COUNTRY PROFILE 2000

Côte d’Ivoire Mali

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ISSN 1351-0576

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Comparative economic indicators, 1999

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 1

April 1st 2000 Contents

Côte d’Ivoire

4 Basic data

5 Political background 5 Historical background 9 Constitution and institutions 9 Political forces 12 International relations and defence

13 Resources and infrastructure 13 Population 14 Education and health 16 Natural resources and the environment 17 Transport and communications 19 Energy provision

21 The economy 22 Economic structure 23 Economic policy 24 Economic performance

26 Economic sectors 26 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 29 Mining and semi-processing 30 Manufacturing 31 Financial services 32 Other services

33 The external sector 33 Trade in goods 35 Invisibles and the current account 36 Capital flows and foreign debt 37 Foreign reserves and the exchange rate

38 Appendices 38 Sources of information 39 Reference tables 39 Population 40 Transport: Port of Abidjan traffic 40 Electricity production and consumption 40 Petroleum consumption 41 Government finances 41 Money, credit and interest rates 42 Gross domestic product

© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 EIU Country Profile 2000 2

42 Gross domestic product by expenditure 43 Gross domestic product by sector 43 Consumer price inflation 43 Producer prices for selected commoditiesa 44 Food crop production 44 Production of main cash crops 44 Gold, oil and gas production 44 Manufacturing production 45 Foreign trade 45 Main trading partners 46 Balance of payments, IMF estimates 47 Net official development assistancea 48 External debt, World Bank estimates 48 Foreign reserves 49 Exchange rates

Mali

50 Basic data

51 Political background 51 Historical background 53 Constitution and institutions 54 Political forces 55 International relations and defence

57 Resources and infrastructure 57 Population 58 Education 58 Health 58 Natural resources and the environment 59 Transport and communications 59 Energy provision

60 The economy 60 Economic structure 61 Economic policy 61 Economic performance 61 Regional trends

64 Economic sectors 64 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 66 Mining and semi-processing 68 Manufacturing 68 Construction 68 Financial services 69 Other services

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69 The external sector 69 Trade in goods 70 Invisibles and the current account 71 Capital flows and foreign debt 72 Foreign reserves and the exchange rate 73 Regional organisations 77 Sources of information 79 Reference tables 79 Government finances 89 Money supply 80 Gross domestic product by expenditure 80 Consumer price inflation 80 Agricultural output 80 Livestock numbers 81 Manufacturing production 81 Foreign trade 81 Main trading partners 82 Balance of payments, IMF estimates 83 External debt, World Bank estimates 84 Net official development assistancea 84 Foreign reserves 85 Exchange rates

© The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 EIU Country Profile 2000 4 Côte d’Ivoire

Côte d’Ivoire

Basic data

Land area 322,463 sq km

Population 14.5m (mid-1999; UN estimate)

Main towns Population in ‘000 (1996)

Abidjan (capital) 2,500 Bouaké 460 Yamoussoukro 190 Daloa 170

Climate Tropical

Weather in Abidjan Hottest months, February-April, 24-32°C (average daily minimum and (altitude 20 metres) maximum); coldest month, August, 22-28°C; driest month, January, 41 mm average rainfall; wettest month, June, 495 mm average rainfall

Languages French, Baoulé and other local languages

Measures Metric system

Currency CFA franc=100 centimes; CFAfr100:FFr1; CFAfr656:¤1. average exchange rate in 1999: CFAfr615.70:$1; exchange rate on March 15th, 2000: CFAfr676.2:$1

Financial year January-December

Time GMT

Public holidays, 2000 January 1st, Eid el Fitr (January 7th-10th), Tabaski (March 17th), Easter Monday (April 24th), Labour day (May 1st), Ascension Day (June 1st), Whit Monday (June 12th), Prophet’s birthday (June 15th), Independence Day (August 7th) All Saints’ Day (November 1st), National Day (December 7th), December 25th

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Political background

The bloodless coup of December 24th 1999 put an abrupt end to what was considered one of the most stable political structures in Sub-Saharan Africa. Elected in 1995, the ousted president, Henri Konan Bédié, purported to be the legitimate successor of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the father of the nation who brought the country to independence in 1960 and remained head-of-state until his death in 1993. It was Mr Houphouët-Boigny who also founded the Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), the ruling party, which was to dominate the country’s political life for four decades, despite the installation of a multi- party system in 1990. The head of the military junta, General Robert Guéï, set up a transition government in January 2000 and promised a return to civilian rule by end-2000.

Historical background

A peaceful transition to In pre-colonial times, the territory of present-day Côte d’Ivoire was independence inhospitable to the sea-borne European traders, because of the dense, thinly populated tropical forest stretching hundreds of kilometres inland from the Atlantic. There was little European interest in the interior before the mid-19th century. Northern Côte d’Ivoire, largely savannah, and Muslim, historically fell under the tutelage of the Guinean kingdoms, which periodically exerted control over much of modern Mali, Guinea and Niger. French influence grew after 1893, when the colony of Côte d’Ivoire was officially established. The potential of the country’s rich agricultural and forestry resources came to be realised with the building of a railway through Côte d’Ivoire into present-day Burkina Faso, and by the late 1940s, Côte d’Ivoire had replaced Senegal as France’s richest colony in West Africa.

Félix Houphouët- Côte d’Ivoire became independent in August 1960, with the francophile Félix Boigny’s rule Houphouët-Boigny, a successful cocoa farmer and a former minister in the French government, as president. By making the most of his carefully cultivated personal relations with successive French governments, as much as through skilful economic and political management, Mr Houphouët-Boigny came to dominate the country’s political life, and in the 1960s and 1970s presided over Côte d’Ivoire’s emergence as one of Africa’s few stable and economically successful countries. Mr Houphouët-Boigny’s ruling party, the Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), became similarly dominant. There was remarkably little internal strife, and no significant external threat. The president saw no reason to develop a costly, and possibly untrustworthy, army, and national defence was largely entrusted to France.

Côte d’Ivoire’s success as an exporter of cocoa, coffee, timber and tropical fruits was another important factor in its stability. These exports quickly enabled the country to achieve an enviable level of prosperity. The number of French people working in the country came to exceed that in colonial times, and high-rise buildings transformed the Abidjan skyline. Immigrants flocked to the country’s

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plantations from Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and other countries; towards the end of the 1990s they made up around 40% of the total population.

A turbulent fin de règne During the 1980s, however, commodity prices fell and Côte d’Ivoire began to face serious economic and social problems. As Mr Houphouët-Boigny declined into senility, popular dissent grew and by the beginning of the 1990s demonstrations and strikes had become commonplace. The first multiparty elections were held in 1990 and were won by the PDCI and President Houphouët-Boigny, amid accusations from the opposition of vote-rigging. When the flamboyant leader of the leftist Front populaire Ivoirien (FPI), Laurent Gbagbo, defiantly led thousands of protesters through the streets of Abidjan in early 1992 and there was widespread rioting in the commercial capital, the authorities reacted vigorously. There were hundreds of arrests, and student and opposition leaders, including Professor Gbagbo, were imprisoned under retrospective legislation rushed through parliament, the Assemblée nationale; most were freed after six months. The events of 1992 shook ordinary Ivorians, and fears grew that, after Mr Houphouët-Boigny’s death, social chaos would dash hopes of a return to economic prosperity.

The rise of Mr Konan Bédié Two likely successors had emerged by the time Mr Houphouët-Boigny died in December 1993: Alassane Dramane Ouattara, a World Bank-schooled economist, who had been prime minister since 1990, and Henri Konan Bédié, the president of the Assemblée nationale. Within hours of Houphouët-Boigny’s death, Mr Konan Bédié announced that he was the new head of state, invoking a constitutional provision transferring interim power to the speaker of parliament in the event of the president’s death. The then French president, François Mitterrand, accepted Mr Konan Bédié’s claim. Mr Ouattara immediately resigned as prime minister, and Mr Konan Bédié began consolidating his own power, moving loyalists into key positions in the administration, sidelining those sympathetic to Mr Ouattara.

Mr Konan Bédié took 95% of the vote in the October 1995 presidential election. But the opposition denounced the electoral law, passed by the PDCI- dominated parliament shortly before the elections, on the grounds that it excluded anyone whose descent was not “pure” Ivorian or who had been resident abroad during the preceding five years from standing. Mr Ouattara fell into both categories: he was based in the US as a deputy managing director of the IMF since December 1993 and was of mixed Burkinabé descent. Mr Gbagbo withdrew from the campaign, protesting that the electoral process was being manipulated.

Whereas the presidential election was marred by violence, the legislative election in November went ahead without problems, and all the major political parties took part. The PDCI took 149 of the 175 seats; the remaining seats were split between the FPI and the Rassemblement des républicains (RDR), a pro-Ouattara party formed by defectors from the reformist wing of the PDCI.

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Presidential and legislative election, Oct-Nov 1995 % of votes No. of seats Henri Konan Bédié 95.2 PDCI 149 Francis Wodié 3.8 RDR 13 Laurent Gbagboa 0 FPI 13 Djény Kobinaa 0

a Boycotted the poll.

Source: EIU.

Important recent events

December 1993: Felix Houphouët-Boigny, Côte d’Ivoire’s president since independence in 1960, dies. The president of the Assemblée nationale, Henri Konan Bédié, is sworn in as new head of state, sidelining the prime minister, Alassane Dramane Ouattara. Daniel Kablan Duncan is appointed prime minister.

January 1994: The CFA franc is devalued by 50%, preparing the ground for further economic reforms and a sustained period of economic growth.

October-November 1995: Mr Konan Bédié wins 95% of the vote in the October presidential election, in the face of a widespread opposition boycott, after a constitutional amendment had barred Mr Ouattara from standing. In November, the opposition takes part in the legislative election, but the ruling PDCI wins 149 of the 175 parliamentary seats.

August 1998: The constitution is amended, strengthening the powers of the president, and seemingly barring Mr Ouattara from standing in the 2000 presidential election.

October 1998: The leader of the RDR, Djény Kobina, dies of a heart attack.

December 1998: The opposition FPI and the government sign an agreement on the conduct of the 2000 elections.

August 1999: Mr Ouattara becomes the new leader of the RDR and confirms his intention to run the presidential contest, but Mr Bédié’s government rejects his candidacy on the grounds that he is a foreigner.

December 1999: The government accuses Mr Ouattara of forging his national identity papers and issues a warrant for his arrest; opposition protests mount. President Bédié is ousted in a coup.

January 2000: a transition government is formed and general elections promised for October.

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Less than a year after the devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994, Mr Konan Bédié’s regime began to reap the political benefits of a quick economic recovery, helped by improved commodity prices and falling inflation. Mr Konan Bédié sought to consolidate his power, by reshuffling leaders of the army in 1996 and establishing a national security council in 1997. He also successfully co-opted malleable elements of the opposition. In a cabinet reshuffle in March 1998, he enticed the RDR’s deputy secretary-general, Adama Coulibaly, into the government. While changing the constitution in his favour, he also succeeded in initiating a “dialogue” with Mr Gbagbo and the FPI, resulting in an agreement in December 1998 on the conduct of the next presidential and legislative elections in 2000 (see Constitution and institutions).

Pre-coup tension Support for the Bédié government started to flag in late 1998, as the economy showed the first signs of faltering. While world prices for cocoa, the country’s main export, began to dwindle, the IMF announced its decision to withhold structural funds, citing fiscal slippage and opaque financial practice in public administration. In October 1998, the RDR’s founder and secretary-general, Djény Kobina, died, opening the door for Mr Ouattara to became leader in August 1999—the end of his term with the IMF. Citing the 1995 electoral law, the Bédié government continued to refuse to allow Mr Ouattara to run for the presidency. The economic crisis compounded rising tension between supporters of Mr Bédié and Mr Ouattara and increased student militancy.

Despite mounting domestic and international concern over the government’s commitment to holding free and fair elections, the authorities banned all public demonstrations and marches in late November. They went a step further in early December, when they launched a warrant for Mr Ouattara’s arrest, after accusing him of “forging” his national identity papers. As mediation offers were quietly dropped, it became increasingly apparent that Mr Konan Bédié would not hesitate to push the nation to the brink in order to remain in power.

The beginning of a new era Unhappy over pay levels and working conditions, a group of young soldiers mutinied in the capital on December 23rd 1999. President Konan Bédié failed to reach agreement with the mutineers, represented by a well-known retired officer, General Robert Guéï, who announced the following day that Mr Konan Bédié’s government had been ousted. A television address in which the heads of the police, army and gendarmerie appeared with General Guéï and indicated their willingness to work with the military junta, the Comité national du salut public (CNSP), on December 25th gave the ousted president no choice but to leave the country. Bloodshed had been avoided and order was quickly restored.

Following negotiations with the PDCI, the RDR and the FPI, the CNSP announced the composition of a transitional government on January 4th 2000. Under mounting pressure from the international community, the government announced its decision to hold a referendum on a new constitution and electoral law by April 2000. Local, legislative and presidential elections are to be simultaneously held by the end of October 2000.

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Constitution and institutions

Transition to multipartisme Since independence, Côte d’Ivoire has been a unitary state with a unicameral parliament, the Assemblée nationale, whose 175 members, like the president of the republic, are elected by universal suffrage every five years. For three decades, Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI justified the one-party system by arguing that open competition among political parties would emphasise ethnic, regional or religious differences at a time when the priority was to unify the new country. In response to domestic and international pressure for multipartisme, however, 25 opposition parties were registered in 1990, of which only two secured seats in that year’s election. Press censorship was also relaxed, leading to a spate of new politically-aligned newspapers and periodicals. Although the first multiparty elections were held in 1990, the country remained a de facto one-party state, ruled by the PDCI.

Electoral law Mr Konan Bédié pushed through bitterly opposed constitutional amendments that strengthened his position in 1995 and 1998. In anticipation of the presidential and legislative elections in 2000, the electoral code of 1995, which barred candidates that could not prove that both their parents were of Ivorian descent, or that had not resided in Côte d’Ivoire continuously throughout the previous five years—Mr Ouattara fell into both categories—was amended in June 1998. Presidential candidates were now required to have Ivorian fathers and demonstrate ten years of continuous residence in the country. The code also planned to extend the presidential mandate in 2000 from five to seven years, and set the age limit for running for the presidency to 75. This would have allowed Mr Konan Bédié to remain in office for another two terms. An upper house, the Senate, was also to be created. These amendments were partly mitigated by an agreement with the FPI in December 1998, under which an electoral commission was to be created to supervise and arbitrate on elections.

Post-coup constitution Following the suspension of the constitution in the wake of the coup in December 1999, a 27-member, all party electoral commission, Commission consultative et constitutionelle électorale (CCCE).was created to draft the country’s new constitution and change the electoral law. An independent electoral watchdog, the Commission de supervision de l’organisation du référendum constitutionnel (COSUR), is to revise electoral rolls, monitor the elections, and proclaim the results in the April referendum.

Political forces

The military junta Côte d’Ivoire’s army will remain the country’s main political force, until civilian rule is restored. With the coup, the army has been politicised, and top-brass officers are now in charge of important ministerial portfolios. In addition, General Guéï has yet to dismiss rumours that he may contest the presidential poll. But the military is expected to return to barracks eventually, no doubt after having secured some stipends and other privileges. They know that permanent military rule will not only alienate the international community, but also

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endanger domestic stability. The army has shown that it can not be neglected, and will be treated as a major constituency by the incoming government and new Ivoirian president after the elections due in October 2000.

Military personnel, mid-1999 Armed forces 8,400 Army 6,800 Navy 900 Air force 700 Paramilitary 5,500 Presidential guard 1,100 Gendarmerie 4,400 Total regular armed forces 13,900 Reserves 12,000 Militia 1,500 French army forces 570 Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1999/2000.

A moving political The Rassemblement des républicains (RDR) and Front populaire Ivoirien (FPI) landscape are the main parties represented in the transition government. No doubt in a state of shock, the PDCI failed to put forward names for cabinet positions in the post-coup government. Although two persons thought to be close to the PDCI were appointed at the mining and agriculture ministries, the former ruling party will now have little input in the running of government affairs. The RDR and FPI have gone to great lengths to further their own political ambitions in preparation for the general elections due in October 2000. Electoral campaigning was already in high gear before the coup, but then the FPI and RDR presented a semblance of unity in their opposition to the PDCI and Mr Konan Bédié. Mr Ouattara and Mr Gbagbo are now vying for presidency neck-in-neck. As a result, their respective cabinet members have found it hard to set aside their differences and work together.

Mr Gagbo claims to offer the only genuine alternative to four decades of PDCI rule, since his party was already in the opposition in 1990, when the first multiparty elections took place. However, the frontrunner at present is Mr Ouattara. The former deputy-managing director of the IMF has won the sympathy of a great deal of the population, drawing significant support from modernisers within the emerging urban middle class.

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The dangerous concept of Ivoirité

Under the late president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, PDCI loyalists were predominantly francophile Roman Catholics and often, although by no means exclusively, from the president’s Baoulé community in central Côte d’Ivoire. Nonetheless, there was generally little dissent along ethnic or religious lines, with none of the country’s 60 or so tribal groups thought to be dominant. In fact, the concept of Ivoirité was inclusive of the immigrant population, called in to contribute to the countries’ development. Africans from surrounding countries began arriving in large numbers during the boom years of the 1970s, principally as seasonal workers in plantations. Many subsequently settled in Abidjan and in the north of the country.

In contrast, Mr Konan Bédié sought to define citizenship on a narrow basis. In rejecting Mr Ouattara’s candidacy for the presidential election on the ground that the RDR leader was Burkinabè, not Ivoirian, and with the economic crisis helping, the Bédié government has encouraged anti-foreign sentiment. Nationalism is now likely to be used as an electoral platform by the FPI, RDR and the embattled PDCI, against the RDR and its leader, Mr Ouattara. With a third of the population made of immigrants, the concept of Ivoirité has become a sensitive and devisive issue. There is real concern that religious tolerance could be undermined as a result. Most southerners, who regard themselves as “true Ivorinas” are Christian or animist, while their northern counterparts are mostly Muslim.

Student and trade In its first three decades of independence, Côte d’Ivoire faced several local union militancy revolts, alleged coup attempts and bouts of student unrest. Violent campus agitation in 1991 and 1992 led, not for the first time, to the dissolution of the students’ union, the Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire (FESCI). Many of the social troubles that characterised the early 1990s arose from resentment over the Ouattara government’s IMF-inspired attempts to trim the huge public-sector wage bill. Not surprisingly, strikes, marches and student militancy regain much of their intensity around election times, although they usually remained confined to Abidjan.

Main political figures

General Robert Guéï: Head of state under the post-coup government and the CNSP, General Robert Guéï, was head of the armed forces under President Félix Houphouët-Boigny from 1990. The president’s refusal to discipline him over the army’s mistreatment of students prompted demonstrations in Abidjan in 1992. Before the presidential election in 1995, Mr Konan Bédié moved General Guéï into the junior civil service ministry, before eventually dismissing him. His removal was largely attributed to allegations in mid-1996 that elements within the army had conspired to stage a coup against Mr Konan Bédié on the eve of the election, especially as General Guéï refused to commit his troops to “maintain order” during the electoral campaign.

Henri Konan Bédié: Former president of the Assemblée nationale, who assumed the interim presidency of the republic and chairmanship of the ruling PDCI in December 1993. He was elected president, without serious

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competition, in October 1995, before being ousted in a military coup in December 1999. He now is now in exile in France.

Daniel Kablan Duncan: Former prime minister, a loyal technocrat, now in exile. Enthusiastic supporter of the economic reform programme launched by Alassane Dramane Ouattara, under whom he had served as finance minister in 1990.

Laurent Gbagbo: Leader of the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI). Won 18% of the vote in the presidential election of 1990 but boycotted the poll in 1995. Mr Gbagbo claims to offer the only genuine alternative to four decades of PDCI ruling, since his party was already in the opposition in 1990, when the first multiparty elections took place.

Alassane Dramane Ouattara: Former prime minister, who resigned in December 1993, and a deputy managing director of the IMF since May 1994. He and his party, the RDR, are the favourites for the general elections, mooted for October 2000.

International relations and defence

Mildly unfavourable The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), which met in regional reaction Bamako, Mali to discuss the situation in Côte d’Ivoire in January, condemned to the coup the December 1999 coup, and asked the CNSP to organise free and fair elections by June 2000. However, it stopped a long way short from taking actions to restore Mr Bédié as president as it had done when a similar situation occurred in Sierra Leone. In fact, relations between Côte d’Ivoire and neighbouring countries, notably Mali and Burkina Faso, had become strained over the past two years, in part because Mr Konan Bédié’s style of governance was increasingly perceived as a source of regional instability. Ecowas chairman and Malian president Alpha Oumar Konaré, was highly critical of General Guéï’s seizure of power in Côte d’Ivoire, but behind the scenes, Ecowas members seemed to agree that the overthrow of Mr Bédié was hardly a disaster. They will now be watching closely to see whether General Guéï sticks to his pledge to hold elections in 2000.

