Issue 1338 26 October 2018 // USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1338 //

Feature Report

“Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress”. By Amy F. Woolf. Published by Congressional Research Service; Updated Oct. 5, 2018 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43832.pdf The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a “dual-track” decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union’s deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles. … The Trump Administration conducted an extensive review of the INF Treaty during 2017 to assess the potential security implications of Russia’s violation and to determine how the United States would respond going forward. On December 8, 2017—the 30th anniversary of the date when the treaty was signed—the Administration announced that the United States would implement an integrated response that included diplomatic, military, and economic measures. Congress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia’s program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches. This report will be updated as needed.

Issue No. 1320

22 June 2018

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// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1338 //

TABLE OF CONTENTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS  One Nuclear Treaty Is Dead. Is New START Next? (Defense News) Signed in 2010 between the U.S. and Russia, the New START treaty limits the deployed forces of both nations to 1,550 nuclear warheads over 700 delivery systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers.  Belgium Reportedly Picks F-35 for Future Fighter Jet (Defense News) … Belgium for decades has had an agreement with NATO that requires its planes to be capable of carrying U.S. nuclear weapons into a hypothetical atomic war.  China’s H-20 Stealth Bomber: Everything We Know about It (The National Interest) If the H-20 does have the range and passable stealth characteristics attributed to it, then it could alter the strategic calculus between the United States and China by exposing U.S. bases and fleets across the Pacific to surprise air attacks.

US COUNTER-WMD  U.S. Army Awards $9M Autonomous Unmanned Systems Contract to Robotic Research (Homeland Preparedness News) The military has a specific interest in upping these unmanned technologies for use in subterranean environments and counter-weapons of mass destruction operations.  U.S. Military Units in Okinawa Conduct Joint, Bilateral CBRN Training (Stripes Okinawa) The two day CBRN training exercise built upon previously joint/bilateral field training exercises designed to increase combat readiness and interoperability of U.S. forces and the Japan Self Defense Forces.

US ARMS CONTROL  Russia Wants Explanation of Trump Withdrawal from Arms Treaty (VOA) Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters Russia has not violated the treaty and if the United States goes on to develop new missiles then Russia would be forced to respond in kind.  How to Avoid a Cyberattack Turning into a Nuclear War? Keep Talking. (Defense One) One danger that merits special attention is the possibility of a North Korean cyberattack escalating out of control – one that that sparks an American counterstrike using conventional weapons so intense that Pyongyang responds with an attempted nuclear missile attack on the United States.

COMMENTARY  Death of Nuclear Treaty with Russia Could Start Arms Race with China (The Hill) China is building a new generation of ground-based missiles squarely aimed at U.S. and allied bases and naval vessels in the Asia-Pacific that Washington has no ability to match, because of the treaty.  What the IAEA Doesn’t Know — Or Want to Know — about Iran’s Nuclear Program (The Hill) This wasn’t the first time the IAEA failed to investigate possible Iranian violations discovered by Israeli intelligence.  Why America Shouldn’t Threaten Preemptive War (The National Interest) Continually pushing for dominance in the backyards of the world's nuclear powers is madness.  Continuity Is Not Consensus: The Future Nuclear Posture Review (Center for Strategic & International Studies) Leaked a month before its actual release, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) initially unleashed a frenetic and somewhat nasty debate, especially on Twitter among nuclear policy geeks, wonks, advocates, and gadflies.

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// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1338 //

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Defense News (Washington, D.C.) One Nuclear Treaty Is Dead. Is New START Next? By Aaron Mehta Oct. 23, 2018 WASHINGTON — As the Trump administration moves closer towards exiting the Intermediate- Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, experts are left to wonder whether another nuclear treaty may be in the administration’s crosshairs. Signed in 2010 between the U.S. and Russia, the New START treaty limits the deployed forces of both nations to 1,550 nuclear warheads over 700 delivery systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers. Asked about New START’s future while in Moscow, John Bolton. President Donald Trump’s national security adviser, said the government is “currently considering” its position on the agreement, but then added that the administration “does not have a position that we’re prepared to negotiate.” This isn’t the first time the administration has raised fears about the future of New START. In February 2017, Trump called the agreement “a one-sided deal” and a "bad deal.” However, nothing came from those comments, and a month later, Lt. Gen. Jack Weinstein, then the service’s deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration, said the agreement was of “huge value” to the U.S., adding that it has “been good for us.” Advocates for the treaty say New START benefits both directly by limiting the number of weapons deployed, and in indirect ways through information gathered. Frank Miller, who served as senior director for defense policy and arms control for President George W. Bush’s National Security Council, said during a Monday Atlantic Council event that the treaty provides 18 on-site inspections of Russian weapons a year, “valuable” information for America’s military. "The Russians need to see consequences from noncompliance on INF, I fundamentally agree with that,” Miller said. But “if the Russians don’t see us as reliable partners in arms control agreements and think they are likely to be surprised by us, as they were by some degree from the withdraw of the ABM treaty and by the abrupt nature of the withdraw from INF, they may begin to hedge and they may be more inclined, rather than less inclined, to prepare themselves for a [nuclear] breakout.” Speaking at the same Atlantic Council event, Richard Burt, who served as chief negotiator in the original START talks between the U.S. and Russia, said the INF decision is “very bad news for anybody who is a supporter of extending New START.” “That decision doesn’t have to be formally taken until 2021, so a lot will depend on the outcome of the 2020 elections. I would say that if you do see Donald Trump re-elected and his national security adviser remains John Bolton, I think it’s a better than even chance that New START is not extended," he said. Notably, Bolton highlighted in his comments that the treaty doesn’t expire until 2021, so “we have plenty of time,” perhaps a hint that the administration does not plan to leave the agreement prematurely.

