Côte D'ivoire Mali 1996-97

COUNTRY PROFILE

Côte d’Ivoire Mali

Our quarterly Country Report on Côte d’Ivoire and Mali analyses current trends. This annual Country Profile provides background political and economic information.

1996-97

The Economist Intelligence Unit 15 Regent Street, London SW1Y 4LR United Kingdom The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For over 40 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The EIU delivers its information in four ways: through subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through specific research reports, whether for general release or for particular clients; through electronic publishing; and by organising conferences and roundtables. The firm is a member of The Economist Group.

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ISSN 1351-0576

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October 18, 1996 Contents

Côte d’Ivoire

3 Basic data

4 Political background 4 Historical background 7 Constitution and institutions 7 Political forces 9 International relations and defence

10 The economy 10 Economic structure 11 Economic policy 13 Economic performance 15 Regional trends

15 Resources 15 Population 16 Education 16 Health

17 Economic infrastructure 17 Transport and communications 18 Energy provision 19 Financial services 20 Other services

20 Production 20 Industry 21 Mining 22 Agriculture and forestry

24 The external sector 24 Merchandise trade 25 Invisibles and the current account 26 Capital flows and foreign debt 27 Foreign reserves and the exchange rate

28 Appendices 28 Regional organisations 28 Sources of information 29 Reference tables

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 2

Mali

37 Basic data

38 Political background 38 Historical background 43 Constitution and institutions 43 Political forces 45 International relations and defence

46 The economy 46 Economic structure 48 Economic policy 49 Economic performance 50 Regional trends

52 Resources 52 Population 53 Education 53 Health 54 Natural resources and the environment

55 Economic infrastructure 55 Transport and communications 56 Energy provision 57 Financial services 57 Other services

58 Production 58 Industry 58 Mining and semi-processing 60 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 63 Construction

63 The external sector 63 Merchandise trade 65 Invisibles and the current account 66 Capital flows and foreign debt 67 Foreign reserves and the exchange rate

68 Appendices 68 Regional organisations 73 Sources of information 75 Reference tables

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Côte d’Ivoire: Basic data 3

Côte d’Ivoire

Basic data

Land area 322,463 sq km

Population 14.7 million (UN estimate, mid-1996)

Main towns Population in ’000 (1990 national estimates)

Abidjan 2,500a Man-Danane 450 Bouaké 220 Yamoussoukro 120 Daloa 80

a 1991 estimate.

Climate Tropical

Weather in Abidjan Hottest months, February-April, 24-32°C (average daily minimum and (altitude 20 metres) maximum); coldest month, August, 22-28°C; driest month, January, 41 mm average rainfall; wettest month, June, 495 mm average rainfall

Languages French, Baoulé and other local languages

Measures Metric system

Currency CFA franc=100 centimes. CFAfr1:FFr0.01. Average exchange rate in 1995, CFAfr499.2:$1. Exchange rate in mid-October 1996, CFAfr521:$1

Time GMT

Public holidays January 1, May 1, November 1, December 7, 25, Easter Monday, Ascension Day, Whit Monday, Eid el Fitr, Tabaski

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 4 Côte d’Ivoire: Historical background

Political background

Historical background

A peaceful transition to Dense tropical forest, thinly populated, stretched inland from the Atlantic for independence hundreds of kilometres in pre-colonial times, making the territory of present- day Côte d’Ivoire inhospitable to the seaborne European traders active along the Guinean coast from the mid-17th century. The forest peoples lived in generally stateless communities, and there was little by way of European interest in the interior before the mid-19th century. The area of present-day northern Côte d’Ivoire, largely savannah, and Muslim, historically fell under the tutelage of the Guinean kingdoms which exerted periodic control over much of modern Mali, Guinea and Niger. French military penetration gathered pace after 1893 when the colony of Côte d’Ivoire was officially established, but local resistance to France’s rule did not die down until around 1914. It was with the building of a railway through Côte d’Ivoire into present-day Burkina Faso that the country’s rich agricultural and forestry resources came to be realised, and by the late 1940s Côte d’Ivoire had replaced Senegal as France’s richest colony in the region, accounting for almost half the export revenue of French West Africa.

The principal figures in pre-independence politics in the subregion were Léopold Sédar Senghor, the socialist leader and eventual president of Senegal, and his contemporary in Côte d’Ivoire, the sophisticated francophile Félix Houphouët-Boigny, a trained medical assistant and a successful cocoa farmer who led a farmers’ union. Mr Senghor favoured the creation of an independent French-speaking federation of West Africa, while Mr Houphouët-Boigny wanted Côte d’Ivoire to become fully independent, arguing that, under a federal system, it would end up subsidising the poorer states.

Mr Senghor boycotted the Bamako conference of 1946 which established the subregion’s leading pro-independence party, the Rassemblement démocratique africain (RDA), on the grounds that it would be dominated by communists. Instead, the conference elected the moderate left-of-centre Mr Houphouët- Boigny to lead the RDA. The Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), also sometimes known as the PDCI-RDA, which was to maintain close links with the RDA, had been formed six months earlier by Mr Houphouët-Boigny while he was a deputy in the Assemblée nationale (parliament) in Paris. Like Mr Senghor, Mr Houphouët-Boigny was to hold cabinet posts in a succession of post-war French governments, and he was instrumental in drawing up the Loi cadre of 1956 under which the West African colonies received a measure of internal self-government. The Loi cadre put an end to dreams of a French Union, which General Charles de Gaulle subsequently tried to replace with his idea of a French Community. Côte d’Ivoire became independent on August 7, 1960, with Mr Houphouët-Boigny as the president.

Emergence of the By making the most of his carefully cultivated personal relations with successive Houphouëtiste state French presidents and governments, as much as through skilful economic and political management, Mr Houphouët-Boigny (or le vieux, as he was known) was to dominate the country’s life for nearly four decades, until his death in

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December 1993. A benign and dignified father-figure but also an astute politi- cian, le vieux presided over Côte d’Ivoire’s emergence in the 1960s and 1970s as one of Africa’s most prosperous and well-managed states, although he was occasionally attacked for allowing France to perpetuate its influence.

He built up PDCI party structures which came to permeate all aspects of political and economic life, at national and local levels, and there was remarkably little dissent and a noteworthy degree of national contentment at a time when many of newly independent Africa’s bright hopes were being shattered by political upheaval and ethnic strife. A ruling coterie of Houphouët loyalists, the “PDCI barons”, emerged, who were predominantly francophile Roman Catholics and often, although by no means exclusively, from the president’s Baoulé community in central Côte d’Ivoire. The president endeavoured to ensure that none of the country’s 60 or so “micro” ethnic groups was seen to dominate, and remarkably little organised protest was along ethnic or religious lines.

An important factor for stability during the first two decades of independence was national prosperity resulting from Côte d’Ivoire’s success as an exporter of cocoa, coffee, timber and tropical fruits. The primary sector alone provided employment for approximately two adults in three during this period of steady economic growth, which also saw the emergence of small but vigorous industrial and services sectors. The number of French people working in the country, under aid programmes or in business, came to exceed the pre-independence level. High-rise office blocks transformed the Abidjan skyline, and expensive Parisian boutiques opened in the city’s more chic districts. Immigrants flocked to the country’s plantations from Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana and other countries, so that by the end of the 1980s they accounted for at least one-third, and possibly as much as 40%, of the total population.

The 1980s was a period of During the 1980s, however, with the commodity price boom over, oil hopes uncertainty disappointed and foreign debt mounting, the country that had been held up by the international development institutions as an African success story began to face serious economic and social problems. Mr Houphouët-Boigny was re- elected for his seventh consecutive five-year term in October 1990, polling 81.7% of votes, according to the official figures. The flamboyant leader of the populist Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), Laurent Gbagbo, was the only other presidential candidate.

As Mr Houphouët-Boigny became old and ill, the mood of opposition grew. In the late 1980s and early 1990s demonstrations, strikes, and student militancy were commonplace. When the PDCI won its customary landslide victory at the polls in November 1990, a majority of the electorate did not bother to vote. The opposition claimed vote-rigging and attempted to whip up public protest, chal- lenging the authorities in the streets and on the university campuses. Heavy- handed police and army tactics provoked outrage among the government’s opponents and, when the opposition attempted a large-scale protest march through Abidjan in February 1992, the authorities reacted with vigour. Professor Gbagbo and 11 other prominent opposition figures were gaoled under retro- active legislation rushed through parliament the day before, being freed on Mr Houphouët-Boigny’s orders six months later when the atmosphere had calmed. There were no serious public order challenges subsequently, although

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 6 Côte d’Ivoire: Historical background

student militancy continued to plague the government; the professor and most other opposition figures seemed to have lost the stomach for confrontation.

The shadow of To steer the country out of the economic crisis of the 1980s, the president Mr Ouattara recruited Alassane Dramane Ouattara, a gifted World Bank-schooled economist and former governor of the Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO, the Dakar-based regional central bank), as prime minister.

In the long twilight years of Mr Houphouët-Boigny, as the old man declined into illness and senility during the early 1990s, the party barons were closing ranks around Mr Ouattara’s arch-rival, Henri Konan Bédié, the president of the Assemblée nationale (parliament). Within hours of the president’s death in December 1993, Mr Konan Bédié went on national television to announce that he was the new head of state, invoking a constitutional provision transferring power to him as president of the assembly pending the presidential election scheduled for October 1995. The French president at the time, François Mitterrand, decisively accepted Mr Konan Bédié’s claim, Mr Ouattara resigned, and Mr Konan Bédié began consolidating his new power, moving his loyalists into key positions in the administration while sidelining Ouattara supporters. Follow- ing the 50% devaluation of the CFA franc in mid-January 1994, the Konan Bédié administration also began to reap the political benefits of an economic recovery which had largely been the achievement of the ousted Mr Ouattara. In September 1995 it looked inevitable that Mr Konan Bédié would win the coming election, Mr Ouattara having accepted a top post with the IMF as deputy managing director although he retains a significant domestic following.

The Konan Bédié era Mr Konan Bédié easily won the presidential election in October 1995, taking 95.2% of the 1.72 million votes cast. Mr Ouattara made things easy for the interim president by announcing that he would not stand, and the Rassemble- ment des républicains (RDR), which supports him, entered no other candidate. Professor Gbagbo refused to stand, claiming that the electoral process had been manipulated. The only opponent therefore for Mr Konan Bédié was Francis Wodié, the head of the small Parti ivoirien des travailleurs (PIT) and a law professor at Abidjan university. Under highly controversial legislation, only registered voters of “pure” Ivorian parentage were allowed to take part.

In December 1994 the Assemblée nationale had approved a draft electoral code which excluded non-Ivorians from the franchise and which barred those of mixed parentage, or anyone who had resided out of the country during the previous five years, from standing for the presidency. This was blatantly calcu- lated to exclude Mr Ouattara who, apart from the fact that his father had been a Burkinabè, was by this time resident in Washington. The presidential election period was marred by violence which may have laid bare some latent tensions in Ivorian society. In several parts of the country protesters defied a ban on demonstrations and rallies, and opposition supporters attacked members of the president’s Baoulé community.

Elections to the 175-seat assembly in late November 1995 proceeded smoothly, however, largely because the FPI and the RDR took part. The well-prepared PDCI again swept the board, winning 148 seats, compared with 11 for the FPI and 13 for the RDR.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Côte d’Ivoire: Constitution and institutions 7

Constitution and institutions

Côte d’Ivoire is a unitary state with a unicameral parliament, the Assemblée nationale, whose members, in common with the president of the republic, are elected by universal adult suffrage every five years. The president appoints a prime minister, who in turn appoints the cabinet. The constitution provides for a multiparty system, although this provision was not implemented until April 1990, the country having been under de facto one-party rule by the PDCI since independence in 1960. The legislative election of November 1990 saw the emergence of a small radical opposition in parliament, with the FPI winning nine seats and the PIT one seat.

The first contested The legal system is based on the Code Napoléon. Although Article VII of the elections were held in 1990 1960 independence constitution provided for the legalisation of political parties, none had been registered. Until the polls of 1990 all election candidates had been PDCI nominees. From May to August 1990, in opposition response to overwhelming domestic and international pressure for multipartisme, 25 opposition parties were registered, of which only two secured seats in November. Other liberalisation measures announced at the same time included the relax- ation of press censorship and the introduction of relative publishing freedoms. This led to a spate of new politically aligned newspapers and periodicals, some of which soon fell foul of libel laws.

Manipulation of arrangements for the succession by means of constitutional amendments had enabled Mr Houphouët-Boigny to keep rivals on their toes over the years. Until 1980 there had been a dauphin, Philippe Yacé, then president of the Assemblée nationale and PDCI secretary-general who, according to Article XI, would automatically have become head of state in the event of a vacancy. That year however, Mr Yacé was stripped of both posts and replaced by Mr Konan Bédié. By a further amendment, in November 1990, the constitution stipulated that, in the event of the president’s death, incapacity, or resignation, once confirmed by the Supreme Court, the president of the Assemblée nationale would become head of state and party leader, completing the current term.

Political forces

For three decades Mr Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI justified the one-party system by arguing that open competition among political parties would only emphasise ethnic, regional or religious tensions at a period when the priority was to unify a new country. His government faced small crises and challenges over the years: an alleged coup plot in 1963/64 (when over 100 people, including several ministers and PDCI political bureau members, were detained); an ineffective bid for secession by the Sanwi people of the Aboisso region (backed by the Nkrumah government in Ghana) in the early 1960s; a localised revolt by the Bété followers of Kragbé Gnagbé’s Parti nationaliste ivoirien in the Gagnoa region in 1970; and a military plot discovered in 1973. Violent campus agitation in 1991 led, not for the first time, to dissolution of the students’ union (Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire, Fesci). The president’s refusal to discipline the armed forces’ chief-of-staff, General Robert

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 8 Côte d’Ivoire: Political forces

Guéï, over army mistreatment of students prompted the opposition march through Abidjan in February 1992 which landed the opposition leaders in prison and marked the end of street-level confrontation politics. Mr Konan Bédié retired the general on the eve of the presidential election in 1995. No reason was given, but it was said that his error was to show reluctance to deploy the armed forces during the campaign.

Since assuming power, Mr Konan Bédié has been at pains, as was his predeces- sor, to placate the Muslim community, the largest single religious group, which includes large numbers of migrants from Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and elsewhere. Many in this community look to Mr Ouattara, a Muslim of partly Burkinabè extraction, as their political figurehead.

New leadership of the A reformist wing of the PDCI, the rénovateur tendency, split from the ruling opposition party during 1994 to form a new party, the Rassemblement des républicains (RDR), led by Djény Kobina. The new party initially claimed that 31 PDCI deputies were poised to join it. In the event, only nine did so, in December 1994. At about the same time, the FPI suffered two defections to the PDCI, leaving the new party as the main opposition group in the Assemblée nationale. The RDR thinks very highly of Mr Ouattara, whom it perceives as a reforming moderniser and its spiritual father. Mr Kobina and his friends had also hoped to take with them Mr Yacé, a rénovateur and chairman of the influential Conseil économique et social who was thought to have nursed presidential hopes, but he, like Mr Ouattara, appeared to be biding his time.

Main political figures

Emile-Constant Bombet: hardline interior minister. Laurent Dona-Fologo: minister of state for national solidarity and secretary-general for the Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI). Confidant of the late Felix Houphouët-Boigny. Guy-Alain Gauze: long-established commodities minister. Laurent Gbagbo: leader of the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI). Won 18% of the vote in the presidential election of 1990 and boycotted the exercise in 1995. Daniel Kablan Duncan: prime minister and minister of planning and industrial development. Enthusiastic supporter of the economic reform programme launched by Mr Ouattara in 1990. Djény Kobina: leader of the Rassemblement des républicains (RDR), which he launched with PDCI reformers in 1994. Also boycotted the presidential poll in 1995. Henri Konan Bédié: former president of the Assemblée nationale, who assumed the interim presidency of the republic and chairmanship of the ruling PDCI in December 1993. He was elected president, without serious competition, in October 1995. Alassane Dramane Ouattara: former prime minister who resigned in December 1993 and a deputy managing director of the IMF since May 1994. Almost a cult figure among the RDR rank-and-file, which pressed him, without success, to contest the presidential election in October 1995. He remains a leader-in-waiting, and is not to be ignored.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Côte d’Ivoire: International relations and defence 9

Many of the social troubles which marked the early 1990s arose from resentment over the Ouattara government’s IMF-inspired attempts to trim the huge public-sector salary bill. After the end of 1992, when Mr Ouattara announced that he was cancelling plans for salary cuts, public protests in the form of strikes, marches and student militancy lost much of their intensity. As the benefits of the devaluation in January 1994 filtered through, in a year in which commodity prices surged, many Ivorians began to feel that better times were in sight, and the authorities enjoyed a respite.

International relations and defence

Warm ties with France Côte d’Ivoire remained firmly within the Western camp throughout the cold war, Mr Houphouët-Boigny’s liberal attitude to foreign investment and pragmatic foreign policy being appreciated in Washington and Paris while incur- ring the suspicion of revolution-minded African regimes. French interests hold a large and growing share in the main sectors of the Ivorian economy. France maintains a permanent garrison, currently of 700 marine infantry, near the international airport in Port Bouet. French influence is expected to remain all-important under Mr Konan Bédié, although ministers with economic port- folios are courting potential investors in the Anglo-Saxon world. During his first official visit to Paris as president in July 1994, he was Mr Mitterrand’s guest of honour at the Bastille Day celebrations. He was also quick to congratulate Jacques Chirac on his victory in the French presidential election in May 1995. Despite a denial by the French defence minister, Charles Millon, in August 1996, there are suspicions that the French military presence in Africa will be trimmed on account of budgetary pressures.

During the long years when South Africa was ostracised internationally for its apartheid policy, Mr Houphouët-Boigny maintained a policy of “dialogue” with Pretoria, which had a trade office in Abidjan from late 1989. Côte d’Ivoire became the first African government to respond to political change in South Africa, opening full diplomatic relations from April 1992. The country did not, however, appear to derive any substantial benefits, economic or political, from the relationship.

The shadow of Nigeria Côte d’Ivoire has generally been perceived as a force for stability in West Africa. It has used the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS; see Regional organisations), the near-dormant Conseil de l’entente, and the Communauté économique de l’Afrique de l’ouest, to maintain its sphere of influence. It is often said that Côte d’Ivoire is preoccupied with the intentions of Nigeria in the subregion. Relations with Liberia, where Nigerian troops have had a prominent role in attempting to restore peace since 1989, have been a longstanding worry. While Abidjan insisted that it was not supporting any of the armed factions in Liberia, there was enduring suspicion that it was providing arms and sanctuary to the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, led by Charles Taylor. As many as 350,000 Liberian refugees were billeted in camps inside Ivorian territory towards the end of 1994, cared for by the UN and non- governmental organisations. By mid-1996 there were still, according to government sources, 305,000 Liberian refugees in the country. The government has

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 10 Côte d’Ivoire: Economic structure

declined to commit troops to the Nigerian-led ECOWAS Monitoring Group in Liberia. Interestingly, however, it did give its approval to the first joint US- Ivorian military exercises in July-August 1996 which, although small-scale, would have raised eyebrows in the French establishment.

Military forces, mid-1995

Army 6,800 Navy 900 Air force 700 Presidential guard 1,100 Gendarmerie 4,400 Total regular armed forces 13,900 Reserves 12,000 Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1995/96.

The economy

Economic structure

Main economic indicators, 1995

Real GDP growth (%) 7.0 Consumer price inflation (%) 14.2 Current-account balance ($ m) 13a Foreign debt ($ bn) 18.45a Average exchange rate (CFAfr:$1) 499.2 Population (million) 14.21

a 1994 data.

Source: EIU.

The Ivorian economy is dominated by agriculture, notably the production of cocoa, of which it is the world’s largest exporter, and coffee, of which it is Africa’s largest and the world’s seventh largest. World market prices for these two commodities therefore have a determining effect on the underlying health of the whole economy. Agriculture and forestry employ an estimated 81% of the labour force and account for more than 30% of GDP at market prices. Agriculture, fisheries and forestry provide all but one (ie petroleum products) of the six leading merchandise exports, with cocoa, coffee and timber alone sup- plying 50% of export revenue in 1995. In the early 1990s the share of the services sector in GDP rose steeply, with industry’s share stable at just under 20%. (Reference tables 4 and 5 show the breakdown of GDP by expenditure and by sector.)

Côte d’Ivoire’s rich domestic and export food crop lands, and its densest population concentration, lie along the south-eastern coastal strip, approximately 100 km deep. Here are the principal oil palm, coconut, pineapple, and banana plantations, as well as important rubber plantations. Further inland and to the

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west, occupying much of the country’s southern half, are the rich forest lands where most cocoa and coffee are grown, together with the domestic food staples such as rice, cassava, plantain, yams and maize. The northern half of the country—savannah land becoming Sahelian in character where it borders Mali and Burkina Faso—principally produces cotton, sugar, millet, sorghum, groundnuts and maize.

Recovery in a regional Côte d’Ivoire dominates the Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine context (UEMOA), which groups the seven members of the West African subregion of the Franc Zone, with Ivorian GDP accounting for 39% of the total in 1994. The UEMOA itself is smaller in GDP terms than Nigeria, although the overvaluation of the naira and, until the 50% devaluation of January 1994, of the CFA franc gives a false picture of the Nigerian and Ivorian economies in dollar terms. Both economies are themselves small in relation to South Africa, the economic power-house of sub-Saharan Africa which is now restored to the international community. Of all the 14 countries in the Franc Zone, the economy of Côte d’Ivoire has perhaps responded best to the devaluation; the reason partly lies in the preparations of the government for the currency adjustment and its awareness, unlike many in the zone (such as Cameroon and Gabon), that devaluation cannot have its desired effect without accompanying reform measures. In the medium-term Côte d’Ivoire is expected to enjoy strong growth, even in per head terms, and to narrow the gap with Nigeria. Two other points worth noting to place the country in a regional context are that, as a member of the zone, it has traditionally low inflation (1994 being the exception due to the devaluation), and that, resulting from the official policy of encouraging exports since independence, it has a relatively open economy, with foreign trade accounting for over 75% of GDP in 1994.

