAPhysics professor Brian Jones. Liebeler Oswald for both the CIA and the KGB; (2) had had apparently requested that Jones examine been rec r uited by a KGB agent (masquerad- the Zapruder film and prepare the report. ing as a CIA operative) to persuade Oswald no t to participate in a plot against Pres i d e n t 12. David Lifton: Medical Evidence Kennedy; (3) had been instructed by the KGB to kill Oswald if he could not dissuade him David Lifton, author of Best Evidence: Dis- fr om participating in the plot; (4) was in pos- guise and Deception in the Assassination of John session of a Polaroid photograph that had F. Kennedy, testified before the Review Board been taken of himself with Lee Harvey at its public hearing in Los Angeles in Sep- Oswald in New Orleans; (5) had audio tape tember 1996. During his testimony, Lifton rec o r dings of Oswald and others discussing a announced that he would donate to the JFK forthcoming assassination attempt on Pres i - Collection his 35mm “interpositive” of the dent Kennedy; and (6) Zapruder film. Interpositives are valuable had sent a letter, via reg - . . . the intent of the conspirators, because they are made directly fro m is t e r ed mail, to FBI Direc - according to Nagell, was to pin internegatives, which in turn are made from tor J. Edgar Hoover in the blame [for the assassination the original film. They there f o re pro v i d e September 1963, warning of the President] on Castro’s denser colors and better resolution than proof a conspiracy to kill Cuba and spark an invasion of jection prints. Pr esident Kennedy in late the island. . . he has indicated to September 1963 in Was h - me in the past that, if he was Lifton also donated compact disk copies of ington, D.C. (and had ever subpoenaed by a govern- interviews he conducted with medical wit- documentary proof of the ment agency, he would be will- nesses from both Parkland Hospital in Dallas mailing of said letter). ing to testify. and Bethesda National Naval Medical Cen- —D i c k Russell, Ma r c h 24, 19 9 5 ter. Some of Lifton’s medical interviews date The Review Board sent a from as early as 1966. letter to Nagell dated October 31, 1995, requesting that Nagell con- In addition, Lifton provided the Review tact the Review Board’s Executive Director to B o a rd staff with audiotapes, videotapes, discuss any assassination records he might and transcripts of selected witness inter- have in his possession. Subsequently, the views. Lifton’s donations are now in the JFK Review Board was informed that Nagell had C o l l e c t i o n . been found dead in his Los Angeles apartment the day after the ARRB’s letter was 13. Holland McCombs mailed. (The coroner ruled that he died as a result of natural causes.) Holland McCombs, now deceased, was a L i f e magazine correspondent in Dallas at the A member of the Review Board staff traveled time of the assassination. A private citizen twice to California to inspect the effects of told the Review Board that there were assas- Nagell in an attempt to find assassination sination re c o rds in Mr. McComb’s papers, records. During the first trip, the Review which are housed at the Paul Meek Library Board staff member, along with Nagell’s son of the University of Tennessee at Martin. In and niece, inspected Nagell’s apartment in July 1996, a Review Board staff member Los Angeles. During the second trip, the reviewed hundreds of boxes of McComb’s Review Board staff member inspected, again papers and located seven boxes relating to with the assistance of the son and niece, his interest in the assassination. The Board material contained in some footlockers found s t a ff marked approximately 600 re c o rds and in storage in Phoenix, Arizona. The Review t r a n s f e r red photocopies of those re c o rds to Board staff did not locate any of the items the JFK Collection. that Dick Russell references above.

133 A considerable amount of documentary Humes and Boswell. When asked if he would material on Nagell from the U.S. Secret Ser- donate his notes of those interviews to the vice and the U.S. Army’s Investigative JFK Collection and if he had any audiotapes Records Repository (IRR) was placed in the of those interviews, Posner responded, “I JFK Collection as a result of the JFK Act and would be happy, Mr. Chairman, to ask Drs. the efforts of the Review Board staff. Humes and Boswell if they would agree for their notes to be released to the National The CIA processed as part of its sequestered Archives.” The Review Board’s initial contact collection a 201 and Domestic Contacts Divi- with Posner produced no results. The Review sion file on Nagell. The Review Board staff Board never received a response to a second also reviewed a CIA Office of Security file on letter of request for the notes. Nagell. The entire file was designated an assassination record. 17. Frank Ragano

15. New Orleans Metropolitan Crime Frank Ragano, who died in 1998, was an Commission attorney for reputed organized crime figures. Ragano reperesented both Jimmy Hoffa and The Metropolitan Crime Commission is a Santo Trafficante. In Ragano’s 1994 book, private, anti-crime organization that, since Mob Lawyer, Ragano claimed that Jimmy the 1950s, has investigated public corruption Hoffa used him as a messenger to ask Traffi- and organized crime in the New Orleans cante and Carlos Marcello to arrange for the area. HSCA staff members reviewed MCC murder of President Kennedy. Ragano fur- records on organized crime figures, such as ther wrote that in 1987 Trafficante confessed Carlos Marcello, and on the Garrison investi- to him that he, Trafficante, had been involved gation. The MCC also granted the Review in the assassination. B o a rd permission to review its re c o rd s . Board staff members initially identified 12 Ragano also stated in his book that he pos- boxes that they believed would enhance the sessed original, contemporaneous notes of JFK Collection. meetings with organized crime figures. To determine whether Ragano’s notes were rele- About half of the MCC records copied by vant to the assassination, the Review Board Board staff concern New Orleans District subpoenaed the notes and deposed Ragano. Attorney Garrison’s investigation of the He produced several handwritten notes assassination. The remaining half of the regarding the assassination, but he could not records are files that had belonged to Guy definitively state whether he took them dur- Banister. Most of the Banister material dates ing the meetings in the 1960s or later when he from the early 1950s when he worked for the was working on his book in the 1990s. New Orleans Police Department. A la rg e number of those documents—NOPD “Inter- The Review Board submitted the original nal A ffairs” investigative files detailing notes to the Secret Service to see if it could small-time police corru p t i o n — w e re irre l e- determine when Ragano created the notes, vant to the Kennedy assassination. but the Secret Service was unable to provide a conclusive answer. Ragano’s testimony to Review Board staff members designated as the Review Board is now available to the assassination rec o r ds only the MCC documents public in the JFK Collection as a transcript that were not exclusively related to NOPD’s and an audio recording. Ragano’s notes are internal affairs. It still was a sizable number. attached to his deposition transcript. Ul t i m a t e l y , the Board added some 3,000 pages of MCC rec o r ds to the JFK Collection. 18. J. Lee Rankin: Warren Commission Papers 16. Gerald Posner James Rankin Jr., the son of the late J. Lee Gerald Posner, author of the book C a s e Rankin, the General Counsel of the Warren C l o s e d , testified before Congress during Commission, testified at the Review Board’s debate over the JFK Act that he had inter- public hearing in Los Angeles and subse- viewed both Navy autopsy prosectors, Drs. quently agreed to donate his father’s papers

134 to the JFK Collection. J. Lee Rankin’s Warren tion from which Lee Harvey Oswald Commission files include memos and hand- allegedly shot President Kennedy. written changes to draft chapters of the Com- mission report that Commission members The Review Board sosught to identify Gerald Ford, John McCloy and Allen Dulles, museum records that should be part of the among others, recommended. JFK Collection. After deposing Sixth Floor Museum officials and negotiating with the 19. Clay Shaw: Personal Papers and Diary museum, the Review Board secured copies of Parkland Hospital records on the medical Clay Shaw, the New Orleans businessman t reatment of President Kennedy; autopsy whom District Attorney Jim Garrison pros e - records for Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack Ruby, cuted for conspiracy to murder Pres i d e n t and Dallas police officer J.D. Tippit; court Ke n n e d y , left personal papers with one of his papers from Jack Ruby’s criminal trial; Park- friends. The Review Board acquired the land physician Dr. Charles J. Carrico’s papers for inclusion in the JFK Collection. The papers; and several home movies depicting papers, which fill seven boxes, include Shaw’s the Presidential motorcade in Dallas. diary from the time of the trial; rec o r ds from Shaw’s criminal case; and Shaw’s corres p o n - 22. Martin Underwood dence, business rec o r ds, passports, personal rec o r ds, and photographs. Martin Underwood, a My family and I would like to former advance man for contribute all of my fa t h e r ’s 20. Walter Sheridan Pr esidents Kennedy and papers that relate to his War r e n Johnson, was a member Commission service to the Amer- In its effort to comply with the JFK Act, the of President Kennedy’s ican people, to be included in the John F. Kennedy Library reviewed its hold- advance team in Texas National Archi v e s . ings for groups of re c o rds that could contain in November 1963. A —James Rankin, September 17, assassination re c o rds. Among others, it re s e a rcher who worked 1996 found the re c o rds of Walter Sheridan, an with Seymour Hersh on investigator who worked for Robert F. his book, The Dark Side of Kennedy and later for NBC. The library Ca m e l o t , told the Review Board that Under- identified folders of materials, primarily wood claimed that President Johnson sent notes, related to Sheridan’s work as an Underwood to Mexico City in 1966 or 1967 to investigative reporter for NBC covering the see what he could learn about the Kennedy p rosecution of Clay Shaw. In 1967, Sheridan assassination. Underwood allegedly met p roduced an hour-long television special on with Win Scott, former CIA Chief of Station the assassination. in Mexico City.

In 1994, the library informed Sheridan that it The researcher provided the Review Board was processing his records and sending them with copies of handwritten notes, on White to the JFK Collection at NARA. Sheridan House stationery, ostensibly pre p a red by requested that the library return the identi- Underwood and documenting his meeting fied assassination records to him, and the with Scott. The notes state that Scott told library honored his request. Sheridan, how- Underwood that the CIA “blew it” in Dallas ever, died in January 1995. NBC then claimed in November 1963. On the morning of it owns the rights to the Sheridan papers. The November 22, the agency knew that a plane dispute is now pending. had arrived in Mexico City from Havana, and that one passenger got off the plane and 21. Dallas Sixth Floor Museum Records b o a rded another one headed for Dallas. Underwood’s notes state that Scott said that The Sixth Floor Museum in Dallas, Texas, is C I A identified the passenger as Fabian dedicated to providing information to the Escalante. public about President Kennedy’s assassination, and it contains an archives section that The re s e a rcher also stated that someone holds original films and documents. The i n s t ructed Underwood to follow Judith museum is on the sixth floor of the former Campbell Exner on her 1960 train trip from Texas School Book Depository, the exact loca- Washington, D.C., to Chicago, during which

135 she was alleged to have carried money 23. Edward Wegmann between Senator Kennedy (the Democratic Party nominee) and organized crime boss Cynthia Wegmann, the daughter of the late Sam Giancana. Edward Wegmann, a New Orleans lawyer who assisted in defending Clay Shaw during The Review Board staff informally inter- his conspiracy trial, testified before the viewed Underwood. Underwood confirmed Review Board at its New Orleans hearing that he traveled to Mexico City in 1966, but and donated his assassination-related papers said that he went to advance President John- to the JFK Collection. son’s trip and not to look into circumstances surrounding President Kennedy’s assassina- Wegmann’s collection includes some docu- tion. While in Mexico City, Underwood met ments from Garrison’s office files that Weg- with Scott concerning the details of President mann and his colleagues obtained from for- Johnson’s trip. During Underwood’s meeting mer Garrison investigator William Gurvich. with Scott, he said they did discuss President While working for Garrison, Gurvich became Kennedy’s assassination and that Scott told disenchanted and decided to quit. Before him the story that the researcher relayed to leaving, he made copies of Garrison’s memo- the Review Board. randa and witness interviews. He later gave his copies to Shaw’s attorneys. When Review Board staff asked Underwood about any notes he may have taken, he ini- The Wegmann papers contain some 6,000 tially claimed to have no memory of any pages and are now in the JFK collection. notes. Upon viewing copies of the notes that the researcher provided to the Review Board, 24. Thomas W. Wilson Underwood said that he had written the notes in 1992 or 1993 for a researcher to use On September 11, 1998, Mr. Thomas W. Wil- son of Pennsylvania made a presentation to for Hersh’s book. Underwood explained that Review Board staff summarizing his eight the notes are on White House stationery years of research into the authenticity and because he has a lot of extra White House significance of the JFK autopsy images and stationery left over from his work with Pres- the Zapruder film, and additional study of ident Johnson. the Mary Moorman Polaroid photograph, using “photonics” as a technological tool. Underwood could not remember whether he had contemporaneous notes from his meet- Mr. Wilson donated the following materials ing with Scott. He also denied that he fol- to the JFK Collection: (1) a 20-page “execu- lowed Judith Campbell Exner on a train and tive summary” of his work; (2) a graphic pre- that he had no knowledge about her alleged sentation of Mr. Wilson’s research conclu- role as a courier. sions about President Kennedy’s head wounds, using “A.D.A.M.” software to dis- After the informal interview, Underwood play his conclusions; (3) a 20-minute audio- forwarded to the Review Board a set of typed tape of a discussion between Mr. Wilson and notes from his 1966 trip to Mexico City and former Navy x-ray technician Jerrol Custer, his meeting with Scott. The typed notes doc- dated 3/28/98; and (4) a commercially sold umented Underwood’s activities in Mexico videotape summarizing his work. City and briefly mentioned his meeting with Scott. The notes do not mention Under- Mr. Wilson believes he possesses a consider- wood’s conversation with Scott about the able amount of scientific and physical evi- Kennedy assassination. Instead, the notes dence, accumulated over eight years (from state that Underwood sought Scott’s assis- 1988-1996), proving his contention that Presi- tance in staging a big welcome for President dent Kennedy was shot from the front, not Johnson. The Review Board subsequently from behind. He is willing to donate all of requested Underwood to testify under oath, this material to the JFK Collection if FBI or but due to health problems, he was not avail- Department of Justice officials will first allow able. Underwood’s notes now are part of the him to make his full two-day presentation on JFK Collection. the evidence he has collected regarding the

136 Moorman photograph, the Zapruder film, they consider donating their outtakes to the and the autopsy photographs of President JFK Collection. CBS owns rare interview out- Kennedy. takes with individuals such as Marina Oswald Porter. B. PURSUIT OF AUDIO-VISUAL MATERIAL FROM PRIVATE CITIZENS AND CBS agreed to donate its outtakes from its ORGANIZATIONS television specials to the JFK Collection. The Review Board anticipates that the CBS Below is a list of the audio-visual material records eventually will become part of the from private citizens and organizations that JFK Collection. the Board was able to obtain. 4. Robert Groden 1. Tom Alyea: Film from Inside the Texas School Book Depository Robert Groden, a photo-optics technician, was the first to publicly screen the famous Tom Alyea, a cameraman for Dallas televi- Zapruder film as a motion picture. Subse- sion station WFAA, shot film while he was quently he served as an unpaid photographic trapped in the Texas School Book Depository, consultant for the HSCA. which was sealed by the Dallas Police Department after the assassination. Alyea’s G roden’s collection of assassination photos footage includes shots of the sixth floor and films is renowned throughout the assas- sniper’s nest. sination re s e a rch community, and many suspect that Groden made unauthorized In May 1996, Review Board staff met with copies of the HSCA’s photos and films when Alyea, who agreed, in writing, to donate his he worked with the Committee. A f e w original 16mm film to the JFK Collection. re s e a rchers believe that Groden kept origi- Alyea gave the film to the JFK Collection at nal photos and films and returned copies to that time, and as agreed, the Review Board the Committee. sent Alyea a 16mm positive copy and a 16mm negative copy. One researcher believes that Groden may have a photograph from the Pre s i d e n t ’ s Alyea later decided that he wanted the Board autopsy that is not at NARA. The researcher to return the film to him. The Review Board, recalled that he had seen an autopsy photo- however, could not do so because the film graph at Groden’s home in 1980 that was not was then at the National Archives, a federal in NARA’s official collection. The researcher agency, and therefore came under Section 5 urged the Review Board to find this “extra” of the JFK Act. Section 5 requires agencies to photograph. place all assassination records in their possession in the JFK Collection. The Review Board subpoenaed all original and first-generation assassination films in 2. Charles Bronson: Film of Dealey Plaza Groden’s possession, and deposed Groden. Under oath, Groden claimed he did not pos- The Review Board approached the family of sess any original or first-generation assassi- the late Charles Bronson, a private citizen nation films or images of any kind. With the who filmed the scenes in Dealey Plaza help of NARA, the Board collected Groden’s shortly before and after President Kennedy’s materials, studied their provenance, and assassination, and requested that they con- returned them in July 1998. Groden did not sider donating Bronson’s film. The family turn over to the Review Board any autopsy declined. photographs that are not already part of NARA’s official collection. 3. CBS Outtakes 5. Lt. Everett Kay: Audio Surveillance Tape The Review Board approached executives at CBS, the network holding the largest volume Lt. Everett Kay (Ret.), formerly with the of television coverage and subsequent spe- Miami Police Department Intelligence Unit, cials about the assassination, to request that donated to the JFK Collection an audio sur-

137 veillance tape of a November 9, 1963, meet- of approximately 30 interviews that he con- ing between Miami police informant William ducted for the documentary. Among those Somersett and Joseph Milteer, who alleged interviewed are former District Attorney Jim that President Kennedy would be killed by a Garrison, New Orleans witness Perry Russo, rifle shot from an office window. and Warren Commission critic Mark Lane.

6. Vincent Palamara: Interviews with 10. Janet Veazey: KTVT Outtakes Secret Service Personnel In November 1995, the Review Board Vincent Palamara conducted extensive inter- launched a special initiative in Dallas, views with former Secret Service personnel. appealing to residents to consider donating Palamara donated three audio cassettes of any film or photographs they may have relat- these interviews to the JFK Collection. ing to the assassination. As a result, the Review Board acquired important KTVT out- 7. David Powers: Film of Motorcade takes from Janet Veazey.

David Powers, a close aide to Pre s i d e n t Veazey had the film because her father’s Kennedy, was riding in the Secret Service fol- friend, Roy Cooper Jr., was a photographer at low-up car directly behind the President’s KTVT in Dallas. Cooper retrieved the out- limousine on November 22, 1963. Close by takes from the KTVT trash and spliced them President Kennedy’s side, he filmed many of together, creating a 45-minute, 16mm silent the President’s activities that day with his film. The original film, already in the JFK home movie camera. His film ends minutes Collection, contains footage of Pre s i d e n t before the motorcade entered Dealey Plaza. Kennedy and Mrs. Kennedy in Dallas, and The Kennedy Presidential Library holds the the aftermath of the assassination. A first original film, but Powers, now deceased, gra- generation copy of these outtakes are now ciously agreed to make a copy of his film also part of the JFK Collection. available in the JFK Collection. 11. Moses Weitzman 8. David Taplin: November 24, 1963, Coverage of Dallas Police Department Moses Weitzman is a special effects film expert who employed Robert Groden as a Gerald Nathan Taplin Sr. filmed the exterior trainee and junior level staffer in the late of the Dallas Police Department building on 1960s. Weitzman worked for his client, Time- the morning that the DPD scheduled its Life, on the original Zapruder film in the late transfer of Lee Harvey Oswald to the county 1960s and was the first to enlarge the 8mm jail. On that morning, Jack Ruby shot Oswald Zapruder footage to 35mm format. inside the DPD building. The Taplin film contains images of the arrival of the armored car Although Weitzman gave his best Zapruder that the DPD intended to use as a decoy dur- footage to Time-Life, he retained some ing the Oswald transfer, footage of other film imperfect 35mm internegatives (exhibiting crews covering the event, and scenes on the track and framing error) he had made s t reet. David Taplin, Gerald Taplin Sr. ’ s d i rectly from the original Zapruder film. grandson, donated a videotape copy of his Weitzman used these internegatives to grandfather’s film to the JFK Collection. demonstrate his technical ability to enlarge 8mm film directly to a 35mm format. 9. Stephen Tyler Weitzman made these imperfect internega- In 1992, Stephen Tyler produced “He Must tives available to Groden during the late Have Something,” a 90-minute television 1960s. Most likely Groden used prints made documentary about Jim Garrison’s investiga- from these internegatives when he publicly tion of President Kennedy’s assassination. screened the Zapruder film in the mid-1970s. Tyler testified at the Review Board’s public Weitzman testified about the historical hearing in New Orleans, and announced that importance of the Zapruder film at the he would donate to the JFK Collection a copy Review Board’s April 1997 public hearing, of his documentary along with the outtakes and he donated a 16mm copy to the JFK Col-

138 lection. Weitzman informed the Review other topics. The subpoena also sought B o a rd that he no longer possesses any inventories of White’s collection and a list of Zapruder film materials. items that White had received as a benefi- ciary of the Lincolns’ wills. 12. Robert White: Evelyn Lincoln Materials The Review Board staff deposed White in March 1998. During the deposition, White In January 1997, the Review Board contacted described his friendship with Evelyn Lincoln the beneficiaries of Evelyn and Harold Lin- and discussed the various Kennedy-related coln’s wills to determine whether Evelyn, objects that she had given him. In certain President Kennedy’s personal secretary, had cases, White relayed Lincoln’s comments or accumulated assassination-related items. documentation about the provenance of various objects. Among the records that White One of the beneficiaries, Robert White, who produced were Texas trip advance sheets, a collected Kennedy memorabilia and had Secret Service White House Detail photo- been friends with the Lincolns for more than graph book, memoranda authored by Presi- 20 years, apparently had more than 100,000 dent Kennedy, and 23 White House Dictabelt items in his collection. Many of them were tapes. The Board found that four of the mem- Evelyn Lincoln’s, including an entire file cab- oranda written by President Kennedy con- inet and Kennedy memorabilia such as brief- tained classified, national security informa- case, signing table, rocker, and stereo. tion, and forwarded them to the Information Security Oversight Office. After the Review Board sent a letter to White, he contacted an attorney. In a February 1997 On the last day of his deposition, White told letter to the Board, his attorney stated that the Review Board that he had just donated White “did not receive nor was he is in pos- the Dictabelts to the Kennedy Presidential session of any assassination-related artifacts L i b r a r y. The Dictabelts contain telephone and/or memorabilia originating from the conversations, dictations and discussions Lincolns or from any source.” between President Kennedy and other individuals. Specific topics on the Dictabelts White agreed to speak with Review Board include President Kennedy’s dictation dur- s t a ff on April 10, 1997. At this meeting, ing the week of November 4, 1963, discus- White provided a brief, handwritten list of the items Evelyn Lincoln had left him in sions of the Berlin Crisis, conversations her will. White also briefly described his re g a rding the Cuban Missile Crisis, and involvement with cataloguing and apprais- thoughts dictated by President Kennedy on ing the items in the two Lincoln estates. November 12, 1963. White reiterated that his inventory of the estate did not reveal any items related to C. PURSUIT OF STATE AND LOCAL the assassination, other than the diaries GOVERNMENT RECORDS and appointment books that had been bequeathed to the Kennedy Library. An assassination re c o rd. . . i n c l u d e s , without limitation: All records collected After meeting with White, the Review Board by or segregated by all federal, state and continued to receive information that White local government agencies in conjunc- possessed assassination-related items and tion with any investigation or analysis later learned that White planned to auction of or inquiry into the assassination of items from his collection at Guernsey’s auc- President Kennedy. . . 1 tion house in New York City on March 18 and 19, 1998. The Board, with the help of the 1. New Orleans District Attorney Department of Justice, subpoenaed White, Files requiring him to produce all objects and records relating to the Kennedy assassina- Harry F. Connick, Sr., District Attorney of tion, and all re c o rds pertaining to the New Orleans, testified at the Review Board’s Kennedy and Johnson administrations on New Orleans public hearing in June 1995. Cuba, the FBI, the CIA, organized crime, and Connick stated that he was in possession of

139 former District Attorney Garrison’s inves- 2. Dallas City and County Records tigative files. He said he intended to donate the files to the JFK Col- On November 22, 1963, immediately after But we think that what you are lection. President Kennedy was shot, David Burros, a doing is important and we think Dallas motorcycle policeman, found a piece that what we can hopefully add Several days later, a pack- of bone on Elm Street in Dealey Plaza. The to what you’re doing. . . age from New Orleans policeman gave the bone fragment to Deputy —District Attorney arrived in the R e v i e w Constable Seymour Weitzman, who presum- Harry F. Connick, Sr., B o a rd’s offices. It con- ably gave it to the Secret Service. The Secret June 28, 1995 tained what appeared to Service then sent the fragment to the White be original transcripts House physician, then Rear Admiral George from the grand jury Gar- Burkley. The Secret Service placed medical rison convened for his investigation of Clay materials from the autopsy in the safe of Shaw. Robert Bouck, the Chief of the Secret Ser- vice’s Protective Research Section. However, The man who mailed the records, a former the April 26, 1965, inventory of Bouck’s safe Connick investigator, said that Connick had did not list this bone fragment (or any others given them to him to throw out when Con- in Burkley’s possession in November 1963) nick was cleaning out the District Attorney’s as part of its contents. o ffice. Instead, the investigator took the The Review Board staff wrote to the Dallas materials home and stored them in his base- County records management officer and the ment. When he heard about the Review Dallas city archivist to find out if they had Board’s effort, he said he felt compelled to any photographs x-rays, or other records in send the transcripts to the Board. their files regarding this bone fragment. Nei- ther archive had any record of it. Connick responded by demanding that the Board return the records to the District Attor- D. PURSUIT OF RECORDS FROM FOREIGN ney’s office. He said the records were the GOVERNMENTS property of the state of Louisiana and were subject to the seal of the Louisiana state Assassination re c o rds and additional courts. Connick further warned that unless records and information may be located the Review Board returned the grand jury at, or under the control of. . . Foreign records, he would not donate the Garrison governments.2 investigative records. In an effort to compile a more complete The Review Board refused. Since the records record of the assassination, the Review Board w e re in the possession of a government focused considerable attention on an effort to office, namely the Review Board, the Board obtain copies of records contained in the files believed it was compelled by the JFK Act to of foreign governments. The JFK Act states review, organize, and process them for inclu- that it is the “sense of Congress” that the sion in the JFK Collection. Department of State should take steps to obtain such records which have been the A flurry of subpoenas followed. Connick object of much interest since the assassina- subpoenaed the Review Board for the return tion. In particular, the Board focused much of of grand jury records; the Review Board sub- its efforts on the KGB records thought to be poenaed Connick for the investigative maintained both in Russia and in Belarus, records. With the Department of Justice’s and on Cuban and Mexican government help, the Review Board successfully argued records. Congress anticipated, and indeed that Louisiana could not subpoena a federal specifically provided in the JFK Act, that the agency for the records. Connick, however, Department of State “should contact” the was unable to fend off the Review Board’s Russian government and “seek the disclo- subpoena for the Garrison files. Connick s u re of all re c o rds of the former Soviet sued unsuccessfully. Both the investigative Union” relating to the assassination.3 Fur- records and the grand jury transcripts are t h e r m o re, the Department of State was now in the JFK Collection. re q u i red to “cooperate in full with the

