THE NEAREST AND DEAREST ENEMY: AFTER THE WAR By Abbas William Samii*1

Tehran's stand towards events in Iraq developed chronologically and against a backdrop of continuing hostility to the . From 2001 until the beginning of Operation Iraq Freedom in March 2003, Iran called for resolution of the issue through international organizations, while simultaneously interacting with Washington, , and the Iraqi opposition. The next stage was marked by allegations of Iranian support for Iraqi insurgents. These allegations continued in the third stage, from July 2003 to the present, as did a warming of -Baghdad relations. With the end of the war in Iraq, Iran found itself surrounded on all sides by what it perceives as its greatest enemy -- the United States. It was also faced with the possibility of Kurdish autonomy and being surpassed by Iraq as the center of Shi'a Islam.

This article was originally written for a project and conference on "After the : Strategic and Political Changes in and the ," co-sponsored by the GLORIA Center and The Military Centre for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS) of Italy.

One would expect Tehran to welcome the Nevertheless, the conclusion of Operation ouster of Iraqi President . He Iraqi Freedom has placed Iran in an was a man responsible for an eight-year war uncomfortable political and strategic position (1980-1988) against Iran that cost hundreds in which it is surrounded on all sides by what of thousands of lives, who forced thousands it perceives as a greater enemy than Saddam of Iraqis to become refugees in Iran, used Hussein-- the United States. Furthermore, chemical weapons against Iran's Shi'a Tehran is unsure of where it stands with the Muslim co-religionists in Iraq, and who new government in Baghdad. These factors, sponsored a violent Iranian opposition group as well as the possibility of Kurdish for approximately two decades. Indeed, UN minorities militating for greater autonomy Security Council Resolution 598 of July 1988 and the revival of Iraq as the center of Shi'a led to a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq, but a Islam, greatly affect Iran's current position. formal peace treaty was never signed.

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Abbas William Samii

The Iranian attitude towards events in Iraq Iranian decision making process, in which developed in three fairly distinct phases. The informal actors and networks can wield as first phase lasted from September 11, 2001-- much influence as formal ones, makes the date of al-Qa'ida attacks against the U.S. - comprehension and prediction extremely - until March 20, 2003. During that time difficult. A model for Iran's recent dealings Tehran pursed a policy of what it called with Iraq is its dealings with the Balkans in "active neutrality." It refused to take sides the mid-1990s, and Afghanistan since and maintained contacts with Baghdad, September 2001. London, and Washington, but also In the Balkans, Tehran provided simultaneously supported Iraqi opposition humanitarian services, set up radio stations, groups. During this period, furthermore, and sent in missionaries. Tehran also led the Iranian leaders expressed great hostility to the way in securing a December 1992 United States and skepticism about its Organization of the Islamic Conference intentions. The second phase lasted from declaration that called for an end to the March 20, 2003, when Operation Iraqi international arms embargo, and it smuggled Freedom began, approximately until the arms and ammunition into the region. Iranian creation of the Iraqi Governing Council in spies and IRGC personnel were active on the July 2003. This period was marked by U.S. ground, sometimes disguising themselves as allegations of Iranian interference in Iraqi relief workers. affairs, as well as the emergence of a Notably, the Iranian Ambassador to heretofore unknown Shi'a cleric named Sarajevo during some of that time (1994- Muqtada al-Sadr and questions about his 1998), Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian, later relationship with Iran. The third phase, from served as the first ambassador to Kabul after July 2003 until the conclusion of this article the Taliban's ouster. Before that, he served in in June 2005, includes factors seen Afghanistan and helped channel Iranian aid previously-- U.S. and Iraqi allegations of to Shi'a mujahedin groups, and he then served Iranian interference and Iranian criticism of in Tajikistan. 2 The man appointed consul to the U.S. -- and also includes formal Tehran- the southern Afghan city of Kandahar in Baghdad contacts and a warming of relations. December 2004-- Hussein Shaykh Zein-ed- The conclusion identifies the threats Iran Din-- has a similar background. He served as currently perceives, discusses the ways in ambassador to Colombia in 1999, when which Tehran is trying to address them, and Colombian authorities became concerned explains Iranian behavior that appears to be at about Iranian activities in the demilitarized cross purposes. zone and raised questions about Iranian military advisers working on a FORESHADOWING-- FROM THE slaughterhouse in a region that had few cows BALKANS TO AFGHANISTAN TO and was controlled by Revolutionary Armed IRAQ Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas. International actors operate in a very In the early 1990s, the revolutionary dynamic environment, in which the influence impulse was still important to Iran and of different factors fluctuates over time. activities in the Balkans could take place at Times of conflict can be especially fast- relatively little cost to it. A more recent guide paced. Furthermore, the obscurity of the to Iran's reaction to Operation Iraqi Freedom

28 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2005) The Nearest and Dearest Enemy is the way the country's leaders behaved after United States wants to establish itself in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks Central , Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the against the United States. Tehran initially subcontinent under the pretext of establishing condemned the actual attacks and the Iranian security. The United States also intends to public expressed sympathy for the victims "settle scores with anyone who defended the and their families. On the day of the attacks oppressed people of Palestine." Khamene'i President Mohammad Khatami said in a said that U.S. government comments about statement read out on state television, "I the terrorist attacks were "very arrogant and condemn the terrorist operations of hijacking pretentious." Many who side with the United and attacking public places in American States "are more dangerous than the entire cities which have resulted in the death of a terrorists of the world," he said, adding, "The large number of defenseless American most stubborn and evil terrorists are on your people."3 Candlelight vigils took place in side right now." Tehran, there was a moment of silence before During the period immediately preceding a World Cup qualifying match, and officials Operation Enduring Freedom, Iranian signed the book of condolences at the Swiss officials consistently emphasized their desire Embassy, which represents U.S. interests in to have the issue resolved in a multilateral Iran. forum, and preferably by the United Nations. Nevertheless, Tehran claimed that it There were three reasons for this attitude. would not help the United States if it acted The first, and most important, was Tehran's against al-Qa'ida and its Taliban hosts in reluctance to have U.S. military forces on its Afghanistan. "America's expansionist policies eastern border. The second reason, of almost were the cause of recent developments," equal importance, relates to Tehran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i unhappiness about the U.S. ability to act said.4 "Most of the evidence points the finger unilaterally if it desires, and to organize an of suspicion towards the Zionists for international coalition to support its military masterminding the recent incidents in actions. The third reason is Iran's self- America," according to Khamene'i, and he perceived role as a Third World and Islamic went on to say that was exploiting the community leader. If the United States could situation to oppress the Muslim Palestinians. act against a small, undeveloped country such Khamene'i warned that "if America was to as Afghanistan, then other developing enter Pakistan and dispatch forces to countries, including Iran, would be at risk. Afghanistan so as to expand its might in the These reasons reflect some of the region, its problems will multiply daily." traditional influences in Iranian foreign and Less than a week later, Khamene'i said, security policy-- ethnicity, geopolitics, "We shall not offer any assistance to America Islamic radicalism, thirdworldism, and and its allies in their attack on Afghanistan. "5 nationalism.6 Moreover, cooperation with the As the crowd chanted "Death to America," United States in a war against a Muslim state Khamene'i asked how the United States could could have repercussions. Professor Fereidun seek Iranian assistance in attacking Khavand of the University Rene Descartes in Afghanistan, when "You are the ones who Paris explained, "For every regime, there is a have always inflicted blows on Iran's founding myth, and the founding myth of the interests." According to Khamene'i, the Islamic Republic is anti-Americanism."7

