Russian TV Market
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Russian TV market: Between state supervision, commercial logic and simulacrum of public service Ilya Kiriya STATE UNIVERSITY – HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, MOSCOW, RUSSIA Elena Degtereva MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY, RUSSIA ABSTRACT: Th e state plays supervising rather than regulative role on the Russian TV market, being an acting force per se on this market. Th e state takes care of the ideological and moral health of citizens as a missionary. In this respect the Russian State TV cannot be classifi ed as public TV – as the social order could not be formed by society. Instead the order is dropped down from power structures, im- posing state ideas of social development and providing reproduction of power elite. KEYWORDS: state television, broadcasting, power, state and social control, state ownership, state regulation, homogenization of TV content INTRODUCTION Th e situation of Russian television cannot be perceived outside the context of social structure of the Russian society and the role of state in this society. Th is paper con- siders the role of the state in the TV sphere according to the logics of formation of the Russian media market. Th e Russian media market has been linking together market structures and mechanisms with non-market and state-paternalistic ones. Th is duality should not be regarded as a transition factor. In our opinion, the period of transition of the Russian media system from Soviet to market-oriented is over. We are convinced in the necessity of describing the actual situation within TV- sector as stable and organized, having already passed the period of post-Soviet tran- sition. Th is system joints the market-oriented and social-oriented media with the state-oriented and propagandistic into a much instrumentalized media system. It is necessary to stress that Russian television sector is formed not under post- Soviet predictions of globalization or commercialization but according to the spe- cifi c social conditions of modern Russia; the new role of power and new concept of social stratifi cation. Th is new system of Russian television is formed under presi- CENTRAL EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 1 (2010) ISSN 1899-5101 37 JJournal_3(4)_new.indbournal_3(4)_new.indb 3377 22010-05-05010-05-05 115:10:125:10:12 Ilya Kiriya, Elena Degtereva dent Putin and will exist for a continuous time aft er his rule. We will try to verify our hypothesis by examination of structure of television property, state presence in the television sector, content model that this new television proposes and fi nally the new social role played by state-television and state policy on the television market. BETWEEN STATE OWNERSHIP AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP In this part we will shortly remind the main principles of formation for the main actors at the Russian TV market and infl uence of the state onto this process. Mo- nopoly of the state in the TV broadcasting sphere was broken in 1993 aft er estab- lishing of the fi rst private TV Company NTV. However, the mechanism of launch- ing NTV did not follow the market logics: broadcasting license was given by the Kremlin administration according to the decree of president B. Yeltsin. Th is decree gave NTV a chance to start broadcasting using the frequency of a former state edu- cational channel (Hlebnikov, 2001). NTV was founded by V. Gusinsky, one of the well-known businessmen in Russian Federation. In 1995 when the Russian advertising market was formed, the ‘grey cardinal’ of the Kremlin, B. Beresovsky (a businessman who was close to B. Yeltsin’s family), lobbied the privatisation of the Channel One. As a result, Russian ‘public’ TV, ORT, was established. Th e notion ‘public’ in this title has been purely decorative, because 51% of shares belonged to state enterprises and 49% were distributed between a num- ber of private companies. One of the biggest shareholders was a bank owned by B. Beresovsky (Hoff man, 2002; Richter, 1999). Th e second private TV channel, Ren-TV, was launched in the similar way. Its founder Irena Lisnevskaya got president B. Yeltsin’s approval to start the new TV channel. Political and economic context of the epoch was plain. Russian govern- ment at that time was in need of fi nance; obtaining fi nancial support was possible only with the help of ‘authorized’ banks. Th e above mentioned banks (about 10) together served the accounts of all the state organizations. All these banks were run by private persons. Th e year 1995 introduced a change. Bank owners received huge parts of state property in exchange for fi nancial support of the state (so-called second stage of Rus- sian privatisation) (Gaydar, 1998; Nureev, 2003). One of the most important events of the time was support of B. Yeltsin and his policy at