Atlantic Council YOUNG ATLANTICIST PROGRAM

ISSUEBRIEF BY MÜJGE KÜÇÜKKELEŞ AND JEFFREY MANKOFF The Question and US-Turkish Relations in a Changing

MARCH 2014

Growing disorder throughout the Middle East has created the possibility for major changes to the status Young Atlanticist Program of Kurdish minorities in , , and . The Young Atlanticist Program connects emerging Turkey’s handling of its and its leaders with senior decision-makers, unique relations with Kurdish groups throughout the region professional development opportunities, and a are creating new challenges for US foreign policy and universe of like-minded peers from the Atlantic US-Turkish relations. US policy toward the community and beyond through initiatives focused remains subordinate to wider regional security on foreign policy and international security, global business and entrepreneurship, energy and the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. In environmental policy, and programming focused practice,interests. however, Officially, US the policy United is oftenStates inconsistent: does not support the on veterans. United States backs Kurdish groups in some states while opposing them in others. reconciliation between and its Kurdish population. Washington remains cautious not to press The Kurds, whose historic homeland is today divided too hard on an issue of great sensitivity to Turkey, among , Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, are one of the especially given Turkey’s importance to US strategy in world’s most numerous stateless people. Though no addressing the challenges posed by the ongoing unrest exact count exists, the region’s roughly 36 million in the Arab world. Kurds make up slightly less than 10 percent of the population in Iran and Syria, and between 15-20 percent of the population in Iraq and Turkey. Turkey’s months of the Arab Awakening, US and Turkish 14 million or so Kurdish citizens are concentrated in prioritiesDespite significant vis-à-vis thecooperation, Kurds in bothnotably Iraq in and the Syria first the east and southeast of the country, adjacent to the are increasingly diverging. There are tensions over Kurdish regions of Syria and Iraq. Following Ankara’s attempts to cultivate closer ties with the unsuccessful attempts to create a Kurdish state after Iraqi Kurds—who are locked in a dispute with the the collapse of the , the new Turkish central government over the control of the region’s Republic subjected its Kurdish inhabitants to a oil—to bolster Turkey’s energy security. Washington campaign of assimilation and resettlement. The fears that Irbil’s ability to sell oil independently of intensity of this campaign waxed and waned over the Baghdad could undermine Iraqi unity. In Syria, subsequent nine decades, becoming more intense Turkish support for Sunni Islamist groups at the following Turkey’s 1980 military coup and the forefront of the military campaign to overthrow the outbreak of the Workers’ Party (PKK) government of Bashar al-Assad is a source of tension rebellion in the mid-1980s. with the United States, which remains caught between its desire to be rid of Assad and its fear of The Kurdish issue has normally been a secondary issue in US-Turkish relations. Washington has long Ankara’s approaches to the Syrian Kurds, with backed Ankara’s campaign against the PKK. Yet what follows. This is reflected in Washington’s and recognizing that the ongoing struggle for Kurdish largely secular Kurdish nationalists favored by rights impedes Turkey’s full democratization and Washington.Turkish-supported Islamist fighters battling the exacerbates regional insecurity, it also supports

