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Rysk Militär Förmåga I Ett Tioårsperspektiv – 2016

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Rysk Militär Förmåga I Ett Tioårsperspektiv – 2016 Rysk militär förmåga i ett tioårsperspektiv – 2016 Gudrun Persson (red.) Persson – 2016 Gudrun tioårsperspektiv i ett förmåga militär Rysk Rysslands Väpnade styrkor utvecklas från att främst vara organiserade och tränade för att hantera interna oroligheter och konflikter i det forna sovjetområdet mot en organisationsstruktur som kan hantera storskaliga operationer även utanför detta område. 2016 har Väpnade styrkorna större förmåga att försvara Ryssland från utländsk aggression än under 2013. Ryssland har därmed ett mer kraftfullt militärt tvångsmaktsverktyg är tidigare. I denna rapport analyseras rysk militär förmåga i ett tioårsperspektiv. Det är den åttonde utgåvan. I jämförelse med den förra rapporten från 2013 har ett grundläggande antagande ändrats. 2013 bedömde vi den ryska militära handlingsfriheten utifrån förutsättningen att Ryssland skulle svara på ett uppkommet hot vilket skulle ha givit föga eller ingen tid till förberedelser. I ljuset av de senaste årens utveckling bedömer vi de tillgängliga resurserna för militära operationer utifrån antagandet att Ryssland tar initiativet till att begagna militärt våld. Rysslands militära handlingsfrihet analyseras avseende tre övergripande uppgifter: operationer med försvarsgrensgemensam strid, fjärrstrid och strategisk avskräckning. Den ryska militära handlingsfriheten, dvs. de militära förband som Ryssland kan avdela för att lösa dessa uppgifter har fortsatt att växa – särskilt väster om Ural. Ryska militärstrategiska tänkare ägnar mycket uppmärksamhet åt inte enbart militär styrka, utan även åt en mängd andra – icke-militära – medel. Den säkerhetspolitiska utvecklingen fortsätter att präglas av anti-amerikanism, patriotism och ett auktoritärt politiskt system i Ryssland. Framtida generationer ska uppfostras i patriotisk anda, och det finns ett stort antal olika ungdomsorganisationer vilkas syfte är att ingjuta militärpatriotiska värderingar i de unga. Möjligheterna att förändra politiken i en mer västvänlig riktning har minskat. Detta är det läge som Ryssland befinner sig i – oavsett om Vladimir Putin fortsätter som president eller inte. Försvarsutgifternas andel av BNP i Ryssland har ökat från 3,6 procent år 2005 till 5,4 procent 2015. Detta är ett resultat av ett politiskt beslut att prioritera försvarsutgifter före andra Rysk militär förmåga i ett utgiftsposter i budgeten. Samtidigt har förverkligandet av det statliga beväpningsprogrammet förbättrat den ryska försvarsindustrins utsikter att spela en viktig roll för rysk militär förmåga under de kommande tio åren. tioårsperspektiv – 2016 Denna rapport, liksom övriga FOI-publikationer inom Rysslandsprojektet, finns tillgänglig i PDF-format på projektets hemsida www.foi.se/ryssland. Gudrun Persson (red.) FOI-R--4367--SE ISSN 1650-1942 www.foi.se december 2016 Gudrun Persson (red.) Rysk militär förmåga i ett tioårsperspektiv FOI-R--4367--SE Titel Rysk militär förmåga i ett tioårsperspektiv – 2016 Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Title Perspective – 2016 Rapportnr/Report no FOI-R--4367--SE Månad/Month Januari Utgivningsår/Year 2017 Antal sidor/Pages 209 Kund/Customer Försvarsdepartementet Projektnr/Project no A16101 Godkänd av/Approved by Lars Höstbeck Ansvarig avdelning Försvarsanalys Omslagsbild: Ryska kadetter sjunger nationalsången vid examen I Moskva 25 juni 2016. Ivan Sekretarev/AP/TT Nyhetsbyrån Detta verk är skyddat enligt lagen (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk, vilket bl.a. innebär att citering är tillåten i enlighet med vad som anges i 22 § i nämnd lag. För att använda verket på ett sätt som inte medges direkt av svensk lag krävs särskild överenskommelse. This work is protected by the Swedish Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (1960:729). Citation is permitted in accordance with article 22 in said act. Any form of use that goes beyond what is permitted by Swedish copyright law, requires the written permission of FOI. 2 3 FOI-R--4367--SE Sammanfattning Rysslands Väpnade styrkor utvecklas från att främst vara organiserade och tränade för att hantera interna oroligheter och konflikter i det forna sovjetområdet mot en organisationsstruktur som kan hantera storskaliga operationer även utanför detta område. 2016 har Väpnade styrkorna större förmåga att försvara Ryssland från utländsk aggression än under 2013. Ryssland har därmed ett mer kraftfullt militärt tvångsmaktsverktyg är tidigare. I denna rapport analyseras rysk militär förmåga i ett tioårsperspektiv. Det är den åttonde utgåvan. I jämförelse med den förra rapporten från 2013 har ett grundläggande antagande ändrats. 