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Death of a President (U) DCI John McCone and the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

David Robarge

(U) In recognition ofthe .50th anniversary ofthe assassination ofPresident John F. Kennedy on 22 November 1963, Studies in Intelligence reprints the below, which originally appeared as a chajJter in ChiefHistorian Da\tld Robarge:S bookJohn McCone as Director ofCentral Intelligence, 1961-1?65, published by the Center for the Study ofIntelligence in 200.5.

(U) Misconceptions abound regarding CIA~ connection to the assas· sination and its role in subsequent investigations, contributing to the foct that, according to a recent polltalrm by the History Chan· (U) Walter Elder dashed nel, 71 percent ofthe American public still believes that Kennedy's in and cried'' out, 'The del:lth reniltedfrom a conspiracy. president's been shot/' ·(U) Robarge tells a very different story about Cl.A!! immediDte response to the assassination, ils interaction wilh the FBI and War­ ren Commission, the surprise appearance ofKGB defector Htri Nosenko with troubling information about Lee Harvey Oswald, and DC/ McCone's involvement with later inquiries about Kennedy's '' murder. Nothing in tlie numerous books and articles about the ass~sination that have appeared since the publication ofMcCone has materially changed any ofRobarge~ conclusions.

(S) Jolut McCone and Lyman K.irk7 leaving, over hu1th, wanted to talk patrick, the Agency's Executive about the PFIAB meeting with his Director-Comptroller, met with Presi· senior deputies. They were eating in dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory the French Room, a smaJI space next Boanl (PFIAB) through the morning .to the director•s office, when of22 November 1963. The main McCone•s executive assistant, Walter topic of ~iscussion was CIA's image Elder, dashed in and cried out, "''be problem, which McCone attributed tO president's been shotl., • hostile journalists. The DCI planned ' to fly to California that afternoon for {U) McCone turned on the televi­ the Thanksgiving holiday and, before sion. watched the news bulletins,

• (U) Source notes ror this aniele c:an be round in the original publbhccl vcnions or the book on line In CIALink and lnleUnk. .

)

All statements of fad, opinion, or analysis expressed In this article are those of the (b)(3) author. Nothing In the article should be constnled .as asserting or Implying US govern­ ment endotSement of Its factual statements and lnterptetations.

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· (U) The Immediate reaction at Langley, as elsewhere In the US government. was to suspect that a foreign, probably commu­ nist-directed, effort to destabilize the United States might be underway.

. phoned the attorney general at his (U) KeMedy wanted to fly there nearby home. and said, "I'm going to right away, but McCone said that Hickory Hill to be with Bobby!'• The would take too long and suggested DCI made his call before the over­ instead that the slain president's body loaded Washington-area telephone be brought to Washington as soon as system went down 30 minutes after possible. Air Force One landed at the first news ftom Dallas. He Andrews Air Force Base that eve­ remembered wondering on the short ning. and John K.eMedy's body was drive to the K.eMedy house "who taken to Bethesda Naval Medical could be responsible for a thing like Center for an autopsy. Meanwhile, this. Was it the result of bigotry and the controversy over who had killed hatred that was expressed in certain him, and why, had already begun. areas ofthe country, ofwhich Dallas (U) Lee Hltvey Oswald was one? Was this an international Photo: UPI/BeUman (U) lnitiill Fears of11 Conspiracy plot?" (U) McCone returned to Headquar­ cate that a conspiracy had been (S) While McCone was with Rob­ ters at around 1530, summoned the funned t9 kill the President of the crt and Ethel Kennedy in their sec- CIA Executive Committee, asked the United States-and then what was to .ond floor library, the attorney general 'Intelligence Community's Wau:h come next" One of the first cables answered the phone. listened briefly, Committee to convene at the Penta­ was the following message Helms and then said, "He's dead., McCone gon, issued orders for all stations and sent to all CIA stations overseas: recalled feeling shock. disbelief, pro­ bases to report any signs ofa conspir­ Tragic deSoviet Union intelligence developments. arotmd the lawn, spcaldng privately. was trying to take advantage ofthe Although we have no reason dismay in Washington. (S) One ofthe numerous phone to expect anything ofa partic­ ular military nature, all hands calls to interrupt them was ftom Vice (U) The immediate reaction at should be on the quick alert President Lyndon Johnson in Dallas. Langley, as elsewhere in the US gov­ After expressing his condolences, at least for the neitfew days ernment, was to sUspect that a for­ while new president takes Johnson told Robert that the assassi~ eign. probably communist-directed, over reins. nation might be part of a worldwide effort to destabilize the United States plot and indicated that he probably might be underway. Richard Helms (S) In addition, McCone directed should be sworn in right away. The recalled that "[w]e all went to baUie that a special cable channel be estab­ attorney general was initially taken stations over the possibility that this lished so that all traffic related to Lee aback but then agreed. found out the might be a plot-and who was pull­ Harvey Oswald-vrested in Dallas appropriate procedure from the ing the strings. We were very busy soon after the shooting-went~ Department ofJustice, and infonned sending messages all over the world central repository, and he sent~ (b)(1) the pn:sidential entourage in Dallas.· to pick up anything that might indi-

• (U) Robert Kennedy was holdina •luncheon meetl113 onorpniud crime with two Depuvnent ofJustice officllllslllhen FBI Dircdor J. Edpr Hoover ailed 10 !ell him that the president had been shoL

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r (b)(1) I L__ to Parkland (S) For some time after the ~ssass/natlon, and particularly fol­ L....;-;H,.-osp-=-· ,..,.ital...... - w...... h- ere----..J ...,.hll-1o Kennedy had lowing Oswald's murder on the 24th, Agency leaders would not been taken for emergency treatment, rule out a domestic or foreign conspiracy. to coordinate activities with the Secret Service and the FBI. After the the Soviet embassy in Mexico City. shocked their leaders and made them ·secret Service obtained a graphic Headquarters officers speculated .on fear US retaliation.c film of the assassination taken by an 24 November that "[a]lthough it amateur photographer named Abra­ appear.; that he [Oswald] was then (S) For some rime after the assassi­ ham Zapruder, McCone had the thinking only about a peaceful nation, and particularly following National Photographic Interpretation change ofresidence to the Soviet Oswald's murder on the 24th, Center (NPIC) oftkeJs analyze the Union, it is also possible that he was Agency leaders would not rule out a footage (particularly the time getting documented to make a quick domestic or foreign conspiracy-the between shots) and prepare briefing escape after assassinating the Presi- · latter possibly involving ·the Soviet boards for the service.• dent"b Union or Cuba. A Headquarters cable on the 28th stated that "[w]e have by (U) Some senior CIA officers (S) The_Agency's inability to locate no means excluded the possibility looked into possible KGB involve­ Nikita Khrushchev right after the that other as yet unlatown persons ment. The chief ofthe Soviet-Russia assassination especially alanned may have been involved or even that (SR) Division of the Deputy Direc­ McCone and his deputies. The Soviet other powers may have played a torate for Plans (DDP), David Mur­ premier's apparent absence from role:" On I Dec:ember, the station in phy, framed the essential question the Moscow could have meant that he Mexico City, where Oswald had vis­ day after: "[W]as OsWald, wittingly was in a secret command center, ited the Soviet and Cuban consulates or unwittingly, part ofa plot to mur­ either hunkering down for an Ameri­ a few weeks before the ~ination, der President Kennedy in Dallas as an can reprisal, or possibly preparing to was told tQ "continue to follow all attempt to further exacerbate sec­ strike at the Umted States. "We were leadS and tips. 'l1ie question of · tiOnal strife and renderthC US gov­ very high in tension about any indica­ whether Oswald acted solely on his ernment less capable ofdealing with tors which would support such a own has still not been finally Soviet initiatives over the next yeatl'' theme," Helms said. "It bec:ame man­ res0lved."1\vo weeks later, Head­ Also on the 23rd, Mexico City sta­ ifest within 24 or 48 hours owever: quarters told the station to "continue tion reported that 'tess than two that this was not the case.' to watch for ...evidence oftheir months earlier, Oswald had met with ,____ (b)(1 )-----li [Soviet or -~uban] complicity ..." a KGB officer possibly ftom the Thirteenth Directorato-respnsible ws ofthe assassination deeply (S) McCone suggested two possi­ for assassination and sabotage-at ble culprits ifOswald had not acted

• (S) NPIC had dlllleulty computlna &he CUd lime ofexpiiSIII'CI of the fiames on Zapnadu's film because the camaa he used wu spring-wound, which caused lhe limina ofthe hmes to vary slighdy liom lhe standard or I Bpc1 second. The cable slug used for Oswald·relatcd nffic wu GPFLOOR. CIA had opened COilllterintelllgence end security files on Oswald In early November 1959 after II wu noeilied of his defection to the Soviet Union. Oswald's 201 file was opened in December 1960 1o conlain cables, news clipplnp, and othei- material KQIIIIUIIIed In response 1o anlnquily &om the Dcpar1mcnt or Slate about a . llstofi2Amcricandcfectors In Soviet Bloc countries; Oswald's IUIIIIC wu on the list. • ' • (b )(1)

• (S) CIA did liCK est.bllslt thll the Soviet with whom Oswald met, Valcriy Kostikov, was ftom the KGB's "wet afraid' deputmenL Accordins 1o llanseripts • or lheir lelephone conversations! Ithey only disc:luscd Oswald's request for I visa. By early 1964,1he Agency had concluded that Oswald's conllet with the KGB In Mexico City "was nothing mce than a grim coincidence ••••" Oles Ncchipon:nlco, one ofthe: KGB officers in Me:dco City durins Oswald's trip there, has rccounled the Sovicls' dcllinp wilh him In Passport to A.uMSIIIDtlon. (U) One oftho Agency's sar Soviet defectors, Peter Deriabln, wrole slcnglhy memol'll!dwn a few clays aft.et lhe asswinalion azguing that Oswald wu a KGB agent \Wo ei1her wu displl.ched to kill Keruiedy or was sent to the United s.. tes on I!I'Other mission and then committed the murder on his own. Dcri­ abin contended that the KRmlin would have accomplished several objcclivcs by eliminating Kennedy. Amonslhcm wen: removing the West's prmninent Cold Wlrrior fiom the scene; constralnln& US covert actionnpinst Cuba, which would be stlgm1d1.Cd as acts orvengea:c; and dlvertlnslhe Soviet people's lllicntion from domestic problems. Deriabin'1 conjec1lft:s did not find much ofan ~Ill Headquuters.