Müjge Küçükkeleş is a PhD candidate at the Institute for Middle East Studies at Marmara University in Istanbul. Jeffrey Mankoff is a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. They are 2012-13 alumni of the Atlantic Council’s Young Turkey/Young America Program. Background: The Kurds in US Foreign Policy turned to the Iraqi Kurds as partners in its campaign US engagement on the Kurdish issue goes back to the against Saddam, allowing them to seize control of end of the , when President Woodrow much of northern Iraq. Turkey was concerned that the Wilson’s Fourteen Points called for granting autonomy new Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG, now to the non-Turkish peoples of the Ottoman Empire. headed by ’s son Masoud) could Although the 1920 Treaty of Sevres provided for a threaten Iraqi unity, and serve both as a rallying point Kurdish state, the consolidation of the Turkish for Kurdish inside Turkey and a safe haven Republic, which rejected the Treaty of Sevres, coupled for PKK militants. Washington, however, prevented with the League of Nations’ decision to assign the Ankara from deploying troops to northern Iraq and US Kurdish-majority to Britain’s new Iraqi forces even arrested eleven Turkish commandos who mandate, ended that prospect. American attention were apparently planning to carry out acts of sabotage then subsided until the early Cold War, when Kurdish against the KRG. ambitions emerged as a useful tool for keeping pro-Soviet governments in Iraq off balance. Working Despite these tensions, Washington continued to back with allies Israel and Iran, the United States provided Turkey’s campaign against the PKK, which maintained bases in northern Iraq with the KRG’s tacit approval. rebels in Iraq, especially the Kurdish Democratic Party Under growing pressure from Ankara as cross-border (KDP)significant of Mustafa military Barzani and financial during thesupport 1950s for and Kurdish 1960s. 2007 to provide actionable intelligence to support This backing ceased following the signing of the 1975 TurkishPKK attacks military intensified, strikes againstthe United PKK States positions agreed in in Algiers Accord between Iraq’s de facto ruler Saddam northern Iraq. In 2011 the United States announced Hussein (then formally vice chairman of the Iraqi plans to provide advanced military equipment to Revolutionary Command Council) and Shah Turkey for use against PKK camps in northern Iraq, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran, which settled a including Cobra helicopters and Predator drones. territorial dispute in Tehran’s favor in exchange for an end to Iran’s support for Kurdish rebels in Iraq. With the signing of the accord, the Ford administration frustration with the level of US assistance they were eschewed support for an independent Kurdish state, a receivingHowever, Turkishagainst PKKofficials militants continued sheltering to voice in northern position the United States maintains to this day. Iraq, especially as clashes between Turkish security Washington tilted toward Baghdad during the Iran- Iraq war of the 1980s and stood aside as Saddam throughout 2012. Ankara in particular sought US massacred Iraq’s Kurdish population. Although the assistanceforces and PKKto arrest fighters PKK inside members Turkey entering intensified United States encouraged a Kurdish revolt to help KRG-controlled northern Iraq from abroad, but the topple Saddam at the end of the 1991 Gulf War, it failed United States balked, fearing that this would increase to intervene when Iraqi forces crushed the uprising. tension both with the PKK and the KRG leadership in Irbil. The strategic alliance with Turkey led Washington to stay out of disputes between Ankara and the Kurds of The United States and Turkey’s “Kurdish Turkey. When the PKK uprising broke out in Turkey in Opening” the 1980s, the United States remained largely silent as While supporting Turkey’s offensive against the PKK, Ankara cracked down on Kurdish groups inside Washington has long believed that Ankara should do Turkey and Turkish troops crossed into northern Iraq more to address the grievances of its own Kurdish to attack PKK forces and pro-PKK villages (sometimes population. The United States supported efforts by with weapons supplied by the United States). Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) Washington did not designate the PKK a foreign government to loosen restrictions on expressions of terrorist organization, however, until 1997. The Kurdish identity within Turkey and to initiate a peace Clinton administration later provided intelligence and diplomatic support that facilitated Turkey’s capture of support of the “Kurdish opening” that Turkish Prime PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999. process with the PKK. US officials have spoken in summer of 2009. The State Department still considers Washington became more supportive of the theMinister PKK a Recep foreign Tayyip terrorist Erdoğan organization, announced but in US the aspirations the Iraqi Kurds as tensions with Ankara mounted over the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. With political groups in Turkey, including the now-defunct Turkey choosing to sit out the war and preventing US Democraticofficials have Society long maintained Party (DTP) contacts and DTP’s with successor, Kurdish forces from using Turkish territory to establish a the Peace and (BDP). The latter northern front, the George W. Bush administration currently holds twenty-nine seats in the Turkish