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Letting that myth collapse by joining an Iran-- as well as Iraq, North Korea, and their American or Western coalition against a terrorist allies-- "constitute an , Muslim country, Khavand said, would arming to threaten the peace of the world. " jeopardize the Islamic republic's legitimacy. The deputy IRGC commander's reaction to Once the war in Afghanistan began, Bush's speech was to make an implicit threat Khamene'i explained events by saying that to act against Persian Gulf oil fields, and two America's "true motive" is the "quest for weeks later the IRGC commander threatened power" and the "quest for hegemony. "8 to "sever the hands of any invader."12 Khamene'i said that the United States is threatening global peace and its logic for 'ACTIVE NEUTRALITY' attacking Afghanistan is "very weak. "9 Iran adopted a policy of what it called Khamene'i accused the United States of "active neutrality" in the lead-up to Operation having "wounded the body of the Islamic Iraqi Freedom. The Foreign Ministry ummah [community]." In this speech, spokesman described this policy in Khamene'i also accused the United States and September 2002. 13 "The Islamic Republic of United Kingdom of "warmongering, tyranny, Iran's regional position and national interests injustice, arrogance, drunkenness [with necessitate that it should actively hold talks power], and unwise behavior...igniting the with all the parties involved to prevent the flames of war, endangering world peace, outbreak of war in the region." Iran would massacring innocent people, and wasting therefore talk with all the concerned parties, huge amounts of money." he said, "to resolve the Iraqi crisis." Iranian But Tehran's pragmatic side also showed officials consistently opposed unilateral U.S. itself. Before the war began, Iran agreed to action, emphasizing instead their desire that assist downed American aviators, and any action should take place within a afterwards it played a helpful role in the multilateral framework. Meanwhile, Tehran November-December 2001 Bonn Accords.10 and Washington were holding clandestine Tehran recognized that its inaction during the meetings, Iraqi officials were visiting Iran, 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis had not yielded and Iran was hosting Iraqi opposition any benefits. Moreover, it probably hoped to meetings. reap some sort of benefit by cooperating with Active neutrality, which is also referred to the United States as "preventive diplomacy," reflected a cost- Nevertheless, statements from Iranian benefit analysis by the Iranian military and political leaders in the winter of establishment.14 Through this policy, Iran 2001-2002 reflected the discomfort caused by hoped to see Iraq peacefully disarmed while the proximity of U.S. forces. For example, it avoided the prospect of complete the deputy commander of the Islamic encirclement by a "pro-U.S. security belt" Revolution Guards Corps said the U.S. aim stretching from Kuwait in the Persian through was to have "influence on Central Asia and Afghanistan to Central Asia all the way the access to fuel resources and geopolitical Azerbaijan and the Caucasus. This policy and conditions in the region."11 avoiding encirclement would conform to President George W. Bush's January 29, Iran's self-image and desire for prestige. 2002 State of the Union address contributed to Tehran's sense of anxiety. He said that Contacts with Washington

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Tehran and Washington have not had Tehran and Washington concerning military diplomatic relations for more than two emergencies in the Persian Gulf region were decades. U.S diplomatic interests in Iran are taking place through Arab intermediaries in a represented by Switzerland, and the Iranian small Gulf state.21 Unnamed U.S. officials interests section in Washington is located in described discussions regarding American the Embassy of Pakistan. The two countries aviators bailing out over Iran. They said also communicate with each other on the Tehran agreed to provide medical assistance sidelines of multilateral fora. As the war in to downed Americans, get them home as Iraq appeared inevitable, it seemed very soon as possible, and to return any flyable likely that Tehran-Washington contacts aircraft.22 would increase, and there was some optimism Allegations of Iran-U.S. meetings that these contacts would result in a continued in the months immediately diplomatic warming. preceding the war. "Bush administration In mid-July 2002, an anonymous "Tehran- officials held a rare private meeting with based diplomat" said Washington recently Iranian envoys in Europe last month [January sent a message to Tehran to gauge Iran's view 2003] to seek...an assurance that the Tehran on U.S. efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein government would not interfere in military and to enlist Tehran's support.15 Tehran operations if the United States goes to war denied this,16 and Iranian officials reiterated against Iraq."23 As usual, Tehran denied that their opposition to U.S. military action such a meeting occurred. 24 against Iraq. Supreme National Security According to later reports, National Council Secretary Hassan Rohani said that Security Council official Zalmay Khalilzad Iran opposed an attack against Iraq, and he and State Department official Ryan Crocker added, "America has always cast a met with Ambassador to the United Nations hegemonic eye on the region" because of its and IRGC officers.25 strategic value and so it can have access to its The Americans asked Iran to seal its borders energy resources.17 President Khatami said, against escaping Iraqi officials and suggested "Any interference in the affairs of Iraq would that the United States would target Iraqi bases be against the interest of the people of Iraq, of the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization.26 and countries of this region and peace and Tehran denied that the meetings took place tranquility of the world."18 and said the two countries had reached no Soon thereafter, an Iranian vice-president agreements on Iraq. 27 denied that Tehran would assist downed U.S. That summer, a British Arabic-language aviators in the way it had during Operation newspaper reported that an American Enduring Freedom. 19 In his words, "We do delegation that included a White House not agree on dealing a strike to Iraq, let alone envoy met with representatives of Iranian providing services to those who seek to Expediency Council chairman Ayatollah Ali launch such a strike." But a representative of Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani in London.28 the Iranian supreme leader reportedly They reportedly discussed Iranian activities established an office in Dubai to facilitate in Iraq, Iranian nuclear activities, and Iranian clandestine contacts with U.S. officials.20 An support for terrorist groups. The Iranian anonymous U.S. Defense Department official envoys tried to convey the impression that said later that "preliminary feelers" between only Hashemi-Rafsanjani could secure

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Abbas William Samii acceptance of Washington's demands, and Organization.30 It had a good relationship this would be done in exchange for U.S. with the two main Kurdish ones-- the backing of Rafsanjani's bid for the 2005 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the presidential election. The U.S. side was Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Less unenthusiastic about the offer and about such commonly known was Iran's relationship secret dialogues. with Kurdish Islamists-- the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK), the Ansar al- Iran and the Iraqi Opposition Islam, and the Kurdistan Islamic Group Washington began to review its Iraq (KIG).31 The Iraqi National Congress (INC) strategy in early 2002-- "serious planning [for claimed to have a training facility in Iran, and a] campaign against Iraqi President Saddam there were later reports that INC leader Hussein"-- and explore the opposition inside Ahmad Chalabi provided Tehran with and outside Iraq. 29 Iran's long standing information about U.S. signals intelligence relationship with Iraqi opposition groups capabilities.32 made it clear that it would be involved in any SCIRI made clear that it did not care for pre-war calculations, as was the case before Tehran's attitude towards an attack against Operation Enduring Freedom. Iraq. SCIRI's leader said that under Iran's In the Afghan case, Tehran-Mujahedin ties declared policy of neutrality, SCIRI guerrillas from 1979-1988 were mostly limited to the would not be able to enter Iraq in the event of Shi'a resistance groups, such as Shaykh Assef war.33 "The policy of neutrality is not good," Muhseni's Harakat-i Islami (Islamic he said, adding, "It would be good if Iran Movement). After the Taliban take-over, stood beside the Iraqi people." He continued, Iran's contacts with the Afghan opposition "It is not good that the Iraqi people are caught were more diverse. It provided the Northern between a rock and a hard place and they Alliance with weapons, large-scale funding, could hold it against those who leave them and training. Iran was involved with two of isolated." the three "processes"-- the Rome Process and Despite its professed neutrality, Tehran the Cyprus Process-- that aimed to resolve the continued its involvement with the Afghan conflict. The Rome Process centered opposition. The heads of the KDP, PUK, on exiled Afghan monarch Zahir , and SCIRI, and INC met in Tehran in advance of the Cyprus Process was organized by the son- the December 13-15, 2002 Iraqi opposition in-law of Hizb-i Islami leader Gulbudin conference in London. Although the Iraqi Hekmatyar, who was in exile in Iran. Iran National Accord was one of the six main also participated in the "6+2" group, which opposition groups that met in London, it did consisted of Afghanistan's immediate not participate in the Tehran meetings. neighbors, Russia, and the United States. Secretary of the Iraqi National Accord Ayad Iran had contacts with most of the main Allawi described his organization's Iraqi opposition organizations. Its most relationship with Iran: "We respect Iran and extensive ties were with the predominantly hope to have excellent relations with it. But Shi'a organizations that were based mainly in regrettably we have not had such relations so Iran-- the Supreme Council for the Islamic far. Iran is almost the only country in the Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), al-Da'wah al- region with which we maintain no Islamiyah, and the Islamic Action relationship."34