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(S) Besides determining whether an Jntematlonal crisis was Im­ sulate in mid-September, he heard minent, Agency officers also tried to find out as much as they Cubans talk about assassination and could about Oswald. saw them give Oswald money. , Within a few days, however, this aJone. "Castro's been so mghtfully capital during late September-early alanning report was shown to be a intemperate in soine ofhis talks, .. he October. Most of the assassination­ fabrication. McCone discussed the told a senior Pentagon official, and "it related information about which incident with the president and would be witbill his capability if he McCone briefed President Johnson, Bundy on 30 November and 1 thought he could get away with it, I McGeorge Bundy, and Dean Rusk December. Between 23 November think. Khrushchev, no. On the other during the next week concerned the and 5 December, the DCI briefed hand, I don't know how completely qswatd-Cuba connection. On Johnson on assassination develop­ Khrushchev controls the KGB.>• If 23 November, McCone apprised the ments and other intelligence matters either theory proved credible, Helms president and Bundy ofthe station's every day but two-in varying mea­ remembered, "[w]e could have had a trace n:suJts. Later in the day, the sta­ sures, to communicate news about the very nasty situation. What would be tion reported that the Mexican police investigation, to demonstrate how the retaliation? A startled America had arrested a Mexican nationa1 CIA was involved in it, and to create could do some extreme things ...." working at the Cuban consulate who a bond with_the new president• supposedly talked to Oswald in Sep­ (S) Besides detennining whether'an tember. (U) McCone also participated in international crisis was imminent, two rituals surrounding John Ken­ Agency offiC:ers also tried to find out (S) That evening, McCone told nedy's death. On Saturday the 23rd, as much as they could about Oswald. Rusk about all these developments. he went to the White House to pay Mexico City station reported on the ·On the 25th, a Nicaraguan waJk-in to last respects to the fallen president, 22nd that he had been at the Soviet the US embassy in Mexico City said and on Monday the 25th, he attended ~d Cuban embassi~ in the Mexican that when he was in the· Cuban con- .

• (U) The Soviet Union i~iall:ly tried ID dispel notions thai it was behind the assassinaalon. Less than 15 minulcs aftct Kennedy's death was a.Mounc:ed, the TASS IICWl service Issued a bulletin ~ rightwing extremists in the United Stales wen: raponsiblc. Easll:m Europc:anslltions picked up and spread the slof)'. Ac:conling to former KGB officer Olq Kalugin, who wa sta!loned in New York at the lime:, "the Kn:mlln leadmhlp was clearly rattled by Oswald's Soviet connec:lion." KGB Headqueners sent"&anlic c:ablcs .•• onlering us to do everything possible" ID quell suspicions of Soviet inwlvement in Kennedy's death. ..We wen: ti:lld to put forward the line thai Oswald tould have been involved In a conspiracy with American n:aclionaries displeased with the President's rci:ent efforts 1o improve relalions with Russia •••• fJ1he messqe we were to COII\IeY was clear. 'Inform the American public throuch evay passiblt: channel that we ncw:r lniStl!d Oswald and were never in lillY way tonnec:ll:d with him.'" Moscow tried 1o play clown Oswald's tie 1o the Soviet Union by Insinuating thai Jw: was a Trotskyill: or a Marxist ofsome Ulllldamined sort, and not a"real" communist. Walter Elder recalled thinlclng that the Soviets' denials were too scripted: "it was almost like they were readina from a m111111l." Reviewing the early Soviet "line" on the wassi111tlon a few months later, Agency analysts suggcsll:d that "the c:Juqe against the cxtmnc right was perbaps a 'condllioned reDcx' .... Hoodwinked by liS own prcconcqxlons 1111d wishful thinking[,( the Kremlin almostlne\llllbly concluded thall'rc:litknt Kamcdy hid been struck clown by his mOSI tadical right-wing opponents." Otllcr Soviet public:atlons fur· thcf contiacd the plct~~re by propaslwng IS10rtcd conspinq thcorics.lnutla, the govenunent newspaper, and Rm Slar, lhc army periodical, apceulatcd that orpnlzJcd aimc was involved, while Pratlda, the ComDiunlst Party orpn, and·Nesklya, a news magazine; proposed that Oswald was not the usassin. Malia in aatcllile counlries dissemllllted tha,e notions also. • (S) The bogus Nicaraguan walk-In was just one ofmany false sources that US lntclllsencc services !lad to evaluale right after the ~SS~~SSination. As Head· quarters olficc:n noll:d in a cable 1o Mexico City station, "We and other ~~F~Clcs II'C being floodal by &bric:ations on the (Oswald( case livm several conli­ ncnts, some origlnatlnJ with people on the ftinp of the lntclllscnce business. Such flbric:ations II'C not 11511ally clone for money, buc out ofsickly fanc:y and a desire to get Into the inii:Uitcncc pmc." (U) Also on 2l November, the Office ofCurrent lnlelligcnce pn:pan:d a special edition ofthe Pra/dml) lntelllgenu Chedllst, dated the 22nd and bearing this dedication: "{JJn honor or President KcnnedyLJ for whom the Prc:lident's Intelligence Chedcllst was first wrincn on 17 JIDIC 1961." These wen: the only conlenis of that memorial issue: - For tlris ~ the Chedlut StqffCDIIjind no words morejitti"8 thart aRne quatm by 1M Praldenl to a group ofnewspapennen the day he letJmed of the~ ofSuvlel mlssilu ill CvbG. Blllfllglrl critics rtmied Itt rows Crawd thtt mormo111 pltZZD foil; · - But tmly 011els there who .blows And /w) tlw man who jlghts the bulL

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the state funeral at St. Matthew's murder John Kennedy? In 1975, Cathedral in Washington. according to one of the Warren Com­ mission's lawyers, McCone (S) That morning. CIA and the FBI ) received numerous reports that said he felt there was some­ attempts would be made to assassi­ thing troubling Kennedy that nate foreign leaders invited to the he was not disclosing •.•• funeral. McCone personally told one McCone said he now feels ofthe supposed targets, French Presi­ Kennedy may very well have dent de Gaulle, about the threats thought that there was some against him. Fifty-eight CIA security connection between the' officers joined the detail at the assassination plans 'Ogafnst funeral, along the route of the proces­ Castro and the assassination sion, and at Arlington ofPresident Kennedy. He also added his personal belief{hat Cemetery. Later that day, the DCI Robert Kennedy had per­ w~t to a reception for visiting digni­ sonalfeelings ofguilt beciJUSe taries hosted by President Johnson at he was directly or indirectly (U) Raymond Rocca the Depllltment ofState. Involved with the anti-Castro • planning.• Cuban refugee community in Florida. (U) Because of their relationship, Tile Agency concenlratcd first on McCone had &equent contact with (U) As head ofCIA when much of Oswald's activities in Mexico City in Robert Kennedy during the painful that planning took place, McCone September and October 1963, and days after the assassinatiOn. Their also might have had such ta:lings. A th~n on his residency in the Soviet communication appem to have been -distraught KeMedy even had Union during 1959-62 and his possi­ verbal, informal, and, evidently in McCone aflinn that the Agency itself ble ties to Soviet intelligence. Within McCone's estimation, highly per­ ~ not involved in the assassination. a week, Headquarters rcceivecCJ (b)( 1 ) sonal; no memoranda or transcripts When New Orleans district attorney I !about Oswald and for- are exist or known to have been nm Garrison made that allegation in waraea ihCm to.the White House, the made. The DCI no doubt passed on to 1967, Kennedy was prompted to FBI, the Department ofState. and the the attorney general the same infor­ recall that soon after the assassination Secret Service. After 29 November, mation about Oswald, the Soviet he had asked McCone ''ifthey [the CIA also began assisting the W811en Union, and Cuba that he gave to Agency] had kill~ my brother.... I Commission's inquiry. Johnson and other senior administra­ asked him in a way he couldn't lie to (S)As DCI, McCone's role tion officials. me, and [he said] they hadn't" bctwccn the assassination and the (U) In addition, because Robert release of the commission's report 10 Kennedy had overseen the Agency's • (U) Managing CIA~ Part in the months later was, in his words, "to anti-Castro covert actions-includ­ /nvuligat/on see that the Investigation and the ing some of the assassination plans­ (U) lpe FBI took the lead in the review of the CIA's relationship, if his dealings with McCone about his federal irivestigation of President any, with Oswald were thoroughly brother's murde10 had a special grav· KeMedy's murder. CIA supported the studied and all relevant matters con· ity. Did Castro kill the president Bureau by obtaining infonnation ftom veyed tO the Warren Commission." because the president had tried to kill clandestine and liaison sources out­ According to Helms, McCone's func­ Castro? Had the administration's side the United States and from for- · tion was "sec[ing] to it that sufficient obsession with Cuba inadvertently eign contacts inside, principally in the manpower and funds and other inspired a politicized sociopath to resources ofthe Agency were put to

.______j r-vana wasmystiliedlbout Kennedy's killing. (b)(1)

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KEARHN8HtRN . Death ofa President