Comparative economic indicators, 1994

Côte South d’Ivoire Ghana Nigeria Africa UK GDP ($ bn) 7.5 5.3a 41.6b 121.6 1,022.1 GDP per head ($) 547 313a 432b 3,010 17,505 Consumer price inflation (%) 26.0 24.9 57.0 9.0 2.5 Current account ($ bn) 0.0 –0.3 –2.1 –0.6 –3.0 Merchandise exports fob ($ bn) 2.9 1.2 9.5 24.7 206.5 Merchandise imports fob ($ bn) 1.6 1.6 6.5 21.5 222.9 Foreign trade (% of GDP) 75.5 62.5a 42.4 45.7 53.7

a EIU estimate. b Using the official rate of N22:$1.

Source: EIU.

Economic policy

Overall government economic policy in recent years, backed by the World Bank, the IMF and bilateral donors, principally France, is aimed at: strengthening public finances in order to permit the settlement of domestic arrears and allow for significant public investment; bringing the huge salary bill under control; large-scale privatisation of state-owned utilities, with foreign

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participation encouraged; reform and diversification of the agricultural sector; and encouragement of Ivorian enterprises. Some of these traditional components of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) were adopted as early as 1981 but the government showed renewed enthusiasm for reform following the appointment of Alassane Dramane Ouattara as prime minister in November 1990. Daniel Kablan Duncan, who replaced Mr Ouattara as premier in December 1993, has maintained this reforming momentum.

Salary cuts without A major constraint on economic recovery between 1990 and 1993 was the confrontation government’s difficulty in implementing some of the cost-cutting measures it had agreed with the World Bank and the IMF. Essentially, the problem was political. The 110,000-strong civil service, whose salary bill absorbed more than 60% of the non-interest recurrent budget in 1993, was the main target for cuts, but was protected by trade unions with close links to the emergent opposition. Strikes and street demonstrations forced the government to back down.

The 50% devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994 had the effect of reducing public servants’ salaries in real terms without confrontation with the trade unions. As part of a range of compensatory measures backed at the time by the IMF, the World Bank and France, the government put up the salaries of state employees by 5-15%. In April 1996 the government said that it would conduct a census of the 105,000-strong public payroll to root out fraudulent claims, and argued that salaries should absorb no more than 50% of the public- sector budget. It hopes to raise the level of investment in public services.

The heavy burden of the The government’s deficit on a commitments basis in 1994, of CFAfr301bn interest bill ($540m), was only marginally lower in CFA franc terms than it had been four years earlier. The weight of the foreign debt remains onerous. Public finances therefore look more healthy when analysis revolves around the primary deficit (which excludes interest payments and some items of expenditure); by this measure there was a small deficit in 1993 and a substantial surplus of CFAfr218bn in 1994. Mr Kablan Duncan has estimated the surplus, on the same basis, at CFAfr161bn in 1995. (Reference table 1 shows the trend in the public finances, while Reference table 2 gives monetary and credit data.)

A devaluation boost for Government revenue in 1994 was well ahead of the budget target of revenue CFAfr840bn, reaching CFAfr873bn. The devaluation had an automatic impact on taxes levied on foreign trade. Revenue collection has since benefited from the gathering momentum of economic recovery after the seven-year recession up to 1993.

For 1995 the government projected recurrent and capital expenditure of CFAfr560bn and CFAfr260bn respectively. In its 1996 budget the government altered its presentation, notably by including principal repayments on debt in expenditure. The result was a target of CFAfr1.75trn for total expenditure. The significant figure was the projection of CFA356bn for capital expenditure. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in 1995 and 1996 the government has been able to boost investment spending in real terms; it would thus appear to have met one of the objectives of the devaluation, to boost capital spending at the expense of recurrent spending (principally salaries).

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Government finances, 1994 (CFAfr bn) Total revenue 872.5 Total expenditure –1,173.0 Recurrent 976.9 Capital 196.1 Balance (commitments basis) –300.5 Source: Le Comité Monétaire de la zone franc, La Zone Franc, rapport annuel.

Economic performance

A seven-year recession A deep economic malaise set in after 1981 and, apart from a brief respite in 1985-86, did not begin to ease until 1994. Its causes included a dramatic ad- verse shift in the country’s terms of trade in the early 1980s and the high cost of servicing the debt incurred to finance ambitious investment projects launched during the boom years of the late 1970s. Efforts in the 1980s to arrest the decline with the familiar range of reforms backed by the World Bank and the IMF were not always strenuous. (Reference table 3 shows the trend of GDP.)

In December 1991 Mr Ouattara announced a four-year development programme, insisting that the country was at last moving out of recession and that real growth in GDP of 5% could be expected by 1995. However, the government was forced to admit that, despite its efforts, foreign participation in the economy had been declining. Mr Ouattara set great store by his privatisation programme, under which he promised to sell off the state’s equity in two-thirds of 140 public companies. His sale of majority holdings in new operating companies for the electricity and water industries to subsidiaries of a French conglomerate, Bouygues, in 1990 aroused some public disquiet. The policy was attacked by Mr Konan Bédié, then president of the Assemblée nationale, but Mr Houphouët-Boigny backed Mr Ouattara. This intervention ensured the sur- vival of the programme, which began to yield benefits in 1994 and 1995 as investors’ confidence returned.

Gross domestic product (% real change; market prices) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 –1.5 –0.4 0.0 –1.1 1.8 7.0a

a Provisional.

Source: Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO), Statistiques économiques et monétaires.

The pivotal role of The economy’s sensitivity to commodity price changes was illustrated in an commodity prices African Development Bank report in 1993 which noted that in 1986-91, when the economy steadily contracted, the average prices obtained by the state marketing board (Caisse de stabilisation des prix des produits agricoles, Caistab) fell by 72% for coffee and 59% for cocoa. Other causes of recession, the report said, were the overvaluation of the CFA franc, which was tied to the French franc at the same rate for 46 years until the devaluation, and an exces- sive debt-service burden. It was fortunate for Côte d’Ivoire that the devaluation was followed in mid-1994 by a boom in coffee prices and a healthy rise in the world cocoa price. The higher world prices, which the government tracked

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 14 Côte d’Ivoire: Economic performance

through a series of rises in the producer prices (at the same time as introducing its export levies), boosted farm incomes, a key element in personal consumption, and export revenue, after several years of slack demand and low incentives, when plantations became run down.

Average world commodity prices (cents/lb) 1994 1995 1996 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr Cocoaa 69.4 64.8 67.5 66.0 63.1 63.6 61.0 61.4 Coffeeb 169.8 150.7 137.4 138.2 121.7 105.5 91.6 92.6

a ICCO daily indicator. b ICO Robusta indicator.

Source: EIU, World Commodity Forecasts.

Donor endorsement of The government has not seen the devaluation in isolation in its drive for reforms economic reforms. It has revamped its investment code, pursued its privatisation programme and secured a good response from French investors, and made its mining legislation more attractive for business. These are all efforts to restore confidence. The IMF showed its own support for devaluation in the form of a SDR333m ($480m) Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) approved in March 1994. The Fund approved the release of the third annual loan under the ESAF in June 1996, signalling its satisfaction with post- devaluation recovery. At the time of the currency adjustment, France announced a programme of debt cancellation for Côte d’Ivoire and other members of the Franc Zone (see Capital flows and the foreign debt). Donors and investors alike have been encouraged by a much-improved flow of information on the economy from Mr Kablan Duncan and his ministers, both in briefings to the press in Abidjan and in their promotion of Côte d’Ivoire abroad.

A rapidly strengthening The government’s efforts have brought early successes. A confident Mr Kablan recovery Duncan told the Assemblée nationale in February 1996 that he was aiming to achieve double-digit real GDP growth from 1998, and to lead Côte d’Ivoire into the ranks of newly industrialising countries (NICs) early in the new millen- nium. From negative growth in 1993, the economy expanded by 7% in real terms in 1995, and the IMF expects growth of at least 6% in both 1996 and 1997. This offers the prospect of marked increases in GDP per head. According to the prime minister, investment’s share of GDP has risen from 7.8% in 1993 to 11% in 1994 and 12.7% in 1995. His figures do not always tally with other sources (particularly for data before the devaluation) but some clear trends have emerged. Exports and private investment, notably in the energy and mining sectors, are leading the recovery. Manufacturing employment is rising (by an estimated 10% in 1995), industry is re-equipping after many years of stagnation (imports of capital equipment rose in volume by 20% in 1994 and 46% in 1995), Côte d’Ivoire is developing a competitive tourism sector and public finances are stronger. Net foreign assets have been transformed from a negative balance of CFAfr573bn in December 1993 to a small positive balance of CFAfr33bn in June 1995.

A tradition of low Membership of the Franc Zone has helped to contain inflationary pressures, inflation partly through mechanisms to contain budget deficits and partly through the

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Côte d’Ivoire: Regional trends 15

creeping overvaluation of the CFA franc. Average annual inflation of less than 5% had been the norm in Côte d’Ivoire before 1994, when the devaluation forced up the rate to 26% in that year. The government’s target of 35%, set in conjunction with the IMF, was therefore comfortably met. In 1995 the rate decreased to 14.3%, and recent monthly changes indicate a return to pre- devaluation levels. The government’s firmness on public-sector wages, the strength of the French (and thus the CFA) franc against the dollar, and good harvests have helped, in addition to the discipline required of Franc Zone membership. The year-on-year rate of inflation for skilled workers in Abidjan rose from 1.8% to 2% in July 1996. (The trend of consumer price inflation is shown in Reference table 6.)

Consumer price inflation (% real change; period averages; 1990=100) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1.7 4.2 2.2 26.0 14.3 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Regional trends

Côte d’Ivoire’s 34 administrative départements are subdivided into 163 sub- prefectures, based on the French model. Since 1983 the capital has been Yamoussoukro, the village of Mr Houphouët-Boigny’s birth, in the central part of the country. It was developed by him as a quieter, smarter alternative to Abidjan, with several prestigious buildings including the basilica of Nôtre dame de la paîx, one of the largest edifices in Christendom built at an estimated cost of $250m (although the true figure was not officially revealed). Abidjan remains the focus of most economic and political life, however. The other main provin- cial centres are San Pedro, the country’s second major port, Bouaké, Korhogo, Man, and Daloa. Administration is highly centralised, and there are no reliable data on economic development, government expenditure or GDP within Côte d’Ivoire.

Resources

Population

UN Population Fund (UNFPA) estimates for 1996 put the total population of Côte d’Ivoire at 14.7 million and project a total of 36.8 million in 2025, with an average growth rate of 3.2% in 1995-2000. For the same period, it forecasts average annual growth of 4.7% in the population of towns, where, it estimates, 44% of all Ivorians now live. Average life expectancy at birth is 48.6 years for men and 50.5 years for women. Some 83% of the population is said to enjoy access to safe drinking water in 1996, compared with 70% in 1994, and some 60% of the total have access to basic healthcare. The country ranked 147th out of 174 countries in the UN Development Programme (UNDP)’s Human Development Index for 1996, which seeks to measure national incomes with an allowance for the quality of life.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 16 Côte d’Ivoire: Education

A large immigrant It is estimated that 35-40% of the total population consists of first-generation population immigrants, chiefly of Burkinabè, Malian, Guinean and Ghanaian origin. The electoral code introduced at the end of 1994 deprives non-Ivorians of the vote and of the right to stand for the presidency (see Constitution and institutions). One consequence of the new code’s introduction has been to intensify public resentment against immigrants, a community which had enjoyed a degree of tolerance under Mr Houphouët-Boigny, who allowed them to vote in national and local elections. Africans from surrounding states began arriving in large numbers during the boom years of the 1970s, principally as seasonal workers in plantations, but large numbers subsequently settled in towns. As of mid-1996, over 300,000 Liberian refugees were still being housed in camps along the western border.

Education

A system under acute After the collapse of the economic boom in the early 1980s, discontent among strain the country’s 50,000 tertiary-level students repeatedly spilled over from the three university campuses—two in Abidjan and the other in Bouaké 290 km to the north—onto the streets and into the secondary and even the primary schools. Underfunding, which the 1995 budget provisions for education were a first attempt to redress, has been a major problem. Many student grievances turn on the authorities’ failure to pay grants on schedule, and the poor standard of accommodation and facilities. The population explosion has also damaged the quality of education, overwhelming school, college and university facilities. Classes of over 100 have become commonplace in Abidjan schools. Teachers and students have been on strike frequently since the early 1980s, clashing with police and, on occasion, the army, and the universities and some large urban schools have been closed for long periods. Resentment was also fuelled by Mr Ouattara’s moves in 1992 and 1993 to end the long-established right of all university graduates to a post in the public sector. Schools and university campuses appeared relatively calm in the 1995/96 academic year.

Results in the French-type baccalauréat examination have deteriorated steadily in recent years. From a 30% failure rate in 1969, in 1975 three-quarters of students failed and in 1994 the failure rate touched 86%, with fewer than 8,000 of the 60,000 candidates reaching matriculation standard. At the lower level, the brevet d’études du premier cycle (roughly equivalent to GCSE “O” level in the UK, or the US high school diploma), the failure rate was over 92% in 1994; just over 7,000 of the 91,000 candidates managed a pass, the worst results since independence in 1960. The failure rate was 42% in 1962 and 73% in 1993.

Health

Healthcare provision is inadequate, and few Ivorians are able to afford the CFAfr20,000 ($40) payment to get a hospital bed, or the CFAfr10,000 daily cost of a hospital stay, which does not include medicines or treatment. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) estimated the population per doctor in 1991 at 11,111, while there was one nurse to every 3,226 people. Public expenditure on health amounted to 1.7% of GDP in 1990. The health sector has repeatedly

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been hit by strikes by doctors and paramedical staff since the mid-1980s, with Abidjan’s three teaching hospitals, and other centres, being closed down for periods of up to 48 hours on occasion, as staff demanded payment of overdue salaries.

The heavy toll of AIDS Côte d’Ivoire is believed to have the highest number of AIDS cases per head in West Africa, slightly under 19,000 having been confirmed between 1985 and early 1995. HIV infection is said to afflict 12-14% of the population, with the level among prostitutes reported to be 86%, and is on the increase. A recent survey by the national anti-AIDS programme indicates that two-thirds of sexu- ally active Ivorians under the age of 24 do not use condoms. Of the 4,000 patients accommodated at the infectious diseases hospital in Abidjan, 80% were said, as of late 1994, to be in the final stages of AIDS. The country has no other provision for such patients. Officially recorded cases of tuberculosis (TB) have been increasing by approximately 10% per year since AIDS first appeared in Côte d’Ivoire in 1986, and about one-third of all TB cases are reported to be HIV-positive. Around 21,000 cases of TB were thought to exist in late 1994.

Economic infrastructure

Transport and communications

Utilities are sold off A 1,146-km railway links Abidjan with Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, of which 625 km are in Côte d’Ivoire. The Société ivoirienne des chemins de fer (SICF) managed the Ivorian section after the joint company was split up in 1989. The number of passengers on the line, the only railway in Côte d’Ivoire, fell from 3 million in 1988 to 760,000 in 1993, due in part to the poor condition of the rolling stock. There was a corresponding drop in the tonnage of freight carried, from 800,000 tons in 1980 to 260,000 tons in 1993. A French-led consortium, Sitarail, took over management of the line in December 1994 following privatisation, and made all but 1,800 of the 3,100 employees of the former joint- owned parastatal redundant. In May 1995 Sitarail secured CFAfr32bn in investment financing from a consortium including the World Bank group, the European Investment Bank and the Caisse française de développement (CFD, the French state development bank). The fall in railway traffic has increased the burden on the network of 50,000 km of classified roads, of which about 6,000 km are primary roads and 7,000 km secondary roads.

Plans were announced at the end of 1995 to sell off the run-down national shipping line, the Société ivoirienne des transports (Sitram). The line had recorded losses totalling CFAfr13.2bn since 1992 and had debts of CFAfr44bn, of which CFAfr18bn were short term. Government liberalisation had cost Sitram its monopoly over 40% of all Ivorian sea freight, and its fleet had dwindled from ten ships in 1980 to two in 1995.

A busy regional port The port of Abidjan is the busiest in francophone West Africa. Petroleum and related products accounted for 40% of its tonnage handled in 1994 and 32% in the first half of 1995. It also attracts useful business from its landlocked

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 18 Côte d’Ivoire: Energy provision

neighbours. Goods transshipped to and from Burkina Faso and Mali accounted for 2.2% and 1.8% of total tonnage handled in the port of Abidjan respectively in 1994. Côte d’Ivoire’s second port is San Pedro, which handles small volumes of timber and cocoa. (Reference table 7 shows traffic handled by Abidjan port.)

Energy provision

The prospect of an Côte d’Ivoire has been a substantial importer of energy since domestic oil improved balance production, begun in 1980 amid high hopes, tailed off and ceased completely in 1993. Imports of crude oil and petroleum products totalled CFAfr130bn ($460m) in 1993 and CFAfr204bn in 1994. Oil and gas hopes rekindled in 1994 when a consortium led by the US-based United Meridian Corporation (UMC) signed a production-sharing agreement with the government enabling development to commence in a 9,100-km area offshore close to the Ghanaian border, where oil reserves are estimated at 30bn cu metres. Development of the Lion and Panthère fields is being carried out by a joint venture of UMC-Côte d’Ivoire, the Société nationale d’opérations pétrolières de Côte d’Ivoire (Petroci, the state oil company), Global Natural Resources and Pluspetrol of Argentina, with the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) a small equity participant and financial adviser. Ivorian oil production, from the Lion field, resumed at 10,000 barrels/day (b/d) in April 1995 and was reported to have reached 20,000 b/d by the end of the year. Together with exploitation of the existing Bélier oilfield, these fields are expected to make the country self- sufficient in oil in 1997. Promising new offshore finds were announced by the mines and petroleum resources minister, Lamine Fadika, in November 1995, and described by him as the most important yet in the country. (Reference tables 8 and 9 show national data for the consumption of petroleum products, and the production and consumption of electricity.)

Energy balance, 1995 (m tons oil equivalent) Elec- Oil Gas Coal tricity Other Total Primary production 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.30a 2.80 3.60 Imports 2.70 0.00 0.00 0.02a 0.00 2.72 Exports 1.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.50 Primary supply 1.70 0.00 0.00 0.32a 2.80 4.82 Net transformationb 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.69 Final consumption 1.20 0.00 0.00 0.16c 2.77 4.13

a Expressed as input equivalents on an assumed generating efficiency of 33%. b Transformation input and output, plus energy industry fuel and losses. c Output basis.

Source: Energy Data Associates.

More than 40% of electrical energy in recent years has been generated from thermal sources, a consequence of official policy since a drought in 1983-84. Most of the balance has been imported from the Akosombo power station in Ghana. Under its joint venture with UMC, the government commenced purchases in late 1995 of natural gas from the offshore Lion and Panthère fields to supply a new gas-fired electric power generation plant, Vridi II, near Abidjan.

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The plant was built under a CFAfr57bn contract signed in 1994 with the Compagnie ivoirienne de production d’électricité (Ciprel), owned by the French conglomerate Bouygues (65%) and Electricité de France (35%). Addi- tional financing for the plant was provided by the CFD, the World Bank group and the Lomé-based Banque ouest-africaine de développement (BOAD). The initial output from Vridi was expected to meet 45% of the country’s electricity requirement. When the plant’s three new turbines are operational, due by the end of 1996, capacity is projected to reach nearly 7,200 gwh, of which 400 gwh, rising to 600 gwh, are scheduled for export to the region.

Financial services

The Dakar-based Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO) is the regional central bank for the seven West African members of the Franc Zone: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. The African Development Bank has its headquarters in Abidjan. Côte d’Ivoire has 12 commercial banks in operation, the largest of which are the Société générale de banques en Côte d’Ivoire, the Banque internationale pour le commerce et l’industrie de la Côte d’Ivoire and the Société ivoirienne de banque. A further three commercial banks have representative offices in Abidjan.

Overliquidity in the By mid-1989 the banking system was in acute difficulties, for which the banking system mounting level of bad debt, caused in part by loans to cocoa exporters, was largely responsible. There was also a sharp decrease in banking business during the long recession. Four public-sector banks have closed in recent years. The repatriation of capital following the devaluation in January 1994 was on a far larger scale than expected; the transformation of net foreign assets is reflected in a sharp increase in the time and demand deposits held by commercial banks, from CFAfr550bn at the end of 1993 to CFAfr976bn two years later. A combination of liquidity in the banking system and a steady fall in interest rates was expected to encourage bank lending, but this did not materialise. Domestic credit rose by just 6% in 1994, and a further 12% in 1995. Abidjan bankers tend to complain that they receive few sound lending proposals.

Plan for a West African A stock exchange, the Bourse des valeurs d’Abidjan (BVA), has been in oper- stock exchange ation since 1976. At the end of 1995 there were 31 listed companies. Market capitalisation (excluding fixed-income stock) rose in 1995 from CFAfr224bn to CFAfr400bn, and to CFAfr451bn at the end of March 1996. Food industry stocks accounted for 46% of the total, and the financial sector a further 12%. Trading levels remain modest, however. The government is said to have earned CFAfr32bn from privatisation in 1995 although not all these funds were raised through flotation on the BVA. It hopes to sell its stake in a further 40 companies in 1996-97. In March 1995 it was announced that the BVA was to be transformed into a stock exchange for the subregion, serving the seven countries of the UEMOA. Côte d’Ivoire is the only member of the union whose divestiture programme is substantially under way, and the BVA is expected to become a catalyst for privatisation programmes, as part of wider economic reform in the subregion.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 20 Côte d’Ivoire: Other services

Other services

A boost for the tourism There was steady growth in the number of tourists visiting the country in industry 1990-95, and the government has ambitious plans to develop the industry into a major source of foreign exchange. Devaluation provided an important entice- ment to European sun-seekers, and “Sun, Sea and CFA” became a slogan of travel agents. In 1990 approximately 190,000 foreign visitors came to Côte d’Ivoire, of whom roughly one-quarter were French. In 1992 the government unveiled a programme to boost the figure to 400,000 in 1995, and thus create around 1,000 new jobs in an industry that already employed 10,000 people. However, arrivals had risen to 262,000 in 1993 and the target seems to have been overambitious. There are two Club Méditerranée sites and two other beach holiday villages, with more planned. The first charter arrivals touched down in September 1994. Aside from beaches and casinos, the attractions include “green” tourism centred on the remaining primeval forests.