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PUK leader Jalal Talabani met with officials in Tehran in January 2002. The Iraqi President Khatami in Tehran in January 2003, foreign minister's meeting with Iranian at which time the Iranian president said, Minister of Intelligence and Security Ali "Iran's policy is to support and strengthen the Yunesi resulted in a preliminary agreement Iraqi opposition, and it is prepared to give that Baghdad would restrict the activities of every form of cooperation in this matter in the Mujahedin Khalq Organization, while order to bring about a democratic and united Tehran would force the SCIRI's Badr Corps Iraq, in which people can rule themselves."35 to stay five to ten kilometers from the Talabani told reporters that he conveyed U.S. border.41 assurances that Iran would not be targeted.36 Saddam Hussein's son, Qusay, allegedly Later that month, a bigger opposition visited Iran secretly and "without the meeting took place in Tehran. Participants knowledge of President Khatami and his included the INC's Ahmad Chalabi, Brandeis aides" in the first half of 2002. 42 Qusay University Professor Kanan Makiya, Iraqi allegedly met with deputy IRGC commander National Movement leader Muzar Shukat, Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr and expressed an Kurdish representatives Latif Rashid and interest in buying Iranian military equipment Kuran Talabani; and Major General Wafiq al- and Shihab 1, 2, and 3 missiles. He also Samarrai, a former chief of Iraqi military offered to buy back the more than 100 Iraqi intelligence who defected in 1994. 37 Makiya aircrafts flown to Iran at the outset of the said the oppositionists rejected an Iranian 1991 . The Iranians rejected the offer to protect them in Iraq, and he added prospect of military and security cooperation that they did not meet with anybody from with the Iraqis. President Khatami's office or from the Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri visited Foreign Ministry. "We're not involved with Tehran in late-September 2002, only to be the Khatami group. They have absolutely no told by his Iranian counterpart, Kamal say over Iraqi affairs," Makiya said. Kharrazi, that it was up to Iraq to avoid a war Representatives of SCIRI, Da'wah, by cooperating with the UN and giving Islamic Amal Organization, and the INC's access to UN weapons inspectors.43 Indeed, Ahmad Chalabi met in Tehran shortly before any expectations of a sympathetic ear were the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 38 The misplaced. A vice-president said that Iran goal of the meeting was to reunite the groups would prefer any regime in Iraq to that of and insure that the Shi'a would have a place Saddam Hussein. 44 And the deputy speaker of in Iraq's future.39 By that time, furthermore, parliament said, "The overthrow of Iraqi SCIRI's military arm, which is known as the President Saddam Hussein through whatever Badr Corps and which is linked with the means will be the happiest day for all the IRGC, had established itself in northern Iranian people."45 Iraq. 40 Sabri returned to Tehran in February 2003 to discuss the possibility of a U.S. attack. He A Mixed Reception for Iraq reportedly conveyed a message from Saddam Baghdad, meanwhile, was trying to garner Hussein to President Khatami proposing that Iranian support. Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Iran and Iraq settle all their outstanding Sabri Hadithi met with President Khatami, issues.46 Iraq would end its support for the Foreign Minister Kharrazi, and other Iranian Mujahedin-i Khalq Organization if Iran

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Abbas William Samii ended its support for Iraqi opposition groups, The Iranian media reported in January according to Hussein's proposal, and they 2003 that the Iraqi Foreign Minister might would settle border-demarcation issues in visit Tehran soon. A member of parliament compliance with the 1975 . announced that he had prepared a motion for Foreign Minister Kharrazi reportedly a vote of no confidence in Foreign Minister encouraged cooperation with United Nations Kharrazi as soon as Sabri sets foot in Iran.50 inspectors.47 "Far from seeing any reason why Naji Sabri should visit Iran, the Iranian nation is Playing All Sides Has Domestic counting the minutes so they can see the fall Repercussions of Saddam Hussein's regime at the earliest Given the heavy cost of the Iran-Iraq War opportunity," the parliamentarian added. The and their more than two decades of bad parliamentarian said he and his colleagues relations, Baghdad's expectation of a believed Iraq must fulfill four conditions sympathetic Iranian ear was misplaced. The before Sabri could visit Iran:51 Saddam Iranian government's effort to serve as some Hussein must declare valid the 1975 Algiers sort of regional peacemaker had domestic Accord which would confirm the land border repercussions, furthermore, as and eliminate disputes regarding the Shatt al- parliamentarians took umbrage with what Arab waterway; He must apologize to Iran appeared to be the government's flirtation for attacking it in 1980; He must implement with Saddam Hussein's regime. fully UN Security Council Resolution 598, During the May 26, 2002 session of which effectively ended the war, and pay parliament, a parliamentarian questioned the compensation; And he must release all timing of Sabri's visit to Tehran.48 "In view of Iranian prisoners of war still remaining in the sensitive and particular situation in the Iraq. region, what was the reason for a visit by the Another legislator criticized the Foreign Iraqi foreign minister [to Tehran] in the Ministry's dealings with Iraq.52 Iranian second week of last Bahman [late January diplomacy should not create new enemies for 2002], two days before the American the country, he said, and inviting Sabri to Iran president termed Iran, Iraq, and North Korea is not beneficial. An influential conservative as an 'axis of evil.'?" newspaper editor said Iran should be At the end of the year, members of the negotiating with the United States, not legislature's National Security and Foreign holding meetings with Sabri.53 He questioned Affairs committee met with deputy ministers the timing of such meetings and warned that of foreign affairs and of intelligence and "siding with [Iraqi President Saddam security to discuss Iraqi affairs and its affect Hussein] today does not mean supporting the on Iranian interests.49 A parliamentarian said Iraqi nation but implies supporting Saddam afterwards, "The officials gave some himself." answers, some of which were accepted. But After Sabri visited Tehran in early- on the whole, most of the commission February 2003, 100 legislators submitted a members did not think that Iran's policies in motion to interpellate Foreign Minister respect of regional developments would Kharrazi, and President Khatami was forced safeguard our people's interests." to speak out on his behalf.54 Khatami said, "Our friends must know that if our minister

34 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2005) The Nearest and Dearest Enemy of foreign affairs makes a decision, that is a energy shortage, so "they think that acquiring decision made by the state, and we support energy from this region necessitates their it." Khatami criticized the legislators' timing, military presence." He also dismissed U.S. saying, "I expect them not to publicly raise concerns about weapons of mass destruction: issues that run counter to our interest at this "Even if [the U.S.] takes control of Iraq and current sensitive juncture." puts a ruler in power over there, it will use the same instruments against Iraq's Multilateralism and Anti-Americanism neighbors.... What is even worse than As all these events took place in the Saddam's possession of such weapons is the background, Tehran loudly denounced U.S. American presence in our region. Therefore, intentions and Iranian diplomats participated we explicitly oppose America's coming here." in numerous international meetings on Iraq Two weeks later, Kharrazi was in Istanbul and the regional crisis. This duality reflected to discuss Iraq with his counterparts from Iran's real antipathy to the United States, its Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and apprehension about a long-term U.S. Turkey. 58 "We have to stick to presence in the region, and its reluctance to multilateralism and urge the United States not see the U.S. exert power at will and without to resort to unilateralism," Kharrazi said.59 checks. "The United Nations system has to be the In a January 2003 speech, Supreme center of any decision to be made." Kharrazi Leader Khamene'i asked rhetorically whether went to London in early February and the United States would attack Iraq as part of discussed Iraq with Prime Minister Tony its war on terrorism, "or is it for Iraq's Blair and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. numerous oil wells, for dominating the Blair's official spokesman said both the region, for defending Israel, for lording it United States and the United Kingdom over the Islamic Republic of Iran? Today, assured Iran of their commitment to Iraq's these are the secrets of the global arrogance territorial integrity.60 Kharrazi said after the that have been exposed. Everyone knows meeting, "That is, of course, one of the about them."55 On the same day, Foreign concerns of all neighboring countries to Iraq: Minister Kharrazi said Iran was ready to the concern of [the] partition of Iraq. Nobody work with the European Union to avoid a war agrees with that, and everyone believes that in Iraq.56 "Any war in Iraq would have its the territorial integrity of Iraq has to be impact on Iran," he explained. "The simplest maintained." Kharrazi stressed the need to impact is the refugees that may come over to give United Nations inspectors more time, Iran, but there are many other issues: and said that Iran was worried about the deportation to Iraq, the future government of potential influx of refugees.61 Iraq, the use of chemical weapons, and many Kharrazi then proposed, during a tour of other issues that are a matter of concern to Persian Gulf states, that the Iraqi opposition Iran and other neighboring countries." reconcile with Saddam Hussein while the UN The second most powerful official in Iran, supervised a referendum in Iraq.62 Kharrazi Expediency Council Chairman Ayatollah Ali described this as the only way to have a Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, accused the peaceful change of government in Baghdad United States of having ulterior motives.57 He that could preclude a regional war, and he said that the United States was facing an emphasized Iran's concern about Iraq's

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Abbas William Samii territorial integrity. An Iranian government Supreme Leader Khamene'i sounded his spokesman described this as Kharrazi's usual theme when he described the allied personal initiative and not an official attack on Iraq as an "unjust war...that is based proposal. 63 on high-handedness and bullying."68 Khamene'i, meanwhile, continued his Khamene'i dismissed stated American and denunciations of the U.S. He told IRGC naval British goals, saying, "Their aim is to occupy personnel, "The Americans, with their 21st- Iraq, dominate the Middle East region, and century equipment and with today's slogans, gain total control of this precious treasure, intend to do what the colonialists of the 18th namely oil.... They want to protect and and 19th century did...under the pretext of safeguard the existence of the illegitimate democracy, under the pretext of human Zionist government." rights, under the pretext of campaign against terrorism."64 Khamene'i warned, "There is no Allegations of Iranian Interference end to the expansionist policies of the Less than a week after the war started, aggressor, America, which is today, with the U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld temptation of the Zionists, entering into a referred to the "unhelpful" presence of small situation that is dreadful for mankind." numbers of Iranian-backed Iraqi forces, and a In the weeks immediately preceding the few days later he said hundreds of commencement of hostilities, Kharrazi combatants from the Badr Corps were visited Jeddah and Sana'a to discuss regional operating in Iraq and that more were waiting developments, and his predecessor as foreign in Iran. 69 Rumsfeld added, "The Badr Corps minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, went as a is trained, equipped, and directed by Iran's presidential envoy to Jakarta and Islamabad. Islamic Revolutionary Guard, and we will While there, Velayati emphasized the hold the Iranian government responsible for importance to Iran of multilateralism: "Iran their actions and will view Badr Corps and Pakistan have been consulting and activity inside Iraq as unhelpful. Armed Badr coordinating at different world fora such as Corps members found in Iraq will have to be the UN, OIC [Organization of the Islamic treated as combatants." Conference], and NAM [Non-Aligned Rumsfeld put this in stronger terms a Movement]."65 month later, saying, "There is no question but Yet Tehran was not fully confident that that the government of Iran has encouraged these diplomatic efforts would succeed. The people to go into the country [Iraq] and that Foreign Ministry announced on March 19 they have people in the country attempting to that it had recalled its personnel from influence the country."70 Rumsfeld added, "If Baghdad. 66 you're suggesting, how we would feel about an Iranian-type government with a few OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM clerics running everything in the country, the BEGINS answer is : That isn't going to happen."71 Military operations against Iraq began on Anonymous U.S. government officials said the night of March 20-21, 2003. The first Iranian-trained operatives-- from the Badr official Iran reaction was a statement from Corps and the IRGC-- were promoting Kharrazi: "American military operations on friendly Shi'a clerics and advancing Tehran's Iraq are unjustifiable and illegitimate."67 interests in Najaf, Karbala, and Basra.72