2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL Turkey’s sensitivities about foreign intervention in its domestic politics. While the Obama administration communicateparliament (and that opened the PKK an shouldoffice in embrace Washington Ankara’s in saw Turkey as its primary partner for coping with the offerMay 2010). of negotiations, US officials while use thesereiterating interactions the need to for it wave of changes sweeping over the Middle East, to disarm and participate in the political process. Washington was especially careful to avoid any steps constitution moved reconciliation with the Kurds to thatRegional might Dynamics:ruffle Turkish Iraq sensibilities. theErdoğan’s top of Ankara’snow-stalled agenda, efforts since to implement Kurdish support a new Washington’s embrace of the KRG in the years after appears necessary for a draft constitution to pass 2003 was always tactical, but Ankara’s ties with Irbil parliament for submission to a referendum. have become increasingly strategic. Notwithstanding Nonetheless, the Turkish parliament’s Constitution its backing of the KRG as a bulwark against sectarian Reconciliation Commission has failed to reach strife in Iraq, since the withdrawal of US forces in consensus over key issues, while the Kurds have 2009, Washington has been more concerned about the potential for the KRG to serve as a “Kurdish Piedmont,” The also contributed to Ankara’s threatening the territorial integrity of both Iraq and senserejected of urgency,Erdoğan’s given proposed the Assad reforms regime’s as inadequate. its neighbors. Turkey meanwhile has increasingly longstanding ties with the PKK and potential use of the embraced the KRG both for its potential contribution Kurds as a proxy force to deter Turkish intervention. to Turkish energy security and to help manage Efforts at reconciliation received a boost in late 2012 tensions with the Kurds in both Syria and Turkey itself. the release of a roadmap for peace between Turkey andwhen the talks PKK. between The roadmap Öcalan contained and Turkish provisions officials forled ato As US forces withdrew from Iraq in 2009, they worked with both Ankara and the KRG to prevent PKK from Turkey into northern Iraq in exchange for incursions into Turkey. Today, Washington strongly reformsceasefire, designed followed to by secure the withdrawal political, economic, of PKK fighters and opposes the KRG’s efforts to sign contracts with social rights for . With the completion foreign—including US—energy companies over the of these reforms, including the recognition of Kurdish head of the government in Baghdad. Exxon Mobil and identity in the Turkish constitution, the PKK would Chevron Texaco have already signed oil exploration permanently disarm. deals directly with Irbil. Washington’s most immediate fear is that the revenue from oil sales would create an The reforms announced by the Turkish government in economic basis for northern Iraq to break away, the fall of 2013 fell short of what many Kurds were leaving behind a weak, majority Shia rump state in the expecting. Ankara offered to permit the use of Kurdish south that would become an Iranian satellite. in private secondary schools, abolish a nationalist- tinged oath for students, and allow towns in the By contrast, Ankara and Irbil are seeking to build Kurdish regions to use their Kurdish names. The BDP and many other Kurds argue that the reforms are deteriorating relations with the government of Iraqi Primeextensive Minister ties. In Nuri part, Al-Maliki. this reflects More Turkey’s broadly, Turkey’s antiterrorist courts that have been used to jail courtship of the KRG aims to secure new sources of oil, thousandsinsufficient of because Kurds without they do duenot dismantleprocess or offer allowing it to reduce its dependence on imports from amnesty to those jailed for PKK connections. Many Iran and Russia, and to ensure security along the Kurds are also unhappy that the language reform does Turkish-Iraqi border. The United States is uneasy not apply to state schools, or lower the 10 percent about Turkey’s rapprochement with the KRG, which it threshold for parties to enter parliament. Moreover, fears could weaken Maliki and threaten the unity of Turkey’s political crisis, beginning with the July 2013 Gezi Park protests and escalating with the about a recently completed oil pipeline from northern Iraqthe Iraqi to Turkey, state. USexpected officials to have feed expressedup to 300,000 concerns barrels exiled cleric Fethullah Gülen has sapped the political a day into the Turkish pipeline system for sales on willconfrontation to push through between concessions Erdoğan and to the the Kurds. followers of global markets. This pipeline could eventually free the

While some Kurdish interlocutors have pressed for the making a viable state. KRG from its financial dependence on Baghdad, emphasize they have no intention of participating in Regional Dynamics: Syria theUnited negotiations States to actbetween as a mediator, Ankara andUS officials either the The outbreak of civil war in Syria forced the United Kurdish groups or the PKK. Washington recognizes States and Turkey to take a clearer stance on Syrian