Production

Industry

Industry accounted for 20% of GDP in 1994. The principal subsectors are food and drinks, tobacco, textiles and leather goods, chemicals, petroleum products, timber processing, construction materials, and electricity and water. The sector was one of the most dynamic in Côte d’Ivoire’s fast-growing economy until the mid-1980s. Manufacturing output increased by an average 8.9% per year in real terms between 1965 and 1974, and by 5% per year between 1973 and 1984. Initially, policy was to satisfy the needs of the internal market. In the 1960s generous investment terms, coupled with customs protection, encouraged foreign, particularly French, concerns to establish import-substitution industries. The 1970s then witnessed a rapid growth of state participation in manufacturing, notably the processing of agricultural raw materials such as cocoa and cotton, and the orientation of industry towards the export market.

Index of industrial production (% change; seasonally adjusted; 1984/85=100) 1993 1994 1995 3.3 2.1 10.3 Source: Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO), Statistiques économiques et monétaires.

Devaluation has given industrial production a small initial boost although the index in 1994 was still lower than the base of 1984/85. The second quarter of 1995 saw a sharp rise in the index, partly explained by the start of oil production. The currency adjustment has led to a slow shift in consumption patterns towards local produce, and to a shake-out in the industrial sector, as companies heavily dependent on imported components struggle in competition with those which process domestic raw materials. The subsectors showing the fastest year-on-year growth in real output in the first quarter of 1996 were petroleum and mining, chemicals, construction materials and agro-industry.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Côte d’Ivoire: Mining 21

The shake-out will be painful but the interest of foreign, mainly French, business in the privatisation programme suggests that manufacturing in Côte d’Ivoire, which serves as a base of operations for the Sahelian countries of the Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA), has attractions. The government is looking to enhance investment incentives. The prime minister reported in February 1996 that CFAfr518bn had been pledged for private-sector investment in industry in 1996-2000. The principal constraints on development, and on the quest for newly industrialising country (NIC) status, are the reluctance of commercial banks to lend to small businesses and the lack of an educated workforce. (Reference table 10 shows the trend of the index of industrial production.)

Mining

Nickel and gold are the main non-fuel minerals of interest. There are also substantial, but mostly unworked, iron ore and bauxite reserves estimated at 1.5bn tons and 1.2bn tons respectively, and also manganese, estimated at 35m tons. Mining has hitherto been marginal to the economy, the main interest having been in diamond mining at Tortiya and Séguéla. The state- owned Société pour le développement minier de Côte d’Ivoire (Sodemi) and Coframines of France have a joint company, the Société des mines d’Ity, which exploits the 1.98m tons of gold-bearing rock, with an average grade of 7grams/ton (g/t), at Ity, in the west of the country, where mining began in January 1991. A second gold mine, at Aniuri, is owned 32% by Sodemi and 68% by Eden Roc of Canada. This joint venture reported in 1993 that it was extracting 4 g/t-gold ore from the mine at a daily rate of about 1,000 tons. National output exceeded 1,800 kg of gold in 1994.

Following successful tests in 1994 indicating the presence of 54m tons of nickel ore grading 2% nickel and 0.07% cobalt, the Canadian company, Falconbridge, announced plans to invest $500m over five years. Côte d’Ivoire’s nickel deposits, principally at Sipilou and Gounguessou 500 km north-west of Abidjan, have been known about since the early 1970s, but were left unexploited due to low world prices.

A new mining code introduced in 1995 aims to make mining and energy “the second pillar of the economy”. It aims, inter alia, to speed up the processing of permit applications, improve guarantees for producers and allow operators to prospect for all minerals rather than stipulating specific minerals.

Mining production

1993 1994 % change Crushed granite (’000 cu metres) 94.2 142.2 51.0 Gold (kg) 1,714.9 1,859.5 8.4 Diamonds (’000 carats) 98.4 84.3 –14.3 Source: Institut national de la statistique, Bulletin trimestriel.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 22 Côte d’Ivoire: Agriculture and forestry

Agriculture and forestry

Agriculture accounts for 31% of GDP at market prices and employs an estimated 80% of the labour force. Agriculture and forestry dominate merchandise export earnings. The principal food crops are cassava, yams, sweet potatoes, maize, millet, sorghum, rice and plantains. The main cash crops are coffee, of which Côte d’Ivoire is currently Africa’s largest and the world’s seventh largest producer, and cocoa, of which it became the world’s largest producer in 1977/78, surpassing Brazil and Ghana. Together these two commodities account for 60% of the area under cultivation, 40% of merchandise export earnings, and an estimated 70% of agricultural cash earnings. Forestry resources have become seriously depleted, but timber and products became the second Ivorian export (ahead of coffee) in 1994, due to the enhanced competitive position Côte d’Ivoire has enjoyed vis-à-vis South-east Asian producers since the devaluation of the CFA franc. Additional export revenue is earned from cotton, canned fish, palm oil, rubber, bananas and sugar.

Leading cocoa producersa (’000 tons) 1993/94 1994/95 Côte d’Ivoire 884 850 Ghana 255 309 Indonesia 260 240 Brazil 270 208 Nigeria 135 143 Malaysia 205 120 Total incl others 2,443 2,309

a Crop years starting October 1.

Source: International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO).

The reform of Caistab The main agricultural producer prices are set by the Caisse de stabilisation des prix des produits agricoles (Caistab), the commodities marketing board which had an unofficial remit from the former president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, once a cocoa farmer, to defend the living standards of Ivorian planters. The World Bank and its allies pressed for a long time, with ultimate success, for producer price liberalisation in Côte d’Ivoire. Their more convincing arguments were that Caistab was unable to prevent rural impoverishment in years of low prices such as 1987 and 1993; that it could not ensure that the guaranteed prices were actually paid to farmers by the buyers; and that government interference in pricing did not help the industry. There are legitimate fears that liberalisation will lead to a sharp deterioration in quality, as has happened in Cameroon and Nigeria.

An agreement on Caistab’s future role was incorporated in a $150m adjustment credit for the agricultural sector approved by the Bank in July 1995. Producer prices continue to be set at the start of each season but now serve as no more than guidelines. In theory exporters negotiate directly with planters and their organisations, helped by a computer link, but in practice the use of inter- mediaries remains prevalent.

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A record cocoa crop For two seasons, 1986/87 and 1987/88, the government struggled to maintain an artificially high cocoa price of CFAfr400/kg. The cost in terms of official subsidies to Caistab and in bad debts in the banking system was enormous. Belatedly, the price was slashed in the 1988/89 season. It was raised again, following devaluation and in response to rising world demand, to CFAfr240/kg and subsequently to CFAfr315/kg. The government was perhaps not more generous to farmers because of the threat to the industry from the increasing use of cocoa substitutes, especially among European chocolate manufacturers. Prices paid to coffee producers, by contrast, have undergone a radical change during the 1990s. At devaluation the price was raised from CFAfr75/kg to CFAfr220/kg, and has since been increased three times, finally to CFAfr650/kg in February 1995. The 1995/96 cocoa crop (October-September, mid-season and main harvests combined) was a record; the latest industry estimate is 1m tons. Experts attributed the rapid growth to good weather rather than improved farming methods. For coffee, the crop for the same season has been estimated at 160,000 tons. (Reference table 11 shows the principal agricultural producer prices.)

A plethora of Cocoa and coffee plantations suffered in the late 1980s and early 1990s from a opportunities lack of investment as farmers saw little incentive in improving their crop quality. Agronomists claim that Ivorian cocoa yields could comfortably be increased by over 30% through better use of insecticides and fertilisers. Cocoa and coffee are Côte d’Ivoire’s agricultural export staples but the government has identified clear opportunities for other crops. Franc Zone cotton is much in demand for its quality, and Côte d’Ivoire is the zone’s third largest producer after Mali and Benin. The government hopes to raise production from its recent average of 250,000 tons/year (t/y) to 300,000 t/y.

Rubber is one of the few crops in which Côte d’Ivoire achieves smallholder yields better than those in Asia. In February 1995, in line with its privatisation policy, the government sold 60% of the Société des caoutchoucs de Grand- Béréby (SOGB) to a Belgian-dominated consortium, retaining 20% of the shares itself. In June 1994 it had sold its 45.3% holding in the second largest rubber producer, the Société africaine de plantation d’hévéas (SAPH). A third plantation, the 2,000-ha Domaine hévéicole de Cavally, was sold to the UK-based Commonwealth Development Corporation in March 1996. The government intends to invest up to CFAfr150bn in rice growing between 1995 and 2005, and there are plans to increase the area under permanent cultivation from 22,000 ha to 78,000 ha, and the area under non-irrigated seasonal cultivation from 194,000 ha to 776,000 ha in the same period. Production and imports of white rice in 1995 were 536,000 tons and 398,000 tons respectively. The government has pledged to liberalise rice imports from January 1997, while retaining taxes to encourage domestic output. (Reference table 12 shows the commercial production of the main cash crops.)

Since 1980 industrial fishing has been transformed, with large trawlers pro- gressively replaced by smaller boats. Total fish production amounts to 80,000- 100,000 t/y, representing about 40% of domestic consumption. Industrial fishing accounts for up to 60,000 t/y, with the balance consisting of traditional fishing, which is dominated by Ghanaians. The agriculture ministry estimates

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that consumption, now about 250,000 t/y, could reach 400,000 t/y by 2000. Since fish and related products were the third largest import in the first half of 1995, there is clearly scope for trimming the import bill.

The external sector

Merchandise trade

Côte d’Ivoire traditionally enjoys a comfortable trade surplus, the extent of which is heavily influenced by prices for cocoa and coffee. Agricultural commodities, processed and unprocessed, dominate other exports. Devaluation has given a boost to the timber industry, in exports of logs and sawn wood, although the country’s commercial forestry resources are not far from extinction. Other exports that have responded particularly well to the currency adjustment include canned fish (up 52% in CFA franc terms in 1995), natural rubber (up 44%) and bananas (23%). Figures from the Institut national de la statistique (INS) in Abidjan (customs basis) show total exports of CFAfr1.86trn in 1995, compared with CFAfr1.57trn the previous year. This represents a 32% increase in dollar terms. The classic argument that devaluation boosts exports cannot be tested on the first year’s figures, since agricultural planting and investment intentions are not immediately transformed into production and exports. However, the trend in 1995 suggests that the argument holds water.

Foreign trade, 1995 % of % of Exports CFAfr bn total Importsa CFAfr bn total Cocoa & products 552 29.6 Petroleum products 90 12.9 Sawn timber & products 203 10.9 Machinery & equipment 52 7.5 Coffee & products 199 10.7 Vehicles 38 5.5 Petroleum products 183 9.8 Pharmaceuticals 32 4.6 Canned fish 97 5.2 Fish 30 4.4 Raw cotton 69 3.7 Electrical equipment 24 3.5 Natural rubber 55 2.9 Total incl others 699 100.0 Bananas 40 2.2 Unrefined palm oil 39 2.1 Pineapples 22 1.2 Total incl others 1,864 100.0

a January-June.

Source: Institut national de la statistique, Bulletin trimestriel.

A comfortable trade The same INS customs data show total imports (cif) in 1995 of CFAfr1.47trn, surplus compared with CFAfr1.06trn in 1994. In dollar terms this represents a 55% increase from $1.9bn to $2.95bn. On a customs basis, therefore, the trade surplus narrowed from $924m to $789m. The strong growth in imports in 1995 was largely due to much-needed restocking and rehabilitation by the industrial sector. (Reference tables 13 and 14 show principal exports and imports.)

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Côte d’Ivoire: Invisibles and the current account 25

Another argument for devaluation was that consumers would favour domestic products, or at least those from within the zone. This should mean, the theory continues, Ivorian purchases of cattle from Mali rather than Argentina, and a new market for Ivorian light manufactures in the poorer countries of the zone with very modest industrial sectors. The theory cannot be properly tested because there are no reliable detailed data for the direction of trade, although the INS reported a 15% rise in Ivorian exports in 1995 to the UEMOA to CFAfr198bn, which represented 11% of the total. Those from the IMF cover 1995 but are not very revealing, being drawn from trading partners; they show that France and other European countries are the main markets for Ivorian exports, while more than 50% of imports were sourced in France and Nigeria. Imports from Nigeria were presumably dominated by petroleum and related products. (Reference table 15 shows the principal trading partners.)

Invisibles and the current account

Up to and including 1993, the years since 1985 brought substantial deficits on the current account as the surplus on trade narrowed and, less significantly, the deficits on invisibles and transfers rose in a climate of disinvestment. Transport and the small but growing tourism industry account for the greater part of services and income inflows, which have recently been dwarfed by interest payments, international investment and other outflows. In 1994, however, the first current-account surplus since 1985, albeit of just $13m, was recorded, due to much-reduced imports of goods and services. The fall in income debits in 1994 appears to have been caused by the Paris Club rescheduling of March 1994. (Reference table 16 shows the IMF balance-of-payments data.)

The benefits of Transfers are the other component of the current account. Côte d’Ivoire has low-income status traditionally posted a net inflow of public transfers (largely aid grants) and a net outflow of private transfers. The IMF shows a net overall outflow of $43m in 1994, compared with $164m the previous year. There is no breakdown but the improvement was probably due to higher public inflows (as a low-income country since the devaluation, Côte d’Ivoire should now receive most of its aid in grant form).

Balance of payments, 1994a (CFAfr bn)

Merchandise exports fob 1,417.1 Merchandise imports fob –814.3 Trade balance 602.8 Services, net –735.2 Transfers, net 162.2 Current-account balance 29.8 Capital-account balance 281.1 Exceptional financing 19.8 Overall balance 330.7

a Estimates.

Source: Ministère de l’économie, des finances et du plan, Rapport économique et financier 1995.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 26 Côte d’Ivoire: Capital flows and foreign debt

The OECD’s breakdown of aid flows has become much more revealing now that it shows overseas development assistance (ODA) in net rather than gross terms. By its new criteria, total ODA in 1994 was $1.59bn, with the bilateral component $820m. France alone provided $650m. The multilateral donors all responded rapidly to the devaluation, with the World Bank’s IDA, the IMF and the EU all increasing their disbursements sharply in 1994 as a reward for the government—and others in the Franc Zone. (Reference table 18 shows the recent trend of net ODA.)

Capital flows and foreign debt

The financial account also remained in deficit up to 1993. A modest rise in foreign investment since the devaluation and a reduction in debt service appear to explain the improvement shown in 1994. A healthy flow of public capital over the short term seems assured following Côte d’Ivoire’s successful meeting with the Consultative Group of donors in June 1995. Besides praising the government for its reform programme since the devaluation, those present at the meeting, who included the principal bilateral and multilateral donors to Côte d’Ivoire, made indicative pledges of $2.7bn over 1995-97. Regular en- dorsements from the IMF also tend to ease the purse strings of other donors.

Total external debt rose steadily from $14bn in 1989 to $19bn in 1993 when debt per head, at over $1,440, was among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. The sharp increases were largely the legacy of heavy borrowing in the 1980s to finance public investment. They also reflected the weakness of the dollar and the rise in arrears from $2.2bn (principal and interest combined) to $4bn over the same five-year period. As a lower-middle income country, Côte d’Ivoire had to borrow on unfavourable terms, with concessional loans accounting for just 23% of total long-term debt in 1993.

Arrears on long-term debt ($ m) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Interest 841 939 1,059 1,277 1,042 Principal 1,733 2,065 2,364 2,696 2,604 Total 2,574 3,004 3,423 3,973 3,646 Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables.

Further debt relief on the This unserviceable debt burden (242% of GNP in 1993) may be greatly eased by way a combination of cancellation and rescheduling. In measures accompanying the devaluation of January 1994, France announced the cancellation of loans by the Caisse française de développement (CFD, the French state development bank) to Côte d’Ivoire totalling an estimated FFr8.5bn ($1.5bn). In addition, the Paris Club rescheduling of March 1994 covered official, bilateral debt of about $1.7bn falling due in 1994-95: as usual, the precise terms were not disclosed. However, because one of the options open to individual creditors was the cancellation of 50% of maturities, it appears that a further large tranche of debt was annulled. New disbursements meant that total external debt decreased only gently in 1994, to $18.5bn. It may be assumed that further Paris Club rescheduling on favourable terms will follow provided that the

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Côte d’Ivoire: Foreign reserves and the exchange rate 27

government pursues its economic reform programme. In this context it is fortunate that Côte d’Ivoire, as a former lower-middle income country, has a relatively low proportion of non-reschedulable multilateral debt; 24% of total long-term debt in 1994. Talks with the London Club of commercial banks on a rescheduling of an estimated $6bn debt on the basis of a Brady-style plan have continued inconclusively for more than a year. The two sides are far apart on terms, and the government may be looking first to secure a favourable agreement from the Paris Club to influence the final offer from the bankers. (Reference table 17 shows the trend of external debt.)

Foreign reserves and the exchange rate

Excluding gold, Côte d’Ivoire’s international reserves soared from $2.3m at the end of 1993 to $529m two years later. Despite this impressive increase, reserves were only sufficient to recover nine weeks’ merchandise imports (cif) at 1995 levels. The weakness of the dollar has swollen the reserves and has also eroded some of the competitive advantage gained by the devaluation. The dollar rate at the end of January 1994, the month of the currency adjustment, was CFAfr588:$1; this had slipped to CFAfr505:$1 by the end of August 1996.

Foreign reserves, Dec 1995 ($ m) Foreign exchange 527.0 SDRs 1.8 IMF reserve position 0.1 Total reserves excl gold 529.0 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

The other important rate to watch is the CFA franc:naira, which governs the substantial volume of trade with Nigeria, much of it unofficial. Many observers thought it remarkable that the Nigerian military government should use the 1994 budget, launched after the devaluation of the CFA franc, to revalue the naira. The Nigerian budget of 1995, however, reintroduced a second, autonomous window, which approximates to the market rate, is applicable to all private-sector transactions and restores some of the competitive edge lost one year earlier. (Reference tables 19 and 20 show the trend of foreign reserves and exchange rates.)

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 28 Côte d’Ivoire: Regional organisations

Appendices

Regional organisations

For information about the regional organisations to which Côte d’Ivoire be- longs, see Mali, Regional organisations. The two countries belong to the same regional organisations.

Sources of information

National statistical sources The primary statistical source in Côte d’Ivoire is the Rapport économique et financier, published annually by the Ministry of the Economy and Finance. Data collection has greatly improved in the past four years, and this annual document is supplemented by a series of publications from the Abidjan-based Institut national de la statistique (INS). There are two INS publications, one quarterly (Bulletin trimestriel) and the other monthly (Tableau de bord), covering a wide range of macroeconomic indicators. It also produces regular reports on inflation and industrial production, and infrequent bulletins on foreign trade. The press has multiplied since the advent of multiparty politics in Côte d’Ivoire but there is still no non-partisan competent, economic and financial analysis in the Abidjan newspapers.

International statistical It is often said that international statistics on African economies are somehow sources superior to national data. This, however, overlooks the fact that the principal international sources, such as the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, draw almost exclusively on national sources. They do not have any other option since they do not have the resources or the remit to gather and collate data on domestic money supply, credit, public finances and trade. In consequence, it comes as little surprise that international and national sources tend to tell the same story with a few exceptions, such as Cameroon and Nigeria, where the volume of oil exports is disputed, and Angola, where 20 years of civil war have created an enormous parallel non-oil economy that dwarfs the formal sector. There is a further complication to the picture in that the IMF and the World Bank produce internal country-specific documents which can sometimes be obtained informally at their regional offices: these often form the basis for lending decisions by the institutions’ directors and tend to diverge from national data rather more than their own statistics released to the public.

For Côte d’Ivoire divergence is rarely a problem. Other than the International Financial Statistics, the main international sources are: three annual publications from the World Bank, World Debt Tables, World Tables and Trends in Developing Economies; the OECD’s Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients; the annual Rapport from the Franc Zone secretariat in Paris; Les états d’Afrique, de l’océan Indien et des Caraïbes produced by the French cooperation ministry; and Statistiques économiques et monétaires from the Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO) in Dakar. The new INS publications make the BCEAO data look rather old. On the national accounts, there tend to be historic differences between the French/regional sources and the

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Côte d’Ivoire: Reference tables 29

World Bank/IMF. For information on the financial sector (such as balance sheet totals, net profits, board directors and shareholdings in institutions), the Geneva-based Sifida Investment Company produces the useful African Banking Directory annually.

Select bibliography Diégou Bailly, La Restauration du multipartisme en Côte d’Ivoire: ou la double mort d’Houphouët-Boigny, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1995

Bourse des valeurs d’Abidjan, Bulletin mensuel (monthly)

Lubin Doe and Mamadou Lamine Diallo, Economic Activity and Inflation under Fixed Exchange Rate: the Case of Ivory Coast, Savings and Development No 4 1995, IMF, Washington

Fraternité matin (daily), Abidjan

Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens, Spécial: la Côte d’Ivoire, Paris, September 1995

OECD, Adjustment and Equity in Côte d’Ivoire, Paris, 1991

La Voie (daily), Abidjan

Reference tables

Reference table 1 Government finances (CFAfr bn) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total revenue 630.8 589.4 630.5 520.8 872.5 of which: non-petroleum taxes 516.1 499.8 506.4 435.2 678.5 Total expenditure 982.9 973.8 926.9 870.0 1,173.0 Recurrent 908.2 886.7 847.6 796.2 976.9 of which: salaries 339.9 334.5 320.1 314.6 328.0 foreign interest payments 252.8 293.8 269.9 211.4 304.7 domestic interest payments 35.6 29.3 36.4 47.6 47.3 Capital 74.7 87.1 79.3 73.8 196.1 Primary balancea –24.6 –3.5 66.8 –16.4 217.9 Balance (commitments basis) –352.1 –384.4 –296.4 –349.2 –300.5 Increase in arrears 252.7 78.2 101.6 211.8 –438.9 Balance (cash basis) –99.4 –306.2 –194.8 –137.4 –739.4

a Exclusive of interest payments and some small expenditure items.