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U.S. military personnel briefly detained saying, "There are elements in the Badr Islamic Action Organization spiritual leader Corps who are malign and interested in using Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarissi, violence against the coalition."79 He added, Secretary-General Ibrahim al-Mutairi, and "We are making it very clear to Iran that that others in April.73 Al-Mudarissi, who has lived is unacceptable, that [there] will be further in Iran for 32 years, and his companions were marks against them [for] stirring it up in Iraq in a four -vehicle convoy that was heading for and we will deal with the violence on the Karbala. ground accordingly." In May, American forces detained and Iraqi officials had similar complaints. A disarmed Badr Corps personnel and accused security official in Al-Salihiyah described the them of firing on U.S. troops.74 In July, arrest of 12 Iranian intelligence agents who Rumsfeld described "recent reports of intended to conduct bombings in Baghdad in Iranians moving some of their border posts August 2003, and a border police commander along about a 25-kilometer stretch several claimed that Iranians pretending to be kilometers inside of Iraq," and the American pilgrims were entering the country. 80 administrator in Iraq said Iran moved seven Tehran consistently rejected all such border posts 1.5-3 kilometers inside southern allegations, but some Iranian actions Iraq 75 amounted to the incitement of violence. In U.S. officials reiterated their concerns April 2003 Supreme Leader Khamene'i gave about infiltrations from Iran in September. a sermon in Arabic, instead of his usual Rumsfeld, for example, said, "We are Persian, in which he described: unhappy about the fact that people come across the Syrian and Iranian border."76 At …massacres committed against an the same time, American, Arab, and unarmed people...the groaning of European intelligence sources described a bereaved women and the February 2002 meeting at a safe house in injured...cries of hungry, injured eastern Iran between Abu Musab al-Zarqawi children...demolition of people's and al-Qa'ida military leader Saif al-Adel in homes...arrest and imprisonment of which they planned their future activities in passersby...disparaging of the sanctity Iraq. 77 The Iranian authorities reportedly of families...spreading of widespread placed Zarqawi under house arrest after the terror and fear...humiliation of proud meeting, but Tehran rebuffed repeated men and the shameful acts committed Jordanian requests for his extradition. Tehran against them in front of their children eventually released him and he made his way and womenfolk...destruction of the to Iraq. vital infrastructure of the It was not just the United States that was country...dropping of thousands of concerned about Iranian interference. In early bombs and missiles and the cannon June, the British envoy to Baghdad said Iran shelling of cities....81 was supporting the Badr Corps and was trying to exercise "undue and unwelcome Khamene'i accused anybody who helped influence in support of fundamentalist the coalition forces of committing treason, groupings."78 The U.K. special representative and he said American and British dreams for to Iraq struck a stronger note in the autumn, Iraq would not come true because of the

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Abbas William Samii resistance that would emerge. Iran had a Vilayat-i Faqih (Guardianship of the Supreme neutral stance during the war, Khamene'i Jurisconsult) and advocate it in Iraq, reject said, but it would not be neutral in any the Anglo-American presence in Iraq, and struggle between the Iraqi people and oppose the main source of emulation in occupiers. Najaf, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. A more explicit sermon was provided by Moreover, al-Sadr and his followers would Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati one month later.82 replace the traditional Shi'a groups, He said that the Iraqi people "have no option particularly SCIRI. SCIRI's leadership but to resort to Intifada [uprising] and reportedly resented the support given to al- martyrdom-seeking operations. That is the Sadr by the IRGC and the Supreme Leader's only solution. They are learning from the office.86 Palestinian experience." Al-Haeri subsequently renounced his relationship with al-Sadr. "Sadr speaks for Who is Muqtada al-Sadr? himself and we speak for ourselves," al- A new Shi'a political figure emerged in Haeri's spokesman said in April 2004.87 the immediate post-war jockeying for power, "People thought that everything he said he and his relationship with Iran was not clear. got directly from Ayatollah Haeri. But we've Muqtada al-Sadr, the son of the murdered said that's not true. As a result, the Sadr Ayatollah Muhammad Sadeq al-Sadr, was group doesn't have much of a relationship not connected with SCIRI or Da'wah. Iraqi- with the ayatollah anymore." A few months born cleric Kazim al-Husseini al-Haeri based later, al-Haeri's website made this point more in Qom, Iran, issued a religious edict in early emphatic: "Mr. al-Sadr used to be our April 2003 that said, "We hereby inform you representative...but that was on condition of that Mr. Muqtada al-Sadr is our deputy and obedience to and coordination with our office representative in all fatwa affairs."83 "His in Al-Najaf."88 Al-Sadr "does not coordinate position is my position," the decree added. with our office, so his agency became void," Al-Haeri once had a close relationship with according to the website, which added that al- the Shi'a Al-Da'wah al-Islamiyah party, but Sadr "does not seek our advice in his stances, split with the group because al-Haeri was so we cannot endorse what he does." Al- excessively pro-Iranian and called for the Haeri reportedly withdrew his support after party to respect the guidance of Iranian Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani informed senior Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i. clerics in Qom that the Imam al-Mahdi Army Iran's official news agency referred to al- caused some of the battle damage at the Sadr as al-Haeri's envoy, and he traveled to Imam Ali shrine in al-Najaf.89 Iran in June 2003. 84 Al-Sadr met with The Iranian stand on al-Sadr was mixed. Expediency Council Chairman Hashemi- He had traveled to Iran and met with top Rafsanjani and other regime leaders in officials, but President Khatami reportedly Tehran, and in Qom he met with an IRGC refused to meet with him. A reformist officer who allegedly dealt with foreign parliamentarian said, "The policy of the opposition organizations.85 Al-Sadr and his country's senior officials is by no means hosts reportedly made a deal that in exchange support for Muqtada al-Sadr."90 A for financial aid to him and his followers, he conservative parliamentarian, on the other would accept the Iranian theocratic model of hand, said, "The Islamic Republic of Iran

38 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2005) The Nearest and Dearest Enemy must support Muqtada al-Sadr, who is a such as 'America is being defeated,' 'all their figure against the forces of occupation."91 He plans have failed,' 'America has been bogged added, "Iran must have a more active down on the battlefield,' 'the Iraqis have been presence in the Iraqi crisis. We must not be successful,' and suchlike, which one can afraid of the fact that our actions may be deduce from the news reports and analyses of regarded as interference." the Voice and Vision, are unreal."95 Two le gislators also criticized state radio A Politicized Media Reaction and television's war coverage. One Operation Enduring Freedom commenced complained that events in Iraq were being during the No Ruz holiday in Iran, when depicted in such a way that viewers were newspapers are normally not published for up likely to believe that the Iraqi regime would to two weeks. Iranians who did not have win the war.96 Another legislator complained Internet access had to depend on the that the war coverage was so biased that it traditionally conservative state radio and violated the country's stated policy of television (Islamic Republic of Iran neutrality. 97 Broadcasting, IRIB) for their news. Typical of its fare was a state radio analyst claiming AN IRANIAN POLICY SHIFT several times that coalition forces were Tehran's official stance-- hostility towards intentionally targeting civilians , and state and concern about the U.S. presence on its television reporting that Karbala was "the borders-- never subsided. But the gradual target of lengthy aerial bombings" and the transfer of power to Iraqis themselves, as Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf was another well as repeated U.S. statements that the U.S. coalition target.92 forces did not intend to have a permanent Amidst such inaccurate reporting, leading presence in Iraq, may have soothed Iranian Shi'a clerics in Iran, such as Ayatollah nerves. Leading members of the Iraqi Hussein Ali Montazeri-Najafabadi and Grand Governing Council, which was created in Ayatollah Nasser Makarem-Shirazi, spoke July 2003, frequently traveled to Tehran to out against the war. The Association of Qom confer with Iranian officials. President Seminary Lecturers and Researchers sent a Khatami expressed his government's view of letter to UN Secretary General Kofi-Annan the council when he said at an October 2003 calling for an immediate end to the war in Organization of the Islamic Conference order to protect the Iraqi population and the summit, "The [council] can provide the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala.93 blueprint for drawing up an independent and This was not a universal reaction, progressive constitution for Iraq compatible however. The managing editor of the with the religious and cultural identity of the relatively conservative Baztab website said Iraqi people and put it to public voting."98 the official news outlets' coverage is not The Iraqi Governing Council, Foreign balanced. 94 For example, the editor said, Minister Kharrazi said, needed to increase its official news agencies carried "dozens" of interaction with its neighbors.99 Kharrazi reports about the water shortage in Basra but added, "We believe that the Iraqi Governing did not file even one report about the Council is the first step in handing over Americans' restoration of the water supply. A affairs to the Iraqi people and in establishing Tehran University professor added, "Reports national rule and the formation of a