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 3 Kurdish aspirations. Both Ankara and Washington loyalty of the vast majority of armed Kurdish militias in were initially reluctant to engage the Syrian Kurds, Syria. Not only is the PYD the most effective actor in largely because of concerns about the main Kurdish northern Syria, the KNC is beginning to voice calls for autonomy in a united Syria as well. Turkey attempted to build ties with the PYD to support itsforce, anti-Assad the PKK-affiliated strategy, while Democratic working Union to ensure Party that (PYD). The PYD’s military triumph against forces from the the PYD’s growth did not threaten Syria’s territorial al-Qaeda-linked Al-Nusra Front in the strategic town of integrity. However, these efforts bore little fruit, and Ras Al-Ain in July 2013 shifted Turkish and US views of the PYD refused to join the anti-Assad coalition while relations with Ankara deteriorated. point of stating that Turkey is not against the rights of anythe group.ethnic Shortlygroup in after Syria, the including battle, Davutoğlu the Kurds. made PYD a In July 2012, the PYD seized control of several Kurdish leader Salih Muslim was then invited to Turkey for cities and towns in northern Syria after forces loyal to high-level meetings later that month. In return for Assad withdrew to concentrate their forces closer to assurance the PYD would not seek autonomy for and . The nearly bloodless takeover northern Syria or threaten Turkey’s security, Ankara sparked suspicions of collaboration with the Syrian agreed to the formation of a transitional regime, especially given mounting tension between the administration in northern Syria that would include PYD and the mostly Arab Syrian rebels, who have representatives of all political, ethnic, and religious refused in principle the Kurds’ demands for federalism groups within Kurdish territories, and promised to or Kurdish autonomy in Syria. Alarmed by the PYD’s start providing humanitarian aid to . seizure of control in the north, Ankara closed border crossings to Syria and sought to isolate the PYD. Turkey eventually backed away from its engagement with the PYD, partially as a result of the US-Russian the PYD’s actions as “terrorist activity” and warned agreement on removing Syria’s chemical weapons. This thatTurkish Turkey Foreign would Minister not tolerate Ahmet threats Davutoğlu to its described security. deal took the prospect of US military intervention in Syria off the table, seemingly bolstering Assad’s hold on militarily to clear out PYD/PKK forces from northern power, and thereby reducing chances that the PYD Syria.Prime Minister Erdoğan also threatened to intervene could be brought over to the anti-Assad camp. The aid deliveries promised during Salih Muslim’s visit to Washington is reluctant to engage the PYD, in part Turkey failed to materialize. The PYD loudly criticized because of its experiences in Iraq, where it increasingly Turkey for sealing its border with northern Syria, views the KRG less as an ally against hostile forces and effectively preventing humanitarian assistance from Kurdish groups in Turkey reaching the Syrian side. The the PYD against attempts to declare autonomy in PYD also resents alleged Turkish support of radical northernmore as a Syria.threat The to Iraq’s PYD iscohesion. also implicated US officials in brutality warned against opposition groups in northern Syria, including guns on the PYD’s militia in the north. Turkey’s cooling a bloody crackdown on Kurdish anti-Assad protesters towardIslamist the fighters, PYD is who also are related increasingly to the stalling turning of their talks in the city of Amuda in July 2013 that Washington between Ankara and the PKK, since a PYD-controlled publicly condemned. Nevertheless, the United States zone in northern Syria could provide refuge and has come to see the PYD as a secular bulwark against political backing for the PKK in the event Ankara’s the Islamist groups (including some that have received Kurdish opening fails. Turkish backing) increasingly dominating the anti- Assad opposition in Syria. In November 2013, the PYD declared it would move ahead with plans to proclaim Syrian Kurdistan The United States and Turkey have sought, with little independent, a move condemned by both Ankara and success, to bolster the multiparty Kurdish National Barzani’s KRG. In an attempt to reduce the Council (KNC) as an alternative to the PYD in Syria, disagreements within the Syrian Kurdish groups in the while persuading it to join the united opposition to run-up to the January 2014 Geneva II Conference, talks Assad. Some of the KNC’s member parties have were initiated in Irbil between representatives of the longstanding ties to Barzani’s Iraq-based Kurdistan PYD and KNC, who agreed to attend the Geneva II Democratic Party. Turkey thus sees the KRG-linked conference under a united banner. Both Ankara and KNC as preferable to the PYD, which was formed by Washington have sought to keep the Kurdish issue off disciples of Öcalan in Syrian exile and maintains close the agenda at Geneva, however, and the Syrian Kurds ties to the PKK. Despite the best efforts of both were not invited to Geneva as a separate group. The KNC was represented only as part of control of Syrian Kurdistan (or Rojava), and has the delegation, while the PYD was not directly represented. Erdoğan and Barzani, the PYD remains largely in