Source: Le comité monétaire de la zone franc, La Zone franc, Rapport annuel.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 30 Côte d’Ivoire: Reference tables

Reference table 2 Money and credit (CFAfr bn unless otherwise indicated; end-period) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a Currency in circulation 258.3 252.1 272.5 392.6 380.3 Demand deposits 251.8 237.7 221.5 406.2 443.8 Money (M1) 510.1 489.8 494.0 798.8 824.1 M1 growth (%) –3.2 –4.0 0.9 61.7 29.2b Quasi-money 336.3 346.9 331.0 407.8 499.2 Money (M2) 846.4 836.7 825.0 1,206.6 1,323.3 M2 growth (%) –2.6 1.1 –1.4 46.3 27.4b Domestic credit 1,303.3 1,334.6 1,288.2 1,381.8 1,348.6 of which: claims on central government 216.3 367.7 376.1 516.6 494.6 claims on private sector 1,087.0 966.9 912.1 865.3 854.0 Net foreign assets –556.5 –571.3 –572.8 –159.5 33.1 a June. b Year on year, June.

Source: Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO), Statistiques économiques et monétaires.

Reference table 3 Gross domestic product

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 GDP at current market prices (CFAfr bn) 2,987 2,695 2,690 2,945 2,921 4,158 GDP per head ($) 832 845 782 878 783 547 Real GDP growth (%) –1.0 –1.5 –0.4 0.0 –1.1 1.8 Source: Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO), Statistiques économiques et monétaires.

Reference table 4 Gross domestic product by expenditure (% of total; current prices) 1980 1985 1991 1992 1993 Private consumption 62.8 60.3 68.7 65.9 63.3 Government consumption 16.9 13.9 17.8 17.8 20.4 Gross domestic investment 26.5 12.6 10.0 10.9 9.3 Exports of goods & services 35.0 45.6 33.0 33.5 34.3 Imports of goods & services –41.2 –32.5 –29.5 –28.0 –27.4 GDP at market prices 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: World Bank, Trends in Developing Economies.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Côte d’Ivoire: Reference tables 31

Reference table 5 Gross domestic product by sector (% of total; current prices) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Agriculture, forestry & fishing 35.2 33.3 33.7 34.4 30.7 Industry 20.2 19.6 19.0 19.2 19.6 of which: manufacturing 12.0 13.7 13.1 13.3 13.4 electricity & water 8.1 5.7 5.7 5.8 6.0 Services & trade 16.8 19.4 19.5 19.4 27.1 Transport, storage & communications 7.9 7.8 7.5 7.2 6.3 GDP at market prices incl others 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO), Statistiques économiques et monétaires.

Reference table 6 Consumer price inflation (1990=100; period averages) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Indexa 101.7 106.0 108.3 136.5 156.0 % change 1.7 4.2 2.2 26.0 14.2

a African worker and skilled employee families, Abidjan.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Reference table 7 Port of Abidjan traffic (’000 tons) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a Freight loaded 3,995 3,984 3,882 3,702 1,989 of which: petroleum & products 1,692 1,837 1,080 971 419 logs 78 55 66 97 49 Freight unloaded 6,048 6,178 5,936 6,184 3,433 of which: petroleum & products 3,525 3,639 2,814 2,945 1,330 clinker 553 650 665 853 611 Total freight 10,043 10,162 9,818 9,886 5,422

a January-June.

Sources: BCEAO, Statistiques économiques et monétaires; Institut national de la statistique, Bulletin trimestriel.

Reference table 8 Consumption of petroleum and products (’000 cu metres unless otherwise indicated) 1992 1993 1994 1995a Crude petroleum 69.4 63.0 67.8 19.7 Petrol 213.2 222.5 205.6 52.5 Diesel 495.4 511.8 620.8 160.5 Fuel oil (tons) 121.4 87.4 110.4 29.8

a January-March.

Source: BCEAO, Statistiques économiques et monétaires.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 32 Côte d’Ivoire: Reference tables

Reference table 9 Electricity production and consumption (m kwh) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995a Total production 1,811 1,872 2,176 2,375 1,583 of which: hydro 1,253 1,025 1,098 1,175 766 thermal 558 820 1,078 1,183 817 Total consumption 1,985 1,873 1,874 1,942 1,096 Low tension 852 782 812 822 460 High tension 1,133 1,091 1,063 1,120 636

a January-June.

Sources: BCEAO, Statistiques économiques et monétaires; Institut national de la statistique, Bulletin trimestriel.

Reference table 10 Index of industrial production (1984/85=100; seasonally adjusted) 1996 1992 1993 1994 1995 1 Qtr Total 92 95 97 107 122 of which: petroleum & mineral extraction 7 3 3 33 79 electricity & water 107 122 129 155 168 textiles & clothing 84 87 89 117 141 agro-industry 113 119 110 107 136 timber 78 74 84 77 74 Sources: BCEAO, Statistiques économiques et monétaires; Institut national de la statistique, Bulletin trimestriel.

Reference table 11 Principal agricultural producer prices (CFAfr per kg; start of season) 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1993/94a 1994/95 Cocoa (beans) 200 200 200 240 315 Coffee (green) 100 60 75 220 530 Seed cotton (first quality) 90 90 90 105 150 Palm kernels 12 12 12 18 n/a

a Revised after the devaluation of January 1994.

Source: Institut national de la statistique, Bulletin trimestriel.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Côte d’Ivoire: Reference tables 33

Reference table 12 Commercial production of main cash crops (’000 tons unless otherwise indicated) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Cocoaa 827.6 747.7 697.0 887.5 828.6 Coffeea 196.4 259.5 139.5 145.6 189.6 Seed cottona 261.1 193.7 238.8 258.2 280.0 Rubber 70.5 70.5 72.4 63.1 49.9 Palm oil 260.6 267.0 244.0 309.1 79.5b Pineapples 111.0 113.6 114.1 118.2 125.9 Bananas 91.5 110.1 142.3 170.0 153.2 Timber (’000 cu metres) Logs 439.0 372.0 260.0 344.0 421.0 Sawn wood 665.0 613.0 620.0 643.0 759.0

a Crop years starting on September 1. b January-March.

Sources: BCEAO, Statistiques économiques et monétaires; Institut national de la statistique, Bulletin trimestriel.

Reference table 13 Exports (CFAfr bn) 1992 1993 1994 1995 Cocoa & products 256 257 439 552 Sawn timber & logs 62 42 192 203 Coffee & products 56 61 120 199 Petroleum products 85 105 181 183 Canned fish 25 21 64 97 Raw cotton 29 31 69 69 Sources: BCEAO, Statistiques économiques et monétaires; Institut national de la statistique, Bulletin trimestriel; Commerce extérieur.

Reference table 14 Imports (CFAfr bn) 1993 1994 1995a Petroleum products 130 204 90 Machinery & equipment 35 68 52 Fish & products 30 54 30 Rice 28 44 20 Pharmaceuticals 33 44 32 Electrical equipment 19 41 24

a January-June.

Source: Institut national de la statistique, Bulletin trimestriel.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 34 Côte d’Ivoire: Reference tables

Reference table 15 Main trading partners (% of total) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Exports to: France 15 16 16 16 18 Germany 7 10 9 10 8 Netherlands 14 8798 Italy 78778 Mali 55666 Imports from: France 28 36 30 28 32 Nigeria 21 20 24 26 20 USA 64466 Ghana 03454 Germany 43234 Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook.

Reference table 16 Balance of payments ($ m) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Merchandise exports fob 2,913 2,705 2,947 2,652 2,875 Merchandise imports fob –1,819 –1,782 –1,952 –1,801 –1,566 Trade balance 1,094 923 995 851 1,309 Services, credit 590 614 649 605 436 Services, debit –1,626 –1,394 –1,477 –1,303 –967 Income, credit 58 60 19 18 11 Income, debit –1,149 –1,172 –1,100 –923 –733 Inward transfers 370 414 405 237 288 Outward transfers –551 –520 –503 –401 –331 Current-account balance –1,214 –1,074 –1,013 –916 13 Net direct investment 48 16 –231 40 18 Net portfolio investment 46000 Other investment assets –91 –25 170 53 –23 Other investment liabilities –139 –139 –356 –433 284 Financial-account balance –178 –141 –418 –339 279 Net errors & omissions –110 –102 47 40 –250 Overall balance –1,502 –1,317 –1,384 –1,215 42 Financing (– indicates inflow) Movements of reserves 16 –1 –84 24 –215 Use of IMF credit & loans 33 –59 –92 –49 94 Liabilities constituting foreign authorities’ reserves 55 –10 –33 –4 7 Exceptional financing 1,397 1,387 1,593 1,244 72 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Côte d’Ivoire: Reference tables 35

Reference table 17 External debt ($ m unless otherwise indicated) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total external debt 16,456 17,432 17,847 19,017 18,452 Long-term debt 12,407 13,112 13,144 13,047 13,882 Short-term debt 3,618 3,948 4,436 5,751 4,241 of which: interest arrears on long-term debt 841 939 1,059 1,277 1,042 Use of IMF credit 431 372 267 219 328 Public & publicly guaranteed long-term debt 9,849 10,509 10,528 10,430 11,271 Official creditors 6,834 7,649 7,858 7,863 8,562 Multilateral 2,588 2,854 2,905 2,846 3,367 Bilateral 4,246 4,795 4,953 5,016 5,195 Private creditors 3,015 2,860 2,670 2,567 2,709 Banks 2,641 2,616 2,520 2,425 2,553 Total debt service 1,211 1,233 1,100 980 1,274 Principal 571 569 535 479 718 Interest 641 663 565 501 556 of which: short-term debt 167 138 130 110 85 Ratios (%) Total external debt/GNP 186.6 215.7 206.9 242.2 338.9 Debt-service ratioa 33.6 38.0 31.7 29.7 40.1 Short-term debt/total external debt 22.0 22.6 24.9 30.2 23.0 Concessional long-term loans/ long-term debt 17.0 19.6 21.0 22.5 24.3 Variable interest long-term loans/ long-term debt 60.5 61.1 61.6 60.7 58.9

Note. Long-term debt is defined as having original maturity of more than one year. a Debt service as a percentage of earnings from exports of goods and services.

Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 36 Côte d’Ivoire: Reference tables

Reference table 18 Net official development assistancea ($ m) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Bilateral 530.6 434.7 527.4 708.7 820.4 of which: France 416.3 309.7 446.1 585.0 649.7 Spain 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 57.2 Germany 19.2 28.2 25.1 43.8 45.9 USA 17.0 19.0 20.0 21.0 23.0 Japan 55.1 48.0 12.0 39.5 20.4 Multilateral 158.7 198.0 230.3 56.5 773.7 of which: IDA 0.0 31.0 73.5 2.7 447.8 IMF –4.4 –0.3 0.0 0.0 170.5 EU 136.4 137.5 123.0 29.4 134.1 Total 689.3 632.7 757.7 765.1 1,594.1 of which: grants 417.8 366.6 323.5 336.7 798.3 a Disbursements minus repayments. Official development assistance is defined as grants and loans with at least a 25% grant element, provided by OECD and OPEC member countries and multilateral agencies, and administered with the aim of promoting development and welfare in the recipient country.

Source: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Receipts.

Reference table 19 Foreign reserves ($ m unless otherwise indicated; end-period) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Foreign exchange 11.4 6.7 1.1 204.0 527.0 SDRs 2.0 0.3 1.1 0.2 1.8 IMF reserve position 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 Total reserves excl gold 13.4 6.9 2.3 204.3 529.0 Golda 12.1 11.4 12.6 13.0 13.0 Total reserves incl gold 25.5 18.3 14.9 217.3 542.0 Memorandum item Gold (m fine troy oz) 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 a Valued at 75% of fourth-quarter average London price.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Reference table 20 Exchange rates (period averages) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996a CFAfr:$ 264.7 283.2 555.2 499.2 509.7 CFAfr:DM 169.5 171.3 342.1 387.4 340.8 CFAfr:SDR 372.8 395.4 794.8 757.3 741.9 CFAfr:N 15.3 12.8 25.2 22.8b 23.0b a January-June. b The 1995 Nigerian budget reintroduced an autonomous rate, which applies to virtually all commercial transactions. It yielded average rates of about CFAfr5.7:N1 in 1995 and CFAfr6.3:N1 in the first half of 1996.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Mali: Basic data 37

Mali

Basic data

Land area 1,240,190 sq km

Population 10.76 million (mid-1995 EIU estimate)

Main towns Population in 1991 (’000; estimates)

Bamako 615 Ségou 64 Mopti 52 Sikasso 50 Koutiala 37

Climate Mostly hot and dry; semi-tropical in the far south

Weather in Bamako Hottest months, April 34-39°C; coldest month, January,16-33°C; driest (altitude 340 metres) months, December-January, zero rainfall; wettest month August, 220 mm average rainfall

Languages French, Bambara, Fulfuldé, Songhai and Tamasaq (in the north)

Measures Metric system

Currency CFA franc=100 centimes. CFAfr1:FFr0.01. Average exchange rate in 1995, CFAfr499.2:$1. Exchange rate in mid-October 1996, CFAfr521:$1

Time GMT

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 38 Mali: Historical background

Political background

Historical background

Early history The geographical area that is now Mali was, from the 13th century, home to a series of states with similar characteristics, of which the best known are Old Mali, the Songhay empire centred upon Gao in the 15th and 16th centuries, and the Segu kingdom of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. To varying ex- tents, all these states utilised a combination of war, trade and taxation of the low-density rural population in order to function. From the 14th century, Islam played a role, albeit restricted, in statecraft.

The arrival of the French In the middle of the 19th century the Segu state was destroyed by an invading Senegambian force under al-Hajj Umar Tal bn Futi, which declared an Islamic holy war (jihad) against the allegedly pagan kingdoms in its path. This conflict led to a period of social and political instability along the Niger river, which the advancing French turned to their advantage. All Malian territory, apart from some northern desert areas, was under French colonial control by 1905, due to the technical superiority of French arms and the internal dislocations brought about during the chaos of the previous 50 years.

The French colonial state, Soudan français, was administered as part of a highly centralised French West Africa federation and was used as a labour reserve for coastal states and as a primary producer. Little or no attempt was made to industrialise the area. The French also bequeathed their bureaucracy-dominated concept of government, which has had a profound influence on subsequent Malian history. After the Second World War, party politics were introduced and during the 1950s the anti-colonialist Union soudanaise (US), part of the federation-wide Rassemblement démocratique africain (RDA), gained electoral supremacy over its principal rival, the Parti soudanais progressiste (PSP), which was backed, none too secretly, by the colonial authorities. The US-RDA formed the government that would take Mali to independence. Under the name of Soudan, Mali became independent from France in June 1960, along with Senegal, as part of the Federation of Mali, established in September 1959. The federation broke up in August 1960 and Mali became fully independent in its own right and under its new name on September 22, 1960.

Independence and decline Under the country’s first president, Modibbo Keïta, Mali sought to create its own brand of African socialism. The state was to be used as the motor of economic development through a series of five-year plans. Mali also signalled its intention of establishing a significant degree of independence from France, withdrawing from the Franc Zone and creating the Malian franc in 1962. A sharp deterioration in the balance of payments and the failure of state-led development caused a rift within the Keïta administration between radicals and pragmatists, culminating in the “Active Revolution” under an increasingly dogmatic president, from late 1966. Mali had no option but to rejoin the Franc Zone in 1967, its currency devalued by 50% against the CFA franc.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Mali: Historical background 39

The Traoré years In November 1968 a group of disaffected junior army officers overthrew Mr Keïta, establishing a Comité militaire pour la libération nationale (CMLN). Its leading figure, Lieutenant Moussa Traoré, became president in 1969. Mr Keïta was imprisoned until his mysterious death in 1977. Although organised opposition to the government was weak throughout the 1970s Mr Traoré never enjoyed the full backing of the military, surviving coup attempts during the decade. From 1979 he ruled through a newly created parti unique, the Union démocratique du peuple malien (UDPM), with analogous organisations for women and youth, and a single trade union, the Union nationale des travailleurs maliens (UNTM).

Democratic stirrings There was considerable student unrest in 1979 and the early 1980s after the Union nationale des étudiants et des élèves du Mali (UNEEM) broke with the UDPM. The protests were brutally crushed and, as those student leaders not imprisoned or killed went into exile, the disaffected former education minister, Alpha Oumar Konaré, founded the Jamana cooperative in 1983, which rapidly became the focus of intellectual dissent, publishing the influential newspaper, Les Echos, from 1989. During the 1980s economic and political conditions deteriorated to the point where the government, increasingly resembling a Traoré family cabal, lost the support of one social group after another. Oppo- sition groups seized the initiative as the situation deteriorated and from 1989 the UDPM’s monopoly of power came under attack from a broad-based coalition of social and political groups demanding multipartisme and by implication the departure of Mr Traoré. Mass demonstrations became commonplace in Bamako during late 1990, with a revitalised student movement coordinated by the UNEEM’s successor body, the Association des élèves et des étudiants du Mali (AEEM).

A historic transition to The defection to the pro-democracy movement of the UNTM, combined with democracy the president’s failure to recognise the depth of the opposition, rendered confrontation inevitable and matters came to a head in March 1991, when a series of bloody confrontations between citizens and army units culminated in the arrest of the president and several associates on the night of March 25. Over 100 people had died, and about 1,000 had been injured. The arresting officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré, rapidly established dialogue with opposition leaders while acting as head of state and leading a Comité de transition pour le salut du peuple (CTSP). This ruling body of soldiers and political figures exercised power in conjunction with a transitional government headed by Zoumana Sacko, who had resigned as finance minister over official corruption in 1987. Administrative problems and a Tuareg insurrection in the north delayed the planned elections, which took place under the eyes of international observers between January and April 1992. Although the turnout was poor, the Association pour la démocratie au Mali (Adema, a coalition of formerly clandestine parties with Mr Konaré as their presidential candidate) swiftly established electoral dominance. Mr Konaré was elected president in April on a 20% turnout and Colonel Touré, an immensely popular figure with ordinary Malians, formally departed in June.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 40

West Africa in 1995

Gross domestic product Gross domestic product per head $ bn $

Nigeria (a) 65.6 Cape Verde (a)

Côte d'Ivoire Nigeria (b)

Ghana Côte d'Ivoire

Senegal (b) Guinea Senegal (c) Guinea Mauritania (c) Burkina Faso Ghana Mali Benin Benin The Gambia (a)(d) Niger Togo Togo Guinea-Bissau (c) Mauritania (b) Burkina Faso Sierra Leone (c) Mali The Gambia (d)(e) Niger Liberia (f) Sierra Leone (e) Cape Verde (e) Liberia (f)

Guinea-Bissau (b) 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 02468 (a) 1993. (b) At official rate. (c) 1994. (d) Fiscal year (a) At official rate. (b) 1994. (c) Fiscal year ending June 30. starting July 1. (e) Fiscal year ending June 30. (d) Fiscal year starting July 1. (e) 1993. (f) At unofficial rate. (f) At unofficial rate. Sources: EIU estimates; national sources. Sources: EIU estimates; national sources.

Consumer prices Gross domestic product % change, year on year % change, year on year

Nigeria 72.8 Togo Ghana 59.5 Côte d'Ivoire Sierra Leone Guinea-Bissau (a) Guinea-Bissau (a) Benin Benin The Gambia (a)(b) Côte d'Ivoire Mali Mali Guinea Niger Mauritania Liberia Cape Verde (a) Senegal Ghana Burkina Faso Senegal Togo Burkina Faso The Gambia Niger Mauritania Nigeria Guinea Liberia nil Cape Verde (a) Sierra Leone (c)

0 10203040 -10 -5 0 5 10 (a) 1994. (a) 1994. (b) Fiscal year starting July 1. (c) Fiscal year ending Sources: EIU estimates; national sources. June 30. Sources: EIU estimates; national sources.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996

42 Mali: Historical background

A turbulent Third Despite Mr Konaré’s constantly expressed desire for cooperation across political Republic divides, his stewardship has been characterised by suspicion and backbiting between Adema and various opposition parties. Tensions within Adema have hamstrung both the president and a succession of prime ministers, who in any case have had virtually no room for manoeuvre between an urgent economic and fiscal situation, and vociferous demands from sectional groups, led by schoolchildren and students. Until recently, the prevailing atmosphere has been one of crisis management. As prime ministers came and went against a backdrop of student riots, the lack of quick results led to increasing criticism from all sides. Further student unrest, capped by the impact of the 50% devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994, led to the arrival of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta as prime minister, causing the Congrès national d’initiative démocratique (CNID) and the smaller Rassemblement pour la démocratie et le progrès (RDP) to leave the cross-party government. Mr Keïta is a central figure in the Adema machine and his appointment reflected Mr Konaré’s need to keep his badly riven party be- hind him. After his appointment and his rapid crushing of the student leadership, Adema governed alone until the Parti pour le renouveau national (Parena) concluded a political alliance with the ruling party, which resulted in the admission of three Parena ministers in a cabinet reshuffle in mid-1996.