Western donors waiting Western donors have also shown little regret over Mr Konan Bédié’s departure, for elections opting for a wait-and-see approach. Although all aid was suspended, donors failed to call for Mr Konan Bédié’s restitution, effectively signalling the death knell of his term as president. In addition, it soon became clear that France would only provide minimal help to Mr Konan Bédié and his allies, namely by ensuring their safety and granting them political asylum. Protecting national interests in Côte d’Ivoire is the French government’s main concern. Before the coup, France was Côte d’Ivoire’s most significant political, economic and military ally by far. France’s influence with the IMF, the World Bank and other financial institutions has been crucial in winning Côte d’Ivoire important donor support at critical moments, particularly in 1998. With Côte d’Ivoire being its most important African foothold, France is expected to resume co-

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operation with the transition government, providing it sticks to the heralded electoral agenda.

Resources and infrastructure

Population

Population indicators, 1998

Population (mid–year; m) 14.6 Population growth rate (%) 2.0 Fertility rate (children per woman) 5.1 Life expectancy (at birth) 51.0 Urbanisation (% of total) 44.0 Projected population in 2008 (m) 17.7a

a EIU forecast.

Source: UNFPA, The State of World Population, 1998.

A swelling urban A national census was conducted in November 1998, but the preliminary population results will only be known in 2000. According to the UN’s latest estimate, Côte d’Ivoire’s population stood at 14.6m in mid-1998, lower than the government’s estimate of 15.3m in 1997. In recent years, Côte d’Ivoire has become one of the most urbanised countries in West Africa, with an estimated 44% of all Ivorians living in towns according to the UN. The government puts the figure even higher, at 60%. The UN estimates that the urban population is growing at 4.7% a year. Abidjan’s population alone was estimated in 1998 at 3.2m, almost one- quarter of the country’s population. The EIU estimates that the overall population growth rate has fallen to 2% per year in 1998, which is low by West African standards, a result of falling fertility rates, lower immigration and the effect of AIDS. (For historical data see Reference table 1.)

The main ethnic groups are the Akans (Abron, Baoulé, Agni), the Mandés (Malinkés, Dioulas, Yaoucouba and Gouros), and the Voltaïque ethnic groups, notably the Senoufos. At present, nearly 40% of the population consists of first- and second-generation foreigners, chiefly of Burkinabè, Malian, Guinean and Ghanaian origin. The influx from essentially Muslim countries has caused the country’s religious majority to shift, and Muslims are now estimated to be the country’s largest religious group, accounting for about 45% of the population. There are also large French and Lebanese communities, the latter engaged mainly in trade.

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Comparative human development indicators (1997 unless otherwise indicated) Côte South d’Ivoire Mali Ghana Africa France HDI score 0.422 0.375 0.544 0.695 0.918 Real GDP per head ($; in PPP terms) 1,731 565 2,032 4,334 21,176 Life expectancy at birth (years) 46.7 53.3 60.0 54.7 78.1 Adult literacy rate (%) 42.6 35.5 66.4 84.0 99.0 Population without access to: safe water (1990-97) 58 34 35 13 n/a health services (1981-92) 40 80 75 n/a n/a sanitation (1990-97) 61 94 45 13 n/a Population not expected to reach 40 (%) 37.3 33.6 21.1 23.4 n/a Infant mortality rate (1997 per 1,000) 90 145 68 49 n/a Population below poverty linea (%) 17.7 n/a 31.0 23.7 n/a

a $1 per day, (1989-94).

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 1998.

A poor quality of life for In its annual Human Development Report for 1999, the UN Development the majority Programme (UNDP) ranked Côte d’Ivoire 154th out of 174 countries. The UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) attempts to measure quality of life, on the basis of real GDP per head—in PPP terms—the adult literacy rate and life expectancy at birth. This placed Côte d’Ivoire in the ”low human development” category. Its rank has deteriorated since the 1998 report, when it was ranked 148th out of 175 countries. Although GDP per head (in PPP terms) was relatively high for the region, at $1,731 in 1995, 17.7% of all the country’s inhabitants lived below the $1-per-day poverty level.

Education and health

A education system in crisis At a time of mounting fiscal difficulty, the Bédié government was reluctant to sanction additional spending on education, despite funding from the World Bank, continued encouragement by the IMF and other donors, and an ongoing crisis in education. Since the early 1980s, standards of attainment have fallen at all levels. Results in French-type baccalauréat examinations have deteriorated steadily in recent years. The failure rate, which was 30% in 1969, reached 86% in 1994. In addition, further efforts will be required to improve the country’s dismal literacy rates. According to the UN, only 43% of Ivorians were literate in 1997 (50% of men, and 30% of women), compared with 66% of Ghanaians (76% of men and 54% of women).

Discontent among the country’s 50,000 tertiary-level students has repeatedly spilled over from the university campuses onto the streets and into the secondary and even the primary schools, and has usually received rough treatment from the police. In August 1999, the government was forced for the second time in three years to terminate the academic year, following a wave of student protests and strikes that disrupted most courses. Strikes, orchestrated by FESCI, became increasingly violent, after talks with the government in May

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failed to resolve the situation. Students are demanding improved funding, regular payment of grants, better accommodation and reforms to the education system.

Health provision is poor Healthcare provision is inadequate, with few Ivorians able to afford treatment. The government launched an ambitious public health development programme, with a budget of CFAfr80.4bn ($157m), in 1996, and health expenditure was further increased in the 1999 budget. The programme includes the construction of 29 hospitals and more than 300 rural clinics, as well as the provision of 350 dispensaries and 450 maternal health centres. The government hopes that the programme will reduce infant mortality from 90 deaths per 1,000 births in 1997 to 50 per 1,000 by 2005, extend vaccination to 90% of the population from the present 50%, and boost average life expectancy to 60 years. According to the UN, average life expectancy was 47 years in 1997, compared with 60 in neighbouring Ghana. The UNDP estimated the population per doctor at 11,111 in 1991, while there was one nurse to every 3,226 people.

Côte d’Ivoire: estimates of the impact of AIDS (per 1,000 unless otherwise indicated) 1998 2010 Without AIDS With AIDS Without AIDS With AIDS Population growth rate (%) 3.0 2.4 2.9 2.2 Life expectancy (years) 56.5 46.2 61.8 46.7 Crude death rate 10.7 16.7 8.0 15.4 Infant mortality rate 86.7 95.9 61.8 74.8 Child mortalitya 169.2 197.6 84.2 120.9

a Under the age of five.

Source: US Bureau of the Census, World Population Profile, 1998.

The threat of AIDS According to a report from UNAIDS, the international body co-ordinating the fight against AIDS, 700,000 people were infected with HIV in Côte d’Ivoire at the end of 1997. The infection rate among adults was said to be about 10%, one of the highest in West Africa. About 420,000 people were said to have died of AIDS-related illness in the country since the onset of the epidemic in the 1980s; 72,000 died in 1997 alone. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that AIDS is becoming an increasing threat. According to a study conducted by the University of Abidjan, 43% of all deaths among primary- and secondary-school teachers between 1994 and 1997 can be attributed to the disease. In addition, sick leave has increased sharply, resulting in many lost man hours in the country’s education sector. The country’s National Anti-AIDS Programme has called for more awareness campaigns, but the toll of the disease is certain to rise further. An estimated two-thirds of sexually active Ivorians under the age of 24 are thought not to use condoms. According to new estimates released by the US Bureau of the Census, Côte d’Ivoire’s population growth rate has already fallen to 2.4% per year, because of AIDS, compared with a potential 3% without AIDS. In 1997, Côte d’Ivoire and France set up a solidarity fund, which

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seeks not only to prevent the spread of the disease but also to offer available therapies to countries that cannot otherwise afford them.

Natural resources and the environment

A fertile country Except for the north-western regions bordering Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire has an equatorial climate, with two rainy seasons, the longest being between May and July. The country’s most fertile agricultural land, and its densest population concentration, lies along the south-eastern coastal strip, which is approximately 100-km deep. The area contains the country’s principal oil palm, coconut, pineapple and banana plantations, as well as important rubber plantations. Further inland and to the west, occupying much of the southern half of the country, are the rich forest lands where most cocoa and coffee are grown, together with the domestic food staples such as rice, cassava, plantain, yams and maize. The northern half of the country, where savannah land becomes Sahelian in character, principally produces cotton, sugar, millet, sorghum, groundnuts and maize. In terms of mineral resources, outside oil and gas, Côte d’Ivoire has substantial deposits of gold, iron, and nickels.

Oil and gas reserves Côte d’Ivoire contains oil reserves estimated at 100m barrels. The first offshore fields were discovered in the 1970s. Oil production began on two major fields, Espoir and Bélier, in 1980, amid much optimism, but then tailed off and ceased completely in 1993 because of the high operating costs involved. However, hopes were rekindled the following year when the US-based United Meridian Corporation (UMC), which was later bought by Ocean Energy, announced the discovery of two major fields, Lion (oil) and Panthere (gas and condensates), with total recoverable reserves estimated at 44m barrels of oil and 221bn cu metres of natural gas. A production-sharing agreement was signed between the UMC and the government and production duly began in 1995. Under the 1996 petroleum code, several gas and oil prospecting licences have been awarded to the following companies: Ocean Energy (formerly UMC), Shell and the state oil company, Société nationale d’opérations pétrolières de Côte d’Ivoire (Petroci); Apache (US); Addax (Switzerland); Global Natural Resources (US); Santa Fe (US); Elf-Aquitaine (France) and Pluspetrol (Argentina).

Oil production resumed in 1995 at 10,000 barrels/day (b/d), and was estimated to be around 20,000 b/d in 1997. Whereas the government’s oil production target of 100,000 b/d seems by 2005 over-optimistic, daily gas output, which currently averages 75m cu metres, should increase drastically over the next five years; the offshore Foxtrot natural gas project started production at the beginning of June 1999. Foxtrot is a joint venture between two US companies, Apache and Ocean Energy (which together hold a 24% stake), French company Bouygues (24%), the French state utility EDF-GDF and the state-owned Ivorian oil company Petroci (40%). Foxtrot’s gas field has a capacity of 85m cu ft/day and should provide Côte d’Ivoire with gas for about 25 years.

UK engineering firm Penspen is also currently studying a gas pipeline linking Côte d’Ivoire to Ghana. However, its construction remains in doubt, since it would compete directly with a more complex and expensive but more

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established and politically better connected project, the West African Gas Pipeline, which could carry gas from Nigeria through Benin, Togo and Ghana to Côte d’Ivoire. (See Reference table 4 for local consumption of petroleum and products.).

Transport and communications

The “12 works of the The government started 12 new public works projects in 1996, for a total of African elephant” CFAfr350bn ($684m) in planned investment. The projects, often officially referred to as “the 12 works of the African elephant”, are to be financed and built primarily by private-sector firms (mostly French), on a build-operate- transfer or a build-own-operate-transfer basis. In the first phase of the programme the projects will be focused on Abidjan, but are subsequently to be extended to the rest of the country, for a total of CFAfr100bn-200bn in planned investment. One of the first major projects, the commercialisation of Abidjan airport, was completed in late 1999.

With the ousting of the Bédié government, most projects are likely to remain on hold pending clarification on the political situation. Before the coup, contracts had already been awarded for the following:

• completion of the toll highway between Abidjan and Yamoussoukro; • construction of a toll expressway between Abidjan and Grand-Bassam; • construction of a toll bridge between Riviera and Marcory in Abidjan; and • building of a third thermal power station in Azito.

Other projects included:

• construction of a new bus station in Abidjan; • building of a cattle slaughterhouse in Abidjan-Anyama; • establishment of an exhibition park in Abidjan; • construction of a toll bridge between Sud and Banco in Abidjan; • building of an urban train system in Abidjan; • construction of a toll bridge in Jacqueville; and • building of an Olympic stadium.

Railways The only railway in Côte d’Ivoire, built by the French, links Abidjan with Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso. The Société ivoirienne des chemins de fer (SICF) managed the Ivorian section after the joint company was split up in 1989, but the number of passengers using the line had fallen by 75% to 760,000 by 1993, owing in part to the poor condition of the rolling stock. The company was privatised in 1994, and a French-led consortium, Sitarail, took over the management of the line. A local subsidiary of a French company, Bolloré, acquired a 51% majority ownership of Sitarail in late 1998.

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Roads Côte d’Ivoire has a developed road network of 50,000 km of classified roads, about 6,000 km of which are primary roads and 7,000 km secondary roads. The fall in railway traffic has increased the burden on the road network, which the government plans to develop. There are plans to extend the country’s only highway from Abidjan to Yamoussoukro, and to Grand-Bassam south-west of Abidjan. Bouygues-Setao, the Ivorian subsidiary of the French engineering group, was awarded a 30-year concession in 1997 to build and operate the Riviera-Marcory toll bridge in Abidjan.

Air Côte d’Ivoire has an important stake in the troubled multinational airline Air Afrique, which provides most international connections.

In late 1998, the government offered for sale 51% of the shares in the loss- making national airline, Air Ivoire, but had to abandon the privatisation because of lack of interest. A new initiative was launched to increase the attractiveness of the debt-ridden company in April 1999, when the govern- ment announced that it would write off debts worth CFAfr8bn ($12.8m) owed by Air Ivoire to the state and to state-owned companies. The airline, which has 200 employees but only two aeroplanes, would also be able to operate some routes presently allocated to Air Afrique. A number of cost-cutting measures were also introduced, including a reduction in the frequency of flights on less profitable routes, the closure of several offices inside the country, and the slashing of budgets and privileges for Air Ivoire offices abroad. While these measures may improve efficiency, potential investors are now likely to adopt a wait-and-see approach.

Under the “12 works” programme, the management of Abidjan’s international airport was ceded to a French consortium, Aeria. The annual capacity of Abidjan’s international airport was increased from 1.2m passengers to 2m for a total cost of CFAfr21bn ($33m) after completion of the project in late 1999. Abidjan’s airport already handles much of the air traffic in the region.

A busy regional port The port of Abidjan, the Port Autonome d’Abidjan (PAA), is the busiest in francophone West Africa and attracts useful business from the country’s landlocked neighbours—in particular, Burkina Faso and Mali. Petroleum products account for approximately 40% of its tonnage (see Reference table 2). In 1998, total traffic at PAA increased by 8%, to 15.2m tonnes. The port, and the Vridi container terminal in particular, is currently being extended. In February 1999, the government agreed to offer a build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract to a consortium led by a British firm, Transport and Communications International (TCI), to build a new terminal on the other side of Abidjan’s lagoon. TCI had already completed a feasibility study for the port extension and was chosen over France’s Bouygues. The CFAfr70.7bn ($120m) project is to be completed by 2003. The new terminal will be able to accommodate modern container ships, doubling Abidjan’s container-handling capacity and entrenching the port’s position in the region. The new terminal is to be linked to Abidjan’s business district by a new bridge over the lagoon, the study for which has also been awarded to TCI. Côte d’Ivoire’s second port is San Pédro, which handles small volumes of timber and cocoa.

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Telecommunications The government sold 51% of the national telecommunications company, CI- Telcom, to France Télécom in 1997, which renamed the company Côte d’Ivoire Télécom. The state retained 49% of the company. At the time of privatisation, CI-Telcom was operating 120,000 lines. The government has set a target of 400,000 lines by 2002. However, thanks to a 70,000-strong waiting list for telephone lines and the introduction of prepaid mobile telephone cards, the cellular phone sector is experiencing extremely rapid growth. As a result, the number of mobile phone subscribers is expected to have reached 200,000 by the end of 1999, ten times the level of 1997. The main beneficiaries of this growth are the 100% Ivorian-owned Sifcom, Télécel de Loteny, a privately owned joint venture involving the US-based Telecel International and Ivorian companies and, increasingly, the Société ivoirienne de mobiles (SIM) which manages the Ivorian network and became the market leader in 1999. While Télécel dominated the mobile market in its early stages, SIM benefits from the support of France Télécom, which holds 70% of its capital. However, SIM’s further development is dependent on the capacity of Côte d’Ivoire Télécom.

A flourishing media A rash of new publications came into being as a consequence of the political liberalisation after 1990. However, many disappeared during Mr Konan Bédié’s tenure, and at least 20 journalists have been jailed since 1994. Nonetheless, there remains a healthy opposition press, which includes the daily, Notre Voie, and Nouvel Horizon, owned by the pro-FPI Nouvel Horizon media group. This provides a counterweight to the dominance of the pro-government press, mainly the daily Fraternité Matin, founded in 1964, and its evening sister-paper, Ivoir’Soir, with circulation of 50,000 and 40,000 respectively. A Sunday version, Ivoire-Dimanche, claims a circulation of 75,000.

Radiodiffusion-Télévision ivoirienne (RTI) is a government-owned but nominally autonomous corporation, partly funded by advertising, which operates two television channels and a national radio service, broadcasting in French and vernacular languages. Radio Espoir is owned and operated by the Roman Catholic church.

Energy provision

Energy balance, 1998 (m tonnes oil equivalent) Elec– Oil Gas Coal tricity Other Total Primary production 1.00 0.20 0.00 0.49a 3.10 4.79 Imports 1.70 0.00 0.00 0.01a 0.00 1.71 Exports –1.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 –1.10 Primary supply 1.60 0.20 0.00 0.50a 3.10 5.40 Net transformationb –0.50 –0.20 0.00 –0.29 –0.05 –1.04 Final consumption 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.21c 3.05 4.36

a Expressed as input equivalents on an assumed generating efficiency of 33%. b Transformation input and output, plus energy industry fuel and losses. c Output basis.

Source: Energy Data Associates.

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A high electricity Although an estimated 60% of the country’s electricity is generated from generating capacity hydroelectric plants (Ayamé I and II, Kossou, Taabo, Buyo, and Grah), gas power stations are becoming more important. In late 1995, natural gas started to be delivered from offshore fields to supply a new gas-fired electricity generation plant, Vridi II near Abidjan. The plant was built by the Compagnie ivoirienne de production d’électricité (Ciprel)—owned by the France’s Bouygues (65%) and Electricité de France (35%)—under a CFAfr57bn contract, and began delivering power to the national grid in 1997. The development of the plant is expected to turn the country into a substantial regional exporter of electric power by 2000, with 600 gw scheduled for export. Prospects will be further enhanced by the planned construction of a third gas-fired electricity generating station, Vridi III, by Ocean Energy and Petroci, at a cost of $300m. A new 420-mw natural gas-fired power station at Azito, in Abidjan’s suburbs, also began to supply electricity to the grid in January 1999. In its initial stage, the plant will provide 144 mw of electricity. A second phase is scheduled for completion in mid-2000 and a third in mid-2001, bringing total capacity to 420 mw. Like Vidri II, Azito is also fuelled by gas from the US-based Ocean Energy’s Panthere shallow-water field off Abidjan.

Meanwhile, the Compagnie ivoirienne d’électricité (CIE), which is 51% owned by a subsidiary of France’s Bouygues group, has announced plans to expand the national grid. The scheme would provide some 1.8m people in 1,100 rural districts with electricity, at a cost of CFAfr50bn ($83m). About 1,760 rural districts are currently connected to the national grid; roughly 700 of these have been connected within the past three years. More than 8,000 rural districts remain unconnected. (See Reference table 3 for data on electricity production and consumption.)

Fuel production Oil is refined for domestic use but is also exported to the region, including to oil-driven Nigeria, where a dismal downstream oil industry has led to persistent fuel shortages. The Société Ivoirienne de raffinage (SIR), situated in Vitry near Abidjan, has an annual capacity of 3m tonnes of crude oil, much of it imported from Nigeria. Producing oil, diesel and gas-oil, SIR employs 750 people and has an annual turnover of about CFAfr300bn. Under a two-stage expansion programme, the refinery’s capacity is to be raised to 5m t/y over the next five years. The government has sought to sell its 37% stake since 1999 and the tendering procedure was well under way before the coup took place. Two French oil companies, TotalFina and Elf Aquitaine (now merged), are already minority shareholders in SIR, making them the front-runners. Other contenders include Anglo-Dutch company Shell, Malaysia’s Petronas and a US company, Corral. Ivorian groups are also known to be interested but do not meet the bid requirements, which call for a strategic investor with the technical and financial capacity to ensure the development of the refinery. (See Reference table 4 for data on petroleum consumption.)

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The economy

Economic structure

Main economic indicators, 1999

Real GDP growth (%) 4.3 Consumer price inflation (av; %) 0.7 Current–account balancea ($ m) –313 Foreign debtb ($ bn) 15.6 Average exchange rate (CFAfr:$) 616 Population (m) 14.5

a 1998. b 1997.

Source: EIU, CountryData..

Cocoa is king Côte d’Ivoire is the world’s largest producer of cocoa, accounting for an estimated 41% of total output in 1998/99, and the pattern of Ivorian economic growth over the years has often reflected fluctuations in revenue from this all- important crop. The country is also Africa’s largest producer of robusta coffee, and normally ranks fourth or fifth in the world production league. The two products together provided 45% of export revenue in 1998.

Petroleum products have grown in importance, and exploitation of the country’s offshore oil and gas potential has expanded over the past decade. The sector, however, suffered from the fall in world oil prices in 1998. Manufacturing activities have also expanded rapidly, with a wide variety of consumer goods produced for domestic and regional use. The industrial sectors’ share of GDP was around 21% in 1998. This is likely to increase in the coming decade as the country develops food processing. Services are mostly led by trade and transport activities, which accounted for 30.3% of GDP in 1998.

On the expenditure side, private consumption absorbs around 65% of national income, while government consumption accounts for another 11%. Net trade of goods and services brings a positive, albeit small, contribution to GDP each year, while gross fixed investment remains low, at 18.2% of GDP in 1998. (For a breakdown of GDP by sector see Reference table 8).