140 Review Board” in seeking disclosure of rele- ment in particular, continue to pursue the vant records.4 While the Department of State release of these important KGB rec o rd s . occasionally helped facilitate contacts with f o reign counterparts and individual State 2. Belarus Department employees provided helpful assistance and advice, overall the Depart- With the assistance of the United States ment of State was more of a hindrance than a Embassy in Minsk, Chairman Tunheim, Board help to the Review Board. The Board cer- Member Hall and Executive Director Marwell tainly expected much more help than it in November 1996 reviewed the extensive received from a Department that obviously KGB surveillance file kept in Minsk by the did not consider pursuit of foreign records Be l a r usian KGB. The file details over two about the Kennedy assassination to be a pri- years of extensive surveillance and analysis by ority. Letters of request to the Department the KGB of Lee Harvey Oswald during the from the Board went unanswered for long time that he resided in the Belarusian capital. periods of time, cables that contained com- Some of these rec o r ds were utilized by Nor- munications from foreign sources or from man Mailer in his book Os w a l d ’ s Tal e . The United States Embassy personnel to the Bo a r d was unable to obtain a copy of the file, Board sat for months on the desks of State in part due to the deteriorating rel a t i o n s h i p Department employees without being trans- between the United States and Belarus in mitted to the Board, and important opportu- 1997–98. Mailer’s collaborator in Os w a l d ’ s Tal e , nities were missed because the Department La w r ence Schiller, agreed, in response to the did not believe the issue was important Bo a r d’s request, to donate copies of docu- enough to raise. The Review Board has iden- ments from the Minsk files, but the rec o rd s tified significant records, but does not believe will not be released in the JFK Collection until that these collections will be obtained in full a later date. Additional efforts are still under- until the Department of State determines that way to obtain the files which are unquestion- such an effort is an important priority. ably of strong historical interest. Again, the Bo a r d strongly recommends that all possible 1. Russia ef forts be made to obtain for the Am e r i c a n people this important rec o r d of the activities The Review Board believes that the rec o r ds of of accused assassin Lee Harvey Oswald dur- the former KGB exist in Moscow that (1) ing the years prior to the assassination. reflect surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald and Marina Oswald during 1959–1962, and 3. Cuba that (2) reflect the Soviet investigation into the ci r cumstances of the Kennedy assassination. The Review Board initiated a dialogue with The United States Embassy made requests for Cubans stationed in the Cuban Interest Sec- these rec o r ds and a Review Board delegation tion in the Swiss Embassy to try to find out if later visited Moscow and met with rep re s e n - the Castro government has any records rele- tatives of three diffe r ent archives where it was vant to the assassination. The Chief of the believed that re c o rds existed. The Board Cuban Interest Section, who agreed that the received a number of individual re c o rd s release of Cuban records would be beneficial which have been released in the JFK Collec- to Cuba and the United States, launched an tion but was unsuccessful in obtaining per- effort to locate records. However, he noted mission to review or copy the larger sets of that record keeping in Cuba was spotty in the files which exist in Moscow. The Board years immediately following Castro’s rise to received a significant boost to its efforts when power, but agreed to work with the Board in Vice President Gore asked Russian Prime an effort to promote a better understanding Minister Chernomyrdin in March 1998 to of these issues. The Review Board appreci- release the files. Unfortunately, the National ated the excellent cooperation it re c e i v e d Security Council declined to raise the req u e s t from Cuban officials. in September 1998 during the Clinton-Yel t s i n summit meeting. Additional approaches to The Review Board continued to actively the Russians continue, but the Review Board work with officials in the Cuban Interest Sec- st r ongly recommends that the United States tion to determine what, if any, information government in general, and the State Depart- exists in Cuba relating to the assassination.

141 4. Mexico E. CONCLUSION

Since the Mexican government conducted an The JFK Act paved the way for a single gov- investigation into the activities in Mexico ernment entity, for the first time, to be able to City of Lee Harvey Oswald, and the Direc- search for, identify, and assemble donations cion Federal de Seguridad (DFS), the Mexi- from citizens and local governments, and can federal security service, conducted inter- then place them in a central location, open to rogations of Silvia Duran, who met with the public. Oswald in Mexico City, the Review Board sought Mexico’s cooperation in its search for Although not all of the Board’s efforts were additional re c o rds. At the behest of the successful, the Review Board hopes that the Review Board, the Department of State fact that it strenuously upheld its mandate to requested the Mexican government to search search for, obtain, and disclose assassination- its files for possible records relevant to the related material in an open and documented assassination. To date, the only records the fashion will help restore trust in the govern- Mexican government has made available to ment’s desire and ability to be responsive to the JFK Collection were copies of the same citizens’ concerns. diplomatic correspondence between the Mexican Foreign Ministry and the Depart- Public hearings held in several cities by the ment of State that it submitted to the Warren Review Board, independent researcher Commission. Copies of these communica- “expert’s conferences,” and working luncheons tions already were in the JFK Collection. held with Review Board staff and Board members, were instrumental in providing leads that 5. Other Governments pr oved most useful to the search for rec o rd s .

The Review Board also requested records The Review Board is grateful for the contri- that were relevant to the assassination from butions made by citizens who participated in other foreign governments. The Board these meetings, made important res e a r ch sug- received records from the archives of Great gestions to the Review Board, and donated Britain and Canada. These records are now assassination rec o r ds so that all citizens can available in the JFK Collection. enjoy access to these important materials.

142 CHAPTER 7 ENDNOTES

1 44 C.F.R. § 1400.1. 2 44 C.F.R. § 1400.3(i). 3 President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107, section 10(b)(2) (Supp. V 1994). 4 JFK Act, § 10(b)(3).

143 CHAPTER 8 CO M P L I A N C E W I T H T H E JFK AC T B Y GO V E R N M E N T OF F I C E S

A. INTRODUCTION Chapter 6 of this Report describes both the Review Board’s requests for additional infor- Are federal agencies cooperating fully, mation and records to federal agencies and or is there resistance that fosters public federal agencies’ responses to those requests. distrust of the government?1 The Review Board’s compliance pro g r a m The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records stressed agency obligations to search for and Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) directed fed- publicly release records relating to President eral agencies to search for re c o rds re l a t i n g Kennedy’s assassination. As part of its com- to the assassination of President Kennedy pliance program, the Review Board asked and to transfer those re c o rds to the John F. each agency to submit a declaration, under Kennedy Assassination Records Collection penalty of perjury, describing the re c o rd (JFK Collection) at the National A rc h i v e s searches that it completed, the assassination and Records Administration (NARA) for records that it located, and any other actions public disclosure. As explained earlier in it took to release assassination records. The this report, agencies began their compliance Review Board established the compliance activities even before the Senate confirmed program in furtherance of the JFK Act’s man- the nomination of the A s s a s s i n a t i o n date that there be “an enforceable, indepen- R e c o rds Review Board members in 1994. dent and accountable process for the public Once the Review Board convened, it disclosure” of records on the Kennedy assas- assessed the efforts of federal agencies to sination.2 comply with the terms of the JFK Act. The Review Board worked extensively with In late 1996, the Review Board initiated a for- agency personnel to resolve outstanding mal program to ensure that all re l e v a n t compliance issues prior to submission of agencies were complying with the JFK A c t . Final Declarations of Compliance. The Review Board used its compliance program to ensure that government offices ful- B. FEDERAL AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE filled their JFK Act obligations. The pro g r a m JFK ACT re q u i red agencies to certify that: Each section of this chapter describes work (1) the agency conducted a thoro u g h that a particular agency completed, both s e a rch for assassination re c o rds as that before and during the Review Board’s exis- term is defined by the JFK Act and the tence.3 Review Board’s regulation further defining the term; 1. Central Intelligence Agency (2) the agency identified, organized, and reviewed its assassination records; The Review Board considered the CIA’s com- (3) the agency prepared its assassination pliance with the JFK Act, including complete records for public release at NARA; disclosure of all CIA records relating to Lee (4) the agency responded to each of the Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy assassina- Review Board’s requests for additional infor- tion, to be one of its highest priorities. mation and records; and (5) the agency transmitted its assassination The CIA complied with the JFK Act through records to NARA. the auspices of the Agency’s Historical

145 Review Program (previously the Historical the Directorate of Operations, the Direc t o r a t e Review Group or HRG). HRP reviewed doc- of Intelligence, the Directorate of Ad m i n i s t r a - uments, re f e r red documents within CIA, tion, and the Directorate of Science & Tec h - answered questions, negotiated issues with no l o g y .) As a result of this search direc t i v e , the Review Board staff, and, after Board vot- the CIA identified 31 boxes of potentially ing, processed documents for release to responsive re c o rds, and these were for- NARA. The HRP reviewers were all CIA wa r ded to the HRG for review under the JFK annuitants, with twenty years or more expe- Act. Included were 19 boxes of working files rience, working as independent contractors. on the Kennedy assassination by CIA off i c e r Beginning with a 14-member staff in 1992, Russ Holmes (for many years he was the the staff grew steadily to 29 reviewers and Agency’s focal point officer with res p o n s i b i l i t y nine administrative personnel by the sum- for responding to questions related to CIA’s mer of 1998. HRP also drew on the resources Kennedy assassination-related rec o r ds); two of numerous other offices at CIA for record boxes on KGB defector Yuri Nosenko; seven searches, answers to Review Board ques- boxes of Latin American Division rec o rd s ; tions, and the provision of records for inspec- and three boxes related to the Bay of Pigs. The tion by the Board. From Review Board identified 22 boxes as res p o n - [T]he only thing more horrify- 1992 until December 1997, sive under the JFK Act, although many of the ing to me than the assassination HRG functioned as part of rec o r ds were duplicates of rec o r ds contained itself is the insidious, perverse the Center for Studies in in the Oswald 201 file or the CIA–HSCA notion that elements of the Intelligence and its Chief se q u e s t e r ed collection files. American Government, that my was the Director of Cen- own Agency, had some part in tral Intelligence’s per- The Review Board requested numerous cate- it. I am determined personally sonal rep r esentative to the gories of additional CIA records in an effort to make public or to expose to Review Board. In January to ensure the most complete disclosure of disinterested eyes every relevant 1998, the CIA’s reo rg a n i - information relating to the Kennedy assassi- scrap of paper in CIA’s posses- zation renamed HRG the nation. The Review Board made 16 formal sion, in the hope of helping to Historical Review Pro- requests in writing, and 37 informal requests, dispel this corrosive suspicion. gram and moved it to join for additional information and records from —CIA Director Robert Gates, other CIA de c l a s s i f i c a t i o n the CIA. May 12, 1992 e fforts in the Office of Information Manageme n t . In anticipation of the Review Board ’ s requests for additional information and In 1992 and 1993, the CIA’s Historical Review records, the CIA, in April 1995, requested Group proceeded to assemble CIA records each directorate and the DCI administrative relating to the assassination. In early 1992, officer “to appoint a focal point officer” for prior to enactment of the JFK Act, the Chief the JFK Act. Review Board inquiries were of the History Staff located and inventoried referred by the HRG to the appropriate CIA the CIA records on the assassination that CIA office. A number of CIA officers facilitated held pursuant to an agreement between the the difficult processes of securing access to C I A and the HSCA (the CIA–HSCA CIA files, as well as negotiating issues relat- sequestered collection). This material com- ing to the release of records. The Board found prised 64 boxes. In addition, the History Staff that, whenever it and its staff were able to secured the 16 boxes of the original Lee Har- deal directly with knowledgeable experts vey Oswald 201 file. Following passage of throughout the Agency on substantive issues the JFK Act, the CIA reviewed and declassi- or records, more often than not the result was fied with numerous redaction the Oswald a mutually acceptable release or postpone- 201 file and files within the CIA–HSCA ment. These compromises reasonably bal- sequestered collection, and in 1993 the CIA anced the public interest in disclosure with transmitted those records to the JFK Collec- legitimate needs for continued secrecy on tion at NARA. limited issues. The Review Board encountered early CIA resistance to making records In October 1993, the CIA’s HRG requested the available to the Review Board, as well as various CIA di r ectorates to search for addi- resistance to the ultimate disclosure of tional rec o r ds on Lee Harvey Oswald and on records. A small number of CIA staff officers, the JFK assassination. (The directorates were almost exclusively from the Directorate of

146 Operations, unnecessarily impeded the Board inquiries regarding specific records. process and damaged the Agency’s interests The Review Board was disturbed by the by resisting compromise with all-or-nothing belated discovery of these records, particu- positions. larly given its mandate to assure the public that all relevant materials on the Kennedy In response to the Review Board requests, the assassination were being released by the U.S. Board staff was granted access to review government. original, unsanitized CIA f i l e s — i n c l u d i n g original files of the highest officials at CIA In an effort to ensure that the CIA had con- during the time of the assassination—to conducted thorough and adequate searc h e s firm the existence (or non-existence) of mate- under the JFK Act, the Review Board specifi- rials relating to the assassination. Since the cally requested that CIA D i rector Georg e CIAfiles covered other matters in addition to Tenet issue a directive to all components of the assassination, the CIA was initially reluc- CIA requesting that they identify any records tant to provide whole files for Review Board relating to the assassination. Director Tenet inspection. In order to obtain access to certain issued the directive. Other measures were sets of files, and thus examine them in their suggested by the Review Board, and these original form, the Review Board agreed to w e re undertaken by CIA. In particular, limit access to one or two Board staff mem- offices most likely to contain assassination bers. The Board believed that agreeing to this records (e.g., Counter- Intelligence and Latin limitation was of practical benefit because it American Division) were asked to conduct secured access to entire original sets of files. targeted searches following Review Board guidelines. As a result of the Review Board’s requests and inspection of various CIA files, the The Executive Dire c t o r, the third highest Review Board staff identified additional level official of the CIA, certified under oath materials relating to the assassination in that the CIAhad fully complied with the JFK addition to those initially identified in 1992 Act. In its Final Declaration of Compliance, and 1993. the CIA stated that each of its directorates, as well as the official responsible for the DCI In 1997, the CIA provided the Review Board a rea, had certified that “their re s p e c t i v e staff with several briefings by representatives offices or directorates [had] properly and of each directorate with respect to their files fully responded to requests from the Board.” and re c o rd keeping systems and their CIA further represented, under oath, that it searches for assassination-related records. In had “made diligent searches to locate and its searches for records on the assassination, disclose. . . all records in its possession relat- the CIA conducted both manual and elec- ing to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassina- tronic database searches. In 1998, the Review tion of President Kennedy” and that it was Board expressed to the CIA concern regard- “ a w a re of no other assassination-re l a t e d ing the thoroughness of CIA’s initial 1992–93 records in its possession being withheld.. . .” record searches. The Review Board’s concern The Central Intelligence Agency submitted arose out of the CIA’s belated discovery of its Final Declaration of Compliance dated several files relating directly to Lee Harvey September 24, 1998. Oswald, including (a) a multi-volume Office of Security file on Oswald; (b) a previously 2. Federal Bureau of Investigation undisclosed continuation of the Oswald 201 file containing a small number of documents The Federal Bureau of Investigation identi- post-dating the 1977–78 HSCA investigation; fied its primary files on the Kennedy assassi- (c) another, small file on Oswald designated nation in the 1970s in response to public by the CIA as an “A” file; and (d) additional requests for disclosure under the Freedom of records relating to a KGB source with infor- Information Act. These rec o r ds, ref e r r ed to by mation relating to Lee and Marina Oswald. the FBI as the “core and related” files, consist None of these files had been identified by the of headquarters and field office files on the CIA in 1992–93, when the CIA first assem- following subjects: Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack bled its files on the Kennedy assassination. Ru b y , the JFK assassination investigation, the These files were located through Review FBI administrative file on the War r en Com-

147 mission, Marina Oswald, Ruth Paine, George the Review Board that it would attempt to de Mohrenshildt, Clay Shaw, David Ferrie, finish its processing of assassination records the FBI administrative file on the Church as a result of the streamlined processes. In Committee, and the FBI administrative file on March 1998, the FBI wrote a letter to the the House Select Committee on As s a s s i n a - Review Board stating that it did not expect to tions. The FBI established its JFK Task Force finish its assassination re c o rds pro c e s s i n g (which consisted of five document rev i e w - until February 2000. After a series of meet- er s ) 4 in 1992 as Congres s ings between the Review Board and the FBI, The FBI is absolutely committed debated legislation to the FBI again committed to finishing its JFK to achieving the maximum dis- accelerate disclosure of Act processing before the end of September closure of JFK material. all rec o r ds related to the 1998. —FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, assassination of Pres i d e n t November 24, 1993 K e n n e d y. The FBI con- The Review Board formally submitted to the ducted rec o r ds search e s FBI more than 50 requests for additional of the core and rel a t e d rec o r ds. In response to the Board’s req u e s t s , subjects in its Central Records System and its the FBI made its original files available. In a automated electronic surveillance index limited number of instances, the Bureau pro- (ELSUR Index) to determine that they had vided documentation on those files that were ga t h e r ed all core and related files in FBI head- de s t r oyed according to the FBI’s rec o r ds ret e n - quarters and field offices. tion schedule. The Review Board designated thousands of documents for assassination The FBI identified a second major category of rec o r ds processing as a result of these req u e s t s . records to be processed under the JFK Act which the FBI refers to as the “HSCA Sub- In January 1997 and again in April 1998, the jects.” In its investigation of the Kennedy staff of the Review Board met with the FBI to assassination, the House Select Committee a d d ress any outstanding matters with on Assassinations (HSCA) requested access respect to the Bureau’s compliance with the to records responsive to FBI searches on more JFK Act. The compliance program with the than 600 different subjects. The HSCA cast a FBI focused primarily on the scope of the wide net in its investigation, and the HSCA FBI’s searches under the JFK Act. The Review subjects range from individuals who had Board staff raised additional records issues, direct contact with Lee Harvey Oswald to including the identification of any working major figures in organized crime and anti- files of top FBI officials with responsibility Castro Cuban political activity. The HSCA for overseeing the investigation of the secured an agreement from the FBI in 1978 Kennedy assassination and accounting for all that the Bureau would retain the HSCA sub- relevant electronic surveillance that related jects as a “sequestered collection” which to the assassination. Acting on the Review would be filed as a set of records apart from Board’s concerns, the FBI requested all FBI the FBI’s central records system. Headquarters Divisions to conduct searches for any materials not retrievable through the All of these records (the core and related files FBI central records system and for records and the HSCA subjects) were identified, and that may have been maintained by top FBI the FBI had begun its JFK Act processing officials. While the FBI has discovered some prior to the appointment of the Review new assassination records as a result of this Board. The FBI delivered its first shipment of search, they have not found any working assassination records to the JFK Collection in files maintained by top FBI officials from the December 1993. As of September 30, 1998, the early 1960s. FBI has made 22 shipments of assassination records to the JFK Collection. On the issue of electronic surveillance, the FBI requested all 56 of its field offices to identify As described in Chapters 4 and 5 of this any electronic surveillance in which assassina- report, the Review Board streamlined its ti o n - r elated figures were either speaking, or review processes in 1997 to ensure that all ref e r r ed to, in conversations monitored by the assassination records would be reviewed by FBI. The FBI searched its ELSUR indices under the close of the Review Board’s term. In the the core file subjects. The FBI certified that it spring and summer of 1997, the FBI assured identified only one instance where a core sub-

148 ject was a target of FBI electronic surveillance, rec o r ds, the Secret Service identified, as assas- and that was the electronic surveillance of sination rec o r ds under the JFK Act, additional Marina Oswald in Dallas following the assas- materials beyond those contained in the offi - sination. All other responsive electronic sur- cial case file for the Kennedy assassination. veillance identified by the FBI consisted of so- called “overhears,” where a person is Co n g r ess passed the JFK Act of 1992. One mentioned in a conversation. Nonetheless, the month later, the Secret Service began its com- FBI certified that these would be rev i e w e d pliance efforts. However, in January 1995, the and processed under the JFK Act. Se c r et Service destroyed presidential prot e c - tion survey reports for some of Pres i d e n t The FBI has a well-indexed, centralized filing Kennedy’s trips in the fall of 1963. The Review system, and the FBI’s official main files on Bo a r d learned of the destruction approx i - the Kennedy assassination were readily iden- mately one week after the Secret Service tified and processed under the JFK Act. The de s t r oyed them, when the Board was drafting bulk of FBI records relating to the assassina- its request for additional information. The tion have been placed in the JFK Collection. Bo a r d believed that the Secret Service files on However, at the time of this Report, the FBI the President’s travel in the weeks prec e d i n g was still processing some additional materi- his murder would be rel e v a n t . als for inclusion in the JFK Collection. The Review Board requested the Secret Service The FBI submitted its Final Declaration of to explain the circumstances surrounding the Compliance on August 20, 1998. de s t r uction, after passage of the JFK Act. The Se c r et Service formally explained the circu m - 3. Secret Service stances of this destruction in corres p o n d e n c e and an oral briefing to the Review Board. The Secret Service transferred its official case file on the Kennedy assassination to NARA The Review Board also sought to account for in 1979. certain additional re c o rd categories that might relate to the Kennedy assassination. In December 1992, after the JFK Act was For example, the Review Board sought infor- passed, the Assistant Director for the Secret mation regarding a protective intelligence Service Office of Administration directed the file on the Fair Play for Cuba Committee Secret Service to inventory its records in an (FPCC) and regarding protective intelligence attempt to locate records relating to the assas- files relating to threats to President Kennedy sination. In response, the Chief of the Policy in the Dallas area (the Dallas-related files Analysis & Records Systems Branch within were disclosed to the Warren Commission). the Office of Administration reviewed the The FPCC and Dallas-related files apparently inventories of Secret Service records in stor- w e re destroyed, and the Review Board age. Secret Service made these inventories, as sought any information re g a rding the well as archive re c o rds, available to the destruction. As of this writing, the Service Review Board staff for inspection. In 1995, was unable to provide any specific informa- the Assistant Director for the Office of tion regarding the disposition of these files. Administration instructed each A s s i s t a n t Director and the Chief Counsel to search for The Secret Service submitted its Final Decla- assassination-related records. In December ration of Compliance dated September 18, 1996, the same Assistant Director issued 1998, but did not execute it under oath. The another search directive to each employee. Review Board asked the Service to re-submit its Final Declaration. In addition to the Secret Service’s search of its ar chival rec o r ds, the Review Board submitted 4. National Security Agency to the Secret Service more than twenty separate requests for rec o r ds. The Secret Service Despite the highly classified nature of its oper- was generally cooperative in making the ations, the National Security Agency (NSA) requested rec o r ds available to the Review conducted searches for assassination rec o rd s . B o a rd. As a result of the Service’s own In March 1993, NSA’s Deputy Director of se a r ches, as well as Review Board requests for Plans, Policy, and Programs (DDP) direc t e d

149 that an NSA-wide search be conducted for had “report[ed] on reactions to the assassina- rec o r ds responsive to the JFK Act. Wit h i n tion” and that they did not contain “unique NSA, the Office of Policy coordinated rev i e w information” on the “planning , execution, or of NSA’s assassination-related re c o rd s . investigation” of the assassination. Ac c o r ding to NSA, “[a] search of all files and The National Security Agency submitted its databases believed to hold such [assassina- Final Declaration of Compliance dated ti o n - r elated] rec o r ds was conducted by each August 18, 1998. of the Directorates within NSA....” In addition to database searches, NSA assigned ten indi- 5. Department of State viduals to hand-search approximately 200 boxes of archived material from the 1963–64 The Department of State transferred its main time frame. The Directorate of Operations and record holdings regarding the assassination the NSA Ar chives also conducted searches in to NARA in 1989. These were “lot files” con- response to specific requests of the Review sisting mostly of re c o rds re g a rding the Bo a r d in 1995. As a result of NSA’s 1993 and Department of State’s work relating to the 1995 searches, NSA identified a total of 269 Warren Commission investigation. The files rec o r ds to be processed under the JFK Act. In originated in the Department of State Legal 1998, an additional 109 assassination rec o rd s Advisor’s Office and the Office of Security we r e identified by NSA to be processed under and Consular Affairs. After Congress passed the JFK Ac t . the JFK Act, the Department of State opened these files to the public in August 1993. NSA located the bulk of its assassination records in the NSA Legislative Affairs Office The Department of State designated its Office and General Counsel’s Office. These records of Freedom of Information, Privacy & Classi- related to NSA responses to prior investiga- fication Review (within the Bureau of tional inquiries regarding the assassination. Administration) as the entity responsible for In March 1995, the NSA briefed the Review identifying and processing assassination Board members as to how it conducted its records under the JFK Act. The office in turn searches for assassination records and, in appointed a retired Department of State his- addition, submitted answers to specific ques- torian to coordinate the Department’s JFK tions of the Review Board concerning assas- Act compliance. sination records in the possession of NSA. The Review Board subsequently submitted The Department of State staff conducted additional questions to NSA, particularly numerous searches of its records to ensure regarding NSA intelligence records relating compliance with the JFK Act. For example, in to Cuba or the Soviet Union. NSA answered 1993, the Department searched its Central the Board’s questions, submitting a detailed Foreign Policy records. The search included a set of responses to Review Board inquiries review of manifests of retired files of Depart- regarding intelligence holdings on Cuba and mental offices and foreign posts, as well as the Soviet Union that might lead to relevant computerized searches of its automated doc- information relating to the assassination. ument systems. Also in 1993, the Assistant NSA stated that “both Cuba and the USSR S e c retary of State for Administration for- were targets of high interest [to NSA] during mally requested various offices within the the time of the assassination,” and that NSA Department to search for records relating to searched its files relating to those countries. the assassination. NSA concluded that “[t]hese searches produced records that primarily reflected reac- Among the records located by the Depart- tions to the assassination.” ment were 25,000 pages of material relating to condolences, funeral attendance arrange- With respect to NSA’s review of its intelli- ments, and memorial activities. Also, “virtu- gence holdings, NSA “certifie[d] that it has ally every diplomatic conversation held dur- neither located, nor is it withholding, any ing the month or so after the assassination intelligence records containing information contained oral condolences or references to of investigatory significance to the Kennedy the recent American tragedy.” After process- assassination.” NSA advised the Review ing approximately 3,000 such records for the Board that its relevant intelligence records JFK Collection, the Department discontinued