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Abbas William Samii provisional government in order to draw up a even personnel were getting to al-Sadr from constitution and form a legal and nationally- Iran.104 elected government in Iraq." Iranian officials dismissed all the Tehran also welcomed the late June 2004 American allegations. Yet events in Iran transfer of power to Iraq's interim contributed to suspicions about Tehran's government. In September, Mohammad intentions. In May 2004, the Headquarters for Majid al-Shaykh began work as the first Iraqi Tribute to the Martyrs of the Global Islamic ambassador to Iran since 1980. 100 Movement-- which is affiliated with the IRGC-- began enrollment of volunteer Continuing Allegations of Direct Interference suicide bombers to go to Iraq. 105 The Allegations of Iranian interference in Iraqi headquarters announced, "We are confident affairs and complaints about porous borders that expelling the British and American continued regardless of who was in charge in occupiers from Iraq is not possible in any Baghdad. Tehran dismissed the U.S. way other than martyrdom-seeking allegations with its usual rhetoric about being operations." Among the headquarters' used as a scapegoat. Nor did the situation supporters was at least one seem as clear as it had in the past. During parliamentarian.106 During the August intense unrest in April 2004 the U.S. violence in al-Najaf, furthermore, an Iranian secretary of defense said, "We know the official appeared to encourage violence: "The Iranians have been meddling [in Iraq] and it Americans, by affronting holy sites across is unhelpful to have neighboring countries Iraq, have now sown the seeds of combat and meddling in the affairs of Iraq. "101 Yet the resistance [which] will be irrigated with the State Department was less certain. A blood of martyrs and grow up stronger."107 spokesman said, "We've seen, generally More and more often, complaints about speaking, reports of suggestions of Iranian Iranians came from Iraqi officials at both the involvement, collusion, provocation, national and the local level. For example, in coordination, et cetera, et cetera. But I think July 2004 police in Baghdad's al-Rasafah there's a dearth of hard facts to back these district arrested two Iranian intelligence things up."102 officers who were trying to plant That summer, an anonymous "former explosives.108 During the August unrest, senior official of the just-dissolved 1,000 Iranians were deported from Karbala, American-led occupation authority" said and the governor of al-Najaf said, "There is during a discussion about the continuing Iranian support for al-Sadr's group, and this is insurgency that Iranian and Syrian activity in no secret. We have information and evidence Iraq had increased over the past year. 103 The that they are supplying the [Imam] Al-Mahdi Iranians, he said, have "become more active Army with weapons and have found such over time, and not helpful." The source weapons in their possession."109 In December speculated that Tehran might have been 2004, police closed the offices of six Iranian financing Muqtada al-Sadr. As the months tourism firms in Karbala and expelled their went by, officials from the State and Defense staffs.110 departments, as well as military officials, More controversial were Iraqi Defense continued to assert that money, arms, and Minister Hazim al-Sha'lan al-Khuza'i's frequent accusations. In July 2004 he accused

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Iran of "blatant interference," and a month insecurity in both countries. In December later he described Iran as Iraq's "first 2004, Iraq stopped issuing visas to Iranians in enemy."111 When pressed on his claims that a light of the deteriorating security situation.114 neighbor is fueling unrest in Iraq, the defense minister erupted, "Yes, it is Iran. I have said 'Humanitarian and Outreach Programs' it before.... and I say Iran, Iran, Iran. "112 He During peace time there has always been a said Iran was promoting violence in his great deal of cross border traffic between Iran country as a way to "settle its scores" with the and Iraq. Iranian pilgrims travel to Iraq every United States. year to visit shrines in Karbala, Najaf, and the Iraqi President Ghazi al-Yawir and Baghdad suburb of Khazimiyah, and Iraqi Jordanian King Abdullah made similarly pilgrims travel to Iran to visit important controversial statements.113 "Iran has very shrines, such as the tomb of Imam Reza in obvious interference in our Mashhad. From March-September 2004, business...especially in the southeast side of approximately one million people used the Iraq," Yawir said. He said Iran was advising Mehran border crossing in western Iran. 115 the parties sympathetic to Tehran and was Pilgrims are supposed to secure visas, but spending a lot of money to produce a Shi'a they frequently cross the border illegally with theocracy similar to its own. King Abdullah smugglers. Goods are often smuggled across said more than one million Iranians had the long and porous borders. entered Iraq to vote in the January 30 Less than one month after Operation Iraqi election, that Tehran was spending money on Freedom began truckloads of Iranian goods-- social services and welfare to create pro- such as food and medicine-- were arriving in Iranian sentiments, and that some people had southern Iraq. Furthermore, radio and been trained by the Islamic Revolution television stations based in Iran were easily Guards Corps. The Jordanian monarch also received in information-starved Iraq. CIA warned that this Iranian interference could Director George Tenet expressed suspicion have dire consequences for the region: "If about many of Iran's "humanitarian and Iraq goes Islamic republic, then, yes, we've outreach programs" during February 2004 opened ourselves to a whole set of new testimony before the Senate Select problems that will not be limited to the Committee on Intelligence.116 A glance at borders of Iraq." Iranian activities in the Balkans explains The Iraqis' allegations were dismissed, Tenet's concerns. too. Indeed, the absence of serious proof In the Balkans, Tehran provided reduced this issue to a series of unproven humanitarian services through Iran's Red accusations and denials. But it eventually Crescent Society opening a clinic in Bihac, became clear that the issue was having an western Bosnia. Iranian music and Koranic adverse impact on Tehran-Baghdad relations. recitals were broadcast from the Fatah radio An early-December 2004 conference in station in Sarajevo, which had "one of the Tehran of Interior Ministry and security most powerful transmitters throughout the officials from Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, region."117 Iran also sent Koran reciters to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey Bosnia, although in February 1996 Bosnian turned into a debate between Tehran and Croat policemen arrested them for espousing Baghdad over who was more responsible for Islamic revolution.

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Such humanitarian activities were just one programs, carry pro-Intifada commentary, side of Iran's relationship with Bosnia. In glorify violence against Israel, and encourage 1992 there were reports that Iranian future acts of "resistance." After the fall of shipments of humanitarian aid also contained Baghdad, furthermore, SCIRI began arms and ammunition. Bosnian officials broadcasting its Voice of the Mujahedin radio cooperated with Tehran, in at least one case programming on a frequency formerly used exposing an American intelligence officer to by Iranian state radio. Its programs feature the possibility of an Iranian terrorist attack. 118 statements from SCIRI and Iranian leaders, Iranian spies infiltrated the American and it espouses views advocated by Tehran. program to train the Bosnian Army. 119 Of the 59 AM radio broadcasts audible in Islamic Revolution Guards Corps personnel Baghdad on October 7, 2003, according to came to Bosnia and stayed in the guise of the U.S. government's Foreign Broadcast relief workers or through marriage with Information Service (FBIS), transmissions Bosnian females. originating in Iran could be heard on 33 AM Broadcasting frequencies. Four of the frequencies Tehran tried to influence events in Iraq broadcast programming in Arabic, one was in indirectly, through Arabic-language Kurdish, and 28 were in the . television and radio broadcasting. It already Reception varied from poor to good. Four had the Sahar news channel. Shortly before FM broadcasts originated in Iran, including the war, Iran launched its new 24-hour Tehran radio's Arabic service, SCIRI's Voice Arabic-language news television channel, al- of the Mujahedin, and Tehran's youth- Alam. Al-Alam was available via the oriented Javan radio. A new entry-- Voice of Arabsat, Asiasat, Telstar, and Hot Bird Rebellious Iraq-- began transmitting from satellites. Its programming was critical of the Ahvaz on AM for seven hours a day. occupation, terming the conflict a "War of According to a June 28, 2004 FBIS survey, Control," using gory imagery, and making 22 channels originating in Iran could be heard frequent comparisons with events in in Baghdad. The audibility varied from poor Palestine. Sahar and al-Alam could be seen to good, but the Islamic Republic of Iran and heard in Baghdad. Two other television Broadcasting's Arabic-language services channels from Iran-- the religious al- were consistently good, as were SCIRI's Thiqalayn Television and SCIRI's Resistance Voice of the Mujahedin. Channel-- could be viewed in Iraq. The director of IRIB met with clerics from The external service of the Voice of the al-Najaf in July 2003 and offered to help Islamic Republic of Iran could be heard on them establish a TV station.120 AM and shortwave in Iraq even before the war. Tehran ran two radio networks with a Commercial Connections Palestinian focus-- the Voice of the In addition to opportunities for Palestinian Islamic Revolution and the Voice humanitarian and information operations, of the al-Aqsa Intifada-- for many years. The post-war Iraq provided Iran with a potentially two radio stations, using Iranian radio's lucrative business situation. On the eve of an external service transmitters and broadcasting October 2003 international donors' on frequencies that also carry Islamic conference in Madrid, it was estimated that Republic of Iran Broadcasting's Arabic over a four-year period $55 billion would be