(S) Helm~at James Angleton's request-shifted responsibil­ we possibly can in connec­ ity for Agency support for the FBI and the Warren Commission tion with your investigation of to the Cl Staff. the situation in Dallas. I know the importance the President work in support ofthe Warren Com­ (S) The Cl Staff's chief analyst, , places on this investigation mission and the FBI." McCone "cer­ Raymond Rocca. was the Agency's you are maklng. He asked me tainly •.. maintained a continuing and senior point ofcontact for day-to-day personally whether CIA was abiding interest in these proceed­ business related to the assassination. giving you foil support. I said ings" but turned over daily manage­ When needed, other Agency offi­ that they were, but I just wanted to be sure from you ment of the Agency's assassination­ cers-notably Helms and the top thatyoufelt so .... (Y]ou can related activities to Helms, who kept managers in the SR and WH divi­ call on us for anything we the DCI, the DDCI, and the execu­ sions (David Mwphy and J.C. King. have .... I think it is an respectively)--dealt directly with the tive director informed. McCone's cal· exceedingly important investi­ commission and the FBI. According endars indicate that after a flurry of gation and report[.] and I am meetings and discussions during the to Rocca. the CI Staffconcentrated delighted that the President two weeks following Kennedy's on Soviet leads while WH worked has called on you to malce il. death, he settled back into a routine lhe Cuban angle. McCone evidcndy schedule with his usual concentra­ had no problem with this bureau­ (U) Despite McCone's ingnUiating tion on Intelligence Commtmity cratic amngement or with any other diplomacy and the CI Staff's liaison affairs and foreign policy issues. part of Helms's management ofCIA's role, relations between the two agen­ role. "(I]fhe had been dissatisfied," cies worsened during the postassassi­ (S) Heims, in tum, designated the Helms observed later. "he would nation period. The Bureau's four­ chief of the Mexican branch in West­ have made his dissatisfaction clear[,] volume report, issued in early em Hemisphere (WH) Division, John and I wouldn't have foq:otten iL"•(S) December, did not mention CIA. Whitten, to run CIA's initial collec­ referred to just two pieces of informa­ tion and dissemination efforts, and an (S) The shift ofresponsibility to the tion that lhcAgency had provided, officer in the COW1terintelligence (CI) Cl Staff also had the potential benefit and contained mucb material that Sta1rs Special Investigations Group. of improving CIA coordination with CIA officers had not seen before but Birch O'Neal, to handle liaison with the FBI, which had long dealt with that was germane to their own inqui­ the FBI. After Whitten issued a report Angleton's uniL Agency-Bureau rela­ ries, such as extensive information on in December on OsWald's activities tions had grown tense after the assas­ Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union. In in Mexico City, Helms-at James siution because ofjurisdictional mid-December, Hoover voiced suspi- . Angleton •s request, according to disputes. Early on, McCone tried to cions that McCone had questioned Whitten-shifted responsibility for assure J. Edgar Hoover that the FBI the Bureau's investigative abilities Agency support for the FBI and the was in charge of the investigation and and might have leaked derogatory Warren Coni mission to the CI Staif. that CIA would be as helpful as it information to the press. The FBI Helms did so for three reasons: Whit­ could be. In a short telephone conver­ director concurred with a deputy's ten's paper was not regarded as qual­ sation on 26 November, the DCI took recommendation that a "finn and ity work; the assassination almost every available opportunity to forthright confrontation" be held with investigation had a counterintelli­ conciliate the Bureau chief: lhe DCI for "anack[ing] the Bureau gence element; and Angleton's shop in a vicious and underbanded manner I just want to be sure that you provided a tightly controlled channel characterized with sheer dishonesty.'' ofcommun ication. are satisfied that this Agency is giving you all the help that •

• (S) The Apncy'a uassilllllion Inquiry was a mljor test orits dlla rdriev.l capebilities-puticulllly tile c:ompwrizcd lllme·traee ~)'Stan developed for It by IBM ud known as WALNUT, which combined punch cuds and microfilm. In his !lppC8rMCC bcrose the Warren Commission. Mc:Conc encouraged fed. cnl~FJ~Cict 10 computerize their ream!s to facilillle invesliptions.

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(U) Sam Papich, the FBI liaison to (U) Meanwhile, McCone and CIA had to work out a modus vi­ CIA, met with McCone on vendi with the Watren Commission. 23 December to discuss a private alle­ gation that the Agency was claiming the premier entity investigating the Johnson at first opposed creation ofa it had uncovered evidence that KeMedy assassination. presidential panel to examine the Oswald was part ofa conspiracy­ killing. He preferred to let the FBI and specifically, that he had received (S) In December, they were particu­ Texas law enforcement authorities money in Mexico City in September larly concerned that release ofthe FBI quietly handle the matter. With as prepayment for killing Kennedy. report on the assassination would rumors already swirling that some sort McCone then "had endeavored to compromise sensitive CIA surveil­ ofcommunist, rightwing. or under­ leave the impression with certain peo­ lance operations against the Soviet world plot was involved. he did not ple that CIA had developed infonna­ embassy in Mexico City by revealing want a lengthy, public inquiry that tion not known to the Bureau and, in . J)lat the Agency knew about Oswald's might produce explosive "revela­ essence, made the Bureau look ridicu­ visit there. In mid-January 1964, tions" and create pressure on him to lous." According to Papich. the DCI Helms asked Hoover to direct his offi­ act precipitously. At most. he thought. became "very visibly incensed and cers not to pass CIA-originated infor­ a Texas-based. Texan·nm investiga­ left the impn:ssion that he might at mation to the commission without tive boani should be convened." any moment ask [me] to leave." first obtaining clearance and coordina­ McCone then denied that he had tion fi:om Langley. Further animosity (U) The president changed his mind talked to any journalist about the arose when the twQ organizations as the idea ofa blue-ribbon commit· _ assassination and had not been criti­ reached opposite cOnclusions about tee caught on with pundits and politi­ cal of the FBI's handling of the inves­ the bona fides ofa KGB defector, cians after Jack Ruby shot Oswald in tigation, but that he had told President Yuri Nosenko, who claimed to have Dallas police headquarters and Johnson about the original report pn seen Oswald's KGB file compiled inspired fears ofa broad conspiracy Oswald in MexicO City. The enooun­ while the American was in the Soviet and questions 860Ut tbe competence terwith Papich "left [McCone] in an Union. A disagreement over CIA'~ ofTexas authorities. Now that• angry mood." plan to ask defectors it handled to Oswald would never be brought to review FBI information was resolved trial. Johnson calculated that a presi­ (S) That dispute soon was super­ when the Bureau agreed to allow such dentially appointed panel ofdistin- . seded by recurrent problems over vetting as long as its own sources guished citizens stood the best chance infonnation sharing between the were protected and the Agency did of preempting potentially demagogic Agency and the Bureau. Not only did not retain any original reports. • state and congressional probes that "a certain amount ofpride ofowner­ might highlight Oswald's links to the ship" inhibit CIA-FBI communica­ Soviets and Cubans, feed other con­ (lf) Duling with tht! Wa"m tion, acc:ording to McCone, but senior spiracy theories. or reach conttadlc­ Commission Agency officials took issue with the tory conclusions. "This .is a question Bureau's WlCOordinatcd disclosures (U) Meanwhile. McCone and CIA that has a good many more ramifica­ ofinformation to the public and to the had to work out a modus vivendi with tions than on the surface." the presi­ Wa.rren Commission, which becam~ the .Warren Commission. Lyndon dent said, "and we've got to take this

.------(b)(1)1------.

• (U) Johnson disptaye.d hit anxiety over conspiracy nunors on the night after the IIWIISsinatliln. While walclling NBC's lclevision news broadc:as1. he stuted lllklns back to anchormen Chet Huntley llld David Brinkley: YKeep llllcinglike IIIII and you'll bring on a n:vohllion just IS sure as I'm sluing~" Senillr - AmcriCIIII diplomats were working to instill calm In both the United Sllles and the Soviet Union. The US ambassador in Moscow, Foy Kohler, warned Amer­ ican leaden aboul "polilical repei'CUSiions which may develop If undue cmplwiJ Is placed on the alleged 'Marxism' of Oswald •••• 1would hope, if facts pc:r· mit, we could deal with the ISSISSin IS 'madman• wilh l•llons rcconl orac:ts weflcclins mental unbalancc ralhc:r than dwell on his profc:sacd polilical convic:tlons." At the same lime, Ambusldor-ll·J..arae Llewelyn Thompson llfBCd Sovicl Deputy Prime Minist.cr Anastas Mikoyan to lone down Soviet rheto­ ric aboul reacdonary capitalists.