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// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1338 //

But James Acton of the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program sees few ties between the INF move and the future of New START — not that he’s optimistic about the latter. “New START is in deep trouble, but not because of this,” he said. “Russia, I think, would agree to extending New START even if the US withdraws from INF. The problem is that it’s increasingly clear that this administration doesn’t want to extend New START.” For the defense industry, the death knell of the INF agreement doesn’t move the needle much, said analyst Byron Callan, of Capital Alpha Partners. But New START could be “another matter,” he said. “New START’s demise could support a larger strategic weapons force, so it’s possible that programs such as Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent [Boeing vs Northrop] and LRSO [ vs Raytheon] competition are upsized, and there would be more work on nuclear weapons in the Department of Energy,” Callan wrote in a note to investors. “Hypersonic weapon delivery platforms and missile defense could also play well in this environment, particularly with the possible loss of inspection/verification provisions of New START.” Action does wonder if domestic reaction to the INF withdrawal could change how the administration tackles New START, depending on potential blowback. But Callan notes that trying to project the political realities of 2021 is tough, given the U.S. is still two elections away. “It remains conceivable that there are political changes (domestic and diplomatic) that result in major changes from current trajectories,” he wrote. “For now, that does not appear likely, but then it didn’t appear all that likely in the early-mid 1980s either. “We’d take the nuclear theme a year or two at a time, for now.” Daniel Cebul in Washington contributed to this report. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/10/23/one-nuclear-treaty-is-dead-is-new-start- next/ Return to top

Defense News (Washington, D.C.) Belgium Reportedly Picks F-35 for Future Fighter Jet By Valerie Insinna and Sebastian Sprenger Oct. 22, 2018 WASHINGTON and LIÈGE, Belgium — Belgium appears poised to select Lockheed Martin’s F-35 over the as its next-generation fighter jet, with government sources on Oct. 22 telling national news outlet Belga that an F-35 victory has already been decided. The Belgian government is expected to formally announce its decision before Oct. 29, Reuters reported on Monday. A Lockheed Martin spokesman said he could not confirm whether Belgium had communicated its choice to the firm, but said the company remains confident in its offering. “The F-35 offers transformational capability for the Belgian Air Force and, if selected, will align them with a global coalition operating the world’s most advanced aircraft,” Mike Friedman said in an emailed statement. “The F-35 program is built on strong international partnerships, and our

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// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1338 // proposal includes significant industrial opportunities for Belgian companies to contribute to the global F-35 enterprise.” The F-35 was widely considered the favorite in the competition, which included the Eurofighter — a partnership among the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and Germany. This summer, Belgium announced that it would also consider two options in addition to the F-35 and Typhoon: ’s Dassault Rafale or upgrading its existing F-16 fleet instead of purchasing new aircraft. U.S. aerospace behemoth Boeing and Sweden’s Saab pulled out of the competition last year, with Boeing claiming that Belgium’s requirements favored the F-35 and Sweden stating that it was not able to provide the operational support needed by the . A win by the F-35 would further solidify the joint strike fighter’s dominance among U.S. allies in Europe and deal a heavy blow to Franco-German ambitions for a prominent role in building Europe's next-generation defense capabilities. Both Rafale and Eurofighter had pitched extensive industrial packages to Belgium in the hopes of bolstering their offers. Analysts had said that Belgium’s decision could be a bellwether for future European fighter jet competitions. U.S. industry sources told Defense News this summer that they believed that President Donald Trump’s rhetoric on NATO allies' defense spending and tariffs on steel and aluminum may have led Belgium to take a closer look at the European offers. Meanwhile, European defense officials and experts repeatedly made the case that Belgium should pick a European plane. For Brussels, the capital of Europe, to choose the U.S. plane would amount to nothing less than an act of “betrayal,” the French business journal La Tribune headlined on Monday. Two practical considerations were seen as playing heavily into the Belgian government's inclination toward the joint strike fighter: For one, the neighboring Netherlands already is an F-35 customer. The two countries agreed some years ago to pool their resources in policing their common airspace, and having only one aircraft type presumably would be good for interoperability. In addition, Belgium for decades has had an agreement with NATO that requires its planes to be capable of carrying U.S. nuclear weapons into a hypothetical atomic war. Belgium, like neighbor Germany, stores a few warheads within its borders for that purpose. Certifying a European-made aircraft, like the Eurofighter, for the nuclear mission after the F- 16 is politically tricky and – some say – perhaps even undoable given the current state of trans- Atlantic affairs. In that line of thinking, a nuclear-capable F-35 could represent the most trouble- free option for Belgium. The Belgian decision is sure to be watched closely by Germany. Berlin is in the market to replace its Tornado aircraft, looking for roughly 90 new planes. While officials have said they prefer the Eurofighter, uncertainty surrounding the nuclear-weapons certification of the future fleet remains something of an elephant in the room. Belgium intends to buy 34 new fighters to replace its aging inventory of F-16s, which number about 54 jets — although that number may be even fewer after an embarrassing incident earlier this month, where a mechanic accidentally opened fire while doing repair work and and blew up a neighboring F-16. In January, the U.S. State Department pre-emptively approved a $6.53 billion F-35 sale to Belgium that would include 34 F-35A conventional takeoff and landing variants, 38 F-135 engines manufactured by Pratt & Whitney, and a slew of other equipment to enable operations, training and

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// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1338 // logistics. That estimate is expected to come down as Lockheed and the government hammer out a final contract. https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/10/22/belgium-reportedly-picks-f-35-for-future- fighter-jet/ Return to top