A Franc Zone giant Côte d’Ivoire is often dubbed the milking cow of the West African Franc Zone, accounting for roughly 40% of total GDP produced in the Union économique et monétaire ouest-Africaine (UEMOA). In addition, immigrant workers’ remittances from Côte d’Ivoire have become essential to landlocked economies, like Burkina Faso and Mali. Slightly further afield, Côte d’Ivoire suffers little competition from English-speaking Ghana and Nigeria, especially since the 50% devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994. Although Nigeria’s economy is four times bigger, making it a colossus in the region, the productive oil-driven economy is now in difficulties shambles, whereas Ghana, which also exports cocoa, has an industrial base far less-diversified than that in

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Côte d’Ivoire. In addition, the country benefits from a less-corrupt business environment and generally a better-maintained road and port infrastructure.

Comparative economic indicators, 1998

South Côte d’Ivoire Ghana Nigeria Africa France GDP ($ bn) 11.7 7.4 42.6 134.6 1.5 GDP per head ($) 801 390 350 3,191 24,726 Real GDP growth (%) 5.4 4.6 2.2 0.6 3.4 Consumer price inflation (av; %) 4.7 14.6 10.3 7.0 0.7 Current–account balance ($ bn) –0.3 –0.3 –4.2 –1.9 40.2 % of GDP –2.7 –4.8 –10.0 –1.4 2.8 Exports of goods fob ($ bn) 4.58 1.8 9.0 29.2 301.7 Imports of goods fob ($ bn) –2.71 –2.3 –9.2 –27.2 –275.5 External debta ($ bn) 15.6 6.0 28.5 25.2 n/a Debt-service ratio, paida (%) 27.2 25.8 8.0 12.6 n/a

a 1997.

Source: EIU, CountryData.

Economic policy

A narrow room for With a pegged exchange rate against the French Franc and a monetary policy manoeuvre ruled by the regional central bank, Banque centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO; see Regional organisations), the government relies heavily on fiscal policy as the main instrument to achieve financial stabilisation. (For data on public finances see Reference table 5; for monetary statistics see Reference table 6.) Internal adjustment policies seemed to reach a limit in the late 1980s, however, and under increased pressure from France and the Bretton-Woods institutions, Côte d’Ivoire, in line with other members of the Franc Zone, agreed to a 50% devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994. This immediately led to a second generation of IMF-inspired structural adjustment programmes. After expressing its “broad satisfaction” with the reforms carried out under the 1994-1997 enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF), a new three-year facility, worth $384m, was agreed in February 1998.

Under the ESAF, the three main components of the government’s 1998-2000 strategy were to bring the budget close to balance by 2000 and achieve a surplus thereafter; to undertake structural reforms to promoting private-sector development and investment; and to implement an ambitious social development programme aimed at reducing poverty, with the emphasis on education and health. These objectives translated into macroeconomic targets of real GDP growth of 6% a year; an average annual inflation rate of about 3%, consistent with the currency’s exchange-rate peg with the French franc; and a current- account deficit of 2% of GDP by 2000. Only the inflation target is likely to be achieved.

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Bedié’s poor legacy Fiscal slippage, transparency issues, and the generally slow pace of reforms prompted the IMF to withhold the second tranche of the ESAF, worth $109m. The loan should have been paid in two semi-annual instalments, the first one due in March 1999. In particular, the IMF raised strong concerns about the fiscal situation, which it said remained fragile. With an overall fiscal deficit estimated at 1.8% of GDP in 1998, which is only 0.3 of a percentage point above target, fiscal slippage mostly laid in the grey areas of public administration. In addition, the Fund noted some delays in the government’s privatisation programme. In mid-June 1999, the IMF concluded what seemed to be a promising Article IV consultation with Côte d’Ivoire. The government agreed to three conditions for the resumption of payments:

• to better comply with agreed spending limits, by strengthening monitoring procedures;

• to improve revenue collection by cracking down on fraud and recovering money owed to the state; and

• to complete an audit of the commercial operations of the state commodity marketing board, the Caisse de stabilisation des prix agricoles (Caistab), during the 1996-1999 period by the end of July and undertake an audit of the government’s payment arrears to the private sector.

An IMF mission visited the country in November 1999, but no tangible results were achieved and negotiations remained stalled as a result. In particular, the government and the Fund were still at loggerheads over the accounts of the Caistab. According to the Bretton Wood Institutions, CFAfr10bn ($18m) has gone missing, a figure vehemently denied by the authorities. In addition, no significant progress was made towards the auditing of the government’s payment arrears.

State coffers are empty

With low world prices for cocoa, the government’s primary source of revenue, severely impacting on the country’s export earnings, budgetary support from the Bretton Woods institutions withheld over policy slippage, and EU aid suspended following accusations of fraud (see The external sector), the transition government clearly inherited an economy in crisis in 2000. After a mission in Abidjan in early February 2000, the IMF announced that the state of public finances was “worse than expected”, with the budget deficit reaching CFAfr197bn ($322m) in 1999, equivalent to 2.8% of GDP. Although external payment arrears remained low, at CFAfr50bn, payment arrears on the domestic market totalled CFAfr131bn. Even the austerity budget for 2000, adopted by parliament in mid-December, now appears too ambitious, and the IMF has urged the transition government to find ways of constraining total expenditures to less than CFAfr1.4bn, while combating corruption and boosting domestic revenue. But with most bilateral aid frozen in the aftermath of the coup and a sluggish domestic economy, it is difficult to see how the government will find enough cash to pay public sector wages, service its debt, and maintain minimum education and health services. Domestic payment arrears are therefore likely to pile up.

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Privatisation on hold As prime minister, Alassane Ouattara set great store by his privatisation programme, under which he promised to sell off the state’s equity in two- thirds of the 140 publicly-owned companies. The sale in 1990 of the state’s majority holdings in the electricity and water industries to subsidiaries of a French conglomerate, Bouygues, aroused some public disquiet, but a substantial number of other utilities, including the telecoms company, Côte d’Ivoire Télécom, have subsequently been divested. Under pressure from the IMF, the government took steps to accelerate the privatisation of the oil refinery, the Société ivoirienne de raffinage (SIR) and the country’s fourth largest bank, the Banque internationale pour l’Afrique occidentale (BIAO), in 1999. Although bidders were pre-selected, the coup has now put all state divestment on hold. The last divestiture was in October 1999, when 25% of the publisher Nouvelles Editions Ivoiriennes (NEI) was sold for CFAFr435.5m ($714,000).

Economic performance

Gross domestic product (% real change, year on year; market prices) Annual average 1999a 1995-99 GDP 4.3 5.9

a Preliminary estimate.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

An elusive return The government borrowed lavishly in the late 1970s, when a combination of to prosperity high cocoa prices and hopes for the oil sector—ultimately unfulfilled—created a false optimism in the Ivorian establishment, for which the country is still paying. A deep recession gripped Côte d’Ivoire throughout most of the 1980s, induced by an overvalued currency, a fall in commodity prices and the high cost of servicing the debts incurred in the 1970s. In 1991, then prime minister Alassane Ouattara introduced a harsh and unpopular adjustment programme supported by international donors. When Mr Ouattara resigned in 1993, his former finance minister, Daniel Kablan Duncan, replaced him. The devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 marked a turning point for the economy. Annual real GDP growth increased from 1.8% in 1994 to an average of 6.3% in 1995-1998. According to the government, industrial output has been growing by around 10% annually, with strong growth also recorded in the primary sector, led by exports of cocoa, coffee, timber and oil. The economy also benefited from healthy rises in world coffee and cocoa prices since mid-1994, which boosted farm incomes.

In 1999, real GDP growth slowed to 4.3%, against an initial target of 6%. This was largely due to a 30% drop in world cocoa prices—from 76 cents/lb in 1998 to 53cents/lb in 1999—as global production exceeded consumption. While a 4.3% growth rate is high by Sub-Saharan African standards, the sudden downturn in what was heralded as sustainable economic growth shows how fragile the Ivorian economy really is. Despite diversification efforts, cocoa

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exports remain the country’s largest foreign exchange earner and the principal source of revenue for not only the government, but also for a significant section of the population. As a result, any major fall in world cocoa prices generates huge cash-flow problems at all levels of the economy. Real GDP growth could slow further, to 3%, in 2000 as aid money dries up in the aftermath of the coup (see Reference tables 7 to 9 for historical data on GDP).

A tradition of low inflation Membership of the CFA Franc Zone has helped to contain inflationary pressures, mainly through mechanisms to restrict budget deficits. Annual average inflation of less than 5% had been the norm in Côte d’Ivoire before 1994, when the devaluation forced the rate up to 26%. Thanks to the government’s firmness on public-sector wages, the strength of the French franc (and thus the CFA franc) against the dollar and reasonable food prices induced by good harvests, inflation was pulled back to 2.5% in 1996. It rose again, to 4%, in 1997 and averaged 4.7% in 1998, above the 3% target rate set by the UEMOA as part of its convergence targets to achieve a cost-efficient monetary and economic union. Inflation, however, was estimated to have dropped to 0.7% in 1999. (See Reference table 10 for historical data on consumer price inflation; and Reference table 6 for data on money supply and credit).

Inflation (% real change, year on year; period averages) Annual average 1998 1994-98 Consumer prices 4.7 10.3 Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Regional trends

A centralised country Côte d’Ivoire has 34 administrative departments, based on the French model. Since 1983, the official capital has been Yamoussoukro, the village of Félix Houphouët-Boigny’s birth, in the central part of the country. It was developed by him as a quieter, smarter alternative to Abidjan, and features several prestigious buildings including the basilica of Notre dame de la paix, one of the largest edifices in Christendom, whose true cost has never been revealed. The government has, however, stayed in Abidjan, which remains the focus of most economic and political life. The other main provincial centres are the country’s second major port, San Pédro; Bouaké; Korhogo; Man; and Daloa. As in France, administration is highly centralised, and there are no reliable data on regional economic development.

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Economic sectors

Agriculture, forestry and fishing

An overwhelmingly For four decades, independent Côte d’Ivoire’s relative prosperity and stability agricultural economy have been built on the success of its agriculture, which dominates the economy, accounting for upwards of 25% of GDP and employing about 80% of the labour force. The principal food crops are cassava, yams, sweet potatoes, maize, millet, sorghum, rice and plantains. Sugar cane is also produced for domestic use and has benefited from recent privatisation of the state monopoly (see manufacturing). The FAO estimated that the total cereal import requirement for 1999 was 640,000 tonnes (t), mostly wheat (255,000t) and rice (365,000t); these are easily fulfilled at commercial terms.

Côte d’Ivoire: food crop production, 1999 (‘000 tonnes)

Cereals 1,832 of which: paddy rice 1,162 maize 571 Roots & tubers 4,996 of which: yam 2,923 cassava 1,673 Source: FAO.

The main cash crops are cocoa, of which Côte d’Ivoire is the world’s largest producer, and coffee, of which it is Africa’s largest producer and the fourth or fifth largest in the world. Annual production of cocoa has risen sharply since the mid-1990s, to around 1m-1.2m tonnes. Annual production levels for cocoa of 700,000-800,000 tonnes were the norm in the 1980s. For coffee, production averages 200,000 tonnes. Together, cocoa and coffee account for 60% of the area under cultivation in Côte d’Ivoire. The main cocoa harvest takes place in October, with a smaller mid-season harvest in May. Although forestry resources have become seriously depleted, timber remains a major export.

World cocoa productiona (‘000 tonnes) 1998/99b Share of total (%) Côte d’Ivoire 1,300 44.0 Indonesia 420 14.2 Ghana 410 13.9 Nigeria 155 5.2 Cameroon 125 4.2 Total incl others 2,953 100.0

a Crop years starting October 1st. b Forecasts.

Source: E. D. & F. Man, Cocoa Market Report, January 2000.

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Côte d’Ivoire is the CFA zone’s forth largest producer of cotton after Mali, Bénin and Burkina Faso. Rubber is one of the few crops in which Côte d’Ivoire achieves smallholder yields better than those in Asia, although production has been declining in recent years.

Major cotton producers in UEMOA, 1997-98 (‘000 tonnes) Benin 359.2 Burkina 338.1 Côte d’Ivoire 337.1 Mali 522.8 Togo 176.2 Total incl others 1,775.9 Source: BCEAO, Notes d’Information et Statistiques.

Tropical fruit exports have also held up well since the CFA franc devaluation in 1994. Exports of bananas are expected to have reached 224,000 tonnes in 1999, compared with 187,000 tonnes in 1998, thanks to an increase in planting acreage and the fact the most bananas are cultivated on irrigated fields, isolating the fruits from the vagaries of the climate. The pineapple crop, which suffered from the drought in 1998, is expected to increase to 160,000 tonnes in 1999 from 150,000 tonnes in 1998. Papaya is also experiencing a recovery, with production expected to increase to 500 tonnes in 1999 from 225 tonnes in 1998, following the establishment of a direct air-freight connection to Europe. (See Reference tables 11-13 for data on agricultural producer prices and historical information on cash-crop production.)

A new role for Caistab Bédié’s government had come under increased pressure to speed up the liberalisation of the cocoa and coffee sectors, one of the main conditions for the resumption of ESAF payments. The state cocoa and coffee marketing board, the Caisse de stabilisation des prix des produits agricoles (Caistab), was eventually dissolved in January 1999. About 400 of Caistab’s 1,050 employees were sacked in February. Caistab was established in 1962 to provide protection against price variations for Ivorian farmers, but has long been criticised for its opaque role in government finances (see Economic policy).

The so-called New Caistab is a mixed public/private body, with a capitalisation of CFAfr10bn ($16.7m). Producers have replaced the state as the main shareholder, holding a 33% share. They are followed by the state with 25%, exporters with 20%, cocoa and coffee processors with 8%, financial institutions with 8%, and buyers with 6%. The New Caistab mostly acts a regulatory body, its activities ranging from monitoring progress and identifying potential problems throughout the season (from crop financing and planting to purchasing and marketing), to releasing statistics and forecasts, updating the list of exporters, and following-up quality control procedures. A new body to promote co-operation in the sector and liaise with the government, the Conseil interprofessionel du café et du cacao (CICC) was also established, with a starting capital of CFAfr300m. A new producers’ association, the Fédération ivoirienne des producteurs de café-cacao (FIPCC), was formed in November 1999, replacing the Organisation de producteurs agricoles (OPA).

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Hefty price The government took the final step in liberalising domestic cocoa prices in liberalisation— August, seven weeks ahead of the deadline agreed with the World Bank and well in advance of the 1999/2000 (October-September) season. This effectively puts an end to the 37-year old stabilisation system, under which the Caistab was guaranteeing a fixed price to exporters at the beginning of each season, while also setting an indicative (previously guaranteed) minimum price for cocoa growers. This system proved to be particularly costly in 1998/99, when prices were set at CFAfr575/kg ($0.95/kg), up CFAfr120/kg on 1997/98. As a result, the Caistab was said to have incurred losses worth CFAfr36bn in price support, reflecting a 30% slump in world cocoa prices in 1999. In the case of coffee, farmgate prices were fully liberalised in January 1999. Prices are now set on a daily basis, with cif prices published every day in the country’s major newspapers.

—draws the ire of farmers The cocoa sector experienced a difficult few months before General Guéï’s Christmas 1999 coup, contributing to growing instability in the country. Cocoa farmers staged a nine-day protest in late November over the way in which the cocoa sector had been liberalised. When the marketing season started in October, no market-based instruments, such as privately-run buffer stocks or forward price mechanisms, had been set up to soften the impact of low world prices—40% below those of the previous season—on farmers. As prices continued to fall throughout November, cocoa growers claimed to have lost as much as CFAfr40.5bn over the sale of the first 150,000 tonnes marketed at the beginning of the season. In addition, Côte d’Ivoire’s variable quality control measures also led to lower farmgate prices, which, hovering between CFAfr200/kg and CFAfr350/kg, were half of those offered in the previous season, where they averaged CFAfr570/kg.

Cotton producers also went on strike when the new purchasing season started on October 25th. The dispute stemmed from producers and ginners’ failure to agree on fixed delivery prices—a main source of concern for farmers in an international environment of declining prices. The cotton sector was liberalised in 1998 but the government still fixed the producer price for the 1998/99 season and was involved in the ongoing negotiations on a tripartite committee.

The FIPC submitted a series of demands to the government and the CICC. The demands included:

• the departure of the management board of the New Caistab. Already in place under the now dissolved publicly-owned Caistab, the board—appointed by the government and consisting of representatives of farmers’ organisations, traders, exporters and producer states—was said to lack the competence and experience required to run what is now supposed to be a privately-run marketing board; and

• a new privately-run price guarantee scheme to be operational by the end of 1999.

The New Caistab’s board of directors was dismissed on December 22nd 1999. Only the financial director, Edouard N’Guessan, stayed, replacing the managing director, Yves Marie Kouassi, for an interim period of three months.

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General Guéï met with Mr N’Guessan shortly after the coup, stating that “the problem of the farmers is going to be resolved”.

Fishing Since 1980 industrial fishing has been transformed, with large trawlers progressively being replaced by smaller boats. The total fish catch amounts to 80,000-100,000 tonnes/year (t/y), representing about 40% of domestic consumption. Industrial fishing accounts for up to 60,000 t/y, with the balance the product of traditional fishing, which is dominated by Ghanaians. The agriculture ministry estimates that consumption, which was about 250,000 t/y in the early 1990s, could reach 400,000 t/y by 2000.

Mining and semi-processing

A new mining code has The new mining code, introduced in 1995, has gone some way towards encouraged investment encouraging international mining companies to take a stake in developing the sector. However, the government’s hope that mining might become the second pillar of the economy seems a long way from realisation, despite continuing interest in gold prospects. Most interest has so far been in diamond mining at Tortiya and Séguéla (see Reference table 14 for data on gold, oil and gas production).

Gold mining has One of the main companies prospecting for gold, the Société des mines had a setback d’Aféma (Somiaf), which is 67% owned by Eden Roc of Canada and 33% by the government, announced in early 1998 that it was suspending production after six years, owing to low world gold prices. Somiaf had extracted 3.7 tonnes of ore since 1992. The other leading mining company, Société des mines d’Ity (SMI), a joint venture between the state-owned Société pour le développement minier de Côte d’Ivoire (Sodemi), French-Australian joint venture La Source, and France’s Coframines, started gold mining in 1991. South Africa’s Randgold purchased a 51% interest in two gold exploration concessions in the north-east in 1999.

Gold production in West Africa, 1998 (‘000 kg) Ghana 71.8 Mali 22.7 Côte d’Ivoire 2.0 Burkina Faso 1.1 Source: EIU.

Nickel and iron Following tests in 1994 that indicated the presence of 54m tonnes of nickel ore are of interest in Sipilou and Gounguessou in the north-west, a Canadian company, Falconbridge, announced plans to invest $500m over five years, and in 1996 signed a production agreement with the government. There are also substantial, but mostly unworked, iron ore and bauxite reserves estimated at 1.5bn tonnes and 1.2bn tonnes, and manganese reserves estimated at 35m tonnes. The government is reported to be interested in exploiting the vast iron ore deposits at Mount Nimba and Mount Kalayo, in an area straddling

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Côte d’Ivoire’s borders with Guinea and Liberia; reserves of iron ore are thought to total 3bn tonnes.

Manufacturing

Steady growth since Industrial production has been growing strongly since the devaluation of devaluation 1994—by 15.5% in the first six months of 1998, according to the Institut national de la statistique in Abidjan—and now accounts for around 20% of GDP. Agro-industry, the oil and gas sector and the manufacture of construction materials have shown the fastest year-on-year growth in real output. Agro- industry in particular is likely to benefit from government plans to increase local processing of cocoa beans, coffee, rubber, raw cotton, oil palm, and fruit and vegetables. The other principal subsectors are tobacco, textiles and leather goods, timber processing, and electricity and water. The country has also a small pharmaceutical industry. (Reference table 15 gives an index of manufacturing production.)

Manufacturing (% change, year on year) 1998a Annaul average 1993-97 Annual production 15.5 5.0

a January-June estimate.

Sources: Institut national de la statistique; IMF, International Financial Statistics.

A dynamic agro- Since privatisation started in the early 1990s, the agro-industry sector, which processing industry accounts for 20% of the industrial sector, has attracted by far most foreign interest, and therefore has undergone a massive face-lift over the years. Cocoa grinding is the leading activity, even though Côte d’Ivoire’s current grinding capacity, at 240,000 tonnes, remains low. The government hopes to raise the share of the annual cocoa crop (about 1m-1.2m tonnes) which is processed locally to at least 50% by end-2000, but progress has been slow. Prices for semi- finished cocoa products are more stable, as supply and demand trends are relatively stable, offering a more reliable source of earnings.

Côte d’Ivoire: grinding capacity (‘000 tonnes unless otherwise indicated) 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 Worldwide 2,916 2,711 2,683 2,707 Côte d’Ivoire 140 160 205 240 % share of total 4.8 5.9 7.6 8.9 Source: ICCO.