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(U) Under McCone's and Helms's direction, CIA supported the only in response to commission Watren Commission in a way that may best be described as requests-most of which concerned passive, reactive, and selective. the Soviet Union or Oswald's activi­ ties while he was outside the United out of the arena when: they're testifY­ (U) During the next several months, States--and did not volunteer mate­ ing that Khrushchev and Castro did the commission went about what the rial even ifpotentially relevant-for this and did that and chuck us into a chiefjustice called "a very sad and example, about Agency plans to war that can kill40,000,000 Ameri­ solemn duty,'' reviewing reports, assassinate Castro. Helms told the cans in an hour." The public senti­ requesting information from state and House ofRepresentatives' Select ment that troubled Johnson was federal agencies, staging l"C((nstruc­ Committee on Assassinations in 1978 reflected in a Gallup poll taken only a tions. receiving testimony, and pre­ that be "was instructed to reply 'to week after the assassination; just 29 paring its findings. In September inquiries from the Wan:en Commis­ percent ofthose surveyed believed 1964, it released an 888-page report; sion for information fiom the Oswald had acted alone. two months later it followed up with Agency. I was not asked to initiate 26 volumes ofsupporting transcripts any particular thing." When queried, (U) Accordingly, in Executive and exhibits. It concluded that Lee "[I]n other words. ifyou wen:n 't Order 11130, issUed on 29 November, Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin asked for it you didn't give it?," Johitson BMOWlced the formation of and found no evidence that he or his Helms replied, "That's right" the President's Commission on the killer, Jack Ruby, wen: part ofa Assassination of President Kennedy. domestic or foreign conspiracy. The (U) Examining the assassination in It was a seven-member, bipartisan report-described by the New York a different political climate, the Sen­ board comprising the chiefjustice of Tunes as "compn:hen5ive and con­ ate's Church Committee concluded in the United States, Earl Warren; two vincing," with its facts "exhaustively 1976 that the Agency's inquiry was members each from the Senate and gathered, independently checked out, "deficient" in examining Oswald's the House of Representatives, Rich­ and cogently set forth"-had the contacts with pro-Castro and anti­ ard Russell, John Sherman Cooper, reassuring effect the White House Castro groups before the assassina­ Hale Boggs, and Gerald Ford; and and the commission had sought. tion, and that senior CIA officials two prominent fanner government After its release, 87 percent of the "should have realized'' that the officials, banker-diplomat John reSpondents to a Gallup poll believed Agency's Cuban operations "needed McCloy and former DCI Allen Oswald alone had shot Kennedy. to be considered" by the commis­ Dulles. sion. In 1979, the House assassina­ (U) Under McCone's and Helms's tions committee levied a similar (U) The president later called them direction, CIA supported the Warren criticism: "The CIA acted in an ''men who wen: known to be beyond Commission in a way that may best exemplary mBMer in dealing with the pressure and above suspicion." The be described as passive. reactive. and WarTen Commission regarding its panel was empowered to conduct a selective. In early 1965, McCone told nmow requests for information. In fWl and independent inquiry and the Department ofJustice that he had another area, that ofCuban involve­ enjoyed a broad national mandate. Its instructed Agency officers "to coop­ ment and operations, the CIA's members saw their function as bring­ erate fully with the President's Com­ actions might well be described as ing their collective experience and mission and to withhold nothing from reluctant" reputations to calm the shaken popu­ its serutiny," and, through October lace-or, in McCloy's words, to "lay 1964, CIA provided it with 77 docu­ (S) Transactions between the the dust .••[and] show the world that ments and prepared 38 reports of Agency and the commission wen: America is not a banana republic, varying lengths in response to its channeled through Helms but wen: when: a government can be changed taskings. · conducted between the Cl Staff­ by conspiracy." Other state and fed­ mainly by Angleton, Rocca, Arthm eral investigations quickly left the (U) That cooperation, however, was Dooley, and Thomas Hall-and the scene. narrower than those numbers might commission's counsel or staff. SR suggest. CIA produced information ChiefMurphy.and his counterintelli-

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(S) McCone himself had few personal dealings with commis­ gence deputies, Tennent Bagley and Lee Wigren. also worked with the sion members or staffers before he testified to the panel in mid­ commission. Requests for infonna- . May 1964. tion were rarely raised to the DDP or · DCilevel. Helms met with commis­ . Warren to speed up the commission's findings, contended that a second sion personnel only five times pace. In April, he gave some commis­ gunman had fired on Kennedy from between January and June 1964. This sion members and staffers a tour of the Grassy Knoll because the wind-· limited degree ofhigh-level coirunu­ the facilities at Headquarters where shield ofthe presidential car had a nication resulted largely becawe assassination-related infonnation was small hole in it. Only that scenario, most ofthe commissioners, with retrieved, stored. and microfilmed, Buchanan argued, would explai~ the whom McCone would have dealt for and he demonstrated the procedures anomalies regarding the bullets' protocol reasons, did not participate tlie Agency followed in responding to paths, the timing and locations ofthe much in tiJe investigation and left oommission requests. wounds on Kennedy and Texas Gov­ most of the work to staffers. ernor John Connally, and the contta­ (S) The DCIIater said the chiefjus­ dictions between the emergency staff (S) No documentary evidence indi­ ti.ce seemed "quite satisfied'' with at Parkland Hospital in Dallas and the cates whether McCone ordered the · what he saw. In May, McCone dis­ doctors who perfonned the autopsy,. circumscribed approach on his own cussed with Warren and McCloy the on the president's body at Bethesda or at the White House's behest. but need for the commission to refute Naval Medical Center. DDCI Marshall carter recalled that conspiracy theories even ifdoing' so McCone said he would "handle the gave them unwamntcd publicity. "If (S) United States Information whole [commission] business myself, your report doesn't dispose ofit [the Agency and the Department ofState directly"-including, presumably, ••second gunman" scenario] point by worried about the wide circulation establishing, or at least ratifYing, the point, your report is a whitewash,".he Buchanan's assertions had received in chain ofcommand and degree of warned McCloy. AJso in May, the the foreign press. A mutUal fiiend of --­ responsiveness. Moreover, the DCI DCI discwsed his upcoming testi­ the DCI and the chicfjustice, Fleur shared the administration's interest in mony before the commission with its Cowles Montague-Meyers, lived in avoiding disclosures about covert general COIDISCI, J. Lee Rankin. England and had warned McCone . actions that would circumstantially Rankin told him the subjects he that Buchanan was effectively mak- implicate CIA in conspiracy theories, would be asked about~ainly •'your ing his case for a rightwing conspir-. and possibly lead to calls for a tough knowledge about Oswald being an acy on British radio and television US response against the perpetrators agent or informer ...[and] your shows. McCone 81T81lged for Warren of the assassination. Ifthe commis­ knowledge ofany conspiracy, either to talk to her so the chiefjustice · sion did not know to ask about covert domestic or foreign." could best position the commission to operations against Cuba, he was not respond to Buchanan's charges.• going to give them any suggestions (U) One reason for all this attention about where to look. to conspiratorialists was that the ideas (S) McCone does not appear to ofone ofthe earli~ ofthem, have had any explicit,' special under­ {S) McCone himself had few per­ Thomas Buchanan, were circulating standing with Allen Dulles-the sonal dealings with commission widely by the time McCone testified . commission member who worked members or staffefs before he testi­ to the commission. Buchanan, an closest with CIA-that aided the for­ fied to the panel in mid-May 1964.In expatriate American communist and mer DCI in steering the inquiry away December 1963, he discussed with former reporter for the Washington ftom controversial Agency opera­ Sen. Russell the Nicaraguan walk-in Evening Star, had published articles tions. McCone later denied that to ~c US embassy in Mexico City in the French periodicali'E:xpress and ,Dulles was the Intelligence Commu­ who proved to be a fabricator. In Jan­ produced a ~k, Who Killed Ken­ nity's protector on the commission, Uary 1964, at McCloy's request, he nedy?, based on them in May 1964. and the latter declined a suggestion wrote to President Jolmson and sug­ The book's thesis, which anticipated ftom the panel's head lawyet that he gested he encourage Chief Justice many criticisms of the commission's "serve as CIA file reviewer" for the

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spiracy, had ldlled John Kennedy. The DCI could rest assured that his predecessor would keep a dutiful watch over Agency equities and work to keep the commission ftom pursu­ ing provocative lines ofinveStiga­ tion, such as lethal anti-Castro covert actions.

(U) McCone and Helms spent about two hours before the commission on 14 May 1964. They answered ques­ tions about the Agency's information on Oswald and evidence ofa conspir­ acy behind the assassination, includ­ ing Soviet or Cuban involvement. The DCI testified that

{U) The Warren Commission presents its report 10 President Johnson. [w]e had knowledge ofhim Photo: Bettmann/CORBIS [Oswald1 ofcourse, because ofhis having gone to the commission. Dulles did, however, (S) The DCI's eaten~ and logs of Sovil!t Union ...putting him in advise Agency officers of the ques­ meetings and telephone conversa- · a siluation where his name tions his fellow commissioners most tions for the period the commission wiJuld appear in our name likely would ask. As the only com­ existed do not show any contacts-with----tjtkn/uwev~Hanq------mission member who knew about the DuJies, and McCone recalled talldng Oswald was not an agent, Agency's "executive action,. opera­ to Dulles "very infrequently" during employee, or informant ofthe tions. Dulles seems to have taken on that time-perhaps mainly at social Centra/Intelligence Agency. this proprietaJy responsibility him­ functions ofthe capital elite that they The Agency never contacted self. (It is not known ifhe told any· frequently attended. The two men him, interviewed him, ta/lced commissioners in private about CIA's "were not on the best of terms" then, with him, or received or soiU:- plots to kill Castro.) He worked according to Angleton. Their per- ited any reports or through Helms, Rocca, Mwphy, and sonal relations notwithstanding. information/rom him, or other Agency officers and, as was the McCone and Dulles both wanted u) commuf!icated with him case with other commissioners and draw the commission's attention directly or in any other man- staffers, did not need to deal with away fi'om CIA and encourage ner. The Agency never McCone directly.• endorsement ofthe FBJ•s conclusion furni5hed him with any funds soon after the assassination that a or money or compensated him lone gunman, uninvolved in a con- directly or indirectly in any

• (S} The KGB did not1ubsidi;r.e Buehanan'l book, a it did two olhen llultapounded conspiracy lheories: Jcw:hlm Joesten'1 Oswald:'.AutJ.Uin or Fttli..Cuy? (1964) llftd Mule Lane'• Rush ID./udgmt:nJ (1966) (lhc: formerwu the lint of many works to accuse CIA of complicity in the assassination). In 14dition. the Soviet publleation New Tlmu hyped published c:ritiquesofthc Warren Commission report and reqi:led die speculations of sundry ccmspinwists that a~ in Western mcdiL No available information indicates that McCone ever thought 1hcn: were two gunmen. Most ofthe best-selling conspiracy boob appc:BI'CCI after McCone left CIA, so he did DOl have to answu their c:harges officially. • (S) Dulles had several conllcts with the Agency soon after the commission was set up. By mid-December 1963, he had asked for a $UIIUIIII)' of world reac­ tion to the assassination, requested an Agency sec:retary, soupl advice fiom General Counsel Lawrence Houston on the seleetion ofthe commission's law­ yers, and spoken to the Office of Medical Services about Oswald's psyc:hologlcal condition. In JIUIIIIU)' 1964, Duiii:$--IIJIPBI'I:IIY provoked by press c:riticism that the commission had been slow to gel suned, aa:ording to Angleton---BSkcd CIA to suggest questions to be: Included in an official letter to the Soviet JOY· emment. ·