The National Interest (Washington, D.C.) China’s H-20 Stealth Bomber: Everything We Know about It By Sebastian Roblin Oct. 20, 2018 If the H-20 does have the range and passable stealth characteristics attributed to it, then it could alter the strategic calculus between the United States and China by exposing U.S. bases and fleets across the Pacific to surprise air attacks. In October 2018, Chinese media announced that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) would publicly unveil its new H-20 stealth bomber during a parade celebrating the air arm’s seventieth anniversary in 2019. Prior news of the H-20’s development had been teased using techniques pioneered by viral marketing campaigns for Hollywood movies. For example, the Xi’an Aviation Industrial Corporation released a promotional video in May 2018 pointedly imitating Northrop Grumman’s own Superbowl ad for the B-21 stealth bomber, portraying a shrouded flying wing bomber in its final seconds. Later, the silhouette of a possible new bomber appeared at a PLAAF gala. This comes only two years after PLAAF Gen. Ma Xiaotian formally revealed the Hong-20’s existence. If the H-20 does have the range and passable stealth characteristics attributed to it, it could alter the strategic calculus between the United States and China by exposing U.S. bases and fleets across the Pacific to surprise air attacks. Only three countries have both the imperative and the resources to develop huge strategic bombers that can strike targets across the globe: the United States, Russia and China. Strategic bombers make sense for China because Beijing perceives dominance of the western half of the Pacific Ocean as essential for its security due to its history of maritime invasion , and the challenge posed by the United States in particular. The two superpowers are separated by five to six thousand miles of ocean—and the United States has spent the last century developing a network of island territories such as Guam, foreign military bases in East Asia and super-carriers with which it can project air and sea power across that span. Xi’an Aviation, the H-20’s manufacturer, also builds China’s H-6 strategic jet bombers , a knockoff the 1950s-era Soviet Tu-16 Badger which has recently been upgraded with modern , capability and cruise missiles in the later H-6K and H-6J models. Beijing could easily have produced a successor in a similar vein, basically a giant four-engine airliner-sized cargo plane loaded with fuel and long-range missiles that’s never intended to get close enough for adversaries to shoot back. Alternately, analyst Andreas Rupprecht reported that China considered developing a late- style supersonic bomber akin to the U.S. B-1 or Russian Tu-160 called the JH-XX. This would have lugged huge bombloads at high speed and low altitude, while exhibiting partial stealth characteristics for a marginal improvement in survivability. However, such an approach was

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// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1338 // already considered excessively vulnerable to modern fighters and air defense by the late twentieth century. A Chinese magazine cover sported a concept image of the JH-XX in 2013, but the project appears to have been set aside for now. Instead, in the PLAAF elected to pursue a more ambitious approach: a slower but far stealthier flying wing like the U.S. B-2 and forthcoming B-21 Raider. A particular advantage of large flying wings is they are less susceptible to detection by low-bandwidth radar, such as those on the Navy’s E-2 Hawkeye radar planes, which are effective at detecting the approach of smaller stealth fighters. While China’s development of technology in the J-20 and J-31 stealth fighter was an obvious prerequisite for the H-20 project, so apparently was Xi’an’s development of the hulking Y- 20 ‘Chubby Girl’ cargo plane , which established the company’s capability to build large, long-range aircraft using modern computer-aided design and manufacturing techniques—precision technology essential for mass producing the exterior surfaces of stealth aircraft. According to a study by Rick Joe at The Diplomat, Chinese publications began speculating about the H-20 in the early . Postulated characteristics include four non-afterburning WS-10A Taihang sunk into the top of the wing surface with S-shaped saw-toothed inlets for stealth. It’s worth noting that the WS-10 has been plagued by major problems, but that hasn’t stopped China from manufacturing fighters using WS-10s , with predictably troubled results. The new is expected to have a maximum un-refueled combat radius exceeding 5,000 miles and payload between the H-6’s ten tons and the B-2’s twenty-three tons. This is because the H-20 is reportedly designed to strike targets beyond the “second island ring” (which includes U.S. bases in Japan, Guam, the Philippines, etc.) from bases on mainland China. The third island chain extends to Hawaii and coastal Australia. In a U.S.-China conflict, the best method for neutralizing U.S. air power would be to destroy it on the ground (or carrier deck), especially in the opening hours of a war. While ballistic missiles and H-6 bombers can already contribute to this with long-range missiles, these are susceptible to detection and interception given adequate forewarning. A stealth bomber could approach much closer to carrier task forces and air bases before releasing its weapons, giving defenses too little time to react. An initial strike might in fact focus on air defense radars, “opening the breach” for a follow up wave of less stealthy attacks. The H-20 will also likely be capable of carrying nuclear weapons, finally giving China a full triad of nuclear-capable submarines, ballistic missiles and bombers. Though the H-6 was China’s original nuclear bomber, these are no longer configured for nuclear strike, though that could change if air- launched nuclear-tipped cruise or ballistic missile are devised. Beijing is nervous that the United States’ limited ballistic missile defense capabilities might eventually become adequate for countering China’s small ICBM and SLBM arsenal. The addition of a stealth bomber would contribute to China’s nuclear deterrence by adding a new, difficult-to-stop vector of nuclear attack that the U.S. defenses aren’t designed to protect against. Some Chinese publications also argue that the H-20 will do double-duty as a networked reconnaissance and command & control platform similar to U.S. F-35 stealth fighters . This would make sense, as China has developed a diverse arsenal of long-range air-, ground- and sea-launched missiles, but doesn’t necessarily have a robust reconnaissance network to form a kill-chain cueing these missiles to distant targets. Theoretically, an H-20 could rove ahead, spying the position of opposing sea-based assets using a low-probability-of-intercept AESA radar, and fuse that information to a firing platform hundreds or even thousands of miles away. The H-20 could also be used for electronic warfare or to deploy specialized directed energy.

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The crescendo of publicity surrounding the H-20 indicates the PLAAF believes the plane will soon be ready enough to show to the public—and international audiences. Once revealed, analysts will pour over the aircraft’s geometry to estimate just how the stealthy it really is, looking for radar- reflective Achilles’ heels such as exposed engine inlets and indiscrete tail stabilizers. However, external analysis cannot provide a full assessment, because the quality of the radar-absorbent materials applied to surfaces, and the finesse of the manufacturing (avoiding seams, protruding screws, etc.) has a major impact on radar cross-section. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that an H-20 seeking to slip through the gauntlet of long- range search radars scattered across the Pacific to launch CJ-10K cruise missiles with a range of over nine hundred miles would not require the same degree of stealth as an F-35 intended to penetrate more densely defended airspace and launch small diameter bombs with a range of 70 miles. Analysts forecast the H-20’s first flight in the early 2020s, with production possibly beginning around 2025. If the H-20 is judged to be of credible design, the Pentagon in turn will have to factor the strategic implications of China’s stealth capabilities, and will likely seek to field implement counter-stealth technologies which formerly have been mostly vaunted by Russia and China. The publicity which the often-secretive Chinese government is according the H-20 also indicates Beijing’s hope the bomber will serve as a strategic deterrent to foreign adversaries—even before its first flight. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinas-h-20-stealth-bomber-everything-we-know-about- it-34022 Return to top

US COUNTER-WMD

Homeland Preparedness News (Washington, D.C.) U.S. Army Awards $9M Autonomous Unmanned Systems Contract to Robotic Research By Chris Galford Oct. 23, 2018 Robotic Research, LLC of Maryland gained a three-year, $9 million military contract last week for work on Autonomous Unmanned Systems Teaming and Collaboration (AUSTC) for a variety of missions. Robotic Research has worked with the U.S. Army’s Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center in the past under Small Business Innovative Research contracts, but this latest contract will build on those arrangements. The military has a specific interest in upping these unmanned technologies for use in subterranean environments and counter-weapons of mass destruction operations. In theory, they will allow ground forces and commanders informed decisions ahead of military operations, improve intelligence and awareness, and provide invaluable mapping data. Robotic Research will conduct AUSTC technical demonstrations of sensing technologies for these drones, improve autonomy, elaborate 3D and 4D mapping capabilities, as well as engage localization, tracking, visualization, and weapon system integration, among others.