42 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2005) The Nearest and Dearest Enemy needed to rebuild Iraq. Kharrazi said Organization for Migration estimated that beforehand, "Our companies are already there were 100,000-120,000 eligible Iraqis active there and we will help with Iraq's living in Iran, and 60,908 people registered to reconstruction."121 He later added, "We stand vote at 11 sites in Tehran, Qom, Urumiyeh ready to supply our electricity and gas to Iraq (West Azerbaijan Province), Kermanshah, and to facilitate its oil exports through our oil Ahvaz (), Shush terminals or enter into a swap arrangement (Khuzestan Province), and Mashhad that can amount to 350,000 barrels per (Khorasan Province). A total of 56,568 Iraqis day. "122 voted in Iran, according to the IOM. The Export Guarantee Fund of Iran Groups backed by Iran previously had (EGFI) took steps in July 2004 to provide leading roles in the United Iraqi Alliance, a risk coverage for Iranian exports to Iraq, and coalition of 22 political parties and groups the next month Tehran hosted a conference supported by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The intended to strengthen business ties between alliance includes the Supreme Council for the the two countries.123 The Iraqi Finance Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and al- Minister visited Tehran in January 2005 to Da'wah al-Islamiyah. Amidst accusations that discuss the expansion of bilateral trade. 124 this alliance would seek to emulate Iran's The two sides discussed free trade theocracy, one of its leaders said, "There is agreements, cooperation in banking, trade no intention of forming an Islamic or exchanges, border markets, letters of credit, religious state in Iraq, or a Shi'ite state or an and insurance coverage. Iranian-style government."127 Railways are another area of potential Many in Iran welcomed the election cooperation for the two countries. The Iraqi results. Expediency Council Chairman transport minister discussed the issue with the Ayatollah Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani Iranian charge d'affaires in September 2003, said, "The fact that the people of Iraq have and an Iranian railways official announced a gone to the ballot boxes to decide their own few months later that Iran and Iraq ha d fate is the result of efforts by the Iraqi clergy agreed to the construction of two railway and sources of emulation, led by Ayatollah lines.125 [Ali] al-Sistani."128 A prominent Friday Iran participated in a June 2005 donors Prayer leader said the majority of votes favor conference in Brussels with representatives the United Iraqi Alliance and Ayatollah Ali from some 80 countries and international al-Sistani, and every vote is a "no" to the U.S. organizations. The Iranian foreign minister presence in the country. 129 mentioned that plans were under way for oil President Khatami congratulated Patriotic swaps of up to 400,000 barrels per day, and Union of Kurdistan leader Jalal Talabani on added that other projects dealing with oil, his election as Iraq's president in April gas, banking, and finance were being 2005.130 In a conversation the next month, considered. 126 Khatami told Talabani, "We regard Iraq's security and stability as important as Iran's Tehran Welcomes Iraq's Elections national security."131 Iran played an important part in the January 30, 2005 elections for an Iraqi CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS national assembly. The International

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The nature of Iran's decision-making system Bureaucratic rivalries also affected Iran's is the key to assessing Iranian behavior post-war diplomacy. The executive branch before, during, and after the 2003 war in Iraq. resisted pressure to appoint an IRGC officer The Supreme Leader determines general responsible for dealing with the Iraqi policies, and he is advised by the Expediency opposition, Brigadier General Reza Council. The Supreme National Security Seifullahi, as the first ambassador to Council, which is chaired by the president, Baghdad.133 Iran's first post-Taliban consul in determines national security and defense the western Afghan city of Herat, former policy within the framework of the general IRGC officer Hassan Kazemi Qomi, policies specified by the Supreme Leader, subsequently served as charge d'affaires in and it coordinates all activities related to post-Saddam Hussein Baghdad. national security. Other organizations After September 11, 2001, the Iranian involved with the foreign policy process are foreign policy community debated whether or executive branch agencies, the parliament, not the new regional security environment and the Guardians Council. The Ministry of was beneficial to the country's national Intelligence and Security and the Islamic security. 134 The general conclusion appears to Revolution Guards Corps are involved with be that the elimination of the Taliban threat terrorist organizations and covert activities in was accompanied by the introduction of Iraq. another threat, American power. The war has The powerful influence of individuals who an impact in three other areas: the Iraq-based do not have a formal role in the system makes Iranian opposition, Shi'a leadership, and this process even more obscure. Therefore, ethnic minority politics. the statements of a top official may not be The elimination of Saddam Hussein's translated into action. Similarly, the actions regime in 2003 strengthened Iranian of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security or apprehension about U.S. intentions, and there the IRGC in Iraq may be motivated by is a persistent view in Tehran that Iran comes concerns not voiced by the country's leaders. after Afghanistan and Iraq on the U.S. target Furthermore, there is a lack of oversight by list.135 The U.S. is unlikely to withdraw from elected institutions, and the media's watchdog either Afghanistan or Iraq right away. function is circumscribed by governmental Therefore, inclusion of Iran in regional repression and journalists' self-censorship. security discussions could allay some of its This goes some way in explaining the fears. In light of international and particularly Iranian Foreign Ministry's interaction with U.S. concern about Iran's pursuit of a nuclear Washington on Afghan and Iraqi war-related capability and support for terrorist topics, while the Supreme Leader and other organizations, it is not all that likely that the officials decry alleged U.S. ambitions in the inclusion of Iran in such discussions would region. Muqtada al-Sadr's June 2003 visit to yield startling results. Nevertheless, it would Iran is illustrative , too. Al-Sadr met with be worth the effort and is unlikely to have Expediency Council Chairman Hashemi- harmful side-effects. Rafsanjani and IRGC officers, but President The obscure status of the Mujahedin Khatami allegedly refused to meet al-Sadr, Khalq Organization (MKO) in Iraq, almost preferring instead to interact with SCIRI's two years after the war, also worries Iran. Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim.132 The MKO conducted armed operations

44 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (September 2005) The Nearest and Dearest Enemy against the Iranian regime from Iraq during government with Islamic democracy and the Iran-Iraq War and afterwards on behalf of without any special or divine rights for the Saddam Hussein. After Operation Iraqi clergy, the Iranian government won't be able Freedom, its personnel were confined to a to justify its situation to the Iranian citizens." facility called Camp Ashraf, and they were A final concern for Iran-- and also for granted "protected status" under the Geneva Turkey and Syria-- is its Kurdish minority Conventions in July 2004. Hundreds of MKO and the remote possibility that it will begin members have accepted Tehran's offer of an militating for some sort of autonomy. West amnesty. The MKO's leaders and thousands Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Ilam, and Kermanshah of others refuse to go back. The U.S. cannot Provinces are heavily populated by Kurds, continue to keep these people in Iraq, but it about 75 percent of whom are Sunni should secure guarantees from Tehran that Muslims. The Central Intelligence Agency these people will not be harmed before estimates that some 4.8 million Kurds live in expelling them. European governments Iran. These regions are underdeveloped and should make a concentrated effort to shut have high unemployment, and locals down MKO activities in their countries. occasionally protest against government Another Iranian concern relates to its measures and call for greater government status as a Shi'a Muslim theocracy. The Iraqi representation. This has always been a city of Najaf was the center of Shi'a learning sensitive issue for the Iranian government, for centuries, and the most important Shi'a and in February and March 2005, a top shrines are in Iraq. It was mainly because of Iranian election official warned prospective Saddam Hussein's repression of the Shi'a presidential candidates against appealing to community, which coincided with Iran's minorities.138 Developments in Iraq indicate Islamic revolution, that the Iranian city of that the Kurds are satisfied with their share in Qom came to be the preeminent center of the country's central government. It remains Shi'a Islam. The Iranian government depends to be seen how this will affect Iran's Kurds. on the status of Qom, which is home to many These factors explain Iran's continuing leading Shi'a clerics, for much of its interference in Iraqi affairs and its legitimacy, and the resurgence of Najaf simultaneous cooperation with the country's threatens this status. government. This is also why Iranian The resurgence of Najaf and behavior is unlikely to change soon. developments in Iraq coincide with the increasing disdain some Iranian clerics have * Dr. Abbas William Samii is the Regional for their government. For example, eight of Analysis Coordinator for Southwest Asia and the top twelve reportedly refused the Middle East at Radio Free Europe/Radio to vote in the February 2004 parliamentary Liberty. Views expressed in this article do not elections.136 After the Iraqi elections, necessarily reflect the position of RFE/RL. furthermore, a prominent Iranian cleric urged Earlier research articles by Samii have been Iraqis not to recreate the system of Islamic published in MERIA, Middle East Journal, government that exists in Iran. 137 "I think the Middle East Policy, Middle Eastern Studies, Iraqis can make what we wanted to create but Hoover Digest, Brown Journal of World were unsuccessful: a real Islamic Republic." Affairs, Transnational Organized Crime, He continued, "If they have a good Caspian Crossroads, and Comparative