Five groups dominate the domestic grinding industry: local company, Sifca; the Swiss group, Klaus Jacobs, the French groups, Nestlé and Bolloré; and the US- based Cargill. The US-based ADM, which already holds 30% of Sifca, has expressed an interest in taking over the Ivorian company, which is currently plagued by financial difficulties. It could compete against Cargill, also a major

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player in the sector. Cargill has continued to strengthen its presence in Côte d’Ivoire since dropping its joint-venture association with the Société ivoirienne de café-cacao (SICC) in 1997. Cargill plants worldwide already process an estimated 150,000-200,000 tonnes of Ivorian cocoa, but the company has shown a determination to establish itself in Côte d’Ivoire itself. It has begun construction of a $50m cocoa-processing factory in Abidjan, its largest Sub- Saharan investment. The plant will initially process 65,000 tonnes/year of beans, substantially increasing processing capacity in Côte d’Ivoire. Callebaut, which already processes 100,000 tonnes locally, also intends to invest an additional $15m over a two-year period to increase its local grinding capacity.

Privatisation boosts Sugar has also benefited from the privatisation process, with production sugar production increasing from a low of 110,000 tonnes in the 1997/98 season to 140,000 tonnes in 1998/99—the best figure for seven years, but still some 20,000 tonnes less than average annual consumption. The forecast increase in sugar production highlights the success of the privatisation of the former state- owned monopoly, Sodesucre, in August 1997. Two companies emerged from this privatisation, Sucrivoire and Sucaf. Sucrivoire has a two-year plan to increase production from the current level of 70,000 tonnes/year (t/y) to 90,000 t/y, while Sucaf aims to increase output from 67,000 t/y to 110,000 t/y over the same period. If these targets are met, Côte d’Ivoire will become a net exporter of sugar by 2001.

Under pressure from the World Bank, the government also went ahead with the sale of its 70% holding in the cotton monopoly, the Compagnie ivoirienne de développement des textiles (CIDT), in August 1998, overriding objections from the French minority shareholder, the Compagnie française pour le développement des fibres textiles (CFDT). The government’s stake, in the form of two large plantations, one in the north-east, one in the north-west, was sold to two consortia for a total of CFAfr53.5bn. The consortia promised substantial new investment and pledged to retain the workforces. CIDT produced an estimated 320,000 tonnes in the bumper 1997/98 harvest.

In 1995, the government sold 60% of the Société des caoutchoucs de Grand- Béréby (SOGB) to a Belgian consortium, having sold its 45% holding in the second-largest rubber producer, the Société africaine de plantation d’hévéas (SAPH), to local firm Octide a year earlier. To improve productivity, in late 1997 the government announced plans to establish 600 small family-run rubber plantations, to be grouped into larger modules of 3,000 ha, each with its own on-site processing plant.

Financial services

The banking sector The Dakar-based Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO) is the regional central bank for the eight West African members of the Franc Zone: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. The African Development Bank has its headquarters in Abidjan. Côte d’Ivoire has 12 commercial banks in operation, the largest of which are the Société générale de banques en Côte d’Ivoire, the Banque internationale

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pour le commerce et l’industrie de la Côte d’Ivoire and the Société ivoirienne de banques. A further three commercial banks have representative offices in Abidjan.

Belgolaise moving for BIAO The long-run saga of the privatisation of the Banque Internationale d’Afrique de l’Ouest (BIAO) was finally concluded in January by a sale agreement with Banque Belgolaise, the African banking subsidiary of the Belgian-Dutch financial group Fortis. BIAO is the third largest bank in the country with some CFAFr5bn ($80m) in assets after being recapitalised using revenues from the sale of its investment, arm BIAO-Investissement, in late 1998. Belgolaise is buying 80% of the government’s stake in order to modernise and expand its operations. In the second phase of the divestment, a 20% stake in the bank’s capital will be floated on the Bourse régionale des valeurs mobilières (BRVM) and 3% will go to employees, leaving the government with a holding of 10%. The listing of BIAO would be a boost for the BRVM, but the transitional government will have to approve the privatisation process.

The regional stock A regional stock exchange, the Bourse régionale des valeurs mobilières (BRVM), exchange began trading in September 1998, after many delays, replacing the old Abidjan stock exchange, the Bourse des valeurs d’Abidjan (BVA). The BRVM, with an initial capitalisation of $1.5bn, serves the eight countries of the Franc Zone’s West African subregion, UEMOA. The privatised Senegalese telecommunications company Sonatel is now the most important company among the 36 companies listed (all others are Ivorian) and accounts for a substantial share of day-to-day trading. The poor performance of the BRVM since its opening has been blamed on the global downturn in financial markets, but in fact it is largely the result of the relative lack of liquidity of most stocks and the bureaucratic culture of the stockmarket. Its performance should improve with new listings, but much of that hinges on further privatisations in the eight member countries of the BRVM.

Other services

A boost for the The number of tourists visiting Côte d’Ivoire rose to 274,000 in 1997, following tourism industry a government-led promotion campaign, which aims for 500,000 tourist visits by 2000. The industry declined during the recession years of 1980-1993, but has picked up well, and received a boost from the January 1994 devaluation, when the slogan “Sun, Sea and CFA” was coined for the benefit of European sun-seekers. Away from the beaches, the government hopes to capitalise on eco-tourism centred on the vanishing tropical forests.

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The external sector

Trade in goods

Trade in goods, 1998a (CFAfr bn) Exports fob 2,592 of which: cocoa & products 973 petroleum & products 226 coffee & products 200 timber & products 184 Imports cif 1,765 of which: capital goods 378 intermediate goods 610 consumer goods 777 of which: food 369

a Estimates.

Source: Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens; EIU.

Export taxes reduced In October 1999, the government agreed with the World Bank on the need to ease the impact of lower prices on Ivorian exporters and reduced the tax on exported cocoa for the 1999/2000 season to CFAFr100 (16¢) per kg from CFAFr150 per kg. Given lower world prices, however, the move has done little to help producers. The general effect of the lower tax may be to reduce revenue at a time when government finances are in trouble. The government also decided to maintain its standard export tax on coffee unchanged at CFAFr10 (¢1.6) per kilo for the 1999/2000 season.

A strengthening Côte d’Ivoire has enjoyed a comfortable trade surplus since the devaluation in trade surplus 1994, although its size is heavily influenced by prices for cocoa and coffee, which represented 45% of all export earnings in 1998. According to the Paris- based bi-monthly Marché tropicaux et méditerraneéns, total export earnings grew by 7% in 1998 to CFAfr2.6bn ($4.4m), with cocoa and coffee exports increasing by 9% to CFAfr1.2bn, because of both a good harvest and strong world demand. The government’s efforts to promote the domestic processing of cocoa have started to produce results: processed cocoa exports increased by 54% in 1998 to CFAfr185bn. Export earnings from oil and petroleum products, on which the government had pinned high hopes and which became the second highest source of export revenue in 1996, suffered from the sharp drop in world oil prices in 1998, and fell by 28% to CFAfr226bn.

Devaluation has also given a boost to the timber industry, but increases in export earnings from logs and sawn wood have been limited in recent years, as the country’s forestry resources are not far from exhaustion. Other exports that have responded particularly well to the currency adjustment are canned fish,

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natural rubber, bananas and other fruits. Exports of light manufactured goods have also continued to increase, to CFAfr645bn in 1998. Imports grew by 10% in 1998 to CFAfr1.8bn, owing to rising demand for capital equipment and food products. This slowed the increase in the trade surplus from CFAfr813bn in 1997 to CFAfr828bn in 1998 (see Reference table 16 for historical data on exports and imports). Due to the continued decline in the international prices of cocoa and coffee, total exports are estimated to have slipped from $4.6bn in 1998 to $3.7bn in 1999.

Main trading partners, 1998 (% of total) Exports to: France 16.6 Germany 4.7 Netherlands 11.9 EU 52.8a UEMOA 12.9 Imports from: France 20.7 Nigeria 7.7 Italy 3.8 EU 53.1a UEMOA 0.7

a 1997 data.

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook.

The EU is the main partner Despite the government’s wish to diversify the country’s pattern of trade, Côte d’Ivoire’s trade reflects its historical ties with European colonial powers. In 1998, the EU absorbed an estimated 57% of all trade, with France, the former colonial power, accounting for 21%. Trade with African countries is increasing and represented 28% of total trade in 1998; the government is particularly eager to develop closer trade links with the eight-member francophone union, the Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA), of which Côte d’Ivoire is a member. UEMOA countries are currently in the process of reducing import duties on their goods, and the government hopes West Africa will provide the market for 50% of total exports early in the 21st century. Exports to Asia continue to increase, and were 15% of total exports in 1998 (see Reference table 17).

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Invisibles and the current account

Current account, 1998 ($ m) Goods: exports 4,575 Goods: imports –2,705 Trade balance 1,870 Net services & income –1,634 Net current transfers balance –548 Current-account balance –313 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

A deteriorating current- The immediate impact of devaluation in 1994 was to virtually wipe out the account performance current-account deficit that year. The current account returned to a deficit in 1995, mainly because of the rise in merchandise and services imports destined for the government’s large-scale public works programme and for developing manufacturing and the oil and gas sector. The devaluation prompted a spectacular repatriation of capital, and current transfers inflows, helped by international support for the CFA-zone countries at the devaluation, rose substantially in 1994. In 1996, current-account performance improved again, boosted by strong export performance and rising service credits, especially from tourism. (See Reference table 18.)

A current-account surplus was expected in 1997. However, the surplus figures given in recent editions of the IMF’s International Financial Statistics have been revised down, to $242m in 1997, and $313m in 1998. The new data underlines the depth of the challenge facing the new military government; the EIU estimates the current-account deficit will be even higher in 1999, nudging $860m, or 6-7% of GDP, as a result of a slashed trade surplus and frozen aid.

Foreign aid is on According to OECD data, net overseas development assistance (ODA) fell by the decline 54% in 1997 to $444m. This reflects the end of the post-devaluation assistance—the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA), the IMF and the EU all sharply increased their disbursements as a reward for the government—as well as the government’s difficulties in securing an agreement with the IMF in 1997, which held back other donor assistance. In 1997, bilateral aid amounted to $233m, with France alone providing $134m (see Reference table 19). Most bilateral donors have frozen their development and budget assistance in protest at the coup, but foreign aid should resume as soon as a newly-elected government is installed.

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The EU aid dispute

The transition government has made encouraging progress towards resolving the dispute with the EU that began after an EU audit uncovered evidence of serious fraud in June 1999. Since then, $37m of new aid to Côte d’Ivoire—¤17m under the programme to ease the social burden of macroeconomic reforms and ¤20m in counterpart funds— has been suspended, with repayments not scheduled to restart until officials are satisfied with the way that EU aid is managed. According to the audit, development programmes covering some ¤27m ($25.2m) were subject to serious infringements—total EU aid over the 1992-97 period was ¤72m— and at least CFAfr18bn ($28m) was estimated to have been embezzled. Although the government initially tried to blame different accounting practices, finance minister N’Goran Niamen quickly acknowledged the irregularities, promised to reimburse the full sum and introduced measures to tighten up government accounts. In addition to the sacking of the health minister, 18 civil servants and three businessmen have been charged with embezzlement, which included expenses not accounted for, non-delivery of paid goods, payments for faulty materials and significant over-invoicing.

Shortly after seizing power in December 1999, General Guéï said in an interview with the Paris daily, Le Figaro, that he did not accept responsibility for the embezzled aid money that Bédié’s government had started to reimburse in December. However, by the time an EU mission arrived in Abidjan in early February, all the CFAfr18bn ($28m) had been reimbursed, prompting the British EU delegate, John Alexander Corrie, to say that the Ivoirian authorities benefited from “much sympathy from Brussels”. The EU is nonetheless likely to withhold its assistance until the elections, due by October 2000.

Capital flows and foreign debt

Rising investment inflows Foreign direct investment (FDI) has risen strongly since the devaluation, from $78m in 1994 to $327m in 1997, according to the IMF. Privatisation and increased opportunities in the oil, agri-business and construction sectors explain this boost to FDI. In addition, portfolio investments have grown, and should expand further with the emergence of the regional stockmarket, the BRVM. The signing in February 1998 of a three-year ESAF agreement with the IMF triggered a consultative group meeting of the country’s other key donors which, according to the government, agreed to support the three-year programme with commitments totalling $4.1bn. This figure included benefits totalling $1.2bn from recent debt-rescheduling agreements, $1bn of new private-sector investment, and $1.9bn-2bn from bilateral and multilateral sources and from forthcoming privatisations.

The burden of debt Côte d’Ivoire has long suffered from a heavy debt burden, which reflects extravagant levels of borrowing during the late 1970s and early 1980s. According to the World Bank’s Global Development Finance, however, the country’s total external debt fell to $15.6bn at the end of 1997, from $19.5bn at the end of 1996. This was a result of the London Club and Paris Club agreements in 1998, which appear to have been applied retrospectively for

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1997 for accounting purposes. The main reason behind this dramatic fall was the fall in short-term debt from $5.8bn to $2.7bn, as arrears were annulled or rescheduled. According to the government, total external debt fell further in 1998, to CFAfr6.76trn ($12bn) at the end of the year, although this figure should be treated with caution. The 1999 budget allocates CFAfr743bn, out of total expenditure of CFAfr1.95trn, to debt servicing. (See Reference table 20 for historical data on debt and debt service.)

Debt relief is on the way The signing of a three-year ESAF agreement with the IMF in February 1998 gave the go-ahead for a $6.8bn commercial debt restructuring with the London Club of creditors which, under a complex buy-back arrangement, reduced total commercial debt to $2.6bn. Under an ensuing agreement with the Paris Club in April 1998, about 80% of official debt-service was annulled, representing relief estimated at almost $800m over time. If the government satisfactorily complies with the objectives of the ESAF, Côte d’Ivoire will also be eligible for a debt-reduction package under the World Bank’s heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative. Taken together with the London Club agreement, this is expected to reduce total external debt to some $9bn by 2001. However, with the coup and the ESAF still on hold, HIPC debt relief is very likely to be postponed.

Foreign reserves and the exchange rate

Rising reserves Excluding gold, Côte d’Ivoire’s international reserves soared from $2.3m at end-1993 to $648m in September 1999 (see Reference table 21 for historical data on foreign reserves). This was, however, equivalent to only about eight weeks of import cover.

The devaluation The overvaluation of the CFA franc became a chronic problem for all countries in the zone in the 1980s. By 1991, the real exchange rate in Côte d’Ivoire was thought to be overvalued by perhaps 60%, and free convertibility resulted in growing capital flight. France’s decision that it could no longer defend the CFA franc’s existing value in the face of rising losses by the Banque de France (France’s central bank) and growing pressure for a major devaluation from the IMF and the World Bank made such an event inevitable. A 50% devaluation, to CFAfr100:FFr1, happened on January 12th 1994 (see Reference table 22 for historical exchange rates). The CFA franc is now formally tied to the euro.

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Appendices

Regional organisations

For information about the regional organisations to which Côte d’Ivoire belongs, see Mali: Regional organisations. The two countries belong to the same regional organisations.

Sources of information

National statistical sources The primary statistical sources in Côte d’Ivoire are the Tableau résumé de l’économie and the Indicateurs conjoncturels, both published quarterly by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Data collection has greatly improved since 1994, and this annual document is supplemented by a series of publications from the Abidjan-based Institut national de la statistique (INS). There are two INS publications, one quarterly (Bulletin trimestriel), which is not readily available, and the other monthly (Tableau de bord), covering a wide range of macroeconomic indicators. The institute also produces regular reports on inflation and industrial production, and infrequent bulletins on foreign trade. The press has multiplied since the advent of multiparty politics in Côte d’Ivoire, but there is still no non-partisan, competent economic and financial analysis in the Abidjan newspapers.

International statistical It is often said that international statistics on African economies are superior to sources national data. This, however, overlooks the fact that the principal international sources, such as the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, draw almost exclusively on national sources. They do not have any other option as they do not have the resources or the remit to collect data on domestic money supply, credit, public finances and trade. In consequence, with a few exceptions—such as Cameroon and Nigeria, where the volume of oil exports is disputed, and Angola, where 20 years of civil war have created an enormous parallel non-oil economy that dwarfs the formal sector—international and national sources largely agree. However, the IMF and the World Bank produce internal country- specific documents, which can sometimes be obtained informally at their regional offices: the data they contain often forms the basis for lending decisions by the institutions’ directors and tend to differ from national data rather more than the statistics that are released to the public.

Other than the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, the main international sources are: three annual publications from the World Bank, Global Development Finance, World Tables and Trends in Developing Economies; the OECD’s Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients; the annual Rapport Zone Franc from the Banque de France in Paris; Les états d’Afrique, de l’océan indien et des Caraïbes, produced by the French co-operation ministry; and Statistiques économiques et monétaires from the Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO) in Dakar. On the historical national accounts, there tend to be differences between the French and regional sources and the

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World Bank-IMF. For information on the financial sector (such as balance sheet totals, net profits, board directors and shareholdings in institutions), the Geneva-based Sifida Investment produces the useful African Banking Directory each year. The energy balance comes from Energy Data Associates, 1 Regent Street, London SW1Y 4NR.

Bibliography and select IMF, Côte d’Ivoire: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, Washington, DC, websites May 1998

World Bank, Report and recommendation on assistance to the republic of Côte d’Ivoire under the HIPC debt initiative, Washington, DC, March 1998

Diégou Bailly, La Restauration du multipartisme en Côte d’Ivoire: ou la double mort d’Houphouët-Boigny, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1995

Fraternité Matin (daily), Abidjan

Le Jour (daily), Abidjan

Notre Voie (daily), Abidjan

Africa Online website, www.africaonline.co.ci contains daily news from a variety of sources.

Caisse de stabilisation des prix agricoles website, www.caistab.ci features bulletins and statistics from the newely-privatised commodity marketing board.

Investir en Zone Franc website, www.izf.net covers news, business information and statistics for all Franc Zone countries.

Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest, www.bceao.int contains information on the regional central bank.

Bourse régionale des valeurs mobilières, www.brvm.org features statistics from the regional stock market.

Reference tables

These reference tables provide the most up-to-date statistics available at the date of publication.

Reference table 1 Population (m) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997a Population 13.18 13.70 14.23 14.78 14.3 % change 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.9 n/a

a Break in series.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 40 Côte d’Ivoire

Reference table 2 Transport: Port of Abidjan traffic (‘000 tonnes) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Freight loaded 3,995 3,984 3,882 3,702 4,173 of which: petroleum & products 1,692 1,837 1,080 971 n/a logs 78 55 66 97 n/a Freight unloaded 6,048 6,178 5,936 6,184 7,228 of which: petroleum & products 3,525 3,639 2,814 2,945 n/a clinker 553 650 665 853 n/a Total freight 10,043 10,162 9,818 9,886 11,401 Sources: Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO), Notes d’Information et Statistiques.

Reference table 3 Electricity production and consumption (m kwh) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Production 2,040 1,762 2,399 2,757 3,985 Consumption 1,861 1,376 2,304 2,561 2,814 Low tension 783 566 981 1,057 1,250 High tension 1,078 810 1,322 1,492 1,564 Source: BCEAO, Notes d’Information et Statistiques.

Reference table 4 Petroleum consumption (‘000 cu meters unless otherwise indicated) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Crude petroleum 67.8 51.3 67.9 73.5 72.7 Petrol 205.6 147.5 225.2 221.2 90.5 Gas-oil 620.8 469 746.3 780.6 780.3 Diesel (‘000 tonnes) 31.9 24.8 33.1 30.1 30.3 Fuel oil (‘000 tonnes) 110.4 86.7 132.8 139 151.2 Source: BCEAO, Notes d’Information et Statistiques.

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 Côte d’Ivoire 41

Reference table 5 Government finances (CFAfr bn) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998a Total revenue 876.6 1,138.30 1,272.50 1,372.20 1,439.20 Taxes 678.5 897.4 1,040.70 1,112.90 1,142.20 Non-tax revenue 168.4 205.9 191.3 215.2 246.5 Grants 29.7 35 40.5 44.1 50.5 Total expenditure 1,160.90 1,322.60 1,385.10 1,494.50 1,557.30 Recurrent 969.3 1,042.50 1,081.10 1,122.20 1,101.4 of which: salaries 328 346.3 389.6 408.1 415.2 foreign interest payments 303.7 301.7 286.5 264.6 286.2 domestic interest payments 44.6 41.5 35.7 38.6 34.6 Capital 191.6 280.1 304 372.3 455.9 of which: externally financed 91.1 158.9 165 241.6 304.8 Primary balanceb 134.8 245.1 308.1 267.4 268.7 Balance (commitments basis) –284.3 –184.3 –112.6 –122.4 –118.1 Increase in arrears –448.5 –72 –89.1 72 –138 Balance (cash basis) –732.8 –256.3 –201.7 –50.3 –256.1 Financing 736.8 285.8 189 67.4 234.9 Domestic –46 84 23.7 116 76 External 782.8 201.8 165.3 –48.6 158.9 of which: new loans 555.8 364.3 283.4 164.8 320.6 Financing gap 4 29.5 –12.7 17.1 –21.2 a Estimates. b Excluding grants, interest payments and some capital expenditure financed externally.

Source: Banque de France, La Zone franc, Rapport annuel.