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“It is a great honor to expand our work for the US Army, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Special Forces community on the family-of-systems for autonomous collaborative robotic teaming in support of challenging subterranean missions,” Alberto Lacaza, president of Robotic Research, said. “The Robotic Research team shares the Army leadership’s commitment to rapidly fielding effective autonomous Counter-WMD solutions for our Nation’s warfighters.” Robotic Research also serves as the U.S. Army’s autonomy kit provider for autonomous convoy operations on its Oshkosh Defense PLS vehicles. https://homelandprepnews.com/stories/31003-u-s-army-awards-9m-autonomous-unmanned- systems-contract-to-robotic-research/ Return to top

Stripes Okinawa (Washington, D.C.) U.S. Military Units in Okinawa Conduct Joint, Bilateral CBRN Training By 1st Lt. Matthew B Brewer Oct. 22, 2018 CAMP HANSEN, Japan - Interoperability is at forefront of joint and bilateral partnerships. In an effort to increase contingency readiness; Soldiers, Marines, and Airmen stationed in Okinawa conducted a joint and bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) combined training exercise on Combat Town, Camp Hansen, Oct. 10-11, 2018. The two day CBRN training exercise built upon previously joint/bilateral field training exercises designed to increase combat readiness and interoperability of U.S. forces and the Japan Self Defense Forces. Participants included US units from 1st Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Regiment, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 18th Civil Engineer Squadron, and Japan Self Defense Force from the 15th Biological, Chemical Company. The units conducted iterations of reconnaissance, site exploitation, hazard response, and mass casualty scenarios. Set in a simulated environment, each training iteration was progressive, building upon the actions of the previous rotation. “Learning to communicate and integrate with our partners on Okinawa is key to ensuring effectiveness and efficiency when we are called upon to perform our mission,” said 1st Lt. Matthew Li, the 1-1 ADA CBRN Officer and Shisa Fire organizer. In addition to training, the units had the opportunity to share different aspects of their branch and service with one another. “It’s great to come out here and train with our Japanese, Air-Force, and Marine counterparts. The energy and excitement they bring to training is really motivational,” said Pfc Kyle Power, CBRN specialist for Alpha Battery 1-1 ADA. As the dust settled on the last day of training, each participant of Shisa Fire walked away with a deepened knowledge of their role in a tactical environment. “Complacency negates any progress that we’ve made fostering these relationships. Continuing to conduct these opportunities is paramount to ensuring future success on Okinawa,” said Li. Training exercises like these provide the JSDF and U.S. military opportunities to train together in realistic scenarios, enhancing readiness and interoperability, Li added.

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// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1338 // http://okinawa.stripes.com/base-info/us-military-units-okinawa-conduct-joint-bilateral-cbrn- training Return to top

US ARMS CONTROL

VOA (Washington, D.C.) Russia Wants Explanation of Trump Withdrawal from Arms Treaty Author Not Attributed Oct. 22, 2018 The Kremlin expressed concern Monday about U.S. President Donald Trump's pledge to pull out of a key Cold War arms deal with Russia, saying the move would "make the world a more dangerous place." Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters Russia has not violated the treaty and if the United States goes on to develop new missiles then Russia would be forced to respond in kind. Peskov said Russian officials want to get more information about the U.S. plans regarding the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty during talks this week with National Security Adviser John Bolton. Bolton is due to meet with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Monday and President Vladimir Putin. Trump has accused Russia of building and testing missiles that violate the 1987 treaty. The deal bans the U.S. and Russia from building, testing, and stockpiling ground-launched nuclear missiles with a range from 500 to 5,000 kilometers. Former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev signed the deal with the late U.S. president Ronald Reagan at the White House in 1987. "Do they really not understand in Washington what this could lead to?" Russia's Interfax news agency quoted Gorbachev as saying. "Washington's desire to turn back politics cannot be supported. Not only Russia, but all those who cherish the world, especially a world without nuclear weapons, must declare this." Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Tass news agency that the U.S. move would be "a very dangerous step." Without specifying how Russia violated the treaty, Trump Saturday appeared to say Moscow will not get away with it. "Russia has violated the agreement. They have been violating it for many years. And we're not going to let them violate a nuclear agreement and go out and do weapons and we are not allowed to," he said. U.S. officials going back to the Obama administration have accused Russia of deliberately deploying a land-based cruise missile to pose a threat to NATO. Russia has denied violating the INF agreement and says U.S. missile defense systems are a violation.