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Studies of South Asia, , and the Middle East. He also has written chapters for several Washington asked Tehran to aid any books, including The Region at the Center of American aviators who either were forced to the World: Crises and Quandaries in the land in Iran or whose survival, evasion, Contemporary Persian Gulf, Barry Rubin, ed. resistance, and escape activities took them (London: Frank Cass, 2002), and Nuclear into Iran. Minister of Intelligence and Iran: Devising A Strategy Beyond Denial, Security Ali Yunesi said, "We have told them Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, eds. that if any plane crashes inside Iran we will (U.S. Army War College, 2004). help and hand it over, but we will not allow NOTES the Americans to enter Iran," the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported on 1 Views expressed here are solely those of the October 18, 2001. On the other hand, Foreign author. Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Assefi said 2 Kenneth Katzman, Julie Kim, and Richard on October 18, 2001, "No offer has been Best, "Bosnia and Iranian Arms Shipments," made by the Islamic Republic of Iran to Congressional Research Service Report for America." On the Bonn Accords, Richard Congress, April 24, 1996, p. 2. Haass testimony to Senate Foreign Relations 3 Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Committee, December 6, 2001. September 11, 2001 11 Brigadier General Mohammad Baqer 4 Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Zolqadr, IRNA, November 30, 2001. September 17, 2001. 12 Brigadier General Mohammad Baqer 5 Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Zolqadr, Vision of the Islamic Republic of September 26, 2001. Iran, February 7, 2002; General Yahya 6 See Daniel L. Byman, Shahram Chubin, Rahim-Safavi, IRNA, February 22, 2002. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Jerrold Green, 13 Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Iran's Security Policy in the Post- Assefi, Vision of the Islamic Republic of Revolutionary Era, (Santa Monica, CA: Iran, September 30, 2002. RAND, 2001), and A.W. Samii, “Order out 14 Abbas Maleki and Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, of Chaos,” Hoover Digest 2004, No. 3 "Iran's Foreign Policy after 11 September," (Summer 2004). The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. IX, 7 RFE/RL Iran Report, Vol. 4, No. 40 No. 2 (Winter/Spring 2003), p. 3. (October 22, 2001). 15 Tehran Times, July 16, 2002. 8 Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 16 Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid-Reza October 8, 2001. Assefi and government spokesman Abdullah 9 Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ramezanzadeh, IRNA, July 17, 2002. October 15, 2001. 17 Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, July 10 In an initial message to Tehran sent shortly 17, 2002. after the bombing of Afghanistan began on 18 dpa, July 23, 2002. October 7, 2001, the White House promised 19 Vice President for Legal and Parliamentary to respect Iranian territorial integrity; John Affairs Hojatoleslam Mohammad Ali Abtahi, Ward Andersen, "Iran Vows to Rescue U.S. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 3, 2002. Pilots Who Crash on Its Soil," The New York 20 Former Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Times, October 18, 2001. In exchange, Velayati, who served as the supreme leader's

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foreign-affairs adviser, established the office Iraq Flank," New York Times, January 13, in Dubai, according to reports in Al-Sharq al- 2003. On IMK-IRGC meetings, see Hawlati, Awsat, August 28 and 29, 2002. January 27, 2003. On KIG leader Ali Bapir 21 Barbara Slavin, "Iranians may aid U.S. war meeting with Iranian officials, see Komal, on Iraq," USA Today, November 15, 2002. January 4 and 25, 2003. 22 cnn.com, November 25, 2002. 32 On INC facilities in Iran, see Seymour 23 Peter Slevin, "U.S. Met With Iranians On Hersh, "The Iraq Hawks," , War," Washington Post, February 8, 2003. December 24 and 31, 2001. On allegations 24 Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman that Chalabi gave information to Tehran, see Hamid Reza Assefi said, "We deny the report James Risen and David Johnston, "Chalabi published in on Reportedly Told Iran That U.S. Had Code," contacts with American officials in Europe , June 1, 2004, and regarding Iraq;" dpa, February 9, 2003. Walter Pincus and Bradley Graham, "Coded 25 UPI, March 26, 2003. Cable in 1995 Used Chalabi's Name," The 26 Glenn Kessler and Walter Pincus, "One Washington Post, June 4, 2004. Supreme Step Forward, Direction Uncertain," National Security Council Secretary Washington Post, April 18, 2003. Hojatoleslam Hassan Rohani rejected these 27 Hamid Reza Assefi, IRNA, March 21, reports, saying Iran has had "no contacts or 2003. special relationship with Chalabi." Foreign 28 Representing the Iranian side were Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Assefi also Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance rejected such reports as "baseless." IRNA, Tahmasb Mazaheri, Islamic Revolution June 2, 2004 Guards Corps founder Javad Mansuri, and 33 Ayatollah Baqer al-Hakim in an interview Petroleum Ministry adviser and former with Al-Hayat, as reported by AFP, Ambassador to Japan Hussein Kazempur- December 1, 2002. Ardabili. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, July 23, 2003. 34 Al-Safir, December 11, 2002. 29 Robin Wright, "Bush Team Targets 35 Kurdistani Nuwe, January 8, 2003. Hussein," , February 10, 36 Al-Hayat, January 9, 2003; IRNA and Al- 2002. Jazeera television, 10 January 2003. 30 See A.W. Samii, “Shia Political 37 SCIRI's Muhsin al-Hakim, cited by IRNA, Alternatives in Postwar Iraq,” Middle East January 25, 2003. Elaine Sciolino, "Iraqi Policy, Vol. X, No. 2 (Summer 2003); Juan Dissidents Meet in Iran to Plan Iraq Entry," Cole, "The United States and Shi'ite The New York Times, January 26, 2003. Religious Factions in Postwar Iraq," Middle 38 Iran News, March 8, 2003. East Journal, Vol. 57, No. 4, (Autumn 2003); 39 Etemad, March 6, 2003. and W. Andrew Terrill, The United States 40 Najmeh Bozorgmehr and Guy Dinmore, and Iraq's Shi'ite Clergy: Partners or "Iranian-backed forces cross into Iraq," Adversaries? (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War Financial Times, February 19, 2003; AP, College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004). March 5, 2003. 31 On PUK complaints of Iranian support for 41 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 30, 2002. the Ansar al-Islam, see C.J. Chivers, "Kurds 42 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, July 21, 2002. Face a Second Enemy: Islamic Fighters on 43 dpa, September 29, 2002.