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fashion, and Lee HtUVey (S) Although literally true, 1 reporting on Oswald, he was not · · Oswald was never associated McCone's statement was incomplete. being forthright with the commis­ or connected directly or indi­ A former CIA employee, who · sion--presumably to protect an oper­ rectly in any way whaJsoever worked in the Foreign Documents ation that was highly compartmented with !he Agency. Division ofthe Soviet component of and, if disclosed, sure to arouse much the Directorate oflntelligence, told controversy. Moreover, no infonna­ (U) Before the DCJ testified to the the House assassinations committee tion in Oswald's correspondence sug­ commission, Agency and Bureau in 1978 that in-1962 he reviewed a gested he was a threat to the officers reviewed J. Edgar Hoover's report on the Minsk electronics plant · president, so the commission had no testimony and possible statements by where Oswald worked while in the "need to know" about it. McCone to ensure that there were no Soviet Union. The report, · conflicts between the two directors' ac~:o to the officer. came from CIA' (U) On a possible Soviet or Cuban (b)( 1 ) positions. CIA officers also prepared ~field office and was so . role in the assassination, McCone a briefing paper for McCone. The ~Marine who had defected and told the commission: paper included guidance on assuring was employed at the plant The the commission that the Agency bad record does not indicate ifMcCone I have no information ... that disclosed all information it had on would lead me to believe-or knew ofthis report and its sourci~g Oswald, and that allegations ofCIA · conclude that a conspiracy chain and chose not to tell the War­ ties to Oswald probably were Soviet­ existed .... We made an inves­ ren Commission (preswnably to con­ sponsored disinfonnation. tigation ofall developments ceal an embarrassing but, in the after the assassination which (U) The ocr also was advised that, . context of the assassination itself, came to our attention which to protect soittces and methods. he irrelevant Unk between the Agency might possibly have indi­ should not answer on-the-record · and Oswald); if witting CIA officas cated a conspiracy, and we questions about Oswald's activities in did not tell him about it (possibly for determined after these inves­ Mexico. The commission's chief the same reasons); or ifit was foJgOt· tigations, which were made counsel and a few staffers already ten. not located, or not coMccted to promptly and immediately. had received suCh information "on a Oswald.• that we had no evidence to highly restticted basis." By the time support such an assumption. (U) In addition, the Agency had · he testified, McCone had already had acquired infonnadon ''ftom" Oswald (U) McCone said the Agency had one interview about the assassina­ without his knowledge through the Cl investigated Oswald's trip to Mexico tion-in mid-April with author Wil­ Staff's mail-cover and mail-opening City b~ found no evidence he had a liam Manchester, whom Jacqueline program, codenamed HTI..INGUAL. relationship with Soviet intelligence KeMedy fwl retained to write an McCone may not have been aware of or the Cuban government, or that his • account ofher husband's death. In that project before the assassination. travel was related to the 8ssassina­ Febrwuy, following accusations from but insow as Oswald had been on tion. The DCI's statements about Marguerite Oswald that CIA had "set the taraet list (because ofhis former Oswald and the KGB were based in up [her son] to take the blame" for defector status). it would be surpris­ part on SR Division's conclusion in the assassination, McCone stated· ing ifthe DCI were not told about the December 1963 that Oswald was not publicly that Oswald "was never · program after22 November. Ifnot, a Soviet assassin. That report stated directly or indirectly connected with CIA." . his subordinates deceived him; if he that although there were "several did know about HrLINGUAL rather fascinating inconsistencies,

• (S) The supposed "'swalcllnlcllls-z report" ha not bc:cn found lnA.-:y records in seven! seardles. Aasasinadon sdlolar Edwud Jay Epstein has JR­ senled a sliJbdy dlft'ctent ICCOUIIt ofthe "report." He wrila lhU asoun:c of the Dallas olfia: of the Domestic Contacts Division-s R~mi1111 bnlgrt and gcol· osJst named Georse de Mohra!schlldt, who befriended Oswald and often turned up on the shadowy frin~ of the ISSISSination stol)' In subsequent yean­ provided information on thc opmtions ofu. clcc:tnmlcs lictol)' In Minsk. Ac:conlinato Epstein, Mohrenschildt's 1ubsoun:c must have been Oswald, who wodccd in the pl1111t after he defcdcd. ·

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.· (U) McCone judged that he should defer to the DDP's assess­ (U) McCone's answer was neither ment that the plots to kill Castro had no bearing on the Kennedy fiank nor accurate. By the time he assassination, testified to the commission in May 1964, he had known abo~t the Mafia loose ends, and unanswered ques­ highly sensitive document. •. damage plots to kill Castro for nine months, tions about Oswald,•• his extensive to clandestine soun:es and methods but he chose not to mention them. pro-Castro activity and contact with would be nominal." In response to an Moreover, McCone's reference to the the Soviet embassy in Mexico City Agency query, a warren Commis­ commission about ''an investigation violated a longstanding KGB prohibi­ ·Sion lawyer said ''no one [there] was ofall developments a.fler the assassi­ tion on its overseas agents having excited about the Allen-Scott piece nation which came to our attention contact with domestic communist and to forget it.•• which might possibly have indicated parties or Soviet legations. Further­ a conspiracy" (emphasis added) pre­ more, there was no evidence that the (S)' After the full extent of CIA"s cluded providing details about etll'­ KGB had selected and specially regime-change operations in Cuba lier covert actions that might have trained Oswald for 8J1 "executive was revealed during the 1970s, con­ seemed pertinent (U) action" mission, as was its standard gressional and journalistic attention (U) McCone judged that he should practice. focused more on what McCone and the Agency had not told the Warren defer to the DDP's assessment that (U) Th~ DCl also testified that the Commission-particularly about the the plots to kill Castro had no bear­ Agency had no infonnation that Jack plots to kill Castro. To many observ­ ing on the KeMedy assassination, Ruby was coMccted to pro- or anti­ ers, and some CIA officers as well, and---February 1964. The Office of commission with infonnation about the DCI could preserve Agency equi­ Security investigated the leak to covert action, McCone replied in the ties and avoid leading the Warren AI len and Scott and reported to negative, stating that a "public com­ Commission toward a false conclu­ McCone that although the news story mission" could not receive such sion about Oswald and Cuba.• was "a serious compromise ofa material.

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(U) McCone's reasoning fit i~to . the ward.) Once he concluded that consensus that had quickly devel­ Oswald had no current connection oped in the highest levels ofthe US with Moscow or Havana-and he did government after the assassination not believe the commission needed to that the public needed to be con­ know how that determination was vinced that Oswald was the lone gun­ madc-McCone presumably saw no man and that an international or reason to raise what he regarded as extremist conspiracy had not killed a peripheral, distracting. and Wlsettling US president As Deputy Attorney subjects like plots to kill Castro. General Nicholas Katzenbach wrote to presidential assistant Bill Moyers (U) However defensible the DCI's on 26 November: rationale might have seemed in 1964, it came Wlder harsh criticism later. In The public must be satisfied 1976, the Church Committee con­ that Oswald was the assas­ cluded that "concern with public rep­ (U) Yuri Noscnko sin; that he did not have utation ••• possible bureaucratic failure need for clarity and closure all the confederates who are still at and embarrassment. .• the extreme more acutely because while the com­ ·large .... Speculation about compartmentation of knowledge of mission was going about its busi­ Oswald's motivation ought to sensitive operations ... [and] con­ ness, CIA and the FBI were feuding be cut off, and we should scious decisions [by senior CIA offi­ over a sensational counterintelli­ have some basis for rebutting cials] not to disclose potentially gence case whose outcome could the thought that this was a · · imponant information" kept the com­ have destroyed the consoling sense of Communist conspiracy or (as mission fiom knowing all it should finality that the DCI and other US the Iron Curtain press is SQ)'­ ." have. According to the House assassi­ Ing) a right-wing conspiracy leaders were working so hard to fash­ nations committee in 1978, the com­ to blame it on the Commu­ ion. mission "failed to investigate nists .... We need something to adequately the possibility ofa con­ head offpublic speculation or Congressional hearings ofthe spiracy to assassinate the President," (U) The Nosenlco Incubus in part because ofthe limited the wrong sort." way (U) No COWlterintelligence matter Agency cooperated with iLb of McCone's tenure was so fiaught {U) McCone was convinced that (U) In the long term, the decision of with potential for conflict as the neither the Cubans nor the Soviets defection ofKGB officer Yuri had sought revenge against John McCone and Agency leaders in 1964 not to disclose information about Nosenko in early 1964 and the ensu­ Kennedy, largely because SIGINT ing controversy over his bona fides. had disclosed the stwmed reactions of CIA's anti-Castro schemes might have done more to undermine the By claiming to know about the Cuban and Soviet leaders to Ken­ KGB's dealings with Oswald, and by nedy's death. ("They were fiight­ Credibility of the commission than anything else that happened while it extension a Soviet role in the Ken­ ened, and we knew that,'' a nedy·assassination, Nosenko became commission staffer remarked after- was conducting its investigation. At the time, however, McCone felt the potentially the most important defec-

• (U) Angleton, however, told th~ House IISSIISSinatiOJI$ conuniur:e in 1978 that the lntellipnce Community "did not have the capabilities" durinsl96~ such u "a code break or a defector"-to determine whether or not Cuba was Involved. ·

• (U) Critics ofthe Warren Commission often hllv~ cited Katzcnbaeh's memorandum as proofofa hish·level effort, in ISSISIIination scholar Max Holllllld's words, to "put the machinuy of goveinmcnt into p:ar 1o make the lonc«ranpl15315Sin s1cny a c:onvlncins one" and mid! "a pre-cooked vmlicl" M~ plausibly, however, KalzenbaA:h-who hu aclcnowlcdscd that hb lanpsc was less than anJW--"ad\'OQied a process that would put rumor and speculation to rest, bl!caiiSI! Jailer Oswald's death) a pwptive trial had been rcnd=d impossible." · • (U) For its pan. the commission was deferential and trustins ofCIA. Staffers later said that their impressions ofthe Agency In 1964 predisposed them to beiiC¥1: il was telling the whole truth.