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Many so-called hawks in Washington say the INF treaty keeps the U.S. from developing a new generation of weapons in a world that faces new global security challenges. “We’ll have to develop those weapons, unless Russia comes to us and China comes to us and they all come to us and say let’s really get smart and let’s none of us develop those weapons, but if Russia’s doing it and if China’s doing it, and we’re adhering to the agreement, that’s unacceptable,” Trump said. China is not part of the INF agreement. Beatrice Fihn, the executive director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons — the coalition that won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize — said that "by declaring he will leave the INF Treaty, President Trump has shown himself to be a demolition man who has no ability to build real security. Instead, by blowing up nuclear treaties, he is taking the U.S. down a trillion dollar road to a new nuclear arms race." Dmitry Oreshkin, an independent Russian political analyst told the Associated Press, "We are slowly slipping back to the situation of Cold War, as it was at the end of the Soviet Union, with quite similar consequences, but now it could be worse because Putin belongs to a generation that had no war under its belt. These people aren't as much fearful of a war as people of [former Soviet leader Leonid] Brezhnev's epoch. They think if they threaten the West properly, it gets scared." https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-wants-explanation-of-trump-withdrawal-from-arms- treaty/4622702.html Return to top

Defense One (Washington, D.C.) How to Avoid a Cyberattack Turning into a Nuclear War? Keep Talking. By Ankit Panda Oct. 23, 2018 Trump’s Pentagon declared that "significant non-nuclear strategic attacks" may invite U.S. nuclear use, but does that matter to North Korea? In 2017, North Korea became the third adversarial country ever to find itself capable of reaching the U.S. homeland with nuclear weapons. Whether Washington likes it or not, today the United States and North Korea find themselves in a nuclear deterrent relationship, and both sides must continue to talk to manage the nuclear dangers between them. One danger that merits special attention is the possibility of a North Korean cyberattack escalating out of control – one that that sparks an American counterstrike using conventional weapons so intense that Pyongyang responds with an attempted nuclear missile attack on the United States. Or, a scenario where a North Korean cyberattack hits an American target so vital that it elicits an American nuclear missile strike in return. It’s not fantasy. These dynamics are particularly salient given certain policy changes introduced by the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, or NPR. Released in February this year, the Trump NPR introduced a change to U.S. declaratory policy that immediately grabbed the attention of the nuclear community. The change wasn’t a departure from the Obama administration’s policy in the NPR in 2010, but in clarifying the “extreme circumstances”

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// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1338 // under which the United States would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons, some viewed it as a new interpretation to reflect the modern age of cyber threats. “Extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks,” the Trump administration said, in the 2018 document. “Significant non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are not limited to, attacks on the U.S., allied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allies’ nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities.” The word “cyber” does not appear explicitly in the NPR, but there’s little doubt that one of the ways a “significant non-nuclear strategic attack” might occur would be as an offensive cyberattack against the targets identified in the NPR. Proponents of the NPR argue that the document does not introduce the idea of using nuclear weapons directly to deter cyberattacks. But they are arguing on a technicality; the subtext couldn’t be clearer. In the case of North Korea, this specification in the NPR merits scrutiny. It’s easy to imagine, for instance, a repeat of the May 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack — attributed by the Trump administration to North Korea — that would merit the description of a “significant non-nuclear strategic attack.” In the United Kingdom, a U.S. ally, the 2017 attack crippled the National Health Service. There’s no evidence to suggest that patient deaths resulted directly from the mayhem wrought by the attack. But under the new NPR, a subsequent ransomware or other cyberattack could be interpreted as an attack on an entire nation’s public health infrastructure. Pyongyang’s cyber ambitions are broader and deeper than previously appreciated, as made clear in the Department of Justice’s recent unsealed complaint regarding Park Jin Hyok, a North Korean programmer charged with responsibility for the Sony Pictures Entertainment attack in 2014. Separately, the Trump NPR’s inclusion of U.S. command and control capabilities is also concerning. As U.S. adversaries grow sophisticated in the cyber realm, early Cold War anxieties about a well- placed attack severing the president from the U.S. nuclear arsenal are resurfacing. To be sure, an attempted attack on U.S. nuclear command and control would be incredibly serious, but a nuclear retaliation does not appear credible and is unlikely to deter North Korea from attempting it. The United States’ own contemplation of offensive cyberattacks on other countries’ nuclear command and control are likely to signal to adversaries, including North Korea, that this remains a fair game attack vector. U.S. nuclear command and control is mighty impressive and seemingly impervious. But no system is free of vulnerability and there’s no doubt that North Korea, having seen the U.S. as a nuclear bully and aggressor for decades, would have looked into the possibility of tampering with the United States’ ability to use its nuclear weapons. Russia and China might be more circumspect given their confidence in their own nuclear forces; North Korea’s lean nuclear forces and conventional inferiority give it less confidence. Another concern erodes the credibility of the Trump NPR’s language: the difficulty of cyber- attribution. This problem is already being exploited by attackers. Russia attacked South Korean government computers during the Winter Olympics this year and tried to frame North Korea. Russian hackers reused North Korean code signatures. Nothing precludes North Korea from using the same trick in the future. Missiles provide satellite-observable infrared signatures and radar- observable trajectories, making it clear exactly which country was responsible for their launch. There’s simply no equivalent in the cyber realm; attribution may take weeks or months, as it did in the WannaCry case.

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North Korea is outmatched against the United States’ nuclear and conventional arsenals, and to protect its regime’s survival has declared it could use nuclear weapons first, not just as a defensive response. The United States likely has a clear offensive cyber advantage too. Last year, in September, U.S. Cyber Command carried out a fairly unsophisticated attack on networks used by North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau—likely designed as a shot across the bow to suggest that, in a shooting war, North Korea’s cyber capabilities would be easily contained. The U.S. objective shouldn’t be to lower the policy threshold for any state to use its nuclear arsenal. The Trump administration never should have specified the “extreme circumstances” that might lead to the United States considering nuclear use. There’s little doubt that cyber threats are evolving and merit a serious response. It’s just not clear that the administration’s NPR found that response. Instead, it has widened the potential role of U.S. nuclear weapons in a way that neither increases the credibility of U.S. deterrence across the board nor stability with the United States’ newest nuclear-armed adversary. Before a miscalculation or provocation has a chance to test the Trump NPR’s boundaries, U.S. officials in their ongoing talks with North Koreans should make their intentions on nuclear weapons and cyberattacks crystal clear. https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/10/how-avoid-cyberattack-turning-nuclear-war-keep- talking/152236/ Return to top