150 p rocessing these kinds of re c o rds and 6. Department of Justice “restricted its search to documents relevant to the murder investigation.” The Review The Review Board worked separately with Board did not object to this approach. each of the relevant divisions of the Depart- ment of Justice to identify and release records Former Foreign Service Officers, working as under the JFK Act. Accordingly, the Review re-employed annuitants, reviewed Depart- Board worked with the Office of Information ment of State-originated documents and & Privacy (OIP), responsible for “leadership documents re f e r red by other agencies to o ffices,” the Criminal Division, the Civil State. Other entities within the Department Division, the Civil Rights Division, and the of State also participated in review and Office of Legal Counsel. The work of each declassification, including the Bureau of Division is summarized below. Diplomatic Security, the Office of Passport P o l i c y, and the Bureau of Intelligence & a. Office of Information and Privacy. R e s e a rch. Department of State re v i e w e r s w e re sent to NARA, the CIA, the House and This office is responsible for rec o r ds of the Senate Intelligence Committees, and the JFK “leadership offices” of the Department of Jus- Library to review and declassify Department tice, including rec o r ds of the Attorney Gen- of State re c o rds. More than 10,000 such eral, Deputy Attorney General, and As s o c i a t e re c o rds were processed under the JFK Act. In Attorney General. In addition, OIP is res p o n - addition, Department of State re v i e w e r s sible for handling FOIA requests and appeals p rocessed approximately 4,500 documents di r ected against all entities within the Depart- re f e r red to State from other agencies. ment of Justice. OIP assigned staff to carry out its obligations under the JFK Act, including a Since 1997, a team of Department of State senior counsel, a Department of Justice reviewers also has been declassifying ar chivist, and two FOIA/declassification spe- Department records pursuant to Executive cialists. The senior counsel was appointed as the OIP rep r esentative to coordinate OIP’s O rder 12958. These reviewers were ef forts under the JFK Ac t . i n s t ructed to identify any assassination- related materials in the course of their After passage of the JFK Act, OIP had identi- re v i e w. Many of the re c o rds that were fied materials relating to FOIAlitigation over s e a rched under the JFK Act have been records relating to the JFK assassination, and processed under Executive Order 12958 and these materials were placed in the JFK Col- sent to NARA. In view of the Department of lection. OIP also located and designated as State’s representations regarding its declassi- assassination records the following: (1) cer- fication efforts under the Executive Order, tain files of Robert Keuch, who was DOJ’s the Review Board determined that a further liaison to the HSCA; (2) a file of Attorney detailed review of these records for assassi- General Edward Levi (entitled, “FBI/JFK nation-related materials was not necessary. Assassination Investigation”); (3) a file of Attorney General William Barr; (4) files from Among the rec o r ds identified under the JFK DOJ’s Office of Public Affairs; (5) documents Act and transferred to NARA we r e: diplo- from DOJ’s Departmental Review Commit- matic cables reg a r ding foreign reaction to the tee involving administrative appeals of FOIA assassination; rec o r ds from the Mexico City requests; and (6) a historical file containing Post File; documents from the rec o r ds of assassination-related documents from “lead- Llewellyn E. Thompson, former Am b a s s a d o r ership offices” and those that have been the to the Soviet Union; rec o r ds of Secretary Dean subject of past FOIA litigation. Rusk, including memoranda summarizing telephone conversations he had reg a r ding the The Office of Information and Privacy sub- assassination; and working files on the assas- mitted its Final Declaration of Compliance sination maintained by U. Alexis Johnson, dated August 6, 1998. then Deputy Undersecretary of State. b. Criminal Division. The Department of State submitted its Final Declaration of Compliance dated March 18, After passage of the JFK Act, the Acting As s i s - 1998. tant Attorney General for the Criminal Divi-

151 sion instructed high-level officials within the as potentially responsive to the JFK Act: (1) Division to forward any assassination rec o rd s case files relating to FOIA litigation in which to the Freedom of Information/Privacy Ac t plaintiffs sought access to U.S. government (F O I / P A)Unit within the Division. In addi- records on the Kennedy assassination; (2) a tion, rec o r d searches were conducted by the case file relating to compensation for the U.S. FO I A / P A Unit and the Criminal Division government’s taking of the Oswald rifle Re c o r ds Unit. Files relating to the assassina- (Marina Oswald Porter v. United States) (this tion were identified and placed into the JFK file, however, had been destroyed in 1991 Collection in 1993. Among the Criminal Divi- according to the Department’s records reten- sion files in the JFK Collection are the Divi- tion/destruction schedule); (3) a Criminal sion’s main file on the assassination and a file Division file relating to the Kennedy family’s on FBI handling of the assassination investi- agreement to donate certain personal items gation. In the course of complying with the of President Kennedy to NARA; and (4) mis- JFK Act, the Criminal Division utilized four cellaneous materials relating to the assassina- attorneys and support personnel. tion located with the Director of the Federal Programs Branch. In complying with Review Board requests, the Criminal Divison made available for Review In 1993, the Civil Division transferred to Bo a r d inspection numerous original files rel a t - NARAthe small collection of documents that ing to organized crime and internal security had been discovered among the secured files matters. As of September 1998, major cate- of the Director for the Federal Pro g r a m s gories of assassination rec o r ds in the custody Branch. This collection of materials included of the Criminal Division had not yet been pictures of the President’s clothing after the tr a n s f e r r ed to the JFK Collection at NARA. assassination, documents relating to the These consisted of the rec o r ds identified by a u t o p s y, and memoranda relating to the the Board from its review of the orga n i z e d availability of Warren Commission materials. crime and internal security files. The Review Aside from these materials, no other assassi- Bo a r d is disappointed that these rec o r ds have nation-related records had been placed in the not been processed and transferred to the JFK JFK Collection at that time. Collection, but the Criminal Division has committed to completing the process of rel e a s i n g The Civil Division defends federal agencies in these rec o r ds to the JFK Collection. suits arising under the FOIA, and the Division had numerous FOIA litigation cases brou g h t The Criminal Division has also generated against the government for denying access to additional records regarding recent ballistics Kennedy assassination rec o r ds. The Review testing of one of the bullet fragments and has B o a rd requested that the Civil Division committed to placing those records in the JFK pr ocess its FOIA litigation case files relating to Collection. assassination rec o r ds under the JFK Act. The Civil Division took the position that FOIA li t i - The Criminal Division submitted its Final gation files on JFK assassination rec o r ds need Declaration of Compliance dated September not be reviewed or released under the JFK Ac t . 2, 1998. Ho w e v e r , the Review Board prevailed upon the Civil Division to release these FOIA fi l e s c. Civil Division. under the JFK Act. The various JFK-rel a t e d FO I A cases were identified to the Civil Divi- In March 1993, the Acting Assistant At t o r n e y sion by the Review Board, and they were General for the Civil Division directed all Divi- transmitted to the JFK Collection. sion offices to identify any assassination- related rec o r ds that might be in their custody. The Civil Division submitted its Final Decla- In addition, the Civil Division appointed the ration of Compliance dated July 29, 1998. Division’s attorney in charge of its FOI/PA Unit to coordinate release of assassination d. Civil Rights Division. rec o r ds under the JFK Ac t . The Civil Rights Division located one file As a result of the search directive, the Civil responsive to the JFK Act. This file consisted Division identified four categories of records of a civil rights complaint made against New

152 Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison, and making available to the Review Board addi- it is in the JFK Collection. tional rec o r ds for inspection.Treasury has confirmed that all of its identified assassination The Civil Rights Division submitted its Final records have been transferred to the JFK Col- Declaration of Compliance dated July 2, 1997. lection at NARA.

e. Office of Legal Counsel. The Department of the Treasury submitted its Final Declaration of Compliance dated The Office of Legal Counsel collected docu- August 12, 1998. ments spanning from the date of the assassination through the Congressional inquiries b. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms of the 1970s pertaining to legal aspects of the (ATF). assassination, the start-up of the Wa r re n Commission, access to Warren Commission In 1992, ATF’s Assistant [T]he Department of the Trea- evidence, legislation making Pre s i d e n t i a l D i rector (Administra- sury supports the purpose assassination a federal crime, and public tion) directed each of the underlying this Joint Resolution inquiries about the assassination. These heads of offices within and agrees with its intention of records have been transmitted to the JFK Col- ATF to locate any records making the greatest number of lection. relating to the assassina- government documents avail- tion. No assassination able to the public.Perhaps these The Review Board did not request a declara- records were identified at additional disclosures, and the tion of compliance from the Office of Legal that time. In addition, in unfettered review by the public Counsel. 1995, ATF re v i e w e d of the documents, will help inventories of re c o rd s relieve the lingering concerns 7. Department of the Treasury held in storage, and no and anxieties surrounding this assassination re c o rd s tragedy, and restore the confi- The Review Board worked with various com- were identified through dence of the American people ponents of the Department of Tre a s u r y, that review. In particular, that there are no more mysteries including Main Treasury (i.e., the Office of ATF reported that the associated with the tragedy. the Secretary), Secret Service (discussed Fort Worth Records Cen- —Department of Treasury, above), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), ter held no ATF records Senate Hearings on JFK Act the Customs Service, and the Bureau of Alco- from the 1960s. ATF also hol, Tobacco & Firearms (ATF). made search

a. Main Treasury. The Review Board sought to have ATF locate any 1963–64 rec o r ds relating to ATF’s assis- In December 1992, the Assistant Director for tance in the investigation of the JFK assassina- Policy, Plans and Paperwork Management tion, as well as rec o r ds from the late 1970s requested the Departmental Offices Records relating to ATF’s work for the HSCA. The Officer to identify any assassination-related Review Board specifically requested that ATF records under the JFK Act. No assassination check for rec o r ds from the ATF Field Office in records were identified at that time. In 1995, Dallas, as well as rec o r ds for the ATF Direc t o r the Review Board began to make specific and ATF Chief Counsel, and this was done. additional requests for information and re c o rds, and Treasury searched for the ATF was fully cooperative and documented records that the Board requested. In addition, its search efforts in detail and under oath. Treasury made available original records for ATF located only a handful of records, all of Review Board inspection. which related to its work with the HSCA.

In late 1996, Main Treasury designated the One factor that may explain the inability of Departmental Offices Records Officer to coor- ATF to locate any relevant records from the dinate Treasury’s work under the JFK Act. In 1960s was the fact that ATF was not created addition, a senior attorney from the Office of as an independent entity until 1972. ATF’s General Counsel was tasked to handle JFK Ac t predecessor agency was the Alcohol Tobacco matters. These officials assisted in the proc e s s - Tax Unit of the Internal Revenue Service. The ing of identified assassination rec o r ds and in Review Board therefore requested that IRS

153 determine whether it had any pre-1972 ATF identify all records it had relating to the records relating to the assassination. IRS was assassination. In 1994, IRS reported that it unable to locate any ATF assassination had identified, pursuant to the JFK A c t , records within its files. approximately fifty documents. These documents apparently related to a tax proceeding The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms involving Jack Ruby’s estate. At the time, no submitted its Final Declaration of Compli- further work was undertaken by IRS to ance dated November 11, 1997. release these documents or to identify any other records under the JFK Act. c. Customs Service. In late 1996, the Review Board sought to After passage of the JFK Act, Customs con- clarify what IRS did to locate additional ducted a search of its Washington, D.C. head- re c o rds relating to the assassination and quarters files through computerized what it intended to release in light of Sec- searches, as well as extensive review of its tion 6103. In addition, the Review Board archival files with the assistance of Review sought to inspect assassination re c o rds that Board staff. In addition, Customs instructed w e re, or would be, collected by IRS, includ- its field offices to search for assassination ing original tax returns of Lee Harvey records. Customs identified a modest num- Oswald, and re c o rds relating to IRS work ber of assassination records. with the Wa r ren Commission. The Review B o a rd also sought to ascertain the status The Review Board staff requested additional and anticipated treatment of such re c o rd s searches of Customs headquarters records, by IRS under the JFK Act. While IRS con- but no additional records were identified. In s i d e red such re c o rds under Section 6103 an effort to determine whether field offices exempt from release, the Review Board kept records that headquarters might have asserted its legal authority, under the JFK destroyed, the Review Board asked that Cus- Act, to confidentially inspect IRS assassina- toms have its Dallas field office re-check for tion re c o rds. However, the assassination any relevant files. re c o rds collected by the IRS were not made available for the Review Board’s inspection. Customs Service submitted its Final Declara- Only a year later did IRS affirm the Review tion of Compliance dated June 30, 1997. B o a rd’s legal authority to inspect IRS assassination re c o rd s . d. Internal Revenue Service. In 1998, the Review Board requested that IRS The identification and formally document its actions and compli- [T]he department and the IRS release of assassination- ance under the JFK Act. The Review Board have no objection to lifting the related rec o r ds in IRS’s requested that the IRS search for records that bar to public disclosure of the custody has been diffi c u l t might relate to the assassination and that the tax information previously pro- because Section 11(a) of IRS specifically identify any such records that vided to the Warren Commis- the JFK Act explicitly pro- it believed could not be released under Sec- sion and the House and Senate vides that tax-related tion 6103. The Review Board also requested Committees. records continue to be that IRS review the tax-related records in the —Department of Treasury, exempt from public dis- Warren Commission and HSCA holdings to Senate Hearings on JFK Act cl o s u r e under Section 6103 determine which records could be released of the IRS Code. The consistent with Section 6103. Review Board believes that significant assassina t i o n - r elated rec o r ds of the IRS were pre- At the request of the Review Board, the IRS cluded from release under the JFK Act. Most intends to forward to the JFK Collection all si g n i f i c a n t l y , the JFK Act failed to secure IRS’s tax-related assassination records identified public release of the original Lee Harvey by IRS, including those records to remain Oswald tax returns and significant tax-rel a t e d confidential pursuant to Section 6103. The material in the files of the War r en Commission.5 records covered by Section 6103, although transmitted to the JFK Collection, will not be Notwithstanding Section 6103, the Review released pending any later determination as B o a rd requested that the IRS collect and to their status under the IRS code.

154 The Review Board has received draft compli- The Review Board proceeded to formally des- ance statements from the Internal Revenue ignate the identified The PFIAB re c o rd s Service but has not received the IRS’s Final (many of which dealt with U.S. policy towards Declaration of Compliance. Cuba) as assassination rec o r ds under the JFK Act. Challenging the Review Board’s author- 8. National Security Council ity to designate pertinent rec o r ds as assassination re c o rds under the Act, The PFIAB The National Security Council did not ini- requested a document-by-document justifica- tially do any work in response to the JFK Act tion reg a r ding the relevance of the rec o r ds, the following its passage. In 1997, the Review public interest in their release, and whether B o a rd contacted the NSC to ascertain The PFIAB documents contained unique whether it might have any re c o rds that information. The Board had previously articu- would be relevant under the JFK Act. The lated the relevance of the materials to The NSC was fully cooperative in identifying and PFIAB and considered the requested analysis making available the records within its cus- to be unnecessary, burdensome, and ulti- tody and control. NSC provided the Review mately an obstacle to release. At the time of Board with various inventories to records this Report, The PFIAB reserved its right to held off-site and certain re c o rds from its appeal to the President any Board decision to vault in the Old Executive Office Building. release The PFIAB rec o rd s . Review Board staff worked with senior NSC records officials to designate assassination- 10. Immigration & Naturalization related records under the JFK Act. Among Service the early 1960s records designated were minutes of NSC and Special Group meetings. In 1993, the Immigration & Naturalization The materials covered issues regarding Cuba Service (INS) conducted a rec o r ds search in and Vietnam. response to passage of the JFK Act. Specifi- ca l l y , INS’s Assistant Commissioner for the The National Security Council submitted its Re c o r ds System Division directed all INS Final Declaration of Compliance dated April components to search for rec o r ds that met the 30, 1998. statutory definition of an assassination rec o r d. INS designated a Management An a - 9. The President’s Foreign Intelligence lyst for the Headquarters Records Manage- Advisory Board ment Branch to receive and process INS assassination rec o r ds under the JFK Act. Most In early 1997, the Review Board re q u e s t e d of the files identified by INS were files on var- that the President’s Foreign Intelligence ious individuals who had some connection to Advisory Board (PFIAB) make available any the assassination story, and theref o r e had pre- 1962–64 re c o rds that might relate to the viously been made available to Congres s i o n a l Kennedy assassination. The PFIAB agreed to committees, including the HSCA. After con- make available certain re c o rds for the sultation with other agencies, INS identified Review Board’s inspection. Over several additional files as being pertinent under the months, the Review Board staff inspected JFK Act. (A list of the INS files proc e s s e d these re c o rds and identified certain excerpts under the JFK Act is set forth in the INS Final as assassination re c o rds. When the Review Declaration of Compliance.) While INS had B o a rd sought to have the re c o rds pro c e s s e d identified over 65 files to be processed under for public release, The PFIAB took the posi- the JFK Act, none had been transferred to tion that these re c o rds were, in fact, not NA R A until late 1996. INS ultimately devoted releasable under the JFK Act. Senator War re n substantial res o u r ces to processing these files Rudman, Chairman of The PFIAB, appeare d for release under the JFK Ac t . b e f o re members of the Review Board in August 1998 to present The PFIAB’s view INS had not, at the time of this Report, com- that its re c o rds were not covered by the JFK pleted the transmission of its identified Act and, furthermore, that particular rec o rd s assassination records to the JFK Collection. identified by the Review Board were not Although INS had forwarded numerous files a s s a s s i n a t i o n - related within the meaning of to the JFK Collection, including files on Lee the statute. and Marina Oswald, INS had yet to forward

155 files on certain lesser-known figures, some began to make specific requests for addi- miscellaneous documents from its subject tional information from DIA. All requests files, and a work file on Carlos Marcello. INS were ultimately answered. attributes the delay, in part, to the time-consuming processing of referring documents to In an effort to locate records responsive to the other agencies for review and awaiting agen- Review Board’s additional requests, a special cies’ release of their equities. INS has com- DIA task force worked at the Washington mitted to completing the transmission of all National Records Center in Suitland, Mary- remaining assassination-related files to the land, conducting a page-by-page review of JFK Collection. all pertinent pre-1965 Agency file series. After this review of its archive records, DIA The Immigration and Naturalization Service identified additional assassination-re l a t e d submitted its Final Declaration of Compli- documents. These records have been placed ance dated September 11, 1998. in the JFK Collection.

11. Office of the Secretary of Defense The Defense Intelligence Agency submitted its Final Declaration of Compliance dated The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) April 10, 1998. had not identified any assassination records by August 1993, the first deadline imposed 13. Department of the Army by the JFK Act. In October 1995, Review Board staff met with various Department of In response to the JFK Act, the Army con- Defense officials and identified topics and ducted in 1993 an “Army-wide canvassing record categories to be searched for under the for relevant records.” Another canvassing of JFK Act. As a result, components of the records was done in 1997. The Army reported armed forces under the Secretary of Defense that it conducted “a complete review of the were instructed to search for assassination 70,000 line item listing of the Army’s hold- records and, in addition, OSD’s own archival ings in the Federal Records Centers... . ” The re c o rds were searched. Miscellaneous Army identified various assassination records were thereafter identified from the Secretary of Defense official correspondence records, including: (a) material relating to files, including records on Cuba and corre- ballistics research performed by the Army in spondence with the HSCA. connection with the assassination; (b) the 1965 typewritten notes of Pierre Finck, the The OSD’s Directorate for Correspondence & Army pathologist who participated in the D i rectives was diligent in attempting to Kennedy autopsy; (c) records of the Army address the record-related issues raised by Corps of Engineers relating to the design and the Review Board. The OSD’s Records Sec- construction of the Kennedy gravesite; (d) tion ran computerized record searches and materials relating to the polygraph examina- inventoried its archive re c o rds and ulti- tion of Jack Ruby from the Defense Poly- mately responded to all Review Board graph Institute at Fort McClellan, Alabama; searches. (e) records on Cuba from the files of Joseph Califano, created while he was a Special The Office of the Secretary of Defense sub- Assistant to the Secretary of the Army in the mitted its Final Declaration of Compliance Kennedy administration; and (f) Army intel- dated May 21, 1998. ligence files on various individuals connected with the Kennedy assassination story. 12. Defense Intelligence Agency In addition, the Army made available microfilm records of the Pentagon Telecommunica- In 1993, DIA forwarded to NARA approxi- tions Agency, and the Review Board desig- mately one box of materials for the JFK Col- nated certain documents from the 1963–64 lection consisting mostly of correspondence period as assassination records. with the HSCA. The Review Board staff met with DIA in early 1997 and determined that The Department of the Army submitted its DIA had not reviewed all of its relevant Final Declaration of Compliance dated Sep- archive holdings. The Review Board then tember 11, 1998.