Reference table 6 Money, credit and interest rates (CFAfr m unless otherwise indicated; end-period) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Money (M1) incl others 798.8 944.5 966.4 1,080.0 1,219.3 % change, year on year 61.7 18.2 2.3 11.8 12.9 Quasi-money 412.1 485.3 519.6 527.7 485.1 Money (M2) 1,210.9 1,429.8 1,486.0 1,607.7 1,704.4 % change, year on year 46.8 18.1 3.9 8.2 6.0 Foreign assets (net) –71.5 58.1 62.3 100.5 113.5 Domestic credit 1,372.40 1,540.10 1,593.10 1,722.90 1,811.50 % change, year on year 6.4 12.2 3.4 8.1 5.1 of which: claims on central government 506.5 510.1 540 540.1 610.1 claims on private sector 854.9 1,016.00 1,038.70 1,169.40 1,186.70 Discount rate (%) 10 7.5 6.5 6 6.25 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 42 Côte d’Ivoire

Reference table 7 Gross domestic product (market prices) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total at current prices ($ bn) 7.45 9.99 10.71 10.29 11.68 Total at current prices (CFAfr bn) 4,256.00 4,987.70 5,548.20 6,176.20 6,893.30 % real change 1.8 7.1 6.8 6 5.4 Per head at current prices ($) 559.5 702.2 733.8 740.0 801.0a % real change –1.9 4.0 1.9 3.9 3.3

a EIU estimate.

Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, BCEAO, Notes d’Information et statistiques.

Reference table 8 Gross domestic product by expenditure (CFAfr bn at current prices; % of total in brackets) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Private consumption 2,764.2 3,366.6 3,641.1 3,914.5 4,194.2 (64.9) (67.5) (66.5) (65.4) (64.6) Government consumption 599.4 606 674.7 708.9 704.6 (14.1) (12.1) (12.3) (11.8) (10.9) Gross fixed investment 495 641 760 958 1182 (11.6) (12.9) (13.9) (16.0) (18.2) Stockbuilding 46.9 105.0 –25.0 0.0 0.0 (1.1) (2.1) (–0.5) (0.0) (0.0) Exports of goods & services 1,730.5 2,051.0 2,565.0 2,788.4 2,870.6 (40.7) (41.1) (46.9) (46.6) (44.2) Imports of goods & services 1,379.8 1,782.0 2,142.5 2,384.8 2,458.5 (32.4) (35.7) (39.1) (39.8) (37.9) GDP 4,256.1 4,987.8 5,473.6 5,984.5 6,492.9 Source: BCEAO, Notes d’information et statistiques.

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 Côte d’Ivoire 43

Reference table 9 Gross domestic product by sector (CFAfr bn at current prices; factor cost; % of total in brackets) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Agriculture, livestock, forestry & fishing 1,363.6 1,437.6 1,529.9 1,497.8 1,589.5 (33.4) (30.2) (29.2) (26.2) (25.6) Industry 893.4 867 1,010.9 1,197.0 1,321.9 (21.9) (18.2) (19.3) (20.9) (21.3) of which: manufacturing 583.8 635 870.7 841.2 905.8 electricity & water 301.2 224 119 329 385.2 Construction 72.6 131 196.4 285 354.2 (1.8) (2.8) (3.8) (5.0) (5.7) Transport, storage & communications 263.8 469 489 536.6 607.9 (6.5) (9.8) (9.3) (9.4) (9.8) Services & trade 1,059.00 1,444.00 1,570.00 1,748.70 1,881 (25.9) (30.3) (30.0) (30.5) (30.3) Public administration & other services 433.8 414 438.3 459.5 462.2 (10.6) (8.7) (8.4) (8.0) (7.4) GDP at factor cost incl others 4,086.2 4,762.6 5,234.5 5,724.6 6,216.7 Source: BCEAO, Notes d’Information et Statistiques.

Reference table 10 Consumer price inflation (1995=100; period averages) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999b Indexa 100 102.5 106.6 111.6 114.4 % change, year on year 14.3 2.5 4.0 4.7 1.8

a African worker and skilled employee families, Abidjan. b September.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Reference table 11 Producer prices for selected commoditiesa (CFAfr/kg) 1993/94b 1994/95b 1995/96b 1996/97b 1997/98c Cocoa 240 315 320 320 455 Coffee 350 650 700 500 520 Cotton 104 145 155 155 155 Pineapples 379 380 380 322 n/a Bananas 412 325 320 290 n/a

a Crop season October-September. b Prices at end-season. c Indicative prices.

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources.

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 44 Côte d’Ivoire

Reference table 12 Food crop production (‘000 tonnes) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Cereals 1,690 1,494 1,963 1,870 1,832 of which: paddy rice 1,045 833 1,287 1,197 1,162 maize 552 569 576 573 571 Roots & tubers 4,803 4,974 5,095 5,017 4,996 of which: yam 2,880 2,924 2,986 2,921 2,923 cassava 1,641 1,653 1,699 1,692 1,673 Source: FAO Production Yearbook.

Reference table 13 Production of main cash crops (‘000 tonnes) 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000a Cocoa 1,265 1,130 1,110 1,163 1,050 Coffee 177 323 223 131 269 Cotton (fibre & seed) 222 265 338 n/a n/a

a Preliminary estimates.

Source: BCEAO, Notes d’Information et de Statistiques; New Caistab.

Reference table 14 Gold, oil and gas production

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Gold (kg) 1,872 2,008 2,054 2,485 1,995 Oil (‘000 barrels) n/a 2,294 5,815 5,266 3,806 Natural gas (BTU m) n/a 800 16,497 27,063 33.349 Sources: BCEAO, Notes d’Information et Statistiques; Banque de France, La Zone franc, Rapport annuel.

Reference table 15 Manufacturing production (1984/85=100; seasonally adjusted) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Petroleum & mineral extraction 3 3 33 78 82 Electricity & water 122 129 155 171 195 Textiles & clothing 87 89 117 119 169 Agro-industry 119 110 107 116 139 Timber 74 84 77 69 56 Total incl others 95 97 106 120 139 Sources: BCEAO, Notes d’Information et Statistiques; Institut national de la statistique (INS), Bulletin trimestriel.

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 Côte d’Ivoire 45

Reference table 16 Foreign trade (CFAfr bn) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Exports (fob) 713.2 1,522.5 1,819.3 2,178.2 2,413.1 of which: cocoa & products 267.5 527.9 619.8 813.6 862.2 petroleum & products 110 138.4 202.8 335.9 313.7 coffee & products 69 110.5 212.2 151.8 218.8 timber & products 67.1 166.7 179.2 161.9 160.8 fish (tuna) 18.6 64 125.7 108.1 124.2 Imports (cif) 599 1,064.6 1,469.8 1,443.4 1,599.9 Industrial input n/a n/a n/a 393.1 482.9 Capital equipment 118.1 227.8 291.6 313.3 393.9 Petroleum & products 130.1 220 234.5 331.6 291.2 Food & products 122.1 175.9 260.9 237.9 293.9 Other consumer goods n/a n/a n/a 114.6 126.2 Balance 114.2 457.9 349.5 734.8 813.2 Source: INS, Bulletin trimestriel; Tableau de bord.

Reference table 17 Main trading partners (% of total) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Exports to: France 17.6 20 14.4 16.6 16.6 Netherlands 14.3 14.4 14.3 6.4 11.9 Italy 7.4 8.3 4.8 5.8 5.7 Germany 7 5.6 18.7 7.8 4.7 Mali 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.9 4.7 Belgium-Luxembourg 4.2 2.9 2.4 5.6 2.4 EU 60 62 62.8 52.8 n/a UEMOA 11.1 10.6 9.7 11.9 12.9 Imports from: France 30 30.6 24.2 28.2 20.7 Nigeria 17.7 15.8 12.7 17.9 7.7 Italy 3.1 4.1 4.5 4.5 3.8 US 6.5 5.4 5.7 5.4 3.6 Belgium-Luxembourg 2.9 2.9 2.9 5 2.3 Chinaa 2.2 1.9 1.9 4.4 1.6 EU 53.3 56.2 51.6 53.1 n/a UEMOA 0.8 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.7

a Including Hong Kong.

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook.

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 46 Côte d’Ivoire

Reference table 18 Balance of payments, IMF estimates ($ m) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Goods: exports fob 2,896 3,806 4,446 4,299 4,575 Goods: imports fob –1,607 –2,430 –2,622 –2,480 –2,705 Trade balance 1,289 1,376 1,824 1,819 1,870 Services: credit 508 531 566 532 550 Services: debit –1,011 –1,376 –1,444 –1,368 –1,474 Income: credit 134 190 171 167 170 Income: debit –818 –976 –940 –895 –880 Current transfers: credit 247 278 56 50 51 Current transfers: debit –363 –514 –547 –548 –599 Current-account balance –14 –492 –314 –242 –313 Direct investment in Côte d’ivoire 78 212 269 341 435 Direct investment abroad 0 0 0 0 0 Inward portfolio investment –1 10 27 31 39 Outward portfolio investment –27 –8 –19 –15 –14 Other investment assets –40 –323 –254 –278 –324 Other investment liabilities –533 21 –719 –534 –669 Financial balance –601 –300 –967 –797 –846 Capital account credit 528 291 50 40 36 Capital account debit 0 0 0 0 0 Capital account balance 528 291 50 40 36 Net errors & omissions –11 36 –36 65 171 Overall balance –20 –254 –997 –593 –639 Financing (– indicates inflow) Movement of reserves –202 –325 –76 –10 –238 Use of IMF credit & loans 171 181 138 0 168 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 Côte d’Ivoire 47

Reference table 19 Net official development assistancea ($ m) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Bilateral 708.5 820.2 726.6 449.2 232.7 of which: France 585 649.7 516 300.3 133.7 Japan 39.5 20.4 54.2 58.1 33.4 Germany 43.8 45.9 74.2 34 21.1 Belgium-Luxembourg 3.4 12.6 8.6 5.1 15.6 US 21 23 9 14 10 Multilateral 56.5 773.7 485.8 518.3 211.3 of which: IDA 2.7 447.8 226.2 234.8 140.1 IMF 0 170.5 180.7 138.4 0 EU 29.4 134.1 55.4 104.1 41.4 UNHCR 9.5 6.4 11.2 11.3 11 AfDF 1.1 2.7 1.2 17.2 6.8 Total 765.1 1,594.20 1,212.50 967.6 444.0 of which: grants 336.7 798.4 576.3 608.9 401.4

a Disbursements minus repayments. Official development assistance is defined as grants and loans with at least a 25% grant element, provided by OECD and OPEC member countries and multilateral agencies and administered with the aim of promotin

Source: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients.

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 48 Côte d’Ivoire

Reference table 20 External debt, World Bank estimates ($ m unless otherwise indicated) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Public & publicly guaranteed long-term debt 11,111 11,240 11,902 11,367 10,427 Official creditors 8,602 8,641 9,217 8,787 7,906 Bilateral 5,045 4,927 5,317 5,122 4,605 Multilateral 3,557 3,715 3,900 3,665 3,301 Private creditors 2,509 2,599 2,685 2,580 2,521 of which: banks 2,393 2,514 2,630 2,526 16 Private non-guaranteed 2,617 2,611 2,660 1,849 2,071 Use of IMF credit 219 328 427 303 450 Short-term debt 5,125 3,215 3,910 5,805 2,661 of which: interest arrears on long-term debt 1,251 961 1,020 953 87 IMF credits 219 328 427 503 450 Total external debt 19,071 17,395 18,899 19,524 15,609 of which: long-term debt 13,727 13,852 14,562 13,216 12,498 Principal repayments 585 787 625 860 838 Interest payments 509 457 421 487 521 of which: short-term debt 110 20 23 37 105 Total debt service 1,094 1,244 1,046 1,347 1,360 Ratios (%) Total external debt/GNP 211 252.4 209.9 199.5 165.3 Debt-service ratioa 33.2 35.2 23.1 26.8 27.4 Short-term debt/total external debt 26.9 18.5 20.7 29.7 7.1 Concessional long-term loans/long-term debt 19.4 22.3 24.2 24.6 28.9

Note. Long-term debt is defined as having original maturity of more than one year. a Debt service as a percentage of earnings from exports of goods and services.

Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance.

Reference table 21 Foreign reserves ($ m unless otherwise indicated; end-period) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999a Foreign exchange 527 604.4 618.1 855.0 648.2 SDRs 1.8 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 IMF reserve position 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 Total reserves excl gold 529 605.8 618.4 855.5 648.4 Goldb 17.1 16.7 13.6 n/a n/a Total reserves incl gold 546.1 622.5 632.0 n/a n/a Gold (m fine troy oz) 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 n/a

a September. b National valuation.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 Côte d’Ivoire 49

Reference table 22 Exchange rates (period averages; CFAfr per currency unit) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 $ 499.2 511.6 583.7 590.0 615.7 DM 387.4 339.9 336.6 335.3 336.4 SDR 757.3 742.7 803.2 800.4 844.7 Na 22.8 23.4 26.7 27.0b 6.4

a The 1995 Nigerian budget reintroduced an autonomous rate, which applies to virtually all commercial transactions. It yielded an average rates of CFAfr6.9:N1 in 1998. The rate used here, however, is the official rate, which has remained constant since 1993 at around N22:$1. On January 1st 1999 the official rate was abandoned. b EIU estimate.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 50 Mali

Mali

Basic data

Land area 1,240,190 sq km

Population 9.79m (April 1998 census)

Main towns Population in 1998 (‘000; EIU estimates)

Bamako (capital) 1,016a Ségou 95 Mopti 85 Sikasso 85 Gao 60

a April 1998 census.

Climate Mostly hot and dry; semi-tropical in the far south

Weather in Bamako Hottest month, April, 34-39°C (average daily maximum and minimum); (altitude 340 metres) coldest month, January, 16-33°C; driest months, December-January, zero rainfall; wettest month, August, 220 mm average rainfall

Languages French, Bambara, Fulfuldé, Songhai and Tamasaq (in the north)

Measures Metric system

Currency CFA franc=100 centimes; CFAfr100:FFr1; average exchange rate in 1999: CFAfr615.7:$1; exchange rate on February 28th 2000: CFAfr675.5:$1

Financial year January-December

Time GMT

Public holidays, 2000 January 1st, January 8th, January 9th, March 15th, 16th, April 5th, May 1st, 25th, June 15th, July 26th, September 22nd, November 19th, December 25th

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 Mali 51

Political background

Mali has been ruled by the Alliance pour la democratie au Mali (Adema) under President Alpha Oumar Konaré since the country’s first multiparty elections in 1992. Adema was established after mass demonstrations overthrew the regime of Moussa Traoré in 1991. Although both Adema and Mr Konaré were re- elected in 1997, the elections were marred by widespread disorganisation. The opposition has since boycotted the country’s institutions and attempts at resolving the stalemate have so far failed. The next elections are due in 2002.

Historical background

Early history The area that is now Mali was, from the 13th century, home to a series of states, with Islam playing a (restricted) role in statecraft from the 14th century. In the middle of the 19th century, the French turned a period of social and political instability along the River Niger to their advantage, and by 1905, most of the area had been brought under French control. The Soudan français, as Mali was then known, was administered as part of the French West Africa federation and was used as a labour reserve for the coastal states.

Independence The country became independent in September 1960 after the Federation of Mali, formed with Senegal in June 1960, had broken up. Under its first president, Modibbo Keïta, from the anti-colonialist Union soudanaise party, Mali sought to create its own brand of African socialism, and withdrew from the Franc Zone in 1962. A sharp economic deterioration culminated in the “Active Revolution” in 1966. Mali rejoined the Franc Zone in 1967. The following year a group of junior army officers overthrew Mr Keïta, and the leading figure among the officers, Lieutenant Moussa Traoré, became president in 1969. Mr Keïta was imprisoned until his unexplained death in 1977. From 1979 Mr Traoré ruled through his parti unique, the Union démocratique du peuple malien (UDPM).

Transition to democracy Considerable student unrest developed in the late 1970s, but the protests were brutally crushed. A disaffected former education minister, Alpha Oumar Konaré, emerged as the focus of intellectual dissent. From 1989, a broad-based coalition of social and political groups demanded multipartisme. Mass demonstrations became commonplace in the capital, Bamako, in 1990. In March 1991, a series of bloody clashes between the people and the army culminated in the arrest of the president. More than 100 people died in the conflict. Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré subsequently established a Comité de transition pour le salut du peuple (CTSP). Administrative difficulties and a Tuareg insurrection in the north delayed legislative elections until January 1992. The Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali (Adema), leading a coalition of opposition parties, swiftly established electoral dominance, while its candidate, Mr Konaré, was elected president in April of that year. Colonel Touré, a popular figure among ordinary Malians, left office in June.

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 52 Mali

The “problème du Nord” Rising discontent among the nomadic Tuareg in the northern Saharan provinces led to an armed rebellion in 1990, and the Malian army suffered a number of severe defeats. A National Pact was signed in 1992 between the government and the Mouvement des fronts unis de l’Azaouad (MFUA)— Azaouad being the name for the Saharan region for which Tuareg autonomy was being claimed—but anarchy continued. The conflict appeared to have come to a definitive end in 1996 with the creation of an eighth administrative region around Kidal, in the predominantly Tuareg region in the north-east of the country, but sporadic banditry and kidnapping continue to present a security problem.

Political stalemate Mr Konaré’s rule has been characterised by suspicion and recriminations between Adema and various opposition parties. Several parties left the government in 1994, and Adema governed alone until the Parti de la renaissance nationale (Parena) joined the government in mid-1996. The botched legislative and presidential elections in 1997 did nothing to ease the political stalemate. The first round of the legislative election in April, which Adema won overwhelmingly, was annulled by the Constitutional Court on the grounds of disorganisation. After opposition parties announced a boycott, Mr Konaré won a large majority in the presidential election in May on a low turnout, while a re-run of the legislative election in August produced a parliament composed of representatives of Adema and its allies.

Amid demands from the radical opposition that the Adema government resign before new elections were held, the political stalemate continued through 1998. The radical opposition, loosely grouped together since November 1997 as the Collectif des partis politiques de l’opposition (COPPO), refused to take part in the municipal elections held in June 1998. In January 1999, Mr Konaré convened a national forum to improve dialogue with the opposition, but would not consider rerunning the legislative elections of 1997. Therefore, COPPO boycotted the proceedings, and the second round of the municipal elections was finally held in two stages in May and June 1999. Adema won both rounds, obtaining 59% of the seats in southern Mali in the first round, and 62% of the seats in the northern part of the country in the second round. A number of smaller opposition parties chose to participate in the elections, however none was able to get more than 10% of the seats. Mr Keïta resigned as prime minister in February 2000 as allegations of corruption threatened to severely damage to his reputation in the run up to the 2002 presidential elections. Technocrat Mandé Sidibé was appointed to take Mr Keïta’s place.

Mali: results of municipal elections, 1999

First stage (May) Second stage (Jun) Total Seats % Seats % Seats % Adema 4,193 58.8 1,740 69.0 5,933 61.5 Other parties 2,931 41.2 783 31.0 3,744 38.5 Total 7,124 100.0 2,523 100.0 9,677 100.0 Voter turnout 38.5 – 43.3 – 39.7a –

a EIU estimate.

Source: Reuters.

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 Mali 53

Important recent events

January-April 1992: In January, the Alliance pour la democratie (Adema) wins the country’s first multiparty election. In April, the party’s leader, Alpha Oumar Konaré, is elected president. A cross-party government is formed.

January-June 1994: The CFA franc is devalued by 50%, setting the ground for the implementation of further economic reform policies under a new prime minister, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta.

April-August 1997: The first round of the legislative election is won by Adema, but annulled by the Constitutional Court because of disorganisation. In the face of a widespread opposition boycott, Mr Konaré is re-elected in May. Adema wins the re-run of the legislative election in August.

November 1997: The radical opposition comes together under the umbrella of the Collectif des partis politiques de l’opposition (COPPO).

June 1998: Adema wins most of the country’s 19 towns in the first round of municipal elections, which are boycotted by the opposition.

January 1999: Mr Konaré convenes a national forum, which is boycotted by the opposition. The former president, Moussa Traoré, is condemned to death for a second time.

May-June 1999: Adema wins the majority of the country’ seats in the second round of municipal elections, which were also boycotted by the opposition.

February 2000: Mr Keïta resigns as prime minister amid corruption allegations and is replaced by a technocrat, Mondé Sididé.

Constitution and institutions

Military rule As in many other Franc Zone countries, Mali’s first constitution was heavily modelled on that of the French Fifth Republic, but it was in effect a dead letter from 1966. The constitution of the Second Republic was approved in 1974 in a highly dubious referendum. It provided for a single political party, the Union démocratique du peuple malien (UDPM), which was not established until 1979.

The Third Republic In July 1991, during the transition to democracy, a national conference involving representatives of political associations, trade unions, student organisations and other social groups was convened. The conference finalised a new constitution for the Third Republic, which once again was based on the French model. It was approved by referendum in January 1992. A Constitutional Court came into operation in 1994, although the judicial system continues to suffer major funding and credibility problems. However, the judiciary has become increasingly independent, as highlighted by the election debacle of 1997, when it repeatedly ruled against government and

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 54 Mali

opposition alike on various challenges to the elections, as well as its decision to reimpose the death sentence on General Traoré and his wife in January 1999.

Decentralisation The impact of decentralisation on the current constitutional arrangements is as yet unclear. Administrative and revenue-raising powers were devolved in part to 19 urban and 682 rural local bodies in 1999. The first round of the municipal elections, held in June 1998, saw Adema win power in most of the 19 urban areas where polling took place thanks to a widespread opposition boycott. After repeated delays, the municipal elections were held in two rounds, in May and June 1999. COPPO, the main opposition coalition again boycotted the elections, which Adema overwhelmingly won.