COMMENTARY

The Hill (Washington, D.C.) Death of Nuclear Treaty with Russia Could Start Arms Race with China By Harry J. Kazianis Oct. 22, 2018 Dec. 8, 1987, easily could mark the day the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States finally ended. On that day, both nations signed the Intermediate-Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF, a game-changer agreement that scrapped all ground-based missiles — cruise and ballistic — with a range of 300 to 3,400 miles. The treaty created a strict inspection regime: both sides monitoring each other’s compliance, or, as President Ronald Reagan now famously declared during the signing ceremony, “Trust but verify,” allowing on-site inspection of each nation’s missile forces. But if there is any constant in the great game of international politics it is that nothing — even historic treaties of such importance — lasts forever. So, it seems fitting that on Oct. 20, 2018, with President Donald Trump announcing that Washington would “terminate” the INF Treaty, the president inadvertently might have marked the beginning of a new, 21st century Cold War. This time, the superpower standoff involves not Russia but China, which never was party to the treaty’s limitations. None of this should come as a surprise. While Russia clearly has been violating the agreement for years, testing and modernizing its missile forces in the wake of tensions with the European Union and NATO nations over the Ukraine crisis, there always was a possibility that Washington and Moscow could come to terms with a a new version of the agreement. But Trump’s reasoning for killing the treaty has everything to do with China’s rising military might. China is building a new generation of ground-based missiles squarely aimed at U.S. and allied bases and naval vessels in the Asia-Pacific that Washington has no ability to match, because of the treaty.

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Indeed, China’s growing missile forces have been worrisome for U.S. military strategists for nearly a decade. Perhaps the greatest example is one specific weapon, the DF-21D missile, what many weapons experts call the “carrier-killer.” The missile, in development since the mid-1990s, is a response to China’s being unable to hold at risk U.S. battle groups deployed near its coastline during the Taiwan Crisis of 1995-1996. Fired from land from a specialized truck, the missile, in theory, can strike an ocean-going naval vessel from up to 1,000 miles away, descending on its target at speeds up to Mach 10. Some experts consider the weapon almost revolutionary, as China can build such missiles cheaply, leading some to theorize that U.S. Navy aircraft carriers are as obsolete as a World War II-era battleship. From here it gets worse. China has improved upon the DF-21D and developed an even more sophisticated “carrier-killer,” the DF-26. This missile, also fired from land, can strike a naval vessels at sea as far away as 2,500 miles. The weapon can be used to strike land-based targets as well, and perhaps worst of all, can be armed with a nuclear warhead. Military analysts have given this missile its own fear-inspiring nickname — “Guam-killer” — because it would have the range to attack U.S. air and naval forces there. While the death of the INF Treaty signals that America now can match Russian, and more specially, Chinese missile advances, it also could spark a potentially deadly arms race in the Asia-Pacific and wider Indo-Pacific region. With Washington free to develop similar ground-based missiles as China has deployed, Beijing could seek to develop even more advanced systems with longer ranges and capabilities. Additionally, both sides could seek to deploy greater amounts of missile defense platforms to offset each other’s growing offensive capabilities. The costs for all of this, on both sides, easily could add billions of dollars to Chinese and American defense budgets, while further destabilizing a bilateral relationship that has deteriorated over the past two years. However, we should not reconcile ourselves to such a fate just yet. There is still a possibility that President Trump’s move to kill the INF Treaty could be a ploy to try to renegotiate the deal on his terms. The agreement spells out that either party must give six-months’ notice that it is terminating the accord, giving Washington time to work with Moscow and Beijing to perhaps forge a treaty that incorporates all three nations. Although China would be hard-pressed to give up its sizable missile advantage, it should be concerned that taking on America in an arms race bankrupted the Soviet Union, and that this 21st century “missile gap” would be closed within time. To use President Trump’s catchphrase, “We’ll see what happens.” https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/412467-death-of-inf-treaty-with-russia-could-start- arms-race-with-china Return to top

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The Hill (Washington, D.C.) What the IAEA Doesn’t Know — Or Want to Know — about Iran’s Nuclear Program By Joshua Block Oct. 18, 2018 In his speech to the U.N. General Assembly last month, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu revealed that Iran, in addition to having an archive of files documenting its illicit military nuclear research, has a warehouse containing nuclear equipment and material. The prime minister exhorted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano to “go and inspect this atomic warehouse immediately,” before Iran hides its contents. A week later, however, the IAEA rejected his suggestion. In a statement, the agency said, “All information obtained, including from third parties, is subject to rigorous review and assessed together with other available information to arrive at an independent assessment based on the agency’s own expertise.” This wasn’t the first time the IAEA failed to investigate possible Iranian violations discovered by Israeli intelligence. When Israel in April smuggled out a half-ton of documents and CDs from a Tehran warehouse, the IAEA issued a similar statement: “In line with standard IAEA practice, the IAEA evaluates all (nuclear) safeguards-relevant information available to it,” but gave no indication that it would investigate further. Israel subsequently shared many of the files it recovered from Iran with independent weapons experts and selected journalists. The Wall Street Journal assessed in July that the documents showed not only aspects of the Iranian nuclear weapons program the IAEA knew about, but also details “about which international inspectors were unaware.” Though it is charged with monitoring Iran’s compliance with the nuclear accord, at least twice the IAEA has acknowledged it was not verifying compliance. In September 2017, Amano said the IAEA did not have the tools to verify items listed in Section T of the accord, governing “activities which could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device.” David Albright, president of the nonpartisan Institute of Science and International Security and a former weapons inspector, said the statement was an admission that “the deal is not fully implemented.” In announcing the Iran nuclear deal in January 2016, President Obama said Iran couldn’t possibly cheat because the agreement ensured “the most comprehensive, intrusive inspection regime ever negotiated to monitor a nuclear program.” The guarantee for Iran’s full compliance, therefore, was one of the central selling points of the accord. However, critics at the time pointed out that the IAEA did not, in fact, have complete knowledge of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. In an analysis of the final IAEA report on the past military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program, Albright observed that, “Iran did not provide the IAEA with anywhere near a full declaration about its past nuclear weapons related activities, and it did not provide the kind of transparency and cooperation required for the IAEA to conclude its investigation.” This effectively meant the nuclear watchdog was unable to explain in full Iran’s nuclear weapons activities, including verification that Iran’s nuclear program had been completely dismantled. The gaps in the IAEA’s knowledge — of Iran’s past nuclear work, of its military sites, of items mentioned in Section T of the nuclear deal, and of the nuclear sites discovered by Israeli intelligence — raise questions about the full extent of Iran’s nuclear program. These gaps are important as we approach November, when President Trump has said the United States will impose sanctions on Iran’s energy sector that could “cripple” its economy.