4 ATLANTIC COUNCIL Washington’s reluctance to engage on the Kurdish issue in Syria is largely due to the Obama administration’s Kurdish issue. With local elections approaching in Marchweakened 2014, Erdoğan a presidential with less election room forscheduled maneuver for on the Geneva-II fails to produce a lasting settlement, the August 2014, and parliamentary elections set for June Unitedfocus on States ending may the have Syrian reason conflict. to pay If, moreas is likely, attention to constituencies. argued in an August interview, the United States and 2015, Erdoğan is wary of alienating nationalist the conflict’s Kurdish dimension. As Salih Muslim the time being, the failure of the peace process in the morePYD face the aPYD common looks foelike in an al-Qaeda effective affiliated bulwark TurkeyWhile the could PKK pave has thesaid way it will for maintain renewed itsinstability. ceasefire The for againstjihadists the in Syria.spread The of radicalization, more the conflict the dragsmore openon and to longer Ankara stalls, the greater the chances for a engagement the United States is likely to be, Turkish renewal of the PKK’s armed struggle, which could opposition notwithstanding. easily fuse with the ongoing Kurdish uprisings in Iraq and Syria. Conclusion Given the sensitivity of the Kurdish issue inside Turkey, The failure to make progress in improving the status of Turkey’s own Kurdish population would be a disaster for the country itself and sap Turkey’s ability to it has been difficult for the United States to balance its differentstrategic countries.relations with Despite Turkey tactical with differences, the flexibility the Given Washington’s efforts to work with Ankara since Unitednecessary States to address and Turkey the specifichave broadly conditions similar of goalsKurds in in theinfluence start of Kurdish the Arab movements Awakening, throughout the United the States region. too Iraq. Both want to head off a Baghdad-KRG military aspirations while ensuring the territorial integrity of as essential for regional stability. Nevertheless, their bothwould Syria find anditself Iraq. less capable of managing Kurdish contrastingconflict at any approaches cost, and regardto the KRG Iraq’s and territorial Turkey’s unity The challenge for both Turkey and the United States aspirations to access northern Iraq’s oil without going lies in maintaining coordination as the regional context through Maliki are likely to remain a source of tension. rapidly evolves, and in balancing approaches to the Prospects for greater US-Turkish coordination on the Kurdish issue with the wide range of other issues in the Kurdish issue in Syria are diminishing as the Syrian multifaceted US-Turkish partnership. Recommendations between Ankara and Washington. Both agree on the • Washington continues to maintain an needconflict to maintainis increasingly Syria’s becoming territorial a sourceintegrity, of tensionbut little uncoordinated approach to Kurdish issues in Iraq, else. The United States has tempered its enthusiasm for Syria, and Turkey, even as the Arab Awakening is rapid political change in Syria, and all but abandoned creating an increasingly regional dimension to the the idea of direct intervention against Assad. With few campaign for Kurdish self-determination. US allies on the ground in Syria, Washington increasingly opposition to the emergence of a Kurdish state— sees its interests aligning with those of the secular with all the chaos that would entail—will remain, PYD. Turkey meanwhile has stepped up its support for but Washington should supplement its separate anti-Assad rebels, including Sunni Islamist groups that policies with a more holistic approach. That could many in Washington view as a threat to US interests, entail appointing a special representative for Kurdish issues and developing a direct relationship whileHanging seeking over allto limitthese the considerations growth of PYD is the influence. fate of with the Syrian PYD. Turkey’s own Kurdish opening. With the talks between • Ankara and the PKK at a standstill and the withdrawal consistent approach. Turkey’s policy of isolating theAnkara PYD too and would condemning benefit itfrom for linkspursuing with a the more PKK delays to the promised constitutional reforms, the is unsustainable at a time when Ankara is pursuing possibilityof PKK fighters that intothe negotiations Iraq halted in will mid-September fail cannot be over peace talks with Öcalan at home. It also curtails discounted. In early October 2013, the BDP dismissed the proposed reforms released by the Turkish Syria, where the PYD is increasingly becoming a government, and warned of a possible return to forceTurkey’s to be ability reckoned to influence with. Ankara events should in northern therefore violence. At the same time, the outbreak of large-scale resume the tentative overtures to the PYD it made protests in Istanbul and other cities during the summer in the summer of 2013. Turkey should also be open to contacts between its US ally and the Syrian PYD, the AKP and the followers of Gülen leave a now of 2013, along with the growth of infighting between

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 5 which could help restrain the PYD’s ambitions and help prevent Syria’s fragmentation.

• Turkey should seek to engage the Iraqi government in its energy negotiations with KRG, and take a more active role in encouraging reconciliation between Baghdad and Irbil. While US leverage is limited by the participation of US companies in energy deals with the KRG, Washington should nevertheless step up the pressure on Baghdad to reach an accommodation with the KRG, including on revenue sharing from oil and gas.

• Washington also needs to encourage Ankara to get its own Kurdish opening back on track. A resumption of violence between the Turkish state and the PKK would be disastrous for Turkey, the region, and US interests. Washington should encourage Ankara to accelerate its promised reforms and make clear that it expects the PKK (and all other Kurdish groups) to maintain their

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