The problème du nord

The roots of the unrest in the northern regions of Gao, (kel tamasaq) and between the latter and bella and harratin. Timbuktu and Kidal stem from the period of French colonisa- Further divisions within the Malian Tuareg and Arab fronts tion of the Malian Sahara in the early years of the 20th century. result from tensions between the fronts’ leaderships and older, Throughout the southern Sahara, Tuareg confederations, used “traditional” community leaders. The resulting anarchy effec- to a nomadic existence and hostile to centralised state form- tively torpedoed the National Pact of 1992 between the ations, found themselves within territorially defined colonial government and the Mouvement des fronts unis de l’Azaouad units. This was at the root of nomadic unrest in both Mali and (MFUA). Niger. The Tuareg, a Berber-speaking group, are distinct from the Arab populations of the Sahara. Divisions between the The existence or otherwise of a precolonial “Tuareg nation” Iwilliminden Tuareg and Kunta Arabs in the Niger Bend area (temust n imajeghan) is currently the subject of violent dis- resulted in the Iwilliminden chief Firhun’s religious revolt in agreement among both berberophone and French intellec- 1916, which was severely put down. Meanwhile the Kel Adagh tuals. The assertion that such an overarching formation existed Tuareg of the northern Adrar area were the object of a colonial and should form the basis of a modern political entity has been policy of benign neglect, which left them both wrong-footed more strenuously advanced by Nigérien Tuareg politicians and angered by the prospect of “black rule” from Bamako at than by their Malian counterparts, the more moderate of independence. This resulted in the Adrar rebellion of 1963 whom have instead stressed the need for greater autonomy which the Malian army suppressed with extreme violence. and reduced discrimination within Mali’s borders. However, Many Kel Adagh went into exile in Algeria and Libya, and this the revival of violence after 1993 provoked a response among movement was at the roots of the current unrest, which broke the mostly sedentary Fulbé and Songhai populations of the out in 1990, with severe defeats being inflicted on the Malian north. Ethnically based “self-defence” militias, most promi- army. nently the Songhai-dominated Ganda Koy (Masters of the land), have combined appeals to “tradition” with recourse to In January 1991 the hard-pressed Traoré government con- violence against Tuareg civilians and irregulars. Links between cluded an agreement at Tamanrasset, southern Algeria, with these groups and mainstream politicians, although shadowy, the rebellion’s political leadership, the Mouvement populaire clearly exist, and many observers worry that ethnicity could for pour la libération de l’Azaouad (MPLA, Azaouad being the the first time become a significant political card for unscrupu- name for the Saharan region for which Tuareg autonomy was lous political figures. Despite an apparent solution to the con- being claimed.) The MPLA promptly split into four factions, flict in early 1996 the conduct in the north of elections due in reflecting differences both between “noble” Tuareg lineages 1997 will be the key test of any political settlement.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Mali: Constitution and institutions 43

In the north, following two years of low-level conflict between the army, and autonomist Tuareg and Arab fighters (see box), a National Pact was signed in April 1992 between the government and the Tuareg armed groups making up the Mouvement des fronts unis de l’Azaouad (MFUA). Brokered by Algeria, the agreement suffered from a lack of resources. Although refugees are returning from neighbouring countries the Malian north is still insecure and eco- nomically dislocated. Meanwhile, Moussa Traoré, the former president, was sentenced to death after a repeatedly delayed trial, although this will probably be commuted. A promised “economic crimes” trial has so far not materialised.

Constitution and institutions

As in many other Franc Zone countries, Mali’s first post-colonial constitution was heavily influenced by the French model, providing for an état laic and institutions similar to the French Fifth Republic. It was effectively a dead letter from the start of the Active Revolution in 1966. After six years of military rule a new constitution, that of the Second Republic, was approved in 1974 by a highly dubious referendum. It provided for universal suffrage, secret ballots, an 82-seat Assemblée nationale (parliament) and a president to be nominated for election by a single political party. This party (the Union démocratique du peuple malien, UDPM) was not established until March 1979 and legislative elections returned UDPM candidates shortly thereafter. Further legislative elections were held in 1982 and 1988. During the transition to democracy, in late July 1991, a national conference was convened, involving representatives of political associations, trade unions, student organisations, and other social groups. Unlike similar initiatives elsewhere in the Franc Zone the conference stuck to its original brief and finalised a new constitution for the Third Republic in two weeks. Once again it was derived from the French model and was overwhelmingly approved in a referendum in January 1992. A constitutional court, legislated for in October 1992, finally came into operation in March 1994, within an overhaul of the judicial system. The possible impact of decentralisation on the current constitutional arrangements is as yet unclear. The present regional system, essentially that bequeathed by the centralist French colonial system, would be replaced by a new division of territory, with administrative and revenue-raising powers partly devolved to local bodies.

Political forces

Of the dozens of political parties formed during the transition period, all but a few had an ephemeral existence. The ruling coalition, Adema, comprises two formerly clandestine parties: the Parti malien révolutionnaire pour la démocratie and Mr Konaré’s Parti malien du travail. Skilful co-option of the less tainted members of the UDPM and their associates in the regions gave Adema the only genuine nationwide organisational framework, and thus overwhelming strength in the Assemblée nationale. The alliance is an uneasy one, however, with intellectuals and party apparatchiks who espouse power at any cost often at loggerheads. Members of the Adema “left”, including six députés, walked out at the end of 1994 to form the Mouvement pour l’indépendence, la renaissance et

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 44 Mali: Political forces

l’intégration africaine (MIRIA). The main opposition party, the Congrès national d’initiative démocratique (CNID), has split acrimoniously between moder- ates in favour of cooperation with Adema and hardliners, led by the party’s presidential candidate, Mountaga Tall, who reject such moves. The Parti pour le renouveau national (Parena) consists of refugees from CNID and is now in formal alliance with Adema. The single party of the 1960s, the Union soudanaise-rassemblement démocratique africain (US-RDA), retains support among older notables, although it is still riven by the same ideological and doctrinal differences which plagued it before 1968 and which have periodically resurfaced within Adema.

Students at the forefront Political Bamako is further divided by complex attitudes towards the IMF, the of change World Bank and the West in general. Since the devaluation of the CFA franc, France has been excoriated by politicians taking a radical stance. Arguments over structural adjustment cross party boundaries, although no one has come up with a credible alternative. All parties suffer from tension between the political elite and the grass roots, a reflection of the ambivalent attitude most Malians have towards multiparty democracy in a context of continuing extreme hardship.

Main political figures

Alpha Oumar Konaré: The first democratically elected Malian president, he has the opportunity to renew his mandate in 1997. He is frequently accused of being in less than full control of his government. Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta: He was appointed prime minister in February 1994 and has since displayed a forthright attitude to student dissent and post-devaluation auster- ity. He is widely viewed as an Adema hawk. Choguel Maïga: Leader of the Mouvement patriotique pour le renouveau, the resur- rected UDPM, and an apologist for the era of single-party government. He will probably run for presidency in 1997 with the covert financial support of prominent dignitaries from the Traoré era. Tiébilé Dramé: Former student activist and foreign affairs minister in the transitional government of 1991-92, and founder of Le Républicain, the most prominent opposition newspaper of the Konaré era. He is currently minister for arid zones in the reshuffled cabinet, he represents the pragmatic wing of the post-Konaré political generation. Oumar Mariko: A student leader who came to prominence in the demonstrations of 1990-91, he has since been a bitter critic of Adema and is the de facto spokesman for students and youth. Mountaga Tall: A lawyer and direct descendant of al-Hajj Umar Taal, he pursued a pro-democracy campaign from exile in last months of the Traoré era. An unsuccessful CNID candidate in the 1992 presidential elections, he remains opposed to CNID’s participation in government, splitting the party. General Amadou Toumani Touré: A popular hero and the head of the 1991-92 transitional government after having arrested Moussa Traoré. He is now a figure of continent-wide significance, to the irritation of some in government.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Mali: International relations and defence 45

The Association des élèves et des étudiants du Mali (AEEM) emerged as the most powerful and intransigent of the interest groups which mushroomed in the transition period. Rioting involving AEEM members in 1993 and 1994 resulted in the resignations of two prime ministers, before Mr Keïta took the no-nonsense approach of arresting the association’s entire leadership, thereby decapitating the movement. Students had in any case forfeited the support of the rest of society by continuing demands for increased grants and improved conditions, when the living standards of other Bamakois were in decline.

Intersecting with the orthodox political arena is the shifting system of socio- political and religious alliances which determines influence in Mali, most of which are based on clan and family lines, rather than ethnic divisions. Society has become more fragmented in the economic decline of recent years, and some observers have voiced fears that society has degenerated into a Hobbesian war of all against all. Political and commercial alliances formed in the kleptocratic atmosphere of the Second Republic act as a profound drag on reform efforts. Mali’s Islamic hierarchies are also fragmented along overlapping clan and doctrinal lines. Many of the established Muslim figureheads prospered under the Traoré regime, and have an ambivalent attitude towards Mr Konaré and his government. Islamists with a political agenda, while not as prominent as in neighbouring Senegal, are increasingly influential and Mr Konaré has publicly voiced worries about religious extremism.

International relations and defence

A diversification of At independence Mali swiftly aligned with the eastern bloc, led by the former foreign ties Soviet Union, while opting out of the Franc Zone and issuing its own currency. Despite the necessity of rejoining the zone on less than advantageous terms in 1967, relations with France have remained somewhat ambivalent ever since, a fact underlined by Mr Konaré’s refusal in July 1995 to travel to Dakar to meet the new French president, Jacques Chirac. France’s expulsion in mid-1996 of Malian immigrants without full residency rights was also said to have harmed presidential relations. Nevertheless, the former colonial power is Mali’s major bilateral donor, and bureaucratic links between Paris and Bamako are close. Russian policy towards Mali has been unclear in the Yeltsin era (roughly half of Mali’s outstanding bilateral debts are to Moscow). US-Malian relations have become considerably closer since the overthrow of Moussa Traoré, with Washington sponsoring initiatives towards democratic and press freedoms, and approving Mali’s post-devaluation eagerness to diversify its dependence away from a France that is no longer fully trusted.

In the region, relations with Burkina Faso have been carefully maintained since the border dispute of 1985 which saw the two countries briefly go to war. Although Senegal and Mali severed relations after the failure of the Mali Federation in 1960, both countries decided in the mid-1960s that they had more to lose than to gain from such antagonism (Dakar was at the time Mali’s major outlet to the sea). Mali is among the most vocal proponents of regional and continental politico-economic integration and the government has repeatedly stressed its willingness to surrender certain sovereign prerogatives in the Pan-African cause.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 46 Mali: Economic structure

The Tuareg issue has dictated Malian policy towards neighbouring northern countries. Relations with Mauritania have occasionally suffered from resentment among “black” Malians against Arabs and Tuareg, who have been accused of using the border area as a rear-base for armed attack. Algeria has played a major role in arbitrating the government-Mouvement des fronts unis de l’Azaouad (MFUA) conflict in recent years, while Mali maintains a close but watchful relationship with Libya, which views the country as part of its sphere of influence and played a deeply ambiguous role in the early stages of the Tuareg conflict. Libya’s diplomatic presence in Bamako actually increased in 1995-96, a fact which was registered with irritation in Washington and other Western capitals. The Malian government is among the foremost proponents of regional cooperation over security in the Sahara. Relations with the Gulf Arab countries are carefully maintained, although their importance as aid donors has declined in recent years. Mali is a member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

An army in search of a Since the overthrow of Moussa Traoré’s military-based regime in 1991, in new role which different army units were responsible for the deaths of over 100 civilian protesters as well as the arrest of the former president, the army high command has kept a low profile, and morale is said to have deteriorated outside crack regiments such as the parachutists. The army is sensitive to charges of indiscipline and its actions in the north have led to widespread, detailed allegations of human rights violations. It remains underpaid and underequipped, and in need of rationalisation. There is a long history of military cooperation with France, Germany, the USA and the former Soviet Union. The various fronts which made up the MFUA counted an unknown number of irregular fighters, many with considerable experience in Colonel Muammar Qadhafi’s Islamic Legion before the outbreak of hostilities in 1990. The National Pact and subsequent negotiations provided for the integration of many of them into the regular armed forces and the administration.

Military forces, mid-1995

Army 6,900 Air force 400 Navy 50 Total 7,350 Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 1995/96.

The economy

Economic structure

Cotton, cattle and gold The Malian economy is dominated by agriculture, livestock husbandry and predominate other primary sector activities, which together accounted for an estimated 49% of GDP in 1995, including a substantial amount of non-monetary production by the almost 80% of the population in the rural sector. Even so, the country has frequently suffered shortfalls of grain, and the droughts of 1969-74 and 1981-83

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Mali: Economic structure 47

devastated the transhumant cattle herds of the north. Instability in the grain market became apparent again in mid-1996, despite several seasons of adequate harvests. Most agricultural production takes place in the fertile south, principally in the densely populated regions of Ségou and Sikasso. Cotton production has come to dominate the agricultural sector, accounting for up to 40% of export revenue; Mali is now sub-Saharan Africa’s leading cotton producer. Min- ing, mainly of gold, is expanding rapidly under the twin influences of devaluation and a liberal investment code. Its share of GDP will grow sharply before the end of the century. Manufacturing is still insignificant. From the 1960s chronically unwieldy parastatals produced ill-adapted basic consumer goods, while private-sector entrepreneurs preferred to engage in internal and regional trade. The sector was further handicapped by a flood of cheap smuggled consumer items in the years preceding the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994.

Main economic indicators, 1995

Real GDP growth (%) 6.0 Consumer price inflation (%) 12.7 Current-account balance ($ m) –128.3 Foreign debt ($ bn) 2.79 Average exchange rate (CFAfr:$1) 499.2 Population (m) 10.76a

a Estimate based on historical growth rates.

Sources: EIU; government announcements.

Comparative economic indicators, 1995

Burkina Côte Mali Faso d’Ivoire Senegal France GDP ($ bn) 2.3 2.3 9.3 4.7 1,543 GDP per head ($) 210 225 651 565 26,559 Consumer price inflation (%) 12.7 7.8 14.3 7.8 1.7 Current-account balance ($ bn) –0.1 0.0a –0.1b –0.1 17.5 Merchandise exports fob ($ bn) 0.5 0.2a 3.7 1.1 268.4 Merchandise imports fob ($ bn) 0.7 0.4a 2.2 1.5 256.4 Foreign trade (% of GDP) 53.1 31.8a 84.4b 57.0 43.4

a 1994. b EIU estimate.

Source: EIU.

Mali has one of the smallest economies in the West African area of the Franc Zone in both absolute and per head terms, although signs of growth and diversification are now present. This situation reflects its landlocked position and, more generally, low levels of growth in the francophone Sahel since the disastrous droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, and the sharp deterioration in terms of trade from 1985. Economic planning since independence has generally been incoherent and unsuccessful compared with the country’s neighbours, and Mali has become one of the world’s most aid-dependent economies. In common with Burkina Faso, Mali has functioned as an exporter of man- power to Côte d’Ivoire, although this declined with the downturn in the

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 48 Mali: Economic policy

Ivorian economy in the 1970s and 1980s. Mali’s GDP in 1993 was an equivalent 0.2% of that of France, the former colonial power and still among the country’s main economic partners.

Economic policy

At independence the Union soudanaise-rassemblement démocratique africain (US-RDA) opted for a state-led development strategy geared to rapid economic expansion and industrialisation. Most private industry was nationalised, and the government attempted to monopolise external trade. A further attempt to stimulate agricultural production by, on the one hand, subsidising the distribution of inputs while, on the other, paying artificially low producer prices, alienated the peasantry who turned to smuggling via the equally alienated merchant class. The growth of a predatory rural bureaucracy aggravated matters even before the disastrous droughts of the early 1970s and 1980s. External- sector difficulties, largely the result of a disastrous monetary policy (see Foreign reserves and the exchange rate) resulted in further economic stagnation, com- pounded by increasingly severe ideological differences within the US-RDA. Mali’s economic discontents were a key factor in the popular approval of the military coup of 1968.

Economic drift and the At first the military-based government continued with dirigiste policies but, from start of adjustment 1981 and under growing pressure from the IMF, the World Bank and bilateral donors, it opted for a policy of internal adjustment. Policies were adopted to liberalise grain markets, ease price controls, encourage investment, privatise parastatals, reduce subsidies and correct fiscal imbalances. However, implementation was poor and undermined by corruption and a lack of transparency, and the government was riven with divisions between kleptocratic political clans and reform-minded administrators. The centralising tendencies of the bureaucracy were a further major drag on reform. Such problems led to the forced resignation of the reformist finance minister, Zoumana Sacko, in 1987. He would return in 1991 as transitional prime minister. One major policy decision, the ending of automatic placement in the civil service for graduates in 1983, was to create tensions contributing to the government’s overthrow in 1991.

Budgetary inertia Between 1960 and 1990, budgetary policy remained consistent, having little regard for the need to react to changing circumstances. The steady rise in the number of public-service employees and the dominance of the military characterised budgetary allocations, a pattern which the Konaré government has altered at the cost of considerable public-sector anguish. The government has stated that it wishes to see an end to external budgetary aid by 1997, but this is unlikely on any but the narrowest definition. In 1994 and 1995, according to provisional outturns, revenue exceeded targets for the first time in recent years, reflecting the increasing attention to combating tax and customs fraud. Provi- sional outturn figures from the 1995 budget suggest a commitments-basis deficit of CFAfr37bn ($74m), which was comfortably covered by net external financing (including debt relief) worth CFAfr91bn. This implies a cash-basis deficit, after grants, equivalent to 3% of GDP. (Reference table 1 shows the trend of government finances.)

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Mali: Economic performance 49

Mali becomes a model From 1988 the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on economic policy pupil became virtually absolute. The adjustment programme embarked upon in that year was far-reaching, fully liberalising grain markets, privatising or liquidating loss-making parastatals, and attempting to tighten up on revenue collection. Although this improved Mali’s credibility with the Bretton Woods institutions, it fatally damaged Mr Traoré’s credibility at home, contributing to his overthrow. The transitional authorities and later the Third Republic government have shown a keen awareness that there remains no option but to continue implementing adjustment policies, regardless of the considerable short-term suffering. An Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) agreed with the IMF in August 1992 was consistently pursued, despite a drift off-course in 1993, which led to emergency budget measures, 50% civil service pay cuts and the resignation of the finance minister. Since then the government has scored several policy successes, although the average hard-pressed citizen would probably not be impressed.

Sectoral and macroeconomic performances since devaluation have been spectacular, earning the government considerable praise from the Bretton Woods institutions. In mid-1995 the IMF released details of economic performance in 1994, noting that inflation had been kept at 25.3% (although later figures revised this to 28%), that real GDP had grown by 2.4%, that investment (aid-led) was running at 26% of GDP, and that the current-account deficit (before transfers) was down to 19% of GDP, bettering the IMF target. Budgetary performance was also praised. A fresh SDR62m ($91m) ESAF was officially announced in May 1996 in support of the government’s three-year strategy for 1996-98. Goals under this arrangement include bringing the average annual inflation rate down to 2-3% in 1997 and achieving annual real GDP growth of 4-5% for several years to come. The government also pledged itself to further action on domestic debt and a strict monetary and credit policy. (Reference tables 2 and 5 show the trend of money supply and consumer price inflation.) Meanwhile, a new programme for the reform of public enterprises is in the process of being agreed, to cover the period 1996-98.

Economic performance

The past three decades have seen sharp fluctuations in output and growth, as Mali’s terms of trade have oscillated and its dependence upon climatic factors has continued. These trends were intensified by the economic fallout from the political upheavals of 1991-92. According to the World Bank, annual real GDP growth averaged 4.9% in 1970-80 and 2.5% in 1980-91. GDP per head has declined further since 1990, although it is thought to have recovered slightly, to $210, in 1995. Since the devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994, however, the economy has moved into a period of steady expansion. Invest- ment’s share of GDP by expenditure increased by 4.6% in 1994, although only one-quarter of this increase came from the private sector. (Reference tables 3 and 4 highlight the trend of GDP at market prices and GDP by expenditure.)

Manufacturing remains fairly unimportant, accounting for 7% of GDP in 1970 and an estimated 9% in 1993. The World Bank has estimated that, whereas manufacturing grew at an average annual rate of 11.2% in 1981-86, it declined

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 50 Mali: Regional trends

in 1987-91 at an average rate of 2.1%. One reason was the intensified competition from the Ivorian manufacturing sector as its own domestic market shrank during the crisis years from 1986. From 1992 a flood of cheap and often smuggled imports from outside the Franc Zone, led by Nigeria, severely damaged the sector. Since devaluation the textiles sector has shown signs of strong revival, although it faces competition from industries in neighbouring countries. Manufacturers are known to be ambivalent about increased regional integration in the Union économique et monétaire ouest-africain (UEMOA; see Regional organisations) for this reason. However, the industry, handicrafts and tourism ministry has been taking initiatives to promote industrial activity and investment, and the finance ministry has been attempting to lessen the fiscal burden on the sector.

Gross domestic product, 1995 (% real change) Primary sector 8.5 Subsistence agriculture 11.2 Cash crops 19.7 Livestock 2.0 Secondary sector 9.2 Industry 6.1 Mining 20.0 Public works & construction 10.0 Tertiary sector 1.2 Transport 1.3 Administration –8.0 Other services 3.8 GDP at factor cost 6.1 Source: Ministère des finances et du commerce, Bamako.

Regional trends

Regional economic variations are still dictated almost entirely by climate, topography and the legacy of the centralising colonial system. Concerted efforts at local development and diversification by aid donors have had minimal impact over much of the country. The three northern regions (Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal) have by far the lowest per head income in Mali, and were virtually devoid of basic infrastructure even before the recent government-Tuareg conflict. Nomadic herding, the only productive activity in the north, has historically relied on transhumance, herds of cattle and smaller animals moving south along the Niger bend to capitalise on grasses growing in the rainy season and on the swampy terrain (borgou) created by the Niger when it floods its delta from July onwards. As the agricultural population has increased and nomadic pastoralism has become more difficult, herder-farmer conflicts have become common, frequently resulting in multiple fatalities on both sides due to the easy availability of Kalashnikovs and other light weapons. These conflicts have taken on an increasingly ethnic character as land disputes between increasingly desperate Tuareg herders and sedentary Songhay and Fulbé communities have fed into the wider political dispute over the status of the north.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Mali: Regional trends 51

The agricultural south is In the bottom 40% of the country, often ironically referred to locally as le Mali the economic motor utile (useful Mali), higher population density and easier soil conditions favour the production of food and cash crops. Cotton dominates the Third (Sikasso) Region, where the crop is produced with burgeoning success on a smallholder basis under the overall direction of the state cotton company, the Compagnie malienne pour le développement des textiles (CMDT). In the Sikasso area, where rich black-earth topsoil provides the most fertile environment in the country, farming activities are combined with informal border trade with Côte d’Ivoire and, to a lesser extent, Guinea. Although there is considerable mining interest in the Sikasso area, most major developments have taken place further west, south of Kayes, the regional capital of the isolated First Region. The post-Traoré years have seen a sharp upswing in investor interest in the exploration and production of gold and other precious metals, although artisanal gold mining and panning has continued since the European Middle Ages. In the south of the region, towards the border with Guinea, small farming communities form the bedrock of the rural population, with relatively little transhumant herding. Further north and west the land becomes poorer and economic life is hampered by the absence of a road network. The Bamako- Dakar rail link, which runs through this region, is the only link with the outside world for many settlements.