156 a. Investigative Records Repository. tion records. In 1996, the Marine Corps transmitted to the Review Board the original per- The Review Board staff also worked sepa- sonnel and medical Marine Corps files on rately with the IRR at Fort Meade, the Oswald. The Review Board transmitted these Army’s storage facility for counter-intelli- records to the JFK Collection. gence files. The IRR has released several intelligence files under the JFK Act, including Notwithstanding the Navy’s identification of files on Gerald P. Hemming and anti-Castro these core materials, the Review Board activists. The IRR was cooperative in deter- requested the Navy to search additional mining whether it had any files on other indirec o r d categories to ensure that all rel e v a n t viduals related to the assassination. In many materials had been identified. In December cases, they found no records for the names 1996, the Navy designated two officials within submitted. The Review Board requested the the Office of General Counsel to coordi n a t e IRR to determine whether it had any office or the Navy’s further search and processing of work files for certain Army intelligence offi- as s a s s i n a t i o n - r elated rec o r ds under the JFK cials located in the Dallas area in 1963–64. Act. In early 1997, after the Navy consulted The IRR stated that it had no such files. In with Review Board staff reg a r ding categories addition, the Review Board requested that of potentially relevant rec o r ds, the General the IRR provide any additional information Counsel’s office issued another search direc - or documentation with respect to an Army tive to the Chief of Naval Operations, the intelligence dossier maintained on Oswald. Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Judge The Army destroyed this file in 1973 as part Advocate General of the Navy, the Naval of a program to purge domestic surveillance Criminal Investigative Service, the Secret a r y files. The Review Board developed no new of the Navy’s Administrative Division, and information on the file or its destruction other components within the Navy. The beyond that developed by the HSCA. Review Board asked the Navy to search for files of high-level officials of the Marine The Review Board received the Final Decla- Corps, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and ration of Compliance of the Investigative the Navy during the years 1959 through 1964. Records Repository on January 23, 1998. The Navy conducted an extensive review of files, including a review of files from the Sec- 14. Department of the Navy retary of the Navy’s Administrative Office, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Marine The Review Board considered records of the Corps. The Navy located miscellaneous docu- Department of the Navy essential in view of ments relating to the War r en Commission and Lee Harvey Oswald’s tenure with the HS C A fr om files of the Administrative Offi c e Marines, which is administratively a part of for the Secretary of the Navy as a result of this Navy. Under the JFK Act, the Navy identified se a r ch. Among the rec o r ds found was an and placed into the JFK Collection at NARA unsigned copy of an affidavit by the Direc t o r certain core files relating to Lee Harvey of ONI, prep a r ed at the time of the War re n Oswald—(1) the personnel and medical Commission, stating that Lee Harvey Oswald Marine Corps files for Oswald and (2) Office was not used as an agent or informant by of Naval Intelligence records on Oswald. ONI. The Navy confirmed that it had not, ho w e v e r , located the 1959–1964 files for the After passage of the JFK Act, the Navy’s Di r ector of ONI. Criminal Investigative Service transferred, in 1994, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) The Department of the Navy submitted its records that had been maintained on Lee Final Declaration of Compliance dated Harvey Oswald.6 In 1995, the General Coun- December 3, 1997. sel of the Navy directed that a further review of the Navy’s files be undertaken pursuant to a. Office of Naval Intelligence. the JFK Act. This directive went to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the The Review Board pursued the matter of ONI Marine Corps, the Naval Criminal Investiga- rec o r ds separately. Ac c o rd i n g l y , the Board tive Service, and the Naval Historical Center. requested that ONI submit its own certifica- The Navy identified no additional assassination of its compliance with the JFK Ac t . In its

157 Final Declaration of Compliance, ONI stated Finck, including two 1965 reports he prep a re d that it conducted an extensive review of ONI for General Blumberg reg a r ding the Kennedy re c o rds held at Federal Records Centers autopsy and his 1969 memorandum reg a rd i n g th r oughout the country. ONI did not identify testimony he gave at the Clay Shaw trial. The any additional assassination rec o r ds. ONI was Review Board also asked AF I P for any 1963–64 unable to find any relevant files for the Direc - files of top AF I P of ficials who might have had tor of ONI from 1959 to 1964. ONI also information reg a r ding the autopsy of Pres i d e n t acknowledged that there were additional ONI Kennedy. AFIP did locate one additional rec o r ds that were not reviewed for assassina- rec o r d, an oral history interview with Dr. tion rec o r ds, but that these rec o r ds would be Robert F. Karnei, Jr., in which he briefly dis- reviewed under Executive Order 12958 req u i r - cusses his role at the JFK autopsy. ing declassification of government rec o rd s . The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology sub- The Office of Naval Intelligence submitted its mitted its Final Declaration of Compliance Final Declaration of Compliance dated May dated June 12, 1997. 18, 1998. 16. Department of the Air Force b. National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda. In 1995, the Air Force directed certain A i r The Review Board also pursued assassination F o rce commands to undertake searches for rec o r ds with the National Naval Medical Cen- assassination re c o rds. The only assassination ter at Bethesda, Maryland (NNMC). The re c o rd found was an operations logbook NNMC was cooperative and conducted f rom A n d rews Air Force Base that had extensive searches. An unsigned original of re c o rded events at the base on the day of the the JFK autopsy report was located in a safe at assassination. The Review Board asked the the NNMC’s Anatomic Pathology Division. Air Force to conduct further searches for The NNMC located miscellaneous FOIA assassination re c o rds. The Review Board requests relating to autopsy re c o rds. The asked the Air Force to: (1) identify and Review Board asked the NNMC to re- c h e c k review the 1963–64 files for the highest off i- whether it had any 1963–64 files for the top cials in the Air Force, including the Secre t a r y of ficials of the NNMC, including Comman- of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff for the ders Humes and Boswell. Humes and Boswell Air Force; (2) more thoroughly review the we r e the Navy pathologists who conducted files of the Office of Special Investigations the autopsy of President Kennedy. The for any re c o rds related to Oswald; and (3) NNMC re-certified that it had no such files. determine whether there were any rec o rd s relating to Air Force One on November 22, The National Naval Medical Center submit- 1963, including specifically searching for any ted its Final Declaration of Compliance dated audiotapes of transmissions to or from A i r June 27, 1997, and its Supplemental Declara- F o rce One on the day of the assassination. tion of Compliance on December 23, 1997. As the Review Board requested, the A i r 15. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology F o rce conducted a targeted search. The A i r F o rce did not, however, forward additional The Review Board worked directly with the re c o rds to the JFK Collection. After the A i r Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP). F o rce submitted its Final Declaration, the AF I P designated its Ar chivist for the National B o a rd requested that the Air Force further Museum of Health and Medicine to serve as account for specific Air Force re c o rds, partic- the official responsible for conducting AF I P ’ s ularly re c o rds for the Air Force’s Office of se a r ches under the JFK Act. As with the P residential Pilot and the Historical National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, R e s e a rch Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base Maryland, the Review Board sought to identify in Alabama. The Air Force, at the time of this any rec o r ds from AF I P that might relate to the Report, had not followed up on the Review autopsy of President Kennedy (Lt. Col. Pierre B o a rd’s re q u e s t . Finck, one of the autopsy pathologists, was Chief of the Wound Ballistics Branch of A F I Pa t The Air Force submitted its Final Declaration the time). AF I P located some materials of Dr. of Compliance dated November 21, 1997.

158 17. Joint Staff on the day of the assassination and, in addition, a WHCA memorandum providing a The Chief of the Information Management “list of telephone calls recorded by the White Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Staff, coordi- House switchboard on 22 November 1963.” nated the Joint Staff’s compliance with the JFK Act. The Joint Staff searched its archived The Review Board further re q u e s t e d files for records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff W H C A to undertake a broad search for any from the early 1960s, including files of Joint re c o rds reflecting White House communi- Chiefs Chairmen Lyman L. Lemnitzer, cations re g a rding the assassination, includ- Maxwell Taylor, and Earle G. Wheeler. The ing any communications to or from A i r Joint Staff estimated that it spent 210 hours F o rce One on the day of the assassination. searching for assassination records in such The Commander of WHCA i n s t ructed his files. The Joint Staff allowed the Review o ffices to conduct a search for assassina- Board access to these records. t i o n - related re c o rds. WHCA located no additional assassination re c o rds. The The Joint Staff responded to the Review Review Board then requested that WHCA Board’s requests for additional information c e r t i f y, under penalty of perjury, that it had relating to Cuba and Vietnam. no other re c o rds from the 1963–64 period that might relate to the assassination. In the course of identifying relevant records, W H C A certified that it had no re c o rds fro m the Review Board learned that the Joint Staff the 1963–64 time period nor any re c o rd s had destroyed minutes and/or transcripts of relating to their disposition. meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1947 to 1978. Since the re c o rds would have The White House Communications Agency included minutes of meetings in 1963 and submitted its Final Declaration of Compli- 1964 which might have been relevant to the ance dated April 22, 1998. assassination, the Review Board requested that the Joint Staff account for the destruc- 19. U.S. Postal Service tion. The Joint Staff explained that, in 1974, the Secretary for the Joint Chiefs of Staff In 1993, the Postal Service located its original ordered these materials destroyed and, at file on the Kennedy assassination investiga- that time, also established a disposition tion composed of Postal Service investiga- schedule for such records. In 1978, according tive reports re g a rding the assassination. The to the Joint Staff, the “practice of recording file had been located among the arc h i v e d meeting minutes was discontinued.. . . ” re c o rds for the Chief Postal Inspector, and the file was subsequently transferred to the The Joint Staff submitted its Final Declaration JFK Collection. The Review Board suggested of Compliance dated November 13, 1997. additional searches. The Postal Service was diligent in following those suggestions, but 18. White House Communications no additional assassination re c o rds were Agency u n c o v e re d .

The White House Communications Agency 20. Social Security Administration (WHCA) did not identify any assassination re c o rds before its first meeting with the In response to a directive in 1993 by the Review Board in early 1997. The Review Department of Health & Human Services B o a rd contacted WHCA to determine (HHS) regarding compliance with the JFK whether it retained any archived rec o rd s Act, the Social Security Administration (SSA) from 1963–64 relating to the assassination. inventoried its holdings relating to Lee Har- vey Oswald and Jack Ruby. SSA sequestered The Review Board formally requested that the records at the Review Board’s request. WHCA search for any 1963–64 records that These same SSA records were later acquired might have pertained to the assassination. by IRS and IRS deposited them in the JFK WHCA located and placed into the JFK Col- Collection, but Section 6103 of the Internal lection an historical file that contained state- Revenue Code prevents disclosure of tax ments of WHCA personnel regarding events return records.

159 In early 1997, the Review Board staff met a. NARA, Washington, D.C. with SSA to verify what assassination- related re c o rds SSA might have and to NARA has legal and physical custody of determine if any such re c o rds could be pub- numerous federal government records that licly released. The Review Board re q u e s t e d a re transferred to it by federal agencies. that SSA assemble all earnings-re l a t e d Accordingly, the JFK Act required NARA to re c o rds for Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack identify any assassination records that may R u b y, quarterly reports filed by Oswald’s have been in its legal custody at the time the employers (to verify Oswald’s employment JFK Act was passed. history and income), and the original file opened for Marina Oswald’s claim for sur- After the JFK Act was passed, NARA identi- vivor benefits following Lee Harvey fied three major record categories in its cus- Oswald’s death. tody: (1) records of the Warren Commission; (2) the main Department of Justice Criminal The SSA was extremely diligent in collecting Division file on the Kennedy assassination; and assembling these re c o rds. The SSA p ro- and (3) the main Secret Service file on the tected some of these re c o rds under Section assassination. Many of the records within 6103, but the balance were transmitted to these files were already open to the public the JFK Collection. SSA placed its assassina- when the JFK Act was passed. NARA also tion re c o rds that contain information pro- identified administrative re c o rds for the tected by Section 6103 in the JFK collection United States Archivist and Deputy Archivist w h e re they will be kept confidential by relating to the handling of assassination- NARA. The SSA confirmed that these related materials maintained by NARA, re c o rds are being pre s e r v e d . including administrative records regarding Warren Commission holdings. In addition, As with Oswald’s tax returns, the Review NARA staff identified various federal agencies that had cooperated with the Warren Board regrets that Oswald’s earnings infor- Commission and searched those records for mation and employment history, as con- assassination records. tained in employer reports on file with SSA, have not been released to the public as of the In December 1992, the Assistant Archivist date of this Report. issued a directive to the staff of NARA requesting that any other assassination- 21. Drug Enforcement Administration related records be identified. Some miscellaneous records were included in the JFK Col- The Drug Enforcement A d m i n i s t r a t i o n lection as a result of this search. In addition, (DEA) was cooperative with the Review NARA—through its Center for Legislative Board in making files available for review. In Archives—processed hundreds of boxes of May 1998, the Review Board asked DEA to Congressional records relating to the assassi- formally process certain records as assassina- nation, including most importantly the tion records under the JFK Act. In addition, records of the House Select Committee on the Review Board asked for a formal state- Assassinations (HSCA). ment of DEA’s compliance. However, DEA has taken no steps to formally designate In April 1998, staffs of the Review Board and assassination records, nor has it submitted a NARA met to review the status of NARA’s compliance report as requested. identification and release of assassination records. The Review Board asked NARA to 22. NARA and the Presidential Libraries confirm that there were no other closed re c o rds relating to the assassination that The Review Board worked separately with might be among classified or closed files of N A R A in Washington, D.C., the Federal officials of the Kennedy and Johnson Admin- Records Center in Fort Worth, Texas, the Ford istrations, including certain cabinet secre- P residential Library, the JFK Pre s i d e n t i a l taries. In addition, the Review Board had Library, and the LBJ Presidential Library. The asked NARA to coordinate with the Admin- compliance status for each of these entities is istrative Office of U.S. Courts to identify and set forth below. secure for the JFK Collection court case files

160 for various FOIA suits involving the public’s c. The Gerald R. Ford Library. request to open up CIA, FBI, and other agency files on the Kennedy assassination. The Ford Library had substantial holdings NARA has been working with the Adminis- that were relevant under the JFK Act, includ- trative Office to obtain these court files. ing files of the President’s Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (the N A R A submitted its Final Declaration of Rockefeller Commission) and papers of for- Compliance on September 14, 1998. mer President Gerald R. Ford relating to his work on the Warren Commission. The Ford b. NARA, Southwest Region. Library first identified assassination records f rom among materials that were alre a d y NARA had its Southwest regional facility open to researchers, including records from undertake searches pursuant to the JFK Act. Gerald Ford’s Congressional and Vice-Presi- That facility is a repository for federal agency dential papers and records of Ford Adminis- records in the Dallas, Texas area. Among the tration officials.8 As a result of these searches, records identified under the JFK Act by the the Ford Library transmitted approximately Southwest Region were: (1) court files from six cubic feet of records to the JFK Collection the federal district court in Dallas, Texas with in August 1993. The Ford Library also respect to litigation over the rifle used to searched its unprocessed or closed “national assassinate President Kennedy (United States security collections.” This encompassed a v. 6.5 Mannlicher-Carcano Rifle and Marina review of the Rockefeller Commission files, Oswald Porter v. United States); (2) court files as well as files of President Ford’s National for the litigation brought by Claw Shaw Security Advisor and the Presidential Coun- against Jim Garrison in federal district court sel to the extent the files related to intelli- in New Orleans (Clay Shaw v. Jim Garrison); gence investigations of the mid-1970s (i.e., (3) files from the U.S Attorney in Dallas relat- the Rockefeller Commission and Churc h ing to the litigation over the Oswald rifle; Committee investigations). The Ford Library and (4) records of the criminal proceedings reviewed approximately 240,000 pages from against Jack Ruby, also obtained from the more than 20 different closed or unprocessed U.S. Attorney in Dallas. collections, and the Library selected approximately 1,400 documents (11,500 pages) for The Southwest Region also identified within p rocessing under the JFK Act. The Ford its custody various medical equipment from Library worked with the Review Board to Trauma Room No. 1 at Dallas Parkland Hos- have relevant agencies release these assassi- pital. This equipment was purchased from nation records. Dallas County in 1973 when Parkland Hospi- tal was being remodeled, and the equipment The Ford Library submitted its Final Declara- was placed in storage by NARA at its South- tion of Compliance dated August 12, 1998. west Region facility. The Review Board deferred to NARA’s decision to retain the d. The John F. Kennedy Library. equipment in storage.7 The identification of In April 1998, Review Board staff met with offi - assassination re c o rd s The National Archives and cials of the Southwest Region at its facility in within the holdings of the Records Administration (NAR A ) Fort Worth, Texas. The Review Board sought to JFK Library presented a fully supports the accelerated ascertain whether the Southwest Region had challenge to both the r e v i e w , d e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , a n d legal custody of any 1963–64 rec o r ds for vari- Library and the Review release of records related to ous law enforcement, intelligence, or military B o a rd in view of the the assassination of President agencies with offices in the Dallas reg i o n , extensive material rel a t - K e n n e d y . including Secret Service, ATF , FBI, and ONI. ing to, and originated by, —National Archives and The staff of the Southwest Region confirmed o fficials within the Records Administration, Senate that it had no such relevant rec o r ds. Kennedy administration. Hearings on JFK Act

The Southwest Region of NARA submitted its After passage of the JFK Act, the JFK Library Final Declaration of Compliance dated July s t a ff undertook an extensive review of 10, 1998. Kennedy administration re c o rds, personal

161 papers, and oral histories in its possession. In questions re g a rding the Library’s re c o rd p a r t i c u l a r, the JFK Library reviewed its searches and its work under the JFK Act. The closed or “unprocessed” holdings to identify questions were to be answered by Library assassination re c o rds. Among the rec o rd s officials, under penalty of perjury, in the reviewed by the JFK Library staff were Presi- Library’s Final Declaration of Compliance. dent Kennedy’s National Security files and The Library submitted its Final Declaration office files. The Library staff also reviewed of Compliance shortly thereafter. The JFK material made available to investigative bod- Library certified that “[a]ll records of Presi- ies in the 1970s such as the Church Commit- dent Kennedy, Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, tee. In addition, the Review Board staff, with Evelyn Lincoln, and Robert F. Kennedy in the the Library, reviewed the classified Attorney custody of the Library have been reviewed General file series of Robert F. Kennedy. The under the JFK Act.” The Library also stated JFK Library staff reviewed numerous collec- that further review of Robert F. Kennedy’s tions of records from Kennedy administra- papers had resulted in the identification of tion officials, as well as numerous oral his- additional assassination records that would tory interviews of such officials. The Library be processed for release. In addition, approx- processed many of these records as assassi- imately 150 RFK documents previously iden- nation records. tified for release were still in the process of declassification or review by the RFK Donor As of March 1995, the JFK Library had trans- Committee at the time of this Report.9 While mitted to the JFK Collection 33,000 pages of recognizing the extensive work of the JFK documents identified under the JFK A c t . Library and its significant contribution to the These included papers of President Kennedy, JFK Collection, the Review Board was disap- Robert F. Kennedy, C. Douglas Dillon, pointed in the delay in identification and Th e o d o r e Sorenson, Burke Marshall, David release of RFK papers. Bro d e r , Chet Huntley, and Arthur Schlesinger. In addition, rec o r ds from the Kennedy White The JFK Library, at its suggestion, briefed the House were also transmitted. These included members of the Review Board in August rec o r ds from the National Security files, the 1998 with respect to the work of the Library White House Central Subject files, and the under the JFK Act. At that presentation, the Pr esident’s Office files. The Library also sent Review Board was given assurances by the all or parts of numerous oral history inter- Library, in the strongest terms, that it was views to the extent that these interviews committed to completing release of all assas- touched upon the Kennedy assassination. sination-related records, including the RFK Additional materials were sent later, includ- records.10 ing Teddy White’s “Camelot papers,” which contained notes of his interview with Jacque- The JFK Library submitted its Final Declara- line Kennedy for Life magazine, and Evelyn tion of Compliance dated August 18, 1998. Lincoln’s rec o r ds consisting of log books, daily diaries, and appointment books for e. The Lyndon B. Johnson Library. Pr esident Kennedy. Finally, the JFK Library has stated that all remaining closed Dictabelts The LBJ Library has extensive rec o r ds that of President Kennedy’s telephone conversa- we r e reviewed pursuant to the JFK Act. The tions, as well as 25 hours of audio rec o rd i n g s Library holds 505 collections of personal of President Kennedy’s meetings, will be papers, 59 bodies of federal rec o r ds, and 1,227 released this fall. The JFK Library committed p rocessed and deeded oral history inter- to releasing all remaining audio rec o r dings of views. Even before the JFK Act was passed in Kennedy meetings by 1999 under Executive 1992, the Library, beginning in 1980, identi- Or der 12958. fied and made available materials that it had relating to the assassination of Pre s i d e n t The Review Board attempted to ensure that Ke n n e d y .11 In 1993, the LBJ Library transmit- the Library had reviewed and identified all ted to the JFK Collection material on the relevant records in its custody, particularly assassination from the LBJ White House Cen- records that were closed and unavailable to tral files, White House Confidential files, and researchers. The Review Board submitted to the National Security files; the Library’s “Spe- the JFK Library, in July 1998, a detailed set of cial File on the Assassination of Pres i d e n t

162 K e n n e d y,” which was assembled by the was made because NARA, until 1984, was White House in late 1966 as a ref e r ence file to under the auspices of GSA. Therefore, the respond to William Manchester’s book, Th e Review Board wanted to ensure that GSAdid Death of a Pres i d e n t ; Pr esident Johnson’s daily not have records relating to NARA’s han- diary rec o r ds listing his appointments and dling of Warren Commission materials or the phone calls made during the period following handling of the JFK autopsy photos and x- the assassination; office files of various White rays. GSA did identify files for the top offi- House aides; White House telephone offi c e cials of GSA from the 1960s but these were rec o r ds; personal papers of Under Secret a r y already at NARA and fully available to the of State George Ball, Attorney General Ram- public. GSA did not transfer any records to sey Clark, and John Connally; and numerou s the JFK Collection. oral history interviews. The LBJ Library also released tapes of President Johnson’s conver- GSA submitted its Final Declaration of Com- sations relating to the assassination (dating pliance dated January 26, 1998. mostly from 1963, 1964, and 1967—the time of the Garrison investigation and publication of C. CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS the Manchester book). In addition to executive branch records, the In the Spring of 1997, the Review Board staff Review Board worked with various congres- conducted a comprehensive review of LBJ sional committees, and NARA, to ensure dis- Library National Security Files (NSF), closed c l o s u re of various congressional re c o rd s oral histories thought to be related to the relating to the assassination. The most impor- assassination, and various manuscripts, tant record groups in this regard were the archives and office files of key officials. The records of the two congressional committees s t a ff identified more than 300 additional that conducted independent investigations of assassination re c o rds. The Review Board P resident Kennedy’s assassination—the coordinated with various agencies in declas- Church Committee in 1975–76 and the House sifying these records. Select Committee on Assassinations in 1977–79. In addition, the Review Board Finally, the LBJ Library committed to releasing tapes of all of President Johnson’s sought to ascertain whether there were rele- re c o rded telephone conversations thro u g h vant records among certain other Congres- October 1964 by September 1998. This release sional Committees. will include six previously closed recordings of President Johnson’s telephone conversa- 1. The House Select Committee on tions with Jacqueline Kennedy in December Assassinations (the HSCA) 1963 and January 1964. The LBJ Library will also release additional telephone conversa- The files of the HSCA embody the collections identified as assassination-re l a t e d , tive work of that Committee in investigating including two involving McGeorge Bundy. the assassinations of President Kennedy and The Library plans to continue release of the the Reverend Martin Luther King. A f t e r LBJ tapes (post-October, 1964) in chronologi- issuance of the HSCA’s report in 1979, the cal order, and has represented that additional voluminous files of the HSCA w e re placed conversations relating to the assassination in storage and were to be kept under seal will be forwarded to the JFK Collection. until 2029 (i . e ., fifty years from 1979). Because these were Congressional re c o rd s , The LBJ Library submitted its Final Declara- they were not subject to disclosure under tion of Compliance dated August 27, 1998. the FOIA. Oliver Stone’s film, J F K, under- s c o red the existence of these closed files and 23. General Services Administration the fact that they would not be re l e a s e d until 2029. After passage of the JFK A c t , The General Services Administration (GSA) N A R A made the opening of the HSCA f i l e s conducted no records searches under the JFK the highest priorities. NARA opened the JFK Act. The Review Board asked GSA in 1997 to assassination portion of the HSCA re c o rd s determine whether it might have records after consulating with the agencies that had relating to the assassination. This approach equities in the re c o rd s .

163 2. Senate Select Committee to Study released under the JFK Act were Secretary of Governmental Operations with Defense Robert McNamara; Deputy Secre- Respect to Intelligence Activities tary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric; Special (the Church Committee) Assistant for National Security McGeorge Bundy; former Directors of Central Intelli- Records of the Church Committee, like the gence John McCone, Richard Helms, and HSCA records, were of high public interest. William Colby; Deputy Director of Central The Review Board made extensive efforts to Intelligence Marshall Carter; CIAofficer John e n s u re the fullest disclosure of re l e v a n t Scelso (alias); Secret Service Chief James records. The Church Committee, in 1975–76, Rowley; Assistant FBI Director Alex Rosen; investigated a range of issues involving the FBI Special Agent in Charge for the Dallas operations of the intelligence agencies. Many Field Office Gordon Shanklin; and FBI Agent of these issues fell outside the scope of the James Hosty. JFK Act, but the Church Committee investigated the Kennedy assassination and the While the SSCI had been successful in obtain- issue of assassination of foreign leaders. ing the microfilmed transcripts requested by the Board, the Review Board remained con- After passage of the JFK Act, the Senate cerned that the original hardcopy transcripts Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) for this testimony, and any accompanying inventoried the original re c o rds of the materials, had not been located by the SSCI Church Committee (some 450 boxes) and or otherwise accounted for. The Review transmitted approximately 40 boxes of assas- Board asked for access to all 450 boxes of sination-related records to the JFK Collection. original Church Committee files. Again, SSCI This represented a significant effort by the was cooperative and arranged to have the Committee, as well as by the agencies that original Church Committee files available for reviewed and declassified the re c o rd s . the Board’s inspection (the originals had not NARA, however, surveyed the re c o rd s previously been reviewed by the staffs of placed in the Collection and concluded that NARA or the Review Board). The Review testimony directly relevant to the Kennedy Board staff inspected all the original files, assassination (and cited in the Kennedy and additional materials were designated as assassination report of the Church Commit- assassination re c o rds. However, the hard tee) was not included in the released materi- copy of testimony cited in the JFK Assassina- als. For approximately two years, the SSCI tion Report was not among the materials. did not explain or rectify this crucial gap in Although microfilm copies of this testimony the records provided to NARA. were available, the Review Board specifically asked the SSCI to explain the absence of the In 1997, the Review Board wrote to the SSCI hard copy files, particularly since they were a and, again, raised the issue of identifying and discrete and significant body of records relat- processing testimony directly relevant to the ing to the Kennedy assassination. At the time C h u rch Committee’s investigation of the of this Report, the SSCI could not explain the Kennedy assassination, as well as testimony absence of these original transcripts (and per- re g a rding alleged CIA assassination plots haps accompanying materials) relating to the against foreign leaders. The SSCI was coop- Kennedy assassination. erative and diligent in attempting to locate and forward the specific transcripts that had 3. House Select Committee on been identified by the Review Board and Intelligence (the Pike Committee) NARA. Throughout 1997–98, the SSCI identified and produced scores of micro f i l m e d In 1975, the Pike Committee investigated var- copies of the requested transcripts. This testi- ious issues regarding the intelligence com- mony was processed and placed into the JFK munity. The Pike Committee also looked into Collection. The transcripts include testimony certain discrete, limited issues regarding the of FBI and CIA officials who worked on the assassination of President Kennedy. The Pike JFK assassination investigation, as well as Committee records have been under the cus- officials who testified regarding the alleged tody of the House Permanent Select Commit- assassination plots against Fidel Castro . tee on Intelligence (HPSCI). HPSCI identified Among the officials whose testimony was approximately three boxes of assassination-

164 related records of the Pike Committee and Oswald, Marina Oswald, the Fair Play for has placed them into the JFK Collection. Cuba Committee (FPCC), and Mark Lane (a Wa r ren Commission critic). Under House 4. House Judiciary Subcommittee on Rules, investigative rec o r ds of a House com- Civil & Constitutional Rights, mittee may be closed for fifty years after the Chaired by Congressman Don committee finishes their investigation and Edwards (the Edwards Subcommittee) shuts down.