Political forces

Adema rules The ruling coalition, the Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali (Adema), was originally dominated by two formerly clandestine parties, the Parti malien révolutionnaire pour la démocratie (PMRD) and Mr Konaré’s Parti malien du travail. Skilful co-option of the less tainted members of the UDPM has given Adema the only genuine nationwide party framework, and thus overwhelming strength in the Assemblée nationale since 1992, although the legitimacy of the parliament has been doubtful since the 1997 election. The Adema alliance remains uneasy, with idealist liberal intellectuals looking increasingly marginalised by party apparatchiks who believe in power at any cost. Many key ministries are now under the control of technocrats with a greater interest in administrative reform than political debate.

A divided opposition Opposition politics have been characterised by personal antagonisms and factionalism. Despite the establishment of COPPO in late 1997, no opposition party has built a nationwide anti-Adema base. Within COPPO, the Union soudanaise-Rassemblement démocratique africain (US-RDA) retains consider- able support among older notables, although the party split in May 1998. The Mouvement patriotique pour le renouveau (MPR) under Choguel Maïga, is loyal to the memory of the UDPM. Mr Maïga, together with Mountaga Tall of the Congrès national d’initiative démocratique (CNID), is one the most vocal critics of a government that COPPO has maintained a hard-line stance towards. All parties, however, suffer from tension between the political elite and the grass roots, a reflection of most Malians’ ambivalent attitude towards multiparty democracy in a society living in conditions of extreme hardship.

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Main political figures

Alpha Oumar Konaré: The first democratically elected Malian president, his five-year mandate was renewed in 1997. He is frequently accused of not being in full control of his government.

Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta: Resigned from the post of prime minister in February 2000 after a six-year stint in office. The resignation of the Adema hawk should clear the way for him to run for the presidency in 2002.

Choguel Maïga: Leader of the Mouvement patriotique pour le renouveau (MPR) and an apologist for the era of single-party government, he is feared by Adema strategists as a genuine political force.

Mandé Sidibé: Respected economist who had worked at the IMF for 10 years before becoming prime minister in February 2000.

Mountaga Tall: Leader of the Congrès national d’initiative démocratique (CNID), he is a direct descendant of al-Hajj Umar Tal bn Futi, who led a Senegambian invasion force in the 19th century.

Amadou Toumani Touré: A popular hero and the head of the 1991-92 transitional government. He is now a figure of continent-wide significance, although viewed with suspicion by many in Adema.

The role of religion Intersecting with the orthodox political arena is the shifting system of socio- political and religious alliances that determine influence in Mali. Most are based on clan and family lines, rather than ethnic divisions. Mali’s Islamic hierarchies are also fragmented along overlapping clan and doctrinal lines. Many Muslim leaders prospered under the Traoré regime and have an ambivalent attitude towards Mr Konaré and his government. Islamists with a political agenda, though not as prominent as those in neighbouring Senegal, are increasingly influential. Mr Konaré has expressed concern about religious extremism following violent clashes in August 1998 involving an anti-modernist sect, Sena Kolo Dine (meaning “the barefooted” in the Bambara language).

International relations and defence

Western support for At independence, Mali aligned with the Soviet bloc and opted out of the Franc Mr Konaré Zone. It was compelled to rejoin the zone in 1967, and relations with France have remained ambivalent ever since. France’s frequent expulsion of illegal Malian immigrants since mid-1996 has often soured relations, although the election in May 1997 of the Socialist Lionel Jospin as French prime minister gave Mr Konaré a close ally in Paris. Relations with the US have become much closer since the overthrow of Mr Traoré, and Mali now receives more aid from the US than any other African country. US secretary of state Madeleine Albright

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visited Mali in mid-1999, and pledged to maintain current aid levels while lauding the country as a model of Africa democracy.

Uneasy relations with The Tuareg issue has dictated Mali’s policy towards its neighbours. Relations neighbours with Mauritania have frequently suffered from resentment among “black” Malians against Arabs and Tuareg, who have been accused of using the ill- defined border as a base for armed attack. Algeria played a major role in arbitrating the conflict between the government and Tuareg fighters in the early 1990s. Relations with Burkina Faso have been carefully maintained since a border dispute in 1985 which saw the two countries briefly go to war. Although Senegal and Mali severed relations following the failure of the Mali Federation in 1960, economic interdependence led both countries to resume relations in the mid-1960s, Dakar being at the time Mali’s major outlet to the sea. Defying international sanctions against Libya, Mali has recently joined a Libyan-inspired Communauté des états sahélo-sahariens, which also includes Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad. Mali is a member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

An army in search of Since Mr Traoré’s military-backed regime was overthrown in 1991, the army a new role high command has kept a low profile, but Mr Konaré’s relationship with the military remains uneasy. The army is underpaid, underequipped and in need of rationalisation. Many Tuareg irregulars were integrated into the regular armed forces following the National Pact between the government and the Tuareg in 1992. There is a long history of military co-operation with France, Germany, the US and, previously, the Soviet Union. Malian troops have taken part in recent peacekeeping initiatives in Angola, Liberia, Haiti and Rwanda. Mali provided soldiers in 1999 to serve with a West African intervention force in Sierra Leone. The operation, which was funded by the Dutch government, became controversial after several Malian soldiers were killed in a rebel- ambush. After a six-month deployment, Mr Konaré ordered the withdrawal of the 428 soldiers in July of that year.

Military forces, mid-1999

Army 7,350 Land forces 6,900 Air forces 400 Naval staff 50 Paramilitary forces 7,800 Gendarmerie 1,800 Republican Guard 2,000 Militia 3,000 National police 1,000 Total 15,150 Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1999/2000.

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Resources

Population

Population indicators, 1998

Population (m) 9.79 Population growth rate (%) 2.2 Fertility rate (live births per woman) 6.6 Life expectancy (years) 48.0 Urbanisation (% of total) 17.5 Source: Direction nationale de la statistique et de l’informatique (DNSI), Recensement general de la population et de l’habitat, April 1998.

The provisional results of the third national census, conducted in April 1998, showed that Mali’s total population was lower than expected. Whereas the UN had forecast a population of 11.8m by mid-1998, it stood at only 9.8m. This was 27% higher than at the last census in 1987, when Mali’s population was 7.7m, indicating an annual growth rate of about 2.2%. This may be surprising, considering the high fertility rate in Mali (around 6.6 births per woman, according to the UN), but may be explained by high mortality rates and high levels of emigration. There are over 3m Malians outside the country’s borders— mainly in Côte d’Ivoire, but also in France—at any one time. The UN estimate the crude birth rate at 47 per 1,000, and the death rate at 17 per 1,000 compared with a birth rate of 51 per 1,000 and death rate of18 per 1,000 in Niger. The birth rate has been broadly constant since 1970, but the death rate has declined from 26 per 1,000. Life expectancy is currently put at 48 years. A major unknown factor is the impact of AIDS which, according to UNAIDS, affected 1.7% of adults at the end of 1997.

Sharp differences between Overall population density is very low, at about 8 people per sq km. The census the north and south highlighted wide regional disparities, with most of the population growth concentrated in Mali’s southern provinces, in particular Bamako, whose population increased from about 660,000 in 1987 to 1m in 1998. The population of the three northern Saharan provinces, Timbuktu in particular, which have suffered from repeated droughts and a debilitating civil war in the mid-1990s, has barely moved. Altogether, Mali’s seven southern provinces contain over 91% of the population. An estimated 18% of the population lives in towns.

A diverse mix of people Mali’s ethnic mix is diverse, with the main ethnic group, the Bambara, shading into other identities (Marka, Soninké, Peul-Fulbé and Somono) and other groups associated with a particular region, such as the Dogon of the Mopti region. In the north, ethnic tensions between the mostly sedentary Songhai and the chiefly nomadic Tuareg and related groups have resulted in unrest throughout the post-independence period, although there has been an apparent return to stability since mid-1996. Mali has a long tradition of Islamic culture and the overwhelming majority of Malians are Muslims.

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Education

High illiteracy Mali has one of the highest illiteracy rates in Africa, with over 70% of the population unable to read and write. Education spending has historically shown a very strong bias in favour of tertiary-level students, mostly in Bamako, who by the 1990s had become a formidable interest group. Since 1992, the government has tried to redress the balance in favour of primary education and to bring more females into education. The government has developed a ten-year education strategy with basic education and literacy among the key objectives. Sporadic student unrest continues, and the newly established national university in Bamako is dogged by financing and infrastructure problems.

Health

Life is grim Mali has some of the world’s worst health indicators. According to estimates by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), there was one doctor for every 20,000 people in 1988-91, this average disguising a sharp bias in favour of the capital and urban areas. Only 30% of the population were thought to have access to health services in 1995. The grimmest aspect of the health situation concerns women. The UN estimates the infant mortality rate at 120 per 1,000 live births in 1990-96, a rate exceeded only by Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Liberia, although considerably better than the rate of 210 per 1,000 in 1960. At government and non-governmental organisation levels, much effort has gone into improving health and educational services. Nevertheless, health indicators will rise only slowly, given poor nutrition and the prevalence of hepatitis, tuberculosis, meningitis and particularly malaria. Mali was ranked 171st out of 175 countries on the UNDP’s 1998 Human Development Index (only Somalia, Sierra Leone and Niger were rated worse).

Natural resources and the environment

A Sahelian country The dominant natural feature in landlocked Mali is the River Niger. When flooded, the Niger provides natural irrigation in its inner delta zone, hydropower and, for six months of the year, navigation for medium- and large- sized shipping between Koulikoro (close to Bamako) and Gao. The extreme south of the country has small areas of tropical forest; one travels north through bands of first “Guinean” (wooded) and then “Sudanese” (sparse tree cover and shrubs) savannah, before reaching the arid Sahelian zone. Although many areas can support cattle on a seasonal basis, year-round grazing is limited to sheep and, in particular, goats. The desert accounts for about 60% of Mali’s land area, and is mostly flat.

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Transport and communications

Communications are poor Even by regional standards, transport and communications are poor. This is especially the case in the isolated western region, which is only linked to Bamako by an extremely dilapidated railway line between Bamako and Dakar—which is virtually unchanged since its completion in 1924. Road transport in the north has been further disrupted by the Tuareg conflict. A five- year $250m road maintenance and repair scheme is under way, mostly funded by donors. River transport of passengers and freight along the Niger is possible between July and December in years of normal rainfall. There is the possibility of year-round access to the Atlantic along the Senegal River from Kayes to St Louis in Senegal. There is an international airport, Senou, in Bamako, with flights to Europe and neighbouring countries. Domestic services are provided by the now privately owned Air Mali. Telecommunications have improved steadily, and are expected to be boosted by the privatisation of state-owned telecoms company Sotelma, now scheduled for mid-2000. The government hopes to raise CFAfr67bn ($100m) in investment through the sell-off, in order to achieve its target saturation rate of one telephone line for every 100 in habitants. The current ratio is one line for every 400 inhabitants.

Lively media Mr Traoré’s downfall triggered a print media explosion as Les Echos and L’Aurore, the spearheads of the pro-democracy movement, were joined by dozens of other publications. Most notable are Le Républicain, Nouvel Horizon and Cauris, an economic weekly published by a leading private-sector think- tank. Newspapers, however, suffer from comparatively high cover prices and poor distribution outside Bamako. The Office de radiodiffusion et télévision du Mali (ORTM), the former state broadcasting monopoly, now has autonomous status, but its television operation is an easy target for opposition accusations of pro-government bias. Several independent FM radio stations, such as Kaya FM, have a large audience.

Energy provision

Energy provision is poor Nearly 90% of Mali’s energy requirements are met from primary sources, such as fuelwood and charcoal. Deforestation has been an important issue since a major drought in the early 1970s, which lead to a succession of environmental initiatives.

Hydropower provided about 52% of the country’s electricity in 1996. Dry- season power cuts will remain common in major cities, until the Manantali dam on the Senegal River comes on stream. The $600m project between Mali, Senegal and Mauritania has suffered from technical and political hitches, but should start operating early in 2000. There are plans to integrate the Malian and Ivorian national grids, which, together with Manantali, dam, could lead to the full integration of the Ivorian, Malian, Senegalese and Mauritanian power networks early in the 21st century. The national power and water parastatal, Energie du Mali (EDM), suffered a number of serious setbacks in 1999, with technical and managerial problems leading to prolonged black-outs. Most of

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EDM’s facilities are outdated or out of order, reducing the company’s production to only 50mw, whereas it has the potential to produce 1,050mw. The government failed to meet promises to begin privatising EDM in late- November. Under pressure from the World Bank, the government has now set a target date of July 2000 to find a partner to manage 60% of EDM’s shares; the remainder are to be divided between the government, EDM’s employees and the general public.

Energy balance, 1998 (m tonnes oil equivalent) Elec– Oil Gas Coal tricity Other Total Production 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06a 1.58 1.64 Imports 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 Exports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Primary supply 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.06a 1.58 1.82 Net transformationb –0.04 0.00 0.00 –0.04 –0.02 –0.10 Final consumption 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.02c 1.56 1.72

a Input equivalents on an assumed generating efficiency of 33%. b Transformation input and output, plus energy industry fuel and losses. c Output basis.

Source: Energy Data Associates.

The economy

Economic structure

Main economic indicators, 1998

GDP ($ bn) 2.6 Real GDP growth (%) 4.3 Consumer price inflation (av; %) 4.0 Current-account balance ($ m) –93 Foreign debt ($ bn) 3.0 Average exchange rate (CFAfr:$) 615.7a Population (m) 9.8

a 1999.

Source: EIU.

Cattle, cotton and gold Agriculture, livestock husbandry and other primary sector activities, which predominate together accounted for an estimated 44% of GDP in 1998, dominate the Malian economy. Almost 80% of the population are active in the rural sector. The country has frequently suffered shortages of grain, and the droughts of 1969-74 and 1981-83 devastated the cattle herds of the north. Most agricultural production takes place in the fertile south. Cotton production dominates the sector, accounting for 39% of total export revenue in 1997, and

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Mali is sub-Saharan Africa’s leading cotton producer. Gold mining has expanded rapidly under a liberal investment code, accounting (together with diamonds) for 31% of exports. Its share of GDP is expected to grow rapidly.

An extremely poor country Economic planning since independence has generally been incoherent and unsuccessful, and Mali suffered an especially sharp deterioration in its terms of trade in 1985-94, owing to the real appreciation of the CFA franc. Mali became one of the most aid-dependent economies in the world in the late 1980s, a situation that the government is now trying to rectify. Although most ordinary Malians live in conditions of extreme hardship, the government’s economic reforms since 1995 have borne fruit and signs of economic growth and diversi- fication are appearing. In common with Burkina Faso, Mali has exported man- power to Côte d’Ivoire, although this declined with the downturn in the Ivorian economy in the 1980s. Mali’s GDP in 1998 was 1.8% of France’s GDP and 22.2% of that of the Côte d’Ivoire, the CFA zone’s largest economy.

Comparative economic indicators, 1998

Burkina Côte Mali Faso d’Ivoire Senegal France GDP ($ bn) 2.6 2.4 11.7 4.8 1,452.0 GDP growth (%) 4.3 6.2 5.4 5.2 3.4 GDP per head ($) 268 213 801 522 24,726 Consumer price inflation (av; %) 4.0 5.0 4.7 1.1 0.7 Current-account balance ($ bn) –0.1 –0.1a –0.3 –0.1a 40.2 Merchandise exports fob ($ bn) 0.6 0.3 4.6 1.0a 301.7 Merchandise imports fob ($ bn) –0.6 –0.6 –2.7 –1.2a –275.5 Population (m) 9.8 11.4 14.6 9.3 58.7

a 1997.

Source: EIU, CountryData.

Economic policy

Economic drift At independence, the government opted for a state-led development strategy geared towards rapid economic expansion and industrialisation. Most private industry was nationalised and the government attempted to monopolise external trade. Restrictive agricultural policies alienated merchants and the peasantry equally. The growth of a predatory bureaucracy aggravated the problem, even before the disastrous droughts of the early 1970s and 1980s. External difficulties, largely the result of over-ambitious monetary policy in the 1960s (see Foreign reserves and the exchange rate), resulted in further stagnation. Mali’s economic discontent was a key factor in the widespread popular approval of the 1968 military coup.

The start of adjustment The military-based government maintained its dirigiste stance, but opted for a policy of internal adjustment from 1981, as external pressures mounted and indebtedness began to rise. Policies were adopted to liberalise grain markets,

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ease price controls, encourage investment, privatise parastatals, reduce subsidies and correct fiscal imbalances. Although this improved Mali’s reputation with the IMF and the World Bank, it irreversibly damaged Mr Traoré’s credibility with hard-pressed ordinary Malians. The government, which faces increasing domestic opposition to the privatisation of Mali’s largest parastatals, such as Energie du Mali (EDM), began dragging its feet on privatisation in 1999, but under pressure from the World Bank and the IMF, has set mid-2000 as the new target for several important sales.

Mali becomes a model pupil Since the late 1980s, the World Bank and IMF have had near-total influence on economic policy. An enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) agreed with the IMF in 1992 was consistently pursued and sectoral and macro- economic performance since the devaluation of 1994 has been impressive, although this may not be the perspective of the average citizen, particularly those in urban areas. Targets have generally been met, although the government has been chastised for the slow pace of privatisation.

Mali has consistently succeeded in satisfying World Bank and IMF targets, and received a second three-year loan, worth $63m, in August 1999, as part of its ESAF arrangement. The loan is to be disbursed in biannual instalments. The first tranche, of $9.12m, was disbursed in August. Increased social spending is a target of the new ESAF, which aims to increase primary education enrolment from 50% in 1998 to 61% in 2002, raise the infant immunisation rate from 45% to 76% and increasing access to primary healthcare from 40% to 60% over the same period. Government revenue is targeted to rise, and the overall budget deficit to fall, to 5.2% of GDP excluding grants by 2002. Gross domestic investment is programmed to grow to 22% of GDP by 2002, while domestic savings are targeted to grow to 13.9% of GDP by 2002.

Fiscal improvement Between 1960 and 1990 the steady rise in the number of civil servants and the dominance of the military was reflected in budgetary allocations, a pattern which the Konaré government has altered at the cost of considerable disquiet among public-sector employees. Since 1994, budget balances have greatly improved, reflecting the increasing success in combating tax and customs fraud. Aid is now limited to non-core expenditure. (Reference table 1 shows the trend of government finances.)

The 2000 budget Total expenditure in the 2000 (January-December) budget is set to increase by 8%, to CFAfr543.9bn ($833m), based on government forecasts of 5% GDP growth and an anticipated increase in government revenue to CFAfr500.3bn, up from CFAfr460.2bn in 1999. However, given the massive drop in world cotton prices, then finance minister, Soumaila Cisse, acknowledged that the budget may have to be revised. The bulk of the increase in expenditure is due to an anticipated increase in investment costs, scheduled debt repayments and salary costs. Investment spending is expected to rise to CFAfr274bn from CFAfr216bn, primarily due to preparations for the African Cup of Nations football tournament, which Mali is to host in 2002. The budget deficit is set to rise to CFAfr34.6bn, which is expected to be financed through budgetary assistance from international financial institutions.

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Government finances (CFAfr bn) 1999 2000 Budget Budget % changea Revenue 460 508 10 Expenditure 476 543 14 Balance –16 –43 –

a Budget for 1999 compared with 2000 budget.

Source: Reuters.

Economic performance

Gross domestic product (% real change; market prices) Annual average 1998 1994-98 GDP 4.3 4.7 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Growth has resumed The past three decades have seen sharp fluctuations in output and growth as a result of Mali’s oscillating terms of trade and dependence on the vagaries of the Sahelian climate. According to the World Bank, annual real GDP growth averaged 4.9% in 1970-80 and 2.5% in 1980-91. Since the devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994, however, the economy has moved into a period of steady expansion. Real GDP growth was estimated at 5.3% in 1999 by the Union économique et monétaire ouest-Africaine (UEMOA), driven by agriculture and services. The share of investment in GDP by expenditure increased to 25% in 1997, although most of the increase came from the public sector. (Reference table 3 highlights the historical trend of GDP at market prices and GDP by expenditure.) After increasing sharply in 1994, the rate of inflation has fallen. Inflation slowed in 1999 as the effect of food price increases in 1998 created a higher base for annual comparisons. (Reference tables 2 and 4 show the trend of money supply and consumer price inflation.)

Inflation (% real change; period averages) Annual average 1998 1994-98 Consumer prices 4.0 9.6 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics; EIU.

Regional trends

A north-south divide The three northern regions (Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal) have by far the lowest income per head in Mali and were more or less devoid of basic infrastructure even before the conflict between the government and the Tuareg in 1990-95.

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Herding is virtually the only productive activity in the north. In the more populated southern regions of the country (Bamako, Kayes, Koulikoro, Mopti, Ségou and Sikasso), conditions favour the production of food and cash crops, such as cotton. Further west the land becomes poorer and the Bamako-Dakar railroad, which runs through this region, is the only link with the outside world for many. With the exception of Gao, the historic gateway to trans- Saharan trade, Mali’s major urban settlements are all located in the south. Bamako, the capital, exerts economic influence over the entire country, with seasonal migration steadily being replaced by a drift of young people from the land.