With the exception of Gao, historically the gateway to cross-Saharan trade, Mali’s major urban settlements are all located in the south. Bamako, the capital, exerts an economic influence over the entire country south of Mopti, with seasonal migration steadily being replaced by a drift of young people off the land as the 1970s and 1980s progressed. It is not yet clear whether devaluation and the upswing in world soft commodities markets has stemmed the tide, and detailed studies on the economic impact of migration are only now being produced.

Decentralisation plans Decentralisation plans, beyond the reconstruction and development proposals may be for real for the troubled north, are likely, if implemented, to alter the balance between the capital and the major regional centres. Ségou and Mopti in particular should benefit, positioned as they are close to the Niger and on the vital Bamako-Gao highway, the economic spine of the country. In the coming decade the government’s enthusiasm for rural economic development and the improvement of social and educational resources could interlock with the shifting priorities of Mali’s foreign donors, to deliver the capacity for more sustained agro-based growth under a decentralised administration. However, Bamako-based political and administrative elites will be a drag on this process, while a continuing reliance upon the primary sector will keep Mali cruelly exposed to the vagaries of the Sahelian climate.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 52 Mali: Population

Resources

Population

The last census in Mali took place in 1987, and was flawed. There is disagreement over the number of temporarily displaced Tuareg and other refugees from the north, thought to number up to 150,000 people. The World Bank’s World Tables put the population at 10 million in 1993, but other Bank publications put it at 9.83 million in 1995, and project a growth rate dipping only slowly below 3%; this would give a total population of around 24 million in 2025. Crude birth and death rates were estimated by the Bank in 1993 at 50 and 19 per 1,000 respectively. The birth rate has been broadly constant since 1970, although the death rate has declined from 26 per 1,000. According to estimates by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), average fertility (live births per woman) is extremely high, at 7 in 1993, although 25% of married women of childbearing age are thought by the UNDP to use some method of contra- ception; given economic and cultural factors at play, this seems a wild over- estimate. Life expectancy is currently put at 46 years. According to the World Bank’s World Development Report for 1996, the infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) stood at 125 in 1994, well below the average for sub-Saharan Africa.

Sharp differences between Overall population density is low, at about eight persons per sq km. In the north and south north this figure was put as low as 1.5 persons per sq km even before the government-Tuareg conflict, which has left up to 150,000 people as refugees outside Mali’s borders. Even before then, many nomads had left for Algeria and Libya in the wake of the Adrar rebellion of the early 1960s, and the droughts of 1973 and 1984/85. In the more heavily populated south the Third (Sikasso) and Fourth (Ségou) Regions are, with the District of Bamako itself, the most densely populated regions. A national census was under way in mid-1996.

Population of main urban centres, 1991

Bamako 615,119 Ségou 63,974 Mopti 52,088 Sikasso 50,308 Koutiala 37,015 Kayes 36,529 San 34,933 Source: Republic of Mali, Annuaire statistique.

Although the figures for urban populations above should be treated with some caution (Bamako’s population in particular is frequently estimated at close to 1 million), they give a useful indication of the relative weight of urban centres. The only centres of any size in the north are Timbuktu and Gao, capitals of the Sixth and Seventh Regions respectively, and they have suffered depopulation as a result of the conflict between the government and the Tuareg. Overall, an estimated 24% of the population live in towns, although seasonal migration among the young influences the overall figures.

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Mali’s ethnic mix is diverse, with the main ethnic group, the Bambara, shading into other identities (Marka, Soninké, Peul/Fulbé, Somono) and other groups associated with a particular region, such as the Dogon of the Fifth (Mopti) Region. The Futanké descendants of al-Hajj Umar’s 19th-century jihadists have traditionally retained a separate identity. In the north, ethnic tensions between the mostly sedentary Songhai and the mostly nomadic Tuareg and related groups have resulted in unrest throughout the independence period, although an apparently definitive return to stability appeared close in mid-1996.

Education

Education spending has historically shown a very strong bias in favour of tertiary level students, mostly in Bamako, who by the early 1990s had come to constitute a formidable and militant interest group. Educational costs were an estimated 30 times higher per tertiary level student than per primary pupil in 1992, a ratio that clearly cannot be afforded. The government has committed itself to redressing the balance in favour of primary education and of action to bring more girls into the sector. Agreement has been reached with the World Bank and IMF on these priorities.

The higher education sector has been the most badly affected by the recent political and economic crises. Funding difficulties have resulted in a decline in both the quality and quantity of teaching and research at the two major Bamako-based institutions, the Ecole normale supérieure and the Ecole nationale d’administration. Teacher morale has also suffered greatly, with staff unhappy with poor pay and student indiscipline. Further student unrest oc- curred in late 1995-early 1996. Plans for a national university are under way, but face funding and organisational obstacles.

Health

Mali has some of sub-Saharan Africa’s worst health indicators. According to estimates by the UNDP, there was one doctor for 20,000 people in 1988-91 (admittedly an improvement on the situation in 1965, when the number was one per 51,000). This overall figure hides a sharp bias in favour of the capital and urban areas. Just 2.8% of GDP was spent on health in 1990, although 85% of recurrent budget expenditure in 1995 was devoted to health and educational spending. In overall terms, Mali has one of the lowest ranking on the UNDP’s Human Development Index for 1996, placed 171 out of 174 countries, with only Somalia, Sierra Leone and neighbouring Niger faring worse. An epidemic of cholera in mid-1995 underlined the lack of basic sanitation infrastructure in most major settlements; overall, only 30% of the population is thought to have enjoyed access to health services in 1995, and only 37% to safe water supplies. Arguably the grimmest aspect of the health situation concerns women. Accord- ing to the US-based Population Action International, 20% of girls aged 15-19 give birth, and 65% of all pregnant women suffer from anaemia. Women have a one in seven chance of dying in childbirth or from unsafe abortion, one of the very worst rates in the world.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 54 Mali: Natural resources and the environment

Although much effort at government and non-governmental organisation (NGO) levels has gone into boosting the infrastructure, health indicators will rise only slowly due to poor nutrition (worsened for most of the population by the effects of the devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994) and the prevalence of hepatitis, tuberculosis (TB), meningitis and particularly malaria. While much of the country’s medical infrastructure is concentrated in regional capitals, a network of village health centres has been taking shape in the countryside, especially in the south. The health picture in the north, however, is considerably worse than the national figures imply. Among initiatives in recent years has been a series of projects to rationalise the use of locally produced traditional medicines.

Natural resources and the environment

Mali is landlocked, with five distinct climatic and topographical zones. From small areas of tropical forest cover in the extreme south, the landscape runs north through bands of first “Guinean” (wooded) and then “Sudanese” (sparse tree cover and shrubs) savannah, before reaching the arid Sahelian zone, from roughly the latitude of Mopti. The Sahel is characterised by poor soil quality and decreasing cover of shrubs and grasses. Although many areas can support cattle on a seasonal basis (assuming abundant rains) all-year-round grazing is limited to sheep and, especially, goats. The fifth and final zone is the desert proper, which accounts for about 60% of Mali’s land area of 1.24m sq km. With the exception of the extreme northern Adrar des Iforas, the sandstone escarp- ments of the Bandiagara area and areas of low hills in the Kayes Region, the landscape is flat.

The climate is uniformly Rains usually fall between June and September and coverage is highly uneven, hot and dry ranging from about 1,200 mm in Bamako to negligible levels in the arid north. Before the arrival of the rains, the January-May hot season sees temperatures rising to levels of 35° or more in much of the south and up to 45°-50° in the northern Gao and Kidal Regions. These climatic extremes aggravate the deterioration of Mali’s already poor topsoil cover, most of which is sandstone and laterite in character, with shifting sands in much of the north. The country’s dominant natural feature is the Niger river, known as the Joliba in Mande languages. In flood, the Niger provides natural irrigation in the inner delta zone of the Masina area (Fifth Region), as well as hydropower and, for six months of the year, navigation for medium and large-sized shipping between Bamako and Gao. Artisanal river fishing is of great importance at riverine centres such as Ségou and Mopti. There has been anxiety in recent years over dropping water levels and increasing pollution.

Economic infrastructure

Transport and communications

Road and river links are Road communications are poor even by Sahelian standards, a situation aggra- poor vated by the country’s landlocked situation. Several bilateral donors have patronised the road system in recent years, especially in the isolated First (Kayes) Region, which is still effectively cut off from the capital except by rail (see below). Road transport in the north has been further disrupted by the Tuareg conflict. In the capital, an anarchic shared taxi system continues to dominate public transport. A five-year, $250m road maintenance and repair scheme is underway, relying mostly on external funds. River transport of passengers and freight is possible along the Niger between July and December in years of normal rainfall. There is the possibility of year-round access to the Atlantic along the Senegal river from Kayes to St Louis. The continuing revival of the regional hydropower organisation, the Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Sénégal (OMVS), will dictate this route’s future. (See Reference table 6 for transport statistics.)

An antiquated railway The railway line between Bamako and Dakar, completed in 1924 and virtually unchanged since, is extremely dilapidated and suffers from frequent washouts in the rainy season. Ancient rolling stock, poor administration and accidents have put the system under increasing strain since the early 1980s, and rob- beries and violence are a source of frequent complaint in the media. Both the Malian and Senegalese governments are in the process of introducing private capital into the system, via a planned holding company for the two countries’ rolling stock, agreed in November 1995. The Regie du chemin de fer du Mali (RCFM, the state railway company) has also undergone a drastic staff reduction programme to bring it back into profit.

Improving air coverage Bamako’s international airport, Senou, is now linked to the city centre by an express route. According to the Dakar-based African coordination body for air transport, 290,605 passengers passed through Senou in 1993, an increase of 5.8% on the previous year. Freight, at 5,925 tons, was 5.4% down on 1992 levels. The national carrier, Air Mali (known to aficionados as “Air Maybe”) was an early victim of structural adjustment in 1988. After various attempts at finding a replacement or internal connections, a new Air Mali, dominated by private capital, has been operating between Bamako and regional capitals since 1993. Mali is a member of the troubled Air Afrique syndicate (which holds 46% of Air Mali’s equity) and is also serviced by Sabena and Air France. Meanwhile, another domestic carrier, Mali Tombouctou Air Services (Malitas, 20% state-owned) is to be completely privatised. An independent French tour operator began experi- mental charter flights into the northern centre of Gao in early 1996.

A post-Traoré boost for Telecommunications have been improving steadily although international the media— lines out of Bamako are still under considerable strain. Facsimile machines are now commonplace in the capital and are also found in other major towns, while some government ministries and non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) can be contacted by electronic mail, a trend which will intensify despite the increased post-devaluation cost of the imported hardware. Moussa Traoré’s downfall triggered a print media explosion, as Les Echos and L’Aurore, the spearheads of the pro-democracy movement, were joined by dozens of other publications. Most notable are: Le Républicain, launched by Tiébilé Dramé (now the minister for arid and semi-arid zones) after his stint as foreign minister in the transitional government; Nouvelle horizon; and Cauris, an economic weekly subject to irregular absences from the newsstands, published by a leading private-sector think-tank.

—but still a tough Newspapers suffer from poor distribution outside Bamako, difficulties in gath- environment ering news from the regions and abroad, and comparatively high cover prices (CFAfr150-300). Reduced purchasing power and higher printing costs since devaluation have further harmed the industry, although it is arguable that the higher cost of Franco-African publications such as Jeune Afrique has given the local sector a backhanded boost.

The Office de radiodiffusion et télévision du Mali (ORTM), the former state broadcasting monopoly, now has autonomous status, but its television operation is an easy target for opposition accusations of pro-governmental bias. Independent FM radio stations have also made an appearance, mostly notably Radio Kayira, which is close to the leadership of the Association des élèves et des étudiants du Mali (AEEM) and had a series of well-publicised rows with the government in 1993-94.

Energy provision

Over 90% of Mali’s energy requirements are met from sources other than oil and electricity (principally fuelwood and charcoal). Deforestation has been an important issue since the first major drought of recent years, in the early 1970s, leading to a succession of environmental initiatives. Hydropower was due to alter this balance significantly in the late 1990s, as the Manantali dam on the Senegal river came on stream, but a meeting between Mali, Senegal, Mauritania and the various foreign donors and lenders for the $600m project concluded in November 1995 that project evaluation was impossible until late 1996, thus putting the start-date for electricity generation back as far as 2000. Already about 80% of the country’s electricity supplies are hydro-generated. Inte- gration of the Malian and Ivorian national grids, using private-sector companies working on a build-operate-transfer (BOT) basis, is scheduled for 1998, subject to feasibility studies. Such plans are vital to Mali’s development plans and, with Manantali, could lead to the full integration of the Ivorian, Malian, Senegalese and Mauritanian networks. An increase in provision in the south- west is vital to the continuing expansion of the mining sector. The national power and water parastatal, Energie du Mali (EDM), had its managerial func- tions privatised in early 1995 after years of poor management and underinvest- ment. However, recent controversies over power cuts and billing practices have highlighted the difficulties involved in the planned restructuring.

Energy balance, 1995 (m tons oil equivalent) Elec- Oil Gas Coal tricity Other Total Primary production 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06a 1.44 1.50 Imports 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 Exports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Primary supply 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.06a 1.44 1.65 Net transformationb 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.09 Final consumption 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.02c 1.43 1.56

a Expressed as input equivalents on an assumed generating efficiency of 33%. b Transformation input and output, plus energy industry fuel and losses. c Output basis.

Source: Energy Data Associates.

The government has consistently played down the oft-rumoured possibility of petroleum reserves under the Malian Sahara in the Agamor and Taudenni Regions, presumably in order to avoid a further source of tension with the Tuareg fronts making up the erstwhile Mouvement des fronts unis de l’Azaouad (MFUA).

Financial services

The Dakar-based Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO) acts as the central bank for Mali and the six other members of the West African area of the Franc Zone. (For a discussion of the zone, see Regional organisations.) The Banque de développement du Mali has survived various crises over the years and is now recovering steadily, while commercial banks include the Banque malienne de crédit et des dépots, owned jointly by the government and France’s Crédit Lyonnais, and the Bank of Africa-Mali. Domestic savings within the banking system have traditionally been low, but since the CFA franc devaluation of January 1994 banks have been criticised by the business community for what is seen as an over-conservative lending policy as capital flows back into the Franc Zone from abroad. The banks routinely blame the BCEAO’s tight liquidity regulations, but in reality remain tentative about many lending propositions. Domestic savings have increased since 1994, although what appears to be a surge in imports in 1995 will have mitigated the previous year’s improved ratios. Along with other members of the Union économire et minétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA), Mali now faces the problem of diversifying credit instruments in favour of small and medium-sized enterprises, which have historically relied upon informal sources of investment.

Other services

Tourism has so far contributed little to the services sector despite Mali’s un- doubted potential attraction for culture, adventure and eco-tourism. Djenné, which rose to prominence under the Mali empire, is a UNESCO Site of World Heritage, and Timbuktu, although extremely dilapidated, retains an international allure, while the Bandiagara escarpment is home to the Dogon, one of

the most ethnologised and visually spectacular of all African “traditional” cul- tures. The north is home to Mali’s Tuareg minority, which has long exerted a romantic fascination in the northern hemisphere, although insecurity in the north made the classic overland route across the Sahara virtually impossible before early 1996, further harming the sector.

Hopes for more equitable The work of the recording artists Salif Keïta and Ali Farka Touré, and that of tourism film-makers such as Souleymane Cissé, has raised Mali’s international profile since the late 1980s. In addition, the government has made tourism a priority and community-based attempts are being made to improve standards in the related, and somewhat anarchic, artisanal crafts sector. In addition, Mali’s reasonable success in riding the inflationary wave which followed devaluation has slightly improved its competitive edge over neighbouring Burkina Faso, while the government and tourism professionals are increasingly aware of the need to project a professional industry image while safeguarding local interests. However, Mali will never be able to compete with the resort and wildlife tourism of East African centres.

Production

Industry

Cotton processing apart, most manufacturing is concentrated in the industrial zone of Bamako. Manufacturing accounted for 9% of GDP in 1993, a decrease on recent years, although non-mining industry and craft production expanded impressively in 1995. Increasingly unfavourable terms of trade from the mid- 1980s exaggerated the problem of cheap smuggled Nigerian imports, and the damage to much state-owned manufacturing capacity in the rioting which led to the downfall of the Traoré regime in March 1991. Since the adoption of a pro-private-sector policy by the industry ministry there have been signs of a move towards manufacturing among leading local commerçant families. (Manufacturing production is shown in Reference table 7.)

Mining and semi-processing

New incentives for mining The mining sector consisted for several hundred years of artisanal mining and investors panning for gold and diamonds in the south and west of the country. Under the Mali Empire of the 13th-16th centuries, gold production was substantial by world standards of the time and Mali was known in Europe as a major gold producer. In recent years infrastructural weaknesses, governmental inertia and corruption discouraged foreign investment in the sector, which the French had neglected during the colonial period. The Kalana mine, operated by a Russian- backed parastatal, closed in the early 1990s due to mismanagement. With the encouragement of hard-headed and competent officials at the Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water, interest in the industry has since mushroomed and 1994 was a key year for investment.

The legal and fiscal framework was changed shortly after the beginning of the transition period, and further measures have been launched to improve administration and research facilities. The government reserves the right to partici- pate in enterprises up to 20%, including 10-15% without cost. Tax on profits is set at 45%, plus ad valorem tax. There are no taxes on dividends. Tax exemp- tions range from three to five years, and customs duty on capital equipment is waived for four years. This regime, combined with growing confidence among mining companies, has led to the following.

• Anglo American’s project at Sadiola Hill, near Kayes. Developed in conjunction with the Canadian group, Iamgold, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC, the World Bank’s private-sector lending and investment window), Sadiola Hill is Mali’s largest project, expected to yield 10 tons/year (t/y) between 1996 and 2005.

• The Syama gold mine near Sikasso. Originally operated by BHP-Utah, it currently uses open-cast methods and is thought to have yielded 6.2 t/y in 1994. A further underground phase was due to start in 1997. BHP’s sale (at a $40m loss) of Syama to Randgold of South Africa in late 1996 is sign of BHP’s changing global strategy rather than Syama’s unviability.

• The revival of the Kalana gold mine on a joint-venture basis between the recently privatised Ghanaian concern, Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (AGC), and the South Africa group, Johannesburg Consolidated Investments (JCI). AGC and JCI reportedly intend to invest $11m in 1995-97, having made a front-end payment of $18m. Reacting to industry rumours that AGC had effectively bought a working goldmine at a knockdown price, AGC has pointed out the dilapidated nature of the workings.

• A diamond exploration and exploitation permit granted to Mali Diamond Exploration, owned by Ashton Mining of Australia (51%) and Mink Mineral Resources of Vancouver (49%). The permit covers 36,000 sq km in the Kéniéba cercle in western Mali, where Mink claims to have located 21 kimberlite pipes, eight of them diamond-bearing. As far back as the 1950s French geographical surveys revealed a large diamond potential. The government has a 20% stake in the project.

Many other exploration permits have been signed although the mining ministry stresses that only credible long-term projects will be entertained. Other companies involved in the sector include Golden Star and South Korea’s Youngpoong. Canada-based small-scale companies have been especially keen to establish a presence. The potential hazards of one of Africa’s biggest goldrushes were brought home in mid-1996 when the Alberta-listed Timbuktu Gold was reported to have been involved with falsified assay samples. (Mining- sector share-ramp scams are a feature on Western Canada’s stock exchanges.)

Much of Mali remains unsurveyed in any detail, but is known to contain deposits of bauxite, manganese, zinc, copper and lithium. Uranium in the Adrar des Iforas Region is not thought to be commercially viable, as may also be the case with iron ore deposits near the Senegalese border. The French Ministry of Cooperation estimated Mali’s export earnings from gold at CFAfr33bn ($60m) in 1994, which it expected to rise to CFAfr46bn in 1995.

However, a World Bank consultant, Louis Goreux, suspects that exports of artisanally mined gold, which are not reflected in official data, have benefited greatly from the devaluation, as artisanal production is comparatively little affected by the corresponding increase in the prices of imported inputs.

Agriculture, forestry and fishing

Agriculture and livestock husbandry form the backbone of the economy, involving 80% of the population, accounting (with related activities) for an estimated 49% of GDP in 1995 and providing the bulk of export revenue. Pastoral husbandry takes place mostly in the north and around the Niger delta, whereas the bulk of food and cash crops (principally cotton) is produced in the southern regions. Although facing rising competition from mining’s share of GDP, agriculture will continue to retain its importance in the absence of major inwards investment in other sectors, and output will probably increase under the impulsion of greater urban demand for domestic cereals after the devaluation of the CFA franc. Food crop marketing has been fully liberalised since the late 1980s, with the state taking only a regulatory role and maintaining the food security networks, which are vital in a country as vulnerable to sudden climatic reverses as Mali. (Reference table 8 shows the output of selected crops.)

Cotton dominates the Since the late 1970s cotton has risen to a position of dominance in the dom- sector— estic and external sectors. By 1992/93 (August-July) output had risen to 320,000 tons, yielding 135,000 tons of lint cotton and making Mali the largest cotton producer in the zone. After a relatively disappointing year in 1993/94, lint output in 1994/95 was put at 128,180 tons by the Liverpool-based specialist weekly Cotton Outlook, and was projected to rise to 150,000 tons in 1995/96. However, the parastatal Compagnie malienne pour le développement des textiles (CMDT) reported a provisional harvest of 405,000 tons of raw cotton in 1995/96, which would imply a lint output of roughly 180,000 tons. Malian cotton is widely recognised as being of high quality with low production costs. Production is almost entirely artisanal, with village cooperatives in the south- east being coordinated by the CMDT, which is indisputably the country’s most successful and best-run state company.

—and Mali-Sud is the The CMDT’s zone of intervention (which does not reflect the country’s admin- country’s economic heart istrative divisions) is known as Mali-Sud and includes all of the Third (Sikasso) Region and parts of the Second (Koulikoro) and Fourth (Ségou) Regions. Cover- ing 122,000 sq km, the importance of this area can be gauged from the fact that it accounted for 47.5% of GDP and 78% of export revenue in 1992. The CMDT has coordinated three major development programmes (Mali-Sud I, II and III) in recent years. The most recent, funded by the World Bank, France and the Netherlands, was completed in 1994. As with cotton organisations elsewhere in the Franc Zone, the Compagnie française pour le développement des textiles (CFDT) owns a minority share (40%) in CMDT, and provides extension services and research on new cotton strains, inputs and diseases. The CMDT’s cereals branch, Cerecom, performs a similar role where cereals are concerned, com- mercialising small but increasing tonnages of millet, sorghum, rice and other

staple crops, although the CMDT is being divested of other peripheral respon- sibilities through a combination of privatisation and closure.