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(S) Nosenko's contention that Soviet Intelligence had had no were publicizi~& the case. At the operational interest in Oswald seemed implausible. time, Nosenko was the highest-rank­ ing KGB officer to fall into CIA's tor in history. The conclusions ofsev­ first source on the structure and per· hands. eral senior ~pcrations officers that soMe) of the directorate to have actu­ Nosenko was a disinfonnation agent ally worked in it He provided useful (S) Between Nosenko's two Jed McCone to approve Nosenko's leads about Soviet agent and techni­ -encounters with CIA, however, scri· detention and hostile interrogation, cal operations against US and British ous doubts about his bona fides had beginning a protracted, much· targets inside and outside the Soviet arisen in SR Division and the CI debated, and ultimately futile three­ Union, agreed to work as an agent in Slaff, and extensive questioning fol· and-a-half·year effort to "break" him. place, and said he would reestablish lowing his defection seemed to sup­ contact the next time he was in the port those suspicions. Some of (U) The harsh treatment of the West NosenJco•s leads could be regarded as seemingly valuable intelligence "giveaways" or "feed material" source is only explainable by CIA (S) In late January 1964, Noscnko because CIA and the FBI already suspiCions that Nosenko was lying relumed to Geneva and met with CIA knew about them or because the cases . when he said the Soviets were not officers. When asked if he knew were inactive or low·grade; Nosenko involved in killing Kermedy. "That about any Soviet role in the 8SS!ISSi· gave inconsistent or inaccurate made the Nosenko case so extraonli· nation. he claimed to have been the descriptions of his personal history; nary and so different fiom all the oth· KGB officer assigned to Oswald's anomalies in his infonnation about ers,.. Richard Helms has said. case when the American defected to the KGB were identified; he pro­ ''Otherwise, we wouldn't have done the USSR in 1959. According to vided what seemed to be "pat'• infor­ all the things we ended up-doing." Nosenko, the KGB had decided mation on subjects he had no reason Moreover, McCone's relationship Oswald was unstable and unintelli· to know about, while claiming to be with Robert Kennedy assurc(l that the gent and declined to have anything to unfamiliar with topics he should hive DCI would be responsive to the attor­ do with him. Furthennore, Nosenko known about; and he did not show ney general's urging that the Agency said, he had participated in Oswald's what was regarded as a defector's learn the truth about Nosenko and · application for a visa to return to R~ "nonnal" concern for his family and Oswald, and perhaps rmdered him sia in 1963, and he had been assigned his future.• even more inclined than usual to Jet to review Oswald's file after the the professionals in the DDP do what assassination. (S) Noscnko's contention that they thought was necessary to answer Soviet intelligence had had no opera­ the crucial question: Did Moscow (S) lfNosenko was telling the truth, tional interest in Oswald seemed order th~ murder of the president? An his infonnation would dispel suspi· implausible, considering the Ameri· affirmative answer could have been a cions that Moscow had some part in can had been stationed at an airbasc casus ~IIi for the United States. President Kennedy's murder. in Japan involved in U-2 missions. Nosenko also told his Agency con­ Oswald's comfortable living condi­ (S) When he first contacted CIA in tacts that he wanted to defect. In early tions in Minsk, his marriage to the Geneva in June 1962 during a disar· February 1964, after he said he had niece ofa Soviet anny intelligence mament conference, Nosenko was a been recalled to Moscow, he was officer, and the circumstances ofhis mid-level officer in the KGB's Sec­ exfiltrated to West Germany. A week ·return to the United States could be ond Chief Directorate, which was after his arrival, McCone ordered interpreted as suggesting that he had responsible for counterintelligence Nosenko brought to Washington as ties to the KGB. and security. He was the Agency's soon as possible because the Soviets

• (U} Statistically, at lcasl, lhc value ofNoscnlco'1 infonution lppeated questionable a1 first. A Ially oflhc leads he provided, complied in lhc sprina of 1964, showed that out or 157 wcs (63 concerning USc:~ and 94 involvina fon:ipcn), 104 (52 in Cld! catcsory) were alrc.dy blown or suspected. unproduc:· live ot not yet ective, lldccd ateeu 10 ellssifiCd info11111tion, or could not be lnvestlptcd because Noscnlco'• blowledse wes VIIUC or ambiauous.

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(S) None ofNosenko's infonnation (S) McCone and CIA felt pressure from the WatTen Commis­ about Oswald and the KGB could be sion after Hoover unilaterally revealed to the commission what confinned independently; nor would the defector had said about Oswal~wh/ch supported the Bu­ Nosenko, a counterintelligence offi­ reau's conclusion that he was a deranged killer acting alone. cer, necessarily be able to say with­ out reservation whether the KGB's States ...and ... to the world, would Helms, Angleton,.and SR Division foreign intelligence component had have been staggering." managers thought the ba""ce or had n~t recruited a particular indi­ weighed heavily in Golitsyn's (avor. vidual. Also, it appeared too seren­ (S) McCone's deputies kept him Even without his infonnation about dipitous that ofall the thousands of apprised of the Nosenko case fiom Oswald, Nosenlco would have had a KGB officers in the world, one who 'the day in early February 1964 when hard time proving himself. Contrib'\t­ had had direct conblct with the the KGB officer said he had been ing to McCone's uncertainty was Oswald case three separate times recalled to Moscow.• The DCI, in Hoover's conclusion--based largely would seek to defect so soon after the tum, passed on· news of develo~ on a trusted KGB source (code­ assassination with infonnation exon­ ments to the White Houso--espe­ named FEDORA) the FBI had at the emting Moscow. cially to Robert Kennedy, who, . United Nations imd the Bureau's ~wn according to Helms, was the driving interviews with Nosenko---by early (S) Perhaps the most important file. force outside the Agency behind the March thatNosenko's infonnation tor in the Agency's thinking was the decisions to extract the bUth fi:om was "valid and valuable'" and that he claim ofan earlier defector, Anatoliy Nosenko. was a genuine defector. Angleton, Golitsyn, that Moscow would send however, thought FEDORA was a provocateurs to discredit him and (S) From the _first, McCone plant because he corroborated _su~ divert attention ftom the search for received essentially all evaluations of posei:lly inaccurate information ftom moles inside CIA and other Western Nosenko's bona fides ftom skeptics, Nosenko and therefore must be part services. Golitsyn had labeled includingADDP Thomas Karamess­ ofthe same deception. Nosenko as a disinfonnation agent in ines, Angleton, Murphy, and Golit­ 1962. and James Angleton, David Syn. but h~ appears initially to have (S) At about the same time, in early Murphy, and Nosenko's case officer, tried to keep an open mind. Possibly March, McCone and CIA felt pres­ Tennent Bagley-who at first thought he took early warnings about sure ftom the Warren Commission Nosenko was genuine-agreed. Nosenko as a standard caveat about after Hoover unilaterally revealed to Nosenko's reappearance 19 ~onths any defector. ln mid-February, he told the commission what the defector had later had potentially monwnental Rusk he was inclined to believe said about Oswald-which su~ consequences. With the United States Nosenko. After hearing about the ported the Bureau's conclusion that still suffering fiom a national trauma, results offurther questioning, how­ he was a deranged killer acting alone. the Warren Commission inquiry ever, the DCI told the president that With the DCI's pennission, Helms underway, and the Cuban missile cri­ "the Soviet's performance and action told the commission that the Agency sis barely a year old, the Agency had were so different ftom any other had serious reservations about to determine whether the KGB had defector case that our suspicions had Nosenko and asked it to "await fur­ dispatched a false defector to hide the been aroused." ther developments. •• fact that Oswald was a Soviet-spon- . sored killer. As Helms testified in (S) The breadth ofGolitsyn's infor­ (S) To resolve the uncertainty about 1978, "[i]fit were shown that OswaJd mation about Soviet intelligence Nosenko, McCone in early April was ...acting as a Soviet agent when activities and CIA officers' faith in it 1964 accepted the recommendations he shot President KeMedy, the co~ added to Nosenko's difficulty in of Helms, Angleton, and Murphy that quences to the United establishing his veracity. McCone, the defector be cotifined and interro-

• (S) McCone had no role in aulhorizins~ny opeqtilllllll or compcnution ananaements ror N-m aftao the Russlan'slirst conlal:t with CIA in 1962. Other· wise, the record does not indlcale wllat, ihnylhing. McCone la!cw about the case berore 1!164.