Economic sectors

Agriculture, forestry and fishing

Agriculture is the Agriculture and livestock husbandry have long been the backbone of the economy’s backbone economy, accounting (with related activities) for around 45% of GDP and providing the bulk of export revenue. Large-scale cattle husbandry takes place mostly in the north and around the Niger inland delta, whereas most food and cash crops (principally cotton) are produced in the southern regions. Agriculture will retain its importance in the absence of major inward investment in other sectors, except mining. In common with neighbouring countries, Mali benefits from a much more stable food security system than was the case in the crisis years of the 1970s and 1980s. Since the late 1980s the state has taken only a regulatory role, but crises and bottlenecks in supply remain a potential threat in a country as vulnerable to sudden climatic reverses as Mali. Grain exports to neighbouring countries have increased in recent years, although officials are worried about the possible impact on domestic grain balances (see Reference table 5 for the output of selected crops).

Cotton production (‘000 tonnes unless otherwise indicated) 1997/98 % share of total Mali 522 19.2 Burkina Faso 338 12.4 Benin 359 13.2 Côte d’Ivoire 337 12.4 Chad 270 9.9 Sub-Saharan Africa incl others 2,719 100.0 Source: Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens.

Cotton is king Mali is now by far the largest cotton producer in the Franc Zone, and Malian cotton is widely recognised as being of high quality with low production costs, despite relatively low yields by world standards. Production is almost entirely artisanal, with village co-operatives in the south-east being co-ordinated by the parastatal Compagnie malienne pour le développement des textiles (CMDT), in

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which the French Compagnie française pour le développement des textiles (CFDT) owns a 40% share. The CMDT is highly influential and often referred to as “a state within the state”. The World Bank has pushed for the liberalisation of the sector in order to increase prices paid to producers, but the CMDT’s response is that the current system is successful, as cotton production has doubled since 1993. Although the 1998/99 crop was hampered by poor rains, it reached 515,000 tonnes, thanks to the rapid expansion of planted area. Heavy rains at the start of the 1999/2000 planting season have led the CMDT to revise production estimates to 500,000 tonnes, down considerably from earlier estimates of 623,000. Although there much scope for extending cultivation, low global copper prices are expected to limit cultivation levels over the next few years.

The return of the The other major parastatal agribusiness, the Office du Niger, has had a rather Office du Niger more chequered history. It was built (using forced labour) by the French in the 1930s to irrigate the dry section of the Niger’s inland delta. Massive irrigation works were originally intended to facilitate cotton production, but rice proved more viable. As with the CMDT, the Office du Niger functioned until recently as a channel of bureaucratic exploitation rather than as a stimulus to pro- duction. After a radical restructuring, its improved performance contributed to increased food production in 1994/95, resulting in a positive cereals balance.

Livestock exports are Smallholders with a handful of cattle have largely supplanted the nomadic, recovering pastoral Fulbé groups who were among the principal victims of the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s. Livestock is thought to account for some 20% of GDP in an average year, although exports of livestock and meat products suffered from the mid-1980s, principally owing to the unrestrained dumping by EU countries of highly subsidised beef on coastal West African markets. Predation by customs agents and the lack of refrigeration and bulk transport infrastructure have also constrained the sector. Devaluation produced an immediate response, with exports to Côte d’Ivoire rising sharply. (Reference table 6 gives estimates of livestock numbers.)

Forestry is crucial Given the dependence of most Malian households on wood and charcoal for fuel, the forestry sector is of economic and ecological significance. As population growth continues, however, the issue of deforestation will become more serious. Of the various forestry products, all of which are produced artisanally, the most important are fruits (above all mangoes) produced in the south, a wide range of traditional medicines and shea butter (karité). Export potential is considerable, but depends on investment in processing and other agro-industrial plant.

Fishing is in decline Artisanal river fishing is of great importance, but is vulnerable to drought as well as to changes brought about by dam construction and urban pollution. The Niger, above all the Niger inland delta, is the principal centre of activity. The annual catch has amounted to roughly 100,000 tonnes in recent years, of which about one-fifth is exported, mostly to urban centres in Côte d’Ivoire, where a number of Malian fishermen have settled in recent years.

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Mining and semi-processing

A gold boom Mali has become one of the world’s fastest growing gold producing countries. Artisanal mining and panning for gold and diamonds has been practised in the south and west of the country for hundreds of years. However, before 1992 infrastructural weaknesses, government inertia and corruption discouraged foreign investment in the sector. The Kalana gold mine, which was operated by a Russian-backed parastatal, closed in the early 1990s as a result of mismanagement (it has since been re-opened by a foreign consortium). With the demise of the Traoré administration in 1991, a new mining code was adopted to encourage investment. Parliament failed to approve the text of a new mining code introduced by the government in August 1999. The new code, which was intended to encourage investment in the sector, lowered the mining tax to a single payment of 3% on mining proceeds. Under the previous tax regime—which remains de facto in force—mining companies paid 6% value-added tax as well as a service tax. In addition, the government reserves the right to take a stake of up to 20% in enterprises. Tax on profits is set at 35%, royalties at 6%. Tax exemptions are normally for five years from the start of production, and customs duty on capital equipment is waived for the first three years of production.

Gold (kg) 1997 Average 1993-97 Annual production 22,826 11,556 Source: Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO), Statistiques économiques et monétaires.

A promising potential South African and Canadian mining companies have taken the lead in entering into profit-sharing arrangements with the Malian government. Commercial gold production increased from 4.6 tonnes in 1991 to an estimated 23.7 tonnes in 1999, thanks to the start of operations in 1997 of the country’s biggest mine, Sadiola Hill. In addition, about 2 tonnes were produced through artisanal alluvial digging. With costs among the world’s lowest, Mali’s gold sector has remained largely unaffected by the fall in world gold prices. Gold is poised to overtake cotton as the country’s main export revenue earner, particularly as new mines come on stream. Reserves were estimated at over 500 tonnes in 1998, and both Anglogold and Randgold—the two main companies—have increased their output capacity. More is likely to be discovered, since much of Mali remains unsurveyed in any detail. Besides gold, the country is known to contain deposits of bauxite, manganese, zinc, copper and lithium. Uranium in the north is not thought to be commercially viable, and the same may be true of iron ore deposits near the Senegalese border.

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Mining activities

Major mining operations include the following • Anglogold Corporation’s mine at Sadiola Hill near Kayes. Developed in conjunction with a US company, Iamgold, Sadiola Hill is Mali’s largest mine. Production costs are remarkably low, owing to the malleable quality of the surrounding ore. In operation since January 1997, Sadiola Hill is expected to yield over 10 tonnes a year until 2005. A deep-mine expansion study is under way, as are plans to develop nearby reserves at Yatela.

• The Syama gold mine near Sikasso has undergone rapid expansion under a fast-track approach adopted by South Africa’s Randgold, which acquired the mine from Australia’s BHP in 1997. Randgold plans to increase production from 4 to 7 tonnes of gold in 1999 and sustain that level of production to 2003, while further reducing production costs, which have threatened to make the mine unprofitable.

• Randgold has also discovered substantial deposits at its southern concession of Morila. A decision to proceed on a fast-track basis was made in mid-1998. Preliminary figures indicate that the mine contains more than 100 tonnes of gold. Priority is being given to Morila over another potentially lucrative Randgold site at Loulo in western Mali, where production plans have been delayed until at least 2003.

• Studies are underway of more that 20 kimberlite pipes in western Mali. Mali Diamond Exploration, owned by Ashton Mining of Australia and Mink Mineral Resources of Canada, is under licence to explore for and extract diamonds in 36,000 sq km of territory.

Gold production and reserves, 1998 (tonnes) Production Output Extraction Estimated Mine Operator start (tonnes) cost ($/oz) reserves In production Sadiola Hill Anglogold 1997 14.3 126 217 Syama Randgold 1996 4.1 249 288a Under development 311 Morila Randgold 2001 – – 107 Loulo Randgold 2003 – – 147 Yatela Anglogold 2001 – – 57 Projects – – 116 Kalana Nelson/Ashanti/JCI –b – – 25 Wassoul’or (Kodieren) Sodinaf –b – – 43 Tabakato Nevsun –b – – 30 Segala n/a –b – – 18

a Proven and indicated. b To be announced.

Source: Industry announcements.

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Manufacturing

Manufacturing remains Manufacturing remains fairly unimportant, having declined throughout the marginal 1980s, and accounts for an estimated 3% of GDP. Cotton ginning apart, most manufacturing is concentrated in Bamako. From the 1960s unwieldy parastatals produced basic consumer goods, and the private sector preferred to invest in trade. The sector was further handicapped by intensified competition from Côte d’Ivoire and by a flood of cheap and smuggled consumer goods from Guinea and Nigeria in the years preceding the 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc. Since the devaluation, efforts to attract manufacturing investment have had little success, although there have been signs of a move towards manufacturing among the leading local commerçant families. The textiles sector has shown signs of revival, although it faces competition from industries in neighbouring countries. The move since 1998 towards low common tariff arrangements, under the regional monetary union, the Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA; see Regional organisations), was not welcomed by the private sector, as manufacturing costs are higher in Mali than in neighbouring countries, owing to antiquated equipment (Reference table 7 gives indices of manufacturing production). New investment in the sector hinges on further privatisation.

Manufacturing (% change; period averages) 1997 Average 1993-97 Annual production 21.8 6.2 Source: Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO), Notes d’information et statistiques.

Construction

Traditional housing The vast majority of Mali’s population, including many urban dwellers, live in prevails houses of baked earth construction, built artisanally. Mr Konaré’s government has been concerned to upgrade the infrastructure of Bamako and other urban centres, and has launched several projects with foreign aid, including the new national headquarters of the Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO), as well as the King Fahd bridge and an express highway from Bamako city centre to the airport, financed by Saudi Arabia.

Financial services

A limited financial sector The Dakar-based Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO) acts as the central bank for Mali and the seven other members of the West African area of the Franc Zone (see Regional organisations). The Banque de développement du Mali has survived various crises over the years and is now recovering steadily, while commercial banks include the Banque malienne de crédit et de dépôts, owned jointly by the government and France’s Crédit Lyonnais, and the highly successful Bank of Africa-Mali. Since the CFA franc

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devaluation of January 1994 banks have been criticised by the business community for what is seen as an over-conservative lending policy. Like other members of the UEMOA, Mali now faces the problem of diversifying credit instruments in favour of small and medium-sized enterprises, which have historically relied upon informal sources of credit. Some impetus for the sector may come from the proposed privatisation of the Banque malienne de crédit et de dépôts and future listings of privatised companies on the regional stock exchange in Abidjan, the BRVM.

Other services

Hopes for more Tourism has so far contributed little to the services sector, despite Mali’s equitable tourism undoubted potential attraction for culture, adventure and eco-tourism. Djenné, which rose to prominence under the Mali empire, is a UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Site of World Heritage, and Timbuktu, although extremely dilapidated, retains an international allure, while the Bandiagara escarpment is home to the Dogon, one of the most ethnologically explored and visually spectacular of all African “traditional” cultures.

The external sector

Trade in goods

Trade in goods, 1998 (CFAfr bn) Total exports fob 328 of which: cotton 148 gold 133 livestock 28 Total imports fob 335 of which: capital goods 136 petroleum goods 52 Source: Banque de France, La Zone franc, Rapport annuel.

An improving balance Mali’s trade in goods has for decades been characterised by large structural deficits. Export performance has been chronically weak, owing to disincentives to add value to manufacturing and semi-processing, and has been further weakened by an unsympathetic tax and customs regime, an overvalued currency prior to devaluation in 1994 and limited investment. Import cover has improved considerably as a result of the devaluation and the revival of markets for Mali’s principal exports, cotton, livestock and gold. In 1997 Mali for the first time achieved a slight trade surplus, although the trade balance slipped back into deficit in 1998. There is still relatively little interest in export-

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oriented investment outside the extractive sector. In addition, Mali remains heavily dependent on imports from outside the Franc Zone for machinery and capital goods. Most of these have historically been imported on a tied-aid basis from France and other major donors. Similarity of resources between Mali and its Sahelian neighbours and the shared problem of limited domestic markets are a continuing problem, although moves towards greater regional economic and monetary integration under the UEOMA (see Regional organisations) may improve the overall regional trade picture.

Main trading partners, 1998a (% of total) Exports to: Imports from: Italy 19.3 France 17.8 Thailand 15.8 Côte d’Ivoire 18.9 Taiwan 9.6 Belgium-Luxembourg 4.2 EU 35.6 EU 32.9 UEMOA 1.6 UEMOA 22.1

a Based on partners’ trade returns and subject to a wide margin of error.

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook.

A flourishing Algeria and the former Soviet Union became Mali’s main markets for recorded informal trade exports during the late 1980s, although the Soviet Union’s collapse has in effect closed that market and Algeria’s share was reduced by insecurity in the Malian Sahara in 1990-95. Available data, particular from the IMF, should be treated with caution. They are routinely drawn from partners’ trading returns with resulting large distortions in the overall picture. Exports of cattle on the hoof almost certainly are not reflected anywhere in the figures, whereas cotton exports to the Far East are probably understated. Imports from regional partners are increasing, and Mali has generally run a large trade deficit with Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, offset by remittances from Malian migrant labourers. Smuggling in both directions across Mali’s long and porous borders may have accounted for up to half of Mali’s trade with its neighbours in the early 1990s. Tracking by the customs authorities of crossborder trade has since improved. (Historical data on main trading partners are given in Reference table 9.)

Invisibles and the current account

The current account, 1997 ($ m) Merchandise exports fob 562 Merchandise imports fob –552 Trade balance 10 Net services & income –315 Net current transfers 127 Current-account balance –178 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

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A structural services deficit Although individual Malian entrepreneurs are legendary elsewhere in Africa for their business skills, Mali has few services to export. Developing services exports will be difficult, in the light of the stiff Ivorian, Senegalese and French competition, and given the “brain-drain” abroad of Malians with the necessary skills. The prospects for tourism have improved slightly since the devaluation, but it will take some time before tourism can become a major source of income. The services account also suffers from the high insurance premiums and transport costs (the nearest ports, Dakar, Lomé, San Pédro and Abidjan, are all nearly 1,000 km away). The net outflow on income is explained in part by Mali’s debt-service obligations, although these have been reduced by a series of debt reschedulings and consolidations. Private transfers have been positive since 1989, reflecting remittances from Malians working abroad, and have increased since the devaluation. However, official transfers, reflecting grant aid from donor governments have been on the decline since 1994. Overall, the current account remained in deficit, standing at $178m in 1997 (IMF balance- of- payments figures are given in Reference table 10).

Capital flows and foreign debt

Mali is dependent on aid Mali is one of the world’s most aid-dependent countries. The government is attempting to change the nature of this dependence by reducing the need for budgetary and balance-of-payments aid in favour of development funds, a policy that started paying dividends in 1996. Net annual official development assistance, according to OECD criteria, averaged about $497m in 1993-97 (see Reference table 12), with grants accounting for an average 73% of the total. Net official development assistance dropped slightly to $469m in 1997, which equals roughly 18% of estimated GDP for the year. Virtually all capital investment in the country’s infrastructure is aid-funded. France is the main bilateral lender by far, granting $79m in 1997. The US has become a more prominent lender in recent years, reflecting its commitment to supporting emerging African democracies and Mali’s wish to lessen its dependence on France. As with many other poorer African economies, multilateral aid has accounted for a slowly increasing proportion of total aid flows in recent years, with the EU and the International Development Association (IDA, the World Bank’s soft-loan arm) heading the list of donors.

A heavily indebted country Mali counts as a highly indebted country by World Bank criteria. Total external debt rose slightly in 1997, to $3bn (see Reference table 11). Of this total, 92% was public and publicly guaranteed, with about half owed to multilateral lenders. Mali’s recent economic performance has won friends among the Bretton Woods institutions, and they can be counted on to press for increasingly generous reschedulings and write-offs of bilateral debt. The ESAF loan confirmed with the IMF in 1996 was followed by a rescheduling agreement with the Paris Club of Mali’s official bilateral creditors. This comprised a 67% write-off (or the consolidation) of all eligible interest repayments not affected by previous reschedulings, with the further possibility of a write-off of 67% of eligible principal sums, subject to good relations with the IMF. In August 1998 the IMF approved the principle of further debt-relief

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for Mali at the end of 1999, under the World Bank-led heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative, which will reduce its stock of debt by 10%.

The burden of Soviet debt Mali might also benefit from any future re-evaluation of rouble-denominated debt which, according to national figures, accounts for CFAfr297bn ($600m) or 42% of bilateral debt. It is extremely unlikely that any future repayment arrangement will be concluded at the historical Soviet conversion rate of Rb0.56:$1, at which Moscow has persisted in valuing foreign debt. The book value of Mali’s debts to the former Soviet Union, much of which was contracted in the form of services and equipment rather than capital flows, is unrealistically high. Russia’s membership of the Paris Club would therefore bring about a very substantial write-off.

Foreign reserves and the exchange rate

Troubled relations with the The government of Modibbo Keïta, Mali’s first president, regarded control of Franc Zone the country’s own money supply as a prerequisite for genuine independence from France, and in 1962 Mali left the Franc Zone (see Regional organisations). It established its own currency, the Malian franc (Mfr), at par with the CFA franc, and set up its own central bank. Smuggling and speculation rapidly undermined the currency, and in 1967 Mali decided that it had no option but to rejoin the Franc Zone at a devalued (and fixed) rate of Mfr100:FFr1. It did not, however, rejoin the subregional monetary organisation, the Union monétaire ouest-africaine (UMOA, now UEMOA), until 1984, a move which required an effective further 50% devaluation in the process of transferring to the CFA franc.

The looming inevitability The overvaluation of the CFA franc was a chronic problem from 1986. By 1991 of devaluation the real exchange rate in Mali was thought to be overvalued by 25-30%. Free convertibility allowed increasing capital flight, which turned into a haemo- rrhage during 1992. This was aggravated by the illegal import of goods from Nigeria and elsewhere. France’s decision that it could no longer defend the CFA franc’s existing value in the face of rising losses to the Banque de France (France’s central bank) and growing pressure for a major devaluation from the IMF and the World Bank made such a move inevitable. A 50% devaluation, to CFAfr100:FFr1, came into effect on January 12th 1994, which set the base for further adjustment policies in Mali and other CFA zone countries. (see Reference table 14).

Foreign reserves have Reserves have increased sharply since 1988, largely as a result of external increased funding. Having dipped as low as $36m in 1988, total reserves minus gold rose to an all-time high of $432m at the end of 1996. In September 1999, they stood at $330m. (See Reference table 13 for historical data on foreign reserves.)

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Regional organisations

Organisation of African The OAU was founded in 1963 by 30 African nations to promote solidarity and Unity (OAU) higher living standards, to defend the sovereignty of member states and to eliminate colonialism. Another 21 signatories have since joined, the last of which was South Africa in 1994. Morocco left in 1985. The OAU is committed to creating an Africa-wide customs union and to removing tariff and non-tariff barriers by 2004. The organisation has been criticised for lacking effectiveness —little real action results from its policy decisions––and has been hampered for years by severe budgetary problems.

The foreign ministers of member states meet twice a year to discuss the implementation of the organisation’s accords. The issues raised are dealt with at the annual assembly of heads of state, which meets in June or July. The annual conference is hosted by the member state that is due to take over the chairmanship of the organisation for the next year. The 1999 conference took place in Algiers, where the Algerian president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, assumed the chairmanship of the organisation. There have, in addition, been three extraordinary conferences of heads of state: the first was in 1970 to discuss the Angolan crisis; the second, in 1980, sought to address the continent’s economic problems; and the third, in 1990, attempted to address the problem of African debt.

The OAU is committed to the creation of an African economic community (AEC) according to the Lagos Plan of Action drawn up in 1980. This was originally scheduled to be in place by 2000, but at the 27th summit of heads of state in Abuja, Nigeria, in June 1991 this target was postponed to 2025. The AEC treaty, signed at the summit, outlined six stages, including the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and the establishment of a continent-wide customs union by 2004. A commitment was also made to establish an African common market, with a central bank and single currency, by 2031.

The problem of conflict resolution has come to dominate the annual summit of heads of state. At the 1992 summit the OAU was criticised for never having successfully resolved a conflict in any of its member states. The possibility of establishing a military force to observe and monitor cease-fires negotiated by the OAU has been raised by several heads of state and in 1996 the UN proposed a programme to strengthen African capacity for peace keeping through the OAU. However, no formal commitment has been made. The issue has been particularly pressing in the wake of renewed ethnic violence and border disputes since the mid-1990s, notably the Great Lakes crisis, the Ethiopian-Eritrean war, and the civil wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone. In 1996 the OAU agreed to imposed sanctions on Burundi following a military coup although an earlier proposal to send a military force was never implemented. The attempted secession of Anjouan island from Comoros remains unresolved despite diplomatic efforts by the OAU in 1999, including a threat to intervene militarily. Otherwise the OAU’s main initiatives for conflict resolution are focused on the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the conflict in the DRC which involves seven African

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states as direct combatants. Following several failed peace initiatives, the OAU’s council of ministers endorsed President Patrick Chiluba of Zambia as mediator in the conflict in 1999.

Any move to step up the activity of the OAU is hampered by the organisation’s severe budgetary problems. In November 1995 the ten worst debtor countries, owing $16.5m between them, were barred from speaking or voting at any OAU meeting. By 1999 this list had been reduced to eight. The return of full rights is conditional upon their paying a large part of their arrears.