Lint cotton production in the Franc Zone, 1994/95 (’000 tons, provisional) Mali 128,180 Benin 98,185 Côte d’Ivoire 90,900 Chad 62,950 Burkina Faso 62,350 Cameroon 62,070 Togo 50,800 Senegal 12,110 Central African Republic 11,400 Source: Cotton Outlook.

Devaluation has made Malian lint more competitive, and the prices paid to producers have increased, but this will not alter the exposed position of the CMDT to world market prices. The company had to be bailed out in 1993 to the tune of CFAfr5bn by the Caisse française de développement (CFD, the French state development bank), after it was caught between prices paid to producers (themselves quite low) and plunging world prices. One consequence of the more recent recovery in prices is a fresh determination to add value to the crop domestically. The two mothballed state textiles firms, Compagnie malienne des textiles and Industries textiles de Mali (Itema), have seen a revival in production and investment after being opened to private capital. Itema in particular has turned around a disastrous pre-devaluation record and is now exporting throughout the subregion and as far afield as the USA, although it is still far from servicing the less lucrative domestic market and continues to suffer from weak cashflow and outmoded plant. Itema is searching for European joint-venture partners.

The return of the Office The other major parastatal agribusiness, the Office du Niger, has a rather more du Niger chequered history. It was set up by the French in the 1930s to irrigate the dry section of the Niger’s inland delta north-east of Ségou. Massive irrigation works built with forced labour were originally intended to facilitate cotton production, but rice proved more viable although yields were always low. As with other state structures in the rural sector, it functioned until recently as a chan- nel of rural expropriation by the bureaucracy rather than as a stimulus to production, although the Office still supplied roughly 80% of domestic demand for rice in normal times. After a radical restructuring eliminated several tiers of centralised bureaucracy and redefined the body’s remit to one of maintenance of irrigation equipment and a decentralised administrative framework for individual producers, an improved performance at the Office contributed to increased food production in 1994/95, resulting in a positive cereals balance. Mali became an exporter of rice and other cereals to Senegal in 1995, but specialists believe that overheads will have to be brought down further before Malian irrigated rice will be able to compete in other coastal markets. In addition there are worries over soil salinisation.

Livestock exports are Pastoralism is divided into three distinct types. Smallholders with a handful of recovering cattle have largely supplanted nomadic, pastoralist Fulbé groups who were among the principal victims of the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s. The latter have frequently been reduced to wage labour tending the large herds accumulated by merchants, high-ranking bureaucrats and religious notables. There is a lively debate over whether the new patterns of pastoralism of the last two decades are a source of harm to the fragile Sahelian ecosystem. Livestock is thought to account for some 20% of GDP in an average year, although recorded exports of livestock and meat products have suffered in recent years, principally due to the unrestrained dumping by EU members of highly subsidised and often low-quality intervention beef on coastal West African markets. Pre- dation by customs agents, and the lack of refrigeration and bulk transport infrastructure, has also constrained the sector. Devaluation produced an imme- diate response, with exports to Côte d’Ivoire rising sharply. (Reference table 9 shows rough estimates of livestock numbers by the BCEAO.)

Fishing is in decline River fishing is also vulnerable to drought, as well as to changed water movements due to dam construction. The Niger and Bani rivers, and above all the Niger delta in the Mopti area, are the principal centres of activity. Most of Mali’s estimated 100,000 fishermen come from the Bozo and Somono, whose ancestral occupations are all related to riverine activities, although few fish full-time. The yearly catch amounts to roughly 100,000 tons, of which about one-fifth is exported. The Niger is showing signs of having been overfished in recent years, and fishermen are concerned about the threat of urban pollution.

Food production, 1995/96 % change on ’000 tons previous season Millet 815.1 –9.2 Sorghum 812.6 8.9 Rice 437.9 –6.7 Maize 290.5 –9.9 Wild rice (fonio) 30.5 58.3 Groundnuts 147.1 –31.6 Source: Directions nationale de l’agriculture, de la statistique et de l’informatique, Bamako, in Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens.

Forestry is a vital sector Given the dependence of most Malian households on wood and charcoal for fuel, the forestry sector is of extreme ecological significance. The World Bank and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) have both initiated a succession of projects to improve knowledge of how tree cover works in Mali’s Sahelian zones, while national radio campaigns in favour of efficient wood stoves (foyers améliorés) have had a so far unquantified effect which most experts agree has been beneficial. As population growth continues, however, the issue will remain pressing. Of the various forestry products, all of which are produced artisanally, the most important are fruits (especially mangoes) produced in the south; a wide range of “traditional” medicines; and shea butter (karité).

Construction

The vast majority of Mali’s population, including many urban dwellers, live in houses principally of baked earth construction, built artisanally. In Bamako the mass arrival of expatriates in the aid community in the wake of the droughts of the early 1970s led to a building boom, with Western-style villas being built using almost exclusively imported inputs. Although the transition government made efforts to initiate low-cost housing schemes, little came of this. The Konaré government has been concerned to upgrade the infrastructure of Bamako and other urban centres, and has launched several projects with foreign aid, notably the capital city’s new town hall and the main market, to replace the one destroyed by fire in 1993. However, local construction entrepreneurs complain that the cost of imported inputs is still too high despite customs concessions, and also that Chinese construction groups are operating, as elsewhere in Africa, a policy of deliberate low tendering. Other recent major projects in the capital include the new national headquarters of the Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO), as well as the King Fahd bridge and an express highway from the city centre to the airport, financed by Saudi Arabia to the tune of $93m. However, large-scale construction projects will remain more or less completely funded from outside, and a domestically generated upswing in activity will depend upon several years of high, sustained GDP growth outside the agricultural sector. Anglo American’s gold project at Sadiola Hill is an example of such activity.

The external sector

Merchandise trade

Foreign trade ($ m) Total exports fob, 1995 ($ m) 405 of which: cotton 205 livestock 95 gold 68 Total imports fob, 1992 (% share) 100 of which: machinery 31 food products 10 intermediary products 6 petroleum products 5 Sources: Ministère de la coopération, France, Les Etats de l’Afrique de l’océan Indien et des Caraïbes; Situation économique et financière en 1992; World Bank, La dévaluation du franc CFA. Un premier bilan en décembre 1995.

Mali’s merchandise trade has been characterised since the mid-1970s by large structural deficits. From 1979 to 1990 import cover averaged 47.6%, according to the Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO), although this figure has since improved considerably due to downwards pressure on imports and, in 1995, the revival of markets for Mali’s principal exports; cotton,

livestock and gold. Figures from the IMF and the French Ministry of Cooper- ation suggest that import cover averaged 74% from 1991 to 1994, although these figures may reflect different methods of calculating merchandise trade. The most recent partial data make clear that Mali remains heavily dependent upon imports from outside the Franc Zone for machinery and capital goods, much of which have been on a tied-aid basis. These accounted for 37% of the total in 1992, the last year for which comprehensive figures are currently available.

The prospect of a Where exports are concerned, Mali remains dependent upon world commodity continuing deficit markets (despite cotton sales arrangements with the Compagnie française pour le développement des textiles). Powerful historical disincentives to add value to manufacturing and semi-processing have resulted in a chronically weak export performance, which has already been weakened by an unsympathetic tax and customs regime, deteriorating terms of trade, an overvalued currency (until devaluation) and grossly inadequate investment, domestic or inwards. Al- though this situation changed somewhat with the flurry of gold interest from 1992, outside the extractive sector there is still little interest in investment and the trade account can be expected to remain firmly in deficit for the rest of the century. Similarity of resource bases between Mali and its Sahelian neighbours, and the shared problem of narrow domestic markets, have been partly offset since devaluation by the export of newly competitive livestock to coastal markets, notably Côte d’Ivoire.

Flourishing informal trade Algeria and the former Soviet Union became Mali’s main markets for recorded exports during the late 1980s, although the Soviet Union ’s collapse has effectively closed that market and Algeria’s share has been reduced both by domestic chaos and insecurity in the Malian Sahara. Available IMF data for 1993 and 1994 in particular should be treated with caution. They are routinely drawn from partners’ trading returns with resulting large distortions in the overall picture, while the 1994 figures appear to misreport wildly Norway’s share of trade. Norway has been an insignificant trading partner since independence, and its presence in the figures for 1994 (which we are deliberately not using in the table below) is mysterious. The trend to sourcing imports with regional partners was already reflected in Côte d’Ivoire’s share of the total before devaluation and Mali has generally run a large trade deficit with its southern neighbour, offset by remittances from Malian migrant labourers. Nat- ional figures, when released, are generally little more representative of reality, and none have been made available in recent years. Smuggling in both directions across Mali’s long and porous borders may have accounted for up to half of Mali’s trade with its neighbours, and some estimates put the annual loss to the government at CFAfr100bn before devaluation. (Historical data on main trading partners are given in Reference table 10.)

Main trading partners, 1995a (% of total) Exports to: Imports from: Thailand 18.1 Côte d’Ivoire 26.6 China 13.6 France 17.4 Belgium-Luxembourg 10.7 Senegal 4.2 Portugal 8.2 UK 3.8 Brazil 8.2 Belgium-Luxembourg 3.0 Italy 6.6 Hong Kong 2.6 Taiwan 4.1 China 2.5

a Based on partners’ trade returns and subject to a wide margin of error.

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook.

Invisibles and the current account

A structural deficit on Mali’s consistently weak trade balance is matched on the invisibles account, services where the services deficit peaked at $330m in 1992, with little improvement the following year. Mali has few services to export, the only obvious one being tourism, which has been in the doldrums in recent years and which could never plug the gap on its own. Although individual Malian entrepreneurs are legendary elsewhere in Africa for their business skills, it is only in recent years that domestically based consultancies, accounting firms and other services- sector organisations have emerged in any numbers. They face stiff competition from their Ivorian, French and international counterparts, and the net export of financial and other services will remain a difficult goal. The net outflow on income is explained by Mali’s debt-service obligations. Private transfers have been positive since 1989, averaging just over $70m. This reflects remittances to families and village organisations from Malians working abroad (there are an estimated 3 million Malians outside the country’s boundaries). The now- restricted convertibility of the CFA franc will tend to strengthen this balance, while official transfers will stay strongly positive, reflecting grant aid from donor governments. (IMF balance-of-payments figures are given in Reference table 11.)

The current account, 1994 ($ m) Merchandise exports fob 319.7 Merchandise imports fob –421.6 Trade balance –101.9 Services balance –257.2 Income balance –35.8 Net unrequited transfers 230.6 Current-account balance –164.4 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Capital flows and foreign debt

Mali is one of Africa’s most aid-dependent economies, although the government is attempting to reorient the nature of this dependence by reducing the need for budgetary and balance-of-payments aid in favour of development funds. Aid disbursements dwarf other capital flows, although continuing investment in the mining sector could alter this picture before the end of the century. Net annual official development assistance according to OECD criteria averaged $440m in 1990-94. Grants accounted for an average 74% of the total during the period. The government is aware, however, that aid flows from the G7 countries are in historic decline. Virtually all capital investment in the country’s infrastructure is aid-funded. According to the World Bank, aid of various sorts accounted for nearly 27% of GDP in 1994, more than double the proportion of the previous year.

As with many other poorer African economies, multilateral aid has accounted for a slowly increasing proportion of total aid flows in recent years, with the EU and the International Development Association (IDA, the World Bank’s soft- loan window) heading the list. France is by far the main bilateral lender, reflecting the colonial ties of the past, although the USA has become a more prominent lender in recent years, reflecting its commitment to supporting emerging African democracies. Although Mali is known to be diversifying its dependence as a result of changing French policy towards smaller Franc Zone states, this pattern is likely to remain similar for the rest of the century. (Reference table 13 shows the trend of official development assistance.)

Debt levels are currently Mali counts as a highly indebted country by World Bank criteria. Total external stable debt rose only a little in 1994, to stand at $2.78bn. Of this total, $2.62bn was public and publicly-guaranteed debt, just under half of it owed to multilateral lenders. Although these cannot currently reschedule debts, Mali’s recent economic performance has won friends among the Bretton Woods institutions, which can be counted upon to press for increasingly generous reschedulings and write-offs of bilateral debt. The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) loan confirmed with the IMF in May 1996 was followed by a rescheduling agreement with the Paris Club of Mali’s official bilateral creditors. This consisted of a 67% write-off (or the consolidation) of all eligible interest repayments not affected by previous reschedulings, with the further possibility of a write-off of 67% of eligible principal sums, subject to good relations with the IMF. (Reference table 12 shows external debt.)

Mali could also benefit from any future revaluation of rouble-denominated debt which, according to national figures, accounts for CFAfr297bn ($600m), or 42% of bilateral debt. It is extremely unlikely that any future repayment arrangement will be concluded at the historic Soviet conversion rate of Rb0.56:$1, at which Moscow has persisted in valuing foreign debt. The book value of Mali’s debts to the former Soviet Union, much of which was contracted in the form of services and equipment rather than capital flows, is therefore unrealistically high.

EIU Country Profile 1996-97 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 1996 Mali: Foreign reserves and the exchange rate 67

Foreign reserves and the exchange rate

Control of the country’s own money supply was regarded as a sine qua non for genuine independence from France by the Keïta government, and in 1962 Mali left the Franc Zone (see Regional organisations). It established its own currency, the Malian franc (Mfr) at par with the CFA franc, and set up its own central bank. Smuggling and speculation rapidly undermined the currency. The monetary funding of increasing budget deficits hastened the decline of the Malian franc, and in 1967 Mali decided that it had no option but to rejoin the Franc Zone at a devalued (and fixed) rate of Mfr100:FFr1. It did not, however, rejoin the subregional monetary organisation, the Union monétaire ouest-africaine (UMOA), until 1984, a move which required an effective further 50% devaluation in the process of transferring to the CFA franc.

The looming inevitability The overvaluation of the CFA franc became a chronic problem from 1986. By of devaluation late 1991 the real exchange rate in Mali was thought to be overvalued by 25-30% (although in the case of Côte d’Ivoire this figure may have reached 60%). Free convertibility resulted in growing capital flight, which turned into a haemorrhage during 1992. This was aggravated by the illegal import of goods from Nigeria and elsewhere. France’s decision that it could no longer defend the CFA franc’s existing value in the face of rising losses to the Banque de France (France’s central bank), and growing pressure for a major devaluation from the IMF and World Bank made such a move inevitable. The Malian administration was reportedly divided on the issue, with financial reformers in favour and most members of the political class against. A 50% devaluation, to CFAfr100:FFr1, came in mid-January 1994. It was accompanied by promises of considerable multilateral assistance and a development debt write-off by France. Sharply rising world commodity market prices were a further happy coincidence. However, imports have become sharply more expensive to source, especially where machinery is concerned.

Foreign reserves have Reserves have increased sharply since 1988, largely due to external funding. increased Having dipped as low as $36m in 1988, total reserves minus gold peaked at $332m in 1993, before falling to $221m in December 1994 as the impact of devaluation on import costs combined with the government’s determination to keep interest arrears under control. This figure nevertheless represented a healthy six months of import cover, and had improved to $323m by the end of 1995. (Reference table 14 shows data on foreign reserves.)

Appendices

Regional organisations

Organisation of African The OAU was formed in 1963 with the aims of promoting solidarity among Unity (OAU) African states, raising the living standards of the African population, defending sovereignty and eliminating colonialism. The initial 30 signatories to the OAU’s charter have since been joined by another 21. Namibia formalised its membership immediately after independence in March 1990 and Eritrea did the same in May 1993. After its first multiracial elections, South Africa, the only remaining sub-Saharan non-member, joined the OAU in May 1994. All the North African countries are also members, with the exception of Morocco, which left the organisation in 1985 in a dispute over the admission of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). A Moroccan request for the expulsion of the SADR was again rejected at the 1992 heads-of-state summit.

The foreign affairs ministers of member states meet twice a year to discuss the implementation of the organisation’s accords. The issues raised are dealt with at the annual assembly of heads of state which meets in June or July. The annual conference is hosted by the member state which is due to take over the chairmanship of the organisation for the next year. The 1996 conference took place in Yaoundé (Cameroon), where the Cameroonian president, Paul Biya, took over from Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. There have, in addition, been three extra- ordinary conferences of heads of state: the first was in 1970 to discuss the Angolan crisis; the second, in 1980, sought to address the continent’s economic problems; and the third, in 1990, tried to tackle the problem of African debt.

The OAU is committed to the creation of an African Economic Community (AEC) according to the Lagos Plan of Action drawn up in 1980. This was originally scheduled to be in place by the year 2000, but the 27th summit of heads of state in Abuja (Nigeria) in June 1991 saw a postponement of this target to 2025. The AEC treaty, signed at this summit, outlined six stages, including the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and the establishment of a continent-wide customs union by 2004. A commitment was also made to the establishment of an African Common Market (ACM), with a central bank and single currency, by 2031.

The problem of conflict resolution has come to dominate the annual summit of heads of state. At the 1992 summit the accusation was levelled at the OAU that it had never successfully resolved a conflict situation in any of its member states. The possibility of the establishment of a military force to observe and monitor ceasefires negotiated by the OAU has also been raised by several heads of state but no formal commitment has been made. The issue has been particularly pressing in the wake of renewed ethnic violence in Burundi in 1996, but the OAU once again stopped short of agreeing to establish a military force, although it did arrange for peace talks to be held between Burundian factions in Addis Ababa.

Any move to step up the activity of the OAU is, however, hampered by the organisation’s severe budgetary problems. In November 1995, the ten worst

debtors, owing $16.5m between them, were debarred from speaking or voting at any OAU meeting. The return of full rights is conditional upon a substantial fall in accumulated arrears. By the time of the 1996 summit, although the organisation’s finances were in better shape than they had ever been, membership arrears still totalled $54m. The OAU’s budget for 1996/97 was set at $30.6m.

The OAU remains a high-profile talking-shop, with limited real action resulting from its policy decisions, constrained as it is by lack of funds and differing levels of commitment on the part of its members.

The Lomé Convention The Lomé Convention is a trade and aid agreement signed by the European Community (now the EU) and 70 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, including 47 African states, which guarantees preferential access to the EU market for some commodities produced by the ACP countries. All sub-Saharan African countries are members, with the exception of South Africa, which has, however, applied to join. The EU has so far been reluctant to accept this on the grounds that, on several criteria, South Africa fails to qualify as a developing country.

The fourth convention (Lomé IV) was signed in December 1989, replacing the previous agreements signed in Lomé in 1975, 1979 and 1984. Lomé IV maintained the long-term development aims of previous conventions, but placed new emphasis on economic policy reform in member states in line with the general emphasis on “conditionality” among multilateral funding bodies. The terms of Lomé IV will hold for ten, as opposed to the usual five, years, although the initial Financial Protocol only covered funding until March 1995. After months of protracted discussion, a new protocol was agreed at the EU Cannes summit on June 26-27, 1995. The cause for the delay was a divergence in the EU member states’ priorities. The UK and Germany were seeking to cut contrib- utions by a total of 30% and switch to bilateral aid instead. France had sug- gested an increase in total funding to Ecu14.3bn ($18.6bn), while the ACP countries’ stated requirements amounted to Ecu15.8bn. The eventual deal saw a total agreed funding of Ecu14.6bn.

To achieve its objectives, a series of instruments is clearly defined in the convention. The most important is the European Development Fund (EDF), with an allocation of Ecu13.3bn under the Financial Protocol which was agreed in June 1995. The EDF is the main source of multilateral EU aid to the ACP states, and of all EDF funding up to March 1995, some 92% was provided as grants, as opposed to 75% under Lomé III. An additional Ecu1.3bn will be made available to the European Investment Bank (EIB), which lends on a commercial basis. Total funding has been increased by 22% over the previous five years, but some commentators argue that this rise barely takes into account inflation. However, the ACP states did gain, in addition, a 16% cut in import tariffs for mainly agricultural products that did not previously enjoy preferential treatment.

The convention offers two other schemes that are separate from the financial protocol. The Stabilisation of Export Earnings Scheme (Stabex) was set up to cover losses of earnings caused by a drop in prices or production of the main ACP agricultural exports. It has been made more effective under Lomé IV and now includes better risk coverage. A total of 49 products are on the Stabex list.

The overall financial resources allocated to Stabex under Lomé IV were increased by 62% to Ecu1.5bn. However, the European Court of Auditors announced in May 1995 that the scheme suffered from a chronic shortage of funds and that it was able to compensate only 40.7% of eligible ACP export losses between 1990 and 1992. Sysmin, a special financing facility for countries reliant on the export of minerals, covering copper, phosphates, manganese, bauxite, tin, uranium and iron ore, was increased by 16% to Ecu480m.

The Franc Zone Although it evolved in the colonial era (in 1939), the Franc Zone was shaped in its current form by treaties signed by its principal members in the early 1970s. The zone governs the credit, foreign exchange and monetary relations between France, 13 former French colonies in Africa and Equatorial Guinea, as well as between France and its overseas departments and territories, and Monaco.

In November 1972 Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo and Gabon signed an agreement that redefined their monetary cooperation. Rel- ations in this field with France were restated in a treaty signed the same month. Equatorial Guinea became the sixth African signatory to these accords in 1984. The principal elements of this cooperation are a regional central bank based in Yaoundé (Cameroon), the Banque des états de l’Afrique centrale (BEAC), and a common currency, the CFA (Coopération financière en Afrique centrale) franc. BEAC is governed by a monetary committee composed of the six Central African states and a joint monetary committee consisting of the six plus France. A regional customs grouping formed in 1966, the Union douanière des états de l’Afrique centrale (UDEAC), also groups the six states.