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Defenders of the nuclear deal have argued that the United States is wrong to impose sanctions on Iran because the IAEA confirmed it has been complying with the deal. But with its failure to establish a full picture of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, it can’t be said to have confirmed the country’s compliance; just that Iran didn’t blatantly violate the deal at any site that the IAEA has access to. When he revealed Iran’s nuclear archive in April, Netanyahu said Iran kept the files to “use them at a later date.” In other words, the gaps in the IAEA’s knowledge of Iran’s nuclear program mean the deal enables Iran to do what Obama said the accord would never allow: develop nuclear weapons. There is a lot that we don’t know about Iran’s nuclear program. There is a lot we will be unable to know because the deal has too many holes, and the IAEA is unable — or unwilling — to address them. https://thehill.com/opinion/international/411734-what-the-iaea-doesnt-know-or-want-to-know- about-irans-nuclear-program Return to top

The National Interest (Washington, D.C.) Why America Shouldn’t Threaten Preemptive War By Doug Bandow Oct. 21, 2018 Continually pushing for dominance in the backyards of the world's nuclear powers is madness. As a Senator, Kay Bailey Hutchinson was a moderate conservative. But as the current U.S. ambassador to NATO, Hutchinson seemed to lose her prior restraints. She appeared to threaten an attack on Russia. Moscow is developing a new cruise missile which Washington claims would violate the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty. If Russia proceeds, said Hutchinson, then the Putin government would be put “on notice” of possible “countermeasures,” which “would be to take out the missiles that are in development by Russia in violation of the treaty.” She warned that action could come when Moscow had developed its new weapon “to a point where we know they are capable of delivering. And at that point we would then be looking at a capability to take out a missile that could hit any of our countries in Europe and hit America in Alaska.” After her remarks triggered an international furor she insisted that she was not warning of a preemptive strike. Maybe the problem was just a maladroit expression. After all, the new missiles really don’t change the threat facing America: Russia already is capable of hitting any target in America with its strategic missile force. But Hutchinson’s remarks were so disturbing because any preventive strikes would ensure Russian retaliation and the potential for full-blown war. The United States avoided taking direct military action against Moscow throughout the Cold War, even during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Attacking the Russian homeland during peacetime would be simply mad. However, hubris has dangerously infected America’s relationship with Moscow. During the 2016 presidential campaign most Republican candidates—though not Donald Trump— sought to appear tough by threatening Russia with war. At least Hutchinson worried about a weapon which could hit America and Europe. Most of the GOP presidential contenders were prepared to start a great power conflict over Syria’s civil war.

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For instance, a no-fly zone became the favorite proposal for candidates to use to demonstrate that they were tougher than President Barack Obama. The only problem was that Russia and Syria were using airpower to target insurgents. However, the prospect of a military confrontation with Moscow only seemed to invigorate the candidates. And not just Lindsey Graham, who always treats military action as the first resort. Other candidates prepared for war with a nuclear-armed power included Jeb Bush, John Kasich and Carly Fiorina. Chris Christie was most explicit. In typical blustering style, he declared that “My first phone call would be to Vladimir, and I’d say to him: ‘Listen, we’re enforcing this no-fly zone.’” Unfortunately, Christie did not tell voters what he would say if Vladimir responded by threatening to take down American aircraft, plane for plane. When asked if he was willing to risk war by shooting down Russian aircraft, Christie insisted: “Not only would I be prepared to do it, I would do it.” Indeed, he pledged that the Russians would find out that the president no longer was “the feckless weakling that the president we have in the Oval Office is right now.” What, however, would the self-proclaimed tough guy have done if Moscow demonstrated that it could not be cowed? Did Christie understand that with less conventional capability Russia would be tempted to employ nukes earlier in the escalatory ladder? Unfortunately, Christie was only following in the footsteps of others. In 2008, the country of Georgia targeted South Ossetian separatists, backed by Russian forces, with artillery, sparking a short war with Moscow. The late Sen. John McCain declared that “we are all Georgians now,” even though their government had started the fighting. McCain had also encouraged Tbilisi to believe that America would come to its rescue. Far more serious than McCain’s reckless actions—thankfully, he never became commander-in- chief—was the Bush administration’s debate over entering the conflict. Officials reportedly contemplated “surgical strikes” as well as destroying the Roki Tunnel, through which Moscow was sending men and material. Although urged on by some staff members, senior policymakers said no. Surely they realized that the Putin government could not ignore attacks on its military, even by America. No less than America, Russia has red lines to protect. Indeed, as the weaker party, Moscow has an added incentive to demonstrate that it cannot be intimidated. This is especially true in nearby regions where its interests are greater than those of America. For instance, Damascus is a long-time Russian ally and Moscow’s one beachhead in a region dominated by America. Georgia was part of both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union and remains on Russia’s border. Washington’s interest in both conflicts was marginal at best, and primarily humanitarian, which did not warrant war. Moreover, for Moscow the issue goes beyond the individual conflicts. For the Putin government to abandon important interests on America’s demand would be but the beginning, encouraging the United States to employ coercion elsewhere. After all, Washington has proved itself to be a most meddlesome power, intent on having its way everywhere, at whatever cost. The American government is currently applying sanctions—or considering doing so—on most of the known world: Europe, China, Russia, , North Korea, Iran, Cuba and more. The United States will remain the most powerful nation for years to come. However, its ability to unilaterally impose its will is waning. And policymakers who imagine adversaries can be easily browbeaten ignore how Americans would react in similar circumstances. Especially when the opponent has a nationalistic population and possesses nuclear weapons. In 2000, then-candidate George W. Bush suggested that Washington exhibit humility in foreign affairs before quickly dropping that idea. However contrary humility might be to President Donald

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Trump’s nature, he should incorporate it into his foreign policy. Americans would be safer if the United States did less and made less threats. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-america-shouldnt-threaten-preemptive-war-33927 Return to top