2013 bedömde vi den ryska militära handlingsfriheten utifrån förutsättningen att Ryssland skulle svara på ett uppkommet hot vilket skulle ha givit föga eller ingen tid till förberedelser. I ljuset av de senaste årens utveckling bedömer vi de tillgängliga resurserna för militära operationer utifrån antagandet att Ryssland tar initiativet till att begagna militärt våld. Rysslands militära handlingsfrihet analyseras avseende tre övergripande uppgifter: operationer med försvarsgrensgemensam strid, fjärrstrid och strategisk avskräckning. Den ryska militära handlingsfriheten, dvs. de militära förband som Ryssland kan avdela för att lösa dessa uppgifter har fortsatt att växa – särskilt väster om Ural. Ryska militärstrategiska tänkare ägnar mycket uppmärksamhet åt inte enbart militär styrka, utan även åt en mängd andra – icke-militära – medel. Den säkerhetspolitiska utvecklingen fortsätter att präglas av anti-amerikanism, patriotism och ett auktoritärt politiskt system i Ryssland. Framtida generationer ska uppfostras i patriotisk anda, och det finns ett stort antal olika ungdomsorganisationer vilkas syfte är att ingjuta militär-patriotiska värderingar i de unga. Möjligheterna att förändra politiken i en mer västvänlig riktning har minskat. Detta är det läge som Ryssland befinner sig i – oavsett om Vladimir Putin fortsätter som president eller inte. Försvarsutgifternas andel av BNP i Ryssland har ökat från 3,6 procent år 2005 till 5,4 procent 2015. Detta är ett resultat av ett politiskt beslut att prioritera försvarsutgifter före andra utgiftsposter i budgeten. Samtidigt har förverkligandet av det statliga beväpningsprogrammet förbättrat den ryska försvarsindustrins utsikter att spela en viktig roll för rysk militär förmåga under de kommande tio åren. Nyckelord: flygvapen, FoU, det framtida kriget, försvarsbudget, försvarsindustri, försvarsutgifter, inrikespolitik, kärnvapen, luftförsvar, marinstridskrafter, markstridskrafter, materiel, militärdoktrin, Putin, Ryssland, Sjojgu, statliga beväpningsprogrammet, säkerhetspolitik, utrikespolitik, Väpnade styrkorna, övningar. 2 3 FOI-R--4367--SE Abstract The Russian Armed Forces are developing from a force primarily designed for handling internal disorder and conflicts in the area of the former Soviet Union towards a structure configured for large-scale operations also beyond that area. The Armed Forces can defend Russia from foreign aggression in 2016 better than they could in 2013. They are a stronger instrument of coercion than before. This report analyses Russian military capability in a ten-year perspective. It is the eighth edition. A change in this report compared with the previous edition is that a basic assumption has been altered. In 2013, we assessed fighting power under the assumption that Russia was responding to an emerging threat with little or no time to prepare operations. In view of recent events, we now estimate available assets for military operations in situations when Russia initiates the use of armed force. The fighting power of the Russian Armed Forces is studied. Fighting power means the available military assets for three overall missions: operational-strategic joint inter-service combat operations (JISCOs), stand-off warfare and strategic deterrence. The potential order of battle is estimated for these three missions, i.e. what military forces Russia is able to generate and deploy in 2016. The fighting power of Russia’s Armed Forces has continued to increase – primarily west of the Urals. Russian military strategic theorists are devoting much thought not only to military force, but also to all kinds of other – non-military – means. The trend in security policy continues to be based on anti-Americanism, patriotism and authoritarianism at home. Future generations are being trained into a patriotic spirit, and there is a wide array of different school and youth organizations with a mission to instil military-patriotic values in the younger generations. Opportunities to change the policy to a more Western-friendly approach have diminished. This will be the situation Russia finds itself in whether Vladimir Putin continues as a president or not. The share of military expenditure in Russian GDP has increased from 3.6 per cent in 2005 to 5.4 per cent in 2015. This is the result of the political will to prioritize military expenditure over other items in public spending. At the same time, the implementation of the State Armament Programme has improved the Russian arms industry’s prospects of playing a substantial role in the ongoing rebuilding of Russian military capability for the next decade. Key words: air force, air defence, armed forces, defence industry, domestic policy, exercises, equipment, foreign policy, ground forces, military capability, military doctrine, military expenditure, military thinking, national security strategy, naval forces, nuclear weapons, procurement, security policy, Putin, R&D, Russia, Shoigu, State Armament Programme.
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