In 1975 and 1976, the Edwards Subcommittee In November 1996, the Review Board investigated the FBI’s destruction of a note requested that Congress make these records that Lee Harvey Oswald delivered to the Dal- available for inspection by the Review Board las Field Office prior to the assassination of to confirm whether the records initially iden- Pr esident Kennedy. The Review Board raised tified by NARA s t a ff were assassination with NARA’s Center for Legislative Arc h i v e s records and should be released to the public. the issue of whether they had any original The Review Board received no responses and files for this subcommittee. The Legislative raised the matter again in 1997. In January Ar chives staff could not identify any such files 1998, the Clerk’s Office sought permission within its Judiciary Committee rec o r ds. The from the Judiciary Committee to open up the Review Board also asked the Clerk’s Office of HUAC files for Review Board inspection. The the House of Representatives for assistance in Judiciary Committee initially denied the locating these rec o r ds. Unfortunately, no orig- Board’s request, but upon reconsideration inal rec o r ds for this subcommittee have been ultimately agreed to release substantial located, although copies of some of these HUAC files relating to the JFK assassination. rec o r ds can be found in the HSCA Collection. 7. Library of Congress 5. House Government Operation’s Subcommittee on Government The Library of Congress did not transmit any Information and Individual Rights, assassination rec o r ds to the JFK Collection Chaired by Congresswoman Bella after passage of the Act. In June 1994, the Abzug (the Abzug Subcommittee) Library of Congress responded to an inquiry by the Review Board and reported that it had In 1975 and 1976, the Abzug Subcommittee located no assassination-related re c o rd s looked into issues relating to access to War- within the classified holdings in its Manu- ren Commission records and the destruction script Division. In 1996, the Review Board of FBI records. It was the Review Board’s asked the Library of Congress, including the understanding that these records remained Co n g r essional Research Service, to ensure that closed pursuant to House Rules. In 1996, and it had searched for any non-public rec o r ds in again in 1997, the Review Board sought Con- its custody that might relate to the assassina- gressional authorization to have any assassi- tion. The Library of Congress took no action nation-related records within the Abzug Sub- on the Review Board’s request, and the Board committee files reviewed and released under made another formal request in October 1997. the JFK Act. After receiving the appropriate The Congressional Research Service deferred C o n g ressional authorization, the Review compliance with the JFK Act pending explicit Board staff inspected the original files of the Co n g r essional authorization. Aside from CRS, Abzug Subcommittee and designated vari- ho w e v e r , the Library of Congress undertook ous materials for release under the JFK Act. to survey its non-public holdings to identify rec o r ds relating to the assassination. This 6. House Un-American Activities entailed review of the Library’s closed rec o rd s Committee (HUAC) in its Manuscript Division.

During the 1950s and 1960s, this Committee The Library of Congress filed a formal state- investigated “un-American” activities of vari- ment of compliance with the Review Board ous individuals and groups. In the summer of and identified three sets of closed records 1996, the staff of NARA’s Center for Legisla- containing assassination-related materials: tive Ar chives did an initial survey of the (1) a “duplicate and partial” set of Rocke- HUAC files and identified files on Lee Harvey feller Commission records donated by Vice-

165 President Rockefeller and closed until March investigated labor practices in the late 1950s; 25, 2002; (2) papers of Senator Daniel Moyni- then Senator John Kennedy was a member of han from his tenure as Assistant Secretary of the committee and Robert F. Kennedy was Labor in the Kennedy Administration; and Chief Counsel. The records of the committee (3) papers of Howard Liebengood, an aide to include information on organized crime fig- Senator Howard Baker, who did work relat- ures. It was determined that the records of ing to the assassination for the Senate Intelli- the committee did not qualify as assassina- gence Committee. The Library also identified tion records under the JFK Act. relevant collections that were pre v i o u s l y open to the public, including papers of Earl The Review Board surveyed the indices to Wa r ren, David Atlee Phillips, and Elmer 1949–51 records of the Senate Special Com- Gertz (attorney for Jack Ruby). In addition, mittee to investigate Organized Crime in the Library had one piece of correspondence Interstate Commerce (the Kefauver Commit- written by Lee Harvey Oswald while he was tee). Given the remoteness in time from the in the Soviet Union. events of the assassination, no records of the Kefauver Committee were designated as Once the relevant closed materials were iden- assassination re c o rds. More o v e r, Congre s s tified, the Review Board sought the donors’ has authorized NARA to open these records permission to open the records. The Review in 2001. Board obtained Senator Moynihan’s agreement to open his papers relating to the assas- The Review Board and NARA i d e n t i f i e d sination, and the Board has been in the certain re c o rds of the Senate Judiciary’s Sen- process of obtaining Mr. Liebengood’s con- ate Internal Security Subcommittee (the sent. The Library of Congress stated that its Eastland Committee) for review under the Rockefeller Commission records were dupli- JFK Act. Thirteen transcripts of executive cates of the Rockefeller Commission files at session testimony were subsequently identi- the Ford Library. The Ford Library reviewed fied for release under the JFK Act. These and processed assassination records from the w e re processed by the Center for Legislative Rockefeller Commission under the JFK Act. A rchives and transmitted to the JFK Collec- The Review Board has requested the Library tion. The re c o rds included 1961 testimony of of Congress to ascertain whether its set of the Edwin Walker and December 1963 testi- Rockefeller Commission papers contains any mony of Ruth Paine. In addition, the Center assassination-related materials that have not for Legislative A rchives transmitted to the been released by the Ford Library. JFK Collection three boxes of press clippings re g a rding Lee Harvey Oswald and the In the Summer of 1998, the Congres s i o n a l a s s a s s i n a t i o n . Re s e a r ch Service (CRS) identified one box of memoranda relating to the assassination that D. CONCLUSION we r e prep a r ed by CRS for the HSCA and other entities. Having received appropriate Congres - Generally, government offices attempted to sional authorization, CRS has agreed to for- s e a rch for and release their assassination wa r d these materials to the JFK Collection. records in compliance with the JFK Act. Most importantly, this was the case with the major 8. Other Congressional Records agencies, such as the FBI, CIA, Department of State, Department of Justice, Secret Service, The NARA and Review Board staffs also NARA, and the Presidential Libraries, that examined certain other Congre s s i o n a l would be expected to have core materials records to identify any materials that might relating to the assassination. In some cases, be considered “assassination-related” under particular agencies conducted searches after the JFK Act. the Review Board notified them of their obligations. The Review Board was given appropriate Congressional authorization to inspect files By initiating a compliance program, the of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Board decided to require the relevant agen- Activities in the Labor or Management Field cies to affirmatively document their work (the Mclellan Committee). This committee under the JFK Act, including certification

166 that they had conducted diligent searches for assassination records. The individual officials who represented the agencies were professional and cooperative in meeting the substantive and procedural requirements of the Board’s compliance program.

With some limited exceptions, almost all of the federal entities this chapter discusses have explained and certified, under penalty of perjury, their efforts to locate and release all relevant records on the assassination of P resident Kennedy. The Board anticipates that these statements, under oath, will enhance the public’s confidence that the United States government, in good faith, attempted to release all re c o rds on the Kennedy assassination.

167 CHAPTER 8 ENDNOTES

1 House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992: Hearings on H.J. 454, 102 Cong., 2d sess., 1992. (Opening statement by Committee Chairman John Conyers, Jr. 2 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (2)(a)(3). 3 Many of the descriptions of agency’s efforts to comply with the JFK Act were obtained from the initial or final certifications that the agencies submitted to the Review Board. 4 At its peak in 1994, the FBI’s JFK Task Force had more than 90 employees working on assassination records processing. 5 In the spring of 1997, Marina Oswald provided limited consent to the IRS to release Lee Harvey Oswald’s tax returns to researchers Ray and Mary La Fontaine. Marina Oswald declared her intent to have the La Fontaines release these returns to the public, but to our knowledge they have not done so. Absent Marina Oswald’s consent, the IRS is legally obligated under Section 6103 to withhold the Oswald tax returns from public disclosure. 6 Copies of these ONI rec o r ds were also located in the files of the HSCA, and they were released along with the other HSCA fi l e s . 7 In addition to records identified by the Southwest Region of NARA, the Southeast Region had identified some papers of Senator Richard Russell relating to his work on the Warren Commission. (NARA had been providing courtesy storage for these papers on behalf of the University of Georgia.) 8 Among the Ford papers transmitted to the JFK Collection were excerpts of interviews with President Ford conducted by Trevor Armbrister in connection with the writing of Ford’s memoirs, ATime to Heal. 9 The Robert F. Kennedy Donor Committee controls access to all RFK papers under a Deed of Gift agreement with the JFK Library. 10 In addition, the JFK Library is releasing the RFK and other papers pursuant to the declassification requirements of Executive Order 12958. 11 These materials were identified in a detailed index entitled, “Guide to Materials from the Johnson Library Pertaining to the Assassination of John F. Kennedy.”

168 RE V I E W BO A R D RE C O M M E N D AT I O N S

The Final Report of the A s s a s s i n a t i o n ernment was hiding important information Records Review Board provides not only an about the Kennedy assassination by placing opportunity to detail the extraord i n a r y its records beyond the reach of its citizens. breadth and depth of the Board’s work to Broad disagreement with the Warren Com- identify and release the records of the tragic mission findings, explosive claims in the death of President John F. Kennedy, but also popular movie JFK, and continued deteriora- to reflect on the Board’s shared experience in tion of public confidence in government led carrying out this mission and the meaning of to consensus that it was time to open the its efforts for the much larger challenge of files. Thus the debate in Congress largely secrecy and accountability in the federal gov- became a debate over what mechanisms ernment. It is true that the Board’s role was to could constitutionally compel the opening of a large extent disciplined and tightly focused the assassination files. on the assassination, its aftermath and the b roader Cold War context in which the The Review Board’s mandate was not to events occurred. investigate once again the assassination, but to release as many of these heavily restricted Any evaluation, however, of the unique documents as possible. Lawmakers com- experience of the Review Board–five private mented that the efforts of the Review Board citizens granted unprecedented powers to “will stand as a symbol and barometer of require public release of long-secret federal public confidence in the review and release records–inevitably presents the larger ques- of the government records related to the tion of how the Board’s work can be applied assassination of President Kennedy....Several to federal records policy. There is no doubt provisions of [the JFK Act] are intended to that for decades the pendulum had swung provide as much independence and account- sharply toward secrecy and away from open- ability as is possible within our Constitu- ness. Changes wrought by the end of the tional framework.” Restoring public confi- Cold War and the public’s desire to know dence in government is a difficult task under have begun to shift the balance. The Review any circumstances. The Review Board took Board’s mandate represented a new frontier this responsibility seriously, however, and set in this changing balance—an entirely new out in April 1994 to create the most complete declassification process applied to the most- record possible of the documentary evidence sought after government secrets. In this of the assassination so that in the end the chapter, the Board steps back and reflects on American public could draw its own conclu- its experiences, raises issues that will help sions as to what happened and why on that frame the declassification debate, and makes fateful day in Dallas in November 1963. recommendations on the lessons to be learned from the path taken to release of the Fr om the start, the Review Board did as much Kennedy assassination collection. The dia- of its work in public as it could possibly do, logue about how best to balance national given the classified material with which it security and privacy with openness and worked. The Board’s major policy decisions accountability will continue both within gov- we r e all made after carefully consulting with ernment and beyond. The Review Board will the public through public hearings and Fe d - necessarily be part of that important debate. eral Register notices. Many of the Board’ s The Review Board was created out of the requests to agencies for additional informa- broad public frustration that the federal gov- tion were suggested by the Board’s continu-

169 ing dialogue with res e a r chers, authors, and in its review of the re c o rds and guided experts. Frequent public hearings outside of agency reviewers in the positions they took Washington, experts conferences, ongoing toward postponement requests. The devel- public releases of the rec o r ds, witness inter- opment of this unique and valuable set of views, and media availability were among decisions, which came to be known as the the many tools the Board used to reach out Board’s “common law,” eventually resulted and communicate with a public stro n g l y in thousands of “consent releases,” in which in t e r ested in the results of the Board’s work. documents moved directly from the agencies The result was that the Board was helped without redactions to NARA. immeasurably not only by the advice and suggestions that resulted from this public dia- There were, of course, many substantive dis- logue, but by the rec o r ds that were discov- agreements between the Board and the agen- er ed and opened through the communica- cies, but the course of the relationships were tions. The broad definition of “assassination characterized chiefly by growing mutual rec o r d” and the foundation for the taking of understanding and markedly impro v e d the original Zapruder film were developed communications. The Board was gratified to th r ough public hearings. Furthermore, some see agency reviewers and decisionmakers of the Board’s most significant acquisitions of grow increasingly aware that the responsible donated collections—for example, the Rankin release of information can provide an oppor- papers, the Wegmann papers, and the Garri- tunity to create a more complete record of the son grand jury transcripts—were the result of extensive work that many agencies did on the public hearings. the issues raised by the assassination. Many appeared also to gain a greater appreciation Public involvement in the Review Board’ s of the tremendous costs of secrecy, both in work was critical to the success of the Board, terms of public confidence and maintenance both because public participation was impor- of records. tant for public confidence and because public involvement produced results. The assassina- There were critics of the Review Board, those tion res e a r ch community, in particular, pro- who believed that the “targeted declassifica- vided many useful suggestions to the Board, tion” of assassination records not only inter- but more importantly perhaps, monitored the fered with the goal of systematic declassifica- Bo a r d’s work closely and did not permit the tion directed by Executive Order 12958, but Bo a r d to back off in its search for rec o rd s . was also much too expensive. It is difficult, of course, to compare one method of declassifi- The Review Board began its work at a slow cation with another, harder still to place a pace, which was necessary for a group of five price tag on the nature of the information private citizens with no prior involvement that is now released and available to the with the issue. Preparation to weigh the American public. It is worth noting that the important competing interests of national Kennedy assassination records were largely security and privacy with the public interest segregated due to the use of the records dur- took time. Education of the Board and the ing the many prior government investiga- equally important development of tru s t tions of the assassination. But, the Review among the Board, its staff, and agency Board does recognize that any meaningful reviewers takes time, and future declassifica- approach to declassification will of necessity tion efforts need to take that into account. be multi-faceted, with diff e rent methods What developed from the early extensive dis- adopted for different circumstances. The par- cussions between the Board, its staff and the ticular circumstances of the assassination of agency reviewers were thoughtful and well- President Kennedy and the highly secretive reasoned decisions that reflected the Board’s governmental response have had an enor- commitment to the legislation as well as the mous impact on public confidence and made Board’s collective interest in developing the the Review Board approach singularly fullest possible historical record surrounding appropriate. When viewed in that light the this tragic event. cost of this four-year project seems entirely a p p ropriate, particularly when compare d The precedents that developed from the with the significant costs, both financial and Board’s early deliberations guided the staff otherwise, of keeping the record secret. The

170 Board is confident that, in this setting, the At an early stage in the Review Board’s approach chosen by the Congress to open the e fforts, one of the Board members com- Kennedy assassination records was a highly mented that the Board should strive to effective one. accomplish as much as it could, to be remem- bered for what it attempted. Or, to para- The Review Board is certainly aware that phrase Robert Kennedy, the Board should th e r e are a great many unresolved issues rel a t - work hard to ensure that its reach continually ing to the assassination of President Kennedy exceeded its grasp. The Board did not always that will be addressed in the years to come. achieve that standard, but the sheer scope The massive public collection of documents and accessibility of the JFK Collection speaks that awaits the res e a r chers will undoubtedly eloquently about the effort. The Board has shed light not only on the assassination, but left to posterity a historical bequest that is on its broader context as an episode of the invaluable and unprecedented. Cold War . The community of professional historians, who initially exhibited comparatively Recommendations slight interest in the Board’s work, has begun paying attention with the new accessibility of The Review Board presents recommenda- rec o r ds that reflect the Cold War context in tions that reflect the Board’s experience and which the assassination was enmeshed. Ulti- provides guidance for those who wish to ma t e l y , it will be years before the JFK Collec- capitalize on that experience to further tion at NARA can be judged prop e r l y . The test reform the process of classification and will be in the scholarship that is generated by declassification of federal documents. The historians and other res e a r chers who study Board recognizes that the JFK Act represents the extensive documentation of the event and but one approach to declassification, one its aftermath. Does the historical re c o rd whose activity was designed to review sensi- formed by the Board inspire confidence that tive records concerning a controversial event. the rec o r d is now reasonably complete? Wil l the documents released under the JFK Ac t 1. The Review Board recommends that future lead to still other materials? Will the mass of declassification boards be genuinely independent, documentary evidence answer the questions both in the structure of the organization and in posed by historians and others? Will the the qualifications of the appointments. Bo a r d’s compliance program inspire confidence that the agencies have produced all the The Review Board’s independence was relevant documentation that exists today in gr ounded in the concept that the Board was agency files? What do the rec o r ds tell us about in fact an independent agency in the execu- the 1960s and the Cold War context of the tive branch with powers granted through its as s a s s i n a t i o n ? enabling legislation. This independence was consequently as political as it was legal, facil- The Review Board approach, the prec e d e n t itating the Board’s relations with the agencies. cr eated, the tools identified, and the lessons learned will assist future res e a r chers immea- Although appointed by the President, mem- su r a b l y . Agency reviewers will note that the bers of the Review Board could not be termi- Republic has not collapsed under the weight nated except for just cause. By not submitting of threats to national security because of the Review Board to the supervisory authority Review Board actions and, perhaps, they will of the executive branch, providing an inde- also note that openness is itself a good thing pendent staff who answered only to the and that careful scrutiny of government Bo a r d, and establishing strong statutory stan- actions can strengthen agencies and the da r ds governing the review of rec o r ds, the JFK pr ocess of government, not weaken it. There Act provided political and legal balance for likely will be problems in the future that best the conflict with agencies. This balance was lend themselves to the extraordinary attention absolutely necessary for the Board to stand up that a similarly empowered Review Board can to experts and their national security claims. focus. Formation of a historical rec o r d that can augment understanding of important events Furthermore, the independent qualifications is central not only to openness and account- of Board members is likewise important. A ab i l i t y , but to democracy itself. group of five outsiders, uninvolved in previ-

171 ous investigations or research concerning the Other powers conferred on the Board by the assassination, but trained in historical, JFK Act were similarly central to the exercise archival, and legal issues that are central to of the Board’s duties. The agencies could the records of the assassination, the Board challenge Board decisions only by appealing collectively brought a perspective framed by decisions to the President, who has the “non- p rofessional training and experience. The delegable” responsibility to decide them. absence of any connection or allegiance to the This stringent provision raised our declassifi- agencies freed the Board to make truly inde- cation activity to a threshold level that pendent decisions. The Review Board prompted the agencies to weigh the ramifica- absolutely needed its independence in order tions of any appeal that expended valuable to accomplish its statutory mandate. For any political capital. g roup charged with declassifying secre t re c o rds, independence is an essential The access standards have been a central con- attribute. sideration in guiding the work of the Board, never far from any discussion or decision. 2. The Review Board recommends that any Their importance cannot be overlooked, and serious, sustained effort to declassify re c o r d s the pervading influence of the standards was requires congressional legislation with (a) a pre - consistently reflected in our deliberations. In sumption of openness, (2) clear standards of balancing the public interest and harm of dis- access, (3) an enforceable review and appeals closure, the Board determined that the pre- process, and (4) a budget appropriate to the scope cept of a “presumption of disclosure” pre- of the task. vailed in every case where there was salient information relative to the assassination. The JFK Act established admirable and effective standards through its standards of “pre- The Board’s relationship with the agencies sumption of disclosure” for releasing records often faltered over the “clear and convincing and “clear and convincing evidence of harm” evidence of harm” standard. This exacting in restricting them. Both standards helpfully standard, borrowed from the criminal law, guided the Board in its decisionmaking, were was not only a new declassification criterion, understandable and simple in application. but it placed the burden on the agency to The Board strongly urges that these stan- explain why information should re m a i n dards be applied to other efforts to declassify shrouded in secrecy. This occasioned conflict federal records. The discerning enumeration and misunderstanding, especially as the in the Act of criteria for sustaining restricted agencies complained that satisfying the test access created an obligation both for the required unwarranted expenditure of scarce Review Board and the agencies to apply funds. The Board, however, insisted on these criteria to the many issues presented in adherence to the legislative provisions, and the documents. These criteria for sustaining the agencies ultimately learned, for the most restrictions, especially that of “clear and con- part, how to satisfy the Board’s expectations. vincing evidence of harm,” provide a very As interpreted by the Review Board, “clear important focus and disciplined way of and convincing evidence of harm” required thinking about federal records and the infor- specific reasons for protection. General con- mation they often contain. cepts of “national security” and “individual privacy” were insufficient. If harm were to be The central fact that the access standards were caused by release, the Board insisted on embodied in Congressional legislation was of understanding the harm. Thus, the specific immeasurable assistance to the Review Board. standard resulted in greater fidelity to the Although Congress’ inclusion of such stan- law and more accurate decisionmaking by da r ds in the JFK Act nearly sparked a constitu- the Review Board. tional battle over the Act’s legality, the power of independence by Congressional mandate Moreover, the Congress provided adequate su r ely muted a fair number of agency dis- and sufficient funds for the Board to hire staff putes. Standards set through agency rec o m - to undertake its work. The Board was fortu- mendations and presidential inclusion in an nate to recruit talented and dedicated col- executive order would have limited the leagues who worked closely with the Board Bo a r d’s ability to compel disclosure. to fulfill its important mission. The Review

172 Board’s accomplishment is, in a direct way, for processing documents. that of the staff, and the Board is indebted to them. Other federal declassification efforts, Codification of these rules of application especially at NARA, need substantially more would permit restricted access to some of resources if they are successfully to accom- this information, and yet still indicate to plish their mandates. The work of the Review researchers and other citizens what kind of Board staff shows what adequate funding identifying information had been withheld can achieve. and for how long. The idea of substitute language for critical pieces of redacted informa- 3. The Review Board recommends that its tion, together with less sweeping and more “common law” of decision, formed in the context discerning application of what is to be with- of a “presumption of disclosure” and the “clear held, offers a promising way of limiting the and convincing evidence of harm” criteria, be uti - volume of restricted information in federal lized for similar information in future declassifi - documents, either through more uniform cation efforts as a way to simplify and speed up and limited classification rules or through releases. earlier and more declassification.

The Review Board’s understanding of the 4. The Review Board recommends that future important standards of a “presumption of declassification efforts avoid the major shortcom - disclosure” in the release of documents and ings of the JFK Act: (a) unreasonable time limits, “clear and convincing evidence of harm” in (b) employee restrictions, (c) application of the sustaining restricted access and its applica- law after the Board terminates, and (d) problems tion of the more specific section 6 standards inherent with rapid sunset provisions. developed slowly as the Board applied the law to the many postponement issues raised If the JFK Act represented a milestone in in the documents. articulating important new principles by which to review classified records, there were In time, the body of decisionmaking began to also shortcomings in the law that should be gro w , and with it what was termed the avoided in future declassification eff o r t s . Board’s “common law,” a collection of deci- They include: sions that greatly informed staff and agency reviewers how to apply the JFK Act and • the timetable laid out for the Review Board saved an enormous amount of time by han- to accomplish its work was unrealistic and dling similar information in similar ways. req u i r ed the Board to play “catch up” from the beginning and req u i r ed agencies to duplicate Many documents share common characteris- their work after the Board began its work; tics. The names of agents and informants, crypts, digraphs, the location of CIA installa- • the provision that the Board could not hire tions abroad, and other numerical data used staff who were currently working anywhere to identify documents, recurred constantly in in the government seemed unduly restric- the documents examined by the Review tive, and obliged the Board to undertake Board and helped form the Review Board costly and time-consuming security checks “common law” about how to treat redacted for most employees, for whom security clear- information in federal documents. ances were central to their work with classified documents; As the effort to declassify federal documents presses forward on other fronts, the Review • the Review Board sunsets but the JFK Act Board believes that there are common ways does not and, as a result, there is uncertainty of handling these categories of information, about the status of openings that will occur so that similar substitute language may be after September 1998, and whether any fur- provided, and there might also be consensus ther appeals by agencies might be permitted, concerning how long the information needs and, if so, who would represent the interest to be restricted. Handling restricted docu- of openness; ments by adopting common substitute language as appropriate will also enhance the • the sunset provision in the JFK Act, while efficiency of the review, lowering unit costs embodying the important concept that this

173 ef fort was not to be permanent, nonetheless mation. One such way would be to use undermined the careful review and disposi- agreed-upon substitute language to avoid tion of the rec o r ds. The Board inevitably lost the originating agency referral. critical staff in the final stages because they had to seek job security for themselves and 6. The Review Board recommends that a com - their families. Moreo v e r , the sunset enabled pliance program be used in future declassification government agencies that were not inclined efforts as an effective means of eliciting full coop - to cooperate to simply try to outlast the eration in the search for records. Bo a r d. A mo r e open-ended provision would be preferable, in which the Board, supervised The Review Board compliance program was by its congressional oversight committee and established to ensure that all federal agencies the Office of Management and Budget, would holding assassination records would warrant de c l a r e its prog r ess, but not set a termination under oath that every reasonable effort had date until there was agreement concerning been made to identify assassination records the successful completion of the mandate. and that such records had been made fully available for review by the Board. The Board 5. The Review Board recommends that the has remained concerned that critical records cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive may have been withheld from the Board’s problem of referrals for “third party equities” scrutiny and that the Board did not secure all (classified information of one agency appearing in that was “out there.” It is all too easy to imag- a document of another) be streamlined by (A) ine that agencies and agency personnel not requiring re p resentatives of all agencies with inclined to cooperate might simply have interests in selected groups of records to meet for waited, using the JFK Act’s sunset provision joint declassification sessions, or (B) devising by waiting for it to take effect and ending the uniform substitute language to deal with certain need to cooperate. categories of recurring sensitive equities. The Review Board’s solution to this concern The practice of extensive classification of was to develop a compliance program in government documents has created a jungle which each agency designated a “compli- of secrecy in which agencies are protective of ance officer” to warrant, under oath and one another’s pre rogatives, meticulously penalty of perjury, that re c o rds had been referring records to the originating agency in diligently searched for and turned over to all cases. The frequency of this occurrence the Board for review and/or release to has had a substantial impact on the rate and NARA. This program entails a detailed pace of release of such information. It is not review (overseen by Review Board staff) of surprising that sensitive information is the effort undertaken by each agency in pur- s h a red extensively, especially among law suit of such re c o rds and constitutes a re c o rd enforcement and intelligence agencies. One to guide future re s e a rchers in examining consequence of this sharing is that one what assassination re c o rds were actually agency’s restricted information is often u n c o v e red. The program is also intended to found in another’s files. When this occurs, be forward-looking, so that the agencies will the agency creating the information must continue to follow the provisions of the JFK agree to its release by another agency. Such Act after the Board terminates its role. The equities are expensive to search and release. p rogram has worked well.