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44 Vice President Mohammad Ali Abtahi, 65 IRNA, March 19, 2003. cited by Reuters, September 27, 2002. 66 ISNA, March 19, 2003. 45 Parliament Deputy Speaker Mohammad 67 IRNA, March 20, 2003. Reza Khatami, cited by AFP, September 26, 68 Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2002. March 21, 2003 46 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 11, 2003. 69 http://www.usinfo.state.gov, March 25 and 47 IRNA, February 9, 2003. March 28, 2003. 48 Ardabil parliamentary representative 70 http://www.usinfo.state.gov, April 25, Nureddin Pirmoazen questioning Foreign 2003. Minister Kharrazi, Voice of the Islamic 71 Robin Wright, "Rise of Shiite Religious Republic of Iran, May 26, 2002. Leaders in Iraq Gives U.S. Pause," Los 49 Elahe Kulyai, cited by ISNA, December Angeles Times, April 25, 2003. 17, 2003. 72 Julian Borger, "White House fears covert 50 Ardabil parliamentary representative influence on Iraqi Shias," The Guardian, Nureddin Pirmoazen, Aftab-i Yazd, January 6, April 24, 2004. 2003. 73 According to international news agencies, a 51 ISNA, January 7, 2003. press release posted on almodarresi.com, and 52 Khoi parliamentary representative Ali Al-Jazeera television, April 22, 2003. Taqizadeh in a January 26, 2003 speech to 74 Charles Clover, "Iran link to rocket attack the legislature, cited in Tehran Times, against US troops," Financial Times, June 6, January 27, 2003. 2003, and Charles Clover, "US soldiers raid 53 Iran Daily, January 27, 2003. Baghdad office of Shia party," Financial 54 IRNA, February 19, 2003. Times, June 8, 2003. 55 Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 75 Rumsfeld testimony before the U.S. Senate January 9, 2003. Committee on Armed Services, Reuters, July 56 IRNA, 9 January 2003. 9, 2003, and L. Paul Bremer, RFE/RL Iran 57 Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report, Vol. 6, No. 30 (July 21, 2003). An February 7, 2003. anonymous "senior British officer" said at a 58 IRNA, January 23, 2003. June 2004 conference in London that British 59 Karl Vick, "Mideast Countries Issue forces defied U.S. Lieutenant General Appeal to Iraq," The Washington Post, Ricardo Sanchez's order to repel the Iranian January 24, 2003. units that had crossed into Iraq. The British 60 Prime Minister Blair's official website preferred a diplomatic solution, and the issue (http://www.number-10.gov.uk), February 6, was resolved after a week of discussions 2003. between Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi 61 RFE/RL Iran Report, Vol. 6, No. 6, and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. (February 10, 2003). http://www.telegraph.co.uk, June 30, 2004. 62 IRNA, March 4, 2003. 76 Douglas Jehl and Dexter Filkins, 63 Government spokesman Abdullah "Rumsfeld Eager for More Iraqis to Keep Ramezanzadeh, AFP, March 5, 2003. Peace," The New York Times, September 5, 64 Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2003. March 12, 2003.

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77 Peter Finn and Susan Schmidt, "Al Qaeda 91 Abadeh parliamentarian Mahmud Plans A Front in Iraq," The Washington Post, Mohammadi, Aftab-i Yazd, August 23, 2004. September 7, 2003. On Iran's relationship 92 Analyst "Mr. Kazemzadeh," Voice of the with Al-Qa’ida leaders and Jordan, see also Islamic Republic of Iran, March 29, 2003 and John Mintz, "Saudi Says Iran Drags Feet April 5, 2003; Vision of the Islamic Republic Returning Al Qaeda Leaders," The of Iran, April 3, 2003. Washington Post, August 12, 2003, and 93 IRNA, April 5, 2003. Robin Wright, "Jordan Promoting U.S.-Iran 94 Fuad Sadeqi, Fars News Agency, April 2, Contacts, The Washington Post, August 12, 2003. 2003. December 7, 2003. 95 Professor Sadeq Zibakalam, Fars News 78 British envoy John Sawers, cited in Rory Agency, April 2, 2003. McCarthy, "Iran helping religious militias in 96 Lanjan parliamentary representative Ali Iraq, British envoy warns," The Guardian, Mohammad Namazi, IRNA, April 7, 2003. June 4, 2003. 97 Elaheh Kulyai, IRNA, April 7, 2003. 79 Sir Jeremy Greenstock, cited in Ewen 98 IRNA, October 17, 2003. MacAskill, "Blair envoy warns Iran on 99 Sharq, November 6, 2003. 'meddling,'" The Guardian, October 23, 2003 100 IRNA, 18 September 2004. 80 Al-Salihiyah security patrols director 101 RFE/RL Iran Report, Vol. 7, No. 14 (12 Haytham Suleiman, Al-Ahd al-Jadid, August April 2004). 21, 2003; Colonel Nazzim Sherif 102 State Department spokesman Adam Ereli, Mohammad, the Iraqi border police cited by UPI, April 9, 2004. commander at the Al-Munthiriya border 103 David E. Sanger, "Ex-Occupation Aide crossing, Times, August 28, 2003. Sees No Dent in 'Saddamists,'" The New York 81 Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Times, July 2, 2004. April 11, 2003. 104 Robin Wright and Justin Blum, "U.S. 82 Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, Voice of the Targets Iran's Influence in Iraq," The Islamic Republic of Iran, May 2, 2003. Washington Post, September 25, 2004. 83 Craig S. Smith, "Cleric in Iran Says Shiites 105 Kayhan, May 22, 2004. Must Act," The New York Times, April 26, 106 Enrollment forms for volunteers were 2003. distributed after a June 2 meeting in Tehran, 84 IRNA, June 8, 2003. where Tehran parliamentary representative 85 Corrierre della Serra, June 25, 2003. Mehdi Kuchakzadeh, military officials, and 86 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 8, 2003. scholars spoke on topics such as "Martyrdom 87 Borzou Daragahi, "Sadr's mentor distances Operations and Military and Security himself from young firebrand," The Daily Strategies" and "Martyrdom Operations -- Star, April 17, 2004. The Last Weapon," the Iranian Labor News 88 AP, September 5, 2004. Agency (ILNA), June 4, 2004. 89 Nazila Fathi, "Ex-Mentor of Rebel Iraqi 107 Supreme Leader's adviser Ali Akbar Cleric Breaks From His Protege ," The New Velayati, IRNA, August 8, 2004. York Times, September 5, 2004. 108 Iraqi Interior Ministry official Major 90 Ardakan parliamentarian Mohammad Reza General Hikmat Musa Suleiman, Al-Sabah Tabesh, Aftab-i Yazd, August 24, 2004. al-Jadid, July 6, 2004.

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109 Al-Najaf governor Adnan al-Zurufi, Al- 127 United Iraqi Alliance leader Mowafak Sharqiyah, August 8, 2004. Rubai, cited in Doug Struck and Bassam 110 Al-Sharqiyah, December 7, 2004. Sebti, "Iraqi Shiite Coalition Tries to Dispel 111 RFE/RL Iraq Report, Vol. 7, No. 27 (July Fears of Iran-Style Rule," The Washington 22, 2004). Al-Arabiyah television, August 9, Post, January 16, 2005. 2004. 128 Rafsanjani cited by Islamic Republic of 112 AP, September 3, 2004. Iran News Network, January 31, 2005. Al- 113 Robin Wright and Peter Baker, "Iraq, Sistani said he did not vote in the elections Jordan See Threat To Election From Iran," because he is Iranian by birth and not legally Washington Post, December 8, 2004. "I don't entitled to vote in Iraq, Iraq for All News have any problem with Shi'ites," King Network (www.iraq4allnews.dk/), January Abdullah explained in an interview; Middle 31, 2005. East Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Spring 2005). 129 Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, Voice of the "I have a real problem with certain Iranian Islamic Republic of Iran, February 4, 2005. factions' political influence inside Iraq." 130 IRNA, April 7, 2005. 114 Iraqi Ambassador Mohammad Majid al- 131 IRNA, May 5, 2005. Shaykh, Voice of the Islamic Republic of 132 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 8, 2003. Iran, December 19, 2004. 133 Hambastegi, July 21, 2003; Al-Sharq al- 115 Ilam Province police official Colonel Awsat, July 29, 2003; Iran Daily, July 31, Manuchehr Cheraqi, IRNA, September 18, 2003. See also Al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 2004. 26, 2002. 116 134 Maleki and Afrasiabi, p. 1. http://intelligence.senate.gov/0402hrg/04022 135 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Iran-Iraq 4/witness.htm Relations after Saddam Hussein," The 117 IRNA, January 8, 1997. Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4 118 James Risen, "Bosnia reportedly told Iran (Autumn 2003), p. 124. of U.S. spy," Los Angeles Times, January, 15 136 Grand Ayatollah Yusef Sanei, cited in 1997. Kim Barker, "Iran loses faith in clerics," 119 Mike O'Connor, "Spies for Iran are said to Chicago Tribune, May 2, 2004. gain a hold in Bosnia," New York Times, 137 Hojatoleslam Mohsen Kadivar interview November 28, 1997. with Reuters, February 2, 2005. 120 Ali Larijani, Vision of the Islamic 138 On ethnic groups' demands, see A.W. Republic of Iran, July 22, 2003. Samii, “The Nation and Its Minorities: 121 Reuters, October 22, 2003. Ethnicity, Unity, and State Policy in Iran,” 122 Reuters, October 24, 2003. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, 123 IRNA, July 26 and August 2, 2004. and the Middle East, Vol. XX, Nos. 1 & 2 124 Adil Abd al-Mahdi met with Iranian (2000). Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati warned that Commerce Minister Mohammad the United States is determined to exploit Shariatmadari, IRNA, January 20, 2005. rifts, and in and Iraq it has "fanned 125 IRNA, September 21, 2003. Voice of the the flames" of ethnic and religious Islamic Republic of Iran, April 1, 2004. differences; Voice of the Islamic Republic of 126 IRNA, June 22, 2005. Iran, March 18, 2005. "The same plots are

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hatched against Iran," he said. "Some of the prospective candidates are raising such problems in order to win votes." As secretary of the Guardians Council, Jannati plays a major role in vetting prospective candidates for elected office.

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