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(S) One Important concern the Agency had was the embar­ rassment that would result if the commission's report Included Bureau officials "are very much con­ material from a source later shown to be a controlled Soviet cerned and recognize that [Nosenko] agent. could be a plant." "[H]is story has held up--but the cases are peanuts­ gated until broken. (Agency officers (S) There is no reason to doubt that no real significance. The other leads had suspended infonnational debrief­ he would have accepted then the that he gave us-many of them were ings ofNosenko a month before.) argument Helms made to congressio­ known to us .... [The Soviets] have CIA detained Nosenko under the nal investigators a deaule-and-a-half not suffered at all by what he's given tenns ofan "exclusion and parole" later to justifY the severe treatment of us." McCone told Papich that CIA agreement with the Department of Nosenko: would not decide on Nosenko one Justice executed in 1955. The agree­ way or the 9ther unless the Bureau ment gave the Agency authority to rrJhis became one ofthe most - agreed with its judgment. In June, exercise over defectors "control ofil difficult lssues ..• that the Golitsyn--after reading files on kind and degree it believes consistent Agency had eve/' faced. Here Nosenko and listening to tapes of his with the internal security needs ofthe a President ofthe United · debriefings-reaffinned his prior United States." States had been murdered and assessment that Nosenko was a fillse a man had come from the defector. • In July, Golitsyn told the (S) The documentary record does Soviet Union, an acknowl­ DCI that he disputed Nosenko's edged Soviet intelligence not indicate what McCone knew explanation ofGRU asset Pyotr about the austere conditions of - officer; and said his intelli­ gence service had never been Popov's arrest in 1959. Nosenko said Nosenko's year-long detention at an KGB security caught a CIA officer (b)(1) Agency safehousel in touch with this man I [Oswald] and knew nothing mailing a letter to Popov. Golitsyn c:=P'welve ofthe 16 months ofthe about him. This strained cre­ insisted, however, that Nosenko 's - Russian's confinement there were dulity at the time. It strains it account was intended to divert the during McCone's tenure.) Helms to this day •... You are damned Agency from the penetration agent does not recall that McCone ever ifyou hold a follow too long who had tipped off the Soviets.b asked for details of the inquiry, and and treat him badly •.• andyou been the DCI does not appear to have are damned the other way if · (S) The Warren Commission's fully aware of much of the dubious you have not dug his teeth out patience with the Agency over logic and inappropriate! I to fmd out what he knows Nosenko had worn thin by mid-June, (b)(3) procedures upon which the case about Oswald when it asked McCone for a defini­ against Nosenko rested. Assured by tive assessment ofNosenko's credi­ his senior operations and legal ofl:i­ (S) McCone soori received further bility. McCone had Helms tell Chief cers that the Agency was handling impressions about Nosenko ftom the Justice Warren that CIA thought Nosenko lawfully and in ways they FBI and Golitsyn that reinforced his Nosenko might be a dispatched agent believed stood the best chance of approval for having the defector and to advise the commission that his revealing the truth, McCone let the interrogated In May 1964, the FBI's infonnation should be suppressed. hostile interrogation run its course. liaison officer to the Agency, Sam Papich, told McCone that some

• (S) Golil$)'n h=rd ofNosenko's dcfeetion from Angleton just after It occurred. and on II February told McCone that he c:ould help evalualc lhc new amval if he n:ad lhc liiC$. McCone COIII:IIIRCI, and Noscnko's file was added 10 olhen that Golit5y11 had star1cd to read lhc previous November. Golibyn could protect himself by dcbwJking Nosenlco, but it is not evident in the rccont bow much McCone. Helms, Angleton, 1111d olhcts lictored !hat self·lntaat into lhclr evalu­ ations of the two defectors. ~ (S) The chronology of Popov's compromise is c:ompllcalcd, but It Is fair to say that information frvm Soviet penetrations in Austria and the United Kingdom lint c:ast 511Spic:lon on Popov, wbo was lata" found to be c:&n)'lna the CIA letter. Mishandled FBIIIIII"'CIIIancc of Soviet operatives whom PopoV had reported, · Popov's own poor scc:uril)' pm:ticcs, and reporting fiom lhc KGB'• assets in the Vienna pollee and its agent In MJ-6, George Blake, c:onlributed 10 his com­ promise.

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(S) One important concern the (U) In late September 1964, President Johnson appointed Mc­ Agency had was the embarrassment Cone to a four-man commmee to advise on Implementing the that would. result if the commission's Wanen Commission's recommendations for improving presi­ report included material from a dential security. source later shown to be a controlled Soviet agent. Warren later told rate·infonnation. The FBI believed McCone that the commission had Nosenko in 1964, and CIA con­ accepted CIA's advice. In addition, at cluded a few years later that his least three times in July, Agency offi­ n e 1gence o ecutive Com- infonnation about Oswald was accu­ cers (including Helms, Murphy, and mittee approved this phase of the rate. Lastly, Nosenko might have Bagley) told the commission that Agency's handling ofNosenko, been a controlled agent sent to the Nosenko might be a KGB plant although it was not given details of United States to report truthfully that Those sessions settled the quesdon; the defector's trealment There is no the Soviets had nothing to do with the FBI's debriefings ofNosenko record that McCone knew or asked Oswald or the assassination. Mos­ remained closed in the commission's about the mechanics of this much cow miscalculated, however, in files and did not contribute to its con­ more grueling (and ultimately fruit­ thinking the US government would clusions. Jess) phase of the investigation.• find that story more believable ifit came through clandestine channels (S) During the last 12 months of (U) As journalist David Wise from a "defector" with an attractive McCone's directorship, CIA offi­ pointed out in the late I 970s, there resum~. cers subjected Nosenko to at least were several pennutations to the 160 hours of hostile interrogation question ofNosenko's authenticity, (S) As DC I, McCone never freed and an untallied amount of what was most of which were not considered himself from the "zero sum" para­ tenned ''neutral" questioning. by McCone or: any senior Agency digm. to which SR Division and the According to Helms, the DCI did not officer after the Kennedy assassina­ Cl Staff were wedded: Golitsyn was follow the case closely at this stage tion. First. as conventional wisdom good, so Nosenko must be bad. The but expected to be infonned of at CIA ran until the late 1960s, empirically-minded McCone major developments. Otherwise, Nosenko could have been a false judged that enough facts existed to once the Warren Commission for­ detector with a false story about support that deceptively simple mally concluded that Oswald had Oswald and the KGB. Second, conclusion. As in other counterin­ acted alone, McCone showed no fur­ Nosenko might have been a real telligence matters-an area in ther interest in pursuing the Nosenlco defector who had made up a story which he did not display much aspect ofthe assassination. about Oswald to make himself a intellectual creativity-he deferred "bigger catch." The inaccuracies and to trusted deputies. In 1978, (S) Meanwhile, the case remained exaggerations in his story were McCone told the House assassina­ unbroken. In January 1!H;S, CIA reevaluated later as consistent with tions committee that he thought detennined that Nosenko-who had the penchant ofdefectors to embel­ Nosenko was bona fide after all. He not changed his story about Oswald lish their biographies, access, and did not say what Jed him to that and the KGB-was being deceptive knowledge. conclusion, but he may have been but still could not ascertain why. reflecting the Agency's revised When McCone left Langley, the (U) Third, Nosenko eould have view ofNosenko. Reliable KGB Office of Security had nearly com­ been a genuine defector with accu- information shows that both defec- pleted preparations fot placing

• (S) Nosenlco wu held! l&om Aupstl96S Wllil Ol:tobcr 1967, when, at DDCI RuFus Taylor's direction. the Offitc ofSec:urity (OS) lOOk over (b)( 1) his cue. OS officer Bruce Solie handled the "clean slalc.. invcstiplion. Using an ~n~lytlcal methodology lhat lcnded to explain away inamsistenc:ies and inaccwacles In Noscnko'11~ convene of the approach that SR Division and the CI Stalrhaclllkcn--Solic tonc:ludcd that Noscnlco's detraclora had not proven their UJliiiiCI1l. ("[l)t is not considered that based on all available infonnatlon a c:onc:lusion that Noscnko is or Is not a bona n!k defector can be lncontiOYCI'Iibly subswltiatcd at this time. j Nosenko was then n:lcascd uncler supervision, resettled, c:ompcnsalcd, and hired a a contractor.

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(U) The members also encouraged the White House to seek man as Chief of the Secret Service, legislation prohibiting shipments of firearms In interstate com­ after which Mr. Rowley would be merce except between federally licensed dealers or manufac­ required to 'fall into line' or other­ turers. wise become acasualty." McCone recommended Michael J. Murphy, tors were genuine-an apparently to do the staff-level work; McCone's Commissioner of the New York City elementary conclusion that intellec~ aide was DDP officer John Mertz. Police Department, to either replace tual rigidity and bureaucratic obsti~ Rowley or assume a new White nacy kept McCone and a significant • (U) The Dillon Committee met House position supervising the ser­ number of senior Agency officers seven times through the filii and win­ vice.b from reaching. • ter and held discussions with J. Edgar Hoover, James Rowley, the chiefof (U) The Dillon Committee reported the Secret ~ervice, and Kermit Gor­ to President Jolmson in late January (U) Loose Ends don, head ofthe Bureau ofthe Bud­ 1965 and released a version of its (S) In late September 1964, Presi­ geL The DCI attended only four of findings to the·public in early Febru- dent Johnson appointed McCone to a the meetings but took an active part 111)' (as intended, it _had completed its four-man committee tO advise on in the deliberations when he did. He work in time for the next session of implementing the Warren Commis­ suggested that a presidential assassi­ Congress to consider its recommen­ sion's recommendations for improv­ nation statute contain an "informer dations). Contnuy to the Warren ing presidential security. The. clause" similar to those in other fed~ Commission, McCone and his fellow commission had proposed that an era) criminal laws; he thought a high­ members concluded that the Secret assassination attempt, an assault level interdepartmental standing Service should retain primlll)' respon­ against, or kidnapping.of a president group should be established to peri­ sibility for. presidential protection and or vice president should constitute a odicaJiy review presidential protec­ remain in the Department of the Trea­ federal crime; that a cabinet-level tion; and he regarded sUrveys of sury. Despite President Johnson's committee or the NSC assume the buildings at sites ofscheduled presi­ decision not to support any increase responsibility ofreviewing and over­ dentiaJ visits as "tremendously waste- · in the Secret Service budget-in seeing presidential protection pro­ ful" uses of manpower. keeping with his government-wide grams; that the FBI and the Secret economy driv~e committee Service improve their investigative (U) As when he testified before the called for a 57-percent increase in · and intelligence capabilities; and that Warren Commission, McCone again service personnel, improved training. interagency cooperation and informa­ pressed for federal a~ncies to make and augmented resources. greater use of what was then called tion sharing oq security matters be "automated data processinl( teclmol­ (U) The members also encouraged promoted. Others on the presidential ogy to collate information on presi­ the White House to seek legislation committee were C. Douglas Dillon, dential security. He brushed aside prohibiting shipments of firearms in the secretary of the treasury, who served as chairman; Nicholas Katzen­ objections that returning Rowley to interstate commerce except between bach, the acting attorney general; and his previous job as head of the Secret federally licensed deaJers or manu­ McGeorge Bundy, the president's Service's White House detail would facturers. In other areas, the commit­ nationaJ security advisor. Each mem­ cause personal and public relations tee echoed Warren Commission difficulties. ''The best approach proposa]s, calling for a federal assas­ ber had an assistant from his agency would be to select the best available sination and kidnapping statute (with

• (U) KGB M1:hivist \Uill Mitrokhln'a smussJed malcriallncllldcs damege assessments c:ondw:ted after GoiiiS)'n lll1d Noscnlco defec:lcd. Bolh men reportedly were put on a list or "particularly dllngcrous !nilon" 111 be "llquldaled." Oleg Kalusin claims that he was among tJic dozens of KGB offia:n stationed over­ seas who wen: ordcml home after Noscnko defcded. . . ~ (U) President Johnson soon scotched the idea ofremoving Rowley or creating a presidential secllrity·ovcrsccr, but he did agree Ill promote the service's director from the Gcnm1 Schedule 10 the Exccutlve Schedule IS pan or an overall "upsraclc" ofthe agency.