The Review Board developed an effective 7. The Review Board recommends the following means of mitigating these cumbersome refer- to ensure that NARA can exercise the provisions of rals by convening on occasion representa- the JFK Act after the Review Board terminates: tives of agencies with interests in the documents so that a group of documents could be a. that NARA has the authority and means collectively declassified at once, with repre- to continue to implement Board decisions, sentatives there to sign off on the specific b. that an appeals procedure be developed interests associated with each agency.A sec- that places the burden for preventing access on ond means of easing this problem is to the agencies, and develop a uniform means of dealing with c. that a joint oversight group composed of certain recurring categories of sensitive infor- rep r esentatives of the four organizations that origi -

174 nally nominated individuals to serve on the Review as most of them are, occur. The provisions of Board be created to facilitate the continuing execu - the JFK Act have fostered the release of such tion of the access provisions of the JFK Act. documents, and the Board’s experience demonstrates that similar legislation would The creation of the JFK Collection at NARA be successful in the future. established a large records collection under- going intense use by researchers. Having cre- 9. The Review Board recommends that both the ated this national research resource, Con- Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Execu - gress should ensure that NARA receives the tive Order 12958 be strengthened, the former to additional re s o u rces necessary to manage narrow the categories of information automati - this collection responsibly, and that it is also cally excluded from disclosure, the latter to add be given the authority to administer the “independent oversight” to the process of remaining provisions of the JFK Act. “review” when agency heads decide that records in their units should be excluded from release. The Board recommends negotiation of a memorandum of understanding among Despite the sound public policy goals NARA, the FBI, and the CIA that would encompassed in both the FOIA and Execu- establish a common agreement on how to tive Order 12958, both of these measures fall resolve the inevitable issues concerning the short of their goal of access, as evidenced by extensive assassination records of these two the inability of re s e a rchers to use these mea- agencies. This is particularly necessary since s u res to obtain access to assassination additional records will be sent to NARA and re c o rds. The categories of exclusion are far additional releases of documents are sched- too broad in the FOIA to constitute a mean- uled to take place after the termination of the ingful program of opening restricted federal Review Board. re c o rds, and the succession of executive o rders issued since the FOIA was enacted The formation of a liaison group composed reflects the same problem. The most re c e n t , of individuals from professional organiza- Executive Order 12958, also fails by not cre- tions that originally nominated members for ating for federal agencies an “oversight” the Review Board to oversee implementation p ro c e d u re to ensure that the decisions con- of the provisions of the JFK Act would ensure cerning access to agency re c o rds made by the continuing representation of the public that agency’s head will be independently interest by those trained to understand con- reviewed. The mandate to release should be tinuing historical, archival, and legal issues. internalized in the agencies and penalties for s e c recy must rival in consequence those for 8. The Review Board recommends that the unauthorized re l e a s e . Review Board model be adopted and applied whenever there are extraordinary circumstances The mandate of the Review Board, under- in which continuing controversy concerning gov - sc o r ed by powers conferred in the JFK Ac t ernment actions has been most acute and where and further aided by an adequate approp r i a - an aggressive effort to release all “reasonably tion, far exceeds what the FOIA and executive related” federal records would serve usefully to or ders can accomplish because the Review enhance historical understanding of the event. Bo a r d has the authority and res o u r ces to both review and release. Proponents of the FOIA The public stake is clear in creating a mecha- and executive order declassification would nism such as the Review Board to inform benefit from consulting the JFK Act to iden- American citizens of the details of some of tify how best to augment the res o u r ces and the most controversial events in American authority of those measures . history. Moreover, the release of documents enables citizens to form their own views of 10. The Review Board recommends the adoption events, to evaluate the actions of elected and of a federal classification policy that substantially: appointed officials, and to hold them to account. There will not be a large number of a. limits the number of those in government such events, but there must be procedures who can actually classify federal documents, grounded in experience that might be used to b. re s t r i c t s the number of categories by uncover the truth when these events, tragic which documents might be classified,

175 c. reduces the time period for which the doc - ernment is a recent expression of this long- ument(s) might be classified, standing concern. Change is long overd u e d. encourages the use of substitute language and the Review Board’s experience amply to immediately open material which might other - demonstrates the value of sharing important wise be classified, and information with the American public. It is a e. increases the resources available to the matter of tru s t . agencies and NARA for declassifying federal records. The Review Board’s recommendations are designed to help ensure that the comprehen- The Review Board’s experience leaves little sive documentary record of the Kennedy doubt that the federal government need- assassination is both actively developed after lessly and wastefully classified and then the Board terminates, and that the experience withheld from public access countless of the Review Board be turned to the larger important re c o rds that did not re q u i re such purpose of addressing the negative conse- t reatment. Consequently, there is little doubt quences of the excessive classification of fed- that an aggressive policy is necessary to eral records. The Review Board’s effort to a d d ress the significant problems of lack of accomplish the purposes of the JFK Act has accountability and an uninformed citizenry been focused and aggressive. It will be for that are created by the current practice of others, of course, to judge the Board’s success excessive classification and obstacles to in achieving these goals, but there can be no releasing such information. This need is not doubt about our commitment to making the something recently identified, although the JFK Act and an independent Review Board a Moynihan Commission on Secrecy in Gov- model for the future.

176 APPENDIX A TH E ME M B E R S O F T H E AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S RE V I E W BO A R D

“The President, by and with the advice and con- Henry F. Graff. Henry F. sent of the Senate, shall appoint, without reg a r d Graff was recommended to political affiliation, five citizens to serve as to President Clinton by members of the Review Board to ensure and the White House staff. He facilitate the rev i e w , transmission to the is Professor Emeritus of Ar chivist, and public disclosure of Government History at Columbia Uni- rec o r ds related to the assassination of Pres i d e n t v e r s i t y, where he held John F. Kennedy.” JFK Act at § 7 (b)(1). rank as Instructor to Full Professor from 1946-1991. Although the Review Board members were He served as the Chair- Presidential appointees, the JFK Act recom- man of the History Department fro m mended that the President select the Board 1961–1964. In the 1960s he served on the members from lists of names submitted to National Historical Publications Commis- the President by four professional associa- sion, having been appointed by Pre s i d e n t tions—the American Historical Association, Lyndon B. Johnson. Dr. Graff was also a the Organization of American Historians, the Senior Fellow of the Freedom Forum Media Society of American A rchivists, and the Studies Center from 1991-1992. He re c e i v e d American Bar Association. The Review his M.A. and his Ph.D. from Columbia Uni- Board’s biographies follow. v e r s i t y, and his B.S.S. from City College, New York. The Honorable John R. Tun - he i m . The American Bar Kermit L. Hall. The Orga- Association rec o m m e n d e d nization of American His- John R. Tunheim to the torians nominated Kermit Pr esident. Judge Tun h e i m L. Hall, Executive Dean of is currently a United States the Colleges of the Arts District Court Judge in the and Sciences, Dean of the District of Minnesota, and, College of Humanities, at the time of his nomina- and Professor of History tion, was Chief Deputy and Law at The Ohio Attorney General of the state of Minnesota. State University. D e a n Judge Tunheim worked in the Office of the Hall was appointed by Chief Justice Attorney General for 11 years as the Solicitor William Rehnquist to the Historical A d v i- General before his appointment as Chief sory Board of the Federal Judicial Center De p u t y . Earlier, he practiced law privately and and is a director of the American Society for served as Staff Assistant to U.S. Senator Hubert Legal History. Dean Hall received his Ph.D. H. Humphrey . He received his J.D. from the f rom the University of Minnesota, a Master University of Minnesota Law School, and his of Study of Law from Yale University Law B.A. from Concordia College in Moorhe a d , School, received his M.A. from Syracuse Minnesota. The Review Board members elected U n i v e r s i t y, and his B.A. from The Univer- Judge Tunheim to Chair the Review Board. sity of A k ro n .

177 William L. Joy c e . The Soci- Anna Kasten Nelson. Th e ety of American Arc h i v i s t s American Historical As s o - recommended William L. ciation recommended to Joyce to the President. Dr. the President Anna K. Joyce is currently the As s o - Nelson, the Distinguished ci a t e University Librarian Adjunct Historian in Resi- for Rare Books and Special dence at the A m e r i c a n Collections at Princeton Un i v e r s i t y . Dr. Nelson has University. Joyce previ- been a professor of forei g n ously served as As s i s t a n t relations at the Am e r i c a n Di r ector for Rare Books and Manuscripts at the University since 1986. In 1975, she served on New York Public Library. Dr. Joyce has also the staff of the Public Documents Commis- held positions at the American An t i q u a r i a n sion. Dr. Nelson previously served as the So c i e t y , initially as the Curator of Manuscripts, Di r ector of the Committee on the Records of and later as the Education Offi c e r . He rec e i v e d Government and a member of the Historical his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan, his Advisory Committee of the State Department. M.A. from St. John’s University, and his B.A. She was a Distinguished Visiting Professor at fr om Providence College. Arizona State University in 1992. She rec e i v e d her Ph.D. from George Washington Univer- si t y , and both her M.A. and B.A. from the Uni- versity of Oklahoma.

178 APPENDIX B TH E STA F F O F T H E AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S RE V I E W BO A R D

“A person appointed to the staff shall be a private citizen of integrity and impartiality who Laura A.Denk. In July 1998, the Review Board is not a present employee of any branch of the members asked Laura Denk, the Review Government and who has had no prev i o u s Board’s Chief Analyst for FBI Records, to involvement with any official investigation or serve as Executive Director during the final inquiry relating to the assassination of Pres i - months of the Board’s work. Ms. Denk dent John F. Kennedy” JFK Act, § 8 (b)(2). received her J.D. from the University of Kansas and her B.A. from The College of Executive Directors. The JFK Act charged the William and Mary. Review Board’s Executive Director with the duties of overseeing all of the work of the Senior Staff. The Review Board’s Senior Staff Review Board, including overseeing the consisted of the Deputy Director, the General review and declassification process, and Counsel, and the Associate Directors. Aside serving as a liaison between the Review from performing their specific job duties, the Board and federal agencies. Review Board’s Senior Staff acted as a team to recommend Review Board policy and David G. Marwell. David G. Marwell served assist the Executive Director in carrying out as Executive Director from August 1994 to his or her duties. October 1997, the Review Board’s originally scheduled sunset date. Dr. Marwell previ- Thomas E. S a m o l u k p reviously served as the ously served as Director of the Berlin Docu- Review Board’s Deputy Dire c t o r. Mr. ment Center. He has also served as the Chief Samoluk, who was an Assistant A t t o r n e y of Investigative Research in the Office of Spe- General and Director of Communications in cial Investigations at the Department of Jus- the Massachusetts Attorney General’s off i c e tice. Dr. Marwell received his Ph.D. from the also served as the Review Board’s A s s o c i a t e State University of New York at Binghamton D i rector for Communications. He re c e i v e d and his B.A. from Brandeis University. his J.D. from Suffolk University Law School and his B.A. from the University of Massa- T. Jeremy Gunn. In October 1997, the Review chusetts at A m h e r s t . Board members appointed T. Jeremy Gunn as Executive Director. Dr. Gunn also served the Tracy J. Shycoff. Tracy J. Shycoff served the Review Board as its Associate Director for Review Board as Associate Director for Research and Analysis from November 1994 Administration from October 1994 until July until October 1997, and as General Counsel 1998, when the Review Board asked her to from January 1996 until July 1998.1 Dr. Gunn serve as Deputy Director during the final came to the Review Board from the Washing- months of the Board’s work. Ms. Shycoff pre- ton, D.C. law firm of Covington and Burling. viously served as the Associate Director for He received his J.D. from Boston University Administration at the National Commission and his Ph.D. from Harvard University. on AIDS. She attended Southern Methodist University. 1 Sheryl L. Wal t e r , formerly General Counsel of the private National Security Ar chive, served as the Review Ronald G. Haron. Ronald Haron served as the Bo a r d’s General Counsel from November 1994 to May 1995, and departed the Review Board to become the Review Board’s General Counsel during July, General Counsel on the Senator Daniel Patrick Moyni- August, and September of 1998. Mr. Haron han Committee on Government Secrec y . had previously served the Review Board as

179 Associate General Counsel and as Senior subject matters—essential to providing the Attorney. Mr. Haron came to the Review Review Board members with information rel - Board from the Washington, D.C. law firm of evant to the Board’s decision making. More- Howrey and Simon. He received both his J.D. o v e r, analysts carried out the important and his B.A. from the University of Virginia. assignment of determining whether to request additional rec o r ds from agencies. K .M i chelle Combs. Michelle Combs served as the Review Board’s Associate Director for Douglas P. H o r n e . Douglas Horne served as R e s e a rch and Review from March 1998 until the Review Board’s Chief Analyst for Mili- the Review Board’s closure. Dr. Combs pre- tary Records from March 1997 to September viously served the Review Board as a Senior 1998. Mr. Horne previously served the Analyst. Dr. Combs received her Ph.D. in Review Board as a Senior Analyst. Prior to Communication Studies from Northwestern his work at the Review Board, Mr. Horne University and her B.A. from Va n d e r b i l t served in the U.S. Navy and also worked as U n i v e r s i t y. a civilian for the U.S. Navy. Mr. Horne received his B.A. from The Ohio State Uni- P ress and Public Affairs Off i c e r. Given that v e r s i t y. one of the JFK Act’s primary objectives was to re s t o re public confidence in government, Robert J. Sk w i r o t . Robert J. Skwirot served as the Review Board realized that it would the Review Board’s Chief Analyst for CIA have to maintain fairly extensive public Re c o r ds from September 1997 to September a ffairs and communications programs, as 1 9 9 8 .2 M r. Skwirot previously served the described in Chapter 2 of this report. Thus, Review Board as a Senior Analyst. Mr. Skwirot its Press and Public A ffairs Officer was a crit- received his M.A. from Villanova University ical individual in evaluating the Review and his B.A. from La Salle University. B o a rd’s success or failure. Kevin G. Ti e r n a n. Kevin G. Tiernan served as Eileen A. Su l l i v a n . Eileen Sullivan served as the the Review Board’s Chief Analyst for FBI Review Board’s Press and Public Af fairs Offi - R e c o rds from July 1998-September 1998.3 M r. cer from May 1997 until the Review Board’ s Tiernan previously served as a Senior A n a- cl o s u r e in September 1998. Ms. Sullivan prev i - lyst for the Review Board. Mr. Ti e r n a n ously served as the Assistant Press and Public Af fairs Offi c e r . Ms. Sullivan received her B.A. received his B.A. from Mary Wa s h i n g t o n fr om The American University. C o l l e g e .

Computer Specialist. As Chapter 4 of this Joseph P.Freeman. Joe Freeman served as a report describes in detail, computer pro- Senior Analyst for the Review Board. Mr. grams that could track the Review Board’s Freeman had a Rotary International Founda- p rocessing of thousands of re c o rds were tion Fellowship at the School of Peace at the essential components to the fulfillment of the University of Bradford, England, and he Review Board’s mandate. received his B.A. from Harvard University.

Charles C. Rhodes. Chet Rhodes served as the Irene F. Marr. Irene Marr served as a Senior Review Board’s Computer Specialist from Analyst for the Review Board. Ms. Marr December 1994 until the Review Board’s clo- received her M.A. from The Fletcher School sure in September 1998. Mr. Rhodes received his B.S. from the University of Maryland. 2 Mary S. McAuliffe served as the Review Board’s first Chief Analyst for CIA R e c o rds from April 1995 to Re s e a r ch and Analysis Staff. Review Board October 1996. Dr. McAuliffe received her Ph.D. fro m the University of Maryland, and her B.A. from Prin- analysts identified and reviewed rec o r ds and cipia College. made recommendations to the Review Board. Or ganized into three teams, FBI, CIA, and 3 Philip D. Go l r i c k served as the Review Board’s first Mi l i t a r y , analysts developed working rel a - Chief Analyst for FBI Records, and also as Counsel to the tionships with rep r esentatives from the fed- Review Board, from November 1994 until March 1997. Mr . Golrick previously worked for the Washington law eral agencies within the analyst’s purview. firm of Covington and Burling. He received both his J.D. Analysts developed expertise into particular and his B.A. from the University of Virg i n i a .

180 of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University Jerrie Olson. Jerrie Olson served as the Execu- and her B.A. from Smith College. tive Secretary from June 1995 until the closure of the Review Board in September 1998. Sarah Ahmed. Sarah Ahmed served as an Ms. Olson provided support to the Executive analyst for the Review Board. Ms. A h m e d Director, the General Counsel, staff investiga- received her B.A. from The George Wa s h- tors, and the Review Board members. ington University. Catherine M. R o d r i g u e z . Cathy Rodriguez Marie B. Fa g n a n t . Marie Fagnant served as an served as the Technical Assistant for analyst for the Review Board . Ms. Fagnant Research and Analysis and provided support received her B.A., from Arizona State Uni- to the General Counsel from August 1996 v e r s i t y. until the closure of the Review Board in Sep- tember 1998. Ms. Rodriguez attended the James C. Goslee, II. Jim Goslee served as an University of Maryland European Division at analyst for the Review Board. Mr. Goslee is Berlin, Germany. an M.A. candidate at Georgetown University, and he received his B.A. from the University Janice Spells. Janice Spells served as the of Connecticut. Benjamin A. Rockwell. Ben receptionist/administrative assistant for the Rockwell served as an analyst for the Review Review Board. Board. Mr. Rockwell received his B.A. from The George Washington University. I n v e s t i g a t o r s .4 The Review Board hired two full-time staff investigators to locate a vari- Peter H. Voth. Peter Voth served as an analyst ety of re c o rds from non-federal sources. The as well as the Assistant Computer Specialist investigators were successful in identifying for the Review Board. Mr. Voth received his and locating significant private collections M.A. from The American University and his of re c o rds and in arranging for donation of B.A. from Penn State University. those collections to the government. More- o v e r, investigators played a critical role in Administrative Staff. The Review Board’ s locating former government employees who administrative staff, though skeletal in num- w e re subsequently interviewed re g a rd i n g be r , performed a wide variety of tasks. Under the possible existence and location of addi- ideal conditions, the Review Board hoped to tional assassination re c o rd s . have four to five administrative staff members. Ho w e v e r , the Review Board’s administrative 4 Anne E. Bu t t i m e r and David R. Montague served the st a f f often consisted of only three individuals. Review Board as investigators.

181 APPENDIX C TH E PR E S I D E N T JO H N F. KE N N E D Y AS S A S S I N AT I O N RE C O R D S CO L L E C T I O N AC T O F 1992 (JFK AC T)

Section 1: nation of President John F. Kennedy; and Short Title (7) most of the records related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy are This Act may be cited as the “President John almost 30 years old, and only in the rarest F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection cases is there any legitimate need for contin- Act of 1992”. ued protection of such records. (b) Purposes- The purposes of this Act are— Section 2: (1) to provide for the creation of the Presi- Findings, Declarations, and Purposes dent John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection at the National A rchives and (a) Findings and Declarations- The Congress Records Administration; and finds and declares that— (2) to require the expeditious public trans- (1) all Government records related to the mission to the Archivist and public disclo- assassination of President John F. Kennedy sure of such records. should be preserved for historical and governmental purposes; Section 3: (2) all Government records concerning the Definitions assassination of President John F. Kennedy should carry a presumption of immediate In this Act: disclosure, and all records should be eventu- (1) “Archivist” means the Archivist of the ally disclosed to enable the public to become United States. fully informed about the history surrounding (2) “Assassination record” means a record the assassination; that is related to the assassination of Presi- (3) legislation is necessary to create an dent John F. Kennedy, that was created or enforceable, independent, and accountable made available for use by, obtained by, or p rocess for the public disclosure of such otherwise came into the possession of— records; (A) the Commission to Investigate the (4) legislation is necessary because con- Assassination of President John F. Kennedy gressional records related to the assassina- (the “Warren Commission”); tion of President John F. Kennedy would not (B) the Commission on Central Intelli- otherwise be subject to public disclosure gence Agency Activities Within the United until at least the year 2029; States (the “Rockefeller Commission”); (5) legislation is necessary because the (C) the Senate Select Committee to Freedom of Information Act, as implemented Study Governmental Operations with by the executive branch, has prevented the Respect to Intelligence Activities (the timely public disclosure of records relating to “Church Committee”); the assassination of President John F. (D) the Select Committee on Intelligence Kennedy; (the “Pike Committee”) of the House of Rep- (6) legislation is necessary because Execu- resentatives; tive Order No. 12356, entitled “National (E) the Select Committee on Assassina- Security Information” has eliminated the tions (the “House Assassinations Commit- declassification and downgrading schedules tee”) of the House of Representatives; relating to classified information across gov- (F) the Library of Congress; ernment and has prevented the timely public (G) the National Archives and Records disclosure of records relating to the assassi- Administration;

183 (H) any Presidential library; National Archives and Records Administra- (I) any Executive agency; tion and all components thereof, including (J) any independent agency; Presidential archival depositories established (K) any other office of the Federal Gov- under section 2112 of title 44, United States ernment; and Code. (L) any State or local law enforcement (8) “Official investigation” means the office that provided support or assistance or reviews of the assassination of President John F. performed work in connection with a Federal Kennedy conducted by any Presidential com- inquiry into the assassination of President mission, any authorized congressional commit- John F. Kennedy, but does not include the tee, and any Government agency either inde- autopsy records donated by the Kennedy pe n d e n t l y , at the request of any Pres i d e n t i a l family to the National Archives pursuant to a commission or congressional committee, or at deed of gift regulating access to those the request of any Government offi c i a l . records, or copies and reproductions made (9) “Originating body” means the Execu- from such records. tive agency, government commission, con- (3) “Collection” means the President John gressional committee, or other governmental F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection entity that created a re c o rd or particular established under section 4. information within a record. (4) “Executive agency” means an Execu- (10) “Public interest” means the com- tive agency as defined in subsection 552(f) pelling interest in the prompt public disclo- of title 5, United States Code, and includes sure of assassination records for historical any Executive department, military depart- and governmental purposes and for the pur- ment, Government corporation, Govern- pose of fully informing the American people ment controlled corporation, or other estab- about the history surrounding the assassina- lishment in the executive branch of the tion of President John F. Kennedy. Government, including the Executive Off i c e (11) “Record” includes a book, paper, map, of the President, or any independent re g u- photograph, sound or video re c o rd i n g , latory agency. machine readable material, computerized, (5) “Government office” means any office digitized, or electronic information, regard- of the Federal Government that has posses- less of the medium on which it is stored, or sion or control of assassination re c o rd s , other documentary material, regardless of its including— physical form or characteristics. (A) the House Committee on Adminis- (12) “Review Board” means the Assassina- tration with regard to the Select Committee tion Records Review Board established by on Assassinations of the records of the House section 7. of Representatives; (13) “Third agency” means a Government (B) the Select Committee on Intelligence agency that originated an assassination of the Senate with regard to records of the record that is in the possession of another Senate Select Committee to Study Govern- agency. mental Operations with Respect to Intelli- gence Activities and other assassination Section 4: records; President John F. Kennedy Assassination (C) the Library of Congress; Records Collection at the National (D) the National Archives as custodian Archives and Records Administration of assassination records that it has obtained or possesses, including the Commission to (a) In General- Investigate the Assassination of Pre s i d e n t (1) Not later than 60 days after the date John F. Kennedy and the Commission on of enactment of this Act, the National Central Intelligence Agency Activities in the A rchives and Records Administration shall United States; and commence establishment of a collection of (E) any other executive branch office or re c o rds to be known as the President John agency, and any independent agency. F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collec- (6) “Identification aid” means the written tion. In so doing, the A rchivist shall ensure description pre p a red for each re c o rd as the physical integrity and original pro v e- required in section 4. nance of all re c o rds. The Collection shall (7) “National A rchives” means the consist of re c o rd copies of all Government

184 re c o rds relating to the assassination of Section 5: P resident John F. Kennedy, which shall be Review, Identification, Transmission to the transmitted to the National A rchives in National Archives, and Public Disclosure a c c o rdance with section 2107 of title 44, of Assassination Records by Government United States Code. The A rchivist shall Offices p re p a re and publish a subject guidebook and index to the collection. (a) In General- (2) The Collection shall include— (1) As soon as practicable after the date of (A) all assassination records— enactment of this Act, each Government offi c e (i) that have been transmitted to the shall identify and organize its rec o r ds rel a t i n g National Archives or disclosed to the public to the assassination of President John F. in an unredacted form prior to the date of Kennedy and prep a r e them for transmission to the Ar chivist for inclusion in the Collection. enactment of this Act; (2) No assassination re c o rd shall be (ii) that are required to be transmitted destroyed, altered, or mutilated in any way. to the National Archives; or (3) No assassination record made available (iii) the disclosure of which is post- or disclosed to the public prior to the date of poned under this Act; enactment of this Act may be withheld, (B) a central directory comprised of redacted, postponed for public disclosure, or identification aids created for each record reclassified. transmitted to the Archivist under section 5; (4) No assassination record created by a and person or entity outside government (exclud- (C) all Review Board records as required ing names or identities consistent with the by this Act. requirements of section 6) shall be withheld, (b) D i s c l o s u re of Records- All assassination redacted, postponed for public disclosure, or re c o rds transmitted to the National reclassified. A rchives for disclosure to the public shall (b) Custody of Assassination Records Pending be included in the Collection and shall be Review- During the review by Government available to the public for inspection and offices and pending review activity by the copying at the National A rchives within 30 Review Board, each Government office shall days after their transmission to the retain custody of its assassination records for National A rc h i v e s . purposes of preservation, security, and effi- (c) Fees for Copying- The Archivist shall— ciency, unless— (1) charge fees for copying assassination (1) the Review Board requires the physical records; and transfer of records for purposes of conduct- (2) grant waivers of such fees pursuant to ing an independent and impartial review; the standards established by section 552(a)(4) (2) transfer is necessary for an administrative of title 5, United States Code. hearing or other Review Board function; or (d) Additional Requirements- (3) it is a third agency record described in subsection (c)(2)(C). (1) The Collection shall be preserved, pro- (c) Review- tected, archived, and made available to the (1) Not later than 300 days after the date of public at the National Archives using appro- enactment of this Act, each Government priations authorized, specified, and o ffice shall re v i e w, identify and org a n i z e restricted for use under the terms of this Act. each assassination record in its custody or (2) The National Archives, in consultation possession for disclosure to the public, with the Information Security Oversight review by the Review Board, and transmis- Office, shall ensure the security of the post- sion to the Archivist. poned assassination records in the Collec- (2) In carrying out paragraph (1), a Gov- tion. ernment office shall— (e) Oversight- The Committee on Govern- (A) determine which of its records are ment Operations of the House of Representa- assassination records; tives and the Committee on Governmental (B) determine which of its assassination Affairs of the Senate shall have continuing records have been officially disclosed or pub- oversight jurisdiction with respect to the Col- licly available in a complete and unredacted lection. form;