the elections 1996. B. Yeltsin would never have won the elections for the second time without such support. Th us, the biggest Russian fi nancial industrial groups were formed. Th ey got control of the most eff ective state enterprises; the most of the Russian media companies were affi li- ated with them. At that period the so-called oligarchs did not consider media as a source of income because the advertising market was weak. Accordingly, the media income was not comparable with the income from their main branches of businesses. One of the evidences of this function was the so-called oligarchies’ wars during the end of the 1990s. At that time the Channel One, which was controlled by B. Be- 38 CENTRAL EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 1 (2010) JJournal_3(4)_new.indbournal_3(4)_new.indb 3388 22010-05-05010-05-05 115:10:125:10:12 Russian TV market resovsky, was confronting NTV channel, belonging to V. Gusinsky. Th e two oli- garchs were supporting opposite political forces and used their media for support of respective election campaigns. B. Beresovsky was trying to lead to empower the Edinstvo party, affi liated with prime minister V. Putin, while V. Gusinsky was sup- porting the left forces as led by former prime minister E. Primakov and Moscow mayor Y. Luzhkov. Th e attitude of power to the media property (as well as to any property) was spe- cial. Th e state considered media property as a privilege. Such approach is very typical for estate based society (Burtin, 1995). In other words, the privilege to own a TV channel was granted by the state. Only one channel remained independent of the state or oligarch capital: Ren-TV. It belonged to I. Lisnevskaya. However, in the end of the 1990s, due to fi nancial problems, Lisnevskaya was forced to transfer a part of shares to the possession of the state energetic company RAO ES. In 1998 Russia was hit by the fi nancial crisis. Th e crisis led to the decay of adver- tising market. For TV channels that was the reason to search for fi nance in the form of credits. Credits were obtained from state banks and companies in the form of gift s and privileges rather than credits in traditional understanding: NTV got the money from the state monopoly Gasprom, ORT – from state bank Vnesheconom- bank. When V. Putin took power on the verge of 2000s, Russian governmental policy in media sphere and in business in whole rapidly changed. Th e state began to re- deem the media power once given to oligarchs back in its own hands. All the com- panies not acting loyally towards the current power were abolished or were imposed to change owners for more obedient ones. Th e same process happened in the soci- ety: the state was starting the restriction of civil liberties. Both processes were linked together as civil liberties were given by the power as well as TV estate, but never became the result of people’s struggle. Th is phenomenon was described by Russian sociologist Y. Levada (Levada, 2005). According to his research data, people were granted liberties as gift s or presents. In the public mentality these liberties were depolarized. When the liberties were slightly restricted by the state, people became passive. Estate sphere followed the same way. Th e property, which was also acquired as a gift , rather than according to market mechanisms, was required back while the society remained passive. So, in the beginning of the 2000s the state started the re- placement of media property especially in the sphere of television. Such replace- ment was realized by economical methods. In case of NTV channel the scheme of so-called ‘repayment’ was used: the creditor (Gasprom) required the debt back and fi nally became the main shareholder of company. Th is debt claim showed plain ‘political selection’ as the Channel One had similar debts but was exempted from similar sanctions. Th e state forced B. Beresovsky (already having fallen into disgrace) to sell his shares (49%), but offi cial information about the new owner still was not publicized. CENTRAL EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 1 (2010) 39 JJournal_3(4)_new.indbournal_3(4)_new.indb 3399 22010-05-05010-05-05 115:10:125:10:12 Ilya Kiriya, Elena Degtereva Non-offi cial information attributes them to R. Abramovich (Russian businessman, close to power and owner of Chelsea club) (Kachkaeva, Kiriya & Libergal, 2006). Th us, in the middle of 2000 the principally new structure of TV property was formed. Th e key owners became the state (directly) or state companies or at least oligarchs personally bound with political elites. Channel One belongs to the state (51%) and non-offi cially to R. Abramovich (49%). Channel Rossia, channel Kultura, information Channel Vesti-24 belong to state directly. Channels NTV and TNT belong to the state corporation Gasprom, and fi nally National Media Group (NMG) is the owner of Channels Ren-TV and Channel 5 now.