The Lomé Convention The Lomé Convention affords a group of 71 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries preferential trade and aid links with the EU. The Convention Lomé IV, which was signed in 1989, replacing previous agreement signed in 1975, 1979 and 1984, expired in February 2000. A new Convention is to be signed in May 2000 in Suva, Fiji, finalising 18 months of negotiations. With the EU suspending its co-operation with Togo in the early 1990s in protest at human right abuses —subsequently refusing to resume non-humanitarian aid because of dubious presidential elections in 1998— Togo’s capital, Lomé, was not deemed a suitable venue.

The Fiji agreement, which is to last 20 years, has a strong political dimension. Beside respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, all essential components of Lomé IV, the ACP countries have reluctantly agreed to promote good governance, fight co-operation and combat illegal immigration.

Under Lomé IV, ACP products, whether agricultural or industrial, entered the EU duty-free, while four agricultural products, beef, sugar, bananas and rum, were subject to a more restrictive system of tariff quotas. The new agreement offers a negotiating framework for tailor-made regional free trade agreements (RFTAs), under which ACP countries, preferably within already existing economic groupings, will gradually open their domestic markets to European products. Given the adjustment costs involved, a preparatory period of eight years has been agreed, during which the old system of preferences will continue to hold.

In any event, 33 African countries classified as least developed countries (LDCs) will still be given the option of entering the EU generalised system of preferences (GSP) and by 2004, one year before the GSP is to be re-negotiated, the EU will assess which other ACP countries are not in a position to enter a RFTA. Unlike the Lomé Convention, the GSP, which benefits all developing countries, is WTO compliant since it is based on the dual principles of non- reciprocity and non-discrimination.

As far as aid is concerned, the European Development Fund (EDF) will remain the main source of multilateral EU aid to the ACP countries. The ninth EDF will total ¤13.5bn ($12.9bn). In addition, some ¤10bn left undisbursed from previous programmes will remain available until 2007. An additional ¤1.7bn will come from the European Investment Bank. Under the new Convention, the Stabex fund—which covers losses of earnings caused by a fall in prices or a decline in production of the main ACP agricultural exports—and Sysmin—a

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special financing facility for countries reliant on the export of minerals—will be phased out.

Economic Community of ECOWAS was established in 1975 by 15 West African countries: Benin, Burkina West African States Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, (ECOWAS) Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Cape Verde joined in 1977. The principal objective of the community, to be achieved in stages, is the establishment of a customs union and a common market for promoting the free movement of goods and people within West Africa. The initial treaty further provided for the harmonisation of regional policies in several sectors, including agriculture, industry, energy, transport and communications. ECOWAS has a small executive secretariat based in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, and seven specialised commissions. Decision-making powers are invested in a Council of Ministers, while supreme authority rests with the annual conference of heads of state and government, who elect a chairman.

Progress towards improved regional economic co-operation and integration has been limited, however, and ECOWAS focused increasingly on political and security issues in the 1990s. Although a number of tariffs have been abolished or reduced under its aegis, in 1994 francophone members set up their own Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA) to work towards a customs union and other aspects of economic convergence. UEMOA members—Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo—already share the same currency, the CFA franc, and similar legal codes. Prospects for real integration of the economies of the francophone bloc with those of Nigeria and other anglophone countries in the region are remote, despite a formal commitment to monetary union by 2004.

On regional security issues, ECOWAS has been far more active. Attempting to enforce an agreement for ending the civil war in Liberia in 1990, the organisation established the multinational ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (Ecomog). However, in practice Ecomog was quickly dominated by Nigeria and became an instrument for the implementation of its own regional foreign policy. Anxious to present itself as a regional policeman to the Western powers, Nigeria raised Ecomog’s profile, deploying again in Sierra Leone, where in 1997 a Nigerian force operating under the Ecomog banner intervened decisively to topple a military-led junta and restore the elected government. Nigerian troops remain in the country overseeing a shaky peace deal, which is supposed to lead to demobilisation and new elections.

The chairmanship is now held by Mali’s President Alpha Oumar Konaré, and the December 2000 summit will be held in the Malian capital, Bamako.

Comité permanent inter- The CILSS was set up in 1973 by eight Sahelian countries of West Africa— États de lutte contre la Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and sécheresse dans le Sahel Senegal—to co-ordinate the region’s response to the drought emergency at the time. The Gambia joined almost immediately afterwards, bringing the organisation’s membership to the present nine. There are two CILSS research and training institutes, in Niger and Mali, and the organisation produces statistics on member countries’ food production in association with the Food

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and Agriculture Organisation of the UN. After several years of financial and organisational difficulties from the late 1980s, the CILSS was reorganised in 1993-95 and now comprises six major programmes aiming at harmonising food and agricultural policies in the region. A three-year plan was adopted in November 1998 in Banjul, capital of The Gambia, with a total budget of CFAfr45.5bn ($75m) for 1999-2001.

Common Market for The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa), which is Eastern and Southern based in Lusaka, Zambia, is the successor organisation to the regional Africa (Comesa) Preferential Trading Area (PTA), and came into force on December 8th 1994 after the 12 member states ratified the integration treaty. Comesa is a weaker rival to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and includes Angola, Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The 21 members have a total population of 380m and a combined GDP of $170bn. South Africa’s decision not to join the organisation, which aims to liberalise trade between the member countries, has given the SADC the stronger hand. Mozambique and Lesotho withdrew from Comesa in 1997 to concentrate on their membership of the SADC. Tanzania, which is a member of both the SADC and the East African Community (EAC), has given notice that it will quit by July 2000.

The original PTA, which was launched in 1981, aimed to liberalise trade and encourage co-operation in industry, agriculture, transport and communications. Comesa’s main aim now is the formation of a monetary union with a single currency and a common central bank. The first step is the creation of a free trade zone, which is targeted for the end of October 2000. This is optimistic. Intra-Comesa tariffs varied from Madagascar’s 1.6% to Egypt’s 38.7% according to July 1999 figures. Many members are loathed to reduce tariffs further for fear of undermining local industries—Tanzania’s main reason for wishing to leave—and fiscal revenues. A trade dispute caused by Kenya’s unwillingness to reduce tariffs on certain Egyptian exports provides a clear example of this. Another constraint has been the strict “rules of origin”, which stipulate that preferential treatment can be granted only to goods produced by companies that are managed by, and 51% of whose equity is held by, nationals of a member state. Further progress towards free trade will be difficult while several Comesa members are supporting different sides in the war in the DRC, and two, Ethiopia and Eritrea, are directly fighting each other. However, some countries, for example Zambia, are factoring the reduction in tariff revenue associated with the removal of tariff barriers into their budgetary calculations for 2000.

In general, commitment to the organisation and its financing is rather frail. The administration budget is heavily dependent on Kenya and Zimbabwe and meetings are frequently cancelled. The civil strife in many member countries has also impeded attempts at regional integration. Further attempts at crossborder investment promotion, monetary harmonisation and the like have been superseded by EAC and SADC initiatives.

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Under the old PTA, a multilateral clearing facility was established in Harare, Zimbabwe, in February 1984. A PTA monetary unit of account (UAPTA), equivalent to the SDR, was used to settle debts between members every two months, the balances being payable in dollars. The UAPTA was replaced by the Comesa dollar, which is fixed to the US dollar, in 1997. Intra-Comesa trade totalled $4.2bn in 1998, only about 6.5% of members’ global trade. The reasons for this small share include the distortions arising from widespread crossborder smuggling, a lack of political commitment and weak balance-of- payments and foreign reserve positions. In some cases there are hardly any official trade links between member states—Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe accounted for nearly 70% of total intra-Comesa trade in 1998.

A PTA Trade and Development Bank was established in 1986, but only became operational in 1989. Now renamed the Comesa Trade and Development Bank, its headquarters have been relocated from Bujumbura (Burundi) to Nairobi (Kenya). As well as the African Development Bank, 15 Comesa members hold shares in the bank; total share capital was increased to $5bn in June 1999.

Sources of information

National statistical sources Statistical materials have improved considerably since 1997, and many figures are now released through the IMF and the World Bank. The main government statistical agency, the Direction nationale de la statistique et de l’informatique, is under-resourced but now issues regular publications on the country’s economic activity, such as the quarterly Eléments de conjoncture. Owing to Mali’s membership of the Franc Zone, most financial statistics are prepared on a regional basis by the Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO). The government is committed to improving statistical coverage.

Francophone and As with many Franc Zone countries, international statistical sources for Mali international statistical suffer from inconsistency, although their reliability has improved. In addition, sources sources such as the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook can give a highly misleading picture of overall trade patterns, as they are based solely on the returns of official trading partners. Methodologies can also vary widely between the statistics provided by the Bretton Woods organisations and the various francophone sources (the French Ministry of Co-operation, the Franc Zone secretariat and the BCEAO, all of which are themselves capable of considerable disagreement). The BCEAO’s thrice-yearly Notes d’information et statistiques has the additional drawback of being very badly out of date and unreliable for historical figures.

The standard external source for financial data is the IMF’s monthly International Financial Statistics, which relies largely on more timely material from the BCEAO, but also increasingly from the government. In addition, the IMF publishes an increasing number of documents on the country. Partial runs of statistical material are to be found in many World Bank publications devoted to various sectors of African economies. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation’s Production Yearbook relies on government estimates for its

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figures. Two important sources are the World Bank’s Global Development Finance, which gives the most detailed breakdown of Mali’s debt profile, and the OECD’s Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients, which charts net aid commitments by donor. Both are published annually. The energy balance is provided by Energy Data Associates, 1 Regent Street, London SW1Y 4NR.

Select bibliography Direction nationale de la statistique et de l’informatique, Eléments de conjoncture, Bamako

Direction nationale de la statistique et de l’informatique, Comptes économiques du Mali, Bamako

IMF, Mali—Statistical Annex, Washington, DC, February 1998

IMF, Mali—Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, Medium-Term Economic and Financial Policy Framework Paper, 1998-2001, Washington, DC, May 1998

IMF, Mali—Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, Medium-Term Policy Framework Paper, 1999-2001, Washington, DC, July 1999

IMF, Mali—Final Decision Point Document on the Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, Washington, DC, August 1998

Cauris (weekly), Bamako

Cheick Oumar Diarrah, Vers la IIIe république du Mali, Harmattan, Paris, 1991

Chantal Verger, Le Mali au quotidien. La Force des faibles, Harmattan, Paris, 1997

Les Echos (weekly), Bamako

L’Essor (daily), Bamako

Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens, Paris

Le Républicain (weekly), Bamako

Africa Online website, www.africaonline.co.ci contains daily news from a variety of sources.

MaliNet hompage, www.malinet.ml provides links to most of the country’s main sites.

Investir en Zone Franc website, www.izf.net covers news, business information and statistics for all Franc Zone countries.

Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest, www.bceao.int contains information on the regional central bank.

Bourse régionale des valeurs mobilières, www.brvm.org features statistics from the regional stock market.

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Reference tables

These reference tables provide the most up-to-date statistics available at the date of publication

Reference table 1 Government finances (CFAfr bn) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998a Total revenue & grants 236.7 249.5 302.4 320.5 339.3 Domestic receipts 138.9 157.1 205.9 236.3 259.7 Grants 97.8 92.4 96.5 84.2 79.6 Total expenditure 280.1 306.4 324.7 350.3 375.8 Recurrent 151.4 154.3 163.0 194.0 193.1 of which: salaries 44.5 48.0 50.6 56.8 58.8 Capital 128.7 152.1 161.6 156.3 182.7 of which: externally financed 115.0 133.5 137.3 124.5 138.2 Net loans 0.0 –19.0 –10.6 0.0 0.0 Primary balanceb –2.3 –0.2 33.1 24.3 33.8 Balance (commitments basis) –43.4 –39.9 –11.6 –29.8 –36.5 Change in arrears –29.7 –10.1 –18.0 –7.0 –10.0 Cash balance –73.1 –50.0 –29.6 –38.2 –46.5 Financing 73.1 54.1 30.5 38.6 46.6 External (net) 76.7 90.9 82.1 49.0 57.1 Domestic (net) –3.6 –36.8 –51.6 –10.4 –10.5

a Estimates. b Cash basis, after movements in arrears.

Source: Banque de France, La Zone franc, Rapport annuel.

Reference table 2 Money supply (CFAfr bn unless otherwise indicated; year-end) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999a Money (M1) 198.2 240.4 256.0 267.6 278.4 % growth, year on year 13.8 21.3 6.5 4.5 13.2 Quasi-money 56.4 76.4 89.0 91.9 105.2 Money (M2) 254.6 316.8 345.0 359.5 383.6 % growth, year on year 7.3 24.4 8.9 4.2 1.8

a September.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

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Reference table 3 Gross domestic product by expenditure (CFAfr bn unless otherwise indicated; market prices) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Private consumption 751.1 930.0 1,059.6 1,065.4 1,104.3 Government consumption 185.1 204.5 210.6 216.8 228.9 Gross fixed capital formation 249.1 299.6 316.4 345.2 372.2 Exports of goods & services 260.8 264.2 276.6 349.2 385.2 Imports of goods & services –456.8 –494.8 –472.7 –489.4 –552.6 Change in stocks –11 –15 –42 –30 12.3 GDP at market prices 958.0a 1,154.6a 1,292.5a 1,431.9a 1,550.3 $ mb 1,725.5 2,313.1 2,526.6 2,453.3 2,627.8 GDP per head ($)c 199 264 281 262 268 Real GDP growth (%) 2.3 6.4 4.0 6.7 4.3

a Does not sum in source. b Based on average exchange rate. c Based on national population estimates.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Reference table 4 Consumer price inflation (1990=100) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999a Index 100.0 106.8 106.4 110.7 110.5 % growth, year on year 13.3 6.6 –0.03 4.0 –3.1

a September.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Reference table 5 Agricultural output (‘000 tonnes) 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 Millet & sorghum 1,643.8 1,275.2 1,151.0 1,116.0 1,214.0 Paddy rice 469.1 416.4 553.0 512.0 588.0 Seed cotton 293.8 405.9 452.0 523.0 515.0 Maize 322.5 243.4 267.0 311.0 356.0 Groundnuts 213.0 155.5 133.0 143.0 164.0 Source: Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO), Notes d’information et statistiques.

Reference table 6 Livestock numbers (‘000) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Cattle 5,541 5,708 5,879 6,056 6,240 Sheep & goats 12,552 13,179 13,838 14,530 15,226 Source: BCEAO, Notes d’information et statistiques.

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Reference table 7 Manufacturing production (volume index; 1983=100) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 All items 133.9 155.9 156.8 167.4 203.9 % change, year on year –12.8 16.4 0.6 6.8 21.8 Source: Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (BCEAO), Notes d’information et statistiques.

Reference table 8 Foreign trade (CFAfr bn) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998a Exports (fob) 185.9 220.5 221.4 327.7 328.1 of which: cotton 79.7 126.8 137.6 161.2 147.5 gold 27.8 35.8 39.8 117.2 133.1 livestock 51.7 40.0 30.0 31.3 28.1 Imports (fob) 249.4 277.9 282.1 322.1 335.4 of which: capital equipment 101.7 119.0 110.8 129.1 136.2 petroleum products 22.8 30.5 50.7 61.1 52.0

a Estimates.

Source: Banque de France, La Zone franc, Rapport Annuel.

Reference table 9 Main trading partners (% of total) 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Exports to: Italy 4.0 6.8 13.5 20.5 19.3 Thailand 17.2 18.7 23.0 16.9 15.8 Brazil 5.0 11.5 3.0 5.3 9.6 Portugal 5.7 8.5 8.9 4.3 6.5 South Korea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.4 EU 50.0 32.8 33.3 34.5 35.6 UEMOA 2.3 2.1 2.1 3.0 1.6 Imports from: Côte d’Ivoire 16.6 16.3 17.6 19.0 18.9 France 14.6 18.9 19.0 17.0 17.8 Belgium-Luxembourg 4.6 3.3 2.9 3.8 4.2 Senegal 6.3 4.8 4.6 3.5 3.7 UK 2.5 4.1 3.6 3.7 2.4 EU 28.6 33.2 33.1 32.3 32.9 UEMOA 23.2 21.4 22.5 23.0 22.1 Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook.

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 82 Mali

Reference table 10 Balance of payments, IMF estimates ($ m) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Goods: exports fob 371.9 334.9 441.8 433.5 561.6 Goods: imports fob –492.4 –449.2 –556.8 –551.5 –551.9 Trade balance –120.4 –114.3 –115.0 –118.0 9.7 Services: credit 74.8 69.0 87.6 87.6 82.1 Services: debit –360.8 –317.0 –434.5 –382.8 –345.6 Income: credit 30.2 9.3 8.3 10.9 10.6 Income: debit –43.2 –49.7 –48.9 –67.1 –61.7 Current transfers: credit 294.6 281.3 266.8 246.1 170.0 Current transfers: debit –63.7 –41.2 –48.0 –50.0 –43.5 Current-account balance –188.6 –162.6 –283.8 –273.2 –178.4 Net capital account 111.9 99.1 126.2 136.4 108.6 Net direct & portfolio investment 4.1 17.4 111.4 84.1 39.4 Other investment assets –21.4 –104.0 –52.3 4.1 –12.4 Other investment liabilities 2.8 79.6 59.6 86.4 25.7 Capital- & financial-account balance 97.4 92.4 244.9 311.0 161.3 Net errors & omissions –6.0 5.6 –13.0 –8.8 7.9 Overall balance –97.2 –64.6 –52.0 29.0 –9.2 Financing Movement of reserves –45.8 –37.6 –80.2 –131.6 –38.6 Exceptional financing 137.4 69.9 93.8 80.1 26.2 Use of IMF credit & loans 5.6 32.7 38.4 22.4 21.3 Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

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Reference table 11 External debt, World Bank estimates ($ m unless otherwise indicated) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Public & publicly guaranteed long-term debta 2,785 2,545 2,739 2,762 2,687 Official creditors 2,781 2,543 2,736 2,762 2,687 Multilateral 1,103 1,250 1,396 1,459 1,453 B i l a t e r a l b 1,678 1,293 1,340 1,303 1,234 Private creditors 42200 of which: banks 32200 Short-term debt 46 41 72 79 83 of which: interest arrears on long-term debt 18 21 28 33 43 Use of IMF credit 71 108 147 165 176 Total external debt 2,902 2,694 2,957 3,006 2,945 Principal repayments 35 63 62 54 54 Interest payments 43 25 24 62 24 of which: short-term debt 21223 Total debt service paid 78 88 86 116 78 Ratios (%) Total external debt/GNP 109.9 149.2 123.2 115.7 119.2 Debt service/exports of goods & services 13.0 17.0 13.2 18.1 10.5 Short-term debt/total external debt 1.6 1.5 2.4 2.6 2.8 Concessional long-term loans/long-term debt 92.8 91.5 89.9 89.4 89.0 a Long-term debt is defined as having an original maturity of more than one year. b Approximately half of Mali’s bilateral debt is owed to the former Soviet Union and, while the precise currency composition is not known, the rouble component will be heavily discounted in future reschedulings.

Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance.

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000 84 Mali

Reference table 12 Net official development assistancea ($ m) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Bilateral 244.6 245.0 308.1 329.3 270.9 of which: France 80.1 93.0 92.0 109.0 78.9 Germany 24.0 25.4 57.2 70.1 54.5 US 37.0 29.0 31.0 5.0 39.0 Netherlands 23.6 20.9 33.3 42.7 33.4 Japan 33.5 21.7 47.8 38.1 26.1 Multilateral 180.9 202.1 300.8 227.2 198.3 of which: IDA 43.0 87.4 79.6 77.2 67.5 EU 58.2 52.7 82.5 59.4 51.4 IMF 14.2 39.4 39.2 22.7 21.5 UNDP 11.3 7.2 8.0 14.4 19.0 ADF 7.5 10.3 44.9 18.0 12.0 Total 405.4 447.0 608.9 556.4 469.2 of which: grants 308.3 333.9 342.0 343.9 356.1

a Disbursements by OECD and OPEC members and by multilateral agencies. Official development assistance is defined as grants and loans with at least a 25% grant element, administered with the aim of promoting development and welfare in the recipient country. Aid from the former Soviet bloc is excluded.

Source: OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients.

Reference table 13 Foreign reserves ($ m unless otherwise indicated; end-period) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999a Foreign exchange 309.5 418.6 403.0 390.4 318.2 SDRs 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 Reserve position in the IMF 13.0 12.6 11.8 12.4 12.2 Total reserves excl gold 323.0 431.5 414.9 402.9 330.5 Golda 7.3 7.1 5.8 n/a n/a Total reserves incl gold 330.0 438.6 420.7 n/a n/a Memorandum item Gold (m fine troy oz) 0.019 0.019 0.019 n/a n/a

a September.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

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Reference table 14 Exchange rates (CFAfr per currency unit; annual average) 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 $ 499.2 511.6 583.7 590.0 615.7 DM 387.4 339.9 336.6 335.3 336.4 SDR 757.3 742.7 803.1 800.4 844.7 Na 22.8 23.4 26.7 27.0b 6.4

a The 1995 Nigerian budget reintroduced an autonomous rate, which applies to virtually all commercial transactions. It yielded average rates of about CFAfr6.9:N1 in 1998. The rate used here, however, is the official rate, which has remained constant since 1993 at around N22:$1. On January 1st 1999 the official rate was abandoned. b EIU estimate.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Editor: Paul Gamble All queries: Tel: (44.20) 7830 1007 Fax: (44.20) 7830 1023

EIU Country Profile 2000 © The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2000