185 (C) (A) Not later than 45 days after the date (i) determine which of its assassina- of enactment of this Act, the Archivist, in tion records, or particular information con- consultation with the appropriate Govern- tained in such a record, was created by a ment offices, shall prepare and make avail- t h i rd agency or by another Government able to all Government offices a standard office; and form of identification or finding aid for use (ii) transmit to a third agency or other with each assassination re c o rd subject to Government office those records, or particu- review under this Act. lar information contained in those records, or (B) The Archivist shall ensure that the complete and accurate copies thereof; identification aid program is established in (D) such a manner as to result in the creation of a (i) determine whether its assassina- uniform system of electronic records by Gov- tion re c o rds or particular information in ernment offices that are compatible with each assassination records are covered by the stan- other. dards for postponement of public disclosure (2) Upon completion of an identification under this Act; and aid, a Government office shall— (ii) specify on the identification aid (A) attach a printed copy to the record it req u i r ed by subsection (d) the applicable post- describes; ponement provision contained in section 6; (B) transmit to the Review Board a (E) organize and make available to the printed copy; and Review Board all assassination records iden- (C) attach a printed copy to each assas- tified under subparagraph (D) the public dis- sination record it describes when it is trans- closure of which in whole or in part may be mitted to the Archivist. postponed under this Act; (3) Assassination records which are in the (F) organize and make available to the possession of the National Archives on the Review Board any record concerning which date of enactment of this Act, and which have the office has any uncertainty as to whether been publicly available in their entirety with- the record is an assassination record gov- out redaction, shall be made available in the erned by this Act; Collection without any additional review by (G) give priority to— the Review Board or another authorized (i) the identification, re v i e w, and o ffice under this Act, and shall not be transmission of all assassination records pub- required to have such an identification aid licly available or disclosed as of the date of unless required by the Archivist. enactment of this Act in a redacted or edited (e) Transmission to the National Archives- Each form; and Government office shall— (ii) the identification, re v i e w, and (1) transmit to the Archivist, and make transmission, under the standards for post- immediately available to the public, all assas- ponement set forth in this Act, of assassina- sination records that can be publicly dis- tion records that on the date of enactment of closed, including those that are publicly this Act are the subject of litigation under sec- available on the date of enactment of this Act, tion 552 of title 5, United States Code; and without any redaction, adjustment, or with- (H) make available to the Review Board holding under the standards of this Act; and any additional information and records that (2) transmit to the Archivist upon approval the Review Board has reason to believe it for postponement by the Review Board or requires for conducting a review under this upon completion of other action authorized Act. by this Act, all assassination records the pub- (3) The Director of each archival deposi- lic disclosure of which has been postponed, tory established under section 2112 of title 44, in whole or in part, under the standards of United States Code, shall have as a priority this Act, to become part of the protected Col- the expedited review for public disclosure of lection. assassination records in the possession and (f) Custody of Postponed Assassination Records- custody of the depository, and shall make An assassination record the public disclosure such records available to the Review Board as of which has been postponed shall, pending required by this Act. transmission to the Archivist, be held for rea- (d) Identification Aids- sons of security and preservation by the orig- (1) inating body until such time as the informa-

186 tion security program has been established at convincing evidence that— the National Archives as required in section (1) the threat to the military defense, intel- 4(e)(2). ligence operations, or conduct of foreign rela- (g) Periodic Review of Postponed Assassination tions of the United States posed by the public Records- disclosure of the assassination is of such (1) All postponed or redacted records shall gravity that it outweighs the public interest, be reviewed periodically by the originating and such public disclosure would reveal— agency and the Archivist consistent with the (A) an intelligence agent whose identity recommendations of the Review Board under currently requires protection; section 9(c)(3)(B). (B) an intelligence source or method (2) which is currently utilized, or reasonably (A) A periodic review shall address the expected to be utilized, by the United States public disclosure of additional assassination Government and which has not been offi- records in the Collection under the standards cially disclosed, the disclosure of which of this Act. would interfere with the conduct of intelli- (B) All postponed assassination records gence activities; or determined to require continued postpone- (C) any other matter currently relating ment shall require an unclassified written to the military defense, intelligence opera- description of the reason for such continued tions or conduct of foreign relations of the postponement. Such description shall be pro- United States, the disclosure of which would vided to the Archivist and published in the demonstrably impair the national security of Federal Register upon determination. the United States; (C) The periodic review of postponed (2) the public disclosure of the assassina- assassination records shall serve to down- tion record would reveal the name or identity grade and declassify security classified infor- of a living person who provided confidential mation. information to the United States and would (D) Each assassination record shall be pose a substantial risk of harm to that person; publicly disclosed in full, and available in the (3) the public disclosure of the assassina- Collection no later than the date that is 25 tion record could reasonably be expected to years after the date of enactment of this Act, constitute an unwarranted invasion of per- unless the President certifies, as required by sonal privacy, and that invasion of privacy is this Act, that— so substantial that it outweighs the public (i) continued postponement is made interest; necessary by an identifiable harm to the mil- (4) the public disclosure of the assassina- itary defense, intelligence operations, law tion record would compromise the existence enforcement, or conduct of foreign relations; of an understanding of confidentiality cur- and rently requiring protection between a Gov- (ii) the identifiable harm is of such ernment agent and a cooperating individual gravity that it outweighs the public interest or a foreign government, and public disclo- in disclosure. sure would be so harmful that it outweighs (h) Fees for Copying- Executive branch agen- the public interest; or cies shall— (5) the public disclosure of the assassina- (1) charge fees for copying assassination tion record would reveal a security or protec- records; and tive procedure currently utilized, or reason- (2) grant waivers of such fees pursuant to ably expected to be utilized, by the Secret the standards established by section 552(a)(4) Service or another Government agency of title 5, United States Code. responsible for protecting Government officials, and public disclosure would be so Section 6: harmful that it outweighs the public interest. Grounds for Postponement of Public Disclosure of Records Section 7: Establishment and Powers of the Disclosure of assassination records or partic- Assassination Records Review Board ular information in assassination records to the public may be postponed subject to the (a) Establishment- There is established as an limitations of this Act if there is clear and independent agency a board to be known as

187 the Assassinations Records Review Board. the public, scholars, and government; and (b) Appointment- (C) shall include at least 1 professional (1) The President, by and with the advice historian and 1 attorney. and consent of the Senate, shall appoint, (c) Security Clearances- without regard to political affiliation, 5 citi- (1) All Review Board nominees shall be zens to serve as members of the Review granted the necessary security clearances in Board to ensure and facilitate the review, an accelerated manner subject to the stan- transmission to the Archivist, and public dis- d a rd pro c e d u res for granting such clear- closure of Government records related to the a n c e s . assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (2) All nominees shall qualify for the nec- (2) The President shall make nominations to essary security clearance prior to being con- the Review Board not later than 90 calendar sidered for confirmation by the Committee days after the date of enactment of this Ac t . on Governmental Affairs of the Senate. (3) If the Senate votes not to confirm a (d) Confirmation Hearings- nomination to the Review Board, the Presi- (1) The Committee on Governmental dent shall make an additional nomination Affairs of the Senate shall hold confirmation not later than 30 days thereafter. hearings within 30 days in which the Senate (4) is in session after the nomination of 3 Review (A) The President shall make nomina- Board members. tions to the Review Board after considering (2) The Committee on Governmental persons recommended by the American His- Affairs shall vote on the nominations within torical Association, the Organization of 14 days in which the Senate is in session after American Historians, the Society of Ameri- the confirmation hearings, and shall report can Archivists, and the American Bar Associ- its results to the full Senate immediately. ation. (3) The Senate shall vote on each nominee (B) If an organization described in sub- to confirm or reject within 14 days in which paragraph (A) does not recommend at least 2 the Senate is in session after reported by the nominees meeting the qualifications stated in Committee on Governmental Affairs. paragraph (5) by the date that is 45 days after (e) Vacancy-A vacancy on the Review Board the date of enactment of this Act, the Presi- shall be filled in the same manner as speci- dent shall consider for nomination the per- fied for original appointment within 30 days sons recommended by the other organiza- of the occurrence of the vacancy. tions described in subparagraph (A). (f) Chairperson- The Members of the Review (C) The President may request an orga- Board shall elect one of its members as chair- nization described in subparagraph (A) to person at its initial meeting. submit additional nominations. (g) Removal of Review Board Member- (5) Persons nominated to the Review (1) No member of the Review Board shall Board— be removed from office, other than— (A) shall be impartial private citizens, (A) by impeachment and conviction; or none of whom is presently employed by any (B) by the action of the President for branch of the Government, and none of inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance in whom shall have had any previous involve- office, physical disability, mental incapacity, ment with any official investigation or or any other condition that substantially inquiry conducted by a Federal, State, or impairs the performance of the member’s local government, relating to the assassina- duties. tion of President John F. Kennedy; (2) (B) shall be distinguished persons of (A) If a member of the Review Board is high national professional reputation in their removed from office, and that removal is by respective fields who are capable of exercis- the President, not later than 10 days after the ing the independent and objective judgment removal the President shall submit to the necessary to the fulfillment of their role in Committee on Government Operations of the ensuring and facilitating the review, trans- House of Representatives and the Committee mission to the public, and public disclosure on Governmental Affairs of the Senate a of records related to the assassination of Pres- report specifying the facts found and the ident John F. Kennedy and who possess an grounds for the removal. appreciation of the value of such material to (B) The President shall publish in the

188 Federal Register a report submitted under (B) direct Government offices to trans- paragraph (2)(A), except that the President mit to the A rchivist assassination re c o rds as may, if necessary to protect the rights of a re q u i red under this Act, including segre- person named in the report or to prevent gable portions of assassination re c o rds, and undue interference with any pending prose- substitutes and summaries of assassination cution, postpone or refrain from publishing re c o rds that can be publicly disclosed to the any or all of the report until the completion of fullest extent; such pending cases or pursuant to privacy (C) protection requirements in law. (i) obtain access to assassination (3) records that have been identified and orga- (A) A member of the Review Board nized by a Government office; removed from office may obtain judicial (ii) direct a Government office to review of the removal in a civil action com- make available to the Review Board, and if menced in the United States District Court necessary investigate the facts surrounding, for the District of Columbia. additional information, records, or testimony (B) The member may be reinstated or from individuals, which the Review Board granted other appropriate relief by order of has reason to believe is required to fulfill its the court. functions and responsibilities under this Act; (h) Compensation of Members- and (1) A member of the Review Board shall be (iii) request the Attorney General to compensated at a rate equal to the daily subpoena private persons to compel testi- equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay mony, records, and other information rele- p rescribed for level IV of the Executive vant to its responsibilities under this Act; Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United (D) require any Government office to States Code, for each day (including travel account in writing for the destruction of any time) during which the member is engaged records relating to the assassination of Presi- in the performance of the duties of the dent John F. Kennedy; Review Board. (E) receive information from the public (2) A member of the Review Board shall be regarding the identification and public dis- allowed reasonable travel expenses, includ- closure of assassination records; and ing per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates (F) hold hearings, administer oaths, and for employees of agencies under subchapter I subpoena witnesses and documents. of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, (2) A subpoena issued under paragraph while away from the member’s home or reg- (1)(C)(iii) may be enforced by any appropri- ular place of business in the performance of ate Federal court acting pursuant to a lawful services for the Review Board. request of the Review Board. (i) Duties of the Review Board- (k) Witness Immunity- The Review Board (1) The Review Board shall consider and shall be considered to be an agency of the render decisions on a determination by a United States for purposes of section 6001 of Government office to seek to postpone the title 18, United States Code. disclosure of assassination records. (l) Oversight- (2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Review (1) The Committee on Government Opera- Bo a r d shall consider and render decisions— tions of the House of Representatives and the (A) whether a re c o rd constitutes an Committee on Governmental Affairs of the assassination record; and Senate shall have continuing oversight juris- (B) whether an assassination record or diction with respect to the official conduct of particular information in a record qualifies the Review Board and the disposition of for postponement of disclosure under this postponed records after termination of the Act. Review Board, and shall have access to any (j) Powers- records held or created by the Review Board. (1) The Review Board shall have the (2) The Review Board shall have the duty authority to act in a manner prescribed under to cooperate with the exercise of such over- this Act including authority to— sight jurisdiction. (A) direct Government offices to com- (m) Support Services- The Administrator of plete identification aids and organize assassi- the General Services Administration shall nation records; p rovide administrative services for the

189 Review Board on a reimbursable basis. (C) be responsible for the administration (n) Interpretive Regulations- The Review Board of all official activities conducted by the may issue interpretive regulations. Review Board; and (o) Termination and Winding up- (D) have no authority to decide or deter- (1) The Review Board and the terms of its mine whether any record should be disclosed members shall terminate not later than 2 to the public or postponed for disclosure. years after the date of enactment of this Act, (5) The Executive Director shall not be except that the Review Board may, by major- removed for reasons other than by a majority ity vote, extend its term for an additional 1- vote of the Review Board for cause on the year period if it has not completed its work g rounds of ineff i c i e n c y, neglect of duty, within that 2-year period. malfeasance in office, physical disability, (2) Upon its termination, the Review Board mental incapacity, or any other condition that shall submit reports to the President and the substantially impairs the performance of the Congress including a complete and accurate responsibilities of the Executive Director or accounting of expenditures during its exis- the staff of the Review Board. tence, and shall complete all other reporting (b) Staff- requirements under this Act. (1) The Review Board may, in accordance (3) Upon termination and winding up, the with the civil service laws but without regard Review Board shall transfer all of its records to civil service law and regulation for com- to the Archivist for inclusion in the Collec- petitive service as defined in subchapter 1, tion, and no record of the Review Board shall chapter 33 of title 5, United States Code, be destroyed. appoint and terminate additional personnel as are necessary to enable the Review Board Section 8: and its Executive Director to perform its Assassination Records Review Board duties. Personnel (2) A person appointed to the staff of the Review Board shall be a private citizen of (a) Executive Director- integrity and impartiality who is not a pre- (1) Not later than 45 days after the initial sent employee of any branch of the Govern- meeting of the Review Board, the Review ment and who has had no previous involve- B o a rd shall appoint one citizen, without ment with any official investigation or regard to political affiliation, to the position inquiry relating to the assassination of Presi- of Executive Director. dent John F. Kennedy. (2) The person appointed as Executive (3) Director shall be a private citizen of integrity (A) A candidate for staff shall be granted and impartiality who is a distinguished pro- the necessary security clearances in an accel- fessional and who is not a present employee erated manner subject to the standard proce- of any branch of the Government and has dures for granting such clearances. had no previous involvement with any offi- (B) A candidate for the staff shall qualify cial investigation or inquiry relating to the for the necessary security clearance prior to assassination of President John F. Kennedy. being approved by the Review Board. (3) (c) Compensation- The Review Board shall fix (A) A candidate for Executive Director the compensation of the Executive Director shall be granted the necessary security clear- and other personnel in accordance with title ances in an accelerated manner subject to the 5, United States Code, except that the rate of standard procedures for granting such clear- pay for the Executive Director and other per- ances. sonnel may not exceed the rate payable for (B) A candidate shall qualify for the nec- level V of the Executive Schedule under sec- essary security clearance prior to being tion 5316 of that title. approved by the Review Board. (d) Advisory Committees- (4) The Executive Director shall— (1) The Review Board shall have the (A) serve as principal liaison to Govern- authority to create advisory committees to ment offices; assist in fulfilling the responsibilities of the (B) be responsible for the administration Review Board under this Act. and coordination of the Review Board ’ s (2) Any advisory committee created by the review of records; Review Board shall be subject to the Federal

190 Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.). (3) With respect to each assassination record or particular information in assassina- Section 9: tion records the public disclosure of which is Review of Records by the Assassination postponed pursuant to section 6, or for which Records Review Board only substitutions or summaries have been disclosed to the public, the Review Board (a) Custody of Records Reviewed by Board- shall create and transmit to the Archivist a Pending the outcome of the Review Board’s report containing— review activity, a Government office shall (A) a description of actions by the retain custody of its assassination records for Review Board, the originating body, the Pres- purposes of preservation, security, and effi- ident, or any Government office (including a ciency, unless— justification of any such action to postpone (1) the Review Board requires the physical d i s c l o s u re of any re c o rd or part of any transfer of records for reasons of conducting record) and of any official proceedings con- an independent and impartial review; or ducted by the Review Board with regard to (2) such transfer is necessary for an admin- specific assassination records; and istrative hearing or other official Review (B) a statement, based on a review of the Board function. proceedings and in conformity with the deci- (b) Startup Requirements- The Review Board sions reflected therein, designating a recom- shall— mended specified time at which or a speci- (1) not later than 90 days after the date of fied occurrence following which the material its appointment, publish a schedule for may be appropriately disclosed to the public review of all assassination records in the Fed- under this Act. eral Register; and (4) (2) not later than 180 days after the date of (A) Following its review and a determi- enactment of this Act, begin its review of nation that an assassination record shall be assassination records under this Act. publicly disclosed in the Collection or post- (c) Determinations of the Review Board- poned for disclosure and held in the pro- (1) The Review Board shall direct that all tected Collection, the Review Board shall assassination records be transmitted to the notify the head of the originating body of its Archivist and disclosed to the public in the determination and publish a copy of the Collection in the absence of clear and con- determination in the Federal Register within vincing evidence that— 14 days after the determination is made. (A) a Government record is not an assas- (B) Contemporaneous notice shall be sination record; or made to the President for Review Board (B) a Government record or particular determinations regarding executive branch information within an assassination record assassination records, and to the oversight qualifies for postponement of public disclo- committees designated in this Act in the case sure under this Act. of legislative branch re c o rds. Such notice (2) In approving postponement of public shall contain a written unclassified justifica- d i s c l o s u re of an assassination re c o rd, the tion for public disclosure or postponement of Review Board shall seek to— disclosure, including an explanation of the (A) provide for the disclosure of segre- application of any standards contained in gable parts, substitutes, or summaries of section 6. such a record; and (d) Presidential Authority over Review Board (B) determine, in consultation with the Determination- originating body and consistent with the stan- (1) Public Disclosure or Postponement of Dis - da r ds for postponement under this Act, which closure- After the Review Board has made a of the following alternative forms of disclo- formal determination concerning the public su r e shall be made by the originating body: disclosure or postponement of disclosure of (i) Any reasonably segregable partic- an executive branch assassination record or ular information in an assassination record. information within such a record, or of any (ii) A substitute record for that infor- information contained in an assassination mation which is postponed. record, obtained or developed solely within (iii) A summary of an assassination the executive branch, the President shall record. have the sole and nondelegable authority to

191 require the disclosure or postponement of (A) A financial report of the expenses for such record or information under the stan- all official activities and requirements of the dards set forth in section 6, and the President Review Board and its personnel. shall provide the Review Board with an (B) The progress made on review, trans- unclassified written certification specifying mission to the Archivist, and public disclo- the President’s decision within 30 days after sure of assassination records. the Review Board’s determination and notice (C) The estimated time and volume of to the executive branch agency as required assassination records involved in the comple- under this Act, stating the justification for the tion of the Review Board’s performance President’s decision, including the applicable under this Act. grounds for postponement under section 6, (D) Any special problems, including accompanied by a copy of the identification requests and the level of cooperation of Gov- aid required under section 4. ernment offices, with regard to the ability of (2) Periodic Review- Any executive branch the Review Board to operate as required by assassination rec o r d postponed by the Pres i - this Act. dent shall be subject to the req u i r ements of (E) A record of review activities, includ- periodic rev i e w , downgrading and declassifi- ing a record of postponement decisions by cation of classified information, and public dis- the Review Board or other related actions cl o s u r e in the collection set forth in section 4. authorized by this Act, and a record of the (3) Record of Presidential Postponement- The volume of records reviewed and postponed. Review Board shall, upon its receipt, publish (F) Suggestions and requests to Congres s in the Federal Register a copy of any unclas- for additional legislative authority needs. sified written certification, statement, and (G) An appendix containing copies of other materials transmitted by or on behalf of reports of postponed records to the Archivist the President with regard to postponement of required under section 9(c)(3) made since the assassination records. date of the preceding report under this sub- (e) Notice to Public- Every 30 calendar days, section. beginning on the date that is 60 calendar (4) At least 90 calendar days before com- days after the date on which the Review pleting its work, the Review Board shall pro- B o a rd first approves the postponement of vide written notice to the President and Con- d i s c l o s u re of an assassination re c o rd, the g ress of its intention to terminate its Review Board shall publish in the Federal operations at a specified date. Register a notice that summarizes the postponements approved by the Review Board Section 10: or initiated by the President, the House of Disclosure of Other Materials and R e p resentatives, or the Senate, including a Additional Study description of the subject, originating a g e n c y, length or other physical description, (a) Materials under Seal of Court- and each ground for postponement that is (1) The Review Board may request the relied upon. Attorney General to petition any court in the (f) Reports by the Review Board- United States or abroad to release any infor- (1) The Review Board shall report its activ- mation relevant to the assassination of Presi- ities to the leadership of the Congress, the dent John F. Kennedy that is held under seal Committee on Government Operations of the of the court. House of Representatives, the Committee on (2) Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Pres- (A) The Review Board may request the ident, the Archivist, and the head of any Gov- Attorney General to petition any court in the ernment office whose records have been the United States to release any information rele- subject of Review Board activity. vant to the assassination of President John F. (2) The first report shall be issued on the Kennedy that is held under the injunction of date that is 1 year after the date of enactment secrecy of a grand jury. of this Act, and subsequent reports every 12 (B) A request for disclosure of assassina- months thereafter until termination of the tion materials under this Act shall be deemed Review Board. to constitute a showing of particularized (3) A report under paragraph (1) shall need under Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of include the following information: Criminal Procedure.

192 (b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of the (e) Rules of the Senate and House of Representa - Congress that— tives- To the extent that any provision of this (1) the Attorney General should assist the Act establishes a procedure to be followed in Review Board in good faith to unseal any the Senate or the House of Representatives, rec o r ds that the Review Board determines to such provision is adopted— be relevant and held under seal by a court or (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power under the injunction of secrecy of a grand jury; of the Senate and House of Representatives, (2) the Secretary of State should contact the respectively, and is deemed to be part of the Government of the Republic of Russia and rules of each House, respectively, but applic- seek the disclosure of all records of the gov- able only with respect to the procedure to be ernment of the former Soviet Union, includ- followed in that House, and it supersedes ing the records of the Komitet Gosudarstven- other rules only to the extent that it is incon- noy Bezopasnosti (KGB) and the Glaynoye sistent with such rules; and Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye (GRU), rele- (2) with full recognition of the constitu- vant to the assassination of Pre s i d e n t tional right of either House to change the Kennedy, and contact any other foreign gov- rules (so far as they relate to the procedure of ernment that may hold information relevant that House) at any time, in the same manner, to the assassination of President Kennedy and to the same extent as in the case of any and seek disclosure of such information; and other rule of that House. (3) all Executive agencies should cooperate in full with the Review Board to seek the dis- Section 12: closure of all information relevant to the Termination of Effect of Act assassination of President John F. Kennedy consistent with the public interest. (a) Provisions Pertaining to the Review Board- The provisions of this Act that pertain to the Section 11: appointment and operation of the Review Rules of Construction Board shall cease to be effective when the Review Board and the terms of its members (a) Precedence over Other Law- When this Act have terminated pursuant to section 7(o). re q u i res transmission of a re c o rd to the (b) Other Provisions- The remaining provi- Archivist or public disclosure, it shall take sions of this Act shall continue in effect until precedence over any other law (except sec- such time as the Archivist certifies to the tion 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code), judi- President and the Congress that all assassina- cial decision construing such law, or common tion records have been made available to the law doctrine that would otherwise prohibit public in accordance with this Act. such transmission or disclosure, with the exception of deeds governing access to or Section 13: transfer or release of gifts and donations of Authorization of Appropriations records to the United States Government. (b) Freedom of Information Act- Nothing in this (a) In General- There are authorized to be appro- Act shall be construed to eliminate or limit priated such sums as are necessary to carry out any right to file requests with any executive this Act, to remain available until expended. agency or seek judicial review of the deci- (b) Interim Funding- Until such time as funds sions pursuant to section 552 of title 5, United ar e appropriated pursuant to subsection (a), States Code. the President may use such sums as are avail- (c) Judicial Review- Nothing in this Act shall able for discretionary use to carry out this Ac t . be construed to preclude judicial re v i e w, under chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code, Section 14: of final actions taken or required to be taken Severability under this Act. (d) Existing Authority- Nothing in this Act If any provision of this Act or the application revokes or limits the existing authority of the th e r eof to any person or circumstance is held President, any executive agency, the Senate, invalid, the remainder of this Act and the or the House of Representatives, or any other application of that provision to other persons entity of the Government to publicly disclose not similarly situated or to other circu m s t a n c e s records in its possession. shall not be affected by the invalidation.