A similar chain of events unfolded in francophone West Africa. In November 1973 Côte d’Ivoire, Dahomey (now Benin), Niger, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) signed a treaty redefining their monetary cooperation in the Union monétaire ouest-africaine (UMOA), founded in 1962. A convention with France followed in December 1973, and Mali became a party to both agreements in 1984. The entry of Guinea-Bissau in January 1997 has been agreed in principle. As with the Central African members of the Franc Zone, the UMOA was based on a common issuing central bank, the Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO, based in Dakar), and a common currency, the CFA (in this case, Communauté financière africaine) franc. The UMOA became the Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA) in January 1994. Its council of ministers formulates credit and monetary policy, and controls the BCEAO. The council also has responsibility for the regional development bank, the Lomé-based Banque ouest-africaine de développement (BOAD).

A comparable arrangement exists for Comoros. A convention has been signed with France. The issuing and central bank is the Banque centrale des Comores and the currency is the Comorian franc (Cfr).

The principal features of the Franc Zone are freedom to transfer funds throughout the zone, convertibility of the different currencies and fixed exchange rates. The Banque de France guarantees the money issued by the regional central banks, which in turn are required to maintain a minimum of 65% of their reserves in French francs with the French Treasury. The much-praised

unlimited convertibility of the CFA franc was restricted in August 1993, due largely to massive capital flight. CFA franc banknotes are no longer repur- chased outside the authority of the issuing bank (BCEAO or BEAC). These restrictions do not apply to commercial transactions or profit remittances.

Each regional bank holds an operations account (compte d’opérations), a current account denominated in French francs, with the Treasury in Paris. This is the principal payments mechanism in the zone. Its stability is founded on tight monetary and credit discipline. One example of this rigour is that members are not allowed to draw from their regional bank’s central funds more than 20% of the previous year’s budget receipts, although some enterprising governments have found ways to circumvent this requirement.

The future of the CFA franc and of the zone has been highlighted by the move towards European Economic and Monetary Union. From the mid-1980s it was argued that the CFA franc was greatly overvalued, encouraging imports for the urban elite, restraining exports and deterring inwards investment. Falling world prices for the zone’s principal exports (oil, coffee, cocoa and cotton) contributed to a sharp fall in the zone’s terms of trade, estimated at 45% in 1985-93 by the French government. Income per head shrank in the zone by about 20% in the same period. These factors, along with French reservations about funding the budget and current-account deficits of zone members, finally brought major changes. January 1994 saw the first devaluation after 46 years, to CFAfr100:FFr1 (and Cfr75:FFr1). This promptly led to new IMF money for zone members. France has pledged to maintain its support for the zone, and it suggests, without confirmation from its EU partners, that the convertibility and parity of the CFA franc will be transferred to a single European currency in due course.

Regional integration at Advocates of the devaluation point to rapid economic progress in the West two speeds African subregion of the zone since January 1994. The timing of the adjustment proved fortunate in that it was followed in mid-year by sharp rises in the world prices of the subregion’s main export commodities (coffee, cotton and cocoa). Côte d’Ivoire, which accounted for 38% of the combined GDP of UEMOA members in 1994, has introduced a wide range of economic reforms, secured foreign (mainly French) interest in its privatisation programme and seized upon the new competitive edge given by the devaluation to attract investment in energy and mining projects. This has given a boost to the subregion, notably the Sahelian hinterland. Substantial repatriation of flight capital since the devaluation has brought overliquidity in the banking system in Côte d’Ivoire (and elsewhere in the zone), leaving the commercial banks with loanable funds for which demand has been slow to pick up. The expansion of the Abidjan stock market into a regional bourse for the UEMOA is under way.

Regional integration has, for many years, been on the zone’s agenda but the subregion has now embarked upon it in earnest. The UEMOA treaty entered into force in August 1994 with its ratification by the seven members. In January 1995 its seven-member commission was inaugurated: it is the central body in the union, giving the conference of heads of state and the council of ministers its recommendations on the furtherance of regional integration, and setting the union’s budget. The terms of its members can only be revoked by the union’s new court of justice. The UEMOA has a second new judicial body, an

audit office (Cour des comptes). A transitional tariff regime for goods of UEMOA origin was launched in July 1995. By the end of 1997 the union hopes to have common investment and business legislation, and harmonised indirect taxes.

By contrast, progress towards regional integration in the Central African subregion since devaluation has been negligible. Cameroon accounts for more than 50% of its combined GDP, and its government’s lack of direction and leadership has constrained the subregion. The price of petroleum, the principal export of the subregion, has not helped post-devaluation adjustment in the way that prices of tropical soft commodities lifted the West African subregion. The Communauté économique et monétaire d’Afrique centrale (CEMAC), the equivalent of the UEMOA, has not yet formally come into being due to pro- cedural differences and disagreements between governments about the sharing of its top jobs.

Economic Community of ECOWAS was established in 1975 by 15 West African countries: Benin, Burkina West African States Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, (ECOWAS) Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Cape Verde joined in 1977. The principal objective of the community, to be achieved in stages, is the establishment of a customs union and a common market in order to promote the free movement of people and goods within West Africa. The initial treaty further provided for the harmonisation of regional policies in several sectors, particularly agriculture, industry, transport and communications.

Members’ rival trading interests and the existence of other regional organisations with similar aims have slowed progress towards the initial objectives of ECOWAS. Other problems include the multiplicity of currencies, the delays by member states in the payment of their subscriptions and the slow implementation of laws to allow free movement between member states. By the time of the 1991 summit, arrears in subscription payments had fallen by $24m but they still stood at $58m and sanctions were threatened for those still owing, including the refusal of ECOWAS project funding from the Fund for Cooper- ation, Compensation and Development.

In a radical departure from the community’s principal objectives, ECOWAS acted as a regional peacekeeper in the Liberian civil war in 1990-93, sending in the ECOWAS monitoring group (ECOMOG) to monitor a ceasefire and install an interim government. Involvement in the Liberian imbroglio initially did little to remove potential divisions within the organisation but it did see new life breathed into ECOWAS and gave it a high profile in West African affairs. At the 16th conference of heads of state in 1993, with the Liberian crisis apparently nearing a close after the signing of a peace treaty by all the sides in Geneva, it was decided that a permanent regional conflict resolution role should be adopted by ECOWAS. Several institutions, including a regional parliament and a permanent military adviser’s office, are to be established to help the organisation fulfil this new mandate. On July 24, 1993, a new treaty was signed by all the members, replacing that of 1975 and adding the role of regional peacekeeper to the ECOWAS list of objectives. In signing the new treaty ECOWAS members acknowledged that supranational interests must be borne in mind by policy-makers at all times.

Concern has, however, continued to be expressed at the slowness of economic integration in the region. As a step towards this, the commitment to full monetary union by 2000 was reiterated before the 1993 summit and a feasibility study was launched in February 1992 to examine the possibility of adopt- ing one of the region’s currencies as a common currency for all members. The two real contenders are the naira and the CFA franc, although the latter in- volves considerably more complex changes and the unlikely cooperation of France. At the 1992 summit the schedule for the removal of tariff barriers was restated (giving countries up to ten years from January 1990, depending upon their degree of industrialisation, to remove all tariffs on goods arriving from other ECOWAS countries). Companies which are at least 25% owned by citizens of ECOWAS member states are exempt from all tariffs, as are goods which are at least 40% manufactured within ECOWAS. Nonetheless, trade between ECOWAS members stood at only $2bn in 1990 and had actually fallen since 1981, when it totalled $2.3bn.

Organisation pour la mise The OMVS was established in 1972 and so far it has three member states: Mali, en valeur du fleuve Mauritania and Senegal. The admission of Guinea has been agreed in principle. Sénégal (OMVS) The OMVS’s two major projects so far have been the Diama dam in Senegal and the Manantali dam project in the Kayes region of Mali. The latter was completed in 1988, but delays, funding problems and disagreements have delayed the second phase of the project, the installation of major electricity generating capacity. Funding was finally agreed for this project in 1994 and Manantali is scheduled to come on stream in 1998.

Comité permanent CILSS was set up in 1973 by eight Sahelian countries of West Africa—Burkina inter-états de lutte contre Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal— la sécheresse dans le Sahel to coordinate the region’s response to the drought emergency at the time. The (CILSS) Gambia joined almost immediately afterwards. There are two CILSS research and training institutes, in Niger and Mali, and the organisation produces statistics on member countries’ food production in association with the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation. After several years of financial and organisational difficulties from the late 1980s, CILSS was reorganised in 1993-95 and now comprises six major programmes. Peripheral activities have been aban- doned and the organisation is considerably more independent of its member states. CILSS’s total budget for 1995 is CFAfr11.7bn ($23m).

Sources of information

National statistical sources Since 1991 national statistical materials have been patchy and data have been released mostly through regional and international sources (see below). The main government statistical agency, the Direction national de la statistique, is in the process of reorganising and upgrading resources, while the Direction nationale de l’élèvage has begun tracking the livestock sector’s progress closely. Due to Mali’s membership of the Franc Zone, most financial statistics are prepared on a federal basis by the Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO).

Francophone and As with many Franc Zone countries, international statistical sources for Mali international statistical suffer from inconsistency, and occasionally outright contradiction, on such sources fundamental indicators as real GDP growth, which in any case is only of indicative value. In addition, sources such as the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook can give a highly misleading picture of overall trade patterns, based as they are solely on the returns of official trading partners. Method- ologies can also vary widely between the statistics provided by the Bretton Woods organisations and the various francophone sources (the French Ministère de la coopération, the Franc Zone Secretariat and the BCEAO, all three of which are themselves capable of considerable disagreement). The BCEAO’s thrice-yearly Notes d’information et statistiques has the additional drawback of being badly out of date. The standard external source for financial data is the IMF’s monthly International Financial Statistics, which relies largely on more timely material from the BCEAO. Partial runs of statistical material are to be found in many World Bank publications devoted to various sectors of African economies, while Mali’s major aid partners have attempted in the past to compile indices of domestic expenditure and other social indicators. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)’s Production Yearbook appears to rely largely upon guesswork where the vital agro-pastoral sector is concerned. Two highly important sources are the World Bank’s World Debt Tables, which gives the most detailed breakdown of Mali’s debt profile, and the OECD’s Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients, which charts net aid commitments by donor. Both are published annually.

Select bibliography Cauris (weekly), Bamako

C Daum (coordinator), Région IIe de France/région de Kayes (Mali); Immigration et coopération décentralisée, Panos, Paris, 1994

Cheick Oumar Diarrah, Vers le IIIe république du Mali, Harmattan, Paris, 1991

Les Echos (weekly), Bamako

L’Essor (daily), Bamako

Inspection Service, Ministry of Cooperation, Mali. Evaluation de la coopération bilatérale entre le Mali et les Pays-Bas, 1975-1992, Den Haag, 1995

Ministry of Planning, Annuaire statistique du Mali, Bamako, (annual)

Le Républicain (weekly), Bamako

Abdoulaye Sall, Le pari de la decentralisation au Mali (2 vols), Sodifi, Bamako, 1993

B Sanankoua, La chute de Modibo Keïta, Eds. Shaka, Paris, 1989

Ousmane Oumarou Sidibé and Gerard Kester, Démocratie et concertation nationale. La mise en oeuvre du Conseil economique, social et culturel du Mali, PADEP/Harmattan, Paris and The Hague, 1994

Touaregs, exil et résistance (Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée no 57), Edisud, Aix-en-Provence, 1990

Sanoussi Touré, Le budget du Mali, sa conception, ses fonctions, Jamana, Bamako, 1994

Unicef, Enfants et femmes au Mali. Une analyse de situation, Paris, 1985

Trond Vedeld, The State and Rangeland Management: Creation and Erosion of Pastoral Institutions in Mali, IIED, Dryland Networks Programme Issues Paper 46, London, 1994

Reference tables

Reference table 1 Government finances (CFAfr bn) 1993a 1994a 1995b 1995c 1996b Total revenue & grants 146.7 236.2 221.7 269.7 250.5 Domestic receipts 104.7 138.9 158.7 177.3 184.5 of which: budgetary receipts 94.0 126.0 144.0 160.7 168.6 Grants 42.0 97.3 63.0 92.4 66.0 Total expenditure 177.3 278.4 305.0 306.9d 319.9 Recurrent 109.8 150.5 137.8 134.4 140.0 of which: salaries 40.9 44.5 48.0 47.9 50.6 Capital 67.5 127.9 154.2 156.7 164.0 of which: externally financed 58.5 115.0 n/a n/a n/a Other expenses 0.0 0.0 13.0 15.9 15.9 Balancee –22.0 –71.9 –91.4 –49.0 –84.3 Financing External (net) 25.5 76.8 50.6 90.8 53.3 Domestic (net) –3.0 –4.7 –7.0 –39.6 –10.8 Exceptional –0.5 –0.2 0.0 –2.2 0.0

a Outturn. b Budget. Financing gap in both 1995 and 1996 documents. c Provisional. d Does not sum due to rounding. e Cash basis, after movements in arrears.

Sources: Le comité monétaire de la Zone franc, La Zone franc, Rapport annuel; Ministère des finances et du commerce, Bamako; IMF.

Reference table 2 Money supply (CFAfr bn unless otherwise indicated; year-end) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Currency in circulation 59.97 60.84 65.07 94.18 109.53 Money (M1) 107.37 108.20 117.79 177.21 200.19 M1 growth (%) 9.0 0.8 8.9 50.4 13.0 Quasi-money 45.35 48.96 52.62 63.05 56.36 Money (M2) 152.72 157.16 170.41 240.26 256.55 M2 growth (%) 24.0 2.9 8.4 41.0 6.8 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Reference table 3 Gross domestic product (CFAfr bn unless otherwise indicated; market prices) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 GDP at current prices 672.3 737.2 753.8 1,028.7 1,129.3 GDP per head (CFAfr ’000) 70,701 75,109 74,376 98,355 104,630 GDP at constant 1987 prices 644.8 695.2 690.0 709.1 751.9 Real GDP growth (%) –2.5 7.8 –0.8 2.8 6.0 Sources: World Bank, World Tables; Ministère des finances et du commerce, Bamako.

Reference table 4 Gross domestic product by expenditure (CFAfr bn at constant 1987 prices) 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Private consumption 534.1 540.1 506.0 559.5 542.3 Government consumption 87.4 90.0 95.0 93.9 86.2 Gross domestic investment 140.0 148.4 149.2 152.2 151.1 Exports of goods & services 102.0 112.2 119.9 123.7 134.0 Imports of goods & services –205.1 –229.5 –225.3 –234.1 –223.6 GDP at market prices 658.4 661.2 644.8 695.2 690.0 Sources: World Bank, World Tables; Trends in Developing Economies; Secrétariat du comité monétaire de la Zone franc, La Zone franc, rapport annuel 1994

Reference table 5 Consumer price inflation (1986=100; period averages) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Index 112.0 105.3 105.1 130.4 n/a % change 1.5 –6.0 –0.2 24.1 12.7a a Measured by the GDP deflator.

Source: Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO), Notes d’information et statistiques.

Reference table 6 Transport statistics

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Railways Passenger traffic (’000 passenger-km) n/a n/a 377.2a 693.2b 845.9 Goods traffic (’000 ton-km) n/a n/a 243.4a 405.3b 460.9 of which: imports/exports n/a n/a 194.6a 325.0b 339.5 national n/a n/a 42.2a 63.6b 89.6 Air (Bamako Senou airport) Passengers embarked, landed or in transit (’000) 237.0 278.6 253.1 231.0 117.0c Cargo loaded/unloaded (’000 tons) 7.1 8.3 7.9 4.9 n/a a First and third quarters only. b First, second and fourth quarters only. c January-June.

Source: BCEAO, Notes d’information et statistiques.

Reference table 7 Manufacturing production (volume indices unless otherwise indicated; 1983=100) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Food industries 142.6 130.5 141.9 135.7 175.1 Textiles 138.8 83.5 198.1 129.3 175.4 All items 143.7 115.7 156.1 135.1 154.5 % change 16.2 –19.5 34.9 –13.5 14.4 Source: BCEAO, Notes d’information et statistiques.

Reference table 8 Production of selected cropsa (’000 tons) 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 Groundnuts 184.0 127.5 148.6 215.2 147.1 Seed cotton 272.6 320.0 246.4 350.0 405.0 Paddy rice 444.5 404.5 384.8 469.1 437.9 Millet, sorghum & maize 1,916.7 1,638.1 1,596.2 1,918.1 1,918.2

a Crop years starting in calendar years.

Sources: BCEAO, Notes d’information et statistiques; Marchés tropicaux et mediterranéens.

Reference table 9 Livestock numbers (’000 unless otherwise indicated) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Cattle 4,996 5,198 5,298 5,485 5,351 Sheep & goats 12,172 12,717 11,993 12,300 12,700 Pigs 56 67 80 64 65 Horses 77 83 90 97 105 Poultry (m) 22 22 22 22 22 Source: BCEAO, Notes d’information et statistiques.

Reference table 10 Main trading partners ($ m) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Exports to: Thailand 32 30 57 63 44 China 36 32 0 8 33 Belgium-Luxembourg 40 34 19 22 26 Portugal 3 6 11 10 20 Brazil 0 1441120 Italy 698716 Taiwan 13 1 2 1 10 EU 87 97 84 82 86 Africa 27 13 23 18 21 Imports from: Côte d’Ivoire 153 168 201 239 293 France 125 154 131 105 192 Senegal 27 44 30 37 46 UK 18 22 16 18 42 Belgium-Luxembourg 25 28 24 27 33 Hong Kong 14 29 42 26 29 China 116131228 EU 244 283 244 200 332 Africa 307 353 398 473 571 Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook.

Reference table 11 Balance of payments ($ m) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Merchandise exports fob 337.9 355.9 335.9 341.1 319.7 Merchandise imports fob –432.4 –446.9 –484.5 –446.5 –421.6 Trade balance –94.5 –91.0 –148.6 –105.3 –101.9 Exports of services 80.1 69.8 75.0 75.4 66.8 Imports of services –395.1 –374.9 –406.5 –388.6 –324.0 Inflows of IPDa 19.5 11.7 12.8 25.1 5.4 Outflows of IPDa–61.0 –36.9 –43.1 –38.1 –41.2 Inflows of transfers 291.5 333.0 344.9 300.2 275.8 Outflows of transfers –90.6 –87.7 –87.6 –81.9 –45.2 Current-account balance –250.1 –175.9 –253.1 –213.4 –164.4 Direct & portfolio investment –6.6 3.5 –7.6 –20.1 45.0 Other capital 105.8 137.5 143.6 111.9 111.7 Net investment assets 84.3 49.2 10.5 –5.7 –50.9 Capital- and financial-account balance 183.5 190.2 146.5 86.1 105.8 Errors & omissions 1.1 14.6 –31.0 30.1 –5.1 Overall balance –65.6 29.0 –137.6 –97.2 –63.7 Exceptional financing 112.0 100.0 136.8 137.4 61.8 Use of IMF credit and loans 8.3 –9.2 8.4 5.6 32.7 Memorandum item Total change in reserve assets (– indicates inflow) –54.8 –119.8 –7.6 –45.8 –30.7 of which: revaluations 2.5 7.9 9.0 –19.0 21.3 a Interest, profit & dividends.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Reference table 12 External debt ($ m unless otherwise indicated) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total external debt 2,478 2,593 2,603 2,640 2,781 Long-term debt 2,345 2,452 2,474 2,499 2,623 Short-term debt 63 81 64 70 50 of which: interest arrears on long-term debt 10 31 34 41 30 Use of IMF credit 69 60 65 71 108 Public & publicly guaranteed long-term debt 2,345 2,452 2,474 2,499 2,623 Official creditors 2,327 2,438 2,469 2,496 2,621 Multilateral 909 1,020 1,067 1,109 1,232 Bilaterala 1,419 1,418 1,402 1,388 1,389 Private creditors 18 14 5 3 2 of which: banks 22222 Total debt service 65 30 43 40 130 Principal 4117262791 Interest 24 14 17 13 39 of which: short-term debt 33221 Ratios (%) Total external debt/GNP 101.5 108.4 92.4 99.5 151.8 Debt service/exports of goods & services 12.5 5.8 8.2 7.3 27.2 Short-term debt/total external debt 2.5 3.1 2.5 2.7 1.8 Concessional long-term loans/long-term debt 96.3 96.6 97.2 96.8 97.7

Note. Long-term debt is defined as having an original maturity of more than one year. a Approximately half Mali’s bilateral debt is towards the Former Soviet Union and, while the precise currency composition is not known, the rouble component will be heavily discounted in future reschedulings.

Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables.

Reference table 13 Net official development assistancea ($ m) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 Bilateral 327.9 284.2 242.8 216.9 232.3 of which: France 129.1 92.5 89.7 80.2 90.7 USA 30.0 38.0 30.0 37.0 29.0 Japan 12.3 16.5 10.0 9.1 21.9 Netherlands 35.5 28.2 30.8 24.2 20.9 Canada 20.9 20.3 22.9 17.1 20.3 Multilateral 159.6 173.5 191.5 149.5 210.4 of which: International Development Association 41.0 67.0 59.1 43.0 87.4 EU 42.1 45.2 71.1 58.2 52.7 IMF 19.7 –0.1 14.4 14.2 39.4 African Development Fund 20.3 28.4 14.5 7.5 10.3 UN Development Programme 14.1 16.3 15.4 11.3 7.2 Total 487.5 457.7 434.2 366.4 442.6 of which: grants 300.1 330.1 332.6 308.3 333.9 a Disbursements by OECD and OPEC members and by multilateral agencies. Official development assistance is defined as grants and loans with at least a 25% grant element, administered with the aim of promoting development and welfare in the recipient country. Aid from the former Eastern Bloc is excluded.

Source: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients.

Reference table 14 Foreign reserves ($ m unless otherwise indicated; end-period) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Foreign exchange 306.5 295.9 320.3 208.5 309.5 SDRs 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 Reserve position in the IMF 12.4 11.9 12.0 12.7 13.0 Total reserves excl gold 319.3 307.9 332.4 221.4 323.0 Golda 5.1 4.8 5.3 5.5 5.5 Total reserves incl gold 324.4 312.7 337.7 226.9 328.5 Memorandum item Gold (m fine troy oz) 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 a April. b Valued at 75% of fourth-quarter average London price.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Editors: Gregory Kronsten; Andrew Manley All queries: Tel: (44.171) 830 1007 Fax: (44.171) 830 1023