Europe and the Future Combat Air System
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Europe and the Future Combat Air System © 2019 IAI edited by Alessandro Marrone and Michele Nones ISSN 2280-6164 ABSTRACT The development of the next generation of combat aircraft, to be part of a system of systems with satellites, drones and other military assets, does represent the main technological challenges for air forces and aerospace industries in Western countries. This study analyses the approach to the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) in the US as well as in France, Germany, UK, Italy and Sweden, from the military, industrial and political points of view. Two competing initiatives are unfolding in Europe: a Franco-German project and the Tempest programme led by the UK. Such a competition creates a strategic choice for Italy, since Rome has to decide which next generation combat aircraft develop, from now on, to succeed the Eurofigther in service until the 2040s – while continuing the F-35 procurement and use. The study analyses the pros and cons of both initiatives, and recommends Rome to negotiate with London the joint development of a European FCAS, despite Brexit. A cooperation which should in the mid- term merge with the Franco-German project for the benefit of European defence and strategic autonomy. European defence | Brexit | Military industry | Aviation | USA | UK | France | keywords Germany | Italy | Sweden DOCUMENTI IAI 19 | 02 - MARCH 2019 DOCUMENTI IAI 19 | 02 - MARCH Europe and the Future Combat Air System Table of contents Executive summary p. 3 1. The global context, by Andrea Aversano Stabile and Livia Botti 13 1.1 A worldwide pathway towards next generation aircraft 13 1.2 China 15 1.2 India 17 1.4 Japan 19 © 2019 IAI 1.5 Russia 21 1.6 South Korea 23 1.7 Turkey 25 2. The United States, by James Hasik 28 2.1 The military rationale 28 2.2 The industrial rationale 34 2.3 The political rationale 36 Conclusion 39 ISSN 2280-6164 3. The United Kingdom, by Douglas Barrie and Bastian Giegerich 41 3.1 The political rationale 41 3.2 The military rationale 45 3.3 The industrial rationale 49 Conclusion 52 4. France, by Jean-Pierre Maulny 54 4.1 The military rationale 54 4.2 The industrial rationale 59 4.3 The political rationale 61 5. Germany, by Christian Mölling 66 5.1 The military rationale 66 5.2 The industrial rationale: opportunities and competition 70 5.3 The political rationale 72 6. Italy, by Andrea Aversano Stabile and Alessandro Marrone 78 6.1 The military rationale 78 6.2 The industrial rationale 81 6.3 The political rationale 83 7. Sweden, by Per Olsson 89 7.1 The military rationale 90 7.2 The industrial rationale 92 7.3 The political rationale 93 8. Europe, the FCAS and Italy’s strategic choice, by Alessandro Marrone and 95 Paola Sartori 8.1 Towards two European FCASs in Europe 95 8.2 A strategic choice for Italy 98 8.3 Negotiating an FCAS deal with the UK 107 DOCUMENTI IAI 19 | 02 - MARCH 2019 DOCUMENTI IAI 19 | 02 - MARCH List of interviewees 112 List of acronyms 113 2 Europe and the Future Combat Air System Europe and the Future Combat Air System edited by Alessandro Marrone and Michele Nones* Executive summary The global context © 2019 IAI The evolution of the international security environment and the features of defence procurement require Western countries to plan well in advance for the future of their air power – including the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), which is to be used by air force and navy-aviation forces in the medium to long term. The FCAS is also known as the 6th-generation fighter aircraft, although it is generally understood as a “system of systems” centred around a fighter aircraft. In the field of defence procurement, a generational change may occur for several reasons. First, existing platforms may become obsolete if breakthrough technological advancements and ISSN 2280-6164 new requirements take place in key areas, such as the quest for higher speed and faster propulsion systems, electronics and net-centric capabilities, stealthness or composite materials. Second, technological improvements or upgrades (e.g. to stealthness) may, at a certain point, be no longer possible to install on existing aircraft through retrofitting campaigns, thus requiring replacement of the platform itself. Third, generational turnover is accelerated when major military powers compete to gain (or maintain) their armed forces’ strategic advantage vis-à-vis competitors with comparable assets – as is currently happening in an increasingly multi-polar international system marked by aggressive geopolitical competition. Not surprisingly, the overview of air power’s military and technological “state of the art” in six major countries outside of Europe and North America – namely, China, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea and Turkey – reveals a worldwide pathway towards new-generation aircraft. This in turn provides the inescapable background for US and European choices about the strategic advantage of their