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1 a Comparison: the Islamic Revolution of 1979 And A COMPARISON: THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF 1979 AND IRAN’S GREEN MOVEMENT OF 2009 By [Name Withheld] Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, 2011 Submitted to the University Honors College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2011 1 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH School of Arts and Sciences This thesis was presented by [Name Withheld] It was defended on April 8th, 2011 and approved by Professor Ronald Linden, PhD., Department of Political Science Professor Ahmad Khalili, PhD., Department of Professional Studies, Slippery Rock University Professor Daniela Donno, PhD., Department of Political Science Thesis Advisor: Professor Jonathon Harris, PhD., Department of Political Science 2 Copyright © by [Name Withheld] 2011 3 A COMPARISON: THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF 1979 AND IRAN’S GREEN MOVEMENT OF 2009 [Name Withheld] University of Pittsburgh, 2011 In the summer of 2009 thousands of voices combined as Iranians, young and old, cried out in reaction to the presidential election from their rooftops—“Marg Bar Dictator” (death to the dictator) and “Allahu Akbar” (God is great). In the weeks following President Ahmadinejad’s “victory”, voices from the rooftops of Tehran and other major Iranian cities reverberated with revolutionary phrases that had not been heard in almost thirty years. This widespread civil disobedience, along with the daily demonstrations taking place on the street, signaled the Iranian people’s challenge of the Islamic government. But after months of mass protests, why was there no political change after the 2009 Iranian presidential election? Why did the demonstrations that had up to 3 million protestors stop while in 1979 similar dissent developed into a revolutionary movement? These questions will be addressed by comparing four significant variables common to both the 1979 Revolution and the 2009 Green Movement; international pressure, internal pressure, strength of opposition, and governmental tactics used against the opposition. The analysis of these variables will illuminate the similarities and differences between 1979 and 2009 and examine under what conditions a political opposition movement could be successful in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The simple fact that Iranians were yelling from the rooftops like they did 30 years ago against the Shah, demonstrates they have not forgotten about the Islamic Revolution of 1979. And they have certainly not forgotten about the outcome—the capture of the political movement, which began 4 as a democratic process, by Islamic extremists. The Iranian people eager to rid themselves of an autocratic government, but realize true regime change takes time. Iranians today have learned the lessons of the 1979 Revolution. 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ...................................................................................................................................... 9 1.0 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 10 1.1 IRAN’S RULING HISTORY ........................................................................... 12 1.1.1 Post Islamic Revolution ................................................................................. 14 1.1.2 Political Elite Conflict ................................................................................... 17 1.2 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2009 .......................................................... 21 2.0 COMPARISON—1979 AND 2009 ........................................................................... 26 3.0 THE FIRST VARIABLE—THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM’S RESPONSE 28 3.1 1979 ..................................................................................................................... 28 3.2 2009 ..................................................................................................................... 30 3.2.1 The American Response ................................................................................ 31 3.2.2 The European Response ................................................................................ 33 3.2.3 Non Western Response .................................................................................. 35 4.0 SECOND VARIABLE—INTERNAL PRESSURE ................................................ 37 4.1 POLITICAL GRIEVANCES—THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION ................ 37 4.1.1 Mossedegh’s Overthrow................................................................................ 38 4.1.2 The 1963 Uprisings ........................................................................................ 44 4.1.3 Political Oppression after 1963 .................................................................... 49 6 4.2 POLITICAL GRIEVANCES—GREEN MOVEMENT 2009 ....................... 58 4.2.1 After Khomeini’s Death ................................................................................ 62 4.2.2 Khatami’s Rule .............................................................................................. 65 4.2.3 Ahmadinejad’s Election ................................................................................ 68 4.3 ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES—THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION ............... 72 4.3.1 The Nationalization of Oil ............................................................................. 73 4.3.2 The White Revolution ................................................................................... 75 4.4 ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES—GREEN MOVEMENT 2009 ...................... 79 4.4.1 Rafsanjani’s Presidency ................................................................................ 80 4.4.2 The Iranian Economy after 2005 ................................................................. 81 5.0 THE THIRD VARIABLE—STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSITION ..................... 84 5.1 1979 ..................................................................................................................... 84 5.1.1 Opposition Organizations ............................................................................. 85 5.1.1.1 Political Parties .................................................................................... 85 5.1.1.2 Radical Guerrilla Organizations ....................................................... 88 5.1.1.3 Clerical Groups ................................................................................... 89 5.1.2 The Charismatic Leader—Khomeini .......................................................... 91 5.1.3 Unifying Goal ................................................................................................. 95 5.2 2009 ..................................................................................................................... 96 5.2.1 Lack of Political Organizations .................................................................... 97 5.2.2 Absence of Leadership .................................................................................. 98 5.2.3 No Unified Platform .................................................................................... 100 7 6.0 THE FOURTH VARIABLE—GOVERNMENT TACTICS USED AGAINST THE OPPOSITION .................................................................................................................. 103 6.1 1979 ................................................................................................................... 103 6.1.1 SAVAK ......................................................................................................... 103 6.1.2 Failure of the Military State ....................................................................... 104 6.2 2009 ................................................................................................................... 106 6.2.1 The Revolutionary Guard and the Basij Resistance Force...................... 107 7.0 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 113 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 118 8 PREFACE I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincerest gratitude to my thesis advisor, Professor Jonathan Harris for his guidance and continual support. The insightful advice he provided was indispensable and I would not have been able to complete this project without his kind supervision, intellectual stimulation, and friendship. I will cherish the countless hours I spent in his office discussing everything and anything—I am forever in your debt, Professor Harris. I would also like to acknowledge all the members of my thesis committee for their time and patience with me, especially Professor Ronald Linden, who has overseen my academic development since I was a naïve freshman. I am grateful for the unwavering support and encouragement of all my friends—specifically Emily Dotson and Molly Kalish—who have been like sisters to me during this process. Lastly and most importantly, I owe my parents eternal gratitude for their unfailing guidance, tolerance, and love. You both have been reading and reviewing my work since I was a little girl who began to explore the world, and this thesis was no different. Without your encouragement, the project would not have been possible. Dad, thank you for all of your insights into Iranian politics and your ability to help me put my priorities in perspective. Mom, thank you for answering your phone at all hours, day or night, and being my personal cheerleader. Both of you are my best friends and will
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