Center for Strategic & International Studies (Washington, D.C.) Continuity Is Not Consensus: The Future Nuclear Posture Review By Rebecca Hersman Oct. 19, 2018 Leaked a month before its actual release, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) initially unleashed a frenetic and somewhat nasty debate, especially on Twitter among nuclear policy geeks, wonks, advocates, and gadflies. The sky was falling, or nothing had really changed—depending upon whom you asked. An already polarized nuclear policy community found reasons to argue, and it did so vociferously. And yet, in the months since the somewhat anti-climactic release of the “real” report, the NPR has been enjoying a honeymoon of sorts. Domestically, it received strong support and close to full funding in the Republican Congress. In fact, many national security Republicans favored more robust nuclear policy and supported more controversial policy positions on issues like Intermediary-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, New START, and declaratory policy that the NPR moderated or rejected. As for funding, this is the first time since 2008 that the full defense budget has been passed, securing the Department of Defense (DoD) a $686 billion budget for FY2019. Part of this budget will be used to modernize the , including the nuclear command, control, and communications system (NC3) and its supporting infrastructure. Additionally, the Department of Energy (DoE) received $44.6 billion in appropriations, with $11.1 billion specifically set aside for weapons activities within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The implementation process within DoD and DoE also seems to be moving along with minimum friction or controversy. Internationally, the NPR also received surprisingly strong support among allies, especially NATO members. The strong support is in part a confirmation of the changed security environment reflected in the NPR, and in part reflects a sense of relief that the review did not take more extreme or controversial positions that many, especially in Europe, had feared. At the same time, North Korea and Iran have dominated the nuclear landscape and the headlines. But even these factors don’t fully explain the absence of controversy for a community that usually wears its emotions on its Twitter sleeve. One explanation—a classic case of calm before the storm—is that opponents of the Trump administration’s nuclear policy are keeping their powder dry and waiting for the right time to make their case. That time might be right around the mid-term election corner. The NPR’s honeymoon may soon be coming to an end. Even if one or both chambers don’t change hands during the mid-term elections, we can expect narrower majorities. Representative Adam Smith, who would be expected to take the helm of the House Armed Services Committee if Democrats gain control of the House, has already signaled an intention to take funding and policy of nuclear weapons in a different direction, saying that nuclear weapons are the number one difference between the parties in terms of national security spending: “I think the Republican party and the nuclear posture review contemplates a lot more nuclear weapons than I—and I think most Democrats—think we need. We also think the idea of low-yield nuclear weapons are extremely problematic going forward … When we look at the larger budget picture, that’s not the best place to spend the money.” A group of Democrats signaled even stronger

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// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1338 // change could be coming when they introduced bills to the House and Senate on September 17 that seek to prohibit the research and development, production, and deployment of low-yield Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The somewhat controversial “supplemental capabilities”—the low yield SLBM and possible reintroduction of a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile into our nuclear arsenal—are most likely to find their way into the budget-cutting cross- hairs of a Democratic Congress. And yet, those seeking meaningful savings in the defense budget will be disappointed to realize just how little these supplemental capabilities have to offer. These capabilities are at best rounding errors in the overall nuclear modernization program that will cost $50 billion in the next 10 years and an estimated $1.2 trillion over the lifetime of the programs. There is no way to salami slice our way to meaningful budget reductions in the overall modernization program. Upgrades to the weapons complex, sustainment of the life extension programs, and improvements to Command and Control (C2) and cyber resiliency are not optional. You can’t buy half a leg of the nuclear triad or responsibly continue to extend systems that are long past their service life. The systems are aging out, and there is no wiggle room. Cuts to the core program would require big, painful choices if the goal is saving serious money. For those who think the U.S. nuclear arsenal could be the budgetary “easy button,” the disappointment will be deep. Preservation of the nuclear triad and commitment to both pursuing arms control AND modernizing our nuclear deterrent—including maintaining the triad—is the heart of the remaining fragile consensus about U.S. nuclear weapons, and if that unravels, a lot of other things will as well. Hoping to shore up this fragile consensus on nuclear modernization, NPR drafters and spokespersons have stressed “the 2018 NPR represents continuity” and discounted change when discussing the NPR. However, continuity is not the same as consensus. To a large extent it’s true there is a large amount of continuity, especially on the broad outlines of U.S. nuclear posture and declaratory policy. The problem is that the areas of discontinuity happen to be very important to people on both sides of the issue. So, continuity on broad, but less controversial issues does not necessarily offset discontinuity in other important areas such as beliefs about the fundamental role of nuclear weapons and the utility of “supplemental capabilities,” the role and future of arms control and the relative priority of nonproliferation, and nuclear security and deterrence. There is also a sense of disingenuousness that doesn’t sit well. If this NPR shares so much continuity with its predecessors, then why did the 2010 review come under such vociferous criticism from many of the drafters of the current one? The other problem is that the words on the page do not represent the sum total of U.S. policy in these areas. The words and actions of the president play heavily here and in ways that few would argue represent continuity. Finally, it isn’t constructive to keep insisting “but you agree with me, really you do” to someone who feels they have a substantive disagreement on an issue of importance to them. It comes across as belittling and patronizing. And if that doesn’t work for policy wonks, it really won’t work amongst politicians. What do we need to do instead? Focus on consensus—how to build it and maintain it during what are certain to be challenging times. That requires finding and building common ground and listening respectfully to concerns. Above all, it will require compromise. Sustained bipartisan commitment to modernization of our nuclear infrastructure and delivery systems as well as arms control in the form of the five-year extension of New START and enhanced strategic stability dialogues with Russia would be a good place to start. https://www.csis.org/analysis/continuity-not-consensus-future-nuclear-posture-review Return to top

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ABOUT THE USAF CSDS The USAF Counterproliferation Center (CPC) was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University — while extending its reach far beyond — and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff’s Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON) and Air War College commandant established the initial personnel and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation. In 2008, the Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." This led to the addition of three teaching positions to the CPC in 2011 to enhance nuclear PME efforts. At the same time, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide professional continuing education (PCE) through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the CPC in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research on not just countering WMD but also nuclear operations issues. In April 2016, the nuclear PCE courses were transferred from the Air War College to the U.S. Air Force Institute for Technology. In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term “unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. In May 2018, the name changed again to the Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies (CSDS) in recognition of senior Air Force interest in focusing on this vital national security topic. The Center’s military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation — counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management. The Latin inscription "Armis Bella Venenis Geri" stands for "weapons of war involving poisons."

DISCLAIMER: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

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