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an infonner rewards provision) cov­ (U) Despite the prominence that many conspiratorialists have ering the president and vice presi­ given to CIA in their speculations about who killed Presldef}t dent; expansion ofSecretService Kennedy and who has concealed "the troth," they do not ac­ agents' investigative and arteSt pow­ cuse McCone ofparticipating in any murder plot or coverop. ers; establishment ofa cabinet-level group to oversee presidential protec­ Moms) Bishop as a true name, rice Bishop ''rang a bell" with him, he tion; and improved cooperation pseudonym, or alias; the Agency · might have been thinking about among federal agencies and with never supported Alpha 66; and Veci­ someone else. Brcckinridge informed sblte and local law enforcement ana was registered as a contact of the the House committee's chief counsel, departments. Several ofthe recom­ US Anny, not the Agency. b G. Robert Blakey, in mid-October mendations that McCone and his fel­ that "Mr. McCone withdraws his low committeemen made were soon (U) The House committee picked statements on this point." Neither the adopted.• up the Bishop "lead" and questioned identity, nor even the existence, of McCone about it in August 1978. "Maurice Bishop" has ever been (U) One ofMcCone's missions as McCone recalled a "Maurice Bishop" established. c • · DCI was to keep CIA out ofopera­ and believed the man was an Agency tional controversies, so it is ironic employee. but did not know where he that. as. a private citizen, he later gave worked or what his duties were. ClA (U) A Conspinicy in the National infonnation to the House assassina­ management became concerned that Interest? tions committee that rekindled the fonner DCI's statement, even (U) Although criticism ofthe War­ had ch&Jges that the Agency hidden though in context ofthand and impre­ ren Commission intensified and con­ its supposed clandestine relationship ci_se. would call the Agency's credi­ spiracy theories proliferated through with Oswald. In May I97i, colum­ bility into question. Scott the 1960s and 1970s, McCone did not nist Jack Anderson (citing the com­ Breckinridge of the Office of Legisla­ alter his view about Oswald's guilt mittee's files) wrote that Antonio tive Counsel met with McCone in over the years.·He told the House Vcciana, in the 1960s a member of · early October and brought along pho­ assassinations committee in 1978 that the anti-Castro commando group tographs ofall past and present CIA he knew ofno evidence that would Alpha 66, had told congressional employees with the surname of tie Oswald to the KGB, Cuba, or investigators that in Dallas in August Bishop. After hearing that the ClA: Had a 'hostile country been 1963, he had met with Oswald and a Agency had no record ofa Maurice involved, he said, it would have pro­ CIA officer who used the name or Morris Bishop, McCone declined vided Kennedy's killer with an "Maurice Bishop." Anderson's story, to look at the photographs and said he "escape hatch"-for example, a visa which the Agency described in an must have been mistaken when he such as Oswald had tried to get from internal report as "a mixture ofsome gave his deposition. H~ said that the the Soviets and Cubans in September fact and a great deal of fiction," did name had come up along with a 1963. not hold up. A review ofCIA records dozen or so others after five hours of found no·rcfercnce to Maurice (or questioning and that although Mau-

• (U) Later in l96S, Conaress passed a law lhat made assassination or kidnapping or, assault on. or~nspii'IICY to 1wm lhc pn:sidcnt or vic:c p~Uidenta fedenll crime. The Secret Serv!c:c's budset for FY 1966 wu IIICfCUCCI ll pacem ftom three years before; its complement of agents wu expanded SO pacent to 600; and its overall staffing wu lncreued by over half to 920. 'Serving Wider the renamed director (the title "chief" wu lbandOIIed as archaic) were four new assis­ tant directoq, including one in chuBe ofall procective security dclails, and anolher responsible for inrelllgcncc 111rairs. Servicing the latter wu an overhauled, expanded, and automated researm burau lhat shared lnfonnation with CIA, the FBI, and other government entities at all levels. ~ (5) Acconlins to Gacton Fonzi, the ii!YC:S1igator for the House committee who has focused on this Oswlld-Blshop-Vec:iana angle more than any other assas­ sination writer, Bishop was "the secret supervisor and direttor ofall [of) Veciana's anti..cast..o lldiviries ••• thc 11\1111 wbo had sugcsted ~founding ofAlpha . 66 and guided its overall stratesY· Bishop not only directed the BSSBSSination Bllempt on C8SU'o in Cublln October 1961, he also engineered the plan to kill Castnl in Chile In 1971. Bishop bad the connections to pull suings with the US government and get the financ:ial su()I)C!!! needed .... [He lll1d Veciana] worked IOB!her for lhineen years." The only pmons named cilbcr Manis or Maurice Bls"}:,'n CIA files were, respeclively,j I I - d the leader ora radical political party in the country of Grenada. (b)(1) (b)(6)

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5EERE1"HN8f8RN Deaih of a President

(U) The DC/ was compllcit in keeping incendiary and diversion· the conflict between the Warren ary Issues off the commission's agenda and focusing it on what Commission's stated purpose-ascer­ the Agency believed at the.time was the "best truth" taining the facts ofthe assassina­ tion---and implied in its mission­ (U) When asked about Jack Ruby's killed President Kennedy and who defending the nation's security by possible role as an "eraser" sent to has concealed ''the truth," they do not dispelling unfounded rumors that ''rub out" Oswald, McCone replied accuse McCone of participating in could lead to destructive interna­ that the circumstances surrounding any murder plot or coverup. Even the tional conflict. that second murder ''were so bizam: most ferverit critics of the "lone gun­ and unpredictable that it was impossi­ man" and "single bullet" theories (U) The DCI was complicit in keep­ ble to detect a rational ploL" Besides who posit Agency responsibility for ing incendiluy and diversionary Nosenko's bona fides, the only mat­ the assassination blame rogue opera­ issues offthe commission's agenda ter on which McCone had changed tives below the senior executive ech­ and focusing it on what the Agency his mind was concealing infunnation elon. At most, McCone has been believed at the time was the "best about CIA's involvement in plots to. accused ofconceaJing inconvenient truth'': that Lee Harvey OswaJd, for kill Castro. With almost IS years of or embairassing facts about CIA's as yet undetennined motives, had hindsight, he said that the Agency clandestine activities or contacts that acted alone in killing John Kennedy.• Max Holland, one of the most tair­ shouJd have told the Wam:n Com­ migh~ lend credence to theories that mission about those schemes. He did Cuba or the Mafia were behind Ken­ minded scholars of these events, has not explain why he thought differ­ nedy 's death, or that the Agency had concluded that "ifthe word •conspir• ently then. Possibly he believed that a secret relationship with Oswald. acy' must be uttered in the same greater candor in 1964 could have breath as 'Kennedy assassination,' helped attenuate the damage that the (U) McCone did have a place in a the only one that existed was the con­ Agency's reputation suffered during "benign cover-up," or what also has spiracy to kill Castro and then keep the ''time oftroubles" in the 1970s. been termed "a process designed that effort secret after November more to control infonnation than to 22nd." In that sense-and that sense (U) Despite the prominence that elicit and expose iL" The protective aJono-McCone may be regarded as many conspiratoriaJists have given to response by McCone and other US a "co-conspirator" in the JFK assassi­ CIA in their speculations about who government officials was inherent in nation "cover-up."

(b)(1)

• (S) The House commlnee also qualioncd a mired WH Division offic:cr, Balmes Hidalgo. about Maurice or Monis Bishop. Hldalso said he recalled a col­ (b)(3) league at Hcaclquanas in the early or mld-1960s who went by that aliu. When shown the IAII!Ie set of pholOII'Iqlhs that was prepared for McCoi!C, however, he could k:E"the offic:cr. He sugested that the composite ab:leh that the commiltec showed him looked lib: a Conner cblc:f ofhlsJ I Howc:vc:r, retlml in 1962, and his linal posdnsl ldld not bring him ln1D contact with Alpha 66. J. Walcon Moore: of the: Domestic Con- (b)(3) tact Divis · Allee Phillips ofWH Division l1so were: mentioned as possibly being lbc real-lire MBishop".-...Gidon Fonzi assau unequivocally that Phillips wu-but na positive ldcntilication has ever been made. The House commlttec: concluded that "It appears reasonable that 11111SS0Ciati011 similar 1o the alleJ,Cd Maurice Bishop story adullly c:xlsted ...{b(ut whether Veciana's contact was really named Maurice Bishop, or If he wu. whelhcr he: did Ill of lbc: things Veciana claims, and If so, with which US Intelligence qency he: was associated, could not be: determined." The BUhop busineu was reswra:tcd on NBC's telcvisi011 news magazine prognun,/nslde Edition, on S February 1992, which divulged some ofthe: contents of the House committec:'s ~tofore secret lilc:s-!ncluding McCone's statements. • (U) Such reasoning misht explain McCone's request 10 the Department or Justice in I1111uary 1965 that it not exempt then documents the Agency provided 10 the: W&n"en Commission from the: 75-year disclosure period mandated for Investigative egcnc:les. He argued that "national security outweighs any other con­ sidcl'lltion" and lbal the: documeniS should be: withheld rot the filii period.

20 SEERB'J/N8FORN Studies In Intelligence Vol. 57, No.3 (September 2013)

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