193 The President John F. Kennedy Board (including an individual appointed as Assassination Records Collection Executive Director) shall be required to qual- Extension Act of 1994 ify for any necessary security clearance prior to taking office in that position, but may be Section 1: employed conditionally in accordance with Short Title subsection (b)(3)(B) before qualifying for that clearance.”. This Act may be cited as the “President John (b) Appointment and Termination of Staff, Gen - F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection erally- Section 8(b) of the President John F. Extension Act of 1994”. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is amended Section 2: by striking “(b) Staff- ” and all that follows Extension of Act through the end of paragraph (1) and inserting the following: Section 7(o)(1) of the President John F. “(b) Staff- (1) The Review Board, without Kennedy Assassination Records Collection regard to the civil service laws, may appoint Act of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is and terminate additional personnel as are amended— necessary to enable the Review Board and its (1) by striking “2 years after the date of Executive Director to perform the duties of enactment of this Act” and inserting “Sep- the Review Board.”. tember 30, 1996”; and (c) Review Board Administrative Staff- Section (2) by striking “2-year”. 8(b)(2) of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 Section 3: (44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is amended— Amendments Relating to Review Board (1) by striking “A person” and inserting Powers “(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), a person”; and Section 7(j)(1) of the President John F. (2) by adding at the end the following: Kennedy Assassination Records Collection “(B) An individual who is an employee Act of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is of the Government may be appointed to the amended— staff of the Review Board if in that position (1) in subparagraph (E) by striking “and” the individual will perform only administra- after the semicolon; tive functions.”. (2) in subparagraph (F) by striking the (d) Conditional Employment of Staff- Section period and inserting “; and”; and 8(b)(3)(B) of the President John F. Kennedy (3) by adding at the end the following: Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 “(G) use the Federal Supply Service in (44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is amended to read as the same manner and under the same condi- follows: tions as other departments and agencies of “(B) the United States; and (i) The Review Board may offer condi- “(H) use the United States mails in the tional employment to a candidate for a staff same manner and under the same conditions position pending the completion of security as other departments and agencies of the clearance background investigations. During United States.”. the pendency of such investigations, the Review Board shall ensure that any such Section 4: employee does not have access to, or respon- Amendments Relating to Review Board sibility involving, classified or otherwise Personnel restricted assassination record materials. (ii) If a person hired on a conditional basis (a) Security Clearance for Review Board Person - under clause (i) is denied or otherwise does n e l- Section 8 of the President John F. not qualify for all security clearances neces- Kennedy Assassination Records Collection sary to carry out the responsibilities of the Act of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is amended position for which conditional employment by adding at the end the following: has been offered, the Review Board shall “(e) Security Clearance Required- An individ- immediately terminate the person’s employ- ual employed in any position by the Review ment.”.

194 (e) Compensation of Staff- Section 8(c) of the be paid at a rate not to exceed the rate of basic P resident John F. Kennedy A s s a s s i n a t i o n pay for level V of the Executive Schedule; and Records Collection Act of 1992 (21 U.S.C. (2) appoint and fix compensation of such 2107 note) is amended to read as follows: other personnel as may be necessary to carry “(c) Compensation- Subject to such rules as out this Act.”. may be adopted by the Review Board, the chairperson, without regard to the provisions Section 5: of title 5, United States Code, governing Technical Correction appointments in the competitive service and without regard to the provisions of chapter Section 6(1) of the President John F. Kennedy 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 title relating to classification and General (44 U.S.C. 2107 note) is amended in the mat- Schedule pay rates, may— ter preceding subparagraph (A) by inserting (1) appoint an Executive Direc t o r , who shall “record” after “the assassination”.

195 APPENDIX D 36 CFR 1400—GUIDANCE FOR INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992

Sections listed in the Notice of Assassination Record 1400.1 Scope of assassination record. Designation, as described in Sec. 1400.8 of 1400.2 Scope of additional records and infor- this chapter. mation. 1400.3 Sources of assassination records and Section 1400.2: additional records and information. Scope of additional records and 1400.4 Types of materials included in scope information of assassination re c o rd and additional records and information. The term additional records and information 1400.5 Requirement that assassination includes: records be released in their entirety. (a) All documents used by government 1400.6 Originals and copies. offices and agencies during their declassifica- 1400.7 Additional guidance. tion review of assassination records as well 1400.8 Implementing the JFK Act—Notice of as all other documents, indices, and other Assassination Record Designation. material (including but not limited to those that disclose cryptonyms, code names, or Section 1400.1: other identifiers that appear in assassination Scope of assassination record re c o rds) that the Assassination Record s Review Board (Review Board) has a reason- (a) An assassination record includes, but is able basis to believe may constitute an assas- not limited to, all records, public and private, sination record or would assist in the identi- regardless of how labeled or identified, that fication, evaluation or interpretation of an document, describe, report on, analyze or assassination record. The Review Board will interpret activities, persons, or events reason- identify in writing those records and other ably related to the assassination of President materials it intends to seek under this sec- John F. Kennedy and investigations of or tion. inquiries into the assassination. (b) All training manuals, instructional mate- (b) An assassination record further includes, rials, and guidelines created or used by the without limitation: agencies in furtherance of their review of (1) All records as defined in Section 3(2) of assassination records. the JFK Act; (c) All records, lists, and documents describ- (2) All records collected by or segregated ing the procedure by which the agencies by all Federal, state, and local government identified or selected assassination records agencies in conjunction with any investiga- for review. tion or analysis of or inquiry into the assassi- (d) Organizational charts of government nation of President Kennedy (for example, agencies. any intra-agency investigation or analysis of (e) Records necessary and sufficient to or inquiry into the assassination; any intera- describe the agency’s: gency communication regarding the assassi- (1) Records policies and schedules; nation; any request by the House Select Com- (2) Filing systems and organization; mittee on Assassinations to collect (3) Storage facilities and locations; documents and other materials; or any inter- (4) Indexing symbols, marks, codes, or intra-agency collection or segregation of instructions, guidelines, methods, and proce- documents and other materials); dures; (3) Other records or groups of records (5) Search methods and procedures used in

197 the performance of the agencies’ duties (a) papers, maps, and other documentary under the JFK Act; and material; (6) Reclassification to a higher level, trans- (b) photographs; fer, destruction, or other information (e.g., (c) motion pictures; theft) regarding the status of assassination (d) sound and video recordings; records. (e) machine readable information in any (f) Any other record that does not fall within form; and the scope of assassination record as described (f) artifacts. in Sec. 1400.1, but which has the potential to enhance, enrich, and broaden the historical Section 1400.5: record of the assassination. Requirement that assassination records be released in their entirety Section 1400.3: Sources of assassination records and An assassination record shall be released in additional records and information its entirety except for portions specifically postponed pursuant to the grounds for post- Assassination records and additional records ponement of public disclosure of rec o rd s and information may be located at, or under established in Sec. 2107.6 of the JFK Act, and the control of, without limitation: no portion of any assassination record shall (a) Agencies, offices, and entities of the exe- be withheld from public disclosure solely on cuting, legislative, and judicial branches of g rounds of non-relevance unless, in the the Federal Government; Review Board’s sole discretion, release of (b) Agencies, offices, and entities of the exec- part of a record is sufficient to comply with utive, legislative, and judicial branches of the intent and purposes of the JFK Act. state and local governments; (c) Record repositories and archives of Fed- Section 1400.6: eral, state, and local governments, including Originals and copies presidential libraries; (d) Record repositories and archives of uni- (a) For purposes of determining whether versities, libraries, historical societies, and originals or copies of assassination records other similar organizations; will be made part of the President John F. (e) Individuals who possess such records by Kennedy Assassination Records Collection virtue of service with a government agency, (JFK Assassination Records Collection) estab- office, or entity; lished under the JFK Act, the following shall (f) Persons, including individuals and corpo- apply: rations, who have obtained such re c o rd s (1) In the case of papers, maps, and other from sources identified in paragraphs (a) documentary materials, the Review Board through (e) of this section; may determine that record copies of govern- (g) Persons, including individuals and corpo- ment records, either the signed original, orig- rations, who have themselves created or have inal production or a reproduction that has obtained such records from sources other been treated as the official record maintained than those identified in paragraphs (a) to chronicle government functions or activi- through (e) of this section; ties, may be placed in the JFK Assassination (h) Federal, state, and local courts where such Records Collection; records are being held under seal; or (2) In the case of other papers, maps, and (i) Foreign governments. other documentary material, the Review Board may determine that a true and accu- Section 1400.4: rate copy of a record in lieu of the original Types of materials included in scope of may be placed in the JFK A s s a s s i n a t i o n assassination record and additional records Records Collection; and information (3) In the case of photographs, the original negative, whenever available (otherwise, the The term record in assassination record and earliest generation print that is a true and additional records and information includes, accurate copy), may be placed in the JFK for purposes of interpreting and implement- Assassination Records Collection; ing the JFK Act: (4) In the case of motion pictures, the cam-

198 era original, whenever available (otherwise, JFK Assassination Records Collection. the earliest generation print that is a true and (f) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted accurate copy), may be placed in the JFK to prevent or to preclude copies of any elec- Assassination Records Collection; tronic assassination records from being refor- (5) In the case of sound and video record- matted electronically in order to conform to ings, the original recording, whenever avail- different hardward and/or software require- able (otherwise, the earliest generation copy ments of audiovisual or machine readable that is a true and accurate copy), may be formats if such is the professional judgment placed in the JFK Assassination Records Col- of the National A rchives and Record s lection; Administration. (6) In the case of machine-readable information, a true and accurate copy of the orig- Section 1400.7: inal (duplicating all information contained in Additional guidance the original and in a format that permits retrieval of the information), may be placed (a) A government agency, office, or entity in the JFK Assassination Records Collection; includes, for purposes of interpreting and and implementing the JFK Act, all current, past, (7) In the case of artifacts, the original and former departments, agencies, offi c e s , objects themselves may be placed in the JFK divisions, foreign offices, bureaus, and deliber- Assassination Records Collection. ative bodies of any Federal, state, or local gov- (b) To the extent records from foreign government and includes all inter- or intra-agency ernments are included in the JFK Assassina- working groups, committees, and meetings tion Records Collection, copies of the original that possess or created rec o r ds relating to the records shall be sufficient for inclusion in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. collection. (b) The inclusion of artifacts in the scope of (c) In cases where a copy, as defined in para- the term assassination rec o r d is understood to graph (a) of this section, is authorized by the apply solely to the JFK Assassination Records Review Board to be included in the JFK Collection and to implement fully the terms Assassination Records Collection, the of the JFK Act and has no direct or indirec t Review Board may require that a copy be cer- bearing on the interpretation or implementa- tified if, in its discretion, it determines a cer- tion of any other statute or reg u l a t i o n . tification to be necessary to ensure the (c) Whenever artifacts are included in the JFK integrity of the JFK Assassination Records Assassination Records Collection, it shall be Collection. In cases where an original, as sufficient to comply with the JFK Act if the defined in paragraph (a) of this section, is public is provided access to photographs, required for inclusion in the JFK Assassina- drawings, or similar materials depicting the tion Records Collection, the Review Board artifacts. Additional display of or examina- may, at its discretion, accept the best avail- tion by the public of artifacts in the JFK able copy. In such cases that records included Assassination Records Collection shall occur in the JFK Assassination Records Collection, under the terms and conditions established whether originals or copies, contain illegible by the National A rchives and Record s portions, such records shall have attached Administration to ensure their preservation thereto a certified transcription of the illegi- and protection for posterity. ble language to the extent practicable. (d) The terms and, or, any, all, and the plural (d) For purposes of implementing the JFK and singular forms of nouns shall be under- Act, the term copy means a true and accurate stood in their broadest and most inclusive photocopy duplication by a means appropri- sense and shall not be understood to be terms ate to the medium of the original record that of limitation. preserves and displays the integrity of the (e) Unless the Review Board in its sole dis- record and the information contained in it. cretion directs otherwise, records that are (e) Nothing in this section shall be inter- identified with respect to a particular person preted to suggest that additional copies of shall include all records ralating to that per- any assassination records contained in the son that use or reflect the true name or any JFK Assassination Records Collection are not other name, pseudonym, codeword, symbol also assassination records that, at the Review number, cryptonym, or alias used to identify Board’s discretion, may also be placed in the that person.

199 (f) Unless the Review Board in its sole discre- the Review Board to announce publicly its tion directs otherwise, records that are identi- determination that a re c o rd or group of fied by the Review Board with respect to a records meets the definition of assassination particular operation or program shall include records. all records, pertaining to that program by any (b) Notice of all NARDs will be published in other name, pseudonym, codeword, symbol, the Federal Register within 30 days of the number, or cryptonym. decision to designate such records as assassination records. Section 1400.8: (c) In determining to designate such records Implementing the JFK Act—Notice of as assassination records, the Review Board Assassination Record Designation must determine that the record or group of record will more likely than not enhance, (a) A Notice of Assassination Record Desig- enrich, and broaden the historical record of nation (NARD) shall be the mechanism for the assassination.

200 APPENDIX E ME E T I N G S O F T H E RE V I E W BO A R D

April 12, 1994 August 28 – 29, 1995 Open Meeting, Washington, D.C. Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

July 12, 1994 August 30, 1995 Open Meeting, Washington, D.C. Special Meeting (Open), Washington, D.C.

October 11, 1994 September 20 – 21, 1995 Public Hearing, Washington, D.C. Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

November 18, 1994 October 23 – 24, 1995 Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C. Public Hearing, Dallas, Texas November 13 – 14, 1995 December 13 – 14, 1994 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. Open Meeting, Washington, D.C. December 12 – 13, 1995 January 25, 1995 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. January 5, 1996 March 6 – 7, 1995 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C. January 30 – 31, 1996 March 24, 1995 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. Public Hearing, Boston, Massachusetts February 29 – March 1, 1996 May 2 – 3, 1995 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C. March 18 – 19, 1996 May 18, 1995 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. April 16 – 17, 1996 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. June 7, 1995 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. May 13 – 14, 1996 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. June 27 – 28, 1995 Open and Closed Meetings, New Orleans, June 4 – 5, 1996 Louisiana Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

July 17 - 18, 1995 July 9 – 10, 1996 Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C. Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

August 2 – 3, 1995 August 5 – 6, 1996 Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C. Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C.

201 September 17, 1996 December 15 – 16, 1997 Public Hearing and Open Meeting, Los Closed Meeting, College Park, Maryland Angeles, California January 22, 1998 September 27, 1996 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

October 15 – 16, 1996 February 17, 1998 Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C. Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

November 13 – 14, 1996 March 10, 1998 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

December 16 – 17, 1996 April 13, 1998 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. January 8 – 9, 1997 May 12 – 13, 1998 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C. January 29 – 30, 1997 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. June 4, 1998 Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C. February 13, 1997 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. June 17, 1998 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. March 13 – 14, 1997 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. July 7 – 8, 1998 April 2, 1997 Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C. Public Hearing and Open Meeting, Washington, D.C. July 20 – 21, 1998 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. April 23 – 24, 1997 Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C. August 6, 1998 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. May 12 – 13, 1997 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. August 25 – 26, 1998 Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C. June 9 – 10, 1997 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. September 8 – 9, 1998 July 9, 1997 Open and Closed Meetings, Washington, D.C. Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. September 14, 1998 August 5, 1997 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. September 23, 1998 September 17, 1997 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

October 14, 1997 September 28, 1998 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C.

November 17, 1997 September 29, 1998 Closed Meeting, Washington, D.C. Open Meeting, Washington, D.C.

202 APPENDIX F SUMMARY OF REVIEW BOARD VOTES ON RECORDS

Documents Voted on by the Board— NSA ...... 246 NSC ...... 48 By Agency Office of the Secretary of Defense . . 3 PFIAB ...... 18 Army ...... 77 Pike Committee ...... 12 Army Intelligence ...... 2,854 Secret Service ...... 30 Carter Library ...... 1 Warren Commission ...... 70 Church Committee ...... 185 Total Documents* ...... 29,420 CIA ...... 14,079 Department of State ...... 20 Sub Totals DIA ...... 5 Military ...... 3,015 DOJ ...... 63 Libraries ...... 198 DOJ Civil Division ...... 1 Committees ...... 267 Eisenhower Library ...... 2 Other Gov. Agencies ...... 427 FBI ...... 10,013 CIA ...... 14,079 Ford Library ...... 133 FBI ...... 10,013 HSCA ...... 1,421 HSCA ...... 1,421 JCS ...... 76 Johnson Library ...... 31 *Accurate as of 9–12–1998. Some documents Kennedy Library ...... 31 may be counted more than once due to mul- NARA ...... 1 tiple consideration by the Review Board.

203 FINAL REPORT OF THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

Documents Processed by the Board— Kennedy Library ...... 89 Consent Releases NARA ...... 11 NSA ...... 84 By Agency NSC ...... 227 Office of the Secretary of Defense . . 22 Army ...... 929 Pike Committee ...... 9 Army Intelligence ...... 2,075 Secret Service ...... 5 Carter Library ...... 4 Warren Commission ...... 393 Church Committee ...... 167 Total* ...... 33,176 CIA ...... 3,172 Department of State ...... 64 Sub Totals ...... DIA ...... 30 Military ...... 3,317 DOJ ...... 1 Libraries ...... 726 DOJ Civil Division ...... 11 Committees ...... 569 Eisenhower Library ...... 14 Other Gov. Agencies ...... 403 FBI ...... 21,509 CIA ...... 3,172 Ford Library ...... 280 FBI ...... 21,509 HSCA ...... 3,480 HSCA ...... 3,480 JCS ...... 261 Johnson Library ...... 339 *Accurate as of 9–12–1998.

204 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Assassination Records Review Board would like to acknowledge the following individuals who contributed to the success of this project:

Former Staff Members of Assassination Records Review Board

David G. Marwell, Executive Director T. Jeremy Gunn, Executive Director and General Counsel Thomas E. Samoluk, Deputy Director and Associate Director for Communications Sheryl L. Walter, General Counsel Philip D. Golrick, Chief Analyst for FBI Records/Counsel Mary S. McAuliffe, Chief Analyst for CIA Records Thomas L. Wilborn, Press and Public Affairs Officer Timothy A. Wray, Chief Analyst for Military Records Christopher M. Barger, Analyst Mosemarie D. Boyd, Analyst Eugene A. Burpoe, Senior Analyst Anne E. Buttimer, Chief Investigator Jessica L. DiFrisco, Analyst Carrie J. Fletcher, Analyst Andrew J. Funk, Analyst Noelle C. Gray, Technical Assistant for Research and Analysis Kim A. Herd, Senior Attorney/Analyst Manuel E. Legaspi, Analyst Tammi S. Long, Attorney/Analyst Joseph R. Masih, Analyst Christina P. Mays, Administrative Assistant David R. Montague, Senior Investigator Dennis J. Quinn, Attorney/Senior Analyst D. Sydney Reddy, Analyst Brian E. Rosen, Attorney/Senior Analyst Valerie M. Sails, Special Assistant to the Executive Director Eric N. Scheinkopf, Analyst Michelle M. Seguin, Analyst Joan G. Zimmerman, Senior Analyst

Interns

Robert R. Arreola Tracy L. Brandt Christopher J. Burton Nabeena Chatterjee Delaney M. DiStefano Rochelle Juelich Farand Kan Krista B. LaBelle Frank P. Menna Daniel D. Wedemeyer

205 Agency Personnel

Steven D. Tilley, Chief, John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection, NARA Martha Murphy, John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection, NARA Steven Hamilton, John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection, NARA Ramona Branch Oliver, John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection, NARA Roland Bordley, John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection, NARA Matt Fulgham, Center for Legislative Archives, NARA Kris Wilhelm, Center for Legislative Archives, NARA Dave Brown, Initial Processing/Declassification Division, NARA Les Waffen, Motion Picture and Audiovisual Branch, NARA Alan Lewis, Motion Picture and Audiovisual Branch, NARA Margaret Ann Kelly, Document Conservation Laboratory, NARA John Constance, Director, Congressional Affairs, NARA William Grover, Special Access and FOIA Staff, NARA Miriam Nisbet, Office of General Counsel, NARA John Collingwood, Assistant Director for Press and Congressional Affairs, FBI Carol Keeley, Chief, Historical and Executive Review Unit, FBI LuAnn Wilkins, Historical and Executive Review Unit, FBI Debbie Beatty, Historical and Executive Review Unit, FBI Carl Valentine, Historical and Executive Review Unit, FBI Terry O’Connor, Former Inspector in Charge, JFK Task Force, FBI P. Grant Harmon, Supervisory Special Agent, JFK Task Force, FBI J. Barry Harrelson, Chief, JFK Project, Historical Review Program, CIA John Pereira, Former Chief, Historical Review Group, CIA James Oliver, Chief, Historical Review Program, CIA Nina Noring, Department of State Hugh Woodward, Department of State Bruce Miller, Department of the Treasury, United States Customs Service Anthony Radosti, Metropolitan Crime Commission of New Orleans Edmund McBride, Joint Staff Secretariat Will Kammer, Joint Staff Secretariat Paul Jacobsmeyer, Joint Staff Secretariat Toni Bowie, United States Army Clay Ferris, United States Army Elaine Rogic, IRR, United States Army Phyllis Birckhead, IRR, United States Army Claudia Collins, Chief, Information Security Policy, National Security Agency Lee Schroyer, JFK Act Project Officer, National Security Agency Lisa Salvetti, Deputy Director of Access Management, National Security Council John D. Podesta, The White House Kimberly Newman, Office of Management and Budget Maya Bernstein, Office of Policy Calvin Snowden, Former Director, Agency Liaison Division, General Services Administration Cassandra Browner, Agency Liaison Division, General Services Administration Nicholas M. Freda, Typography and Design Division, U.S. Government Printing Office Carlotta Wells, Civil Division, Department of Justice Art Goldberg, Civil Division, Department of Justice Tina Houston, Lydon Baines Johnson Presidential Library Stephanie Fawcett, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library Megan Desoyners, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library

The Assassination Records Review Board would also like to thank the numerous federal officials who were formally designated to ensure agency compliance with the JFK Act.

206 Cogressional Staff

Donald Goldberg Leslie Atkinson Daniel Moll Joyce Larkin Jeff Schaffner Steve Katz Brian Dettelbach Richard Hertling Kevin Sabo Michelle Mrdeza

The Eastman Kodak Company

James Milch Fred Williamson Jim Toner Roland Zavada

Participants in Additional Ballistics Testing

Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Dr. Mitchell Holland, Chief, Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory (AFDIL) Edwin Huffine, Chief DNAAnalyst, AFDIL Dr. Jerry Spencer, The Armed Forces Medical Examiner

FBI Laboratory Dr. Chris Allen, Hairs and Fibers Unit Steven Burmeister, Chief, Chemistry Unit Douglas Deedrick, Chief, Trace Evidence Unit Dr. Joseph DiZinno, Chief, DNA-II Unit Robert Fram, Trace Evidence Unit Donald Havekost, Materials Analysis Unit Ronald Menold, Chemistry Unit Charles Peters, Materials Analysis Unit Dr. Jenifer Lindsey Smith, Chief, DNA-I Unit Robert Sibert, Deputy Chief, Scientific Analysis Section

Independent Consultants Dr. Mary Baker, Smithsonian Center for Materials Research (SCMRE) Dr. Michael Zimmerman, Maimonides Medical Center

Experts at Review Board Experts’ Conferences

May 1995 April 1998 The Quest for Additional The Problem of Secrecy Records and Information Steven Aftergood G. Robert Blakey Steven Garfinkel David Garrow David Garrow Paul Hoch Morton Halperin James Lesar William Leary David Lifton Mike Lostumbo John Newman Kate Martin David Slawson Roslyn Mazer Page Putnam Miller Mary Ronan Britt Snyder Evan Thomas

207 Witnesses at Public Hearings of the Assassination Records Review Board

Washington, D.C., October 11, 1994 Dick Russell Daniel Alcorn Edgar Tatro Martin Barkley Steve Tilley Max Holland Richard Trask John Judge William Kelly New Orleans, Louisiana, June 28, 1995 James Lesar The Honorable Lindy Boggs Harrison Livingstone The Honorable Harry F. Connick, Sr. Page Putnam Miller Wayne Everard John Newman Michael Kurtz Charles Sanders Steve Tilley Peter Dale Scott Stephen Tyler Daryll Weatherly Cynthia Anne Wegmann Mark Zaid Washington, D.C., August 6, 1996 Dallas, Texas, November 18, 1994 Barry Harrelson Gary Aguilar John Pereira Adele E.U. Edisen Steve Tilley Gary Mack Los Angeles, California, September 17, 1996 Jim Marrs David Belin Beverly Oliver Massegee James DiEugenio John McLaughlin Eric Hamburg Wallace Milam Wesley Liebeler David Murrah David Lifton Steve Osborn James Rankin Roy Schaeffer Robert Tanenbaum Martin Shackelford Steve Tilley Kenneth Smith Philip Tenbrink Washington D.C., Wednesday, April 2, 1997 Robert Vernon Robert Brauneis Thomas Wilson Debra Conway James Lesar Boston, Massachusetts, March 24, 1995 Art Simon George Michael Evica Josiah Thompson Priscilla Johnson McMillan Richard Trask Philip Melanson Moses Weitzman

The Review Board would also like to thank the many private citizens with whom it maintained contact throughout its tenure. We thank you for your interest, your suggestions, and your support.

208