militaries in the air domain, as well as the future of their aerospace and defence industries. The United States In the US, the military rationale for recapitalising America’s combat-aviation fleets is to continue the air dominance that its armed forces have enjoyed since the mid- 1940s, particularly vis-à-vis Putin’s aggressive Russia and the upcoming Chinese * Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme and Senior Fellow in the Security Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Michele Nones is Scientific Advisor at IAI. The editors are extremely grateful to Vincenzo Camporini and Stefano Silvestri for the valuable and interesting inputs and feedbacks received through the elaboration of this report. For the useful and constructive exchange of views during the project, the editors also thank the Italian Air Force, and the following practitioners and experts interviewed on a personal basis: Gregory Alegi, Gianfranco Annunziata, Pietro Batacchi, Giuseppe Bernardis, Stefano Cont, Luigi Del Bene, Luca De Martinis, Basilio Di Martino, Francesco Langella, Carlo Magrassi, Pasquale Montegiglio, Placido Torresi, DOCUMENTI IAI 19 | 02 - MARCH 2019 DOCUMENTI IAI 19 | 02 - MARCH Leonardo Tricarico. A final thanks to Giulia Mantini, intern at IAI from January to April 2019, for her valuable support in the finalisation of the report. This study has been realised with the support of Leonardo, and it has been completed on 20 February 3 2019. Europe and the Future Combat Air System peer competitor. This challenge suggests that the next generation of aircraft meant to penetrate enemy territory will need at least as much stealth, at least in their defence-suppressive abilities, and a longer range than today’s models. Stealthness is first and foremost a matter of shaping, and secondarily of materials and coatings – and new ways of enhancing that sought-after stealthness are emerging. Whether the FCAS will be manned is an open question. The US Government and its armed forces are rather more comfortable than those of most European countries with remote and autonomous weaponry, and the US defence industry is keen to explore technological possibilities without the pilot in the cockpit. The current US Navy’s © 2019 IAI plans for the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) programme seem to favour a mix of aircraft – some manned, or optionally manned, and some unmanned. Considering Russian and Chinese investments on missile capabilities able to hit US bases in Europe or in the Pacific Rim, the prevailing response is to fly the FCAS over a greater range – possibly from the American homeland. Longer ranges may be possible with new propulsion technologies, but they imply a larger aircraft too. From a procurement and industrial point of view, the difficulty is that successive combat air systems have cost more and taken longer to develop than their ISSN 2280-6164 predecessors. At the same time, the US seeks to maintain some semblance of competition across its defence industry. The starting point is the F-35 as the only 5th-generation aircraft worldwide, and a major procurement programme for the Pentagon. At this stage, neither the US Navy nor Air Force want another joint programme, and have to prioritise resources on F-35 procurement. Since the latter has acquired a central role for American air power and the US defence industry, this will reinforce enthusiasm for follow-on versions of the type. The United Kingdom In the UK, the 2018 Combat Air Strategy provides an ambitious template to retain “operational sovereignty” over key technologies, in order to provide the nation’s air force with a capable next-generation multi-role combat aircraft and to produce an export successor to the Eurofighter. In this context, the Tempest project was unveiled at the 2018 Farnborough Air Show with the endowment of a 2 billion pound investment through to 2025 – although there are concerns about the overall financial sustainability of the planned Ministry of Defence (MoD) budget over the next few years (especially in the light of Brexit). From a military point of view, the development of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs) has generally been slower than anticipated, while the emergence of a more antagonistic Russia and the renewed risk of state-on-state war have combined to rekindle British interest in a further generation of crewed multi-role combat aircraft – beyond the Eurofighter and F-35. After two decades focused on counterinsurgency operations in environments where British and allied forces were largely unchallenged in the air domain, investments by adversaries in highly capable systems have reduced the technological advantage that Western militaries enjoy in achieving and maintaining control of the air. Accordingly, Tempest aims for a low-observable twin-engine multi-role fighter, and a central element of its notional design involves meeting the need for an air-superiority aircraft as a DOCUMENTI IAI 19 | 02 - MARCH 2019 DOCUMENTI IAI 19 | 02 - MARCH successor to the Eurofighter.